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Omar al-Faruq

Omar al-Faruq

al-Qaeda

Afghanistan

20051219

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Terror Networks

Escaped al-Qaeda liaison to JI gives 35 minute interview

2006-03-10

A thirty-nine minute video interview with Farouq al-Iraqi, who is reported as Mehmood Ahmed Mohammed AKA Omar al-Faruq, an al-Qaeda lieutenant captured in Indonesia in 2002, was recently distributed amongst jihadist forums. Produced by al-Sahab, an al-Qaeda production company, the video shows al-Iraqi seated in a forest clearing, answering a battery of questions from an interviewer concerning Bagram prison, his escape, and messages he has for the mujahideen and Americans. Along with three other al-Qaeda prisoners at Bagram prison, including Abu Yehia al-Libi, Farouq al-Omar escaped from the prison in July 2005. The video opens with a speech from Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, originally aired in February 2005, in which he speaks to the U.S. maltreatment of Muslim prisoners. The video continues with pictures of people taken prisoners by American soldiers, and a voice in the background explains that what happened in Guantanamo was not an isolated event, but happens in all American prisons: “Mujahideen are exposed to the most abhorrent types of physical and spiritual torture”. The video proceeds to explain that despite the fact that US prisons are heavily guarded and fortified, “four lions of the lions of Islam” managed to escape from the Bagram prison, among them “the hero Farouq Al-Iraqi”. Before presenting the interview with al-Iraqi, the video summarizes his experiences, noting his arrest in Indonesia and his being branded as the head of al-Qaeda in East Asia. Farouq al-Iraqi describes his incarceration in Bagram prison, calling it a variety of nicknames such as the “prison of darkness,” “prison of torture,” and “prison of music,” elaborating upon the reason for such aliases. Concerning his arrest, he states: “The reason for my arrest was that they accused me of being a Mujahid. Specifically, as I understood from several guards, it was because I carried a gun. That was the accusation”. He also notes that he heard of the additional accusation of him being the al-Qaeda leader in East Asia and being linked to the September 11th attacks in East Asia from CNN and other publications. The interview continues as Farouq al-Iraq addresses words to the mujahideen to remain steadfast in their jihad, and to the Americans, stating the following: “They will never manage to drive away the fire of Allah, blessed and almighty. They will never manage to stop the procession of Jihad Neither the American barricades will stop it, nor its forces, nor its vehicles nor its developed machines We will fight them in this country, in Iraq, everywhere, even in their own country, with the help of Allah, blessed and almighty. We pray that Allah, blessed and almighty, will give us victory over them in their country”.

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Terror Networks

Bagram escapee vows to take the fight to the US

2006-02-28

A Web site often used by militants posted a video tape on Monday in which a purported al Qaeda escapee from a U.S. airbase in Afghanistan vowed to fight Americans in Iraq and the United States. The man, identified as Faruq al-Iraqi, said he was one of four al Qaeda members who escaped from the base in July. A U.S. defence official said in November four Qaeda members, including the group's most senior operative in southeast Asia, Omar al-Faruq, escaped from Bagram military prison in July. "I say to the Americans ... we will fight them ... in Iraq and in their country," the man said on the tape recorded late in 2005 and posted on the Web site. "They (Americans) will not be able to stop the march of Jihad ... with their checkpoints, forces, machinery, advanced equipment. No matter how strong or equipped they are they will not defeat the Almighty." Sitting in a jungle wearing an ammunition belt, the man told the story of an "easy" escape from the Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan where he was held after his arrest in Indonesia. "We did not think it was this easy, to leave like this. We thought there were military positions...," said al-Iraqi, who said he escaped with three other Qaeda members he identified with aliases Abou Nasser, Abou Yehya and Abdullah al-Shami. The tape showed what purported to be all four of them. U.S. intelligence officials say Faruq, a Kuwaiti, was captured in Indonesia in 2002 and handed to U.S. custody.

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Afghanistan

More on al-Libbi's video debut

2005-12-21

One of four prisoners who escaped from Bagram airbase, north of the Afghan capital Kabul, in July, warned that militants would “sully the United State’s pride in the sand”, in a statement posted on the internet. Yahya al Libbi, whose real name is Mohammad Hassan Qayid, indicated in a 20 minute videotape message entitled “The sermon of Eid al Fitr”, marking the end of Ramadan, which fell on 4 November this year, “We will humiliate the United States. Either we live proudly or our fate will be to enter paradise”. “Signs of victory can be seen on the horizon, in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine and Chechnya. Victory is forthcoming in spite of the wishes of all enemies, infidels and aggressors,” he added. Al Libbi was one of four detainees who escaped from the US airbase in Bagram. The others are Saudi national Mohammad al Qahtani, Syrian national Abdullah al Hashemi, Iraqi national Mahmoud al Rashid, also known as Omar al Faruq, a senior al Qaeda figure. A U.S. military official described the men as “dangerous enemy combatants”. At the time, a military source revealed he had discovered four orange prison uniforms dumped near Bagram prison in July. How they managed to escape remains a mystery but there are indications that they received outside assistance. Brilliant, inspector, brilliant.

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Afghanistan

Key 'al-Qaeda militant' surfaces

2005-12-19

The Arab television, Al Arabiya, has shown a video tape of a militant who claims to have escaped from the main American base in Afghanistan. Must be sweeps week The purported militant, Abu-Yahya al-Libbi, is said to be one of four detainees who escaped from the Bagram airbase in July. US officials did not identify them at the time but described the men as "dangerous enemy combatants". In November, US prosecutors said that one of the four was Omar al-Faruq. Al-Faruq was seen as one of Osama bin Laden's key lieutenants in Asia. It is not clear what Abu-Yahya al-Libbi - also identified as Hassan Qayid - is doing in the Al Arabiya video. There has been no reaction to the tape from the American military. Al-Arabiya claims that the other detainees who escaped from Bagram are Muhammad Jafar al-Qahtani, who is a Saudi national, Abdallah al-Hashimi, a Syrian national and Omar al-Faruq who is described as an Iraqi national.

