by Kamran Gasanov
[REGNUM] The Middle East conflict has emerged on three levels: Israel's attacks on Iranian proxies, its strikes on Iran itself, and, finally, the United States' strikes on the Islamic Republic.
And Turkey has its position at every level. At the first level, its position is crystal clear. One of Iran's proxies, Hamas, is also an ally of Turkey. That is why Ankara is most active when rockets fall on the Gaza Strip. Here, Netanyahu is accused of both genocide and fascism.
Lebanon's Hezbollah is not a friend of Turkey, to put it mildly: they were at odds during the civil war in Syria. But the violation of Lebanon's sovereignty as such is also unacceptable for Ankara.
The change of power in Syria has opened another front in the confrontation with Tel Aviv: it has set its sights on the Turkish bases being built in Syria.
At the second level, it would seem that Turkey's position should sound less definite. After all, Iran is its historical rival and competitor in the Middle East and, at the present stage, in the South Caucasus. But nevertheless, since the instigator of the war is Israel, here too Erdogan takes the side of the Muslim neighbor.
Well, that's a load of bullshit
The topics of Iran and Gaza are closely linked for the Turkish president. As Recep Tayyip Erdogan said, Israel's attacks on Iran are attempts to "distract attention from the genocide in Gaza." The more Iran weakens, the stronger Israel becomes, and its journalists are planning to outplay Turkey itself in the future.
But everything becomes much more complicated when the United States comes out against the same Iran. Here it is not only the fact that Türkiye is a member of NATO: this factor has never stopped the two countries from mutual reproaches and pressure.
Washington has tried to overthrow Erdogan several times, put a spoke in his wheel in Syria and supported the “Kurdistan” project. The US has tried to limit the multi-vector foreign policy of the Turks by imposing sanctions for parallel trade and the deal to supply S-400 systems to Russia.
At the same time, when relations between Turkey and Russia worsened in November 2015 due to the downing of a Russian Su-24, NATO, led by the United States, disowned Turkey, and in October 2023, shot down a Turkish drone in Syria.
Trump, who came to the White House, was not considered a true friend of Turkey. In his last term, he caused considerable damage to its economy when, in the wake of the arrest of American pastor Andrew Brunson and Erdogan’s operations against Kurdish separatists in Syria, he announced new tariffs on steel and aluminum, threatening to collapse the Turkish economy.
This time there were no illusions about him either. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan in his assessments allowed for the possibility of reaching an agreement with Trump on Syria, but was not entirely confident in the possibility of concluding a profitable deal.
But Trump 2.0 proved more accommodating. He began showering Erdogan with compliments, calling him smart and noting Turkey’s strength in “taking over Syria.”
In Ankara, they couldn’t get enough of such compliments: Erdogan values personal “chemistry.” But at the same time, he can’t help but understand that the sympathy across the ocean was far from altruistic.
The American leader respects power, and Turkey has much more of it. Ankara did not become the hegemon of the Middle East, but after the change of power in Damascus, it made both America and Europe respect it.
The existence of American bases in Kurdish territories now largely depends on the goodwill of the "Turkish Sultan." And having sensed the breath of Trump's isolationism in Ukraine, Europeans have begun to treat Ankara more warmly, seeing it as an integral part of the new security architecture of the Old World.
Trump's current sympathy for Turkey is felt in two key areas of world politics at once. Thanks to Erdogan's mediation and call, the occupant of the Oval Office took an unprecedented step - he met with the new Syrian leader Ahmad al-Sharaa, for whose head the US had previously promised $10 million.
The US also partially lifted sanctions on Syria and restored the ability of its banks to use the SWIFT system. However, Turkey is outraged that for some reason the restrictions on the supply of the latest American fighters have not been lifted.
In parallel with organizing negotiations with Syria, Trump asked Erdogan to host a meeting between Russia and Ukraine in Istanbul.
Moreover, Erdogan's weight increased even more when Trump asked Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to be more reasonable and not to conflict with Turkey in Syria. And Israel went to de-escalation talks in Baku.
Trump's close relationship with Erdogan should have influenced Turkey's response to the American strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities on the night of June 21-22. And in fact, it did.
Unlike the bombing of Gaza and the Israeli strikes on Iran, Türkiye has refrained from making aggressive and emotional statements in response to the American strikes.
The country's Foreign Ministry is merely "deeply concerned about the possible consequences of a US attack on Iran's nuclear facilities." Turkish diplomacy is trying to shift the blame to Israel as the main instigator of the war.
"We always pay attention to the risk of the conflict in the region, which began with Israeli aggression, spreading and destabilizing the security situation. Today's US attack on Iran's nuclear facilities has raised this risk to the highest level," the Foreign Ministry said in a statement on June 22.
Erdogan does not want to break ties with Trump. After all, if confrontation is allowed even at the rhetorical level, the unpredictable and emotional Trump may escalate the situation with Turkey.
In a situation of financial and economic volatility, new US sanctions would be tangible and would become an additional motivation for the revival of barely subsided protests due to the arrest of Erdogan's political opponent, Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu.
In such a conflict, it would be dangerous for the Turks to count on the hypocritical European leaders: neither the EU nor Britain will cover them. London itself is determined to overthrow the Iranian regime, Germany has fallen under Trump, and Erdogan has his own scores to settle with Macron.
One explanation for Turkey’s flexibility is its attempts to act as a peacemaker. Before the American strikes, Erdogan received Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and said he was making diplomatic efforts to end the fighting and return to dialogue.
Axios reported that Erdogan offered Trump to organize a meeting of Iranian and American representatives in Istanbul. The Turkish president contacted Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Araghchi, but the latter allegedly failed to contact Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
In addition, Erdogan is trying to present himself as the leader of the Islamic world. During the attacks on Gaza, he proposed that fellow Muslim countries form an Islamic coalition against Israel.
On June 21-22, the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation was held in Istanbul. Erdogan organized exactly the same summit when Trump recognized Jerusalem as Israeli. So the demands on Ankara as the leader of the Muslim world are considerable, and this puts a lot of pressure on the Turkish president.
The only problem is that, despite the verbal condemnation, few Arab and, more broadly, Islamic countries are ready to seriously oppose Trump.
As long as military actions in Iran do not go beyond strikes on nuclear facilities, Turkey, like a number of countries in the region that have multi-billion dollar businesses with the US, military cooperation and warm personal relations with Trump, will be able to maneuver.
Ankara will bet on peacekeeping, hoping to pull the negotiations from Oman and Rome to Istanbul.
At the same time, increasing the degree of escalation will put Turkey in a very uncomfortable position. Of course, one can try to remove the geopolitical competitor with Trump's hands, but the price of a potential war could be very high for Turkey.
The country is already suffering from millions of Syrian refugees. Destabilization of the region threatens oil and gas supplies from the Persian Gulf, rising energy prices and many other things - man-made disasters, increased terrorist activity and other troubles.
And in domestic affairs, US support will not add points to Erdogan - the Turkish population, like the population of Arab countries, has become more anti-American in recent years.
...Turkey's version of Mohammed Morsi but they voted him back in so they deserve him. It's a sin, a shame, and a felony to insult the president of Turkey. In Anatolia did Recep Bey a stately Presidential Palace decree, that has 1100 rooms. That's 968 more than in the White House, 400 more than in Versailles, and 325 more than Buckingham Palace, so you know who's really more important...
..a contraction of the Arabic words for "frothing at the mouth",...