Shamil Basayev | Shamil Basayev | Al-Haramein | Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia | 20050820 | ||||
Shamil Basayev | Chechnya | Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia | Chechen | Deceased | Big Shot | 20050727 | ||
Shamil Basayev | Islamic Brigade of Shaheeds | Caucasus | 20031208 | |||||
Shamil Basayev | Ingush Wahhabi Jamaat | Caucasus | 20040419 | Link | ||||
Shamil Basayev | Brigade of Suicide Fighters | Caucasus | 20030226 | |||||
Shamil Basayev | Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Cheche | Caucasus | 20030228 | |||||
Shamil Basayev | Special Purpose Islamic Regiment | Caucasus | 20030228 | |||||
Shamil Basayev | Islamic International Brigade | Caucasus | 20030228 |
Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia | |
Astrakhan resident convicted for justifying Beslan school seizure | |
2025-04-24 | |
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. [KavkazUzel] The Southern District Military Court imposed a fine on the Astrakhan resident, finding him guilty of calling for terrorist activity and extremism. The verdict for the "repeatedly convicted resident of Astrakhan" was reported on April 23 by sources connected to the security forces. According to them, the man shared the ideas of "terrorist and pro-Ukrainian nationalist groups." According to security forces, the man published posts on social networks justifying the terrorist attack in Beslan, called Shamil Basayev
On September 1, 2004, militants took 1,128 hostages in the gymnasium of School No. 1 in Beslan. The operation to free them ended on September 3, 2004. As a result of the terrorist attack, 334 people were killed, including 186 children, and another 810 people were injured. The "Caucasian Knot" has prepared a report " Terrorist attack in Beslan (September 1-3, 2004) " and a chronicle of the terrorist attack and the events that followed. The channel published a short video of the suspect's arrest. Judging by the recording, the man was detained on the street by four law enforcement officers in civilian clothes; the arrest probably took place in the fall. The sound was selectively removed from the video, so the phrases exchanged between the law enforcement officers and the detainee are impossible to make out. The Astrakhan resident's case was heard by the Southern District Military Court in Rostov-on-Don, reported the Telegram channel "From Astrakhan", which positions itself as the "Main Channel of the City and Region". The man was found guilty under two criminal articles - calls for terrorist activity (Part 2 of Article 205.2 of the Criminal Code of Russia) and calls for extremism (Part 2 of Article 280 of the Criminal Code of Russia). Although both of these articles provide for actual imprisonment, the court sentenced him to a fine of 500 thousand rubles and a ban on website administration for three years. In the card index of the Southern District Military Court, the description matches the case card of Denis Polyakov - it was received by the court in December 2024, the verdict was issued on February 4. A month later, on March 4, the court sent the writ of execution on the case to the Soviet District Department of Bailiffs of the city of Astrakhan. Related: Astrakhan: 2025-04-18 Current information on the situation on the front line on April 17 (updated) Astrakhan: 2025-03-24 Ukrainian Perspective: Invasion of Ukraine: March 23, 2025 Astrakhan: 2025-03-24 Current information on the situation on the front line on March 23 (updated) Related: Beslan: 2025-04-23 No More Terrorists: Why Russia Needs Afghanistan and the Taliban Beslan: 2025-04-23 Exorcism. Now Dostoevsky could not be afraid to report a terrorist attack Beslan: 2025-04-01 Russian Prosecutor General's Office has requested a suspension of the ban on Taliban activities Related: Shamil Basayev 04/16/2025 Former Basayev hostage involved in Moscow metro niqab conflict Shamil Basayev 03/29/2025 Glorification of Basayev's image resulted in a criminal case for a citizen of the Russian Federation and Abkhazia Shamil Basayev 03/02/2025 'Half an Hour's Respite - and Again the Attack.' How 90 'Greenhorns' Turned the Tide of the 2nd Chechen War | |
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Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia |
Former Basayev hostage involved in Moscow metro niqab conflict |
2025-04-16 |
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. [KavkazUzel] Former photojournalist Natalia Medvedeva, who was among the voluntary hostages of Basayev's detachment after the seizure of the hospital in Budyonnovsk, was arrested for seven days after a conflict with a Moscow metro passenger wearing a niqab. A group of militants led by Shamil Basayev seized the central hospital of Budyonnovsk on June 14, 1995. As a result of the terrorist attack, 129 people died. After negotiations on June 19, 1995, the terrorists released the remaining people, and the authorities agreed to stop military actions in Chechnya, allowing the militants to leave. The "Caucasian Knot" published a reference material "Terrorist attack in Budyonnovsk". 61-year-old Moscow resident Natalya Medvedeva, a former photojournalist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta and Ogonyok magazine, received seven days of administrative arrest after a conflict with a metro passenger wearing a niqab. The conflict began because Medvedeva considered the woman in a Muslim headdress "suspicious." She later explained that "after the terrorist attack she experienced, people in Muslim clothing in public places frighten her," Lenta.Ru writes. The video of the incident in the capital's metro was published by the Telegram channel "Beware, Moscow". One of the short recordings shows a woman with blond hair pulling a girl in a niqab and a long dress by the fabric of her headdress. At this moment, the man punches her, and two other men try to calm him down. The Muslim woman steps aside, adjusting her niqab. Her companion, beating the blonde, swears obscenely, shouting, in particular: "This is my honor! Whose hair are you touching?" According to eyewitnesses, the pensioner's tablet, on which she was filming herself being beaten, was broken. One of the passengers claims that the man beat the elderly woman and dragged her by the hair in the aisle of the train car, threw her to the floor and kicked her. The court also arrested the man who beat Medvedeva while defending the girl in the niqab. According to sources, the 21-year-old migrant from Tajikistan “admitted guilt and repented” in court and was sentenced to 13 days of arrest. During her work as a photojournalist, Natalya Medvedeva often went on business trips to Chechnya, where active military operations were taking place at the time. During the seizure of a hospital in Budyonnovsk by militants, she was wounded in the head by a shell fragment fired from a Russian armored personnel carrier, after which she went inside the hospital, and subsequently, along with a number of other journalists, accompanied Basayev and his detachment to Chechnya. Related: Budyonnovsk: 2024-12-12 War Without Victory Day: How Russia Almost Lost Chechnya Budyonnovsk: 2024-09-25 Defendants in Chechnya Terrorist Attack Case Sentenced to 24 and 25 Years in Prison Budyonnovsk: 2023-11-11 Human rights activists name possible motives for the detentions in Kadi-Yurt |
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Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia | |
Glorification of Basayev's image resulted in a criminal case for a citizen of the Russian Federation and Abkhazia | |
2025-03-29 | |
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. [KavkazUzel] A citizen of the Russian Federation and Abkhazia was detained in Sochi after publishing content that created glorified images of members of Chechen illegal armed groups, in particular, Shamil Basayev. A citizen of Russia and the Republic of Abkhazia, born in 1988, involved in the distribution of terrorist materials on the Internet, has been detained, security forces reported. According to the FSB, the detainee published materials on his Telegram channel justifying and promoting terrorist activity "by creating a glorified image of the leaders of illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic from 1991 to 2006, in particular, the terrorist Shamil Basayev." A case has been opened against the detainee under Part 2 of Article 205.2 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (public calls for terrorist activity, public justification of terrorism or propaganda of terrorism). The penalty under this article provides for up to seven years of imprisonment, Interfax writes, citing the FSB Public Relations Center. On August 7, 1999, more than a thousand armed fighters under the leadership of Shamil Basayev and Jordanian Amir Khattab entered Dagestan from Chechnya. Fighting continued in the republic for more than a month, including on September 5, when about 2,000 fighters again crossed the Chechen-Dagestan border and occupied villages and heights in the Novolaksky District.