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Afghanistan

New details emerge in al-Farouk's great escape

2005-12-04

The prisoners were considered some of the most dangerous men among the hundreds of terror suspects locked behind the walls of a secretive and secure American military detention center in Bagram, Afghanistan. Their escape, however, might as well have been a breakout from the county jail. According to military officials familiar with the episode, the suspects are believed to have picked the lock on their cell, changed out of their bright orange uniforms and made their way through a heavily guarded military base under the cover of night. They then crawled over a faulty wall where a getaway vehicle was apparently waiting for them, the officials said. "It is embarrassing and amazing at the same time," an American defense official said. "It was a disaster." The fact of the escape was disclosed by the American authorities shortly after it set off an intense manhunt at Bagram, 40 miles north of Kabul, on the morning of July 11. But internal military documents and interviews with military and intelligence officials indicate it was a far more serious breach than the Defense Department has acknowledged. One of the four suspects was identified as Al Qaeda's highest-ranking operative in Southeast Asia when he was captured in 2002, a fact that emerged only during an unrelated military trial last month. Another, a Saudi, was also described by intelligence officials as an important Qaeda operative in Afghanistan. The detainees planned their breakout meticulously, United States officials said, apparently studying the guards' routines, getting themselves moved into a cell that was less visible to the guards and taking advantage of construction work that was intended to expand and improve security at the prison. "Based upon the findings of the investigation, it appears that the detainees had a clear understanding of the operating procedures of the guards inside the facility," said the chief spokesman for United States military forces in Afghanistan, Col. James R. Yonts. One American intelligence official said the prisoners also took advantage of "a perfect storm" of mistakes by the military guards. The escape is believed to have been the first from one of the detention centers established by the United States for people suspected of being terrorists after 9/11. Military officials, many of whom spoke on condition of anonymity because details of the incident are classified, said there was still much they did not know about how the men escaped. Although an American military police guard was initially suspected of having helped the prisoners, he was eventually cleared. Half a dozen other soldiers, including officers and sergeants, have received administrative punishments, a senior military official in Afghanistan said. "It was bizarre to me," said Maj. Gen. Peter Gilchrist of Britain, who served at the time as the deputy commander of coalition forces in Afghanistan in Kabul. "I don't understand how it could happen." Military officials have often cited the danger posed by the prisoners at Bagram and Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, as a reason for the extreme security measures and harsh conditions there. Prisoners are typically shackled by their hands and feet when outside their cells and rarely move without an escort of at least two guards. During interrogations, they have often been forced into uncomfortable "safety positions" or chained to a bolt on the floor. The two prisoners believed to have led the escape, Omar al-Faruq, a Kuwaiti who was the former Qaeda operative in Southeast Asia, and Muhammad Jafar Jamal al-Kahtani, the Saudi, had for months been awaiting transfer to Guantánamo Bay, officials said. For reasons they have not explained, the military authorities gave different names for both men in announcing the escape last summer. At the time of Mr. Faruq's arrest in Jakarta, Indonesia, in early June 2002, he was considered one of the most important Qaeda figures ever captured by the United States. Three months later, he told C.I.A. interrogators at Bagram that he had been sent to the region to plan large-scale attacks against American Embassies and other targets there. Intelligence officials gave differing views on the importance of Mr. Kahtani. One official described him as having been responsible at one point for maintaining Al Qaeda's operational support structure in Afghanistan; another said he was an important Qaeda fighter, but not a senior-level operative. According to a classified, one-page military report on the escape that was reviewed by The New York Times, those two detainees - along with a Syrian prisoner identified as Abdullah Hashimi and a Kuwaiti named Mahmoud Ahmad Muhammad - were being held with four other men in Cell 119, on the ground floor of the Bagram prison. A senior military official said each of the prisoners who escaped was moved into the cell in the days before his escape after causing problems with other detainees. The main cells at Bagram are large wire cages that can be easily surveyed by guards patrolling the catwalks above them. Cell 119, by contrast, was somewhat apart and out of the way, officials said. Asked whether the prisoners might have fabricated the disturbances to be moved together into Cell 119, the senior official said, "The investigation revealed credible factors that support this theory." After a head count of prisoners at 1:50 a.m. on July 11, the military report states, the sergeant of the guard on duty at the detention center, now called the Bagram Theater Internment Facility, reported all of them accounted for, the report states. About two hours later, at 3:45 a.m., as the detainees were being roused for the morning prayer, the four detainees were discovered missing from their cell. The military police battalion on duty at the prison, Task Force Cerberus, immediately locked down the prison and began a search, the report said. How the men got out of their cell remains a mystery, officials said. Two senior military officials said some equipment was temporarily moved beside the cell, partly obstructing the guards' view. One senior military official said investigators believe the prisoners managed to pick the lock with implements they had fashioned while detained. There were also suspicions that one of the American military guards, who had had disciplinary problems, might have deliberately left the door open, two senior officials said. But those suspicions were eventually discounted and the guard was never charged, they said. The four men escaped out the southeast door of the main prison building, the report said. Military and intelligence officials said the detainees left behind their bright orange prison uniforms, apparently changing into less conspicuous blue prison garb that they might have somehow hidden in their cells or knew where to find elsewhere. At the time, several officials said, construction crews had been working to expand and reinforce the prison, a cavernous aircraft machine-shop built by the Soviet military during its occupation of Afghanistan and converted by the American military into its primary screening center for terror suspects captured overseas. The breakout took place only days before a series of tougher security measures, including surveillance cameras and brighter lighting, were to be put in place. The American forces have released more than 250 Taliban and other prisoners from Bagram this year as part of an Afghan national reconciliation program. Still, they have had to refurbish the prison to hold the roughly 500 detainees who remain. The escapees also appear to have taken advantage of the construction work to move through an exercise yard and out of the prison compound. Another indication that the four men might have received help in their escape, officials said, was the apparent speed with which they found their way through a maze of buildings and roads to a small, damaged section of the perimeter wall surrounding the vast Bagram Air Base. Once they found the faulty section of the packed-dirt wall, officials said, the detainees were able to crawl beneath the concertina wire that topped the barrier and drop down on the other side in an area of agricultural fields and abandoned homes. "There were three or four points where they could have been caught," one American intelligence official said. "The escapees got very lucky." Within minutes of the escape, American forces began fanning out across and outside the prison, concentrating on the area near the faulty section of the wall. As the base sirens blared an alert and Cobra and Black Hawk helicopters hovered overhead, American soldiers and Afghan policemen scoured fields and homes in the area. The district police chief, Colonel Assadullah, said in an interview in Bagram that he was asked to have his men search for a yellow pickup truck, which was apparently seen leaving the area. The district governor, Kabir Ahmad, said the Afghan authorities set up checkpoints on the highway leading to Kabul and other roads in the area, but turned up nothing suspicious. Military officials said American soldiers questioned laborers who had been working at the prison, as well as local Afghan officials. But no arrests were made, and neither Afghans working at the base nor American officials said they knew of any laborers fired as a result of the inquiry. In a recent interview, a former Bagram prisoner, Moazzam Begg, said he had heard during his detention there that American intelligence officers had once proposed staging an escape to release a detainee whom they wanted to act as a double agent against Al Qaeda. He said he had no knowledge that any such scheme had been carried out, and several American officials strongly dismissed the idea that that had happened with Mr. Faruq and the others. In a videotape delivered to the Pakistan bureau of the Arab-language satellite television station Al Arabiya, Mr. Kahtani boasted about the preparations for the escape, suggesting that they had been painstaking. "We decided to escape on Sunday because that is the day off for the nonbelievers," he said on the tape, which was broadcast Oct. 18. "To escape we studied the plan very carefully."

