Hello !
| Ahmad Samir | Ahmad Samir | al-Tawhid | Iraq-Jordan | 20050721 | |||||
| Anas Samir | Anas Samir | al-Tawhid | Iraq-Jordan | 20050721 | |||||
| Sabri Samirah | Sabri Samirah | Islamic Association for Palestine | Home Front | 20030127 | |||||
| president of the United Muslim Americans Association in Palos Hills, outside Chicago; immigration officials denied him permission to return after visiting his parents in Jordan. | |||||||||
| Sabri Samirah | United Muslim Americans Association | Home Front | Jordanian | Big Shot | 20030127 | ||||
| president of the United Muslim Americans Association in Palos Hills, outside Chicago; immigration officials denied him permission to return after visiting his parents in Jordan. | |||||||||
| Salim Samir Baamer | Salim Samir Baamer | al-Qaeda in Africa | Africa: East | 20030826 | |||||
| Samir Abd al-Aziz al-Najim | Samir Abd al-Aziz al-Najim | Iraqi Baath Party | Iraq | 20030507 | |||||
| Samir Abdulaziz Al Najm | Samir Abdulaziz Al Najm | Iraqi Baath Party | Axis of Evil | 20030108 | |||||
| Samir Ait Mohamed | Samir Ait Mohamed | al-Qaeda | Great White North | 20040108 | |||||
| Samir Al-Biyuk | Samir Al-Biyuk | Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine | Middle East | 20031012 | |||||
| Samir Asli | Samir Asli | al-Qaeda in Europe | Europe | Algerian? | Arrested | Tough Guy | 20030129 | ||
| charged with conspiring to develop or produce chemical weapons | |||||||||
| Samir Azzouz | Samir Azzouz | Hofstadgroup | Europe | 20051221 | Link | ||||
| Samir Feddag | Samir Feddag | al-Qaeda in Europe | Europe | Algerian? | Arrested | Tough Guy | 20030129 | ||
| charged with conspiring to develop or produce chemical weapons | |||||||||
| Samir Feddag | al-Qaeda | Europe | 20030113 | ||||||
| Samir Fouda | Samir Fouda | Hamas | Middle East | 20031024 | |||||
| Samir Ghosheh | Samir Ghosheh | Popular Struggle Front | Middle East | 20030123 | |||||
| Samir Ghosheh | Palestinian Authority | Israel-Palestine | Palestinian | 20020609 | |||||
| Samir Hakim | Samir Hakim | Abu Sayyaf | Southeast Asia | Filipino | 20030625 | ||||
| Samir Kandil | Samir Kandil | Palestinian Authority | Middle East | Palestinian | 20020906 | ||||
| Samir Kishk | Samir Kishk | Salafist Group for Call and Combat | Africa North | 20011201 | |||||
| Samir Kishk | al-Qaeda | 20011201 | |||||||
| Samir Kuntar | Samir Kuntar | Hizballah | Southeast Asia | 20060719 | Link | ||||
| Samir Kuntar | Hezbollah | Syria-Lebanon-Iran | 20051226 | Link | |||||
| Samir Kuntar | Palestine Liberation Front | Israel-Palestine-Jordan | 20060802 | Link | |||||
| Samir Mahdjoub | Samir Mahdjoub | Ansar al-Islam | Europe | 20040519 | Link | ||||
| Samir Masharawi | Samir Masharawi | Fatah | Israel-Palestine-Jordan | 20060402 | Link | ||||
| Samir Mashharawi | Samir Mashharawi | Fatah | Israel-Palestine-Jordan | 20051214 | |||||
| Samir Rousha | Samir Rousha | Popular Front Struggle | Israel-Palestine | 20040525 | Link | ||||
| Samir Saleh Abdullah Al-Suwailem | Samir Saleh Abdullah Al-Suwailem | Chechnya | Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia | Saudi | Deceased | Big Shot | 20021228 | ||
| Real name (purported) of Chechen Arab leader Khattab | |||||||||
| Samir Salih Abdallah al-Suwaylim | Samir Salih Abdallah al-Suwaylim | Chechnya | Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia | 20060130 | Link | ||||
| Samir Suleiman Al-Ansari | Samir Suleiman Al-Ansari | al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula | Arabia | 20040504 | Link | ||||
| Samir al-Ansari | al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula | Arabia | 20040503 | Link | |||||
| Samir Yahia Awadh | Samir Yahia Awadh | al-Qaeda Freelance | 20020518 | ||||||
| Samir al-Aziz al-Najem | Samir al-Aziz al-Najem | Iraqi Baath Party | Iraq | 20030419 | |||||
| Samir al-Aziz al-Najim | Samir al-Aziz al-Najim | Iraqi Baath Party | Iraq | 20030421 | |||||
| Samir al-Imbayed | Samir al-Imbayed | Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades | Middle East | Palestinian | Deceased | Cannon Fodder | 20040125 | ||
| Killed while reconnoitring an Israeli army position along the fortified fence between Gaza and Israel | |||||||||
| Israel-Palestine-Jordan |
| Israel is killing Hamas's next generation of commanders - can it break the cycle? |
| 2026-11-16 |
If it doesn’t at least they’ll be dead, reducing the scum in the gene pool. After 10/7 Israel is considerably less interested in having someone to negotiate with than in ensuring the Hamas leadership doesn’t get the chance to become competent and get bright ideas. [Jpost] By targeting replacement commanders soon after their appointments, Israel may seek to prevent Hamas's ability to re-establish its command and control.The IDF’s elimination of Hamas ..one of the armed feet of the Moslem Brüderbund millipede,...Rafah Brigade commander Samir Mahmoud Hassan Abu Younis overnight from Saturday to Sunday illustrates an emerging pattern in Israel’s operations in Gazoo ...Hellhole adjunct to Israel and Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, inhabited by Gazooks. The place was acquired in the wake of the 1967 War and then presented to Paleostinian control in 2006 by Ariel Sharon, who had entered his dotage. It is currently ruled with a rusty iron fist by Hamas with about the living conditions you'd expect. It periodically attacks the Hated Zionist Entity whenever Iran needs a ruckus created or the hard boyz get bored, getting thumped by the IDF in return. The ruling turbans then wave the bloody shirt and holler loudly about oppressionand disproportionate response... The Israeli military is systematically targeting Hamas commanders who have recently been appointed to replace senior officers killed earlier in the war. Will this prevent Hamas from rebuilding its forces? If the tactic is not paired with a strategy to permanently remove Hamas, will this merely be another iteration of what the IDF has done in the past? The IDF and Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) reported on Sunday that they eliminated Abu Younis in a strike in the southern Gaza Strip. "Samir Abu Younis served as the commander of the Rafah Brigade for only approximately two months, following the elimination of the brigade’s previous commander, Nael Abu Obeid, on September 15," the IDF said. The Israeli military said that Abu Younis had previously served as deputy commander of the Rafah Brigade and commander of the Tel al-Sultan Battalion. He was not a new figure within Hamas’s military hierarchy. He was an experienced officer promoted to replace commanders who had been eliminated. It’s surprising he survived this long since most Hamas battalion and company commanders have been eliminated in the last three years of war. According to the IDF, Abu Younis had directed attacks against Israeli civilians and soldiers and sought to rebuild the brigade’s capabilities after its losses in the Israel-Hamas War. Purportedly, he joined Hamas’ Izzadin al-Qassam Brigades in 1991 and was involved in planning and overseeing the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel. In yet another example of the cycle of Gaza fighting. Abu Younis’ targeting follows a series of strikes against commanders of Hamas’s two southern Gaza brigades. On November 12, the IDF targeted Muhammad Abu Ismail, identified by the military as the commander of Hamas’s Khan Yunis Brigade, in a strike at the Nasser Hospital complex in Khan Yunis. On September 11, the IDF announced that it had eliminated Muhammad Yazouri, who had previously commanded the same brigade. The IDF has cleared Khan Yunis of Hamas several times in the war, beginning in early 2024. It also had cleared Nasser Hospital. Each time, the area was handed back to Hamas control. Even though the IDF today controls around 65% of Gaza, Hamas is still in control of the rest and of the lives of two million civilians. The Rafah Brigade has experienced turnover similar to that of Khan Yunis. Rafah was conquered by the IDF in the spring