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Syria-Lebanon-Iran
Syria thwarts coup d'etat plotted by former army officers
2025-04-17
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
[Regnum] The special services prevented the preparation of a coup d'etat in Syria, which was being prepared by officers of the former army. This was stated by the Minister of Internal Affairs Anas Khattab on April 16.

"We have thwarted the plans for a coup that were being prepared by officers of the overthrown regime that is now a thing of the past. This was possible thanks to the efforts of our armed forces and people," SANA reports him as saying.

It is noted that the operation to suppress the coup was coordinated by both the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defense of Syria. It was also decided to create a department responsible for pursuing criminals through increased coordination with other security services.

As reported by the Regnum news agency, on December 8, 2024, former President of the Republic Bashar al-Assad resigned as head of state and left the country after the successful offensive of opposition groups on Damascus. He received political asylum in Russia. The head of the new government was Ahmed al-Sharaa.

On March 6, clashes broke out in Syria between Assad supporters and the forces of the new government. The clashes took place in Latakia and Tartus, after which the government sent in troops. Three days later, clashes began in the port city of Baniyas. According to the Kurdish television channel Rudaw, at least 532 civilians had died in the conflict as of March 8.

Press Secretary of the Russian President Dmitry Peskov noted that Moscow wants to see the Syrian state stable and prosperous. He pointed out the need to ensure stability in the country, given the general explosiveness of the Middle East. Instability in one state in the region can cause a chain reaction in neighboring ones, the Kremlin representative emphasized.

Link


Syria-Lebanon-Iran
US maintains non-recognition of any entity as the Syrian government: Spox
2025-04-11
[Rudaw] The United States "provided guidance" to the Syrian Mission to the United Nations
...an organization originally established to war on dictatorships which was promptly infiltrated by dictatorships and is now held in thrall to dictatorships...
regarding the modification of the visa status of its members in New York, a US State Department spokesperson told Rudaw on Thursday, emphasizing that Washington "currently does not recognize any entity" in Damascus as "the government of Syria."

"The United States recently provided guidance to the Syrian Mission to the [United Nations] UN in New York regarding the visa classification of members of its mission," the spokesperson stated.

Underscoring that "the United States currently does not recognize any entity as the government of Syria," the spokesperson explained that "visa classification depends in part on the United States' recognition policy," with the "administrative decision made on the basis of current U.S. recognition policy."

The move comes after Washington recently downgraded visas for members of the Syrian mission from G1, for diplomats representing a permanent mission at the UN, to G3, granted to a mission or foreign nationals representing a government that is not recognized by the US.

However,
we can't all be heroes. Somebody has to sit on the curb and applaud when they go by...
according to the US State Department, ’’there has been no change to the privileges or immunities of the accredited members of the Syrian Permanent Mission to the United Nations.’’

The state-run Syrian News Agency (SANA) on Monday quoted a Damascus "foreign ministry source" as downplaying "the modification of the legal status of the Syrian mission in New York" as a "purely technical and administrative procedure" and "does not reflect any change in the stance regarding the new Syrian government."

SANA quoted the source as explaining that the Syrian foreign ministry is engaging with "the relevant authorities to address this issue" and to ensure that "that no misunderstandings arise regarding the related political or legal positions."

The source further noted that "a comprehensive review of Syria's diplomatic missions abroad is currently underway, and serious decisions regarding their reorganization will soon be announced."

The US is maintaining its non-recognition of any entity as the Damascus government despite Syria’s interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa in appointing a 23-member cabinet in late March, which held its first official meeting on Monday.

Importantly, the cabinet selection raised many eyebrows for including figures blacklisted by the UN and the US over their reported ties to bully boy gangs, namely Interior Minister Anas Khattab.

US State Department spokesperson, Tammy Bruce, told Rudaw on Tuesday that the new Syrian cabinet has yet to meet Washington’s expectations regarding inclusivity.

"There's much more that has to be done that has not been done, and we're waiting to see them [leadership in Syria] take more action," Bruce stated, adding that "there are expectations that have yet to be met, and so we're waiting to see what they're doing."

In addition to concerns about forming an inclusive transitional government in Syria, the US remains wary of human rights
...which are usually entirely different from personal liberty...
violations in Syria.
Link


Syria-Lebanon-Iran
Syria's new cabinet draws criticism over controversial appointments, Syrian Kurds reject it altogether
2025-03-31
[Rudaw] Syria’s interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa on Saturday appointed a 23-member cabinet, including four members from minority groups. However, the appointments have raised eyebrows as ethnic and religious groups say they were not consulted during the appointment process. The cabinet also includes figures who have been blacklisted by the UN and the US over ties to extremist armed groups.

Following a swift offensive, a coalition of opposition groups led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, headed by Sharaa, in early December toppled the regime of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad. Sharaa was appointed as Syria’s interim president in late January, after which he vowed to form an “inclusive transitional government that would reflect Syria's diversity.”

Upon announcing the new cabinet, Sharaa on Saturday stated, “at this historic moment, we mark the beginning of a new phase in our national journey” and “advance toward the future we deserve with strong will and unwavering resolve.”

THE SOVEREIGN PORTFOLIOS
Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani retained his position in the new cabinet lineup. Born in 1987 in Hasaka, Shaibani holds a Bachelor's in English literature from Damascus University and a Master’s in political science and international relations from Istanbul Sabahattin Zaim University. He is pursuing a doctorate in International Relations. Shaibani was a founding member of the Idlib-based Syrian Salvation Government in 2017 and served on HTS’s Shura council - a traditional Islamic council that provides guidance based on religious principles.

Syria’s Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra will also continue in his role. A native of Hama province, Abu Qasra was born in 1984. He played a key role in the armed opposition against Assad and the HTS-led offensive that toppled him. He holds a degree in Agricultural Engineering from Damascus University and a master’s degree from Idlib University. Sharaa promoted Abu Qasra to Major General in late December.

Meanwhile, the ministry of interior has been assigned to Anas Khattab, a senior member of the Syrian opposition and founding member of the al-Nusra Front, which rebranded itself as the Jabhat Fatah al-Sham in 2016 when it split from al-Qaeda, and then again to HTS in 2017, when it merged with other factions. Khattab’s name is not far from controversy as he was listed by the UN on its terrorism lists in September 2014 and by the US in December 2012.

Another controversial figure that was assigned the Justice portfolio is Mazhar al-Wais. He is a top HTS judge who headed the Sharia Commission in Syria’s eastern regions. The commission was established following the split of al-Nusra Front from the Islamic State (ISIS) in 2013. He was one of HTS’s religious leaders and headed the Supreme Judicial Council of the Syrian Salvation Government.

MINISTRIES LED BY MINORITY MEMBERS
Despite a majority Sunni Arab ministers, Sharaa’s new cabinet reportedly includes members from other Syrian ethnic and religious components.

Mohammad Turko, reportedly a Kurd from the Kurdish-majority city of Afrin in northeast Syria (Rojava), was appointed as minister of education. Born in 1979, Turko holds a law degree from Damascus University and a doctorate from Leipzig University. He has written on child rights, citizenship, and education and has taught at several universities in Syria.

Hind Kabawat, a Christian woman, was named Minister of Social Affairs. She holds degrees in economics, law, and a Master’s in Law and Diplomacy from Tufts University in the US. Kabawat has been a prominent figure in the Syrian opposition since the 2011 uprising, holding leadership roles in the High Negotiations Committee and Geneva Negotiations Office between 2015 and 2022. Following Assad's fall in 2024, she became a member of the National Dialogue Conference preparatory committee.

Amjad Badr, a Druze, was appointed Minister of Agriculture. Born in 1969, Badr holds a doctorate in Agricultural Economics from Aleppo University.

Ya’rub Badr, an Alawite, was named Minister of Transport. Born in 1959, he earned a doctorate in Transportation Sciences from Paris and served as the Regional Advisor for Transport and Logistics at the UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA). He also served as Syria’s Minister of Transport from 2006 to 2011.

Despite the inclusion of some ministers from different backgrounds, the Kurdish-led administration in northeast Syria (Rojava) on Sunday criticized Syria’s newly-formed government for “allowing a single faction to maintain control,” saying that the country’s ethnic and religious groups were neither involved in nor consulted in the distribution of ministerial portfolios.

The Democratic Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria (DAANES) warned that any government that does not represent Syria’s plurality will not be able to properly manage the country, stressing that it will not adhere to the decisions of the newly-appointed government.

OTHER MINISTRIES
The remaining ministers appointed are as follows:

Minister of Communications Abdul Salam Haykal holds a degree in Political Science and International Relations from the American University of Beirut (AUB) and the University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS).

Minister of Information Hamza al-Mustafa, born in 1985, holds a degree in political science. He was notably dismissed from his Master’s program in Syria during the Assad era over his support for the Syrian uprising. He later earned a master's degree from the Doha Institute and a doctorate in social science from the University of Exeter

Minister of Education Marwan al-Halabi, born in 1964, specializes in Obstetrics, Gynecology, and Surgery and has earned postgraduate diplomas from universities in France. A professor at Damascus University, he served as Head of the Department of Anatomy and Editor-in-Chief of the Damascus University Journal for Medical Sciences.