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Terror Networks

Human Rights Watch's list of "ghost prisoners"

2005-12-02

Take a good, long look at the people on this list and you can decide for yourself whether or not you have any problems with this. I sure don't. 1. Ibn Al-Shaykh al-Libi Reportedly arrested on November 11, 2001, Pakistan. Libyan, suspected commander at al-Qaeda training camp. 2. Abu Faisal Reportedly arrested on December 12, 2001 3. Abdul Aziz Reportedly arrested on December 14, 2001 Nationality unknown. In early January 2002, Kenton Keith, a spokesman at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, produced a chart with the names of senior al-Qaeda members listed as killed in action, detained, or on the run. Faisal and Aziz were listed as detained on Dec. 12 and 14, 2001. 4. Abu Zubaydah (also known as Zain al-Abidin Muhahhad Husain) Reportedly arrested in March 2002, Faisalabad, Pakistan. Palestinian (born in Saudi Arabia), suspected senior al-Qaeda operational planner. 5. Abdul Rahim al-Sharqawi (aka Riyadh the facilitator) Reportedly arrested in January 2002 Possibly Yemeni, suspected al-Qaeda member (possibly transferred to Guantanamo). 6. Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi Reportedly arrested in January 2002 Nationality unknown, presumably Iraqi, suspected commander of al-Qaeda training camp. U.S. officials told Associated Press on January 8, 2002 and March 30, 2002, of al-Iraqi's capture. This is a different Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi who was placed in command of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan yesterday (who had previously been in command of Brigade 055 rather than a training camp), for those keeping score. 7. Muhammed al-Darbi Reportedly arrested in August 2002 Yemeni, suspected al-Qaeda member. The Washington Post reported on October 18, 2002: "U.S. officials learned from interviews with Muhammad Darbi, an al Qaeda member captured in Yemen in August, that a Yemen cell was planning an attack on a Western oil tanker, sources said." On December 26, 2002, citing "U.S. intelligence and national security officials," the Washington Post reports that al-Darbi, as well as Ramzi Binalshibh [see below], Omar al-Faruq [reportedly escaped from U.S. custody in July 2005], and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri [see below] all "remain under CIA control." 8. Ramzi bin al-Shibh Reportedly arrested on September 13, 2002 Yemeni, suspected al-Qaeda conspirator in Sept. 11 attacks (former roommate of one of the hijackers). 9. Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (or Abdulrahim Mohammad Abda al-Nasheri, aka Abu Bilal al-Makki or Mullah Ahmad Belal) Reportedly arrested in November 2002, United Arab Emirates. Saudi or Yemeni, suspected al-Qaeda chief of operations in the Persian Gulf, and suspected planner of the USS Cole bombing, and attack on the French oil tanker, Limburg. 10. Mohammed Omar Abdel-Rahman (aka Asadullah) Reportedly arrested in February 2003, Quetta, Pakistan. Egyptian, son of the Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, who was convicted in the United States of involvement in terrorist plots in New York. See Agence France Presse, March 4, 2003: "Pakistani and US agents captured the son of blind Egyptian cleric Omar Abdel Rahman. . . a US official said Tuesday. Muhamad Abdel Rahman was arrested in Quetta, Pakistan, the official said, speaking on condition of anonymity." David Johnston, New York Times, March 4, 2003: "On Feb. 13, when Pakistani authorities raided an apartment in Quetta, they got the break they needed. They had hoped to find Mr. [Khalid Sheikh] Mohammed, but he had fled the apartment, eluding the authorities, as he had on numerous occasions. Instead, they found and arrested Muhammad Abdel Rahman, a son of Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, the blind Egyptian cleric. . ." 11. Mustafa al-Hawsawi (aka al-Hisawi) Reportedly arrested on March 1, 2003 (together with Khalid Sheikh Mohammad), Pakistan. Saudi, suspected al-Qaeda financier. 12. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed Reportedly arrested on March 1, 2003, Rawalpindi, Pakistan. Kuwaiti (Pakistani parents), suspected al-Qaeda, alleged to have "masterminded" Sept. 11 attacks, killing of Daniel Pearl, and USS Cole attack in 2000. 