Investigators regularly report detentions and arrests of alleged former members of Basayev and Khattab's group. In December, the court remanded in custody Khamidulla Yapov and Minkail Magamadov, accused of involvement in attacks by Basayev and Khattab's militants on servicemen in Chechnya. Related: Shamil Basayev 03/02/2025 'Half an Hour's Respite - and Again the Attack.' How 90 'Greenhorns' Turned the Tide of the 2nd Chechen War Shamil Basayev 12/12/2024 War Without Victory Day: How Russia Almost Lost Chechnya Shamil Basayev 09/25/2024 Defendants in Chechnya Terrorist Attack Case Sentenced to 24 and 25 Years in Prison | |
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Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia |
'Half an Hour's Respite - and Again the Attack.' How 90 'Greenhorns' Turned the Tide of the 2nd Chechen War |
2025-03-02 |
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. by Daniil Pelymov [REGNUM] "The battalion was carrying out a blocking mission. Intelligence discovered the caravan. The battalion commander moved to the battlefield and commanded the unit. The soldiers fulfilled their duty with honor. I am proud of my people." These few words of Colonel Sergei Melentyev, commander of the 104th regiment of the 76th Pskov Airborne Division, at a briefing on March 5, 2000, became the first official testimony of the bloody battle that took place several days earlier in the Argun Gorge of Chechnya. ![]() Only later, from the words of the survivors, it became clear that this was an event that would forever enter the history of the Russian army. Exactly twenty-five years ago, 90 young fighters of the 6th company of the 104th regiment found themselves in the path of militants who were many times superior in force – and at the cost of their lives, they thwarted the breakthrough through the mountains of a large group of Shamil Basayev and the international terrorist Khattab. At the same time, the feat of the “Spartans from the Airborne Forces” revealed the systemic problems of the Russian army of that time, which had to be solved already in the new century. ENEMY BREAKTHROUGH IN TWO DIRECTIONS The last year of the 20th century, 2000, was a leap year, so the last battle of the 6th company of the Pskov landing force fell on a rare date - February 29. Leap years are considered difficult years – and in this case it was not just a matter of popular superstition. It was the last war that Russia had waged this century – the Second Chechen War. Since September 1999, the army, at the cost of heavy losses, but steadily corrected the mistake made in 1996 - when the First Chechen War was ended by the Khasavyurt Peace. The conflict was supposedly stopped, but the "deal" only extended the life of the criminal-terrorist enclave that called itself the "Chechen Republic of Ichkeria". The regime that captured Chechnya quickly drifted from separatism to Islamism and could not help but begin "exporting jihad" - the invasion of Khattab and Basayev's gangs into Dagestan without the knowledge of the "President of Ichkeria" Aslan Maskhadov was inevitable. By the end of 1999, the militants' attack was repelled by the regular army and Dagestani militias, and the war continued on enemy territory. The cities of Gudermes, Achkhoy-Martan, Argun, Shali, and the village and airfield of Khankala had already been liberated, and the battle for Grozny was underway (November 1999 - February 2000). During the retreat from the Chechen capital, the "Ichkerians" lost many fighters who were blown up in their own minefields. Unable to confront the regular army in open combat, the enemy retreated to the mountains of the Shatoi and Itum-Kalinsky districts, where they felt more confident. The absence of problems with food, the support and training of Arab professional terrorists (who were supervised by the “Black Arab” Khattab and the main “specialist” in airborne and subversive operations Abu al-Walid ), knowledge of the terrain - all this contributed to the effective operations of the Wahhabis and the difficulties of the advancement of the “federalists”. The gang of "division general" Ruslan Gelayev moved towards the village of Komsomolskoye (Urus-Martanovsky district), trying to gain a foothold in this strategically important point of mountainous Chechnya. Gelayev hoped for the effectiveness of the tactics of the first war, when Salman Raduyev's terrorists successfully held Pervomayskoye together with the hostages. The battles for Komsomolskoye (March 5-20, 2000) became the last major battle of the Second Chechen War and require a separate story. We will turn our attention to another group. The formation under the dual command of Basayev and Khattab concentrated in the area of the village of Ulus-Kert in the Shatoi district and the adjacent mountains along the Argun gorge. From here, the enemy planned to wage a sabotage war and wait for spring to begin full-scale guerrilla operations. Ulus-Kert became a "stronghold" for the separatists. The goal of our army was to encircle and eliminate the remaining large groups in the Argun Gorge. The enemy hoped to break out of the encirclement being formed and, possibly, break through the mountains into Dagestan again. YOUNG, INEXPERIENCED In this difficult situation, the 6th Company of the 2nd Battalion of the 104th Regiment, consisting mainly of young, “green” soldiers (many were only 19 years old), was ordered to occupy the dominant height 776 in the Argun Gorge. The problems began even before the operation. The better prepared and equipped 4th company was originally planned to be assigned to fortify the heights, but due to problems with transport, the "green" 6th company was sent on the mission. It is worth adding that right before being sent to the combat zone, the company was staffed from different units, which affected its coherence and combat training. The commanders were able to get to know the fighters only at the front. This is exactly the situation that Guards Major Sergei Molodov, appointed as the group leader, found himself in. Together with him, the battalion commander, Guards Lieutenant Colonel Mark Yevtyukhin, took command. The concept of the operation was quite simple. By this time, the 3rd company of the same 104th regiment, already occupying a fortified height, successfully held off the onslaught of superior enemy forces, using machine gun fire and artillery support with a smaller staff. Therefore, the "youngsters" from the 6th company were given a similar task. A major problem in planning the operation was the lack of proper information about the enemy's forces and movements. There was a lack of technical equipment and scale of reconnaissance operations, and Basayev's men themselves skillfully camouflaged themselves in the mountain forests and carried out large-scale regroupings only at night. "NO, THEY'RE GOBLINS." On the afternoon of February 29, the paratroopers encountered a small enemy reconnaissance group. After a short firefight, the militants retreated, and then Major Molodov was tragically killed by a sniper shot, which was a blow to the morale of the personnel. It was an alarming signal, but no one realized the scale of the impending threat. They thought everything was all right. The separatists, noting that the detachment was small, had a lot of cargo, and was poorly trained in moving in the mountains (the company was scattered in a long chain along the mountains), decided to break through the chain right here, sensing what they thought was a weak bleeding spot. Khattab was confident of success, but Basayev still initially doubted the success of the fight even with such an advantage. A recording of their radio communications from February 29, intercepted by our intelligence, has been preserved. Basayev: If there are dogs in front (in militant jargon - soldiers of the internal troops), we can come to an agreement. The separatists were counting on success, as they outnumbered the paratroopers, outsold them in experience and mobility. As veteran of the 104th regiment Andrei Lobanov noted, the field commanders were far from being "schoolchildren", they were experienced, trained people with disciplined fighters. Also, unlike the "federals", who carried all their belongings, including potbelly stoves, the militants could leave most of their equipment and provisions in Ulus-Kert and actively used pack animals. TWO DAYS IN HELL During the day, the jihadists secretly approached the army positions and began to dig in. In the evening, a fierce battle began. The exact number of attackers is unknown, but according to various estimates, up to 2,500 people. Only the first waves of attacks involved 300-400 militants armed with mortars, machine guns, and sniper rifles. “They were simply coming at us like a wall, their eyes bulging, shouting: ‘Allahu Akbar!’” Guards Sergeant Andrei Porshnev, one of the six who survived the battle at Height 776,told Rossiyskaya Gazeta in 2014. “We’d shoot one wave, have a half-hour break, and then attack again... There were a lot of them,” the soldier recalled. The battle flared up with incredible force. The paratroopers, despite the enemy's numerical superiority, put up a desperate resistance. Every meter on the approach to the dominant height was drenched in blood. By midnight on March 1, the shooting had died down. The unit, previously stretched out along the heights, began to regroup, help the wounded and remove the dead. Artillery support was ineffective due to inaccurate calculations, poor intelligence and the stressed state of the gunners. Nevertheless, according to enemy information, at least 30 "mujahideen" were killed by artillery fire. On the night of March 1, the 1st company of Guard Major Sergei Baran tried to break through to help: only they had the opportunity to cover the distance to the heights in the shortest time and help their comrades. But, probably, the fighters encountered a blocking detachment of militants while crossing the Abazulgol River and were forced to retreat. At the same time, the paratroopers, tired and having lost a third of their number, were unable to dig trenches in the frozen ground, despair gripped everyone, and the only hope was for dawn, which would dispel the darkness for artillery and reinforcements. Around 6 a.m., the enemy made a final attempt to break through. The wounded paratroopers continued to fight, covering the retreat of their comrades. When their ammunition ran out, not wanting to surrender, they blew themselves up with grenades, taking their enemies with them to the grave. By order of Captain Viktor Romanov, who took command after Yevtyukhin's death, the heights were covered with artillery fire. By