Recent Appearances...

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Recent Appearances... Rantburg

Kamran Atif	Kamran Atif	Harkatul Mujahideen al-Aalmi	Afghanistan-Pak-India	20051114	Link
	Kamran Atif	Harkatul Mujahedeen Al-Aalmi	Afghanistan/South Asia	20040520	Link
	Kamran Atif	Harkat-ul Mujahideen al-Alami	Afghanistan/South Asia	20040526	Link
Kamran Butt	Kamran Butt	Jamaat-e-Islami	India-Pakistan	20020824
	Kamran Butt	Jaish-e-Mohammed	India-Pakistan	20020824
Kamran Mir	Kamran Mir	Jaish-e-Mohammed	India-Pakistan	20020811

Afghanistan

Islamabad-Kabul Relations Reach ‘Point of No Return,’ Report Says

2026-09-29

[KhaamaPress] Relations between Pakistain and the Taliban
Taliban

...the Pashtun equivalent of men...
have reached a "point of no return" and are likely to deteriorate further despite regional mediation efforts, according to Pakistain’s Express Tribune, as military festivities and diplomatic tensions continue to escalate between Islamabad and Kabul.

In a report by Pak journalist Kamran Yousaf, the newspaper cited a senior Pak official involved in Afghanistan policy as saying Islamabad believes relations with the Taliban administration have entered a phase that will be increasingly difficult to reverse. "I think we have reached a point of no return," the official said, warning that tensions are expected to intensify rather than improve.

The report says ~~The Sick Man of Europe~~ Turkey
...the decaying remnant of the Ottoman Empire...
and Qatar
...an emirate on the east coast of the Arabian Peninsula. It sits on some really productive gas and oil deposits, which produces the highest per capita income in the world. They piss it all away on religion, financing the Moslem Brotherhood and several al-Qaeda affiliates. Home of nutbag holy manYusuf al-Qaradawi...
recently launched diplomatic efforts to reduce tensions between Pakistain and the Taliban. As part of those efforts, the head of Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization visited both Kabul and Islamabad in mid-September to encourage dialogue between the two sides.

According to the report, the mediation efforts suffered a setback after a deadly attack on coppers in Kohat a day after the diplomatic meetings. Pak authorities said one of the suicide kaboomers was an Afghan national and argued the attack reinforced their concerns about bad boy groups operating from Afghaniustan territory.

Pakistain has repeatedly accused the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistain (TTP) and affiliated bad boy groups of using safe havens inside Afghanistan to launch attacks across the border. The Taliban administration has denied those allegations, insisting it does not allow Afghaniustan territory to be used against neighboring countries.

The newspaper also reported that Pakistain responded by launching air and dronezaps on around 10 locations inside Afghanistan, including sites in Kandahar that it said were linked to bad boy infrastructure and drone launch facilities. Taliban officials, meanwhile, claimed they responded by sending drones toward Pakistain, while Pak authorities said the drones were intercepted before causing significant damage.

Express Tribune further reported that Turkey’s intelligence chief had hoped to meet Taliban leader Hibatullah Akhundzada in Kandahar during the mediation mission. Instead, Akhundzada reportedly sent a representative from his office, a move that Pak and Ottoman Turkish sources described as a diplomatic setback.

The report says some Pak officials believe the worsening relationship could reshape regional perceptions that Islamabad continues to support the Taliban. One unnamed official warned that if the current trajectory continues and pressure from anti-Taliban groups increases, a weakening of the Taliban’s authority in parts of Afghanistan "should not come as a surprise."

The report comes as festivities have intensified along the Afghanistan-Pakistain border, with local sources reporting exchanges of heavy weapons fire between both sides forces in parts of Paktia, Nangarhar
The unfortunate Afghan province located adjacent to Mohmand, Kurram, and Khyber Agencies. The capital is Jalalabad. The province was the fief of Younus Khalis after the Soviets departed and one of his sons is the current provincial Taliban commander. Nangarhar is Haqqani country..
and Pakistain’s Kurram district over the weekend.

Link

The Grand Turk

Uncertain Decisiveness: Why Erdogan Is in No Rush to Fight the Houthis

2026-09-28

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Kamran Gasanov

[Regnum] Ankara is seeking to turn the new trilateral agreement with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan into a viable regional security instrument, but practical support risks a direct clash with Iran and its allies.

Good luck with that.
On September 19, Turkey perhaps for the first time attempted a decisive response to the Houthi attacks on the Saudis, but this “decisiveness” appears as limited and hesitant as the attempt to respond to Iran’s strikes on the kingdom during the spring war.

In any case, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan told NTV that the Houthi attacks pose a serious threat to Saudi Arabia's territorial integrity, sovereignty, and infrastructure. He added that the monarchy may have military needs, particularly in technical areas, and Turkey is ready to meet them under the Mecca Mutual Defense Agreement, signed last month.

There's no hint of sending troops to defend the kingdom, much less launching a joint operation against the Houthis. The "technical support" formula allows Ankara to demonstrate its allied solidarity without being directly drawn into the Yemeni war.

Most likely, this involves the supply of weapons, air defense systems, UAVs, reconnaissance, electronic warfare, training, and equipment maintenance. The specific scope of military assistance has not been made public.

TÜRKIYE IS TRYING TO FILL THE VACUUM.
The key formula of the Mecca Agreement is that an armed attack on one of the three countries – Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia – is considered an attack on all.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan previously said that the agreement's implementation could include joint defense-industrial projects and counter-terrorism operations.

However, on September 25, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, he specifically clarified that the agreement does not automatically mean that all parties will enter the war on the side of the attacked country. In an interview with Newsweek, Erdoğan stated that states will respond "based on the demands and needs of the country being attacked."

According to him, assistance could take the form of "intelligence, logistics, or ammunition support." Partners' involvement in an armed conflict is generally possible, but not mandatory.

The statement is of fundamental importance. The Turkish president effectively proposed interpreting the pact as a framework for consultation and assistance, rather than as a NATO-like system with a pre-established mechanism for collective military response. At the same time, Erdoğan emphasized that the agreement should not be viewed as an alliance against Iran, Israel, or any other country in the region.

In doing so, Ankara is attempting to achieve two objectives at once. On the one hand, it is demonstrating to Riyadh that the agreement is not an empty declaration and can provide concrete military, intelligence, and logistical support.

On the other hand, Türkiye is avoiding the obligation to automatically enter into conflict with the Houthis, who are backed by Iran, and is showing the Islamic Republic that Ankara is not trying to isolate it.

Of course, when it comes solely to the military-industrial complex, there are no problems. Selling or jointly producing weapons is a relatively risk-free undertaking. Especially since Turkey has planned to increase defense spending by 229% over the next three years.

Investments will help develop and produce fighter jets and missiles, and then sell them to the Saudis. It's quite another matter to side with an ally and wage a grueling, costly, and dangerous war.

Therefore, with all due respect to the treaty, the "Mecca Union" remains more of a political alliance than a full-fledged military one. Ankara can justify itself by arguing that the agreement does not stipulate an automatic response.

Who determines whether an attack has occurred? Are the Houthis' actions an attack or a defense? After all, Saudi Arabia itself launched a military campaign against them in 2015. Furthermore, the pact doesn't explicitly stipulate that allied countries are obligated to send troops.

Even in the more formalized military alliance NATO, where the notorious Article 5 formula of "attack me, attack us all" exists, each country independently decides whether to use force. Incidentally, unlike the North Atlantic Alliance, the "Sunni alliance" lacks a unified headquarters, a planning system, or extensive experience in joint military exercises.

Judging by Fidan's statements, Türkiye is currently proposing to use consultation mechanisms. This is roughly what the European Union, whose military powers are also very limited, typically does.

That is, before the organizations of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey grow into a full-fledged military bloc, it would be good to establish political coordination and ongoing consultations in the defense sphere.

The three countries' foreign ministers took a step in this direction only now: on September 25, they agreed to intensify defense contacts in connection with the events in Yemen.

WHY DOES ANKARA NEED SAUDI ARABIA?
Despite the limited nature of the measures, Turkey cannot afford to take any at all. Firstly, due to the need to maintain the authority of the "Mecca Pact" and secondly, given Saudi Arabia's growing importance to Erdoğan.

The Kingdom is one of the most influential players in the Middle East, a leading oil producer and an important economic partner of Turkey.

After a period of tension between Ankara and Riyadh over Libya, the two sides have gradually restored relations and are expanding trade, investment, and defense contracts. Amid the ongoing lira crisis, the kingdom may continue to be a source of wealth for Erdoğan.

If the Saudis fail to protect their refineries and the East-West oil pipeline from Iran and its proxies in Iraq and Yemen, the country will plunge into crisis.

Until that happens, Türkiye is interested in supporting its ally's defense capability by supplying UAVs, surveillance systems, missiles, and electronic warfare systems.

The countries are discussing a defense deal worth approximately $6 billion, which includes the delivery of warships, Altay tanks, air defense systems, and Riyadh's possible participation in the development of the Turkish next-generation KAAN fighter jet.

WHY ISN'T TÜRKIYE SENDING TROOPS?
Readiness to help Riyadh does not mean that Ankara wants, is ready, and intends to engage in direct war with the Houthis.

After all, participating in military operations in Yemen could lead to a clash with Tehran-backed forces and complicate relations with the latter. In the most extreme scenario, Türkiye risks entering into war with Iran.