13. Majid Khan Reportedly arrested on March-April 2003, Pakistan. Pakistani, alleged link to Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, alleged involvement in plot to blow up gas stations in the United States. Details about Khan's arrest were revealed in several media reports, especially in Newsweek: Evan Thomas, "Al Qaeda in America: The Enemy Within," Newsweek, June 23, 2003. U.S. prosecutors provided evidence that Majid Khan was in U.S. custody during the trial of 24-year-old Uzair Paracha, who was convicted in November 2005 of conspiracy charges, and of providing material support to terrorist organizations. 14. Yassir al-Jazeeri (aka al-Jaziri) Reportedly arrested on March 15, 2003, Pakistan. Possibly Moroccan, Algerian, or Palestinian, suspected al-Qaeda member, linked to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. 15. Ali Abdul Aziz Ali (aka Ammar al Baluchi) Reportedly arrested on April 29, 2003, Karachi, Pakistan. A Pakistani, he is alleged to have funneled money to September 11 hijackers, and alleged to have been involved with the Jakarta Marriot bombing and in handling Jose Padilla's travel to the United States. U.S. Judge Sidney Stein ruled that defense attorneys for Uzair Paracha could introduce statements Baluchi made to U.S. interrogators, proving that he was in U.S. custody. Former Deputy Attorney General James Comey also mentioned Baluchi during remarks to the media about the case of Jose Padilla on June 1, 2004 16. Waleed Mohammed bin Attash (aka Tawfiq bin Attash or Tawfiq Attash Khallad) Reportedly arrested on April 29, 2003, Karachi, Pakistan. Saudi (of Yemeni descent), suspected of involvement in the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000, and the Sept. 11 attacks. See Afzal Nadeem, "Pakistan Arrests Six Terror Suspects, including Planner of Sept. 11 and USS Cole Bombing," Associated Press, April 30, 2003. His brother, Hassan Bin Attash, is currently held in Guantanamo. 17. Adil al-Jazeeri Reportedly arrested on June 17, 2003 outside Peshawar, Pakistan. Algerian, suspected al-Qaeda and longtime resident of Afghanistan, alleged "leading member" and "longtime aide to bin Laden." (Possibly transferred to Guantanamo.) 18. Hambali (aka Riduan Isamuddin) Reportedly arrested on August 11, 2003, Thailand. Indonesian, involved in Jemaah Islamiyah and al-Qaeda, alleged involvement in organizing and financing the Bali nightclub bombings, the Jakarta Marriot Hotel bombing, and preparations for the September 11 attacks. 19. Mohamad Nazir bin Lep (aka Lillie, or Li-Li) Reportedly arrested in August 2003, Bangkok, Thailand. Malaysian, alleged link to Hambali. 20. Mohamad Farik Amin (aka Zubair) Reportedly arrested in June 2003, Thailand. Malaysian, alleged link to Hambali. 21. Tariq Mahmood Reportedly arrested in October 2003, Islamabad, Pakistan. Dual British and Pakistani nationality, alleged to have ties to al-Qaeda. 22. Hassan Ghul Reportedly arrested on January 23, 2004, in Kurdish highlands, Iraq. Pakistani, alleged to be Zarqawi's courier to bin Laden; alleged ties to Khalid Sheikh Mohammad. 23. Musaad Aruchi (aka Musab al-Baluchi, al-Balochi, al-Baloshi) Reportedly arrested in Karachi on June 12, 2004, in a "CIA-supervised operation." Presumably Pakistani. Pakistani intelligence officials told journalists Aruchi was held by Pakistani authorities at an airbase for three days, before being handed over to the U.S., and then flown in an unmarked CIA plane to an undisclosed location. 24. Mohammed Naeem Noor Khan (aka Abu Talaha) Reportedly arrested on July 13, 2004, Pakistan. Pakistani, computer engineer, was held by Pakistani authorities, and likely transferred to U.S. custody. (Possibly in joint U.S.-Pakistani custody.) 25. Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani Reportedly arrested on July 24, 2004, Pakistan Tanzanian, reportedly indicted in the United States for 1998 embassy bombings. U.S. and Pakistani intelligence officials told UPI that Ghailani was transferred to "CIA custody" in early August. 26. Abu Faraj al-Libi Reportedly arrested on May 4, 2005, North Western Frontier Province, Pakistan. Libyan, suspected al-Qaeda leader of operations, alleged mastermind of two assassination attempts on Musharraf. Col. James Yonts, a U.S. military spokesman in Afghanistan, "said in an email to The Associated Press that al-Libbi was taken directly from Pakistan to the U.S. and was not brought to Afghanistan."