Minister of Tourism Mazen al-Salihani, born in 1979, holds postgraduate degrees in Business Administration and Project Management and has led major hotel and resort developments in the Middle East, including in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.

Minister of Energy Mohammad al-Bashir, born in 1983, holds a degree in Electrical and Electronics Engineering from Aleppo University and a Master’s in Sharia and Law from Idlib University. He worked at the Syrian Gas Company before joining the revolution in 2011. He served as Prime Minister in the Syrian Salvation Government and later in the interim government.

Minister of Economy Mohammad al-Shaar has worked in financial regulation and international banking and has taught economics at George Washington University.

Minister of Local Administration and Environment Mohammad Anjarani, born in 1992, is a mechanical engineering graduate. He joined the Syrian uprising upon its debut and was arrested in 2011. He later held key administrative positions in the Syrian Salvation Government.

Minister of Finance Mohammad Barniyeh, born in 1967, is a graduate of Damascus University’s Faculty of Economics. He pursued further studies in the US at Kansas State and Oklahoma State universities. He trained at the Federal Reserve Bank in New York and worked as an economist at the Arab Monetary Fund.

Minister of Sports Mohammad Hamoud, born in 1976, previously led the national basketball team to the Asian Cup qualifiers. He also worked in developing sports infrastructure in Idlib.

Minister of Culture Mohammad Saleh, born in 1985, studied Linguistics at London Metropolitan University and earned a master’s in translation from Westminster University. He worked in journalism, including at Qatar’s al-Jazeera Network.

Minister of Religious Endowments Mohammad Shukri, born in 1961, holds a doctorate in Sharia and Law from Beirut. He served as a preacher at Imam al-Shafi’i Mosque in Damascus.

Minister of Administrative Development Mohammad Skaf, born in 1990, holds a Master’s in Administration and a degree in Applied Mathematics. He has worked in public administration and budget management in northern Syria.

Minister of Health Musab al-Ali, born in 1985, is a graduate of Homs University’s Faculty of Medicine. He specialized in neurosurgery at Aleppo University before working in Germany. He is currently a consultant neurosurgeon.

Minister of Public Works and Housing Mustafa Abdulrazzaq, born in 1989, is a civil engineering graduate. He has worked in public administration and infrastructure projects in northern Syria.

Minister of Emergency and Disaster Management Raed al-Saleh, born in 1984, has a background in business administration. He played a leading role in founding the Syrian Civil Defense (White Helmets) and has represented the organization at major international forums, including the UN Security Council.

THE PREMIER
While heads of ministries have been named, a prime minister has not been appointed as Sharaa is expected to lead the executive branch.

In mid-March, Sharaa signed a 53-article constitutional declaration that centers on Islamic jurisprudence, which stipulates that the country’s president must be a Muslim and sets a five-year transitional period for the country. It also maintains the name of the country as the Syrian “Arab” Republic.

The interim constitution further grants Sharaa exclusive executive power, authority to appoint one-third of the legislature, and the ability to appoint judges to the constitutional court, the body responsible for holding him accountable.

The constitutional declaration has been criticized by Kurds, Christians, and Druze in Syria for consolidating power in Sharaa’s hands and not reflecting the diverse aspirations of the Syrian people. These communities have urged amendments to the interim constitution, warning that they would not participate in the new government without them.

Rojava says won’t implement decisions of new ‘exclusionary’ government in Syria

[Rudaw] The Kurdish-led administration in northeast Syria (Rojava) on Sunday criticized Syria’s newly-formed interim government as “exclusionary” and “failing” to uphold diversity, stressing that they would not abide by its decisions.

Syria’s interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa on Saturday announced his new 23-minister cabinet, which includes ministers from his former government.

The Democratic Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria (DAANES) on Sunday rejected the new cabinet, claiming that it “resembled its [caretaker] predecessor in failing to take Syria's diversity into consideration and allowing a single faction to maintain control.” It warned that any government that does not represent Syria’s plurality will not be able to properly manage the country and pull it out of its crisis.

The DAANES further noted that they will not adhere to the decisions of the new government in Damascus.

“We will not be concerned with implementing and executing decisions issued by it, as this insistence on repeating past mistakes will harm Syrians and will never launch a comprehensive political process that can provide solutions to the pending issues, problems, and crises Syria is experiencing,” their statement read.

The Kurdish-led administration has previously criticized other actions taken by the interim government in Damascus, accusing it of marginalizing Kurds and other minorities.
Link


Syria-Lebanon-Iran
Syria swears in new transitional government four months after ousting Assad
2025-03-30
[IsraelTimes] Members of minority groups including a Christian woman, a Kurd, and and an Alawite given cabinet positions as Damascus aims to convince West to lift crippling sanctions

Syria’s new transitional government was sworn in Saturday, nearly four months after the Assad family was removed from power and as the new authorities in Damascus work to bring back stability to the war-torn country.

The 23-member Cabinet, which is religiously and ethnically mixed, is the first in the country’s five-year transitional period and replaces the interim government that was formed shortly after Bashir Pencilneck al-Assad
Before going into the family business Pencilneck was an eye doctor. If he'd stuck with it he'd have had a good practice by now...
was removed from power in early December.

The Cabinet does not have a prime minister since, according to the temporary constitution signed by interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa earlier this month, the government will have a secretary general.

The government includes new faces apart from the ministers of foreign affairs and defense, who have been kept in the posts they held in the interim government. Syria’s new Interior Minister Anas Khattab was until recently the head of the intelligence department.

"The formation of a new government today is a declaration of our joint will to build a new state," Sharaa said in a speech marking the formation of the government.

Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra said his main goal will be to build a professional army "from the people and for the people."

The government did not include members of the US-backed and Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces or the autonomous civil administration in northeast Syria. Sharaa and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi signed a breakthrough deal earlier this month in Damascus on a nationwide ceasefire and the merging of the US-backed force into the Syrian army.

Among those whose names were announced late Saturday night was Hind Kabawat, who became the first woman appointed to the new government.

Kabawat, a Christian activist and vocal opponent of Assad since the start of the civil war in 2011, was named minister of minister of social affairs and labor.

Raed Saleh, who for years headed the Syrian Civil Defense, also known as the White Helmets, was named minister for emergency disasters, and Damascus-based Syrian Kurd Mohammed Terko was named minister of education.

Mohammed al-Bashir, who has headed Syria’s interim government since Assad’s fall, was named minister of energy. He will mainly be tasked with restoring the electricity and oil sectors that were badly damaged during the 14-year civil war.

The new government’s main mission is to try and bring a decisive end to the war and bring stability to the country, which witnessed festivities and Dire Revenge killings earlier this month along the coastal region that is home to members of the minority Alawite sect, to which Assad belongs. The violence left more than 1,000 people, mostly Alawites, dead.

Most of Syria’s bad boy groups now running the country are Sunni Moslems, but the presence of members of minority sects including an Alawite, as well as a woman, is a message from Sharaa to Western countries that have been demanding that women and minorities be part of Syria’s political process.

The announcement of a religiously mixed government aims to try to convince Western countries to lift crippling economic sanctions that were imposed on Assad more than a decade ago. The UN says that 90% of Syrians are below the poverty line, while millions face cuts in food aid as a result of the war.

Hours before the government was announced, the US State Department cautioned US citizens of the increased possibility of attacks during the Eid al-Fitr holiday, which it said could target embassies, international organizations and Syrian public institutions in Damascus. It added that methods of attack could include, but are not limited to, individual attackers, armed button men, or the use of bombs.
Rudaw has more names:
  • Anas Khattab - Minister of Interior,

  • Asaad al-Shaibani - Minister of Foreign Affairs,

  • Murhaf Abu Qasra - Minister of Defense,

  • Marwan al-Halabi - Minister of Higher Education,

  • Hind Kabawat - Minister of Social Affairs,

  • Mazhar al-Wais - Minister of Justice,

  • Mohammed al-Bashir - Minister of Energy.
Link


Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia
Glorification of Basayev's image resulted in a criminal case for a citizen of the Russian Federation and Abkhazia
2025-03-29
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
[KavkazUzel] A citizen of the Russian Federation and Abkhazia was detained in Sochi after publishing content that created glorified images of members of Chechen illegal armed groups, in particular, Shamil Basayev.

A citizen of Russia and the Republic of Abkhazia, born in 1988, involved in the distribution of terrorist materials on the Internet, has been detained, security forces reported.

According to the FSB, the detainee published materials on his Telegram channel justifying and promoting terrorist activity "by creating a glorified image of the leaders of illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic from 1991 to 2006, in particular, the terrorist Shamil Basayev." A case has been opened against the detainee under Part 2 of Article 205.2 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (public calls for terrorist activity, public justification of terrorism or propaganda of terrorism). The penalty under this article provides for up to seven years of imprisonment, Interfax writes, citing the FSB Public Relations Center.

