Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Kamran Gasanov
[Regnum] Ankara is seeking to turn the new trilateral agreement with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan into a viable regional security instrument, but practical support risks a direct clash with Iran and its allies.
 Good luck with that.
On September 19, Turkey perhaps for the first time attempted a decisive response to the Houthi attacks on the Saudis, but this “decisiveness” appears as limited and hesitant as the attempt to respond to Iran’s strikes on the kingdom during the spring war.
In any case, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan told NTV that the Houthi attacks pose a serious threat to Saudi Arabia's territorial integrity, sovereignty, and infrastructure. He added that the monarchy may have military needs, particularly in technical areas, and Turkey is ready to meet them under the Mecca Mutual Defense Agreement, signed last month.
There's no hint of sending troops to defend the kingdom, much less launching a joint operation against the Houthis. The "technical support" formula allows Ankara to demonstrate its allied solidarity without being directly drawn into the Yemeni war.
Most likely, this involves the supply of weapons, air defense systems, UAVs, reconnaissance, electronic warfare, training, and equipment maintenance. The specific scope of military assistance has not been made public.
TÜRKIYE IS TRYING TO FILL THE VACUUM.
The key formula of the Mecca Agreement is that an armed attack on one of the three countries – Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia – is considered an attack on all.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan previously said that the agreement's implementation could include joint defense-industrial projects and counter-terrorism operations.
However, on September 25, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, he specifically clarified that the agreement does not automatically mean that all parties will enter the war on the side of the attacked country. In an interview with Newsweek, Erdoğan stated that states will respond "based on the demands and needs of the country being attacked."
According to him, assistance could take the form of "intelligence, logistics, or ammunition support." Partners' involvement in an armed conflict is generally possible, but not mandatory.
The statement is of fundamental importance. The Turkish president effectively proposed interpreting the pact as a framework for consultation and assistance, rather than as a NATO-like system with a pre-established mechanism for collective military response. At the same time, Erdoğan emphasized that the agreement should not be viewed as an alliance against Iran, Israel, or any other country in the region.
In doing so, Ankara is attempting to achieve two objectives at once. On the one hand, it is demonstrating to Riyadh that the agreement is not an empty declaration and can provide concrete military, intelligence, and logistical support.
On the other hand, Türkiye is avoiding the obligation to automatically enter into conflict with the Houthis, who are backed by Iran, and is showing the Islamic Republic that Ankara is not trying to isolate it.
Of course, when it comes solely to the military-industrial complex, there are no problems. Selling or jointly producing weapons is a relatively risk-free undertaking. Especially since Turkey has planned to increase defense spending by 229% over the next three years.
Investments will help develop and produce fighter jets and missiles, and then sell them to the Saudis. It's quite another matter to side with an ally and wage a grueling, costly, and dangerous war.
Therefore, with all due respect to the treaty, the "Mecca Union" remains more of a political alliance than a full-fledged military one. Ankara can justify itself by arguing that the agreement does not stipulate an automatic response.
Who determines whether an attack has occurred? Are the Houthis' actions an attack or a defense? After all, Saudi Arabia itself launched a military campaign against them in 2015. Furthermore, the pact doesn't explicitly stipulate that allied countries are obligated to send troops.
Even in the more formalized military alliance NATO, where the notorious Article 5 formula of "attack me, attack us all" exists, each country independently decides whether to use force. Incidentally, unlike the North Atlantic Alliance, the "Sunni alliance" lacks a unified headquarters, a planning system, or extensive experience in joint military exercises.
Judging by Fidan's statements, Türkiye is currently proposing to use consultation mechanisms. This is roughly what the European Union, whose military powers are also very limited, typically does.
That is, before the organizations of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey grow into a full-fledged military bloc, it would be good to establish political coordination and ongoing consultations in the defense sphere.
The three countries' foreign ministers took a step in this direction only now: on September 25, they agreed to intensify defense contacts in connection with the events in Yemen.
WHY DOES ANKARA NEED SAUDI ARABIA?
Despite the limited nature of the measures, Turkey cannot afford to take any at all. Firstly, due to the need to maintain the authority of the "Mecca Pact" and secondly, given Saudi Arabia's growing importance to Erdoğan.
The Kingdom is one of the most influential players in the Middle East, a leading oil producer and an important economic partner of Turkey.
After a period of tension between Ankara and Riyadh over Libya, the two sides have gradually restored relations and are expanding trade, investment, and defense contracts. Amid the ongoing lira crisis, the kingdom may continue to be a source of wealth for Erdoğan.
If the Saudis fail to protect their refineries and the East-West oil pipeline from Iran and its proxies in Iraq and Yemen, the country will plunge into crisis.
Until that happens, Türkiye is interested in supporting its ally's defense capability by supplying UAVs, surveillance systems, missiles, and electronic warfare systems.
The countries are discussing a defense deal worth approximately $6 billion, which includes the delivery of warships, Altay tanks, air defense systems, and Riyadh's possible participation in the development of the Turkish next-generation KAAN fighter jet.
WHY ISN'T TÜRKIYE SENDING TROOPS?
Readiness to help Riyadh does not mean that Ankara wants, is ready, and intends to engage in direct war with the Houthis.
After all, participating in military operations in Yemen could lead to a clash with Tehran-backed forces and complicate relations with the latter. In the most extreme scenario, Türkiye risks entering into war with Iran.
Even if the operations are limited to Yemen, Ankara will incur significant costs. The Houthis will have carte blanche to block Turkish vessels transiting the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
Iran may also join the blockade of Turkey by preventing its commercial ships from entering the Strait of Hormuz.
Another war could also have a negative impact on the ratings of the ruling Justice and Development Party and Erdogan personally, with parliamentary and presidential elections just around the corner.
For the weakened and divided opposition and the Republican People's Party, from which Ankara Mayor Mansur Yavaş, following the departure of its leader Özgür Özel, the operation in Yemen would be a convenient tool for raising support among the population.
PAKISTAN CREATES CONTRAST
Against the backdrop of loud Turkish rhetoric, Pakistan's position appears even more cautious.
Islamabad initially stated that the agreement could be implemented in the event of aggression against Saudi Arabia. However, following the Houthi attacks, the Pakistani Foreign Ministry clarified that a military response was not discussed under the agreement.
Islamabad needs to simultaneously maintain its special relationship with Riyadh and avoid becoming embroiled in a standoff with Iran, with which it shares a long border. Pakistan, despite possessing nuclear weapons, has no interest in complicating relations with its neighbor. After all, it faces enough threats already, including terrorist organizations in Balochistan and unresolved territorial disputes with the larger India.
Overall, both Türkiye and Pakistan are demonstrating in every way that the "Meccan Union" is not directed against anyone, and least of all, it is not directed against Iran.
The alliance's long-term goal is to create a new collective security system to replace the discredited American one. Iran may be a competitor to both Turkey and Pakistan, but it poses no direct threat to them.
The main threat to Turkey is Israel, and to Pakistan, India. This explains the talk of Iran possibly joining the pact.
Thus, Turkey's recent statements and joint consultations with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia at the General Assembly demonstrate that Ankara is keen to ensure that the alliance is not taken lightly.
The issue of prestige in the East is always particularly sensitive. Given the high risk of being drawn into the Yemen war, Ankara would prefer to find a regional equivalent of the "Istanbul format" rather than join the anti-Iranian campaign of its main rival, Israel.
It is no coincidence that rumors are already circulating on social media that the Turks are offering the Saudis a deal with the Houthis.
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