Even if the operations are limited to Yemen, Ankara will incur significant costs. The Houthis will have carte blanche to block Turkish vessels transiting the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

Iran may also join the blockade of Turkey by preventing its commercial ships from entering the Strait of Hormuz.

Another war could also have a negative impact on the ratings of the ruling Justice and Development Party and Erdogan personally, with parliamentary and presidential elections just around the corner.

For the weakened and divided opposition and the Republican People's Party, from which Ankara Mayor Mansur Yavaş, following the departure of its leader Özgür Özel, the operation in Yemen would be a convenient tool for raising support among the population.

PAKISTAN CREATES CONTRAST
Against the backdrop of loud Turkish rhetoric, Pakistan's position appears even more cautious.

Islamabad initially stated that the agreement could be implemented in the event of aggression against Saudi Arabia. However, following the Houthi attacks, the Pakistani Foreign Ministry clarified that a military response was not discussed under the agreement.

Islamabad needs to simultaneously maintain its special relationship with Riyadh and avoid becoming embroiled in a standoff with Iran, with which it shares a long border. Pakistan, despite possessing nuclear weapons, has no interest in complicating relations with its neighbor. After all, it faces enough threats already, including terrorist organizations in Balochistan and unresolved territorial disputes with the larger India.

Overall, both Türkiye and Pakistan are demonstrating in every way that the "Meccan Union" is not directed against anyone, and least of all, it is not directed against Iran.

The alliance's long-term goal is to create a new collective security system to replace the discredited American one. Iran may be a competitor to both Turkey and Pakistan, but it poses no direct threat to them.

The main threat to Turkey is Israel, and to Pakistan, India. This explains the talk of Iran possibly joining the pact.

Thus, Turkey's recent statements and joint consultations with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia at the General Assembly demonstrate that Ankara is keen to ensure that the alliance is not taken lightly.

The issue of prestige in the East is always particularly sensitive. Given the high risk of being drawn into the Yemen war, Ankara would prefer to find a regional equivalent of the "Istanbul format" rather than join the anti-Iranian campaign of its main rival, Israel.

It is no coincidence that rumors are already circulating on social media that the Turks are offering the Saudis a deal with the Houthis.

Link

The Grand Turk

More weapons, less trust in the West. Erdogan is preparing a new chair for himself

2026-09-11

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited

by Kamran Gasanov
Türkiye announced an unprecedented 229% increase in its defense budget under its 2027–2029 medium-term program. Ankara is preparing for potential wars.

Vice President Cevdet Yılmaz announced a record increase in defense spending. Defense spending is the largest of the seven key areas of the new economic program he presented.

According to the vice president, the goal of such measures is independence in the military-industrial complex, the development of domestic technologies, and the production of high-value-added weapons. In practical terms, this means accelerating programs to develop domestic fighter jets (including the much-hyped KAAN), air defense systems, UAVs, and armored vehicles.

There's no doubt that Türkiye is capable of churning out new aircraft and tanks, even if there are occasional problems with Western engines and technology. But where will the money come from?

Funding will likely come not only from the treasury, but also from large-scale foreign investment. High hopes lie with the Persian Gulf countries, which a couple of years ago allocated significant funds to save the sinking lira.

The Meccan Alliance and Arab Money
Unlike three years ago, when Turkey was just making peace with Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, overcoming disagreements with them in Libya and Qatar, Ankara and the Arab world are now building full-fledged alliances.

On August 7, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan signed the Mecca Defense Agreement, a pact providing for a collective response to aggression against any of the parties.

At the end of the month, the first meeting of the strategic political and defense committee of the three countries was held in Istanbul, where the parties confirmed their intention to actively cooperate in the military-industrial complex, including joint development and production.

In other words, Saudi Arabia is ready to invest in the Turkish military. The kingdom is currently negotiating participation in the production of KAAN fighter jets. It is interested in purchasing a batch of 20-100 aircraft. Three years ago, the Saudis purchased Bayraktars (TB2 and Bayraktar Akıncı) from Turkey.

Qatar, a more traditional regional ally, is also investing in Turkey, purchasing unmanned boats and frigates. The Turks, in turn, are purchasing Eurofighter fighter jets from Qatar.

Bahrain and Kuwait plan to join the "Mecca Union." Why are Arab monarchies so interested in military cooperation with Turkey? The answer is simple: they need weapons of their own.

All of the listed Arab countries continue to face retaliatory attacks from Iran and its allies. On September 8, the Houthis carried out perhaps their most extensive attack on Saudi Arabia, using drones and missiles.

America is provoking Iran and doing nothing to shield its regional "allies." The only country the Americans will actually save with munitions is Israel.

When the US is perceived as an unreliable partner, Russia is preoccupied with Ukraine, China is uninvolved, Europe is spineless and hypocritical, and Iran is forced to become a threat, the only option is to rely on Sunni Turkey. The Turkish military-industrial complex becomes an alternative for the Arabs—affordable, technologically advanced, and politically acceptable.

Greece, Israel and the Shield of Achilles
Regional affairs are also a concern for Turkey itself. The Turks, of course, aren't thrilled with Iran, and regardless of their criticism of the US war against Iran, the centuries-old rivalry with the Persians will persist.

But the more real threat is Israel. In the middle of last month, the Israeli Air Force bombed the Syrian base of Abu Duhur, where the IDF believed Turkish troops and equipment were to be stationed. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz warned Recep Tayyip Erdoğan against drawing Turkey into "dangerous adventures in Syria."

The second threat is increasingly intertwined with Israel's. At the end of 2025, Israel signed an agreement on joint military exercises and defense with Greece and Cyprus, and after the August shelling of Syria, Israel and Greece signed a $3.5 billion agreement to build the Achilles Shield air defense system.

This is the largest defense deal in the history of bilateral relations. The joint system, which will be operational in three years, will link Israeli SPYDER radars and air defense systems with Greek Patriot air defense systems, Belharra frigates, Rafale fighters, and F-16 Vipers.

The Turkish Ministry of Defense said it is monitoring Israeli-Greek cooperation and preparing scenarios ranging from crisis to war.

At the same time, Greece is militarizing islands in the Aegean Sea, which the Turks claim violates the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne and the 1947 Peace of Paris, which require the demilitarization of several islands (Limnos, Karpathos, and others). Athens rejects these claims, citing the right to self-defense and regional instability.

Distrust of the West
Benjamin Netanyahu is becoming increasingly toxic to the European Union. EU member states are imposing sanctions on Israel, recognizing Palestine, and, amid distrust of Trump, are seeking rapprochement with Erdoğan. However, Ankara remains wary of the West.

At the "right hour," Brussels will choose the side of the Greeks and Israelis rather than Turkish Muslims. It was not for nothing that Ursula von der Leyen called Turkey a threat this summer. Carefully concealed pro-Israeli sentiments in Europe are being exposed by attempts to pressure Iran through sanctions.

Therefore, along with the creation of an independent military-industrial complex and an alliance with Sunni countries, Erdogan is trying to strengthen the bonds of partnership with the “global majority” on another chessboard.

This was confirmed by the Turkish leader's visit to Bishkek, where he took part in a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

He once again made it clear that Turkey wants to become a full member of the SCO. The same plans exist for BRICS. Erdogan is using the SCO and BRICS summits to demonstrate that he has alternatives.

Following the NATO summit in Ankara, the Republic of Turkey once again tilted toward the West. But after the first Ukrainian air strikes against its ships in the Black Sea and the escalating crisis in Hormuz, it once again recalled Russia's importance.

Erdoğan discussed his mediation in Ukraine with Vladimir Putin in Kyrgyzstan, which has become even more urgent following the visits of Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner to Russia. Meanwhile, Ankara reached an agreement with Moscow on the supply of mineral fertilizers, which have led to a global shortage due to the Hormuz blockade.

Ultimately, militarization will allow Turkey to earn money from exports to increasingly arms-hungry Middle Eastern countries, increase its independence from NATO countries, and have the ability to conduct military operations or flex its muscles in the most tense parts of the Mediterranean and Middle East.

Link

The Grand Turk

'You won't trap us!' Erdogan is clearly tired of Zelensky.

2026-09-01

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Kamran Gasanov

[REGNUM] A noticeable and fundamental shift is taking place in Turkish-Ukrainian relations.

For five years now, Ankara has been repeating the mantra of "Ukraine's territorial integrity," occasionally supplying weapons to Kyiv, and at the same time trying to remain in its role as mediator and peacemaker. But over the past year, Ukraine has increasingly tested Turkey's patience.

Ukraine's strategy of shifting hostilities to maritime communications harms not only Russia, but also Turkish citizens, companies, and ports. When war begins to affect Ankara's merchant fleet, it ceases to be a foreign land.

THE TURKS ARE UNDER ATTACK
Attacks on ships carrying cargo to and from Turkey have previously unnerved the Turks. Their Ministry of Foreign Affairs has periodically reprimanded their Ukrainian counterparts, albeit privately.

But on August 29, the crisis in relations came to light. That day, the Turkish Foreign Ministry summoned Ukrainian Ambassador Nariman Celal. The reason for the summons was the attack by a Ukrainian drone on the Turkish ferry Lider Bordo Mavi off Tuapse three days earlier, which injured five people, and the subsequent attack on the Lider Kocatepe, which was sent to assist and tow the damaged vessel.

The Turkish side demanded that Kyiv ensure the safety of people, property, shipping, and the environment in the Black Sea. The very summoning of the ambassador is a targeted demarche, demonstrating that, despite all its support, Ankara does not prioritize the "territorial integrity of Ukraine" above the lives of its citizens and its own economic interests.