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Afghanistan-Pak-India

Al-Qaeda's prison break

2005-11-06

Bagram airbase is home to one of the most heavily fortified military prisons in the world. Located in the shadow of the Hindu Kush about 30 miles north of Kabul, the facility holds hundreds of alleged jihadists at the center of three tight rings of security, surrounded by U.S. and Afghan troops. To enter and leave Bagram one has to pass through a labyrinth of concrete and dirt-filled-wire barriers that are overlooked by two-storey-high observation posts. The prisoners, dressed in orange jumpsuits, are kept in wire cages in the middle of an old warehouse, somewhat like Hannibal Lecter in "Silence of the Lambs." The warehouse in turn is ringed by razor wire and finally the fences and guard posts of the airbase itself. Yet in the early morning hours of July 11, 2005, U.S. officials say, four of these brightly attired men somehow penetrated each of the three security cordons and slipped through a Soviet-era minefield just outside the base, one purposely left active. Then the escapees disappeared into the darkness, managing even to elude local Tajik villagers who are generally hostile to foreign fighters. It was, almost everyone agreed, an astonishing feat. "If this really happened as reported, it makes the Great Escape of World War II look like an Outward Bound exercise," said one U.S. defense analyst familiar with detainee operations who would speak only if he were not named. On wanted posters that were displayed around Bagram at the time, the escapees were identified vaguely as foreigners who had come to join Al Qaeda in Afghanistan—a Kuwaiti, a Syrian, a Libyan and a Saudi. But last week Pentagon officials were forced to admit that one of the fugitives was not who they said he was. Originally identified as one Mahmoud Ahmad Mohammed of Kuwait, he was actually Omar al-Faruq, a well-known Qaeda leader in Southeast Asia who had been handed over to the Americans by Indonesian authorities in 2002. Faruq's true identity emerged after a defense lawyer at the Texas trial of a U.S. soldier accused of brutality at Bagram called Faruq as a witness—only to be told by the U.S. Army he was no longer there. What really happened at Bagram last July? No one knows, or at least those who know aren't saying. But coming at a time when America's detention policies in the global war on terror are under fire, Faruq's disappearance raises new questions about whether a system with so little transparency, accountability and oversight can continue. Bagram is an open book compared with those secret facilities around the world that are run by the CIA but not publicly acknowledged. Anywhere from two dozen to 100 prisoners are held at these sites with no prospect of release, according to official U.S. accounts and Human Rights Watch. Even at the agency, "senior people are saying we've got to have an endgame to this," says one career CIA official who spoke on condition of anonymity. "This isn't sustainable." Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman told NEWSWEEK that he was not authorized to provide any details about the escape. "Clearly it wasn't the U.S. military's finest hour," Whitman said. But he added: "This is a field facility. It isn't Rikers [Island]. This is not the first time that prisoners have escaped from military facilities in Afghanistan as well as Iraq." But few Afghans seem to believe an escape from Bagram is possible, and that has given rise to rumors about the July 11 breakout. According to one fugitive Taliban commander interviewed by a NEWSWEEK reporter last week, the four men were actually exchanged in secret for captured U.S. special-operations troops. Whitman called that account "absolutely absurd and completely untrue." U.S. officials believe that Faruq and his three companions likely had some inside help, perhaps from local hires at the base. Two U.S. counterterrorism officials also sought to play down Faruq's importance. One official, who would speak only if he were not identified, said Faruq had been held elsewhere in the secret U.S. detention system overseas but was then transferred to Bagram, which normally houses ordinary foot soldiers in the jihadist movement. Yet this seemed to contradict previous accounts in which Bush administration officials—before Faruq got away—emphasized his stature in Al Qaeda. "He was the top Qaeda guy in Southeast Asia," says Zachary Abuza, an expert on Asian jihadist groups at Simmons College in Boston. "He was one of first guys who was part of the CIA's rendition program," in which terror suspects are ferried abroad. The Indonesians also believe Faruq is quite a big fish—and still very dangerous. Born in Kuwait, Faruq married into the family of a founder of Jemaah Islamiah, a regional terrorist group blamed for deadly suicide bombings on Bali in 2002 and again last month, among other terror attacks. In June 2002, Indonesian intelligence officers arrested Faruq and handed him over to U.S. officials. They have come to regret it. Because the Bush administration has viewed this as a war without traditional rules, it has largely denied Jakarta and other governments legal access to detainees like Faruq. Jakarta repeatedly requested—but never got—the right to question Faruq to support its legal case against the alleged spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiah, Abu Bakar Bashir. Partly as a result, Indonesian prosecutors were never able to prove that Bashir headed Jemaah Islamiah, and in 2004 he was sentenced to only 30 months. Much remains to be learned about the great escape from Bagram. But the tale may bolster the case of those who argue that handling detainees in such an extralegal, secretive way is only hurting the antiterror campaign. After a few months, most detainees are milked of all intelligence value and are useful mainly as witnesses, terror experts say. "There has got to be some resolution," says the CIA official. Omar al-Faruq, at least, may have found a way to resolve his own case.

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Africa: Subsaharan

Al-Qaeda MPs in Kuwait?

2005-10-02

Speaking on the U.S.-funded Arab language TV station al-Hurra, the former head of the Kuwaiti security services, Mashaal Jarrah, discussed the infiltration of two al-Qaeda members into the Kuwait parliament, without specifying whether these were current or former legislators. The revelations detailed in the Kuwait daily al-Seyassah added extra embarrassment to a country that has been shaken from its complacency following the attacks of last January. [www.alseyassah.com] Evidence of local pro-Qaeda sympathies had already surfaced from the Kuwaiti origin of high-ranking members in the organization, such as its nominal spokesman Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, mastermind of the 9/11 attacks Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (captured in Pakistan in March 2003) and Omar al-Faruq (arrested in June 2002 and believed to have been active in linking al-Qaeda with groups in Southeast Asia). But this year the emirate witnessed scandals of high-ranking military officers prosecuted for plotting anti-U.S. attacks, accusations of ‘sleeping cells' in the country's security agencies and armed confrontations on the streets (see Terrorism Focus, Volume II, Issue 02). Investigations into the causes of the jihad-friendly environment in the aftermath of those attacks focused on the role played by the influence of salafist and Muslim Brotherhood members in the Ministry of Education—whose syllabus was once described by a Kuwaiti Shi'ite legislator as "enough to turn your hair white," for it's potential inculcation of takfir (excommunication) and militant jihadist values among the nation's youth. Conservative political currents are strong in Kuwait, with 21 of the 50-strong legislature described as Islamists. Jarrah's own focus of blame for the phenomenon, according to the Arab Times, is on the number of unregulated mosques in the emirate outside the control of the Kuwaiti religious authorities, whose radical imams are being exploited by al-Qaeda to spread its ideology. [www.arabtimesonline.com] The former security chief's allegations may remain unproven, but the fact that they were made at all hints at continuing unease at the level of radical Islamist views in the emirate. This is the first time a senior officer in the security authorities has officially admitted that al-Qaeda has infiltrated Kuwait, the closest ally to the United States that is home to an expatriate population in excess of 35,000 Americans.

