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2026-11-17 International-UN-NGOs
Pirates, nepotism, and fraud. Europeans even quarrel over Somalia
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Leonid Tsukanov

[Regnum] The Federal Republic of Somalia has once again found itself in the spotlight of the global community. Not only because of the renewed activity of pirates, but also because of the ongoing redistribution of power in the security sector. Western "benefactors" are eagerly pursuing this, competing for a share of the sector's generous funding.

At the end of October 2026, the mandate of the United Nations Transition Mission in Somalia (UNTMIS) expired, which should have opened the door for increased military influence by other interested players – especially Europeans seeking to increase their influence in Africa.

In practice, however, the new opportunities quickly turned into a source of intense debate.

ARE THE DEFENDERS LEAVING?
UN forces have continuously ensured the stability of Somalia's state institutions for over 30 years (since 1993) and over time have come to be perceived as an integral part of the local governance system.

However, as time passed, UN officials began to feel burdened by their permanent presence in the Horn of Africa. Meanwhile, local leaders unanimously declared their readiness to assume full power and ensure the continued implementation of democratic reforms.

The UN had doubts until the very end, but by mid-2026 they finally decided not to renew the mandate.

Of course, the withdrawal of the "helmets" hasn't created a security vacuum in Somalia: army and national police units still have some support. Specifically, the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) remains deployed in the country, numbering approximately 12,000 troops.

Unlike UNTMIS, which focused on building Somalia's security apparatus from a safe distance, AUSSOM addresses the country's national security issues on the ground.

The mission's troops ensure the security of key cities and ports and participate in operations against terrorist gangs in the periphery. However, its mandate also expires in December 2026, posing the risk of a sharp weakening of Somalia's security apparatus.

The Africans themselves, incidentally, are not averse to staying longer. Back in July 2026, at the African Union summit in Kampala, Uganda, the mission's participants agreed to extend the mandate for another eighteen months to two years, to thoroughly train local law enforcement agencies and, through joint efforts, to destroy the remaining major terrorist and pirate bases.

Provided that the scope of AUSSOM's tasks will gradually narrow and the number of deployed contingents will decrease.

TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE SITUATION
The US opposes the Kampala AUSSOM model.

Washington has repeatedly stated that it will not support a mission that relies simultaneously on the resources of UN support missions, for which Washington pays separately out of its own pocket, providing at least a quarter of the total budget, and on the infrastructure of the US Africa Command, which is also maintained by Americans.

Washington is thus forced to allocate double funding for the same purposes. The Donald Trump administration is also unhappy with the two-year "transition period": Republicans believe that the favorable conditions will further weaken Mogadishu and negatively impact the pace of reform.

If the White House takes a dim view, AUSSOM's implementation will be seriously complicated. There's also a high probability that certain politicians will be reluctant to antagonize Trump and will prefer to quietly withdraw their forces from Somalia. This, too, will not enhance the stability of the local security system.

Compared to the United States, Europeans show surprising flexibility.

Brussels has already announced plans to extend the European Union Capacity Building Mission to Somalia (EUCAP), which has been in place since 2012, until at least February 2027.

Similarly, the mandate of the Counter-Piracy Mission (NAVFOR ATALANTA) was extended and its funding increased, as local maritime gang activity has been at an all-time high in recent months, disrupting civilian shipping.

European officials seized the opportunity to mock the US's shortsightedness (though they didn't dare name names).
They were already rude. Naming names would have invited equally open retaliation.
In an official press release, the European External Action Service noted that Brussels will not abandon its partners, especially at a time when they are close to confidently transitioning to the "path to democratization."

AN UNEXPECTED OBSTACLE
However, Europe's ambitions in the Horn of Africa suddenly collided with European bureaucracy.

The selection of a consortium led by the Swedish private military company Vesper Group as the new contractor sparked protests from other EUCAP contractors and led to several appeals being filed with the European External Action Service.

Private investors from all over Europe are scouring the winning tender for signs of nepotism and fraud (in 2014, Vesper Group's management was already embroiled in a scandal involving illegal arms sales, which should have scared off European bureaucrats).

They also point to clearly dishonest proposals, such as the consortium's anti-UAV training teams, which, in their opinion, only exist on paper.

The competitors' desire to challenge Vesper Group's contract is understandable: among European security contracts, the Somali program is considered the most profitable.

Average annual expenditures in this area typically exceed those of other missions by 1.5 to 2 times, amounting to at least €8 million. Only the Ukrainian mission (EUAM) costs more, with a portfolio estimated at €10-12 million.

Therefore, the struggle for the right to “teach Somalis democracy” and ensure their security has become more than serious.

Meanwhile, Brussels finds itself in a difficult position: the obligations of the current EUCAP contract executors expire in the second half of November, and regulations prohibit approving Vesper Group without considering appeals from other tender participants.

Therefore, the mission urgently needs to resolve the main disputes – preferably without transferring them to the EU Court of Justice in Luxembourg, where hearings could drag on for several months.

Otherwise, there will simply be no one to teach Somali partners European security experience.
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Posted by badanov 2026-11-17 00:00|| E-Mail|| Front Page|| ||Comments [56 views ]  Top
 File under: Pirates 

1 So the Somali government, such as it is, has had 30 years to get their act together and they still haven't? Isn't that kinda like a lost cause?
Posted by Abu Uluque 2026-11-17 11:08||   2026-11-17 11:08|| Front Page || Comments   Top

11:55 Skidmark
11:42 Skidmark
11:40 Abu Uluque
11:35 Frank G
11:35 Abu Uluque
11:34 Frank G
11:31 Skidmark
11:31 Frank G
11:29 Frank G
11:25 Abu Uluque
11:24 Skidmark
11:20 Grom the Reflective
11:19 Skidmark
11:10 Skidmark
11:08 Abu Uluque
11:02 Skidmark
10:58 Abu Uluque
10:53 Skidmark
10:46 Skidmark
10:43 Skidmark
10:19 Dopey Photch2701
09:38 DarthVader
09:14 SteveS
08:27 Bobby
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