and summer of 2024. It was then partially razed. The IDF took over most of Rafah again in March and April 2025. Hamas returned to some areas and had to be cleared out again. Even after the ceasefire in October 2025, some Hamas members remained underground in a tunnel complex. Abu Obeid, eliminated in September, had replaced Muhammad Shabana, killed in an Israeli strike on May 13, 2025, alongside senior Hamas leader Mohammed Sinwar. The succession of commanders illustrates the difficulty Hamas faces in keeping these men alive in their roles, only to see even their replacements killed. IDF STRIKES HAMAS COMMANDERS ACROSS ENTIRE MILITARY STRUCTURE Historically, Hamas’s military wing was organized into five regional brigades: North Gaza, Gaza City, Central Gaza, Khan Yunis, and Rafah. These included battalions and smaller units responsible for operations in their respective areas. During more than three years of war, the IDF has targeted commanders throughout this structure, from brigade leaders to battalion and company commanders. Israel has also sought to dismantle command centers, tunnel networks, weapons production facilities, and other military infrastructure. However, you can observe a lot just by watching... the elimination of a commander does not necessarily mean the elimination of a military formation. Hamas can appoint replacements, transfer surviving officers between units, and attempt to rebuild its command networks. This is particularly important in southern Gaza. Israel controls Rafah, yet Hamas continues to appoint commanders to its Rafah Brigade. These commanders may be operating from other parts of Gaza, such as Khan Yunis. The latest strike shows the difference between controlling territory and preventing a terrorist army from regenerating. By targeting replacement commanders soon after their appointments, Israel may seek to prevent Hamas’s ability to re-establish its command and control. However, you can observe a lot just by watching... so far Hamas has not collapsed and continues to hold on as it has in earlier rounds of war in previous decades. Experienced Hamas members are being targeted, though. How deep is Hamas's bench of commanders? This approach by Israel creates a dilemma for Hamas. The gunnies must continue appointing commanders to maintain a semblance of military command, but each new appointment potentially exposes another senior officer to being killed. The IDF said that Abu Younis had been working to restore the brigade’s force buildup, indicating that efforts to rebuild Hamas’s capabilities remained a problem. The military also said it had taken precautions to reduce civilian casualties during the strike, including through the use of precision weapons and aerial surveillance. IDF CAMPAIGN AGAINST HAMAS LEADERSHIP ENTERS NEW PHASE The broader significance of these operations is that Israel appears determined to prevent Hamas from reconstituting its military command even after major combat operations have subsided. The repeated targeting of replacement commanders in Rafah and Khan Yunis suggests that the campaign against Hamas’s leadership has entered a new phase. Most Hamas fighters and commanders alive on October 7, 2023, have been killed. In July 2024, the IDF reported that it had eliminated six brigade commanders, more than 20 battalion commanders, and approximately 150 company commanders in Gaza since the beginning of the Israel-Hamas War. In October 2025, the IDF reported that the 99th Division alone had eliminated five battalion commanders and nine company commanders along with their deputies during four months of operations in northern Gaza. The IDF also confirmed that Shabana, the Rafah Brigade commander, was killed alongside Sinwar and South Khan Yunis Battalion commander Mahdi Quara on May 13, 2025. Israel has spent years seeking to erode Hamas’s command structure, and the latest operations are a continuing effort to prevent its regeneration. The terrorist group, meanwhile, continues to recruit, as well as to appoint new commanders. As time elapses, Hamas will rebuild, as it has in the past. It remains to be seen whether killing replacement Hamas commanders, and then their replacements, will have a strategic effect. |
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| Israel-Palestine-Jordan |
| Israel kills top Hamas commander who had plans to ‘carry out terror attacks' |
| 2026-11-16 |
More about this story from yesterday, with photos. [NYPost] A top Hamas commander with plans “to advance and carry out terror attacks” was killed by Israeli forces on Sunday – only two months after replacing his predecessor, military officials said. Samir Mahmoud Hassan Abu Younis, who had allegedly directed attacks against Israeli civilians and soldiers, was killed in an early morning airstrike in southern Gaza, the IDF said. Hamas officials confirmed in a statement that Abu Younis died in the strike and that a funeral would be held for him later Sunday. Abu Younis was a longtime member of Hamas’ military hierarchy, joining the Izzadin al-Qassam Brigades in 1991, the IDF told the Jerusalem Post. Israeli officials said that Abu Younis also had a hand in planning and overseeing the Oct. 7 attack that killed over 1,000 Israeli citizens and soldiers. Officials said that other Hamas militants were targeted in the Sunday night strike, but provided no further details. Last month, two Hamas commanders, including one involved in holding three Israeli hostages during the ongoing Israeli-Hamas war were killed. Israeli military officials said that Muhammad Yazji, a Hamas commander in the Shati Battalion, was killed in an airstrike in Gaza City on Oct. 5. The IDF said that Yazji had been involved in holding Emily Damari, Romi Gonen and Matan Angrest hostage for over a year. Hamas commander targeted at Nasser Hospital loses leg, suffers severe head injury [Jpost] Muhammad Abu Ismail, commander of Hamas's Khan Yunis Brigade, suffered a severe head injury and had his leg amputated after surviving an Israeli targeted strike at Nasser Hospital in the southern Gaza Strip on Thursday, according to Israeli sources. The strike against Abu Ismail was part of a series of operations targeting senior Hamas commanders in southern Gaza, with another targeted strike carried out overnight between Saturday and Sunday. Security officials said the operation was the fifth attempt to eliminate a Hamas brigade commander in the past two months, as part of a systematic effort to dismantle the senior chain of command of Hamas's military wing. The list includes the elimination of Ahmed Ghandour, commander of Hamas's northern Gaza Brigade, and two strikes targeting commanders of the Khan Yunis Brigade. The first resulted in the elimination of Rafa'a Salameh, while the second critically wounded his successor. Two additional targeted strikes were carried out against commanders of Hamas's Rafah Brigade: Nael Abu Obeid, who was killed on September 15, and Samir Abu Younis, who was targeted overnight between Saturday and Sunday. Related: Muhammad Abu Ismail 11/13/2026 IDF directed by the Shin Bet, attacked the terrorist Muhammad Abu Ismail and other terrorists in Nasser Hospital in Khan Yuni Muhammad Abu Ismail 11/12/2026 IDF strikes Hamas terrorists planning attacks from Khan Yunis's Nasser Hospital |
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| Israel-Palestine-Jordan |
| IDF, Shin Bet confirm death of Hamas' Rafah Brigade commander in targeted southern Gaza strike |
| 2026-11-15 |
