|
2026-09-30 Africa Subsaharan
|
|
Nigeria’s Unaccounted War
|
[HumAngleMedia] Sixteen years into the war against Boko Haram and ISWAP in Nigeria, public records still do not show what the North East campaign costs, where the money goes, or which interventions produce lasting security.
by Ahmad Salkida
After 16 years of war, Nigerians still cannot find the answer to a basic question: how much does it cost to face one insurgent on the battlefield?
It is noteworthy that requests have not been made of the military to reveal information such as intelligence sources, targeting files, or troop locations. Nigerians are asking for an auditable account of what the state spends, what it buys, and what security that money delivers. However, Nigeria seems unwilling to state the annual cost of fighting Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), and unverified estimates often suggest figures above ₦700 billion a year, but those estimates are not linked to any official dataset.
No consolidated public account exists for Operation Hadin Kai, the principal counter-insurgency operation in the North East. National budgets combine salaries, weapons, aviation, intelligence, fuel, logistics, pensions, construction, and operations across the country under broad national budget lines. They do not show what goes to Borno, Adamawa, or Yobe; what supports several theatres at once; or what was budgeted but never released.
The accounting failure extends beyond combat. The government has received large numbers of people leaving insurgent-controlled territory, with some being fighters and others non-combatants like farmers, children, forced recruits, and captives. A much smaller group has passed through Operation Safe Corridor, the federal programme for screened, low-risk adults selected for deradicalisation, rehabilitation, and reintegration.
Yet the public does not have answers to questions like: what does it cost to screen, house, feed, rehabilitate, and monitor one participant? How long does each stage take? How many graduates remain safely disengaged after three years? What support do receiving communities and victims receive? And what does the state save when an eligible person leaves an armed network for good?
Nigerians argue that they are asked to analyse force and rehabilitation, or justice and peace, without the evidence needed to judge what any option costs or achieves. Without this information and data, the government cannot establish that rehabilitation is cheaper than continued combat, even if it may be, and critics cannot prove that military pressure alone offers better value or more durable security.
More at the link
# id) ?>
|
Posted by badanov 2026-09-30 00:00||
E-Mail||
Front Page|| ||Comments
[7 views ]
Top
File under: Boko Haram (ISIS)
|
|
03:11 NN2N1
03:08 NN2N1
02:40 Grom the Reflective
01:08 Frank G
00:32 Frank G
00:30 DarthVader
00:28 Skidmark
Merry-Go-Blog
|