On August 7, 1999, more than a thousand armed fighters under the leadership of Shamil Basayev  and Jordanian  Amir Khattab entered Dagestan from Chechnya. Fighting continued in the republic for more than a month, including on September 5, when about 2,000 fighters again crossed the Chechen-Dagestan border and occupied villages and heights in the Novolaksky District.
At the time they called themselves the Republic of Ichkeria, which morphed into the Al Qaeda-linked Caucasus Emirate, which eventually swore allegiance to the Islamic State, changing its name to Vilyat Kavkaz. I suppose for our purposes current members should be filed under ISIS…
Only on September 15, 1999, the Minister of Defense announced that Dagestan had been completely liberated, according to the " Kavkazsky Knot " report " Militant Invasion of Dagestan (1999)."

Investigators regularly report detentions and arrests of alleged former members of Basayev and Khattab's group. In December, the court remanded  in custody Khamidulla Yapov and Minkail Magamadov, accused of involvement in attacks by Basayev and Khattab's militants on servicemen in Chechnya.

Related:
Shamil Basayev 03/02/2025 'Half an Hour's Respite - and Again the Attack.' How 90 'Greenhorns' Turned the Tide of the 2nd Chechen War
Shamil Basayev 12/12/2024 War Without Victory Day: How Russia Almost Lost Chechnya
Shamil Basayev 09/25/2024 Defendants in Chechnya Terrorist Attack Case Sentenced to 24 and 25 Years in Prison

Link


Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia
'Half an Hour's Respite - and Again the Attack.' How 90 'Greenhorns' Turned the Tide of the 2nd Chechen War
2025-03-02
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Daniil Pelymov

[REGNUM] "The battalion was carrying out a blocking mission. Intelligence discovered the caravan. The battalion commander moved to the battlefield and commanded the unit. The soldiers fulfilled their duty with honor. I am proud of my people." These few words of Colonel Sergei Melentyev, commander of the 104th regiment of the 76th Pskov Airborne Division, at a briefing on March 5, 2000, became the first official testimony of the bloody battle that took place several days earlier in the Argun Gorge of Chechnya.

Only later, from the words of the survivors, it became clear that this was an event that would forever enter the history of the Russian army.

Exactly twenty-five years ago, 90 young fighters of the 6th company of the 104th regiment found themselves in the path of militants who were many times superior in force – and at the cost of their lives, they thwarted the breakthrough through the mountains of a large group of Shamil Basayev and the international terrorist Khattab. At the same time, the feat of the “Spartans from the Airborne Forces” revealed the systemic problems of the Russian army of that time, which had to be solved already in the new century.

ENEMY BREAKTHROUGH IN TWO DIRECTIONS
The last year of the 20th century, 2000, was a leap year, so the last battle of the 6th company of the Pskov landing force fell on a rare date - February 29.

Leap years are considered difficult years – and in this case it was not just a matter of popular superstition. It was the last war that Russia had waged this century – the Second Chechen War.

Since September 1999, the army, at the cost of heavy losses, but steadily corrected the mistake made in 1996 - when the First Chechen War was ended by the Khasavyurt Peace. The conflict was supposedly stopped, but the "deal" only extended the life of the criminal-terrorist enclave that called itself the "Chechen Republic of Ichkeria". The regime that captured Chechnya quickly drifted from separatism to Islamism and could not help but begin "exporting jihad" - the invasion of Khattab and Basayev's gangs into Dagestan without the knowledge of the "President of Ichkeria" Aslan Maskhadov was inevitable.

By the end of 1999, the militants' attack was repelled by the regular army and Dagestani militias, and the war continued on enemy territory. The cities of Gudermes, Achkhoy-Martan, Argun, Shali, and the village and airfield of Khankala had already been liberated, and the battle for Grozny was underway (November 1999 - February 2000).

During the retreat from the Chechen capital, the "Ichkerians" lost many fighters who were blown up in their own minefields. Unable to confront the regular army in open combat, the enemy retreated to the mountains of the Shatoi and Itum-Kalinsky districts, where they felt more confident.

The absence of problems with food, the support and training of Arab professional terrorists (who were supervised by the “Black Arab” Khattab and the main “specialist” in airborne and subversive operations Abu al-Walid ), knowledge of the terrain - all this contributed to the effective operations of the Wahhabis and the difficulties of the advancement of the “federalists”.

The gang of "division general" Ruslan Gelayev moved towards the village of Komsomolskoye (Urus-Martanovsky district), trying to gain a foothold in this strategically important point of mountainous Chechnya. Gelayev hoped for the effectiveness of the tactics of the first war, when Salman Raduyev's terrorists successfully held Pervomayskoye together with the hostages. The battles for Komsomolskoye (March 5-20, 2000) became the last major battle of the Second Chechen War and require a separate story. We will turn our attention to another group.

The formation under the dual command of Basayev and Khattab concentrated in the area of ​​the village of Ulus-Kert in the Shatoi district and the adjacent mountains along the Argun gorge. From here, the enemy planned to wage a sabotage war and wait for spring to begin full-scale guerrilla operations. Ulus-Kert became a "stronghold" for the separatists.

The goal of our army was to encircle and eliminate the remaining large groups in the Argun Gorge. The enemy hoped to break out of the encirclement being formed and, possibly, break through the mountains into Dagestan again.

YOUNG, INEXPERIENCED
In this difficult situation, the 6th Company of the 2nd Battalion of the 104th Regiment, consisting mainly of young, “green” soldiers (many were only 19 years old), was ordered to occupy the dominant height 776 in the Argun Gorge.

The problems began even before the operation. The better prepared and equipped 4th company was originally planned to be assigned to fortify the heights, but due to problems with transport, the "green" 6th company was sent on the mission.

It is worth adding that right before being sent to the combat zone, the company was staffed from different units, which affected its coherence and combat training. The commanders were able to get to know the fighters only at the front. This is exactly the situation that Guards Major Sergei Molodov, appointed as the group leader, found himself in. Together with him, the battalion commander, Guards Lieutenant Colonel Mark Yevtyukhin, took command.

The concept of the operation was quite simple. By this time, the 3rd company of the same 104th regiment, already occupying a fortified height, successfully held off the onslaught of superior enemy forces, using machine gun fire and artillery support with a smaller staff. Therefore, the "youngsters" from the 6th company were given a similar task.

A major problem in planning the operation was the lack of proper information about the enemy's forces and movements. There was a lack of technical equipment and scale of reconnaissance operations, and Basayev's men themselves skillfully camouflaged themselves in the mountain forests and carried out large-scale regroupings only at night.

"NO, THEY'RE GOBLINS."
On the afternoon of February 29, the paratroopers encountered a small enemy reconnaissance group. After a short firefight, the militants retreated, and then Major Molodov was tragically killed by a sniper shot, which was a blow to the morale of the personnel.

It was an alarming signal, but no one realized the scale of the impending threat. They thought everything was all right. The separatists, noting that the detachment was small, had a lot of cargo, and was poorly trained in moving in the mountains (the company was scattered in a long chain along the mountains), decided to break through the chain right here, sensing what they thought was a weak bleeding spot.

Khattab was confident of success, but Basayev still initially doubted the success of the fight even with such an advantage.

A recording of their radio communications from February 29, intercepted by our intelligence, has been preserved.

Basayev: If there are dogs in front (in militant jargon - soldiers of the internal troops), we can come to an agreement.

Khattab : No, they are goblins (paratroopers)

Basayev: Listen, maybe we should go around? They won't let us in, as soon as we reveal ourselves...

Khattab: No. We will cut them down.

The separatists were counting on success, as they outnumbered the paratroopers, outsold them in experience and mobility. As veteran of the 104th regiment Andrei Lobanov noted, the field commanders were far from being "schoolchildren", they were experienced, trained people with disciplined fighters. Also, unlike the "federals", who carried all their belongings, including potbelly stoves, the militants could leave most of their equipment and provisions in Ulus-Kert and actively used pack animals.

TWO DAYS IN HELL
During the day, the jihadists secretly approached the army positions and began to dig in. In the evening, a fierce battle began. The exact number of attackers is unknown, but according to various estimates, up to 2,500 people. Only the first waves of attacks involved 300-400 militants armed with mortars, machine guns, and sniper rifles.

“They were simply coming at us like a wall, their eyes bulging, shouting: ‘Allahu Akbar!’” Guards Sergeant Andrei Porshnev, one of the six who survived the battle at Height 776,told Rossiyskaya Gazeta in 2014.

“We’d shoot one wave, have a half-hour break, and then attack again... There were a lot of them,” the soldier recalled.

The battle flared up with incredible force. The paratroopers, despite the enemy's numerical superiority, put up a desperate resistance. Every meter on the approach to the dominant height was drenched in blood.

By midnight on March 1, the shooting had died down. The unit, previously stretched out along the heights, began to regroup, help the wounded and remove the dead. Artillery support was ineffective due to inaccurate calculations, poor intelligence and the stressed state of the gunners. Nevertheless, according to enemy information, at least 30 "mujahideen" were killed by artillery fire.