And Volodymyr Zelensky and his administration will not be able to escape responsibility by hiding behind the guise of "protection from the aggressor."

At the end of summer, tensions in the Black Sea, which Turkey considers an area of direct interest, reached a new level. Back in early August, the Turkish Foreign Ministry reported drone attacks on the Turkish-owned civilian vessels Yaşar and Nadezhda after they departed Novorossiysk.

Crew members, including Turkish citizens, were injured. Ankara demanded that all parties involved, primarily the warring parties, take concrete measures to protect shipping.

At that time, the authors tried to hide their complaint under the formula "all parties," but the administration of Recep Tayyip Erdogan understood that his country suffered much more economically and humanitarianally from the actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, since Russia is Turkey's most important trading partner.

But Ukraine doesn't.

PIRACY AS POLITICS
Mustafa Can, chairman of the board of directors of the Turkish company Transbosphor Deniz Taşımacılığı, described this reality most starkly and clearly. He called Ukraine's attacks on commercial ships piracy and emphasized that Turkish vessels are becoming targets.

He estimates that if the crisis between the Black Sea and Egypt continues for another three months, Turkey's losses could reach $20 billion. This includes lost revenue from vessel transit through the straits, transport losses, repairs to damaged vessels, and additional business costs.

Jan also drew attention to the scale of the decline in shipping activity: if five months ago, an average of 200 ships passed through the Turkish Straits per day, now it is only 25–30.

For a country whose economy is heavily dependent on transit, disruption to shipping is a strategic issue. According to data provided by Turkish market participants, premiums for war risks in the Black Sea have risen by up to 10%. Some insurers are even stopping providing one-time coverage for voyages into the danger zone.

So, the bottom line is that Ukraine is not only hitting individual vessels, but also raising prices and hindering trade throughout the region.

A BLOW TO TURKISH BREAD
For Turkey, the Black Sea is not only about ship owners and logistics.

Turkey is one of the largest buyers of grain from Russia and Ukraine. Turkish companies use the purchased grain to produce flour, pasta, and finished food products, which they then export to countries in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Some of this grain is also consumed locally.

However, due to attacks on ships and ports in the Black Sea, according to the head of the Istanbul Grain Exporters Union, Kazim Tayci, supplies from Russia and Ukraine have effectively stopped.

Prices for processed grain products have already increased by 4–4.5%, and if the problem is not resolved within two months, the increase could exceed 10%.

Last year, Turkey earned $13 billion from such exports. Losing every cent of that in the current challenging economic climate is bad news for Erdogan, especially with presidential elections approaching. More broadly, his country is losing its status as a global food hub.

It was precisely in light of these circumstances that the "grain corridor" was recalled. In August, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan conveyed to Moscow and Kyiv a proposal for a moratorium on attacks in the Black Sea. Ankara is proposing the creation of a mechanism that would preclude attacks on commercial shipping.

This is not just a manifestation of sentimentality towards starving African countries, but an attempt to save Turkish business.

REAR ADMIRAL'S WARNINGS
Criticism of Ukraine in Turkey isn't just coming from the business community. The opposition is slightly more vocal than the ruling Justice and Development Party.

The Foreign Policy Council of the Republican People's Party (CHP) directly warned of the risk of the war spreading to other countries. The party's statement called for maintaining the Kremlin's trust, warning Ukraine, and preventing Turkey from becoming involved in the conflict.

The RNP specifically noted that strikes on civilian targets in Russia could provoke further escalation and draw other countries into the war.

The statement is quite telling, as this is not a marginal entity, but, until its recent split, the largest opposition party. Moreover, it is generally considered pro-Western—and not without reason. But, as with any leading force in the country, the party's own interests are more important than Ukraine's.

Her comment, coupled with the Turkish Foreign Ministry's protest to Ukraine and statements by company heads, showed that critical assessments of the actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces are no longer limited to individual pro-Eurasian commentators and politicians like Doğu Perinçek.

Another curious reaction recently came from a man who had a hand in conceptualizing Turkey's interests in the Black Sea.

Retired Rear Admiral Cem Gürdeniz, one of the authors of the "Blue Homeland" doctrine, which is slated to be enacted into law, called on his country to be more careful with its northern neighbor. "A conflict between Turkey and Russia would be suicidal for Turkey. Let me make this perfectly clear," he said.

Gürdeniz compared attempts to pit Ankara against Moscow to a historical episode in World War I, when the Goeben and Breslau ships, flying the Ottoman flag, attacked Russian ports and contributed to the Ottoman Empire's involvement in a disastrous war. "We must not fall into this trap. But they will do everything to lure us into it," he emphasized.

Of course, Gürdeniz doesn't speak on behalf of the Turkish government, but the position he has expressed has been voiced from time to time by the highest-ranking officials. Former Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu directly accused the West of fueling the conflict in Ukraine, and President Erdoğan, during the early years of the war, stated that he "does not support the West's provocative course in Ukraine," and that increasing arms supplies was risky.

ERDOGAN'S PROPOSAL TO PUTIN
Following the NATO summit in Ankara, Türkiye's current political line appears to contradict its own course in 2022–2023.

Erdogan then expressed his desire to join the PURL program, and the State Department announced that Ukraine would receive ATACMS ballistic missiles from Turkish stockpiles. The Turkish Foreign Ministry has not yet confirmed this latest news.

However, ultimately, the Turks themselves feel that the expansion and escalation of the conflict, which they may have a hand in, could backfire on them. It already has: in mid-August, a drone crashed and exploded in the courtyard of a police station in the city of Trabzon.

So, it is probably no coincidence that, before the beginning of autumn, the Erdogan administration stepped up efforts to return the conflict to a diplomatic channel.

In addition to his proposal to ensure security in the Black Sea, the Turkish president plans to meet with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, on the sidelines of the SCO summit in Bishkek and express his readiness to once again offer Istanbul as a venue for negotiations.

We'll see what comes of this. Past experience makes it clear that Turkey's efforts are futile when they run counter to the positions of the US, Europe, and Ukraine. And by supplying military supplies, Ankara is denying itself the right to call itself a mediator.

Therefore, it is most likely that it will delay the transfer of missiles to Kyiv as long as possible.

Link

The Grand Turk

'He seeks to encircle Israel.' Erdogan takes revenge on Netanyahu for Greta Thunberg

2026-08-23

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Kamran Gasanov

So ironic, given that poor, sad Ms Thunberg was sent against Israel by Turkey to begin with.

[REGNUM] On August 18–19, the Middle East once again found itself on the brink of a full-scale war: Israeli aircraft launched a series of strikes on the Syrian Abu al-Duhur airbase in Idlib province, located just 70 km from the Turkish border.

Unlike many other IDF raids in Syria, which were aimed at eliminating the remnants of the Assad regime's arsenals, Iranian facilities, instilling fear in the new authorities in Damascus and protecting national minorities (mainly the Druze), this one was an unambiguous message to Ankara.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has made no secret of these intentions. "We will not tolerate the strengthening of the Turkish military presence, which is advancing south," he declared, adding that the strike was a signal of sorts to Ankara.

TÜRKIYE IS THE "NEW IRAN"
In Ankara, following the tragedy of October 7, 2023, they have been quick to offer Netanyahu and his cabinet members new "compliments." Further evidence of mutual political hostility was Turkey's decision to formally request Interpol Red Notices against Benjamin Netanyahu and Israeli official Afek Moskovich.

The request is based on arrest warrants issued in July by the Istanbul High Criminal Court in connection with the interception in international waters of the Global Sumud Flotilla, which was attempting to deliver humanitarian aid to Gaza.

Recall that it was subsequently discovered that most of the few items of “aid” on the boats were expired or inappropriate for a population under siege, because the real purpose was a Mediterranean cruise with preening self-promotion, even as aid delivered via Israel into Gaza languished in neatly ordered piles, untouched because the Hamas warehouses were stuffed with supplies they withheld by force of arms from the populace over which they ruled.

It was this flotilla that carried prominent environmental activist Greta Thunberg.
Emphasis on 'mental'
Turkish authorities accuse the defendants of genocide, crimes against humanity, unlawful imprisonment, torture, intentional bodily harm, robbery, and vehicle theft.

All things Turkey has done, like the Armenian genocide a century ago, not to mention that nonsense against Turkey’s Kurds in recent years, but do go on.

The Turkish Ministry of Justice submitted documents to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for forwarding to Interpol, stating that it “will not allow crimes in Gaza to be covered up with the shield of impunity” and will use all the possibilities of national and international law.

I quite agree. It is long past time the crimes of the Gazans stop being justified by those who claim to be speaking from a place of conscience.

The conflict in Syria is driven by the fact that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan views it as his domain, while Israel perceives the Turkish presence as an existential threat no less than that once posed by Iran.

Turkey certainly intends to be. Whether Turkey can carry it off is a different question - Iran has not been able to thus far.

It seems highly odd that the Turkish Ministry of Defense rejected Tel Aviv's accusations, stating that there was no Turkish military delegation at the Idlib base either before or during the attack. The Turkish Foreign Ministry called the strike "reckless aggression" that violated Syria's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and called on the international community to take a firmer stance against Israel.

Syria is also acting cautiously and seemingly timidly.

Given that HTS is still consolidating its conquest of Syria, not challenging Israel is wise. Fighting Arabs is very different than fighting the IDF, as Hamas and Hezbollah discovered the hard way.