| [Jpost] Defense Minister Israel Katz indicated in a social media post shortly after the IDF announcement on Saturday night that the target had been killed. The IDF and Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) killed Samir Mahmoud Hassan Abu Younis, the commander of Hamas ..a contraction of the Arabic words for "frothing at the mouth",...'s Rafah Brigade, in a targeted Saturday strike in the Gazoo ...Hellhole adjunct to Israel and Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, inhabited by Gazooks. The place was acquired in the wake of the 1967 War and then presented to Paleostinian control in 2006 by Ariel Sharon, who had entered his dotage. It is currently ruled with a rusty iron fist by Hamas with about the living conditions you'd expect. It periodically attacks the Hated Zionist Entity whenever Iran needs a ruckus created or the hard boyz get bored, getting thumped by the IDF in return. The ruling turbans then wave the bloody shirt and holler loudly about oppressionand disproportionate response... Strip, the agencies confirmed on Sunday morning. Abu Younis, 53, served as the commander of the Rafah Brigade for only about two months, having taken over from the previous brigade commander, Nael Abu Obeid. Obeid was killed by the IDF and Shin Bet on September 15. "NEXT!" Abu Younis had been a member of the al-Qassam Brigades since 1991 and held several senior operational roles in Rafah. Hamas sources confirmed Abu Younis' death to Rooters on Saturday, later announcing that his funeral would be held on Sunday afternoon in Khan Yunis. Later on Saturday, Army Radio reported that Younis had been killed in the dronezap. Medics said that alongside Younis, others were maimed in the strike that targeted him in a street in the Mawasi area of Khan Yunis. 'ANOTHER ONE JOINS HIS PREDECESSORS IN THE DEPTHS OF HELL' Defense Minister Israel Katz indicated in a social media post shortly after the IDF announcement on Saturday night that the target had been killed. The IDF had not yet confirmed his death. "The IDF continues to eliminate Hamas leaders in Gaza," Katz wrote. "And another one joins his predecessors in the depths of hell." Related: Rafah Brigade: 2026-11-09 IDF reveals 10 km Rafah tunnel where Hamas held Hadar Goldin's remains, one year after his return Rafah Brigade: 2026-10-14 IDF killed five terrorists from the Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorist organizations in southern Gaza Strip Rafah Brigade: 2026-10-13 IDF kills five Hamas, PIJ terrorists in separate Gaza strikes |
| Link |
| Africa North | ||
| The Muslim Brotherhood thing: Abdul El-Sayed’s historic Senate victory sparks mixed reactions across Egypt, the Middle East | ||
| 2026-11-08 | ||
| [Jpost] Samir Ragheb, President of the Arab Foundation for Development and Strategic Studies, told TML that although El-Sayed "carries weight across the Arab and Muslim worlds … Cairo heard criticism." From Cairo to the Gulf, analysts see the Democratic takeover of Congress as a potential turning point for US military assistance, relations with Israel, and the confrontation with Iran, while stressing that Arab governments are unlikely to abandon their long-term strategic calculations. The Democratic Party’s sweeping victory in the US midterm elections, securing control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate, has raised new questions across the Middle East about the future of Washington’s regional policies, its military commitments, and the balance of power between the White House and Congress. For Arab countries, the implications extend beyond US President Donald Trump ...His ancestors didn't own any slaves... 's and the Republican Party's domestic political defeat. With the ongoing confrontation involving Iran, growing scrutiny of American military assistance to Israel, and the emergence of progressive Arab and Moslem political figures in Washington, the election results are being examined through the broader lens of regional security and economic interests. For Egypt, El-Sayed's victory presents a more complicated picture. Although his Egyptian background and criticism of American military involvement in the Middle East attracted attention, his previous remarks about Egypt's political system generated controversy. EL-SAYED CARRIED WEIGHT ACROSS ARAB, MUSLIM WORLDS "Abdul El-Sayed
...Hellhole adjunct to Israel and Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, inhabited by Gazooks. The place was acquired in the wake of the 1967 War and then presented to Paleostinian control in 2006 by Ariel Sharon, who had entered his dotage. It is currently ruled with a rusty iron fist by Hamas with about the living conditions you'd expect. It periodically attacks the Hated Zionist Entity whenever Iran needs a ruckus created or the hard boyz get bored, getting thumped by the IDF in return. The ruling turbans then wave the bloody shirt and holler loudly about oppressionand disproportionate response... and his opposition to the Iran ...a theocratic Shiite state divided among the Medes, the Persians, and the (Arab) Elamites. Formerly a fairly civilized nation ruled by a Shah, it became a victim of Islamic revolution in 1979. The nation is today noted for spontaneouslytaking over other countries' embassies, maintaining whorehouses run by clergymen, involvement in international drug trafficking, and financing sock puppet militiasto extend the regime's influence. The word Iranis a cognate form of Aryan.The abbreviation IRGCis the same idea as Stürmabteilung (or SA).The term Supreme Guideis a the modern version form of either Duceor Führeror maybe both. They hate war won him wide sympathy in the Arab street, the Egyptian street included. We felt it here too. But his statements after his primary win changed that," Samir Ragheb, President of the Arab Foundation for Development and Strategic Studies, told The Media Line. "He said his family came from 'a country without democracy' and said he would not fund what he called a 'strangling grip' on the Egyptian people. Cairo heard criticism, not friendship, and public opinion split. Supporters of the national path found his words offensive. Others asked why an American politician would take such a position against Egypt," he added. El-Sayed's remarks, made after his Democratic primary victory in August, targeted US taxpayer funding and what he described as a lack of democracy in Egypt. He has also opposed unconditional American military assistance to other countries, including Israel. Ragheb cautioned against assuming that an American politician's ethnic or religious identity would necessarily translate into policies favorable to the country of his family's origin. "Perspective matters. He is one of a hundred senators. We do not see him as an enemy or as a friend. We do not count on him to do good, and we do not fear he will do harm. He is American first, born and raised in the US, and his loyalties lie there. We may welcome him, but we should not mistake him for one of us. His real impact is yet to unfold," he noted. His assessment underscores a distinction between the symbolic importance of Arab and Moslem representation in American institutions and the practical consequences such representation may have for bilateral relations. Yet assessments from Egypt and Bahrain suggest that the Democratic victory does not necessarily translate into an immediate transformation of American foreign policy. Instead, it imposes new political constraints on an administration that will retain executive power for another two years, while Arab governments continue pursuing strategies to reduce their dependence on Washington. "The Democratic wins in both the House and the Senate come as no surprise to those tracking recent US polling and public sentiment," a former Bahraini diplomat told The Media Line, requesting anonymity and attribution only by that description. The November 3 elections handed Democrats ...every time you hear the phrase white people, white supremacy, whiteanything but paint, you're listening to a Democrat. Ask him/her/it to reimagine something for you; they do that a lot, though not well. They can hear a dog whistle a mile or two away. They invented the spoils system and Tammany Hall, and inspired the addition of the word (Thomas) Nastyto the English language. They want to stop continental drift and repeal the law of unintended side effects... control of both chambers of Congress, following a campaign dominated by concerns over the cost of living, the economic consequences of the Iran war, and