On the night of March 1, the 1st company of Guard Major Sergei Baran tried to break through to help: only they had the opportunity to cover the distance to the heights in the shortest time and help their comrades. But, probably, the fighters encountered a blocking detachment of militants while crossing the Abazulgol River and were forced to retreat.

At the same time, the paratroopers, tired and having lost a third of their number, were unable to dig trenches in the frozen ground, despair gripped everyone, and the only hope was for dawn, which would dispel the darkness for artillery and reinforcements. Around 6 a.m., the enemy made a final attempt to break through.

The wounded paratroopers continued to fight, covering the retreat of their comrades. When their ammunition ran out, not wanting to surrender, they blew themselves up with grenades, taking their enemies with them to the grave. By order of Captain Viktor Romanov, who took command after Yevtyukhin's death, the heights were covered with artillery fire.

By morning, the 6th company had practically ceased to exist. Only six remained alive. The enemy's loss figures vary. Colonel General Gennady Troshev, who commanded the united federal forces during the Second Chechen War, wrote in his memoirs about 400 "Ichkerians" killed, while the newspaper " Krasnaya Zvezda " wrote about half a thousand fighters in an article for the first anniversary of the battle.

LESSONS OF TRAGEDY AND HEROISM
In any case, at the cost of its life (and at the cost of tragic mistakes), the 6th Company greatly influenced the outcome of the war. The active combat phase of the Second Chechen War - with the capture of cities and large-scale battles "in the field" - ended by April 2000.

On the other hand, the tragedy at the 776th height stirred up all of Russia. A mass of legal proceedings followed, connected with the death of soldiers, in every corner of the country they knew about the battle for the 776th height.

The unit was able to delay the advance of the militants, but in the future the shortcomings of the old military system (understaffing, sending "green" conscripts to the front lines, the quality of planning operations and coordination between units) will lead to tragic episodes and a number of military failures. It is enough to recall the destruction of a column of Perm OMON near the village of Dzhani-Vedeno in March 2000. And some of Basayev's and Khattab's men managed to break through from the Argun Gorge in other areas. The "Black Arab" himself was liquidated in 2002, Basayev was "gotten" only in 2006.

But, be that as it may, the experience of mistakes, successes and exploits of the Second Chechen Campaign - completed successfully, but at a high price - was laid as the basis for the military reform of 2001-2004 and, in general, became the beginning of the revival of the Russian Armed Forces, which distinguished themselves during the five-day war in South Ossetia, and in the Syrian operation, and on the fields of the North Caucasus Military District.

The special operation added new pages to the annals of the Airborne Forces' history (it is enough to recall the defense of the airport in Gostomel in February 2022), but the paratroopers do not forget the feat of the generation of fathers and older brothers. The whole of Russia remembers them, which is especially important now, when, on the initiative of the president, 2025 has been declared the Year of the Defender of the Fatherland.

Link


The Grand Turk
Erdogan will have to try very hard to remain Syria's main partner
2025-02-07
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Kamran Gasanov

[REGNUM] In 2011, the Turkish and Syrian governments went their separate ways, like ships at sea, and for more than ten years they had no contact, except for meetings at the level of heads of the Foreign Ministry, Defense Ministry, and intelligence services, mediated by Russia. In the last two years, Damascus and Ankara have been preparing to restore ties, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan wanted to meet with Bashar al-Assad. However, to the delight of the Turkish leader, this was no longer necessary.

Now the Turks do not have to negotiate for a long time on unfavorable conditions for establishing diplomatic relations, which depended on the demands to withdraw troops from the northern territories of Syria. If earlier Turkey, with certain exceptions in the form of Kurdish zones, had control only over a thin corridor from the Mediterranean to the border with Iraq, now Ankara can lay claim to broad influence in the capital of Syria.

The head of the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT), Ibrahim Kalin, was praying at the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus just four days after the change of power, and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan became the first diplomat to visit the Syrian capital.

Turkey's leadership in Syria, it must be said, was deserved. After all, after the introduction of Russian troops in 2015 and subsequent operations by Assad's army, the armed opposition lost significant territories.

Its former sponsors, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, withdrew, and after Turkish military operations in the north against ISIS* and the Kurdish YPG, the rebels either came under full Turkish control (as the Free Syrian Army, later renamed the Syrian National Army) or were heavily dependent on it (as was the case with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham* and smaller groups in Idlib).

The Americans and Europeans have shifted their focus from the fight against Assad to the fight against Iran and the protection of the Kurds, settling in the Euphrates region.

It is therefore not surprising that the first foreign guests in Damascus are Turks, and one of the top priority destinations for the representatives of the new Syria is Ankara and Istanbul. On January 15, a large delegation headed by Foreign Minister Asad Hassan al-Shibani arrived in the Turkish capita . He was also accompanied by Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Kasra and General Intelligence Director Anas Hassan Khattab.

Given that Turkey is Syria's main military supporter, it was expected that the most important person in the Syrian leadership, Ahmad al-Sharaa, would choose Turkey as his first country to visit. But before arriving in Ankara, al-Sharaa left for a two-day visit to Riyadh.

This circumstance, on the one hand, is surprising. After all, the KSA has not been the main player in Syria for a long time, and moreover, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, together with his colleagues from the League of Arab States, has actually legitimized the "dictator" by returning Assad to the LAS.

However, in politics, such steps are called diversification. Al-Sharaa does not want to fall under complete dependence on Turkey and be Erdogan's puppet, like the president of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Therefore, he needs to pursue a policy of multipolarity.

High-level Europeans, including the heads of the French and German Foreign Ministries, as well as EU representatives, have come to Damascus, but they demand too much in return – democracy, inclusiveness, an agreement on the creation of Kurdish autonomy. And from the general experience of the Middle East, it follows that the “Westerners” are dangerous and unreliable allies. Al-Sharaa remembers the history of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi well.

The Gulf monarchies do not lobby for human rights and democracy, but they have fat wallets that the UK and the US, especially Donald Trump, covet. Half-destroyed Syria needs money. And what about Syria - Erdogan himself went on a tour of the Gulf to save the lira, which was falling into the abyss. Where there is money, there is politics.

Damascus wants to have the support of Arab countries, whose leader Saudi Arabia is trying to position itself not without success. Syria is aiming even wider, hoping to legitimize itself and gain weight in the Islamic world through bin Salman. Such support will strengthen Damascus's independence from Ankara, and at the same time will become, albeit light, but still a bulletproof vest against Israel, which has expanded its occupation of Syrian lands.

What the parties actually agreed on in Riyadh is still unclear. In general, during this transition period there are almost no specifics on any international issue, including the fate of the Russian bases.

At the same time, having flown to Ankara after Riyadh, the interim president of Syria appeared before Erdogan as a much more authoritative leader than he had been just a few days ago. Negotiations with Erdogan are a recognition of both al-Sharaa and the realities “on the ground”. And Turkey is now the most influential of the bordering countries. And al-Sharaa is not averse to monetizing the potential offered by its northern neighbor.

It is clear from the content of the speeches of the two leaders that the special relations between Syria and Turkey stem not only from the former's great dependence on the latter. Al-Sharaa and Erdogan are also linked by relative ideological closeness.

The Syrian oppositionists who came to power, including armed ones, and various militant groups set the task of establishing an Islamist regime in the country in one form or another. Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party are their model and guide in this direction.

From the very first days of the change of power, Ankara made it clear that it was ready to help Damascus build state institutions. And Erdogan said at a meeting with his guest that he attached "great importance to the creation of the country's administration." Al-Sharaa, for his part, appreciated "Turkey's efforts to ensure the political and economic success of the current Syrian administration."

The Syrian authorities also cannot ignore the fact that Turkey supported the anti-Assad forces almost alone and until the very end. “Turkey did not leave the Syrian people alone in their most desperate and difficult days,” Erdogan said. His guest did not skimp on words of gratitude in response, saying that he would never forget how Erdogan let millions of Syrian refugees into his country, and how “Syrian and Turkish blood mixed in the liberation struggle.”

The refugee issue will also remain a common point of contact for a long time. Türkiye would like to bring millions of Syrians home so as not to burden its economy and reduce social tensions.

For Al-Sharaa, this is a big burden. It is not that Erdogan will terrorize Syria, like Europe, with a “migration baton,” but Damascus will still be obliged to take Ankara’s opinion into account. But money will also be needed to support the refugees, and in this regard, the help of the Arab monarchies becomes even more relevant.

The most painful issue for Erdogan, perhaps even more than refugees, remains the YPG, the Kurds and their separatism.

Since Assad's fall, Turkish troops have carried out several operations against them in Manbij and Tel Rifaat, but Ankara wants the complete destruction, disarmament or evacuation of YPG and SDF fighters, the lead structure in the northeast.