In an interview with Axios, Foreign Minister Assad al-Shaybani confirmed that he had explained to Israel the absence of plans to establish a Turkish base in Abu al-Duhur. He stated that work on the site is limited to restoring damaged infrastructure for the Syrian Air Force, and that the visits by Turkish officers were for the purpose of exchanging experience and conducting training exercises.

Uh huh.

Israel has no complaints against Syria itself. Israeli Ambassador to the United States Yechiel Leiter acknowledged in an interview with The Jerusalem Post that "the Syrians don't want a confrontation with us." However, Turkey's intention to strengthen and expand its influence is clear to Israeli ministers.

Moreover, from the diplomat's perspective, this is happening against Damascus's will. "That's why we're telling the Turks not to create conflicts. There's several indications that Turkey's planned actions were imposed on the Syrians," he said, adding that the Jewish state has intelligence on plans to expand the Turkish military presence in that Arab country.

Mossad sees you when you’re sleeping,
They know when you’re awake,
They know if you’ve been bad or good…
And in the case if Iran, the Iranian Mossad-hunting unit was headed and staffed by Mossad.

After 2023, the Netanyahu government and Israeli intelligence agency Mossad began to take the Turkish threat seriously. Turkey is no less of a threat to Israel, if not a greater one, than Iran, battered by the spring war and the attacks on its "Axis of Resistance" (Hamas and Hezbollah).

The Turkish threat is being discussed not only within the ruling coalition but also in the opposition. Former Prime Minister and Netanyahu's election rival, Naftali Bennett, before the US-led war against Iran, called Turkey "the new Iran" and Erdogan "a sophisticated politician seeking to encircle Israel."

Threat perceptions in Israel are extremely heightened, but there's some truth to Bennett's words. Turkey is pressuring Hamas from the south, exerting pressure from Gaza and wielding no less influence than Iran. Erdogan regularly threatens to send the Turkish-Islamic army into Gaza and even Israel.

Turkish troops have dug in deep in the north, in Syria, and the recent visit of Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam to Ankara suggests that Erdogan wants to take Lebanon, where Hezbollah is weakening, and along with it, Iran, under his wing.

ISRAELI STRIKES ON SYRIA AND US MEDIATION
Israel began taking its first steps to neutralize the Turkish threat immediately after the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Since then, hundreds of airstrikes have been carried out on Syrian territory.

In the first 48 hours after the opposition took Damascus, Israeli aircraft carried out more than 350 strikes, destroying a significant portion of Syria's air defense systems, airfields, and arsenals to prevent them from falling into the hands of the new authorities.

In March 2025, Israel attacked the T4 airbases in Homs and Palmyra, which, according to Reuters, had previously been visited by Turkish military delegations. In February 2025, a strike was carried out on a base where, according to Tel Aviv, Turkish forces were planned to be stationed. The most recent strike (excluding this August) was recorded in March of this year.

While the verbal spats between Erdoğan and Netanyahu had long since faded, the risk of a military clash raised concerns in the White House. In 2025, the United States, with the personal involvement of President Donald Trump and the support of Azerbaijan, mediated a series of talks between Israel and Turkey on the Syrian issue in Baku.

The main goal was to create a mechanism for incident prevention and de-escalation in areas where the interests of both countries intersect. Despite the announcement of a communication channel, a full-fledged agreement was never reached.

That’s because while wannabe neo-Ottoman sultan Recep Tayip Erdogan the First “the much beloved” plans on regaining Turkey’s former province, Israel, Israel arrogantly insists on being left to rule itself. The two cannot be reconciled.

While Trump is following Netanyahu's lead in the Iranian case, the situation with Turkey is different. The American leader reprimanded the Israeli prime minister for his attacks on Turkey and rejected his request not to sell F-35 fighter jets to Ankara.

"Turkey is a great ally for me. <…> No one is going to tell me what we should sell," Trump said in July.

Aren’t a lot of the F-35 improvements courtesy of Israeli innovations? Possibly this is a Brer Rabbit in the briar patch situation…

Now the White House is trying to separate its friends into different corners of the ring. Trump's special envoy for Syria and ambassador to Turkey, Tom Barrack, made it clear that the Israelis had not informed the Pentagon of their intentions, and he considers the attack on Abu Duha an "unjustified escalation." In other words, Netanyahu is being blamed for the escalation.

Is President Trump saying the same, or is it just one ambassador who’s gone a bit native?

The diplomat warned that such incidents could lead to a direct confrontation between Israel and Turkey, as the Turkish military was unaware of the Israeli operation's objectives and could have launched its fighter jets, mistaking them for an attack on its own territory.

That would have been interesting, given that the IAF is a bit at loose ends at the moment, being between engagements...

Barrak proposed creating a coordination center with experts speaking Hebrew, Arabic, Turkish, and English to prevent accidental clashes.

WIN VOTERS OR LOSE TRUMP
Whether Netanyahu will heed Barrak's advice remains to be seen. But the Israeli prime minister faces a difficult situation: elections are scheduled for late October. Although several polls show the ruling Likud party remains the most popular, Netanyahu cannot afford to risk defeat: corruption cases hang over him and the prospect of imprisonment looms.

The Israeli deep state is as vicious as America’s, and they’ve had more time on the project of driving their bête noir from office, though with equal lack of permanent success.

The economy can't be revived in a matter of months, so the Israeli prime minister resorted to his usual ratings-boosting tool—creating the image of a besieged fortress. The difference is that while he previously defended Israel from Iran and its friends, now Turkey has been added to the list of enemies.

Pushing the anti-Turkish agenda could potentially boost his ratings, as Ankara is also perceived as a threat by the opposition.

However, excessive escalation of the Turkish issue is fraught with the potential for a direct confrontation, and if this is avoided, then at the very least, a deterioration in relations with the only reliable ally.

Former Prime Minister Ehud Barak warned Netanyahu, calling escalation with Turkey "reckless and politically dangerous": "Turkey is not Iran or Assad's Syria." Turkey possesses different geopolitical and military capabilities, and a potential confrontation with Ankara does not serve Israel's long-term interests.

Barak proposes de-escalation through US mediation and explains that Netanyahu is trying to use attacks on Syria to win the Knesset elections.

As for the United States, Turkey is not just a NATO member, but also a lever of influence in the Middle East. During his current presidency, Trump has spoken too highly of Erdoğan, calling him a strong politician and a victor in Syria. He needs Turkey not only in that region but also as a mediator or even an instrument of influence in the Ukrainian case.

Netanyahu calls himself the only person in Israel who can communicate with the United States, but a conflict with Trump over Turkey will backfire in the elections.

NEW REGIONAL REALITY
Turkish-Israeli tensions are clearly growing. For Israel, Turkey is becoming the "new Iran." Iranian troops have withdrawn from Syria, and Turkish troops have arrived. And what's bad for Israel is that while the US could be used against Iran, it can't be used against Turkey.

The outcome of the standoff depends not only on the desires and capabilities of these two countries, but also on regional configurations. Three powerful blocs have currently emerged in the Middle East.

The first bloc—Israel, Greece, Cyprus, India, and the UAE—is based on shared interests in energy, security, and countering Islamist movements. The second bloc consists of Iran and its "Axis of Resistance," struggling for its very existence. And the newest alliance is the "Mecca Pact," comprising Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, with the potential inclusion of Qatar.

That last: Muslim Brotherhood-ish, former Wahhabi, Deobandi, and Muslim Brotherhood, which makes the thing very interesting to watch.

The United States, as well as Egypt and Jordan, which have recognized Israel, are hesitating, unable to make a final choice between the “Meccan union” and the Israeli-UAE alliance.

Link

The Grand Turk

'This has never happened before.' A 'pro-Iranian' ally has Erdogan on edge.

2026-08-07

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Kamran Gasanov

[REGNUM] Turkey moved confidently into Syria after the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad, and then its attention shifted further south and east – towards Lebanon and Iraq.

The recent visit of the prime ministers of these countries to Ankara, the agreements on the participation of the Turkish company TPAO in the development of oil in Iraq's Kirkuk and the "Roads of Development" confirm Recep Tayyip Erdogan's intentions to restore influence in the former vilayets of the Ottoman Empire.

By seeking to weaken Iran, Türkiye is at the same time, paradoxically, creating new points of conflict with Israel.

TURKISH BREAKTHROUGH INTO IRAQ
Turkey's increased involvement in Iraq began in March 2023, when then-Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani arrived in Ankara. A year later, a Turkish leader visited Baghdad for the first time in 12 years.

The main outcome of these meetings was the "Road to Development" project. Iraq, with its Shiite majority, became an Iranian domain after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the failed American occupation.

Interestingly, both visits took place before Assad's overthrow in Syria.

However, given the growing pressure from Israel and the US on Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iran itself in these years, Turkey's dominance in the Middle East has become increasingly difficult. Assad's fall is not the cause of Ankara's rise or Tehran's weakening, but rather a result.

At the end of July, Erdoğan continued to expand his influence in Iraq. A meeting with the new Prime Minister, Ali al-Zaidi, was held at the Beştepe Palace. Five agreements were signed, including a document on the "Road to Development." This is a transport corridor from the port of Greater Faw in the Persian Gulf through Iraq to the Turkish border, with further access to Europe.

The cost of creating a 1,200-kilometer logistics route (including roads, railways, and port infrastructure upgrades) is estimated at $17 billion. The project also involves Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Jordan, and Syria—Arab countries where Iran has limited leverage.