dissatisfaction with the Trump administration's policies. The incoming Congress, which takes office on January 3, 2027, will have greater authority to conduct oversight, investigate administration decisions, and influence federal spending. Nevertheless, Trump will remain president and retain significant power over diplomacy, military operations, and foreign policy. For Cairo, this distinction remains fundamental. "Congress has changed hands, but Egypt's calculations have not. Cairo watches the shift calmly and confidently, because it has prepared for it," Ragheb said. "The Egyptian state deals with the White House first. President Trump keeps the executive for two more years. But Congress holds the purse, and a Democratic Congress can now shape US military aid to Egypt in ways the president cannot block. Expect closer scrutiny of aid and arms sales in committee," he added. Ragheb's assessment reflects the importance Egypt places on maintaining working relationships with successive American administrations, regardless of their political affiliation. However, some people cause happiness wherever they go; others whenever they go... congressional control over appropriations and oversight could put additional pressure on the bilateral relationship, particularly on military financing and arms transfers. Congress can attach conditions to assistance, conduct investigations, and influence future appropriations. However, some people cause happiness wherever they go; others whenever they go... significant changes to spending legislation remain subject to the broader legislative process, including the president's veto authority. Egypt remains one of Washington's principal military partners in the Middle East, a relationship consolidated following the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.
For fiscal year 2026, Congress approved $1.375 billion in Foreign Military Financing for Egypt, with $320 million subject to human rights ...which are often intentionally defined so widely as to be meaningless... and other conditions, along with provisions allowing waivers on national security grounds. In October, the Trump administration waived human rights-related conditions for $320 million in fiscal 2025 military assistance, citing Egypt's contribution to regional security following the escalation involving Iran. The election of a Democratic majority therefore raises questions about whether Congress could demand more oversight, particularly on human rights, weapons transfers, and the conditions attached to future assistance. Ragheb, however, argued that Egypt has already considered alternatives should Washington reconsider its financial commitments. EGYPT READY FOR EVERY SCENARIO ON AID "On aid, Egypt is ready for every scenario. America gains from having Egypt as a friend, more than Egypt gains from the aid. That’s certainly one theory… Egypt has other sources of arms and other sources of financing. The Chinese and Russian options are open," he noted.Russia used to have money — now they have a war with Ukraine. China has a bursting financial bubble. Saudi Arabia has more expenses and less oil income than they used to, much to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s mortification. Things are much more interesting than they were before. "If Washington withholds aid, it has nothing left to punish Egypt with. Egypt can buy tanker aircraft from China, the S-400 and the Su-35 from Russia, and fighters from China's J family. In theory, sure. In practice, with what money? Egypt is already going broke again — 55% of government spending is interest on government debt, while over half of the government’s revenue is actually borrowed, robbing Peter to pay Paul. This does not worry us. Trump's term released some frozen aid, but it did not raise the aid's value. It did not solve the two core problems either, credit and cash flow financing," he added.Although Ragheb characterized American assistance as unchanged, the fiscal 2026 military financing allocation was $75 million higher than Egypt's longstanding annual baseline of approximately $1.3 billion. His references to Chinese and Russian weapons systems describe potential procurement alternatives rather than confirmed Egyptian purchases. The broader question is whether a Democratic Congress could encourage Cairo to further diversify its military partnerships, or whether its established strategic relationship with Washington would remain strong enough to withstand additional political scrutiny. Beyond relations between governments, the election results have also drawn attention for the success of progressive candidates, including politicians of Arab and Moslem backgrounds who challenged established positions on US foreign policy. Among the most significant developments was the election of Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan, making him the first Moslem elected to the United States Senate. El-Sayed, an American politician of Egyptian descent, defeated Republican Mike Rogers after a closely watched campaign in which American military assistance to Israel, the war with Iran, and the influence of political lobbying organizations became prominent issues. His victory followed considerable spending by groups aligned with the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), which had opposed his candidacy. For the former Bahraini diplomat, the significance of these victories extends beyond the identities of individual candidates. "The success of several progressive, Arab, and Moslem candidates, despite facing heavily funded opposition, signals a noticeable shift in domestic political dynamics. Coupled with AIPAC’s decision to keep its donor list private and Trump’s election-evening comments about halting financial aid to Israel early next year, it is clear that the US-Israel partnership is no longer immune to public debate." He added, "American voters are increasingly questioning unconditional foreign intervention and military spending, particularly in the Arab World." The diplomat's assessment comes as Israel has become an increasingly prominent issue in American elections. On October 21, AIPAC announced that it would stop directly endorsing candidates and making direct political action committee contributions, while its affiliated super PAC would continue operating. That announcement should be distinguished from the diplomat's characterization of a decision concerning donor-list privacy. On November 3, Trump also announced that the United States would stop providing roughly $4 billion in annual assistance to Israel after the end of 2026, saying that an understanding had been reached with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The announcement came despite an existing US-Israel military assistance agreement providing $3.8 billion annually through September 2028. President Trump did not explain how the funding would end ahead of that timetable, raising questions about implementation and Congress's role. The political significance of these developments is considerable, although they do not necessarily indicate a consensus within the Democratic Party over future relations with Israel. The confrontation between Washington, Israel, and Tehran represents another major concern for the region following the midterm elections. The Democratic victory comes amid continued uncertainty over the direction of American military operations against Iran and the possibility of further escalation. The former Bahraini diplomat interpreted the election outcome as potentially favorable to Tehran's broader strategic calculations, particularly if stronger Democratic representation limits the Trump administration's ability to sustain prolonged military commitments. "Also from a geopolitical standpoint, Tehran seems to have been watching these developments closely. Iran’s strategy was never built on direct military confrontation on the US soil, but it instead relied on strategic patience, asymmetric attrition, leveraging prolonged negotiations, maritime