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Southeast Asia

Local al-Qaeda affiliates coming out of the woodwork in Aceh

2005-02-01

The humanitarian catastrophe caused by the 26 December tsunami has led to an outpouring of humanitarian aid and support from some unlikely quarters. While media attention has focused on how the relief efforts will affect the Indonesian armed forces (TNI) counter-insurgency campaign against the Acehnese separatist movement, GAM, the real security issue is how militant Islamist organizations and charities, especially the Indonesian Mujahideen Council (MMI), the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), the Laskar Mujahideen and the Medical Emergency Relief Charity (MER-C), and a handful of others are taking advantage of the situation. With the exception of the FPI, all of the above-mentioned organizations are linked to Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a regional affiliate of al-Qaida, which has been responsible for three major terrorist attacks in Indonesia since the Bali bombing in October 2002. Moreover, all four organizations were involved in fomenting the sectarian conflict in the Malukus and Central Sulawesi, from 1999-2001, which left more than 9'000 people dead. On 4 January, the MMI dispatched the first group of 77 volunteers to Aceh, from their Jogyakarta based headquarters as part of a 206-man contingent. The MMI is an overt civil society organization that was founded in August 2000 by the alleged spiritual chief of Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Bakar Baasyir. Many of its senior leadership positions were held by members of JI or their kin. For example, MMI leaders Mohammad Iqbal Abdurrahman (a.k.a. Abu Jibril) and Agus Dwikarna were not only members of JI's shura, but also heads of the two paramilitary organizations, the Laskar Mujahideen and the Laskar Jundullah, established by JI to engage in sectarian conflict in 1999-2001. The Laskar Mujahideen is inextricably linked to JI and al-Qaida. Founded in January 2000 by Jibril and JI's operational chief Hambali, the organization fielded roughly 500 armed combatants. They were armed by JI operatives in the southern Philippines, and were equipped with high-speed motor boats. Laskar Mujahideen operatives worked closely with al-Qaida operatives, such as Omar al-Faruq and the jihadist filmmaker Reda Seyam. Malaysian authorities detained Jibril in June 2001 and deported him to Indonesia in the summer of 2004, where he was detained on immigration offenses but quietly acquitted and released last October. Indonesian authorities asserted that they did not have enough evidence to link Jibril to any terrorist attacks, and downplayed his involvement with Laskar Mujahideen. (The US Treasury had placed Jibril on their list of specially Designated Global Terrorists.) Since 2001, with Jibril's arrest and the crackdown against JI members, the Laskar Mujahideen (and its fraternal organization the Laskar Jundullah) has gone completely underground. Although it was thought to be behind some of the sporadic violence in the Malukus that resumed in 2004, most Indonesian police and intelligence officials interviewed by this author assume the group had disbanded. Yet the Laskar Mujahideen dispatched some 250 persons to Aceh, over 50 of whom were ferried aboard Indonesian military planes. They established four base camps in the province, including one outside the airport, adjacent to the camps of other domestic and international relief organizations, beneath a sign that reads, "Islamic Law Enforcement". Unlike the MMI, which is more concerned with providing "spiritual guidance" and restoring "infrastructure in places of religious duties," the Laskar Mujahideen has been involved in relief work, including the distribution of aid and the burial of corpses. The MMI and Laskar Mujahideen have been joined by a small Indonesian charity that was previously an important executor agency for Saudi funding. The Medical Emergency Relief Charity (MER-C) was established on 14 August 1999 in response to sectarian strife. They now have 12 offices in Indonesia, concentrated in the regions most directly affected by sectarian violence (Sulawesi, Malukus and Kalimintan). In 2000-2001, MER-C produced two well-publicized jihadi videos for fund-raising purposes. While MER-C members were not implicated in directly supporting Laskar Jundullah and Laskar Mujahideen paramilitary operations in the Malukus and Central Sulawesi, to the degree that another Indonesian charity KOMPAK was, its one-sided approach to the Malukus conflict, as well as the actions of some individual members, inevitably raised suspicions. MER-C's operations abroad, particularly in Iraq, Palestine and Afghanistan, have also raised some concerns. Indeed, the MER-C website states that they operate in the tribal areas of Pakistan with the support and permission of the Taliban. This is not to cast aspersions on what MER-C has been able to accomplish in Aceh. According to a separate English language website, they have used donations to buy medicine and basic foodstuffs as well as rent tractors and bulldozers to clear rubble and distribute food. The FPI, founded by the fiery cleric Habib Rizieq in August 1998, has also taken a high profile position in Aceh. The group, best known for destroying bars, night-clubs, massage parlors and discos, dispatched 250 activists to Aceh and promised to send an additional 800. "FPI is not only an organization that destroys bars and discos in major Java cities, it has a humanitarian side as well that the media is not happy to expose," asserted Hilmy Bakar Alascaty, the head of the FPI's contingent in Aceh. Alascaty stated that the military had provided the group with air transport and that Vice-President Jusuf Kalla had arranged for FPI members to travel on a government-chartered plane. He announced that in addition to providing aid and burying corpses, his group would ensure that foreign soldiers did not violate Islamic law. Interestingly, Hizb-ut-Tahrir, the seemingly ubiquitous Pan-Islamic organization, is also on the ground in Aceh. The hardline Wahhabi organization, Hidayatullah, does not yet have a presence in Aceh, but they are raising money for mosque reconstruction through their website and other media organs. The central questions, of course, revolve around the possible ulterior motives of these Islamic organizations. Broadly speaking, and aside from a genuine desire to assist fellow countrymen and Muslims, these organizations are motivated by four objectives. The first is extensive press and media attention. It is particularly instructive that in the April 2004 parliamentary election, the party that had the most spectacular gains was the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), which increased its share of the vote from under 2 per cent in 1999 to almost 8 per cent. While there is a debate over the degree to which the PKS has downplayed its Islamist goals, all acknowledge that the party's popularity was in large part due to their anti-corruption stance and high-profile charitable relief work. Indeed, the PKS has dispatched almost 1'000 cadres to Aceh, one of the largest contingents thus far. Their previous work in the sectarian conflicts of Poso, Sulawesi and the Malukus, confirmed in them the belief that humanitarian aid is a very effective way to win the hearts and minds of an afflicted community and garner support for their political program. Secondly, these groups are dedicated to cleansing Indonesia of western influence. From their posturing and rhetoric, it is apparent than none believe the Americans or Australians are motivated by sheer altruism, but have an ulterior motive. It should be noted that even the PKS has called on foreign troops to be in the restive province for no more than a month. Thirdly, these groups see the disaster as an opportunity to proselytize. Several groups, such as the MMI, indicated that their primary goal was to provide "spiritual guidance" to victims and assist in the reconstruction of mosques. With 400'000 refugees and mosques at the center of rural community relief efforts, the potential for influence is great. Fourthly, these organizations all seek to provide relief and assistance in order to discredit the corrupt, secular regime that they seek to replace. The slow and haphazard response of the Indonesian government's relief efforts confirms their belief that the government is unable and unwilling to truly serve the needs of the Muslim community. The Indonesian government has shown little concern about the motives of these organizations. It was only after international donor organizations raised the alarm that the TNI expelled 19 MMI members from Aceh. There are many possible explanations as to why the TNI assisted their movement to Aceh; with the role of the so-called "green generals" or the machinations of army Chief General Ryamizard Ryacudu, who is engaged in a pitched political battle with President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, amongst the favorites. Ironically, the Acehnese separatist organization GAM has raised the sharpest concern about their presence. While the radical groups have supported Shari'ah law and other concessions that GAM has wrought from the government, they do not support their secessionist insurgency. To that end, it is likely that the TNI will not divert its resources to these groups and will instead focus on resuming the war against GAM. What is the implication for the US? The most pressing issue is the legal ramifications of the TNI's assistance to the militants. In addition to transport, they have provided tents and equipment. Under the terms of the Lehey Amendment, the TNI is to sever relations with all militia groups. This is acutely consequential as many in the US Executive Branch seek to use the humanitarian crisis as a cover for lifting congressional restrictions on bilateral military relations. How the US deals with this sensitive issue will likely have a significant impact on the dynamics of Islamic militancy in Indonesia.