For Tehran, the "Development Road" means losing exclusive control over transit flows from the Persian Gulf. While the Strait of Hormuz and Iranian ports were previously the only outlet for energy and cargo from the region, an alternative route has now emerged, completely controlled by Turkey and its allies.

Iran observed the process silently and did not publicly torpedo Turkish initiatives, but nevertheless attempted to slow them down.

At a meeting between Turkish and Iraqi leaders in Ankara, Iraqi Transport Minister Wahb Al-Hasani refused to sign the "Road to Development" document. Only after a direct order from the Prime Minister did he finally sign the agreement.

Several regional media outlets attributed the delay to Iranian influence. Al-Hasani is a member of the Shiite Badr Organization in Iraq, which is affiliated with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The minister quickly denied accusations of working for Iran, citing "technical and protocol glitches." However, such glitches are extremely rare at such a high level. Erdogan was forced to summon his Foreign Minister, Hakan Fidan, to find out what was going on. The awkward pause lasted several minutes.

Turkish columnist Mehmet Koçak, writing in Yeni Akit, notes: "Iran fears that the Development Road project, as well as the Zangezur Corridor, seen as a gateway to the Turkic world, could negatively impact its geopolitical and economic interests." He also noted that this was the first time President Erdoğan had personally noted that any of the documents scheduled for signing were missing.

OIL COMEBACK
In parallel with its transportation projects, Türkiye made a historic breakthrough in the energy sector by reaching an agreement with Iraq to supply more than 750,000 barrels of oil per day via the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline.

As Sabah newspaper columnist Erhan Afencu writes, "Turkey lost the battle for Mosul and Kirkuk 100 years ago, in 1926, and received only a share of Mosul's oil for 25 years. Payments for this share ended in 1955. Last week, TPAO acquired 15% of BP Energy Company's shares in Kirkuk Limited. This agreement made Turkey a partner with BP in the Kirkuk fields."

This isn't just a commercial deal, but Turkey's return to a region it considered its own a century ago. TPAO became a partner in a consortium including BP (43%) and ConocoPhillips (42%), gaining access to fields with estimated reserves of approximately 3 billion barrels of oil equivalent.

The war in Iran and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, while strengthening Tehran's position in relations with the US and Sunni monarchies, simultaneously increased Turkey's role as a transit country. Together with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria, Turkey is reviving the Hejaz Railway, which will connect Istanbul with the Persian Gulf.

There is talk of a Qatar-Europe gas pipeline project through Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey. And since April, Iraq has been shipping fuel by truck to the Syrian port of Baniyas, and from there by tanker to the EU.

LEBANESE VECTOR
In parallel with its Iraqi efforts, Ankara is actively working with Lebanon. At the end of July, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun arrived in the Turkish capital. This signaled Beirut's willingness to reduce the influence of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and France in its territory. Turkey promised financial and military assistance for the reconstruction of southern Lebanon, as well as support for dialogue with the new Syrian leadership.

Academician Tuba Yildiz, writing for Fokus+, notes: "Lebanon has realized that it can obtain the necessary foreign policy support thanks to Turkey's diplomatic and political strength, especially given Washington's contradictory position." Although Donald Trump is attempting to reconcile Hezbollah with Israel, the ceasefire is constantly violated.

As Israel also keeps pointing out.

Turkey's presence could pose a direct challenge to Hezbollah's influence. The Lebanese government could lean on Ankara to weaken the pro-Iranian movement. Other players could also support this process, including the United States, the European Union, France—and even Israel, which is hostile to Erdogan.

That last is backward - it’s Turkey — specifically President Erdogan — that is hostile to Israel.

Turkey's entry into Lebanon was largely due to the weakening of Hezbollah in its confrontation with Israel following Operation Pager and the armed clashes that have been ongoing since 2024, as well as the coup in Damascus.

Influence in Syria allows Ankara to open a natural corridor to Lebanon and work directly with Beirut. Closer ties with Lebanon will strengthen Turkey's position in the Mediterranean, where it already has a 1,500-kilometer coastal zone and a presence in Cyprus, Syria, and Libya.

Yıldız writes: "Turkey views Lebanon not as an extension of its Syrian policy, but as an independent component of a regional strategy with its own internal dynamics—as part of the fight against Israel and strengthening its position in the Eastern Mediterranean." In this context, the recent attempt to enshrine the expansive geopolitical concept of the "Blue Homeland" into law is highly symptomatic.

In Lebanon—as in Libya and Syria—Turkey appears to be unwilling to limit itself to economic and soft power. Ankara may send troops to guarantee the republic's security from Israeli attacks and incursions.

That could prove amusing — what has Turkey’s army done beyond march in parades and bully the Kurds of Iraq and Syria?

Erdogan wanted to send troops to Gaza as part of Trump's peace plan, but due to Israeli opposition, the US president did not approve of this approach.

Golly — why do you suppose they objected?

Turkish journalist Yahya Bostan points out that Israel won't be able to do the same in Lebanon, where Turkey is already present as part of the UN peacekeeping mission UNIFIL.

Sure — for a little while longer.

"This time, Ankara's hand is strong," the author asserts. Erdogan has already hinted at his willingness to become the republic's security guarantor: "We want to participate in all initiatives aimed at ensuring Lebanon's sovereignty."

Turkey's growing influence in Iran's traditional spheres of influence undoubtedly irritates Tehran. However, Tehran remains pragmatic and is reluctant to openly clash with Ankara at the official level. After all, their interests often coincide. The countries are important trading partners.

On security issues, Iran and Turkey can both compete, as they did in Syria, and present a united front. For example, when the US attempted to mobilize Iranian Kurds against the ayatollahs during its attack, Ankara threatened to launch military action against the separatists.

In any case, by gaining a tactical advantage in Iraq and Lebanon, Turkey is not achieving hegemony. Firstly, Iran, due to religious factors, will still retain its potential both in Iraq and in other countries with large Shiite populations. Secondly, Turkey's strengthening in Lebanon will exacerbate tensions with Israel, which will both divert resources and undermine good relations with the United States.

Link

The Grand Turk

The split in Atatürk's party. The Turkish opposition has made Erdoğan's life much easier

2026-07-28

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Kamran Gasanov

[REGNUM] Turkish politics hasn't seen such a demonstrative political rift in a long time. Republican People's Party (CHP) leader Özgür Özel and 90 other MPs left the party to form the New Party (YENİ Parti).

Formally, it all began with an appeals court ruling in May that invalidated the 2023 RPP congress, where Özel replaced Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu as chairman. The court cited the "absolute nullity" of the proceedings, annulled the results, and reinstated the unpopular party veteran.

For Ösel's supporters, this verdict was the point of no return. Removed from his post as chairman but retaining his position as head of the parliamentary group, he spoke openly of a "forced and long-overdue sad farewell" and took to the podium with the phrase: "Every end is a beginning."

Compromising and accepting the leadership of the reinstated leader, who was essentially appointed by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan through the judges, would have meant capitulating to the authorities. Özel preferred a split in the party to its external control.

Although the opposition's grip on parliament has weakened, the newly formed party is ahead of the CHP. The New Party has 91 seats. The Republicans have lost ground from 135 seats to 44, falling behind even the pro-Kurdish DEM party, which has 56 seats. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) holds 277 of the 600 seats.

The new party's main goal, according to Özel, is to become the most important opposition force in the Grand National Assembly. His closest ally, Ankara MP Murat Emir, is even more blunt: "We are leaving behind the occupied party." For the CHP's old guard, this is a blow to its influence and prestige.

The reasons for the split go far beyond a single court decision. Özel assumed leadership of the CHP in 2023, replacing his 77-year-old predecessor, whose 13-year leadership was widely described as an ineffective challenge to Erdoğan.

Just a year later, Özel proved his effectiveness, securing the AKP's first-ever defeat in municipal elections. The politician became the face and symbol of the opposition to Erdoğan, especially in 2025, when the most popular opposition figure, Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, was arrested. He is currently in prison, with combined sentences amounting to thousands of years.

The government's actions following İmamoğlu's arrest looked like an attempt to wipe out the opposition. Erdoğan's men attempted to impose external control over the CHP's Istanbul branch, though unsuccessfully. Then came the declaring of Özel's election as party leader illegal. Dozens of mayors and party officials were arrested on charges of corruption and ties to terrorism.

For part of society, Özel's departure is perceived not as a betrayal, but as an attempt to give new life to an opposition suffocated by legal battles and internal political contradictions.

This is precisely the perspective of the opposition liberal newspaper Sözcü. Rahmi Turan's column is headlined: "The People Seek Hope in the New Party." The publication sees Özel's project as a chance to reshape the opposition, moving beyond tired faces and procedures. The popular demand for change, according to the author's logic, is no longer satisfied by the historical legitimacy of the CHP alone—new energy and a new organizational model are needed.

Pro-government newspaper Akşamcriticizes Ozel for trying to build yet another centrist structure without clear ideological contours, comparing his plan with Macronism, Biden's course, and the failed "pillar of six" (an alliance of parties for the 2023 Turkish parliamentary elections).

"Ideological diversity alone does not guarantee a common political identity," the publication notes, effectively warning that the anti-Erdoğan coalition format without a clear ideological core has already proven its inadequacy in 2023.

The popular publication Hürriyet draws attention to the moral and political side of the issue: for some Kemalists, leaving the “century-old party” is almost a family taboo and a betrayal.

But author Ahmet Hakan, arguing, writes: "A party membership is not hereditary... You can have boundless respect for your father and still not follow in his footsteps." For him, Özel's departure is part of a modernization of political consciousness, a rejection of "tribal thinking," where party affiliation is determined by tradition rather than rational choice.