friction, and high energy prices to strain US domestic optics." He continued, "In Tehran’s eyes, a constrained Republican leadership and a stronger progressive presence in Washington could count as a tactical win in the current conflict." The assessment points to the domestic political costs of sustained military involvement in the Middle East, particularly when disruptions to energy markets place additional pressure on American consumers. Nevertheless, congressional control does not automatically determine military policy. The president retains significant authority over the armed forces, while Congress can influence military funding, oversight, and the legal framework governing American involvement. The period between the election and the beginning of the new congressional session consequently presents an additional source of uncertainty. "However, some people cause happiness wherever they go; others whenever they go... the transition window leading into early next year remains critical. With full authority still in place until the new Congress takes office, a bold military move against Iran, and any subsequent retaliation across the Gulf, to set a new reality on the ground remains possible," the Bahraini diplomat said. The diplomat's warning highlights the distinction between the political consequences of an election and the administration's remaining capacity to make consequential military decisions. Whether the Democratic victory ultimately translates into a different approach toward Tehran will depend on the interaction between congressional pressure, the administration's strategic objectives, and developments in the conflict itself. ARAB STATES BRACE FOR SIGNIFICANT CHANGES For Arab states, however, the implications of the elections are not limited to Washington's decisions. Regional security arrangements have undergone significant changes as governments seek alternatives to their longstanding dependence on American military protection. Saudi Arabia ...a kingdom taking up the bulk of the Arabian peninsula, largely made up of sand and oil rigs. Its primary economic activity involves exporting oil and soaking Islamic rubes on the annual haj pilgrimage. The country supports a large number of princes in whatcha might call princely splendor. Formerly dictatorial and steeped in Olde Tyme Religion, deferring to Salafist holy men on all issues, it has now done a 180 and is making a serious effort to modernize, so as not to be left in the sand by its Gulf Arab neighbors. The holy men have been shoved to the background and the nation is now still dictatorial but somewhat rational. That doesn't make them trustworthy, but it's a start...'s growing defense cooperation with Pakistain and ...the occupiers of Greek Asia Minor... has become one example of this trend. In August, the three countries signed a joint defense agreement intended to strengthen cooperation and collective deterrence. Ragheb argued that these developments reflect a broader strategic reassessment that predates the American elections and is unlikely to be reversed by the change in congressional leadership. "On regional security, the region has already adjusted. Washington stepped back from defending its friends, and the states of the region rearranged their own defense. Egypt works with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has a defense pact with Pakistain and growing ties with Turkey. These arrangements are in place, and a change in Congress will not change them. A new trend is coming. Arab states will rely less on America for their arms," he said. "They will build weapons together, through joint manufacturing, and turn to partners beyond Washington. No US election will change that when it comes to Arab collective defense and national security," Ragheb continued. His argument suggests that the diversification of defense partnerships is increasingly viewed as a long-term strategic objective rather than a temporary reaction to individual American administrations. Such arrangements do not necessarily mean that Arab governments intend to abandon Washington. Instead, they reflect efforts to expand their military options, strengthen regional cooperation, and reduce exposure to political decisions made outside the region. This approach also helps explain why the Democratic victory is being assessed with caution rather than interpreted exclusively as an opportunity or a setback. The new congressional majority may introduce different priorities concerning military assistance, foreign intervention, and relations with Israel, but Arab governments must also account for the continuity of American executive power and their existing strategic relationships. For Egypt, Ragheb maintained that geography and regional diplomacy will remain central to the country's importance for both American political parties. "Egypt's strategic weight does not change with an election. Gaza, Rafah, the Suez Canal, and regional stability make Cairo a partner both parties need. Egypt's strategy is clear. It does not side with a party. It sides with its own interests and works with everyone in Washington, the White House and Congress alike," he said. Related: El-Sayed 11/04/2026 US Democratic tsunami: Three major challenges facing Israel after Republican defeat El-Sayed 11/04/2026 Trump: Netanyahu agreed to end $4 billion in US aid to Israel by end of 2026 El-Sayed 11/03/2026 In Michigan, a Black conservative group pushes Jewish and pro-Israel messaging | ||
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| Syria-Lebanon-Iran |
| Lebanon's Christians face mounting hostility as sectarian divisions deepen |
| 2026-11-05 |
| [Jpost] “The sentiment is ‘If you are not 100% with 'us,' then you must be 100% with 'them,'’ Help The Persecuted CEO Joshua Youssef explained. Leb ...Formerly inhabited by hardy Phoenecian traders, its official language is now Arabic, with the usual unpleasant side effects....’s sectarian tensions have resurfaced following a series of incidents and claims that have reignited divisions between the country’s religious communities. These include unsubstantiated allegations surrounding the murder of a Catholic priest, vandalism at a Maronite cemetery, and renewed circulation of claims about a 20,000-strong Christian force that could seek to disarm Hezbollah. On Sunday, statues were smashed by person or persons unknown at the Saints Cemetery in the Harat al-Fouar area of the Zgharta District. MTV Lebanon reported that those responsible had been identified and arrested within 24 hours of the incident. The attack follows several other incidents involving Christian religious sites in recent months. In August, L’Orient Today reported that unidentified individuals had broken into the historic Saint John Chrysostom Monastery in Koubba and vandalized its outdoor installations. In early May, the Saint Challita Shrine, located in a valley in North Lebanon’s Akkar district, was also vandalized. The incidents have added to concerns among Christians about the treatment of their religious sites. Those concerns have been compounded by a separate controversy surrounding the murder of Catholic priest Samir Daou. Anger has been directed at al-Mahatta, a Hezbollah-affiliated Lebanese media outlet that presents itself as independent, following its publication of allegations about the circumstances of Daou’s death. SITE ALLEGES DAOU KILLED BY SYRIAN SEX WORKER WITHOUT EVIDENCE Described by the Washington, DC-based Center for the National Interest as "Hezbollah’s new digital mouthpiece," the site alleged, without providing evidence, that Daou had been killed by a Syrian national with whom he had paid to have sexual relations. According to al-Mahatta, the Syrian national arrested in connection with Daou’s murder, identified in Lebanese media as Arkan Nadaf, claimed that the 62-year-old priest had attacked him and threatened to have him deported after he sought to end their relationship. The outlet did not explain how it had obtained the alleged account, attributing it