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Southeast Asia

US asked for Bashir

2005-01-13

THE US convened a secret meeting with Indonesia's president Megawati Sukarnoputri in 2002 to pressure her to covertly hand over the militant Islamic preacher Abu Bakar Bashir. Fred Burks, a disaffected former US State Department interpreter who resigned late last year, told a Jakarta court yesterday that he had translated for Ms Megawati at the meeting in Jakarta. National Security Agency specialist Karen Brooks and US ambassador in Jakarta Ralph Boyce, accompanied President George W. Bush's secret envoy, whom Mr Burks didn't name, to the meeting. The testimony illustrates the efforts the US made to corner the market in terrorism intelligence following the September 11 attack, and the importance attached to the then little-known elderly preacher from central Java. Called by Bashir's defence counsel, Mr Burks testified that he sat in on the meeting to provide instantaneous translation for Ms Megawati. The special envoy was first introduced to Ms Megawati at the meeting in her private residence, Mr Burks said. The envoy then explained to Ms Megawati that intelligence from other terrorist operatives suggested Bashir was the puppet-master behind the Christmas Eve bombings of churches across Indonesia in 2000, which killed 19 people. Indonesia should capture the extremist preacher and give him to the US, Mr Burks recalled the envoy saying during the meeting, which was held just weeks before the Bali bombings. "Mainly, the request was made with the reason that this preacher was truly evil," Mr Burks said. The envoy used the term "render" for the nature of the request, which Mr Burks said he translated as secretly arrested and handed over to the nation concerned. President Megawati, who had met Mr Bush in person in the weeks after the September 11 attacks, declined the request. "Megawati took a breath, then she said: 'Very sorry, but I cannot fulfil your request'," Mr Burks said. She allegedly said that unlike another suspect, Omar al Faruq, Bashir was too famous to simply be captured and handed over. Mr Burks told the court he left the State Department because he had resented the insistence that he sign a security pledge. The prosecution attempted to undermine his testimony by forcing him to admit he had taken the drug ecstasy twice, years before the meeting. Bashir has been charged with inciting bomb attacks, including the 2002 Bali bombings which killed 202 people, including 88 Australians, and the Marriott blast in Jakarta last year, which killed 12.