Al-Sharaa is negotiating with Kurdish representatives, the Kurds themselves initiated the talks. However, there are no specifics yet. The Kurds sometimes raise green-white-black flags, sometimes demand autonomy for their political institutions and armed forces.

Erdogan and al-Sharaa share a position on the territorial integrity and unity of Syria, hinting that there will be no independent Syrian Kurdistan. However, the Turkish president wants more practical steps in this direction.

"We discussed the steps that need to be taken against the separatist terrorist organization and its supporters occupying northeastern Syria. I told him that we are ready to provide Syria with the necessary support in the fight against all forms of terrorism, be it Daesh or PKK," Erdogan said after the talks, expressing satisfaction with al-Sharaa's "firm will" in the fight against terrorism.

Ash-Sharaa himself is in no hurry to drive the horses to the east.

He speaks of interest in a strategic partnership with Turkey in all areas. He also noted that Ankara and Damascus are working on "creating a common strategy to counter security threats in the region" and discussing issues of Syria's integrity in the northeast. However, there is still no clarity regarding a military solution to the issue or ultimatums to the Kurds.

What explains such caution?

Perhaps, the hope for a diplomatic solution to the issue, fear of Turkey's strengthening after the next military operations, in which the key player will be the SNA, not HTS*. Also, al-Sharaa is forced to look back at the US and the EU, from which he needs the lifting of international sanctions, without which Arab rials and dirhams will not flood the Syrian market.

In terms of the economy, Turkey depends, firstly, on the lifting of sanctions under the US Caesar Act, and secondly, on funding from the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Turkey understands the scale of the upcoming reconstruction work and is ready to participate in the construction of infrastructure facilities. "Turkey is ready to provide the necessary support for the reconstruction of Syria," Erdogan said, adding that the Arab and Islamic world should provide material support to the Syrians.

To sum up, we can say that Turkey holds the lead in terms of geopolitical influence in Syria. Western countries have only opened embassies, Arab countries can buy Syria, but they need permission from the West.

Turkey has a presence on the ground in the form of military bases and under certain conditions (if Al-Sharaa does not decide to go to war with the YPG) it can increase it. Incidentally, according to media reports, the construction of two permanent Turkish military bases in Syria is currently being discussed.

At the same time, it is worth noting that the competition for influence over the new Syrian leadership has already begun and will only intensify. Al-Sharaa invited Erdogan to visit Syria "as soon as possible", but Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani has already been there. Someone else may appear there before Erdogan arrives.

In short, Ankara has a good starting position, but to play its cards successfully, it needs to take into account a number of other factors, including the West's sanctions toolkit, the Gulf's financial advantages, Arab solidarity, and Israeli pressure. And, of course, one should not discount Ahmed al-Sharaa's still underestimated desire for independence.

Link


Syria-Lebanon-Iran
Syrian rebels find heaps of illicit stimulant trafficked by Assad regime
2024-12-14
More captagon!
[IsraelTimes] Islamist-led fighters vow to destroy the vast quantities of captagon, the lucrative trade in which helped keep the now-deposed strongman in power amid Syria’s civil war

The dramatic collapse of Bashir al-Assad’s Syrian regime has thrown light into the dark corners of his rule, including the industrial-scale export of the banned drug captagon.

Victorious Islamist-led fighters have seized military bases and distribution hubs for the amphetamine-type stimulant, which has flooded the black market across the Middle East.

Led by the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, formerly al-Nusra, before that it was called something else
...al-Qaeda's Syrian affiliate, from which sprang the Islamic State...
(HTS) group, the rebels say they found a vast haul of drugs and vowed to destroy them.

On Wednesday, HTS fighters allowed AFP journalists into a warehouse at a quarry on the outskirts of Damascus, where captagon pills were concealed inside electrical components for export.

"After we entered and did a sweep, and we found that this is a factory for Maher al-Assad and his partner Amer Khiti," said black-masked fighter Abu Malek al-Shami.

HOUSEHOLD APPLIANCES
Maher al-Assad was a military commander and the deposed strongman’s brother, now presumed on the run. He is widely accused of being the power behind the lucrative captagon trade.

Syrian politician Khiti was placed under sanction in 2023 by the British government, which said he "controls multiple businesses in Syria which facilitate the production and smuggling of drugs."

In a cavernous garage beneath the warehouse and loading bays, thousands of dusty beige captagon pills were packed into the copper coils of brand new household voltage stabilizers.

"We found a large number of devices that were stuffed with packages of captagon pills meant to be smuggled out of the country. It’s a huge quantity. It’s impossible to tell," Shami said.

Above, in the warehouse, crates of cardboard boxes stood ready to allow the traffickers to disguise their cargo as pallet-loads of standard goods, alongside sacks and sacks of caustic soda.

Caustic soda, or sodium hydroxide, is a key ingredient in the production of methamphetamine, another stimulant.

Assad fell at the weekend to a lightning HTS offensive, but the revenue from selling captagon propped up Assad’s government throughout Syria’s 13 years of civil war.

Captagon turned Syria into the world’s largest narco state. It became by far Syria’s biggest export, dwarfing all its legal exports put together, according to estimates drawn from official data by AFP during a 2022 investigation.

Experts — like the author of a July report from the Carnegie Middle East Center — also believe that Assad used the threat of drug-fueled unrest to put pressure on Arab governments.

Captagon fuelled an epidemic of drug abuse in wealthy Gulf states, even as Assad sought ways to end his diplomatic isolation among his peers, wrote Carnegie scholar Hesham Alghannam.

’HUGE AMOUNT, BROTHER’
Assad, he wrote, "leveraged captagon trafficking as a means of exerting pressure on the Gulf states, notably Saudi Arabia
...a kingdom taking up the bulk of the Arabian peninsula, largely made up of sand and oil rigs. Its primary economic activity involves exporting oil and soaking Islamic rubes on the annual haj pilgrimage. The country supports a large number of princes in whatcha might call princely splendor. Formerly dictatorial and steeped in Olde Tyme Religion, deferring to Salafist holy men on all issues, it has now done a 180 and is making a serious effort to modernize, so as not to be left in the sand by its Gulf Arab neighbors. The holy men have been shoved to the background and the nation is now still dictatorial but somewhat Frational. That doesn't make them trustworthy, but it's a start...
, to reintegrate Syria into the Arab world," which it did in 2023 when it rejoined the Arab League
...an organization of Arabic-speaking states with 22 member countries and four observers. The League tries to achieve Arab consensus on issues, which usually leaves them doing nothing but a bit of grimacing and mustache cursing...
bloc.

The caustic soda at the warehouse, in the Damascus suburbs, was supplied from Saudi Arabia, according to labelling on the sacks.

The warehouse haul was massive, but smaller and still impressive stashes of captagon have also turned up in military facilities associated with units under Maher Assad’s command.

Journalists from AFP this week found a bonfire of captagon pills on the grounds of the Mazzeh air base, now in the hands of HTS fighters who descended on the capital Damascus from the north.

Behind the smoldering heap, in a ransacked air force building, more captagon lay alongside other illicit exports, including off-brand Viagra impotence remedies and poorly-forged $100 bills.

"As we entered the area we found a huge quantity of captagon. So we destroyed it and burned it. It’s a huge amount, brother," said an HTS fighter using the nom de guerre "Khattab."

"We destroyed and burned it because it’s harmful to people. It harms nature and people and humans."

Khattab also stressed that HTS, which has formed a transitional government to replace the collapsed administration, does not want to harm its neighbors by exporting the drug — a trade worth billions of dollars.
Link


Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia
War Without Victory Day: How Russia Almost Lost Chechnya
2024-12-12
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.

Back in the good old days, I read Lester Grau's narrative on the Battle of Grozny from the website of the US Army's Office of Foreign Military Studies. You can find one of his works published in 1996 here. Not the same as the article I read, but it is engaging if interested in this period of Russian military history.

Like me, Grau is a student of Russian military history, and has a number of books published on the matter.

by Andrey Zvorykin

[REGNUM] "Our war began on the morning of December 11, 1994... And we don't have our own Victory Day," these words of Andrei Palachev, a veteran of the first Chechen war and participant in the battles in Grozny, are perhaps typical for memoirs about the events of thirty years ago. In any case, the expression "a war without a Victory Day" is often found in the testimonies of veterans who, in the mid-nineties, were on average about twenty years old, like the Primorsky OMON fighter Palachev.

"As the poet said: "You can't make drums out of our skin - it's thin. Napoleonic plans are often pulled out of thin air," - these are already lines from the memoirs of General Gennady Troshev, who during the years of the first Chechen campaign was the commander of the Joint Group of Forces of the Russian Ministry of Defense.

The war began with the failed December assault on Grozny, cost the lives of 5 to 14 thousand “federals,” as the Russian press called Russian soldiers at the time, and ended with the Khasavyurt Peace Treaty in August 1996, which effectively handed victory to the Islamists and separatists of “Ichkeria”*.

"DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES"
"Any war is started and ended by politicians. Can the political decision to send troops in December 1994 be considered an adventure? To some extent, yes," admitted General Troshev, for whom Grozny was no stranger - he spent his childhood there. "To some extent" - because by the end of 1994 there were clearly no other ways, except military ones, to liquidate the criminal-terrorist regime that had seized power in Chechnya. But seized it at least with the connivance of the federal center.

In June 1991, even before the GKChP putsch, the leader of the All-National Congress of the Chechen People (ANCP), former Soviet Air Force Colonel General Dzhokhar Dudayev took control of part of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR. In July of the same year, Dudayev announced the secession of the "Chechen Republic of Nokhchi-cho" from the RSFSR and the USSR.

The federal leadership of the time — President Boris Yeltsin, Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi, and Supreme Council Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov — clearly had other things on their minds. On the eve of the collapse of the USSR, for example, the redistribution of Union property seemed more important. Radicals from the “general democratic forces of Chechnya” were seen as allies in the fight against the “reactionary party bureaucrats.”

When on September 6, 1991, Dudayev’s “guard” stormed the building of the Supreme Council of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, the television center and the radio house (during these events, the first blood of this conflict was shed, the head of the Grozny city council, Vitaly Kutsenko, was thrown out of a window), Khasbulatov sent a telegram to his small homeland:

“A favorable political situation has finally arisen, in which the democratic processes taking place in the republic are being freed from overt and covert shackles…”

In November 1991, the federal government tried to solve the Dudayev problem with a cavalry charge. Yeltsin declared a state of emergency in Chechnya, and to pacify the separatists, not even the notorious "two parachute regiments" were sent, but one "transport plane" with special forces of the Airborne Forces. At the Grozny airport, Dudayev's men blocked the plane and "offered" the fighters to return in a friendly manner.

THE KINGDOM OF THE "COCKROACH MUSTACHE"
While the rest of Russia was experiencing the shock of Gaidar’s reforms and was drawn into the confrontation between Yeltsin and the same Khasbulatov and Rutskoi, in Chechnya the process of the semi-disintegration of the state (which was also evident in Tatarstan, the Urals, and other parts of the weakened country) had gone too far.

By June 1992, de jure, the Russian Armed Forces had left the region, leaving the militants with a huge amount of military equipment and ammunition depots. According to the agreement signed with Dudayev by Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, the "Ichkerians" were to receive half of the arsenal - but in reality, our officers could only take their service weapons.

This is how the separatists got their army.

At the same time, the federal center continued to financially support Chechnya, which had not signed the federal treaty. Thus, in 1993, the republic was allocated 11.5 billion rubles for social payments. The money did not reach the recipients, but ended up in the pockets of the leadership of "Ichkeria", including the military leaders of the separatists.

Dudayev "stopped paying pensions to old people, teachers' salaries... Schools closed. It was enough of a primary education for us, if only they could count money," recalled a builder from Grozny, Gunki Khukiev. Only criminal elements could count money in the "independent state." The center "did not notice" the notorious Chechen avisos - the execution of a fake transaction with the subsequent "disappearance" of the swindlers. According to experts, more than 4 trillion rubles of the then rubles were received from these avisos.

They also failed to notice the displacement of the non-Chechen population - essentially, ethnic cleansing. If according to the 1989 census, 294 thousand Russians lived in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR (with a total population of 1 million 270 thousand), and 270 thousand Russians out of a population of 397 thousand lived in Grozny, then in the 21st century, about 1.9% of ethnic Russians live in the Chechen Republic, about 24 thousand people. About 250 thousand people left the republic even before the start of the first campaign.

Already in the first half of the 1990s, the rampant banditry (including armed banditry) sobered up many residents of the "sovereign state", especially city dwellers. "My brother... got nothing from the revolutionary pie, now he called his idol Dudayev nothing other than "ts1eza mekhash" (cockroach mustache). There were tens of thousands of such repentants," Khukiev recalled.

But the leaders of Ichkeria already felt strong enough to suppress any discontent. On June 4, 1993, field commander Shamil Basayev made his presence known for the first time - his fighters stormed the headquarters of the anti-Dudayev opposition, which was headed by the mayor of Grozny Bislan Gantamirov (who had previously had a falling out with Dudayev over the income from the oil business).

The Ichkerians were making plans to "export the revolution." It was not for nothing that Dudayev gave shelter to the ousted former President of Georgia Zviad Gamsakhurdia and simultaneously supported the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, whose militias had recently fought against the Georgians in Abkhazia.

PROLOGUE TO THE WAR. THE "GANTAMIROV" ASSAULT
The federal center, having “blown away” Chechen separatism, decided to play its own subtle game, overthrowing Dudayev with the hands of the opposition, which became a more or less organized force after the “president of Ichkeria” dissolved the Chechen parliament.

The opposition was supported by the urban population (which was gathered under the wing of Dudayev's personal enemy, Gantamirov) and some clan leaders who did not fit into Dudayev's system. An example is the former head of Dudayev's security, Ruslan Labazanov, who spoke out against Dudayev's men on the side of the Russian Armed Forces, but was not much different from them in essence.

In the summer of 1994, a civil war broke out in Chechnya between the "president of Ichkeria" and the militants loyal to him (led by Basayev and Ruslan Gelayev ) on one side and the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic on the other. Several "federal" tank crews appeared at the disposal of the opposition. Gantamirov and Labazanov's militia took control of the cities of Urus-Martan and Argun and on November 26, 1994, they moved on Grozny.

After the first shelling from Dudayev's men, the opposition infantry scattered, the tank crews, left without cover and not knowing the terrain, found themselves in a hopeless situation, 28 of them were taken prisoner, about 18 (data based on lists of names) were killed.

This event had a decisive impact on Yeltsin's decision to send in troops. On December 9, he signed a decree "On measures to suppress the activities of illegal armed formations on the territory of the Chechen Republic and in the Ossetian-Ingush conflict zone." A few days before, on December 1, a Russian air raid completely destroyed the planes that had been captured and bought by the separatists.

“THEY DIDN’T EVEN HAVE TIME TO COME UP WITH A NAME”
Finally, on December 11, 1994, units of the Russian Armed Forces, in accordance with Yeltsin’s decree, entered the Russian region of Chechnya.

The troops advanced in three groups. The first, under the command of Lieutenant General Vladimir Chilindin, advanced from the northwest, from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia. The second, from Vladikavkaz, under the command of Lieutenant General Alexander Chindarov, moved from the northwest through Ingushetia. The third, from Kizlyar, under the command of Lieutenant General Lev Rokhlin, headed from the northeast from the territory of Dagestan.

The overall command of the operation to restore constitutional order was entrusted to Defense Minister Grachev. "Pavel Grachev brought the army to a terrible state," Rokhlin later lamented. This concerned supplies, weapons, and the level of training of conscripts. However, it is unlikely that the problem was solely Grachev's, since he did not possess such outstanding abilities to destroy the mighty army organism to its foundations in just a few years. Structural problems in the armed forces arose much earlier.

An important point: it was difficult to talk about broad public support for the military operation. The media, controlled by media oligarchs Vladimir Gusinsky and Boris Berezovsky, broadcast if not a pro-Dudaev, then a "neutral" position. Not only liberals, but also the left opposition, including the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, criticized the operation.

Meanwhile, our group's problems began almost immediately: only the Mozdok group achieved relative success, reaching the village of Dolinskoye (10 kilometers from Grozny) the next day. The Vladikavkaz and Kizlyar groups were soon blocked and forced to either break through with a fight or bypass enemy-controlled settlements along a longer route.

Finally, 16 days after the start of the march (according to the plan, 3 days were given for the advance), all groups reached Grozny, blockading it from three sides. General Troshev later noted :

"According to some generals, the initiative for the "festive" New Year's assault on Grozny belonged to people from Pavel Grachev's inner circle, in order to coincide the capture of the city with the birthday of the Russian Minister of Defense (January 1). I don't know how serious this is. Another thing is that the operation was prepared hastily, without a real assessment of the enemy, his forces and resources, without careful preparation. This is a fact. They didn't even have time to come up with a name for this operation!"

"GOD, HELP ME BREAK FREE..."
The southern outskirts of Grozny remained unblocked. It was assumed that civilians would be evacuated this way, but in fact the militants were receiving supplies from here throughout the assault. On December 19, the first bombing attack was carried out on the city center, and on the 31st, the bloodiest battle of the war began - the storming of Grozny.

According to General Troshev, "many commanders with big stars, federal-level chiefs, believed that it was enough to go to Grozny, fire a couple of times in the air, and that would be the end of it." The military leader believed that it was precisely this method of intimidation that was the basis for the hastily approved plan to take Grozny, and, Troshev believed, it was approved "at the very top."

About 250 units of equipment entered the city with infantry cover, but the fallacy of this plan soon became apparent. The number of militants, their wide variety of anti-tank weapons, and their completely fanatical resistance were unexpected.

The units of the northern group were the most unlucky.

The fighters of the 131st Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (better known as the Maikop brigade) received an order from the commander of the "North" group, Konstantin Pulikovsky : together with the motorized riflemen and tankers of the 81st Motorized Rifle Regiment (who had 10 tanks at their disposal), reach the city center and fortify themselves in the railway station building.