At the other extreme, in the same Hürriyet, the well-known columnist Abdulkadir Selvi actually accuses Özel of using the resources of the RPP to prepare a split.

He describes in detail how the opposition leader, losing lawsuits against Erdoğan for insults, spent years paying compensation not from his personal pocket, but from the party treasury. Moreover, according to him, just before leaving, he secured accelerated payments for three major court decisions totaling approximately 747,000 lira. For a conservative audience, this seems like a bill for his own legal losses.

For the New Party, gaining recognition, media attention, and parliamentary status is now far more important. Özel needs to demonstrate that his bloc is more popular and can win over the entire opposition in the future, representing them in the upcoming parliamentary elections.

Özel and his team expect up to a million CHP members to join the movement. However, several influential mayors, including Ankara Mayor Mansur Yavaş, have chosen to remain in the old party. This means that the struggle for the Kemalist camp's electoral legacy is only just beginning.

The CHP found itself in an extremely vulnerable position. It had effectively lost its leader and a significant portion of its faction. Kılıçdaroğlu returned to his seat, but was unable to regain public trust: after years of battling Erdoğan, he had failed to translate his electoral potential into victory.

Now, he's also being portrayed as someone who regained power through the courts (or even through collusion with Erdoğan), rather than through a congress. For some of the Kemalist core, preserving the historic party at any cost will be crucial, but the CHP will likely lose a broad base of voters, as it was unable to elect its leadership without the involvement of the authorities and the courts.

Clearly, the main beneficiary of the opposition's split is the ruling AKP. The CHP's shrinking mandates and support base, the New Party's lag and its squabbles with the Republicans, coupled with frustration among opposition supporters, all make it easier for Erdoğan to retain power. The Kemalists will certainly lose ground in potential snap elections.

Scheduled parliamentary elections are scheduled in two years, and no one is rushing to call snap elections yet. Meanwhile, a multipolar opposition architecture is emerging on the horizon. The Democratic People's Republic (DEM) is strengthening its position as a third force, with a stable Kurdish electorate and its own strategy for surviving the threat of possible bans.

Nationalist and Islamist parties—from the MHP to smaller conservative projects—will try to lure away supporters disillusioned with the RPP. The new party is becoming an experimental field: whether it can unite disillusioned Kemalists, part of the urban middle class, and those who see no place in either the old party or traditional conservative structures remains to be seen.

In any case, the Turkish opposition has entered a new phase of its development. The CHP has lost its monopoly as the sole Kemalist force, and Erdoğan, having achieved a split in his main adversary, simultaneously opened the field to new, less predictable players.

The Turkish political system, accustomed to the AKP versus CHP model, will now face a fragmented opposition. And whoever best navigates this new landscape will determine not only the outcome of the upcoming elections but also the future of Turkish politics and democracy itself.

Geopolitically, the split of the RPP and the emergence of the New Party are also important for external players. Despite the embrace of Erdoğan and the lure of Turkey into new European security arrangements, Europe will, deep down, sympathize with both the New Party and the RPP.

After all, the destruction of the opposition weakens democracy and centralizes power, diminishing the EU's ability to influence Turkey's domestic politics and its intransigent leader. Donald Trump, who shed no tears over İmamoğlu's arrest and considers Erdoğan an important partner, won't be concerned about a split within the Kemalists.

As for Russia, we still have to deal with the current leadership until the new elections. Relations with Ankara are strategically important in the economic and energy sectors.

At the same time, Erdoğan periodically makes it clear that Turkey is far from being an ideal neutral country and negotiating platform. From August to November, a squadron of Turkish F-16s and approximately 70 military personnel will be stationed in Estonia. At the last NATO summit in Ankara, Erdoğan promised arms supplies to Ukraine, and the Turks intend to resell the S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems purchased from Russia to the UAE.

In any case, internal squabbles between the authorities and the RPP, as well as between the RPP and the New Party, are unlikely to affect Russian-Turkish relations in the next couple of years.

Link

Syria-Lebanon-Iran

Iran increasingly scapegoats Baha’i minority, including accusing members of spying for Israel

2026-07-16

Human interest story snipped, can be read at the link.

[IsraelTimes] Rights groups say anti-government protests, war with US and Israel prompted Islamic Republic to publicly incite against the faith, arrest dozens of its members, some without charge

Ever since the Baha’i faith was founded in Persia — now Iran
Iran

...a theocratic Shiite state divided among the Medes, the Persians, and the (Arab) Elamites. Formerly a fairly civilized nation ruled by a Shah, it became a victim of Islamic revolution in 1979. The nation is today noted for spontaneously taking over other countries' embassies, maintaining whorehouses run by clergymen, involvement in international drug trafficking, and financing sock puppet militias to extend the regime's influence. The word Iran is a cognate form of Aryan. The abbreviation IRGC is the same idea as Stürmabteilung (or SA). The term Supreme Guide is a the modern version form of either Duce or Führer or maybe both. They hate ~~Jews~~ ~~Zionists~~ Jews. Their economy is based on the production of oil and vitriol...
— in the 19th century, its followers there have been persecuted, usually more harshly during times of crisis.

This year, amid massive anti-government protests and war with the United States and Israel, the Islamic Theocratic Republic has mounted a fierce crackdown on the country’s largest non-Moslem religious minority, human rights
...which are often intentionally defined so widely as to be meaningless...
groups say.

Since January, dozens of Baha’is have been imprisoned because of their faith, human rights groups say. Holy books and religious symbols have been desecrated during raids of Baha’i family homes — which these groups say is evidence of authorities’ sectarian motivations. Those detained have faced mistreatment ranging from electric shocks to mock hangings, and some have made forced confessions to crimes punishable by death, rights groups say.

The Islamic Theocratic Republic’s intensified campaign against Baha’is is part of a wider crackdown across Iran. Nationwide protests that began in late December prompted the deadliest backlash by Iranian security forces since the Islamic Theocratic Republic took power in 1979, with thousands killed and tens of thousands reportedly arrested.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry and its spokesperson at the United Nations
...where theory meets practice and practice loses...
didn’t respond to multiple requests to discuss the treatment of Baha’is.

The targeting of Baha’is, who make up less than 1 percent of Iran’s population, is hardly discreet: The authoritarian government often uses state TV and social media to accuse followers of being spies and blame them for the country’s economic woes.

"Every time there is a crisis — social, economic or political — shift the blame to the Baha’is," said Simin Fahandej, who represents the international community of Baha’is at the United Nations. "And this [year’s] protest and the war have also been no different."

While Baha’is often practice their religion in secret, the Iranian public is encouraged to report on neighbors if they are known or suspected followers of the faith, which is considered immoral by the country’s ruling holy mans.

"Much of this portrayal stems from theological hostility," said Omid Ghaemmaghami, an associate professor of Middle East Studies at the State University of New York at Binghamton. He and other experts said the scapegoating of Baha’is also serves to instill fear and obedience among other Iranians.

BAHA’IS HAVE A LONG HISTORY OF PERSECUTION IN IRAN
The Baha’i faith was founded in the 1860s by a Persian nobleman named Baha’u’llah, who was considered a prophet by his followers. He taught that all religions represent progressive stages in the revelation of God’s will, leading to the unity of all people and faiths.

There are more than 5 million Baha’is across the world, according to Harvard University’s The Pluralism Project. Most live in Asia, with the largest community in India. The Baha’i World Centre, the faith’s spiritual and administrative center, is located in the Israeli cities of Acre and Haifa, the latter of which is home to the famed Baha’i Gardens.

Baha’is also face persecution in Egypt, Qatar
...an emirate on the east coast of the Arabian Peninsula. It sits on some really productive gas and oil deposits, which produces the highest per capita income in the world. They piss it all away on religion, financing the Moslem Brotherhood and several al-Qaeda affiliates. Home of nutbag holy manYusuf al-Qaradawi...
and Yemen
...an area of the Arabian Peninsula sometimes mistaken for a country. It is populated by more antagonistic tribes and factions than you can keep track of...
. But the mistreatment is greatest in Iran, where Shiite Moslem holy mans have regarded the faith as heretical since its earliest days.

After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, many Baha’is fled Iran in the face of arrests, executions, property seizures, and restrictions on education and employment. Some stayed, while others have returned in the ensuing decades. An estimated 300,000 Baha’is live in Iran, whose population exceeds 90 million.

Many Baha’is feel a sense of purpose by remaining in Iran, said Sheyda Kamran, a professor at the Baha’i Institute for Higher Education. Despite living in fear, her students often ask how they can help Iranians grieving losses from protests and war. "They have a goal," she said. "That is the only way they can survive."

SCAPEGOATING INTENSIFIED AFTER WAR BEGAN
The crackdown against Baha’is — and all Iranians — intensified after the US and Israel launched the war in late February.

The Baha’i International Community says at least 63 Baha’is were detained in Iranian prisons as of June 11, though it says the figure is likely an undercount because some families fear speaking out.

Most detainees are being held without known charges, while others face accusations of "propaganda against the regime" and acts deemed "contrary to Islamic law," the Human Rights Activists News Agency said on X.

Some Iranian television outlets and social media accounts have amplified anti-Baha’i rhetoric in recent months, accusing followers of the faith of collaborating with Israel to undermine the Islamic Theocratic Republic.