only to a source. No other Lebanese media outlets have reported the allegations. The claims have been widely viewed as inflammatory given Daou’s religious background and Article 534 of the Lebanese Penal Code, which criminalizes "any sexual intercourse contrary to the order of nature" and carries a potential prison sentence of up to one year. The provision has been used to prosecute same-sex relations. AL-MAHATTA ACCUSED OF PROMOTING ANTI-CHRISTIAN SENTIMENT Several voices have accused al-Mahatta of promoting anti-Christian sentiment and have called for the outlet to be investigated by the authorities. The debate over the place of Christians in Lebanon has also intersected with the country’s wider political divisions over Hezbollah. A clip from a 2024 al-Mashhad TV interview with Camille Dory Chamoun, a Lebanese member of parliament and grandson of former Lebanese president Camille Nimr Chamoun, has recently resurfaced and gone viral, with some presenting it as new information. During the interview, Chamoun claimed that 20,000 Christians could be mobilized to disarm Hezbollah. He also asserted that 75% of the Lebanese public wanted to see the Iran-backed group disarmed. Hezbollah’s disarmament is already a deeply divisive ...politicians call things divisivewhen when the other side sez something they don't like. Their own statements are never divisive,they're principled... issue in Lebanon. The group has refused to surrender its weapons despite demands from the Lebanese government and has repeatedly drawn the country into destructive conflicts with Israel. But tensions have also emerged around the ability of Christian communities to rebuild and manage their own affairs, particularly in areas close to the Israeli border. Nagib Amil, the parish priest of Rmeish in southern Lebanon, has been repeatedly summoned in recent weeks following his attempt to defuse a dispute over what has been described as illegal construction in the village. In a letter to a judge concerning the dispute, Amil suggested that, given Israel’s presence in the area, it would be better to postpone legal action. The judge reportedly interpreted the comment as a threat to involve Israel in the matter. Prominent Lebanese academic Zena Mansour criticized the summons, describing it as "a moral transgression and a stab in the side of the resilience of the people of the south and the border villages." The renewed attention to past commentaries and these incidents highlights the growing tensions in Lebanon centered on the question of Hezbollah’s weapons, and pressure is building against Lebanon’s Christians community, whom experts say are being labeled as Zionists and punished for siding with the state. CHRISTIANS UNDER HEZBOLLAH FACE HOSTILITY, AGGRESSION Help The Persecuted CEO Joshua Youssef told The Jerusalem Post that many Christians live within Hezbollah-controlled areas and "historically, the group has treated Christians on a spectrum of behavior that ranges from placating Christians to outright hostility and aggression." "Christians have often found themselves caught between two fires: being labeled a Zionist for supporting Israel and being accused of dodging Israel’s response to Hezbollah’s aggression," he explained, adding that "simply by identifying as neutral in the Israeli/Lebanese conflict, there is an accusation of Zionism." "The sentiment is ’If you are not 100% with us, then you must be 100% with them,’" he explained. "Reality is much more nuanced. Christians desire to live in peace. They are tired of war, especially those who lived in Lebanon during the Civil War. They want to do everything in their power to avoid repeating it." |
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| Israel-Palestine-Jordan |
| IDF eliminates terrorist in rocket system affiliated with the terrorist Islamic Jihad Movement |
| 2026-10-02 |
Translated Text: #BREAKING | To Remove the Threat: Defense Forces Eliminate Terrorist in Rocket System Affiliated with the Terrorist Islamic Jihad Movement ⭕️The Defense Forces attacked yesterday (Wednesday) in the Khan Younis area, eliminating the terrorist Bilal Mahmoud Suleiman Al-Samiri, who was a terrorist in the rocket system affiliated with the Khan Younis Brigade, in the military wing of the terrorist Islamic Jihad Movement. ⭕️The terrorist advanced with terrorist plans, in a systematic violation of the ceasefire, and set up ambushes against Defense Forces troops operating in the Yellow Line area. He was eliminated with the aim of removing the threat he posed. ⭕️Defense Forces troops in the Southern Regional Command are deployed in the area in accordance with the agreement and will continue to operate to remove any immediate threat. |
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| Israel-Palestine-Jordan |
| Feuding Fatah officials meet as internal rifts risk poor showing in November election |
| 2026-09-01 |
| [IsraelTimes] After reconciliation between Abbas and Dahlan fails to bear fruit, dominant PA party works to heal more bridgeable divisions, such as one between Hussein al-Sheikh and Jibril Rajoub A meeting was held over the weekend between feuding senior Fatah officials Hussein al-Sheikh and Jibril Rajoub, as the West Bank’s dominant Paleostinian political party seeks to limit internal divisions ahead of November 28 legislative elections, two sources familiar with the matter told The Times of Israel on Monday. Rajoub has been boycotting Fatah meetings since June, when the party’s chief — Paleostinian Authority President the ineffectual Mahmoud Abbas ...aka Abu Mazen, a graduate of the prestigious unaccredited Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow with a doctorate in Holocaust Denial. While no Yasser Arafat, he has his own brand of evil, just a little more lowercase.... Sheikh was already serving as vice president of the PA, and the decision to name him deputy Fatah chief appeared to be part of an effort by the 90-year-old Abbas to consolidate power ahead of what is certain to be a grueling succession battle. Sheikh has offered Rajoub the ability to maintain the more junior role of Fatah secretary-general, but the veteran Paleostinian official has thus far refrained from taking the offer, the two sources said. Progress was made in bridging rifts during the meeting, and the pair are planning to appear in public in the coming days, one of the sources said. NO PROGRESS ON BRIDGING ABBAS-DAHLAN RIFT The meeting between Rajoub and Sheikh came roughly one week after the former held a meeting in Egypt with members of a breakaway Fatah faction headed by former PA Gazoo ...Hellhole adjunct to Israel and Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, inhabited by Gazooks. The place was acquired in the wake of the 1967 War and then presented to Paleostinian control in 2006 by Ariel Sharon, who had entered his dotage. It is currently ruled with a rusty iron fist by Hamas with about the living conditions you'd expect. It periodically attacks the Hated Zionist Entity whenever Iran needs a ruckus created or the hard boyz get bored, getting thumped by the IDF in return. The ruling turbans then wave the bloody shirt and holler loudly about oppressionand disproportionate response... security chief Mohammad Dahlan. Dahlan had a falling out with Abbas over 15 years ago, leading him to live in exile in the United Arab Emirates. He serves as a top adviser to Emirati President Mohammed bin Zayed and has become a key power broker that the US-controlled Board of Peace has used to mediate between the various regional players involved in the postwar management of Gaza. Dahlan’s Fatah faction has been seeking to return to the party, but Abbas has largely resisted efforts to reconcile with him unless stringent terms are met, and the meeting in Egypt did not lead to any progress toward that end, the sources said. THE HAMAS MEETING THAT NEVER MATERIALIZED Sheikh was also slated to meet with a delegation of Hamas ..the braying voice of Islamic Resistance®,...representatives while in Egypt to