The combined group of "Maikopts" and fighters of the 81st regiment carried out the order, but by 19:00 the station they had occupied was surrounded by superior forces of militants. When reinforcements broke through here on the evening of January 1, no more than a third of the defenders remained alive. The commander of the 131st brigade, Colonel Ivan Savin, was also killed in the battle.

Captain Vyacheslav Mironov, a participant in subsequent battles in Grozny, testifies in his book I Was In This War: “As we approached the railway station, we began to come across burnt, mutilated equipment and many corpses. Our corpses, our Slavic brothers, were all that remained of the Maikop Brigade, the one that was burned and shot by the “spirits” on New Year’s Eve from 1994 to 1995. God, help us escape…”

HARD VICTORIES AND STRANGE DEFEATS
War plans had to be changed on the fly and "in the field," Troshev noted. The troops held up in other directions changed their tactics by January 7, focusing on maneuverable groups, which gradually yielded results. On January 9, the Grozny Oil Institute and airport were occupied with heavy fighting, and on the 19th, the city center and the presidential palace. The militants retreated behind the Sunzha River.

It was only on February 3 that the decision was made to close off the southern direction and completely blockade Grozny. The city was surrounded only by February 9. The Chechen capital was completely occupied by March 6, when Shamil Basayev's fighters retreated from Chernorechye, the last district in the hands of forces loyal to Dudayev.

With the fall of Grozny, the actions of the Ichkerians finally acquired a partisan character - and our army was not ready for this.

Although the entire flat part of Chechnya and most of the mountainous regions were occupied over the following months, the army was unable to actually ensure control over the territory. On the one hand, ambushes and raids by militants became frequent occurrences, and on the other, our troops repeatedly occupied the same "inhabitants", which were again captured by the separatists after the redeployment of the "federals".

"One of the peculiarities of this strange war, which literally drove us crazy, is that we passed through and cleared the same villages several times. In the end, I studied the area so well that I could fight there blindfolded," the publication "Chelyabinsk Segodnya" cited the testimony of Alexander Berezovsky, who during the first Chechen war was the head of the reconnaissance group of the 17th detachment of the special forces of the internal troops "Edelweiss".

A NEW TYPE OF ENEMY
Thus, simultaneously with the exhaustion – moral and physical – of the Russian troops, the actions of the militants became ever bolder. Beginning in March 1996, raids on Grozny became an everyday reality. In addition to guerrilla warfare, the enemy used a method of warfare for which we were even less prepared – terror.

On June 14, 1995, about two hundred of Basayev's militants broke through the border of Chechnya and Stavropol Krai and seized a hospital in Budyonnovsk. About 1,200 city residents were taken hostage, herded into the hospital buildings. After negotiations, Basayev's men were allowed to leave. At that time, 143 Russian fighters were killed (including 46 special forces), 415 were wounded, with enemy losses of 19 killed and 20 wounded.

In January 1996, Salman Raduyev's group attacked the Dagestani city of Kizlyar. At the captured helicopter base, the bandits destroyed several units of equipment and took hostages. While security forces were approaching the city, the militants captured a hospital and a maternity hospital, driving about 3 thousand more residents there. During negotiations, the terrorists, along with some of the hostages, were released from the encirclement. Retreating, Raduyev's men also captured the village of Pervomayskoye. As a result, the terrorists were released.

Also, in parallel with the military actions, the Ichkerians captured airplanes, buses, and attacked railways.

In response, Russia took the first – and sometimes successful – steps in the fight against terrorism.

Thus, on April 21, 1996, our special services managed to track the mobile communication channels of the "Generalissimo of Ichkeria" Dudayev. During a conversation with the State Duma deputy, liberal Konstantin Borovoy, two Su-24s struck the location of the separatist leader.

Dudayev's successors as "presidents of Ichkeria" - Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev and Aslan Maskhadov - could no longer effectively control the "brigadier generals" and other field commanders. This defect in the system, however, would come back to haunt him in 1999, when the gangs of Basayev and Khattab attacked Dagestan without Maskhadov's knowledge.

THE SECOND "OBSCENE WORLD"
On August 6, 1996, the militants "turned the tide" of military operations: another attack on Grozny allowed them to take control of the city. At the same time, the separatists captured the large cities of Gudermes and Argun. The loss of three key centers, ongoing terrorist attacks, the shadow of Budyonnovsk and Kizlyar - all this demoralized the army.

Yeltsin (who had recently narrowly escaped defeat in the elections) was threatened by the political consequences of continuing the conflict. Everything was pushing the federal center of that time to conclude peace on terms unfavorable for Russia.

On August 31, in the Dagestani city of Khasavyurt, the Secretary of the Russian Security Council, Lieutenant General Alexander Lebed, and the "Chairman of the Government of Ichkeria" Aslan Maskhadov signed a ceasefire agreement. Russia was obliged to withdraw its troops from Chechen territory, and the decision on its political status was postponed until 2001.

Later, the Khasavyurt agreements were compared with another “shameful peace” – the Brest peace.

The Chechen people suffered first and foremost from the “peace”.

The "Ichkeria" of 1996-1999 plunged into chaos and became not only a "hub" for drug trafficking and a sanctuary for criminals, but also a springboard for international terrorism. Instead of national separatists like the "Minister of Culture and Brigadier General" Akhmed Zakayev or the "Chechen Goebbels" Movladi Udugov, the leading role was played by supporters of Sharia rule and a worldwide caliphate.

Maskhadov, elected president in 1997, not only failed to control his "prime minister" - the convinced Wahhabi Basayev, but also increasingly fell under the influence of foreign emissaries such as Khattab, Abu al-Walid and Abu Hafs al-Urdani. The transformation of the "Republic of Ichkeria" into the "Caucasus Emirate"*, which eventually swore allegiance to the "Islamic State"*,
…first Al Qaeda then later ISIS, but do go on…
was entirely expected. Just as the "export of jihad" was a matter of time, resulting in the attack on Dagestan in August 1999.

THREE BOGATYRS SQUARE
To correct political mistakes (which had been accumulating since the early 1990s and, in fact, led to the war) and miscalculations of the military command, whose Napoleonic plans did not always correspond to their capabilities, the Second Chechen Campaign was needed, no less difficult, but ended in success.

A change in political leadership, a clear national policy and a change in the quality of military planning played their role. During the second campaign, the Russian army proved its combat capability, which it has repeatedly confirmed subsequently - in the defense of South Ossetia, in peacekeeping operations - and is confirming now, in the SVO zone, where units from Chechnya are also proving themselves.

General Troshev died in 2008, having witnessed the beginning of the restoration of the republic under Akhmad-hadji and Ramzan Kadyrov — the military leader writes about the beginning of reconciliation in the finale of his memoirs. The afterword contains a vivid image. In one of the squares of Grozny in the 1970s, a monument was erected to three heroes of the Civil War: the Russian Odessan Nikolai Gikalo, the Chechen Aslanbek Sheripov and the Ingush Gapur Akhriev. "The people immediately nicknamed this place "the square of the three heroes," the general recalled.

Under Maskhadov, there was a slave market here, near the monument, and executions were carried out here according to Sharia law. “The war destroyed the monument to the representatives of three nations. But the pedestal remained. Maybe the monument will be restored, or maybe a new one will be erected?” Troshev wondered and added, “I believe that nothing will ever destroy the surviving foundation, not even the war, which left a deep mark on people’s souls.”

In 2008, Friendship of Nations Square was opened in Grozny after reconstruction, with a restored monument to the “three heroes”.

Link


Syria-Lebanon-Iran
Wild video from Khattab Syria
2024-12-05
[X]
Link


Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia
Defendants in Chechnya Terrorist Attack Case Sentenced to 24 and 25 Years in Prison
2024-09-25
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
[Regnum] The Southern District Military Court has sentenced Nazhmudin Dudiyev (included in the register of terrorists and extremists of Rosfinmonitoring) and Ibragim Donashev (included in the register of terrorists and extremists of Rosfinmonitoring), accused in the case of the terrorist attack in Chechnya in 2005. This was reported by RIA Novosti with reference to a representative of the court.

“The court sentenced Dudiyev to 24 years in a strict regime prison with deprivation of his military rank, and Donashev to 25 years in a strict regime prison with deprivation of his military rank,” the agency’s source said.

According to the investigation, in July 2005, Dudiev and Donashev, as part of the gang of Supyan Arsanukaev and Viskhan Zaitov, took part in the kidnapping and murder of a man, whose body was then used in a terrorist attack in the village of Znamenskoye in the Nadterechny District of Chechnya.