In May, in the northern Mazandaran province, an exhibition open to the public portrayed Baha’is as enemies of the state, according to IRNA, the Iranian state-run news agency
...and if you can't trust the state-run news agency who can you believe?...
. A representative for Iran’s supreme leader who attended the exhibition, Mohammad Bagher Mohammadi Laini, said Baha’is are "spies" and should be banned from owning property, according to the semiofficial news agency Tasnim.

The highly publicized harassment of Baha’is suggests the real purpose is to instill fear among all Iranians, said Mahmood Amiry-Moghaddam, founder of Iran Human Rights, an Oslo-based organization.

"I think it’s part of the general intensification of the repression in Iran," he said.

BAHA’IS PAY A ’HEAVY PRICE’ FOR REMAINING IN IRAN
In April, Behzad Basiri was arrested by Revolutionary Guard agents at his house in Shiraz — without any charges, according to his family, which said Baha’i holy books were torn up during the raid. His wife Mandana Sotoudeh was arrested the same day at her parents’ house, and her sister Mahsa Sotoudeh were tossed into the calaboose three days earlier.

Basiri was released on bail on May 6; his wife and sister-in-law were released on bail on July 1, according to their family.

Basiri’s sister, Roya, who lives in Canada, said some of her family members chose to stay in Iran out of love for the country and hope for a better future.

"They’re paying the heavy price for that choice," she said.

Link

The Grand Turk

The Global Chair: How Erdogan is Trying to Become a Mediator Between Everyone

2026-07-01

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Kamran Gasanov

[REGNUM.RU] When people weren't interested in oil and gas, the Ottoman Empire was simply a transportation hub. Today, with the construction of bridges and tunnels under the Bosphorus, Turkey has strengthened its infrastructure role. A gas hub project is also underway. And an artificial intelligence hub is already a dream for future generations.

While Turkey was previously content to act as a passive transit hub between East and West, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's strategy today aspires to transform the country into a governing center where flows not only intersect, but also the rules of the game are established. The Turkish president's ambitions are constantly expanding, encompassing not only energy and transportation, but also neural networks and the military-industrial complex.

In June, Erdoğan unveiled an updated "AI Roadmap" for 2026–2030. This isn't just a declaration of intent, but a massive $10 billion plan.

In the era of "algorithmic diplomacy," those without their own AI are doomed to digital colonization. The plan calls for mobilizing the private sector to build data centers with a capacity of at least 1 GW by 2030. But the most important thing is people. Ankara aims to train 5 million AI literacy specialists and 10,000 specialized AI experts.

Ankara is listening to critics who point out Turkey's 53rd place in the Oxford Insights ranking, but they are drawing their own conclusions. Turkey has fallen far short of its previous strategy's goal of entering the top 20, but it clearly intends to correct this.

A special emphasis in AI development is placed on digital sovereignty—the development of our own large-scale language models and national platforms, such as T3 AI and Havelsan's MAIN. Erdogan wants neural networks to be independent of Western companies and to operate in the Turkish language.

Defense plays a key role in the strategy, with plans to integrate AI into drone swarms, autonomous systems, and decision support. Artificial intelligence is expected to be implemented in almost every area of life, from city administration and customs to agriculture and the Ministry of Emergency Situations.

Ankara plans to develop not only software but also physical infrastructure—computing power, energy, networks, and data centers—to become a regional AI hub and reduce dependence on foreign technologies.

Just as with logistics (take, for example, projects to deliver goods from China to Europe via Kazakhstan and further along the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railway) and energy supplies, Turkey will try to use the AI sector to secure its status as a center of gravity for Turkic-speaking countries.

This topic became a key issue at the recent summit of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). Erdoğan proposed creating a unified language model for the Oghuz, Kipchak, and Karluk branches of the Turkic languages.

Energy remains another important element of the planned transformation into a regional – and even global – economic hub.

But here the republic's role is transforming. "Turkey is no longer a corridor," declare experts at the Türkiye Araştırmaları Vakfı think tank. The signing of 10-year contracts between BOTAŞ and SEFE (formerly Gazprom Germania GmbH) and ENI for the supply of 11 billion cubic meters of LNG brings Turkey closer to the status of Europe's "energy bank."

The goal is to gather gas from everywhere: Russia (via Turkish Stream), Azerbaijan (TANAP), Iran, Iraq, and now Libya and Algeria. This allows for the gas's "origin" to be changed, making it "acceptable" for the European market even under strict sanctions.

The expansion of storage facilities in Silivri and Lake Tuz to levels that cover 25% of annual consumption gives Ankara enormous leverage over the Europeans during the winter.

The Zangezur Corridor (TRIPP) occupies a special place in this plan. As Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Alparslan Bayraktar notes, this is the missing link that will allow Caspian resources to flow directly to Turkey, bypassing complex detours.

The project is important for Europe, as it plans to impose a complete embargo on Russian gas starting in 2027. For Turkey, it's a new tool for rapprochement within the amalgamated territorial community.

Since 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin has proposed creating a gas hub in Turkey to reroute lost gas volumes from the blocked Nord Stream pipeline. However, due to the limited capacity of Turkish gas pipelines to Southern Europe and Turkey's reluctance to jointly sell gas, the project has stalled.

While the Strait of Hormuz remains in turmoil due to Iran's measures and the Red Sea remains a potential target for the Houthis, Turkey is offering the Arabs a safe alternative: the $17 billion "Development Road" project, connecting the Iraqi port of Basra with Istanbul.

Ankara is seriously reviving the Hejaz Railway. Negotiations with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the new Syrian government are in full swing.

Türkiye also isn't ruling out the possibility of building a gas pipeline from Qatar to Syria. The former has a Turkish base, while the latter came under Erdogan's "guardianship" after Assad's overthrow.

In April, the newspaper Türkiye, citing the republic's Ministry of Energy, noted that the republic had developed five gas and oil supply routes bypassing Hormuz.

If the TRIPP project is implemented, Turkey will also be aligned with Armenia. Ankara supported Nikol Pashinyan's party in the last elections.

And TRIPP could become the second line after BTK of the so-called Middle Corridor of trade flows between Asia and Europe.

The military-industrial complex also aspires to become a separate hub.

Over the past 20 years, Turkish exports have exceeded $10 billion. Products from Baykar, TAI, and Aselsan are exported to 40 countries.

But ambitions go further: Türkiye wants to become a platform for licensed assembly and joint production of Western technology for third-world markets.

The KAAN fifth-generation fighter project, the national air defense system (Steel Dome), and even prototypes of intercontinental missiles (Yildirimhan) are forcing NATO to view Ankara not as a springboard, but as a partner.

European allies, frustrated by the uncertainty of US guarantees in the Donald Trump era, are increasingly turning to Turkish capacity, which is cheaper and faster to deploy than German or French ones, according to Reuters.

KAAN aircraft have been ordered not only by Muslim countries from Saudi Arabia to Indonesia, but also by Spain. Spain is one of four countries (along with Germany, Britain, and Italy) developing the Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jets, which Erdogan acquired after much debate.

Diplomacy could be singled out as a separate area of Turkey's transit role.

Ankara hosts important international meetings. Four rounds of Russian-Ukrainian talks (in 2022 and 2025) took place in Istanbul. The exchange of political prisoners between Russia and the United States took place there, as well as a meeting between diplomats from the two countries.

Many Middle Eastern conflicts cannot be resolved without Turkey's participation. In October, in Sharm el-Sheikh, Erdogan became one of the signatories of the ceasefire agreement in Gaza, along with Qatar, the United States, and Egypt.

He also played a role in brokering a ceasefire in Iran. Antalya hosts an annual diplomatic forum, where representatives of European countries can hear the position of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in person.

For Moscow, Turkey's rise as a global hub brings both challenges and opportunities.

On the one hand, Ankara is actively replacing Russian influence in Central Asia and offering Europe a resource that bypasses Gazprom’s direct control.

On the other hand, under the conditions of the SVO, Türkiye remains a “window” for parallel imports and a link in bypassing sanctions.

Ankara earns significant profits from Russian transit, but the risks are also growing. The EU recently demanded that Turkey stop supplying Russian gas to Europe through its pipelines. If Moscow succeeds in joining the TRIPP project, Turkey's increased transit role will not be detrimental.

As for gas supplies, Türkiye is interested in maintaining and increasing them, but EU sanctions and Ankara's desire to lower prices for Russian supplies could create obstacles.

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The Grand Turk

'You all lack charisma.' Erdogan has decided who will take his seat

2026-06-25

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Kamran Gasanov

[REGNUM.RU] For the past two years, the Republic of Turkey has been abuzz with debate over one important topic: will Recep Tayyip Erdoğan run for office? Now it's clear—he will.

Turkey held presidential elections in 2023. The current leader won, not without difficulty. Officially, he still has two years left in his current term. However, there's a catch. According to the law, he's not allowed to run in subsequent elections under the usual procedure—he can serve no more than two consecutive terms. But there are two options.

The first is to return the country to a parliamentary form of government, where the prime minister can rule indefinitely as long as his party wins. But Erdoğan himself transformed the system from parliamentary to presidential in 2017—precisely to extend his stay in power. So no one will understand or appreciate this reversal.

Pooh. They’ll understand it completely. Appreciation depends on who’d be doing the work.

Moreover, even such a change requires time and public support. And it's not a given that the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) will prevail.

The second option—more obvious and simple—is to call snap elections. While previously these were merely rumors, speculation, and hints, recently AKP spokesman Ömer Çelik officially announced that Erdoğan will be a candidate in the new presidential elections. And since Erdoğan is running, the elections will be early.