discuss the upcoming elections for the Paleostinian Legislative Council (PLC) and the umbrella Paleostine Liberation Organization’s separate parliamentary body, but the sit-down never materialized, a Paleostinian official said. Cooperation from Hamas will likely be required for PLC elections to be held in Gaza. While Hamas has agreed to cede governing powers in the Strip to a Board of Peace-overseen technocratic panel called the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, that handover has been stalled amid Israel’s rejection of the Board of Peace’s disarmament plan; and the terror group is still seen as maintaining significant political sway in the coastal enclave. Earlier this month, the PA submitted an official request to Israel’s Coordinator for Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) to allow election materials into Gaza so balloting can be held there in November for the first time in over 20 years. However, there's no worse danger than telling a mother her baby is ugly... Ramallah never received any response, the Paleostinian official said. COGAT referred The Times of Israel to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office, which did not reply to requests for comment. Israeli approval will also be needed to hold elections in East Jerusalem, though a Paleostinian official said this obstacle can be overcome through mail-in or online voting. The official acknowledged, though, that Israel still has the ability to block Paleostinian elections if it wants to, and a lot will depend on the results of the October 27 Knesset election. While Hamas representatives did not meet with Sheikh in Egypt, they have been holding talks with Dahlan’s deputy Samir Masharawi about collaborating in the Paleostinian legislative elections, according to two sources familiar with the matter. Hamas would not be allowed to field candidates on the Dahlan-backed list, but would avoid coming out against it, the sources explained. Dahlan’s Fatah faction, known as the Democratic Reform Current, is also seeking similar collaboration with other Paleostinian factions, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Paleostine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Paleostine... a breakaway faction of the Pöpular Frönt för the Liberation of Paleostine. The are regarded as the most intellectual of Paleostinian fedayeen groups, smoking cheap cigarettes and drawing heavily on Marxist-Leninist theory to explain their crappy lives. They can occasionally be seen strutting through the streets of Paleostine, dressed up like soldiers and lugging firearms, though they seldom manage to hit anything and then usually by accident. This may be because of their habit of wearing black masks that cut off most of their vision. That would also explain their habit of occasionally walking into walls, which is a well-known attribute of those immersed in true understanding of the dialectic... (DFLP). FATAH DIVISIONS AMASS Given that its rifts with the Dahlan faction and Hamas appear insurmountable for the time being, Abbas’s circle is seeking to mend more manageable rifts, such as the one between Sheikh and Rajoub, one of the sources familiar with the weekend meeting between the pair said. Fatah is already dealing with potential breakaways led by former PA ministers Nasser al-Qidwa and Qadura Fares. Some supporters of former Fatah secretary general Marwan Barghouti — who is serving five life terms in Israeli prison for planning terror attacks that killed five people — want him to lead a separate breakaway faction. Barghouti’s condition is largely unknown, though, and he hadn’t been seen in years, until National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir posted a video berating the frail-looking prominent Paleostinian prisoner in his cell. An international campaign of influencers is advocating for his release, but Israel is not likely to. Barghouti sought to run from behind bars the last time a Paleostinian presidential election was called by Abbas in 2021. That vote was canceled, with Abbas blaming Israeli restrictions on balloting in East Jerusalem, while critics said the real motivating factor behind the PA president’s decision was polling predicting significant Fatah losses. Abbas in June announced that presidential elections would be held in 2027, but a date has not yet been set, and the various Fatah divisions have led to poor polling for the PA president and his party, as well as an increase in speculation that the November parliamentary elections will also be delayed. Pledges to hold elections were essential in securing financial support from the European Union ...the successor to the Holy Roman Empire, only without the Hapsburgs and the nifty uniforms and the dancing... , so Abbas may have a hard time canceling the vote completely, as he did in 2021. But while Brussels has taken an interest in Paleostinian political reform, Washington’s attention has been elsewhere, which may give Abbas the ability to push off the legislative elections for a short period of time with limited consequences in the international arena. |
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| Syria-Lebanon-Iran |
| Hezbollah Commander's House Held Piles of Dollars and Gold |
| 2026-08-24 |
[X]
… an Israeli strike in southern Lebanon. The footage comes as the dollar has smashed through 200,000 tomans on Iran’s free market for the first time, devastating purchasing power. The Iranian rial is now the weakest currency in the world by nominal exchange rate. For decades, the regime has blamed sanctions for Iran’s economic misery while lavishly spending Iran’s wealth abroad through its proxies, patronage networks and well-connected insiders. Billions have flowed into Hezbollah and other armed terrorist groups as ordinary Iranians have watched their savings and living standards collapse. Stacks of dollars and gold in Lebanon while Iranians are driven into poverty at home. The regime blames sanctions, but its own priorities tell the real story. Related: Radwan Force: 2026-08-20 The Human-Shield tactic creates tragedies, and Hezbollah exploits this to spread a false narrative Radwan Force: 2026-08-17 Israel vows strong response after deadly strikes in south Lebanon Radwan Force: 2026-08-16 Israeli strikes kill 11 in south Lebanon after Hezbollah wounds 3 IDF soldiers in attack |
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| Israel-Palestine-Jordan |
| Gaza: 4 of 6 people killed in Gaza cafe strike were Nukhba fighters, IDF seals 2 Hamas tunnels with concrete |
| 2026-08-20 |
| [IsraelTimes] Four commanders in Hamas’s elite Nukhba Force were killed in an Israeli strike in Gaza City yesterday, the military announces. Palestinian media reported that the strike on a cafe near the city’s port killed six — including a child — and wounded 14, including an elderly woman. The IDF says it was able to confirm that the strike killed four Nukhba Force commanders in Hamas’s Beit Lahia Battalion. They are named as: Muhammad Hamdi Ahmed al-Masri, a company commander; Samad Samir Harb Abu Jabal, a platoon commander who invaded Israel during the October 7 onslaught; Muhammad Attar, a platoon commander; and Muhammad Fathi Hussein Nasser, also a platoon commander. The military says the operatives were involved in advancing attacks on troops. “The commanders’ activities posed a threat to IDF troops, and they were therefore eliminated in an aerial strike to remove the threat,” the army adds. Army seals Hamas tunnels in central, southern Gaza [IsraelTimes] Two Hamas tunnels, spanning in total some two kilometers (1.2 miles) underground, were recently sealed by combat engineers, the IDF announces. The IDF says the tunnels were found in central and southern Gaza, amid efforts to clear the Israeli-held portion of the Strip of Hamas infrastructure. The army says it used concrete to close off the tunnels. Sealing tunnels with concrete can be a cheaper and less risky alternative to blowing them up, although it takes longer to carry out.