morning, the 6th company had practically ceased to exist. Only six remained alive. The enemy's loss figures vary. Colonel General Gennady Troshev, who commanded the united federal forces during the Second Chechen War, wrote in his memoirs about 400 "Ichkerians" killed, while the newspaper " Krasnaya Zvezda " wrote about half a thousand fighters in an article for the first anniversary of the battle. LESSONS OF TRAGEDY AND HEROISM In any case, at the cost of its life (and at the cost of tragic mistakes), the 6th Company greatly influenced the outcome of the war. The active combat phase of the Second Chechen War - with the capture of cities and large-scale battles "in the field" - ended by April 2000. On the other hand, the tragedy at the 776th height stirred up all of Russia. A mass of legal proceedings followed, connected with the death of soldiers, in every corner of the country they knew about the battle for the 776th height. The unit was able to delay the advance of the militants, but in the future the shortcomings of the old military system (understaffing, sending "green" conscripts to the front lines, the quality of planning operations and coordination between units) will lead to tragic episodes and a number of military failures. It is enough to recall the destruction of a column of Perm OMON near the village of Dzhani-Vedeno in March 2000. And some of Basayev's and Khattab's men managed to break through from the Argun Gorge in other areas. The "Black Arab" himself was liquidated in 2002, Basayev was "gotten" only in 2006. But, be that as it may, the experience of mistakes, successes and exploits of the Second Chechen Campaign - completed successfully, but at a high price - was laid as the basis for the military reform of 2001-2004 and, in general, became the beginning of the revival of the Russian Armed Forces, which distinguished themselves during the five-day war in South Ossetia, and in the Syrian operation, and on the fields of the North Caucasus Military District. The special operation added new pages to the annals of the Airborne Forces' history (it is enough to recall the defense of the airport in Gostomel in February 2022), but the paratroopers do not forget the feat of the generation of fathers and older brothers. The whole of Russia remembers them, which is especially important now, when, on the initiative of the president, 2025 has been declared the Year of the Defender of the Fatherland. |
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Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia | |
War Without Victory Day: How Russia Almost Lost Chechnya | |
2024-12-12 | |
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. Back in the good old days, I read Lester Grau's narrative on the Battle of Grozny from the website of the US Army's Office of Foreign Military Studies. You can find one of his works published in 1996 here. Not the same as the article I read, but it is engaging if interested in this period of Russian military history. Like me, Grau is a student of Russian military history, and has a number of books published on the matter. by Andrey Zvorykin [REGNUM] "Our war began on the morning of December 11, 1994... And we don't have our own Victory Day," these words of Andrei Palachev, a veteran of the first Chechen war and participant in the battles in Grozny, are perhaps typical for memoirs about the events of thirty years ago. In any case, the expression "a war without a Victory Day" is often found in the testimonies of veterans who, in the mid-nineties, were on average about twenty years old, like the Primorsky OMON fighter Palachev. ![]() "As the poet said: "You can't make drums out of our skin - it's thin. Napoleonic plans are often pulled out of thin air," - these are already lines from the memoirs of General Gennady Troshev, who during the years of the first Chechen campaign was the commander of the Joint Group of Forces of the Russian Ministry of Defense. The war began with the failed December assault on Grozny, cost the lives of 5 to 14 thousand “federals,” as the Russian press called Russian soldiers at the time, and ended with the Khasavyurt Peace Treaty in August 1996, which effectively handed victory to the Islamists and separatists of “Ichkeria”*. "DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES" "Any war is started and ended by politicians. Can the political decision to send troops in December 1994 be considered an adventure? To some extent, yes," admitted General Troshev, for whom Grozny was no stranger - he spent his childhood there. "To some extent" - because by the end of 1994 there were clearly no other ways, except military ones, to liquidate the criminal-terrorist regime that had seized power in Chechnya. But seized it at least with the connivance of the federal center. In June 1991, even before the GKChP putsch, the leader of the All-National Congress of the Chechen People (ANCP), former Soviet Air Force Colonel General Dzhokhar Dudayev took control of part of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR. In July of the same year, Dudayev announced the secession of the "Chechen Republic of Nokhchi-cho" from the RSFSR and the USSR. The federal leadership of the time — President Boris Yeltsin, Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi, and Supreme Council Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov — clearly had other things on their minds. On the eve of the collapse of the USSR, for example, the redistribution of Union property seemed more important. Radicals from the “general democratic forces of Chechnya” were seen as allies in the fight against the “reactionary party bureaucrats.” When on September 6, 1991, Dudayev’s “guard” stormed the building of the Supreme Council of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, the television center and the radio house (during these events, the first blood of this conflict was shed, the head of the Grozny city council, Vitaly Kutsenko, was thrown out of a window), Khasbulatov sent a telegram to his small homeland: “A favorable political situation has finally arisen, in which the democratic processes taking place in the republic are being freed from overt and covert shackles…” In November 1991, the federal government tried to solve the Dudayev problem with a cavalry charge. Yeltsin declared a state of emergency in Chechnya, and to pacify the separatists, not even the notorious "two parachute regiments" were sent, but one "transport plane" with special forces of the Airborne Forces. At the Grozny airport, Dudayev's men blocked the plane and "offered" the fighters to return in a friendly manner. THE KINGDOM OF THE "COCKROACH MUSTACHE" While the rest of Russia was experiencing the shock of Gaidar’s reforms and was drawn into the confrontation between Yeltsin and the same Khasbulatov and Rutskoi, in Chechnya the process of the semi-disintegration of the state (which was also evident in Tatarstan, the Urals, and other parts of the weakened country) had gone too far. By June 1992, de jure, the Russian Armed Forces had left the region, leaving the militants with a huge amount of military equipment and ammunition depots. According to the agreement signed with Dudayev by Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, the "Ichkerians" were to receive half of the arsenal - but in reality, our officers could only take their service weapons. This is how the separatists got their army. At the same time, the federal center continued to financially support Chechnya, which had not signed the federal treaty. Thus, in 1993, the republic was allocated 11.5 billion rubles for social payments. The money did not reach the recipients, but ended up in the pockets of the leadership of "Ichkeria", including the military leaders of the separatists. Dudayev "stopped paying pensions to old people, teachers' salaries... Schools closed. It was enough of a primary education for us, if only they could count money," recalled a builder from Grozny, Gunki Khukiev. Only criminal elements could count money in the "independent state." The center "did not notice" the notorious Chechen avisos - the execution of a fake transaction with the subsequent "disappearance" of the swindlers. According to experts, more than 4 trillion rubles of the then rubles were received from these avisos. They also failed to notice the displacement of the non-Chechen population - essentially, ethnic cleansing. If according to the 1989 census, 294 thousand Russians lived in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR (with a total population of 1 million 270 thousand), and 270 thousand Russians out of a population of 397 thousand lived in Grozny, then in the 21st century, about 1.9% of ethnic Russians live in the Chechen Republic, about 24 thousand people. About 250 thousand people left the republic even before the start of the first campaign. Already in the first half of the 1990s, the rampant banditry (including armed banditry) sobered up many residents of the "sovereign state", especially city dwellers. "My brother... got nothing from the revolutionary pie, now he called his idol Dudayev nothing other than "ts1eza mekhash" (cockroach mustache). There were tens of thousands of such repentants," Khukiev recalled. But the leaders of Ichkeria already felt strong enough to suppress any discontent. On June 4, 1993, field commander Shamil Basayev made his presence known for the first time - his fighters stormed the headquarters of the anti-Dudayev opposition, which was headed by the mayor of Grozny Bislan Gantamirov (who had previously had a falling out with Dudayev over the income from the oil business). The Ichkerians were making plans to "export the revolution." It was not for nothing that Dudayev gave shelter to the ousted former President of Georgia Zviad Gamsakhurdia and simultaneously supported the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, whose militias had recently fought against the Georgians in Abkhazia. PROLOGUE TO THE WAR. THE "GANTAMIROV" ASSAULT The federal center, having “blown away” Chechen separatism, decided to play its own subtle game, overthrowing Dudayev with the hands of the opposition, which became a more or less organized force after the “president of Ichkeria” dissolved the Chechen parliament. The opposition was supported by the urban population (which was gathered under the wing of Dudayev's personal enemy, Gantamirov) and some clan leaders who did not fit into Dudayev's system. An example is the former head of Dudayev's security, Ruslan Labazanov, who spoke out against Dudayev's men on the side of the Russian Armed Forces, but was not much different from them in essence. In the summer of 1994, a