Article

2026-10-03 Caribbean-Latin America

Poverty, corruption, and riots. American 'order' has arrived in Venezuela

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Olga Kuznetsova

[Regnum] In the last days of September, protests have been roaring across Venezuela, "liberated" by the Americans, in almost every form and shape: trade unions are bringing people out onto the streets, members of committees for the defense of political prisoners have raised their heads, and new associations, led by previously unknown activists, are spontaneously springing up in the provinces.

Demonstrations took place in Caracas, the traditionally problematic Zulia, Bolívar, Monagas, Lara, Yaracué, Aragua, Anzoátegui, Carabobo and Trujillo.

Some publications indicate that the total number of protests has reached almost 4,200 incidents, however, given the sympathy with which many Spanish-language media refer to every clash with law enforcement as a "political protest," assessing such figures requires an understanding of the regional context.

SORE SPOT
The main grievances of protesters in the capital and the provinces diverge, completely in line with the poles of Maslow's pyramid: the former actively talk about political rights, while the latter demand a solution to the issue of power outages, which have reached catastrophic proportions in recent months.

The government of Delcy Rodriguez, in an attempt to explain the situation, for some time referred to abnormally hot weather, and later to the June earthquake, but these arguments are received with open aggression.

Firstly, power outages in some areas have been ongoing for years. This is due to the deterioration of critical infrastructure, which has been neglected due to US sanctions.

Secondly, because of the electricity rationing system, which requires provinces to survive on rolling blackouts, while the capital is supplied on a priority basis.

Further nuances of popular anger are revealed by other details: in reality, power outages are occurring unscheduled, including during business hours, for up to 17 hours a day. For Venezuela's small businesses, which have only just begun to recover in recent years, this has been a blow.

Furthermore, the disruptions are related to the work of oil companies, which enjoy priority in energy supply. Amid President Donald Trump's upbeat pronouncements, foreign companies have increased oil production.

It's not significant: the final figures are still not far off the million barrels per day achieved under Nicolás Maduro. Nevertheless, this has increased pressure on an already overstretched power grid and driven energy demand to a nine-year high.

Exactly what the kidnapped Maduro had warned about happened: capitalists began to drain the Bolivarian Republic of all its resources. The pro-Western opposition's promises that ordinary Venezuelans would receive not only money but also a standard of living comparable to the UAE never materialized.

For many, this was a real blow, but some people saw certain political prospects here.

"EVERYTHING IS FINE IN VENEZUELA"
In one of his last addresses, the American president stated that “everything is fine in Venezuela” and that the US authorities are “helping people become rich again.”

Meanwhile, minimum wages for ordinary workers—including those in the mining sector—have remained unchanged since the government's change of course, and when converted into dollars, they cause panic.

At the same time, the arrest and extradition of Maduro's closest supporter, former Industry Minister Alex Saab, triggered the suspension of many social programs (for example, free and low-cost pharmacies) and the end of the previous course of "capitalism with a human face," depriving the poor of additional state support.

Contrary to expectations, the doors of local prisons have also not opened, and many "anti-regime fighters" remain behind bars. Prisons in Latin America are not a bed of roses; even food supplies are a problem for prisoners themselves or their families.

This strengthens prison gangs and criminal organizations, which recruit new members by providing them with food and medicine. One of the first to break this system was El Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele, who transferred the food supply function to prison authorities. However, similar reforms are still unknown in the new Venezuela.

But we hear about new arrests and mysterious deaths. For example, on September 27, the former director of a correctional center, who herself ended up behind bars in Miranda state, died.

There are reports on social media that she died from intestinal obstruction and lack of timely medical care. The situation is further fueled by the fact that the deceased allegedly possessed evidence of corruption in both the old and new Venezuelan law enforcement systems.

The public, of course, doesn't know the truth, but given what's happening in the country, the general population is inclined to assume the worst.

THE NEW COMING OF MACHADO
Against this backdrop, one of the leaders of the Venezuelan opposition, María Corina Machado, decided to come to the country, but her attempt (according to some estimates, the seventh over the past year) was unsuccessful.

Dutch authorities reportedly blocked her flight to Venezuela via Curaçao, fearing to jeopardize relations with the United States. The enterprising woman attempted to transfer from the plane to a boat, but was unsuccessful there as well.

Machado did not lose her composure and sent her press secretary, Claudia Macero, in her place, who tried to lead the protests in Caracas and demanded that the Rodriguez government hold new presidential elections.

However, by the time Macero arrived in the capital, most of the protests there had already died down. Nevertheless, her arrival helped coordinate the technologists organizing protests on Machado's behalf and launch operations in the regions.

