|
2026-11-07 Europe
|
|
'People with Flashlights': Tusk caused chaos in Poland and blamed Russia for it
|
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Kristina Ismagilova
[Regnum] The long-running conflict between Polish President Karol Nawrocki and the government of the republic eventually led to a high-profile crisis surrounding the Constitutional Tribunal, which one side controlled for many years while the other refused to recognize.
Prime Minister Donald Tusk's attempt to seize government control of the tribunal was declared by opponents to be an attempted coup and caused chaos in the country.
Now—immediately following his failed "coup" and the debacle at the National Security Council meeting—Tusk has turned his attention to suspicious "men with flashlights" on the Russian border. This, naturally, has prompted calls for a mobilization of forces to prevent possible provocations.
However, the border service clarified that several people with flashlights were on the Russian side, and no one attempted to cross the border. Tusk himself later also admitted that it was impossible to determine their intentions. This was forced to be acknowledged after criticism on social media: he was accused of knowing about such "threats" and then destabilizing the situation in the country.
At the same government meeting, Tusk linked the escalation around the Constitutional Tribunal to Russia's activities and an "army of Russian bots," mentioned "pro-Russian politicians," and placed some responsibility for the escalation on the opposition and the president.
The structure is convenient, albeit hackneyed: the debate over the government's powers moves into the realm of national security, where the opponent is no longer required to prove his case, but to confirm his trustworthiness.
However, the events of recent days demonstrate the limits of this tactic. Against the backdrop of the National Security Council meeting and regional protests, the ground beneath the prime minister is truly heating up.
Not because the cabinet is already doomed, but because Tusk must simultaneously prove the legitimacy of his actions, maintain the political initiative, and retreat where continuing the conflict threatens consequences that cannot be explained by “Russian bots.”
ADVICE WITHOUT RECONCILIATION
The National Security Council meeting on November 3rd ended neither with Tusk's capitulation nor with reconciliation between the two centers of power. During the public session, President Nawrocki held Tusk personally responsible for the events of October 30th, accusing the government of an illegal attempt to replace the leadership of the Constitutional Tribunal under police cover.
The President demanded an end to actions he considers illegal, citing the approaching Independence Day on November 11, even before the holiday week begins.
In other words, there's no talk yet of a constitutional mechanism for removing the prime minister. Instead, measures are being used to formally force him to either yield or demonstratively ignore the head of state's demands.
Tusk, for his part, did not abandon his commitment to recognizing the judges elected by the Sejm (parliament) and the need to ensure their employment. Therefore, there is no basis for claiming that he abandoned the Constitutional Tribunal at the Security Council. The prime minister retreated on another point: after an open confrontation, he proposed changing the format and moving to a personal discussion.
A closed conversation is, in itself, a valid political tool. It would be odd to demand that the president and prime minister resolve all their differences exclusively in front of cameras. The question is: what exactly is being proposed for agreement and what will remain unchanged after the meeting.
Tusk has several potential objectives here. The first is to reduce the risk of further clashes around the tribunal. The second is to prevent Nawrocki from establishing himself as the sole politician offering a solution. The third is to move the dispute from the public sphere, where every police action becomes a separate accusation, to negotiations whose content can be explained independently by the parties.
The offer to talk, therefore, cannot be automatically considered either capitulation or a sign of goodwill. It simply changes the prime minister's position: the president's refusal can be portrayed as an unwillingness to reduce tensions, while acceptance can be seen as an acknowledgement of the need to discuss the situation with the government. It follows that Tusk will have an additional argument even before the meeting begins.
In right-wing circles close to President Nawrocki, warnings have emerged that Tusk could repeat the tactics he used during his conflict with the late Polish leader Lech Kaczynski : behind closed doors, there might be goodwill and a search for common ground, but after appearing before journalists, a return to a harsh public attack.
For Navrotsky, the main risk is failing to win over his interlocutor, after which he might agree to ease the pressure. Then the government will gain time by continuing to act in the tribunal, and the president will have to explain to his own supporters exactly what was achieved.
But the opposite risk also exists. If Nawrocki rejects any discussion, Tusk will have the opportunity to portray him as someone who seeks conflict more than a solution. Therefore, the most rational option for the president is not to boycott the meeting, but to separate personal contact from political concessions.
Tusk seems to be already making advances to the presidential palace: he recently signed a countersignature to the appointment of new members of the board of the National Bank of Poland, passing off his capitulation as "statesmanship for the sake of the stability of the zloty."
The prime minister had been refusing to do so since May, when he returned the appointment documents for four board members to Nawrocki's office. In October, the president resubmitted them. And now, more than six months later, as the term of National Bank Vice President Adam Lipiński expired , Tusk capitulated.
While those at the top are discussing reducing tensions, below the opposition is expanding the geography of the confrontation.
On November 4, several hundred people gathered in Rzeszów in front of the Podkarpackie Voivodeship Office in support of Nawrocki. Among the participants were members of parliament and regional representatives of the Law and Justice party. In Opole, opponents of the government's actions held a rally on November 3. Further rallies were announced in Olsztyn and Lublin.
Calling this a regional uprising would be an exaggeration, but Tusk is uncomfortable with something else. Local organizers, venues, and new regular participants are being drawn into what could have been another showdown between Warsaw politicians.
To maintain the conflict, the opposition no longer needs to gather everyone in front of one building in the capital every time.
WHAT WILL HAPPEN NEXT?
The attempted "blitzkrieg" at the Constitutional Tribunal fizzled, and the retreat over the National Bank confirmed that the government cannot continue to mount an open institutional battering ram indefinitely—the state machine risks collapsing.
At the same time, the active mobilization of the opposition, especially outside the capital, literally ruins the prime minister's scenario for a quick victory. Now, any attempt at forceful pressure will mobilize not only the capital's deputies, but also all voters of right-wing parties from Podkarpackie to Opole.
A personal meeting between Tusk and Nawrocki will most likely take place, but will only result in a ceasefire without any real compromise.
The Prime Minister desperately needs to calm the tension by November 11th, so that the traditional Independence March in Warsaw doesn't turn into a half-million-strong rally calling for the immediate resignation of his cabinet.
But once the holiday week is over, the conflict could flare up again. And perhaps the most dangerous thing about this situation is that it cannot be resolved within the existing framework: the wheels of government in Poland are too obviously turning in opposite directions.
The country is gradually entering a protracted state of institutional paralysis, from which there are only two practical exits: either a complete collapse of the constitutional system through emergency measures, or an early reboot of the Sejm, when voters will have to decide whose baton is more legitimate.
# id) ?>
|
Posted by badanov 2026-11-07 00:00||
E-Mail||
Front Page|| ||Comments
[17 views ]
Top
|
|
07:59 ed in texas
07:58 Skidmark
07:56 Skidmark
07:51 Skidmark
07:46 Skidmark
07:44 Skidmark
07:38 Skidmark
07:32 Skidmark
07:30 Skidmark
07:28 Skidmark
07:19 Skidmark
07:11 Skidmark
07:07 Skidmark
07:02 Skidmark
06:57 Skidmark
06:52 Skidmark
06:50 Grart Phuns3954
06:48 Skidmark
06:46 Skidmark
06:42 Skidmark
06:35 Besoeker
06:35 Skidmark
06:29 Besoeker
06:26 Skidmark
Merry-Go-Blog
|