civil war broke out in Chechnya between the "president of Ichkeria" and the militants loyal to him (led by Basayev and Ruslan Gelayev ) on one side and the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic on the other. Several "federal" tank crews appeared at the disposal of the opposition. Gantamirov and Labazanov's militia took control of the cities of Urus-Martan and Argun and on November 26, 1994, they moved on Grozny. After the first shelling from Dudayev's men, the opposition infantry scattered, the tank crews, left without cover and not knowing the terrain, found themselves in a hopeless situation, 28 of them were taken prisoner, about 18 (data based on lists of names) were killed. This event had a decisive impact on Yeltsin's decision to send in troops. On December 9, he signed a decree "On measures to suppress the activities of illegal armed formations on the territory of the Chechen Republic and in the Ossetian-Ingush conflict zone." A few days before, on December 1, a Russian air raid completely destroyed the planes that had been captured and bought by the separatists. “THEY DIDN’T EVEN HAVE TIME TO COME UP WITH A NAME” Finally, on December 11, 1994, units of the Russian Armed Forces, in accordance with Yeltsin’s decree, entered the Russian region of Chechnya. The troops advanced in three groups. The first, under the command of Lieutenant General Vladimir Chilindin, advanced from the northwest, from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia. The second, from Vladikavkaz, under the command of Lieutenant General Alexander Chindarov, moved from the northwest through Ingushetia. The third, from Kizlyar, under the command of Lieutenant General Lev Rokhlin, headed from the northeast from the territory of Dagestan. The overall command of the operation to restore constitutional order was entrusted to Defense Minister Grachev. "Pavel Grachev brought the army to a terrible state," Rokhlin later lamented. This concerned supplies, weapons, and the level of training of conscripts. However, it is unlikely that the problem was solely Grachev's, since he did not possess such outstanding abilities to destroy the mighty army organism to its foundations in just a few years. Structural problems in the armed forces arose much earlier. An important point: it was difficult to talk about broad public support for the military operation. The media, controlled by media oligarchs Vladimir Gusinsky and Boris Berezovsky, broadcast if not a pro-Dudaev, then a "neutral" position. Not only liberals, but also the left opposition, including the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, criticized the operation. Meanwhile, our group's problems began almost immediately: only the Mozdok group achieved relative success, reaching the village of Dolinskoye (10 kilometers from Grozny) the next day. The Vladikavkaz and Kizlyar groups were soon blocked and forced to either break through with a fight or bypass enemy-controlled settlements along a longer route. Finally, 16 days after the start of the march (according to the plan, 3 days were given for the advance), all groups reached Grozny, blockading it from three sides. General Troshev later noted : "According to some generals, the initiative for the "festive" New Year's assault on Grozny belonged to people from Pavel Grachev's inner circle, in order to coincide the capture of the city with the birthday of the Russian Minister of Defense (January 1). I don't know how serious this is. Another thing is that the operation was prepared hastily, without a real assessment of the enemy, his forces and resources, without careful preparation. This is a fact. They didn't even have time to come up with a name for this operation!" "GOD, HELP ME BREAK FREE..." The southern outskirts of Grozny remained unblocked. It was assumed that civilians would be evacuated this way, but in fact the militants were receiving supplies from here throughout the assault. On December 19, the first bombing attack was carried out on the city center, and on the 31st, the bloodiest battle of the war began - the storming of Grozny. According to General Troshev, "many commanders with big stars, federal-level chiefs, believed that it was enough to go to Grozny, fire a couple of times in the air, and that would be the end of it." The military leader believed that it was precisely this method of intimidation that was the basis for the hastily approved plan to take Grozny, and, Troshev believed, it was approved "at the very top." About 250 units of equipment entered the city with infantry cover, but the fallacy of this plan soon became apparent. The number of militants, their wide variety of anti-tank weapons, and their completely fanatical resistance were unexpected. The units of the northern group were the most unlucky. The fighters of the 131st Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (better known as the Maikop brigade) received an order from the commander of the "North" group, Konstantin Pulikovsky : together with the motorized riflemen and tankers of the 81st Motorized Rifle Regiment (who had 10 tanks at their disposal), reach the city center and fortify themselves in the railway station building. The combined group of "Maikopts" and fighters of the 81st regiment carried out the order, but by 19:00 the station they had occupied was surrounded by superior forces of militants. When reinforcements broke through here on the evening of January 1, no more than a third of the defenders remained alive. The commander of the 131st brigade, Colonel Ivan Savin, was also killed in the battle. Captain Vyacheslav Mironov, a participant in subsequent battles in Grozny, testifies in his book I Was In This War: “As we approached the railway station, we began to come across burnt, mutilated equipment and many corpses. Our corpses, our Slavic brothers, were all that remained of the Maikop Brigade, the one that was burned and shot by the “spirits” on New Year’s Eve from 1994 to 1995. God, help us escape…” HARD VICTORIES AND STRANGE DEFEATS War plans had to be changed on the fly and "in the field," Troshev noted. The troops held up in other directions changed their tactics by January 7, focusing on maneuverable groups, which gradually yielded results. On January 9, the Grozny Oil Institute and airport were occupied with heavy fighting, and on the 19th, the city center and the presidential palace. The militants retreated behind the Sunzha River. It was only on February 3 that the decision was made to close off the southern direction and completely blockade Grozny. The city was surrounded only by February 9. The Chechen capital was completely occupied by March 6, when Shamil Basayev's fighters retreated from Chernorechye, the last district in the hands of forces loyal to Dudayev. With the fall of Grozny, the actions of the Ichkerians finally acquired a partisan character - and our army was not ready for this. Although the entire flat part of Chechnya and most of the mountainous regions were occupied over the following months, the army was unable to actually ensure control over the territory. On the one hand, ambushes and raids by militants became frequent occurrences, and on the other, our troops repeatedly occupied the same "inhabitants", which were again captured by the separatists after the redeployment of the "federals". "One of the peculiarities of this strange war, which literally drove us crazy, is that we passed through and cleared the same villages several times. In the end, I studied the area so well that I could fight there blindfolded," the publication "Chelyabinsk Segodnya" cited the testimony of Alexander Berezovsky, who during the first Chechen war was the head of the reconnaissance group of the 17th detachment of the special forces of the internal troops "Edelweiss". A NEW TYPE OF ENEMY Thus, simultaneously with the exhaustion – moral and physical – of the Russian troops, the actions of the militants became ever bolder. Beginning in March 1996, raids on Grozny became an everyday reality. In addition to guerrilla warfare, the enemy used a method of warfare for which we were even less prepared – terror. On June 14, 1995, about two hundred of Basayev's militants broke through the border of Chechnya and Stavropol Krai and seized a hospital in Budyonnovsk. About 1,200 city residents were taken hostage, herded into the hospital buildings. After negotiations, Basayev's men were allowed to leave. At that time, 143 Russian fighters were killed (including 46 special forces), 415 were wounded, with enemy losses of 19 killed and 20 wounded. In January 1996, Salman Raduyev's group attacked the Dagestani city of Kizlyar. At the captured helicopter base, the bandits destroyed several units of equipment and took hostages. While security forces were approaching the city, the militants captured a hospital and a maternity hospital, driving about 3 thousand more residents there. During negotiations, the terrorists, along with some of the hostages, were released from the encirclement. Retreating, Raduyev's men also captured the village of Pervomayskoye. As a result, the terrorists were released. Also, in parallel with the military actions, the Ichkerians captured airplanes, buses, and attacked railways. In response, Russia took the first – and sometimes successful – steps in the fight against terrorism. Thus, on April 21, 1996, our special services managed to track the mobile communication channels of the "Generalissimo of Ichkeria" Dudayev. During a conversation with the State Duma deputy, liberal Konstantin Borovoy, two Su-24s struck the location of the separatist leader. Dudayev's successors as "presidents of Ichkeria" - Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev and Aslan Maskhadov - could no longer effectively control the "brigadier generals" and other field commanders. This defect in the system, however, would come back to haunt him in 1999, when the gangs of Basayev and Khattab attacked Dagestan without Maskhadov's knowledge. THE SECOND "OBSCENE WORLD" On August 6, 1996, the militants "turned the tide" of military operations: another attack on Grozny allowed them to take control of the city. At the same time, the separatists captured the large cities of Gudermes and Argun. The loss of three key centers, ongoing terrorist attacks, the shadow of Budyonnovsk and Kizlyar - all this demoralized the army. Yeltsin (who had recently narrowly escaped defeat in the elections) was threatened by the political consequences of continuing the conflict. Everything was pushing the federal center of that time to conclude peace on terms unfavorable for Russia. On August 31, in the Dagestani city of Khasavyurt, the Secretary of the Russian Security Council, Lieutenant General Alexander Lebed, and the "Chairman of the Government of Ichkeria" Aslan Maskhadov signed a ceasefire agreement. Russia was obliged to withdraw its troops from Chechen territory, and the decision on its political status was postponed until 2001. Later, the Khasavyurt agreements were compared with another “shameful peace” – the Brest peace. The Chechen people suffered first and foremost from the “peace”. The "Ichkeria" of 1996-1999 plunged into chaos and became not only a "hub" for drug trafficking and a sanctuary for criminals, but also a springboard for international terrorism. Instead of national separatists like the "Minister of Culture and Brigadier General" Akhmed Zakayev or the "Chechen Goebbels" Movladi Udugov, the leading role was played by supporters of Sharia rule and a worldwide caliphate. Maskhadov, elected president in 1997, not only failed to control his "prime minister" - the convinced Wahhabi Basayev, but also increasingly fell under the influence of foreign emissaries such as Khattab, Abu al-Walid and Abu Hafs al-Urdani. The transformation of the "Republic of Ichkeria" into the "Caucasus Emirate"*, which eventually swore allegiance to the "Islamic State"*,