In Zulia, supporters of the fugitive opposition leader began blocking highways, and in Carabobo and Apure, they clashed with military personnel, demanding elections and higher wages. Some groups of workers declared strikes and shut down some mining companies.

During these same days, protest content production was ramped up—videos appeared on social media depicting citizens, against the backdrop of burning buildings, predicting the end of the Rodriguez regime.

At the same time, the official legal track was launched. In the capital, the opposition and representatives of the National Trade Union Coalition criticized the reform of the judicial appointment process and demanded that elections be held as early as December of this year.

It would be extremely naive to expect any of these demands to be met. It appears Machado's team is trying to secure the support of as many union leaders as possible and use them in their internal political struggle.

At the same time, the moment of actual recognition of Rodriguez by Washington is carefully ignored, and the US is not publicly criticized by the top opposition.

However, Machado's team cannot be held solely responsible for what is happening. The situation is also being fueled by those who have been responsible for maintaining order in these troubled areas for the past few years—the armed forces of the Bolivarian Republic.

CLAN DEALS
Following Maduro's kidnapping, Venezuela's regional military leadership changed its operating format. While they previously specialized in professionally circumventing US sanctions, including through cooperation with illegal groups, their current approach is different.

The forces of each strategic district have been transformed into separate PMCs, protecting the economic interests of a particular company in a specific territory.

For example, the commander of the Western Strategic Region, Javier Enrique Magallanes, oversees the operation of oil hubs and the smooth operation of Western companies' pipelines in the state of Zulia.

And Eastern Commander Denny Ferrer Sandrea oversees the loading of export tankers and their shipment across the Atlantic. Almost all of them are protégés of the power broker and Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello. And, according to pro-American media, Washington has amassed a thick cache of incriminating evidence on each of them.

Routine protection of American assets doesn't seem like a project worthy of the attention of Cabello, who controls almost the entire Orinoco oil belt. Rather, what we're looking at is a massive payout system, provided by the minister for a limited time in exchange for maintaining order in key areas.

In June, Venezuelan armed forces pompously cleared out illegal gold mines in Bolívar, along with several villages where the workers lived. The question of who now owns the remaining legal mines remains unanswered.

Now, as reported by various media outlets and blogs, military personnel are engaged in a confrontation with Colombian militaristic groups in the border area. Several days ago, one of the clashes occurred with the National Liberation Army in the state of Táchira.

Events of this kind naturally increase (at least in words) the flow of potential investment from the United States. They also heighten the overall level of public discontent, as until recently, work in the illegal mining sector was overlooked.

And the military command, by getting rid of this or that group, does not at all ensure legality, but takes over the functions of racketeering for itself.

And here, Machado's strategists have chosen the right moment to begin working on protest sentiments—over the next year, this will help increase political capital and win, if not some preferential treatment within Venezuela, then at least the right to budgets related to it. Perhaps even in Washington, where Machado has supporters, especially in the Democratic Party.

Around the same time, Interim President Rodriguez arrived in New York, where she met with Trump in person for the first time on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly.

This event did not enhance the popularity of the ruling forces in Caracas. Not only did the interim president publicly call the meeting with her boss's kidnapper "historic," but she also arrived there unlike everyone else, on the presidential jet, a business jet formally owned by the American Bank of Utah.

This demonstrated that the sanctions' stranglehold on the Venezuelan leadership had not been lifted, and transportation for the visit had clearly been paid for through shadowy assets. Therefore, news of energy agreements negotiated under such humiliating circumstances for Rodriguez was met with skepticism in her home country.

As if all of this weren't enough, Trump also brought up the possibility of a US military base in Venezuela. While this is purely hypothetical for now, the proposal itself fundamentally contradicts the constitution of the Bolivarian Republic and damages the reputation of Rodriguez, who is certainly in no position to argue with an American "partner."

Now it looks as if some of the current leadership (primarily Rodriguez) are being prepared for a major meltdown in the event of an unforeseen situation.

Machado's supporters attribute all unpopular decisions and political risks, including those clearly pushed through by the White House, to Rodriguez. She will also bear additional responsibility if the new presidential election is delayed or if she potentially wins it.

The country's protest potential is almost bottomless and will likely manifest itself within the next six months, regardless of which party rules in Washington.

At some point, both Republicans and Democrats will simply cease to be interested in a public leader of a country whose resources are controlled by relatively loyal security forces. Those forces are willing to hand over this same leader to a recent enemy at any time of day or night, in exchange for certain concessions.

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