Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Leonid Tsukanov
Recently, the situation in Yemen has been the focus of attention in the Middle East. The stakes in the growing conflict are so high that even Syria's transitional leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, has promised to help pacify the troubled republic.
At the same time, the situation in Syria itself is still far from allowing Damascus to project influence outward.
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Syrian representatives visited Riyadh during the emergency meeting of the Mecca Pact (while not being part of the alliance), and the country's interim leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, received an audience with Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, although the content of their lengthy conversation was not disclosed.
The day after the meeting, Reuters, citing unnamed Saudi courtiers, reported that Riyadh had requested Damascus's help in containing the Houthis, positioning this, among other things, as a kind of test before fully joining the "Mecca Pact."
The Syrians apparently found the offer tempting. Al-Sharaa had previously attempted to single-handedly suppress Lebanon's Hezbollah in a similar manner. Now, the country had a chance to demonstrate its strategic value to three major powers at once.
According to Axios, Damascus is considering sending 10,000 to 20,000 troops to Yemen to fight the Houthis. However, the exact format of this deployment remains unclear.
Getting involved in a regional war without properly addressing domestic political issues would be highly reckless for the new Syrian elites, especially given that Damascus's entry into the campaign could anger the Houthi-friendly Hezbollah and lead to the opening of yet another front.
The al-Sharaa cabinet denies Western newspaper reports, but generally does not deny that it is ready to “help in one way or another” its partners, but without sending a contingent directly to Yemen.
At the same time, Syria is unlikely to be able to join the campaign under the pretext of protecting the skies: the lack of air defense and missile defense systems does not allow it to completely close even its own territory, let alone its partners.
The situation is getting tense
Interestingly, despite al-Shara'a's intentions to project power outward, the situation within Syria itself still leaves much to be desired. Despite the transitional government's noticeable strengthening in the capital and surrounding areas, the periphery remains unstable.
The number of unidentified terrorist attacks has increased significantly compared to the summer of 2026. For example, on September 30, unidentified gunmen opened fire on a civilian bus carrying workers from a trade and industrial company in Homs.
The incident left seven people dead and four others injured. Meanwhile, unknown groups of attackers have begun a systematic hunt for local minorities—at least seven attacks on Druze, Kurdish, and Alawite homes have been recorded. These attacks were carried out in various ways, but invariably with particular brutality.
Damascus is in disarray. No local force (including the terrorist underground) has claimed responsibility for the attacks, so local security officials are searching almost blindly for the culprits—sometimes among Hezbollah supporters, sometimes among former terrorists and ordinary bandits.
This is causing irritation on the periphery – rumors are increasingly circulating about attempts to cover up for Damascus loyalists, which is not adding to the popularity of al-Sharaa’s cabinet.
However, the biggest incident in recent weeks was a sudden explosion at a gas pipeline in the northeast of the country, between Al-Shola and Deir ez-Zor. The fire caused significant damage to the complex, forcing it to temporarily close.
As a result, the Tishreen hydroelectric power station and several other power plants (including Deir Ali and Nasiriyah) were effectively shut down. Power outages began in the northeast.
And along with them, local protests. Moreover, not long before this, the Syrian Ministry of Energy had revised tariffs upward several times in an attempt to curb rising energy costs.
Damascus recently reached an agreement with Baghdad to ensure safe overland shipments of Iraqi oil, bypassing the blocked Strait of Hormuz, so the Syrians should be on guard. It's possible that unknown attackers will try to strike in this direction as well.
Take advantage of the situation
Incidentally, the turbulent situation in Syria and beyond has proven to be very beneficial for Israel.
Taking advantage of the shift in attention of most regional players to Yemen, IDF forces have increased their offensive in Syria and expanded their zone of control in the Golan Heights.
According to the Syrian Ministry of Defense, Israeli forces made about a hundred local breakthroughs during September, about half of which were on the border of the buffer zone.
Advance detachments of the Jewish state were detected in Quneitra, western Daraa, and even in the Beit Jinn area west of Damascus. The number of strongholds established by the IDF in Syrian territory increased to 11.
In addition, Israeli forces have stepped up their filtration of the local population: over the past week, they arrested at least three people, accusing them of attempting to infiltrate military installations and carrying out subversive activities on behalf of Damascus, and also conducted house searches in the western towns of Daraa and Quneitra.
In response to the Syrian authorities' objections and demands to stop taking arbitrary action and cease violating the 1974 Separation of Forces Agreement, the contingent's command responded with a series of artillery shelling of the southern regions.
Overall, Damascus finds itself in a paradoxical situation: unable to respond to internal challenges, the country is increasingly seeking to help its powerful neighbors.
It's quite possible there's a subtle calculation behind this—any service rendered can be demanded in return. And Damascus has a list of such requests prepared in advance.
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