THREE BOGATYRS SQUARE To correct political mistakes (which had been accumulating since the early 1990s and, in fact, led to the war) and miscalculations of the military command, whose Napoleonic plans did not always correspond to their capabilities, the Second Chechen Campaign was needed, no less difficult, but ended in success. A change in political leadership, a clear national policy and a change in the quality of military planning played their role. During the second campaign, the Russian army proved its combat capability, which it has repeatedly confirmed subsequently - in the defense of South Ossetia, in peacekeeping operations - and is confirming now, in the SVO zone, where units from Chechnya are also proving themselves. General Troshev died in 2008, having witnessed the beginning of the restoration of the republic under Akhmad-hadji and Ramzan Kadyrov — the military leader writes about the beginning of reconciliation in the finale of his memoirs. The afterword contains a vivid image. In one of the squares of Grozny in the 1970s, a monument was erected to three heroes of the Civil War: the Russian Odessan Nikolai Gikalo, the Chechen Aslanbek Sheripov and the Ingush Gapur Akhriev. "The people immediately nicknamed this place "the square of the three heroes," the general recalled. Under Maskhadov, there was a slave market here, near the monument, and executions were carried out here according to Sharia law. “The war destroyed the monument to the representatives of three nations. But the pedestal remained. Maybe the monument will be restored, or maybe a new one will be erected?” Troshev wondered and added, “I believe that nothing will ever destroy the surviving foundation, not even the war, which left a deep mark on people’s souls.” In 2008, Friendship of Nations Square was opened in Grozny after reconstruction, with a restored monument to the “three heroes”. | |
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Defendants in Chechnya Terrorist Attack Case Sentenced to 24 and 25 Years in Prison | |
2024-09-25 | |
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. [Regnum] The Southern District Military Court has sentenced Nazhmudin Dudiyev (included in the register of terrorists and extremists of Rosfinmonitoring) and Ibragim Donashev (included in the register of terrorists and extremists of Rosfinmonitoring), accused in the case of the terrorist attack in Chechnya in 2005. This was reported by RIA Novosti with reference to a representative of the court. “The court sentenced Dudiyev to 24 years in a strict regime prison with deprivation of his military rank, and Donashev to 25 years in a strict regime prison with deprivation of his military rank,” the agency’s source said. According to the investigation, in July 2005, Dudiev and Donashev, as part of the gang of Supyan Arsanukaev and Viskhan Zaitov, took part in the kidnapping and murder of a man, whose body was then used in a terrorist attack in the village of Znamenskoye in the Nadterechny District of Chechnya. According to the information from the republican Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, the gang members parked a car filled with explosives near residential buildings. It also contained the body of a kidnapped man, who was dressed in a Russian military uniform. One of the accused fired at the car to attract attention. After the start of investigative and operational activities, an explosive device was detonated. As a result of the incident, 15 people were killed, and another 36 were injured to varying degrees. Law enforcement officers were among the dead and injured. kavkaz-uzel.eu adds: Dudiev and Donashev were previously sentenced by the court to prison terms of 18 to 19 years. Recall that Dudiev and Donashev were previously sentenced by the court to prison terms of 18 to 19 years. They were taken into custody in late November 2018 on charges of banditry, participation in an armed mutiny, and an attempt on the life of a serviceman during an attack in Chechnya in 2000. On the night of March 1, 2000, fighters of the 6th parachute landing company of the 104th regiment of the 76th Pskov airborne division entered into battle with a detachment of field commanders Shamil Basayev
Tangentially related from kavkav-uzel.eu The Museum of Abkhazia closed the exhibition with Basayev's portrait to visitors The Russian embassy in Sukhum was outraged by a portrait of Shamil Basayev, which was displayed at an exhibition in the State Museum of Abkhazia, with the caption: "Hero of Abkhazia." The museum promised to rectify the situation and closed access to the exhibition. Representatives of the Russian embassy stated that they considered the display of the portrait of the terrorist unacceptable and contacted the museum. The site's management promised to "correct the situation as soon as possible," the agency reported, citing embassy representatives. As of 17:40, the websites and Telegram channels of the State Museum of Abkhazia and the Russian Embassy in Abkhazia did not contain any information about the exhibition where Basayev’s portrait was presented or its closure. The information that the State Museum of Abkhazia has a portrait of Basayev and a photo from the exhibition was published on September 22 by the Telegram channel Hard Blog. "How Basayev performed in Abkhazia is no longer important. He has tarnished himself so much that none of his past merits can serve as an excuse for the Abkhaz side. When Heroes of the Soviet Union committed crimes, they were stripped of their titles and condemned without much thought about their past merits," the blogger wrote in a message. Shamil Basayev was a field commander during the First Chechen War and the leader of the storming of Grozny (August 1996), the organizer of terrorist attacks and the hostage-taking in Budyonnovsk in Stavropol Krai (1995), the Dubrovka Theater Center in Moscow (2002), the school in Beslan (2004, North Ossetia), the leader of the militant invasion of Dagestan (1999), which marked the beginning of the Second Chechen War, and the attack on Nalchik (October 2005, Kabardino-Balkaria). He was killed on July 10, 2006. Since August 1992, he took an active part in military operations in Abkhazia. He was the commander of the Gagra front and deputy minister of defense of Abkhazia. He commanded a detachment of Chechen volunteers. In January 1993, at a joint meeting of the Presidential Council and the parliament of the Confederation of Peoples of the Caucasus, Shamil Basayev was appointed commander of the expeditionary corps of the CPC in Abkhazia. He was charged with the duties of "coordinating, uniting, directing in the right direction and controlling the incoming flow of volunteers." In 1996, Basayev reported that during 1992-1994 he traveled three times with his "Abkhaz battalion" to the camps of the Afghan mujahideen, where he learned the tactics of guerrilla warfare. Already in 1994, the "Abkhaz battalion" and Basayev entered into military operations in Chechnya, according to the biographical information about Shamil Basayev prepared by the "Caucasian Knot". "Kavkazsky Uzel" also wrote that relations between Abkhazia and Russia have become complicated recently. On September 4, the head of the Abkhazian Foreign Ministry announced that Russia would suspend social payments from September 1, which concern Abkhazian teachers, doctors and security forces. Russia suspended payments because the Abkhazian authorities are not fulfilling agreements, including on investments and the so-called apartment bill, said Russian State Duma deputies Konstantin Zatulin and Alexey Chepa. The suspension of social payments to Abkhazia is related to the failure to maintain a balance of obligations between the two countries, but did not worsen relations, said Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Russia's suspension of funding for Abkhazian public sector employees has not yet affected their salary payments, political analysts interviewed by the "Caucasian Knot" said on September 11. Among the reasons for this decision, they highlighted Sukhum's refusal to adopt laws important for Moscow and the failure of the Abkhazian side to fulfill its obligations under economic agreements. The cessation of payments (we are talking about approximately 150 million rubles per year) will affect doctors, social workers and teachers, since the military, security forces and pensioners are financed under a separate agreement, emphasized Natalia Smyr, chairperson of the "Amtaa" foundation. Related: Shamil Basayev 09/12/2024 The case of a participant in the attack by Basayev's militants on Dagestan has reached court Shamil Basayev 09/07/2024 2004: Novaya Gazeta Releases Details of Tank Shooting at School in Beslan Shamil Basayev 08/08/2024 25 years have passed since the invasion of Basayev's militants into Dagestan | |
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The case of a participant in the attack by Basayev's militants on Dagestan has reached court | |
2024-09-12 | |
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. [KavkazUzel] The case of Stavropol resident Rustam Yarbuldyev, whom investigators believe to have participated in the attack by Basayev's militants on Dagestan, has been referred to court. As the "Caucasian Knot" wrote, in June 2023, the FSB reported the detention of Rustam Yarbuldyev in Stavropol Krai in connection with the attack on the Botlikh District of Dagestan in 1999.