According to the information from the republican Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, the gang members parked a car filled with explosives near residential buildings. It also contained the body of a kidnapped man, who was dressed in a Russian military uniform. One of the accused fired at the car to attract attention. After the start of investigative and operational activities, an explosive device was detonated. As a result of the incident, 15 people were killed, and another 36 were injured to varying degrees. Law enforcement officers were among the dead and injured.

kavkaz-uzel.eu adds:
Dudiev and Donashev were previously sentenced by the court to prison terms of 18 to 19 years.
Recall that Dudiev and Donashev were previously sentenced by the court to prison terms of 18 to 19 years. They were taken into custody in late November 2018 on charges of banditry, participation in an armed mutiny, and an attempt on the life of a serviceman during an attack in Chechnya in 2000.

On the night of March 1, 2000, fighters of the 6th parachute landing company of the 104th regiment of the 76th Pskov airborne division  entered into battle  with a detachment of field commanders Shamil Basayev
…Shamil Salmanovich Basayev, also known by his kunya "Abu Idris" and Emir Abdullah Shamil Abu-Idris (1965-2006). Basayev was a Chechen warlord in the post-Soviet Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, which after his death became the Al Qaeda-linked Caucasus Emirate. In 2015 most of the hard boys changed their allegiance to the local Islamic State affiliate, Vilayat Kavkaz, whereupon a majority chose to escape the Spetsnaz hunting them by making hijra to the caliphate in Syria. Some of his projects were the 2004 Beslan school siege and the 2002 Moscow theater hostage crisis...
and  Khattab near the Chechen village of Ulus-Kert . 84 of the 90 Russian servicemen were killed, including 13 officers. Another four were wounded. The militants' losses amounted to 370 people.

Tangentially related from kavkav-uzel.eu
The Museum of Abkhazia closed the exhibition with Basayev's portrait to visitors
The Russian embassy in Sukhum was outraged by a portrait of Shamil Basayev, which was displayed at an exhibition in the State Museum of Abkhazia, with the caption: "Hero of Abkhazia." The museum promised to rectify the situation and closed access to the exhibition.

Representatives of the Russian embassy stated that they considered the display of the portrait of the terrorist unacceptable and contacted the museum. The site's management promised to "correct the situation as soon as possible," the agency reported, citing embassy representatives.

As of 17:40, the websites and Telegram channels of the State Museum of Abkhazia and the Russian Embassy in Abkhazia did not contain any information about the exhibition where Basayev’s portrait was presented or its closure.

The information that the State Museum of Abkhazia has a portrait of Basayev and a photo from the exhibition was published on September 22 by the Telegram channel Hard Blog. "How Basayev performed in Abkhazia is no longer important. He has tarnished himself so much that none of his past merits can serve as an excuse for the Abkhaz side. When Heroes of the Soviet Union committed crimes, they were stripped of their titles and condemned without much thought about their past merits," the blogger wrote in a message.

Shamil Basayev was a field commander during the First Chechen War and the leader of the storming of Grozny (August 1996), the organizer of terrorist attacks and the hostage-taking in Budyonnovsk in Stavropol Krai (1995), the Dubrovka Theater Center in Moscow (2002), the school in Beslan (2004, North Ossetia), the leader of the militant invasion of Dagestan (1999), which marked the beginning of the Second Chechen War, and the attack on Nalchik (October 2005, Kabardino-Balkaria). He was killed on July 10, 2006.

Since August 1992, he took an active part in military operations in Abkhazia. He was the commander of the Gagra front and deputy minister of defense of Abkhazia. He commanded a detachment of Chechen volunteers.

In January 1993, at a joint meeting of the Presidential Council and the parliament of the Confederation of Peoples of the Caucasus, Shamil Basayev was appointed commander of the expeditionary corps of the CPC in Abkhazia. He was charged with the duties of "coordinating, uniting, directing in the right direction and controlling the incoming flow of volunteers."

In 1996, Basayev reported that during 1992-1994 he traveled three times with his "Abkhaz battalion" to the camps of the Afghan mujahideen, where he learned the tactics of guerrilla warfare. Already in 1994, the "Abkhaz battalion" and Basayev entered into military operations in Chechnya, according to the biographical information about Shamil Basayev prepared by the "Caucasian Knot".

"Kavkazsky Uzel" also wrote that relations between Abkhazia and Russia have become complicated recently. On September 4, the head of the Abkhazian Foreign Ministry announced that Russia would suspend social payments from September 1, which concern Abkhazian teachers, doctors and security forces.

Russia suspended payments because the Abkhazian authorities are not fulfilling agreements, including on investments and the so-called apartment bill, said Russian State Duma deputies Konstantin Zatulin and Alexey Chepa. The suspension of social payments to Abkhazia is related to the failure to maintain a balance  of obligations between the two countries, but did not worsen relations, said Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.

Russia's suspension of funding for Abkhazian public sector employees  has not yet affected  their salary payments, political analysts interviewed by the "Caucasian Knot" said on September 11. Among the reasons for this decision, they highlighted Sukhum's refusal to adopt laws important for Moscow and the failure of the Abkhazian side to fulfill its obligations under economic agreements.

The cessation of payments (we are talking about approximately 150 million rubles per year) will affect doctors, social workers and teachers, since the military, security forces and pensioners are financed under a separate agreement, emphasized Natalia Smyr, chairperson of the "Amtaa" foundation.



Related:
Shamil Basayev 09/12/2024 The case of a participant in the attack by Basayev's militants on Dagestan has reached court
Shamil Basayev 09/07/2024 2004: Novaya Gazeta Releases Details of Tank Shooting at School in Beslan
Shamil Basayev 08/08/2024 25 years have passed since the invasion of Basayev's militants into Dagestan

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Iraq
Iraq sentences three ISIS members to death, six more airstruck in Kirkuk
2024-09-22
[Rudaw] Iraq’s Supreme Judicial Council on Thursday announced that it had sentenced to death three Islamic State
...formerly ISIS or ISIL, depending on your preference. Before that they were al-Qaeda in Iraq, as shaped by Abu Musab Zarqawi. They're really very devout, committing every atrocity they can find in the Koran and inventing a few more. They fling Allah around with every other sentence, but to hear western pols talk they're not really Moslems....
(ISIS) members it said were responsible for attacks on security forces.

The Lions of Islam carried out attacks on security forces in Anbar and Salahaddin provinces and wanted to "create fear and panic among civilians," according to the court.

They were sentenced to death for participating in the commission of a terrorist act as defined under the 2005 Terrorism Law.

Iraqi forces have intensified their anti-ISIS operations across the country in recent months, particularly in the disputed areas.

Thousands of people have been detained across Iraq since 2014 for suspected links to terrorist groups, including ISIS, and hundreds have been executed. Human rights monitors have criticized the trials, saying they depend on confessions obtained through torture, they do not investigate specific charges such as genocide, and they exclude the victims, thereby denying them justice.

Iraqi warplanes kill six suspected ISIS members in Kirkuk
[Rudaw] At least six suspected Islamic State members, including a leader, were killed in an operation carried out by Iraqi security forces in Kirkuk province on Thursday, the army said, amid a spike in anti-ISIS operations.

“Three painful strikes by F-16 aircraft today resulted in the killing of a terrorist detachment consisting of six members, including the terrorist Omar Salah Nima, codenamed Abu Khattab, one of the most dangerous leaders of the ISIS terrorists,” the Iraqi army’s Joint Operations Command said in a statement.

Iraqi counterterrorism and intelligence forces raided the site after the airstrikes, discovering a “number of explosive belts, weapons, technical equipment, and various phones,” the statement added.

The strikes are the latest in an intensification of anti-ISIS operations across the country, particularly in the disputed areas.

Despite its territorial defeat, ISIS has continued to pose security threats in Iraq through hit-and-run attacks, bombings, and abductions, particularly in areas disputed between the federal government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) which stretch across provinces including Diyala, Salahaddin, Nineveh, and Kirkuk.

Two ISIS militants wearing explosive vests were killed during a clash with security forces in Kirkuk on Sunday, Iraq's interior ministry announced.

On Monday, Iraqi security forces arrested six ISIS members near the capital Baghdad and seized a pile of explosives.

Earlier this month, an Iraqi airstrike in the Hamrin mountain range in Diyala killed three ISIS militants.

In late August, a joint operation by the Iraqi army and US forces in the western Anbar province killed 16 ISIS militants, and the US military said on Saturday that the operation killed four ISIS leaders.

Iraqi airstrikes target suspected ISIS hideouts in Kirkuk, Salahaddin: State media
[Rudaw] A number of suspected Islamic State (ISIS) hideouts in Kirkuk and Salahaddin provinces were destroyed by Iraqi airstrikes late Tuesday, state media reported, amid a spike in air raids on alleged jihadist locations in the country.

“The heroes of the air force carried out painful strikes on hideouts within the Kirkuk and East Salahaddin operations commands, which led to their destruction,” state media said, citing a statement from Yehia Rasool, military spokesperson to Iraq’s prime minister.

Rasool said that the strikes were conducted after “specialized aircraft carried out reconnaissance and surveillance” missions which revealed their locations.

No information on casualties was readily provided, and the strikes come as the Iraqi air force intensifies its anti-ISIS operations across the country, particularly in the disputed areas.
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