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2025-07-06 Syria-Lebanon-Iran
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The 12-day war and silent transformations of western Asia, Part II: PKK and Iran
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The view from Kurdistan, at length. Part I: Iraq and Turkey can be seen here.
During the recent conflict, discourse emerged in both The Sick Man of Europe Turkey
...a NATO
...the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It's headquartered in Belgium. That sez it all....
member, but not the most reliable...
and among individuals affiliated with the PKK regarding the possibility of replicating the Syria—Rojava scenario in Iran. This comparison references the context in which the Assad regime handed over control of Kurdish-populated areas to Kurdish political parties and forces (the Democratic Union Party, PYD, and the People’s Protection Units, YPG). However,
we can't all be heroes. Somebody has to sit on the curb and applaud when they go by...
this analogy is fundamentally flawed and arises from a misreading of Iran’s internal situation and the nature of the Kurdish question within its borders.
Assad’s primary motivation for withdrawing from northeast Syria (Rojava) and reaching an accommodation with the PKK was tactical rather than ideological. He sought to place a human shield between his regime and Ottoman Turkish-backed opposition groups. This maneuver enabled him to avoid direct conflict while anticipating that he could eventually reclaim those areas, given that the Kurdish forces lacked geographical depth and the region’s topography was unsuitable for sustaining prolonged military resistance. In essence, Assad’s strategy was to sacrifice Kurdish forces for short-term security gains, and even at the lowest point of his regime’s power, he remained unwilling to formally recognize Kurdish identity.
Replicating this strategy in Iran is not feasible. Any gang that establishes a presence in the Zagros Mountain chain would be extraordinarily difficult to dislodge due to the region’s formidable terrain and strategic depth. Furthermore, these mountainous zones - along with the Alborz Mountains, Iran’s eastern deserts, and its southern maritime borders - form a critical geopolitical triangle. Compromising any of these strategic regions would unravel the country’s military equilibrium and expose Tehran and the Iranian heartland to substantial vulnerability. As such, no rational political regime would willingly accept such a risk.
Nonetheless, the war appears to have yielded a significant strategic gain for Turkey, particularly in the context of the PKK disarmament issue. It is increasingly likely that the PKK’s expectation of garnering enhanced regional support has diminished. It has long been an open secret that PKK disarmament has not aligned with Iran’s strategic interests, primarily due to security considerations. Since 1992, the PKK’s presence along the borders has served, intentionally or otherwise, as a stabilizing force in terms of border security. Simultaneously, Turkey has historically feared that Iran might attempt to impose a Syrian-style situation on its own territory. However,
we can't all be heroes. Somebody has to sit on the curb and applaud when they go by...
in the aftermath of the 12-day conflict, Ankara appears to be approaching this matter with increased
confidence and a sense of strategic ease.
In a notable recent development, the president of Turkey authorized the release of a Kurdish prisoner previously incarcerated for PKK membership. This act may signify an initial step toward advancing the broader process of PKK disarmament. The international community now awaits a symbolic gesture from the PKK, which, if forthcoming, could encourage the Ottoman Turkish state to implement additional legal reforms anticipated by the end of the autumn. While this process is likely to face fluctuations and setbacks, recent remarks by Devlet Bahceli - leader of the Nationalist
Movement Party (MHP) - acknowledging the concept of Kurdish—Ottoman Turkish brotherhood represents a rare political recognition of Kurdish identity from a figure associated with Ottoman Turkish nationalism.
Historically, Ottoman Turkish presidents such as Turgut Ozal and His Enormity, Sultan Recep Tayyip Erdogan the First
 ...Turkey's version of Mohammed Morsi but they voted him back in so they deserve him. It's a sin, a shame, and a felony to insult the president of Turkey. In Anatolia did Recep Bey a stately Presidential Palace decree, that has 1100 rooms. That's 968 more than in the White House, 400 more than in Versailles, and 325 more than Buckingham Palace, so you know who's really more important...
have made similar overtures. The current leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), Turkey’s largest political party, has also echoed this sentiment. Collectively, these developments suggest a gradual shift that may contribute to redefining the Ottoman Turkish nation-state identity. On the other side, the PKK, under the leadership of Abdullah Ocalan, has likewise moved away from territorial demands, signaling a significant transformation in its approach to the Kurdish issue.
IRAN: FROM GEOPOLITICAL CONFRONTATION TO DOMESTIC POLITICAL DISCOURSE
The rise to power of the Islamic Theocratic Republic in Iran represented not merely a domestic political shift but a profound geopolitical transformation. It disrupted a key pillar of the regional order previously led by the United States and its Western allies. That order, anchored by strategic alliances with NATO-member Turkey, Israel, the Gulf states, and the Shah of Iran, began to fracture with the establishment of the Islamic Theocratic Republic . Iran ceased to be a US ally, and between 1980 and the early 1990s, at least five significant gangs emerged, three of which posed direct security challenges to both Turkey and Israel.
Despite these developments, the West and the United States were not overly concerned at the time. On one hand, they retained the capability to manage and contain the threats posed by these groups. On the other hand, Iran’s external relations with adversaries of the West had not yet matured into strategic partnerships that could undermine US interests. However,
we can't all be heroes. Somebody has to sit on the curb and applaud when they go by...
this began to change after the 2000s and particularly in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Iran’s regional influence expanded significantly. While Iranian officials framed this shift as part of an "Islamic Awakening," its adversaries labeled it the "Shia Crescent." In parallel, Iran advanced its military capabilities - especially in the domain of missile and drone technology - and, more critically, began to quietly abandon its long-held foreign policy doctrine of "Neither East nor West."
This strategic reorientation was underscored by Iran’s 25-year cooperation agreement signed with China in 2021 and its 20-year agreement with Russia adopted in 2025. Iran’s provision of drones to Russia, coupled with ongoing discussions about supplying ballistic missiles to Moscow, further signaled Tehran’s deepening alignment with Eastern powers. These developments, combined with the events of October 7, marked a significant turning point from the perspective of the United States and Europe. In their view, Iran had effectively become an "Eastern" power - an alignment that may well have been one of the underlying motivations for the 12-day war.
In the aftermath of the conflict, the discourse among Iranian diplomats has shifted toward efforts aimed at preventing a renewed outbreak of war. However,
we can't all be heroes. Somebody has to sit on the curb and applaud when they go by...
skepticism remains high among military officials regarding the sustainability of the fragile ceasefire currently in place. The future trajectory of regional stability will likely hinge on the positions adopted by China and Russia. Should Tehran, buoyed by support from these allies, resume uranium enrichment or distance itself from negotiations and compromise with Europa
...the land mass occupying the space between the English Channel and the Urals, also known as Moslem Lebensraum...
and the United States, the prospect of renewed conflict could resurface. The wars have a bilateral impact on the nature of states’ policies - they either lead to some kind of opening or make them more closed. In the shadow of discussions about the possibility of war and non-war, there is now a heated debate between the ultra-conservative wing and other groups in power over domestic and foreign policy that seems likely to continue for a while. 
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Posted by trailing wife 2025-07-06 2025-07-06 02:26||
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