The investigation of the criminal case against Rustam Yarbuldyev, a native and resident of the Neftekumsky District of Stavropol Krai, has been completed. He is accused of participating in a gang, armed rebellion and attempted murder of military personnel, the Russian Investigative Committee reported today. According to investigators, Yarbuldyev had been a member of a gang created by Basayev and Khattab since 1999, and participated in an armed rebellion in the Botlikh region of Dagestan, during which security forces were attacked. As a result, 33 servicemen were killed and another 34 were injured, according to a statement on the department's website. The criminal case has been sent to court for consideration on the merits, the investigation reported. "Caucasian Knot" also wrote that Toymaskhan Adzhinyazov and Kaitarb Nasyrov, whom investigators consider to be participants in the attack on the Botlikh region of Dagestan in 1999, rejected in court the charges brought against them for mutiny and attempted murder of the military. | |
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2004: Novaya Gazeta Releases Details of Tank Shooting at School in Beslan | |
2024-09-07 | |
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. Sometimes the Russians are their own worst enemy. [KavkazUzel] The crews of four tanks deployed to the school building in Beslan were ordered to fire on the building when hostages were inside, according to materials from interrogations of servicemen and hostages published by Novaya Gazeta. ![]() As "Kavkazsky Uzel" wrote, on the twentieth anniversary of the terrorist attack in Beslan, the cultural and patriotic center for the prevention of terrorism "Beslan School No. 1" was opened. The school grounds had to be preserved, says Emma Tagaeva. The center will become international and is necessary to preserve the memory of the terrorist attack, says Atsamaz Misikov. The project took three years to implement, and 206.1 million rubles were allocated for the creation of the center. Twenty years later, the authorities have still not given a concrete answer as to how terrorists managed to organize the 2004 seizure of a school in Beslan, which resulted in the deaths of more than three hundred people, North Ossetian journalists noted. On September 1, 2004, militants took 1,128 hostages in the gymnasium of School No. 1 in Beslan. The operation to free them ended on September 3, 2004. As a result of the terrorist attack, 334 people were killed, including 186 children, and another 810 people were injured. The "Caucasian Knot" has prepared a report "Terrorist attack in Beslan (September 1-3, 2004)" and a chronicle of the terrorist attack and the events that followed.
As follows from the interrogation protocols of the Chief of Staff, Head of the UFSB of North Ossetia Valery Andreyev, the Chief of the FSB Special Operations Center, General Alexander Tikhonov, reported that on September 2 he asked the command of the 58th Army to provide tanks to the Alpha and Vympel special forces to conduct the operation to rescue the hostages. The Commander of the 58th Army, Viktor Sobol, who was also part of the operational headquarters, gave the order to bring tanks into Beslan. At 18:00 on September 2, exactly one hour after the former President of Ingushetia, General Ruslan Aushev, led 26 hostages out of the school seized by terrorists and managed to convince the militants to continue negotiations and allow the bodies of the dead hostages to be taken away, tanks entered Beslan and stopped near a transformer substation next to a railroad crossing, three hundred meters from the school seized by terrorists. The hostages stood in the windows The first shot from the tank was fired on September 3 at 14:25 Moscow time. At the same time, conscript Dmitry Godovalov, who commanded tank #328, said that the tank crews, who were in their combat vehicles, could clearly see the hostages through the viewing slits and triplex on the windows of the canteen. "The hostages were standing in the windows "This cafeteria became a real trap for the hostages. The fact is that in the entire first school, only the cafeteria windows had bars installed. Moreover, the bars were installed not on the outside of the windows, as is usually the case, but on the inside of the building. This fact is clearly recorded in numerous photographs of the cafeteria destroyed during the assault, including such photos in the materials of the criminal case. These bars became the main obstacle for the operational combat groups "Alpha" and "Vympel" deployed from Kominterna Street, because they did not allow the special forces to get inside the school. The headquarters tried to develop a scenario for the assault with a minimum number of casualties among both the hostages and the special forces - General Tikhonov spoke about this at a meeting of the parliamentary commission, in addition, this point is reflected in the situational examination. The bars on the cafeteria windows could have become a determining factor in the decision to use tanks. Because the internal fastening of the bars did not allow them to be knocked down or torn out using heavy equipment," writes Milashina. At 14.25, one of the tanks fired directly at the window of the canteen, where the terrorists had placed their hostages as a human shield. Yuri Savelyev, a member of the federal parliamentary commission, who analyzed in detail in his special opinion the use of tanks during the storming of the Beslan school, assumes that it was tank No. 325, since it had more powerful active armor than other tanks. The shell hit the school gatepost and flew into the assembly hall. Only 14 years after the tragedy, in December 2018, the presidential envoy to the North Caucasus Federal District, Alexander Matovnikov, made the first official admission since the terrorist attack that the storming of the school had been planned from the very beginning, despite protests from local residents. The presidential envoy also confirmed that the school had been shelled from a tank. More than 50 witnesses from among former hostages and city residents testified that tanks fired at the canteen between 15:00 and 16:00 (closer to 16:00) on September 3. It was at this time, at 15:10, that General Tikhonov gave the order to the Alpha and Vympel combat groups to directly storm the school. Until that time, the school, mainly the combat positions of the militants, was actively shelled with small arms and grenade launchers. Until 15:10 Moscow time on September 3, not a single special forces soldier was in the school building, the publication says. The tank crews fired at the windows of the canteen, so the damage to the school's façade wall was minimal; the main damage to the walls, ceilings and floors from tank shells was recorded inside these rooms. At that time, dozens of hostages were able to escape from the gymnasium, which had been destroyed by the first explosions, either on their own or with the help of local residents. However, a significant number of hostages, at the request of the terrorists, moved from the gymnasium to the main part of the school (classrooms, canteen, kitchens) and to its southern wing, the article notes. The author of the article also emphasized that the number of hostages killed directly in the cafeteria will most likely never be known. "Immediately after the assault, all the bodies of the dead were taken out of the cafeteria. An autopsy of the bodies and the establishment of the real causes of death of the people killed in the school were not carried out. And in the criminal case and death certificates they wrote that all the hostages died as a result of explosions in the gym," claims Elena Milashina. At this time, an attempt was made to tear off the bars from the dining room window by the crew of BTR-80 No. 834, commanded by the commander of the reconnaissance and airborne platoon of military unit 12356 Andrei Shuvarikov. However, the terrorists, using the hostages as cover, stopped this attempt with direct fire to kill. Trying to carry out the order, Andrei Shuvarikov and Warrant Officer Sergei Ryabikhin were wounded, and the BTR was hit by terrorists with an under-barrel grenade launcher. The investigation, despite the fact that the attempt was unsuccessful, supported the official version, stating that the servicemen of the crew of the armored personnel carrier #834, Shuvarikov and Ryabikhin, managed to hook a cable and tear off the bars on the windows. But this was denied in court by both the hostages and the only, according to the investigation, surviving terrorist Nurpasha Kulaev. "When they fired from the tank, the bars [in the dining room] fell... The bars were inside. They did not shoot with the tank at the second floor. They shot at the bars. This is inside the first floor," he said. The hostages who survived in the dining room said that the bars "flew off" as a result of the shelling. "I remember