Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Leonid Tsukanov
[Regnum] In Ethiopia, leaders of the rebel Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and allied groups have declared war on the federal government and seized several strategic infrastructure facilities in Tigray state and surrounding provinces.
Although Ethiopian federal forces were subsequently able to recapture some of the opposition's gains, they have yet to fully stabilize the situation. Against this backdrop, Addis Ababa is seeking instigators of the conflict not only within the country but also abroad.
DEFROSTING THE OLD CRISIS
Over the past few months, tensions have gradually escalated between Addis Ababa and the armed opposition leadership. Both sides have repeatedly accused each other of violating the 2022 Pretoria Agreement, which ended the two-year conflict between the center and the autonomous region.
In May 2025, the TPLF made a public demarche and restored the previously dissolved regional administration, appointing the movement's chairman, Debretsion Gebremichael, as the local president. This created a public counterweight to the Interim Regional Authority, governed from Addis Ababa.
In the particularly volatile regions of Ahmar and Tigray, limited clashes and skirmishes have become more frequent, and in August, a group of TPLF militants attempted to break through into Sudanese territory, but were stopped by armed forces.
Despite this, the Ethiopian government insisted that the situation remained under control.
Nevertheless, in reality, the conflict was approaching another acute phase. One of the most obvious signs was the unification of seven major rebel groups into a military-political coalition on September 21.
It was called the "Ethiopian People's Alliance for Survival" and included the "Tigray People's Liberation Front" (TPLF) and the "Amhara Fano National Movement", which had previously fought among themselves.
In addition to them, the alliance included groups from Oromia, Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz and the Somali region, which made it possible to create a basis for an offensive along a broad front line against government forces.
The Alliance members declared the strategic goal of cooperation to be the removal of the government of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, whom they accuse of attempting to “erase the identity of the peoples of Ethiopia,” and the creation of a transitional administration.
Addis Ababa viewed these statements as a deliberate escalation—previous similar alliances had been formed by opponents shortly before the start of major campaigns—and began gradually concentrating additional forces near the rebel areas.
The Alliance managed to act preemptively. On September 23, armed opposition units, under the pretext of a "defensive war," launched a large-scale offensive in Tigray and quickly took control of Mekelle Airport, the region's key air hub.
Later, the rebels also captured the Shire and Axum airports and several major road junctions, completely cutting off Tigray's communications with the rest of the country. The rebels launched an offensive against government positions in the neighboring Afar and Amhara regions, successfully driving federal forces out of some settlements.
SHORT-LIVED DOMINANCE
The military alliance in Tigray gave the TPLF a temporary opportunity to seize the initiative, creating pressure on several front lines and forcing the Ethiopian federal forces to spread their forces over long distances.
For the first few days, Alliance flying squads wedged themselves into the gaps between government forces and quite effectively attacked their flanks, as well as cutting off important communications.
During one of the raids, the rebels even managed to destroy the field headquarters of the Ethiopian National Defense Forces and capture two senior commanders from the 61st Division of the 803rd Corps.
However, the Alliance began to be gradually torn apart by internal contradictions, which the Tigray opposition agreed to temporarily forget until the overthrow of Ahmed's government.
In particular, the "Gumuz People's Democratic Movement," which was allegedly intended to attack federal positions from the north and west, declared no grievances against Addis Ababa that would necessitate the creation of an armed wing. Elders, however, called reports of joining the "Alliance" "incitement to a major war" and promised to find those who spread this "rumor."
The situation is even more interesting for the Ogaden National Liberation Front, which has effectively split in two: some of its factions have declared their allegiance to Addis Ababa and have sent supporters to help the TPLF, while others have declared their loyalty to Addis Ababa and will remain neutral in this war.
The remaining groups, one after another, began to appeal to the TPLF with appeals and complaints, demanding that numerous territorial, ideological, and financial disputes between the factions be resolved “on the shore.”
This significantly slowed the advance on the capital and gave federal forces the opportunity to regroup. By September 27, government troops had already launched an offensive, driving the rebels out of several major cities and forcing them to retreat in the Sama, Sekota, and Alamata regions. Over the next few days, the Alliance lost almost a third of the territory gained in the initial stages of the campaign. And in early October, federal forces recaptured Mekele, the capital of the Tigray region, forcing the rebels to retreat northwest.
However, the TPLF leaders have no intention of engaging in global cooperation. Moreover, they are seeking sophisticated ways to remind the central authorities that their reach is long. On October 1, Tigray opposition supporters launched several suicide drones toward the capital, attempting to strike local military and industrial facilities.
SEARCH FOR SPONSORS
Ethiopia's central authorities are convinced that Tigray erupted with the help of outside interests. Addis Ababa has placed the primary blame on Eritrea, with which relations have teetered on the brink of open conflict for many years.
Already on the second day after the fighting began, Ethiopian Army Chief of Staff Birhanu Jula stated that Eritrea was financing and supporting the armed alliance that had formed in Tigray and was inciting it against Addis Ababa in order to curb Ethiopia's development.
Afar Governor Awol Arba went even further. He accused the Eritrean armed forces of invading the region and claimed they were trying to cut the road connecting Djibouti and Ethiopia.
Although there is no official confirmation yet of the participation of Eritrean special forces in fighting on the rebel side, harsh measures were taken against their neighbor in advance. In early October, Ethiopia closed its embassy in Asmara and expelled ten Eritrean diplomats. Eritrea responded by announcing the severance of diplomatic relations.
However, Eritrea is not the only country on Ethiopia's list of potential enemies. Sudan has also received its share of accusations. Specifically, the Prime Minister's Office claims that Sudan provided a space for contacts and coordination between Addis Ababa's opponents, and that several meetings of the leaders of the new "Alliance" took place in Port Sudan several weeks before the fighting began.
Here, Ethiopia makes the reservation that Sudan could hardly be the main sponsor of the opposition in Tigray, including because it is forced to spend a significant portion of its resources on containing its own civil war.
Finally, Ethiopia considers Egypt an indirect stakeholder. For Cairo, the potential destabilization of Addis Ababa represents a chance to disrupt the commissioning of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, a megaproject that threatens to alter the course of the Nile and, consequently, deplete the Arab Republic's agricultural land.
However, Addis Ababa believes that, despite the “machinations of its neighbors,” it is still capable of winning the war in Tigray in a short time.
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