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| Syria-Lebanon-Iran |
| The Human-Shield tactic creates tragedies, and Hezbollah exploits this to spread a false narrative |
| 2026-08-20 |
[IsraelAlma] On the night of August 14–15, 2026, the IDF carried out a targeted strike against a headquarters of Hezbollah’s Radwan Force, located inside a civilian building in the village of Ansar, in the Nabatieh Governorate of southern Lebanon.![]() The strike was intended to eliminate Ali Samir al-Hajj Hassan (علي سمير الحاج حسن), a battalion commander in the Radwan Force, and to target the unit’s military headquarters where he was staying. According to reports, his wife and their four children, who were inside the military facility at the time of the strike, were also killed. This incident, involving Hezbollah’s use of human-shield tactics, also became an example of Lebanon’s leadership endorsing Hezbollah’s narrative instead of demanding accountability from the organization. For years, Hezbollah has operated from within civilian areas, using civilians and their homes as human shields. In doing so, it seeks to make it more difficult to target its operatives and military assets – and, following a strike, to promote the false narrative that Israel deliberately attacked innocent civilians. In this case as well, parts of the Lebanese discourse in the media and on social networks focused on the family tragedy while downplaying the fact that the father was a senior commander in the Radwan Force and that the building in which the family was staying served as a military asset – a headquarters of the unit. Moreover, no one asked what the wife and four children of a Radwan Force battalion commander were doing inside the headquarters, or why the father would bring his family to a military facility when he was fully aware that both he and his headquarters constituted a target. Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam helped reinforce Hezbollah’s narrative when he addressed the incident in a post on X, declaring that those killed in Ansar were “not military infrastructure” and that the woman and children there were not “military targets.” His remarks ignored the fact that the target was a military headquarters and a Radwan Force battalion commander operating from within it, with his family beside him as human shields. Salam also ignored the fact that the strike followed Hezbollah’s violation of the ceasefire. More at the link Related: Ansar: 2026-08-17 Israel vows strong response after deadly strikes in south Lebanon Ansar: 2026-08-17 IDF Airstrikes in Response to Hezbollah Attack on Yellow Line Position at Ali A-Tahr – 15 August 2026 Ansar: 2026-08-16 Israeli strikes kill 11 in south Lebanon after Hezbollah wounds 3 IDF soldiers in attack |
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| Syria-Lebanon-Iran |
| Israel vows strong response after deadly strikes in south Lebanon |
| 2026-08-17 |
| [North Press] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz on Sunday vowed to launch a strong strike following an escalation that left people dead in southern Lebanon on Saturday. “No account on any front will remain unsettled. We will forcefully defend our soldiers and citizens,” Katz said on X. On Saturday, the office of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said three Israeli personnel were seriously wounded after Hezbollah targeted them in southern Lebanon. Earlier Saturday, 11 people, including three children, were killed in Israeli strikes on southern Lebanon, the highest daily death toll since the two countries signed a framework agreement in late June. The Israeli army said its strikes on the town of Ansar in southern Lebanon targeted a Hezbollah military official and came in response to an operation carried out by the group against its forces. The Israeli army said in a statement that its forces attacked a Hezbollah command center and killed Ali Samir al-Hajj Hassan, who it identified as a sector commander in Hezbollah’s Radwan Force. |
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| Syria-Lebanon-Iran |
| IDF Airstrikes in Response to Hezbollah Attack on Yellow Line Position at Ali A-Tahr – 15 August 2026 |
| 2026-08-17 |
[IsraelAlma] Hezbollah violated the ceasefire during the night of August 14–15, when it launched an explosive drone at Israel Defense Forces (IDF) troops positioned, in accordance with the Framework Agreement, inside the Yellow Zone in the Ali al-Taher Ridge area (مرتفع علي الطاهر). The explosive drone seriously wounded three IDF soldiers. This was the third explosive drone launched by Hezbollah against IDF forces in this area.![]() In response to Hezbollah’s violation, the IDF launched strikes against Hezbollah targets. The main strikes were carried out in Ansar (أنصار), Deir al-Zahrani (دير الزهراني), and the Ali al-Taher Ridge area. Six Hezbollah operatives were eliminated in the strikes, including two senior operatives from the Radwan Unit and the Badr Unit. During the night of August 14–15, the IDF conducted a targeted strike against a Radwan Unit military headquarters operating from a civilian building inside the village of Ansar, in the Nabatieh Governorate of southern Lebanon. The strike eliminated Ali Samir Al-Haj Hassan (علي سمير الحاج حسن), from the village of Chmistar (شمسطار) in the Bekaa Governorate. Hassan served as a fawj commander (a battalion commander) in the Radwan Unit. At the time of the strike, the wife and four children of Ali Samir Al-Haj Hassan were inside the headquarters building in Ansar. What were Hassan’s family members doing inside a Radwan headquarters in Ansar? Hezbollah routinely employs human-shield tactics in an attempt to disrupt strikes against its operatives and assets – or, when a strike does occur, to falsely accuse Israel of deliberately targeting innocent civilians. More at the link |
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