that there was a loud shot, and then the bars [flew off]. I determined by ear that these were shots from a tank, by the way the room shook when they shot. Before that, the militants also shot from machine guns and something else. Then the building shook, too, but not to such an extent," said hostage Zhanna Tsirikhova. On September 4, during an inspection of the school, investigators actually found window bars inside the cafeteria. In addition, the same inspection recorded a large number of characteristic destructions of the interior walls, floors and ceiling of the cafeteria and adjoining utility rooms, which could not have occurred from the use of firearms and grenades, the publication says. During the interrogation of the participants in the events in September 2004, a version about the grating, the cable and the APC emerged. The tankers in their testimony claim that only one tank, No. 325, fired seven shots, and that it was in the evening. This tank was commanded by Guram Abuladze. The second wave of interrogations of the tankers took place in 2005, after the victims testified at the Kulaev trial that all the tanks had repeatedly fired at the canteen during the day, when the hostages were still there. The repeated interrogations of the tankers and servicemen of military unit 12356 almost word for word coincide with their first interrogations. Only one phrase is added: "Tank No. 325 fired at the school when there were "no more living hostages" in it." The tank crews were interrogated for the third time in 2006. From these interrogations it follows directly that the commander of tank No. 325, Guram Abuladze, voluntarily changed his testimony between 2005 and 2006 and testified under the protocol that on September 3, 2004, he and other tank crews received orders from officers to fire at the canteen where the hostages were. But Guram Abuladze apparently refused to carry out this order, Milashina notes in the publication. Ivan Bazhenov, a tank driver, said on May 18, 2006, that on the afternoon of September 3, "the Alpha special forces began preparing to storm the school." According to him, he heard an order on the radio for one of the tanks not to get nervous and not to shoot. "No one fired from the tanks during the assault, at least I did not hear any shots. I did not hear anyone on the radio ordering Abuladze to shoot at the school, at least when I was in the tank, and when I got out of it, I could not hear the radio," he said. Another conscript, Aleksandr Asharin, said on June 9, 2006, that he did not know that "Abuladze refused to carry out the order <...> to shoot at the school when there were hostages there." "I cannot explain why witnesses and victims claim that the tank fired during the daytime; maybe they got something mixed up," he said. I know that there was an order to fire at the school during the day when there were hostages there. This testimony proves that Abuladze told the investigation about the order from the officers to shoot at the school, the publication notes. This was confirmed by Dmitry Godovalov, commander of tank No. 328. "I know that there was an order to fire at the school during the day, when there were hostages there. But we refused to fire at the school, since the hostages were standing in the windows and waving white rags," he said. Sixteen years after the terrorist attack, the investigation admitted that tanks had indeed fired at the school during the assault - in 2020, VGTRK aired a film by Alexander Rogatkin about the tragedy in Beslan. The author of the film stated that "a tank was also used." "He fired blanks in order to “to make breaches in the walls for the passage of special forces, and with combat shells,” Rogatkin asserts. Albert Khasanov, senior investigator for especially important cases of the Investigative Directorate for the North Caucasus Federal District, also spoke about this in the film. "The T-72 tank had been used before, but it fired blanks. The combat use of the tank, that is, when it fired high-explosive fragmentation shells, was after 21:00," he said. However, in the weapons reports available in the criminal case, all T-72s only have high-explosive fragmentation shells. According to Milashina, "the version about the "blanks" was created by the victims themselves, who saw the tanks shooting at the school, but they could not imagine that the tanks could shoot at hostages standing in the windows and waving white rags." At the same time, all the interrogated tank crews confirmed that there were no "blanks" in the ammunition of their tanks, the article says. | |
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25 years have passed since the invasion of Basayev's militants into Dagestan | |
2024-08-08 | |
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. [KavkazUzel] Today marks a quarter of a century since the attack of Basayev and Khattab's militants on Dagestan. A memorial rally and re-enactment of the events of 1999 took place in the Botlikh District. As the "Caucasian Knot" reported, in 2019, Vladimir Putin signed a law granting militiamen from Dagestan who fought militants in 1999 the status of combat veterans, the right to monthly payments and material benefits. The list of applicants included about 28,000 people, but only 520 people received certificates, and most of those who actually fought were not included in their number, members of veterans' organizations said in December 2020 On August 7, 1999, more than 1,000 armed fighters led by Shamil Basayev and Jordanian Amir Khattab
A rally dedicated to the 25th anniversary of the militant invasion was held in Botlikh today, the Botlikh District Administration reported on its Telegram channel. "At the memorial […] they remember the tragic events of those days, their victims and heroes. […] The event is attended by the head of the district, Ruslan Gamzatov, Hero of Russia Dibirgadzhi Magomedov, militiamen, Afghans, SVO participants and local residents," the publication says. Those who gathered for the memorial rally in Botlikh were shown a re-enactment of events that took place 25 years ago and were "reminded of the history of 1999," RIA Dagestan reports. Let us recall that even decades later, investigators periodically report the detention of alleged participants in the militant attack on Dagestan. Thus, on November 2, 2022, security forces detained Stavropol residents Eduard Taushev and Temirali Zarakaev, who, according to investigators, participated in the attack. In April 2024, the case was transferred to court. Cases of participation in the gangs of Basayev and Khattab are similar and often falsified, lawyer Narine Ayrapetyan told the "Caucasian Knot" earlier. "The witnesses are the same everywhere. Five witnesses are usually taken - three secret witnesses and two open ones," she said. Ayrapetyan emphasized that cases are also fabricated against innocent people. "When people did not participate, but under threat, including torture, other people are forced to testify against them. For example, one of my clients, who is serving a sentence in the Ulyanovsk region, told me that he is being pressured to testify about the events of 1999 against people he did not know before," the lawyer said. Related: Khattab 07/13/2024 Human rights activists linked Alkhanov's transfer from Rostov pretrial detention center to an attempt to extract testimony Khattab 06/26/2024 Terrorist attacks in Dagestan: battered ISIS returns to the Caucasus Khattab 05/21/2024 Black flags over the Dark Continent. Who is the Russian Afrika Korps fighting with? Related: Shamil Basayev 07/13/2024 Human rights activists linked Alkhanov's transfer from Rostov pretrial detention center to an attempt to extract testimony Shamil Basayev 04/16/2024 The court sides with a convict from Chechnya in a dispute with the colony administration Shamil Basayev 03/23/2024 Two people charged in the case of Basayev's raid on Dagestan Related: Dagestan: 2024-08-07 Good Morning Dagestan: 2024-08-07 Three young men suspected of preparing terrorist attack in Dagestan Dagestan: 2024-08-06 Makhachkala prison chief convicted of torture disappears in Ukraine | |
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Human rights activists linked Alkhanov's transfer from Rostov pretrial detention center to an attempt to extract testimony | |
2024-07-13 | |
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. [KavkazUzel] Magomed Alkhanov, the defendant in the case of the attack on the Pskov paratroopers, and two other natives of Chechnya, as well as one native of Dagestan, were transferred from Rostov's SIZO-1 after the hostage-taking. Alkhanov and the other detainees are not allowed to see a lawyer; human rights activists believe that they may be subjected to torture. As reported by the "Caucasian Knot", Magomed Alkhanov escaped from custody on October 26, 2021, while undergoing a medical examination in a psychiatric hospital department in Astrakhan.