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Home Front: WoT

Another WaPo Story with No named Sources

2004-06-28

The CIA has suspended the use of extraordinary interrogation techniques approved by the White House pending a review by Justice Department and other administration lawyers, intelligence officials said. The "enhanced interrogation techniques," as the CIA calls them, include feigned drowning and refusal of pain medication for injuries. The tactics have been used to elicit intelligence from al Qaeda leaders such as Abu Zubaida and Khalid Sheik Mohammed. No attribution ... The decision applies to CIA detention facilities, such as those around the world where the agency is interrogating al Qaeda leaders and their supporters, but not military prisons at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and elsewhere. No attribution "Everything’s on hold," said a former senior CIA official aware of the agency’s decision. Aware how? And why is this person talking to the press? "The whole thing has been stopped until we sort out whether we are sure we’re on legal ground." A CIA spokesman declined to comment on the issue. I would decline to comment on intel matters, too. Adults are in charge now. No talking to the press without being arrested. CIA interrogations will continue but without the suspended techniques, which include feigning suffocation, "stress positions," light and noise bombardment, sleep deprivation, and making captives think they are being interrogated by another government. ... The suspension ... is related to the White House decision, announced Tuesday, to review and rewrite sections of an Aug. 1, 2002, Justice Department opinion on interrogations that said torture might be justified in some cases. No attribution The legal debate over CIA interrogation techniques had its origins in the battlefields of Afghanistan, secret counterterrorism operations in Pakistan and in President Bush’s decision to use unconventional tools in going after al Qaeda. The interrogation methods were approved by Justice Department and National Security Council lawyers in 2002, briefed to key congressional leaders and required the authorization of CIA Director George J. Tenet for use, according to intelligence officials and other government officials with knowledge of the secret decision-making process. Guess it’s not a secret anymore When the CIA and the military "started capturing al Qaeda in Afghanistan, they had no interrogators, no special rules and no place to put them," said a senior Marine officer involved in detainee procedures. Involved how? The FBI, which had the only full cadre of professional interrogators from its work with criminal networks in the United States, took the lead in questioning detainees. But on Nov. 11, 2001, a senior al Qaeda operative who ran the Khaldan paramilitary camp in Afghanistan was captured by Pakistani forces and turned over to U.S. military forces in January 2002. The capture of Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, a Libyan, sparked the first real debate over interrogations. The CIA wanted to use a range of methods, including threatening his life and family. But the FBI had never authorized such methods. The bureau wanted to preserve the purity of interrogations so they could be used as evidence in court cases. Al-Libi provided the CIA with intelligence about an alleged plot to blow up the U.S. Embassy in Yemen with a truck bomb and pointed officials in the direction of Abu Zubaida, a top al Qaeda leader known to have been involved with the Sept. 11 plot. No attribution to the ’facts’ in this graf In March 2002, Abu Zubaida was captured, and the interrogation debate between the CIA and FBI began anew. This time, when FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III decided to withhold FBI involvement, it was a signal that the tug of war was over. No attribution "Once the CIA was given the green light . . . they had the lead role," said a senior FBI counterterrorism official. Abu Zubaida was shot in the groin during his apprehension in Pakistan. U.S. national security officials have suggested that painkillers were used selectively in the beginning of his captivity until he agreed to cooperate more fully. His information led to the apprehension of other al Qaeda members, including Ramzi Binalshibh, also in Pakistan. The capture of Binalshibh and other al Qaeda leaders -- Omar al-Faruq in Indonesia, Rahim al-Nashiri in Kuwait and Muhammad al Darbi in Yemen -- were all partly the result of information gained during interrogations, according to U.S. intelligence and national security officials. All four remain under CIA control. A former senior Justice Department official said interrogation techniques for "high-value targets" were reviewed and approved on a case-by-case basis, based partly on what strategies would work best on specific detainees. Justice lawyers suggested some limitations that were adopted, the former official said. ... The administration concluded that techniques did not amount to torture if they did not produce significant physical harm or injury. However, interrogators were allowed to trick the detainees into thinking they might be harmed or instructed to endure unpleasant physical tasks, such as being forced to stand or squat in stress positions. .... Anyone see a pattern here? I do. Not one named source was used in this article. Why? Is this agenda pushing in the guise of jouranlism? I think so.

Link

Home Front: WoT

CIA Suspends "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques"

2004-06-27

From The Washington Post The CIA has suspended the use of extraordinary interrogation techniques approved by the White House pending a review by Justice Department and other administration lawyers, intelligence officials said. The "enhanced interrogation techniques," as the CIA calls them, include feigned drowning and refusal of pain medication for injuries. The tactics have been used to elicit intelligence from al Qaeda leaders such as Abu Zubaida and Khalid Sheik Mohammed. ... The decision applies to CIA detention facilities, such as those around the world where the agency is interrogating al Qaeda leaders and their supporters, but not military prisons at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and elsewhere. "Everything’s on hold," said a former senior CIA official aware of the agency’s decision. "The whole thing has been stopped until we sort out whether we are sure we’re on legal ground." A CIA spokesman declined to comment on the issue. CIA interrogations will continue but without the suspended techniques, which include feigning suffocation, "stress positions," light and noise bombardment, sleep deprivation, and making captives think they are being interrogated by another government. ... The suspension ... is related to the White House decision, announced Tuesday, to review and rewrite sections of an Aug. 1, 2002, Justice Department opinion on interrogations that said torture might be justified in some cases. .... The legal debate over CIA interrogation techniques had its origins in the battlefields of Afghanistan, secret counterterrorism operations in Pakistan and in President Bush’s decision to use unconventional tools in going after al Qaeda. The interrogation methods were approved by Justice Department and National Security Council lawyers in 2002, briefed to key congressional leaders and required the authorization of CIA Director George J. Tenet for use, according to intelligence officials and other government officials with knowledge of the secret decision-making process. When the CIA and the military "started capturing al Qaeda in Afghanistan, they had no interrogators, no special rules and no place to put them," said a senior Marine officer involved in detainee procedures. The FBI, which had the only full cadre of professional interrogators from its work with criminal networks in the United States, took the lead in questioning detainees. But on Nov. 11, 2001, a senior al Qaeda operative who ran the Khaldan paramilitary camp in Afghanistan was captured by Pakistani forces and turned over to U.S. military forces in January 2002. The capture of Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, a Libyan, sparked the first real debate over interrogations. The CIA wanted to use a range of methods, including threatening his life and family. But the FBI had never authorized such methods. The bureau wanted to preserve the purity of interrogations so they could be used as evidence in court cases. Al-Libi provided the CIA with intelligence about an alleged plot to blow up the U.S. Embassy in Yemen with a truck bomb and pointed officials in the direction of Abu Zubaida, a top al Qaeda leader known to have been involved with the Sept. 11 plot. In March 2002, Abu Zubaida was captured, and the interrogation debate between the CIA and FBI began anew. This time, when FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III decided to withhold FBI involvement, it was a signal that the tug of war was over. "Once the CIA was given the green light . . . they had the lead role," said a senior FBI counterterrorism official. Abu Zubaida was shot in the groin during his apprehension in Pakistan. U.S. national security officials have suggested that painkillers were used selectively in the beginning of his captivity until he agreed to cooperate more fully. His information led to the apprehension of other al Qaeda members, including Ramzi Binalshibh, also in Pakistan. The capture of Binalshibh and other al Qaeda leaders -- Omar al-Faruq in Indonesia, Rahim al-Nashiri in Kuwait and Muhammad al Darbi in Yemen -- were all partly the result of information gained during interrogations, according to U.S. intelligence and national security officials. All four remain under CIA control. A former senior Justice Department official said interrogation techniques for "high-value targets" were reviewed and approved on a case-by-case basis, based partly on what strategies would work best on specific detainees. Justice lawyers suggested some limitations that were adopted, the former official said. ... The administration concluded that techniques did not amount to torture if they did not produce significant physical harm or injury. However, interrogators were allowed to trick the detainees into thinking they might be harmed or instructed to endure unpleasant physical tasks, such as being forced to stand or squat in stress positions. ....

Link

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