On June 16, prisoners in Rostov's SIZO-1 took two employees of the detention center hostage. During the assault, the prisoners who took the hostages were killed and the hostages were released. On June 18, it became known that one of the participants in the hostage taking, 28-year-old native of Stavropol Daniil Kamnev, survived and is in intensive care in serious condition. He has been arrested until August 15. Also arrested was Malik Gandaloyev, a native of Ingushetia, who, according to security forces, participated in the hostage taking in the detention center. The hostage takers declared themselves to be followers of the "Islamic State". The "Caucasian Knot" has prepared a report " Taking of Hostages in the Rostov SIZO " with a chronology of these events. A native of Chechnya, Magomed Alkhanov, accused in the case of the attack on the Pskov paratroopers, and three other prisoners were suddenly transferred from the Rostov-on-Don pretrial detention center No. 1, where an escape attempt had previously occurred, to the Taganrog pretrial detention center, the Memorial Human Rights Defense Center reported today (the Memorial Human Rights Defense Center has been recognized as a foreign agent). According to human rights activists, after the assault, Alkhanov and other Muslim prisoners were beaten by special forces. Relatives were afraid to talk about this, so as not to worsen the prisoners' situation. Magomed himself expressed concerns that the security forces would want to present him as an accomplice to the invaders, since some of them were in his cell. Alkhanov was placed in a solitary confinement cell in Taganrog's SIZO-2, restricted in daily walks, has no access to personal hygiene products, was not given personal items, and cannot even change into clean clothes. Magomed is not allowed to see a lawyer. The detention center staff say that the man refuses to meet with his lawyer, but his relatives do not believe this. They fear that violence is being used against Alkhanov to obtain a confession about complicity in the preparation of an escape from SIZO-1, the report states. Along with Alkhanov, at least three prisoners were transferred to Taganrog - two Chechens and a Dagestani. They are also not allowed to see lawyers, human rights activists emphasized. A recess has been declared in the consideration of the case against Alkhanov, which has been ongoing since December 2022, and the next hearing is scheduled for August 5, according to the case file on the website of the Southern District Military Court. Magomed Alkhanov, in particular, is accused of involvement in the attack on the Pskov paratroopers in Chechnya. On the night of March 1, 2000, soldiers of the 6th company of the 104th Regiment of the 76th Guards Airborne Division entered into battle in Chechnya with a large detachment of Shamil Basayev and Khattab. The company held off the onslaught of about 2,000 militants for about a day, who were trying to break out of the encirclement. Then 84 of the 90 servicemen died, 370 militants were killed. Among the reasons for the tragedy, analysts name corruption and incompetence of the command and officers, according to the reference material " Battle for Height 776: How the Pskov paratroopers died ", published on the "Caucasian Knot". | |
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Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia | |
The court sides with a convict from Chechnya in a dispute with the colony administration | |
2024-04-16 | |
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. [KavkazUzel] The appellate instance did not satisfy the appeal of the colony administration against the decision of the Grozny court, which recognized violations of the rights of a native of Chechnya, Arbi Dandaev, who was convicted in the case of the attack of Basayev’s
As the "Caucasian Knot" wrote, the Supreme Court of Dagestan in March 2009 sentenced Chechen resident Arbi Dandaev to life imprisonment, recognizing that during the militant attack on Dagestan in 1999, Dandaev personally participated in the execution of six servicemen. The Supreme Court of Russia recognized the verdict as legal, and in August 2009 it entered into legal force. On August 7, 1999, more than a thousand armed fighters led by Shamil Basayev and Jordanian Amir Khattab (also referred to as Emir Khattab) entered Dagestan from Chechnya. Fighting continued in the republic for more than a month; only on September 15, 1999, Defense Minister Igor Sergeev announced that the territory of Dagestan was completely liberated from the participants in the attack, according to the “Caucasian Knot” certificate “ Invasion of militants in Dagestan (1999) .” The Supreme Court of Chechnya upheld the decision of the Visaitovsky District Court of Grozny dated June 28, 2022, which partially satisfied Arbi Dandaev’s claim against the colony in the Khabarovsk Territory. Dandaev demanded that the actions of the administration be declared illegal and that compensation be awarded to him for violating the conditions of detention; the district court’s decision was appealed by the colony’s management, as stated in the appeal ruling posted on the website of the Supreme Court of the Republic. In his lawsuit, Arbi Dandaev stated that “the defendant violated the conditions of detention for a long time.” In particular, according to the document, the Constitution and the Chechen-Russian dictionary were confiscated from the convict, the electricity was turned off during the fasting month of Ramadan, his opportunities for watching films and videos and television programs were limited, and he was kept “in a metal cage during court hearings in a video conference room.” connections." Arbi Dandaev demanded compensation of 500 thousand rubles. The court ordered the administration of colony No. 6 of the Federal Penitentiary Service for the Khabarovsk Territory to return to Dandaev the brochure “The Constitution of the Russian Federation” and the Chechen-Russian dictionary, declared the power outage during the month of Ramadan illegal and ordered the colony to pay Dandaev ten thousand rubles. The district court did not satisfy the remaining requirements, as indicated in the publication of the Supreme Court. "In the appeal, the representative of PKU IK-6 of the Federal Penitentiary Service of Russia for the Khabarovsk Territory O.V. Shadrina asks the court to cancel the decision as illegal and unfounded, and to make a new decision in the case to refuse to satisfy the claims. In the court of appeal, A.Kh. Dandaev ., participating in the court hearing through the use of video conferencing systems, objected to the arguments of the complaint and asked the court’s decision to be left unchanged,” the document says. Contrary to the arguments of the appeal, the district court, when determining the amount of compensation for violation of the conditions of detention of the convicted person, “took into account the nature and duration of the violations, the circumstances under which these violations were committed, the amount of compensation corresponds to the principle of reasonableness and fairness,” the Supreme Court indicated. “The decision of the Visaitovsky District Court of the city of Grozny dated June 28, 2022 is left unchanged and the appeal is not satisfied,” the judge ruled. Let us remind you that Arbi Dandaev has previously initiated litigation. So, in 2020, he demanded 300 thousand rubles as compensation for moral damages for prolonged detention in solitary confinement in a pre-trial detention center in Makhachkala in 2008-2009. The court refused to satisfy the claim, and Dandaev in a new claim changed the defendant from the Makhachkala pre-trial detention center to the department of the Federal Penitentiary Service for Dagestan. In May 2022, the Kirov District Court of Makhachkala again rejected his claim. In addition, Dandaev challenged the decision of the Grozny district court, which refused to recognize as illegal the decision of the leadership of the colony in the Sverdlovsk region to place Dandaev on preventive registration as prone to escape. In August 2022, the Supreme Court of Chechnya upheld the decision of the district court. | |
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Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia |
Two people charged in the case of Basayev's raid on Dagestan |
2024-03-23 |
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. [KavkazUzel] The case of two people accused of participating in the attack of militants Basayev and Khattab on Dagestan in 1999 has been brought to court. As the "Caucasian Knot" wrote, the detention of the alleged participants in the attack of the Basayev and Khattab group on Dagestan continues after almost a quarter of a century. Thus, in December 2023, the Investigative Committee reported that a native of Dagestan, Ibragim Magomedov, had been detained, whom investigators considered to be a participant in the attack of militants Basayev and Khattab on the republic in 1999. On August 7, 1999, more than a thousand armed fighters from Chechnya entered the territory of Dagestan under the leadership of Shamil Basayev and Jordanian Amir Khattab. Fighting continued in the republic for more than a month. Only on September 15, 1999, the Minister of Defense announced that the territory of Dagestan had been completely liberated, according to the “Caucasian Knot” certificate “ Invasion of Militants in Dagestan (1999).” The case of two people accused of attacking military personnel in the Botlikhsky district in 1999 was transferred to the Southern District Military Court in Rostov-on-Don, the Prosecutor General's Office announced today. “They are accused under Part 2 of Article 209 (participation in a stable armed group (gang), Article 279 (active participation in an armed rebellion for the purpose of forcibly changing the constitutional system of the Russian Federation and violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation), Article 317 (attack on the lives of military personnel in for the purpose of obstructing the legitimate activities of these persons to protect public order and ensure public safety) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation,” says the publication on the department’s website. According to investigators, the accused have been members since 1999 “of a gang created on the territory of the Chechen Republic by Basayev and Khattab.” “As part of which they participated in an armed rebellion in the area of the village of Rakhata, Botlikh district, where they attacked a military maneuver group,” the prosecutor’s office said. Previously, the cases of more than 90 accused of the attack were also sent to court, some of them have already been sentenced to various terms of imprisonment, the publication notes. The cases of participation in the gangs of Basayev and Khattab are of the same type and are often falsified, lawyer Narine Airapetyan previously told the Caucasian Knot. "The witnesses are the same everywhere. Five witnesses are usually taken - three classified witnesses and two open," she said. Hayrapetyan emphasized that cases are being fabricated against innocent people as well. “When people did not participate, but under threat, including torture, other people are forced to testify against them. <...> For example, one of my clients, who is currently serving a sentence in the Ulyanovsk region, told me that he was under pressure in order to force him to testify on the events of 1999 against people whom he had never known before,” the lawyer noted. |
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