But even if the snap vote opens the door for the president to the political race, it still doesn't guarantee his victory. And the issue isn't even the results of individual candidates, but rather the parliament.

To call an early presidential election, a minimum of 360 votes out of 600 is needed. The AKP and its nationalist coalition partners (MHP) can expect 327. The pro-Kurdish party DEM is opposed, so the outcome depends on the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP).

WHY ERDOGAN?
The current president's decision is, on the one hand, his personal choice. Over the past 20 years, he has built a new political system in which, for example, the army is no longer independent but is completely subordinate to the head of state.

On the other hand, his fellow party members and MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli are nominating him. They fear losing their seats, and after the 2017 constitutional changes, the president is the key figure in power.

In recent years, the media have actively discussed potential successors. The list included Erdoğan's sons and sons-in-law, as well as the current Foreign Minister, Hakan Fidan. However, none of them have comparable charisma or approval ratings. Attempting to nominate any of them could prove a risky maneuver.

A potentially weaker leader could exacerbate competition within the AKP and the government, which would reduce the government's effectiveness. Erdoğan himself may be perceived as the best guarantee of succession.

Fidan has regularly figured in discussions as the leading potential successor, eclipsing even Erdoğan's son, Bilal. Among the president's other favorites (including, for example, his son-in-law, Selçuk Bayraktar, the head of a drone manufacturing company), the 57-year-old foreign minister is the most experienced politician.

He has been a member of government structures for 25 years. He held the posts of head of the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency and head of the National Intelligence Organization of Turkey (MIT).

But despite Fidan's recognizability, nominating him while Erdoğan is alive and well would undermine the government's chances of victory. After all, the current president represents the elite consensus. Fidan, on the other hand, could be controversial.

Even if it is approved from above, a conflict of interest could arise later. For example, with Ibrahim Kalın, the former presidential spokesman and current head of the MİT. Kalın and Fidan's approaches to the Kurdish issue differ: the former advocates a moderate course, the latter advocates harsh measures.

In December 2025, some AKP MPs criticized statements Fidan made during a visit to Syria. At the time, the Foreign Minister threatened a military operation against the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG).

WHAT ABOUT THE OPPOSITION?
Ataturk's CHP would have had a good chance if Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu had not been under investigation in 2023 and then jailed in March 2025, where he was soon given a one-year, eight-month sentence.

The end of this sentence does not guarantee freedom or participation in the elections, as the investigation is being conducted into a major corruption case. The prosecutor's office is demanding up to 2,430 (!) years in prison.

The remaining candidates are clearly inferior to the mayor in popularity, and they face other challenges. Özgür Özel lost his position as CHP chairman after an Ankara court overturned the results of the party congress.

Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu was formally reinstated as party leader. Özel is currently challenging the court's decision, calling for a party congress to be held as soon as possible and for himself to be elected as the sole and undisputed leader. Had Özel accepted Kılıçdaroğlu's leadership, party unity would have been preserved.

But Kılıçdaroğlu is objectively less popular. He lost to Erdoğan in the last election. Furthermore, his reputation has been tarnished after he was reinstated as chairman of the Republican People's Party by a pro-government court ruling. He could be seen as a Trojan horse.

There's also the well-known and quite popular mayor of Ankara, Mansur Yavaş. But he's a relatively quiet politician and less charismatic than Özel. His nationalist views could alienate the Kurdish opposition. Moreover, the capital's mayor himself isn't trying to push his candidacy forward.

EARLY PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS?
Meanwhile, early parliamentary elections may take place in the republic, which could affect the balance of power.

Until recently, the opposition was the one seeking them more. Economic problems, inflation, ineffective governance, and outrage over Imamoglu's arrest gave the RPP an advantage, fueling public disapproval of the government. But now, the ruling party is the one most eager for snap elections.

Her argument is this: yes, the economy has slumped, but it's recovering. Inflation has fallen from a record 75% in May 2024 to 33%. The government is preparing a large-scale social support package to regain the trust of pensioners. Politically, the AKP has the advantage over the RPP: the opposition is riven by internal contradictions.

Özel fears the authorities will suddenly call snap elections. And there's a risk the RPP won't be able to participate, as it won't have time to hold its congress and elect its leadership.

Tensions within the RPP make it impossible to quickly develop a unified strategy against Erdoğan and undermine the electorate's trust. As a result, the opposition is unable to turn fair criticism of the socio-economic situation to its advantage.

According to polls, around 30% are prepared to vote for the RPP, and the same percentage for the AKP. Neither party will win with certainty; the result will be, as before, a close race. But the government could outmaneuver the opposition using administrative resources and form a coalition with the support of nationalists and other small parties.

INTERESTS OF GLOBAL PLAYERS
It's too early to say how the elections will play out. By Turkish standards, two years is a long time. Erdoğan's adviser, Mehmet Üçum, announced that presidential elections will be held on April 16, 2028, the anniversary of the constitutional referendum that established the country as a presidential republic.

But one thing is certain: unless his health deteriorates, Erdoğan will stand for his next (and likely final) election at age 75. If he wins, he will rule until 2034.

The usually critical West is unlikely to object to the very fact of early elections. Under Donald Trump, the United States pursues a non-ideological policy. For the sake of a deal, he is willing to negotiate with Ahmed al-Sharaa and even with the hated regime in Iran.

And Erdogan is Trump's friend. Incidentally, during a meeting with him, the American once joked that the Turk is well versed in the art of falsification.

As for Europe, Brussels, Paris, and Berlin continue to feign a commitment to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. But with the US retreating from European security, Turkey is becoming increasingly important to the Old World. This is being made clear by the leaders of the "EU-3" (Britain, Germany, and France).

Since no one has charged the Turkish president with İmamoğlu's arrest, will Europeans be concerned about his run for reelection? Deep down, the French and Germans will hope for the long-time leader's defeat, but they won't risk supporting the opposition ahead of time. After all, a victorious Erdoğan could be vengeful.

Moscow will be watching developments with interest. The Turkish opposition is not overtly anti-Russian, but some of its leaders, including Kılıçdaroğlu, have made vocal statements against the Kremlin. The AKP is critical of the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant project, which is being implemented by Rosatom. If this party's representative wins, Turkey will move closer to the EU and pursue a more pro-Atlantic course.

Under Erdoğan, relations between Russia and Turkey will remain more predictable. One way or another, any Turkish government will act in its own interests. And no one will sever ties with the main importer of oil and gas.

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Israel-Palestine-Jordan

'Chaos Factory': Who will win the Erdogan-Netanyahu Cold War?

2026-06-21

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Kamran Gasanov

[REGNUM] Since the IDF's operation in Gaza, which claimed tens of thousands of lives, Israel has become Turkey's number one enemy. Israeli experts, meanwhile, believe that after Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran, Ankara poses the most serious threat to their country's security.

A curious fact: when the State of Israel was founded, its main threats came from Arab countries—Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and even Saudi Arabia. Today, its main rivals are Shiite Iran, with its network of proxies from Lebanon to Yemen, and Sunni Turkic Türkiye.

That’s because the Arab countries repeatedly blunted their teeth on Israel, and have learnt better. Whether or not the IRGC has yet absorbed the same lesson, they’ve still been pretty thoroughly disarmed for the moment.

Although Israel has no direct experience of clashes with Turkey, the level of mutual rhetorical aggression is similar to that maintained by countries at war. It could be said that Ankara and Tel Aviv are waging a cold war.

Turkey is waging a direct proxy war via the Hamas planners they’re hosting and, of course, the regular Gaza flotillas full of idiots they send off with such fanfare. Warm, rather than cold or hot.

Recently, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan hurled yet another barrage of insults at the Israeli prime minister.

"Those who follow in Hitler's footsteps will end up like all tyrants throughout history," he said, referring to Benjamin Netanyahu and his war crimes in the Gaza Strip. "Under the current administration, Israel is nothing more than a factory churning out instability and chaos," he added.

Comparing any of their politicians to Hitler offends Israelis in much the same way that accusations of mass murder of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire offend Turks. Incidentally, Netanyahu, who has long and steadfastly refused to recognize the Armenian Genocide, broke with this consensus in an interview.

As expected, Netanyahu's office didn't let Erdoğan's attack go unanswered. This time, he reminded him not of the Armenians, but of the Kurds, which is no less painful for Turkey's Justice and Development Party, especially at a time when it has launched a process of disarming the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and reconciling with Turkey's Kurds.

"The anti-Semitic dictator Erdogan, who commits genocide against the Kurds, supports the terrorist organization Hamas, oppresses his own people and imprisons political opponents, is the last one who can preach morality to the State of Israel," the Netanyahu administration said in a statement.

The day before, Erdogan called the Israeli government a "criminal network" that is posing a threat to Turkey with its attacks in Syria and Lebanon. It's difficult to be definitive about Lebanon, as it's not Erdogan's "office," but Iran's. The Islamic Republic stands behind Hezbollah.

But Syria is truly Turkey's domain. Israel occupies the Golan Heights and periodically launches forays into the southern provinces or bombs Damascus and former Iranian, now Turkish, bases in the remaining provinces.

I wondered what they’d been bombing in Syria. The latest report didn’t say, just that they’d been busy there.

Israel is a nuclear state. Turkey has a large army, and Erdogan is trying to strengthen it with modern military equipment. New frigates and fighter jets are being built. Turkey's first intercontinental ballistic missile, the Yildirimhan, and its first aircraft carrier, the MUGEM, are under construction.

If you look at the map, the frontline between Turkey and Israel is quite extensive. It includes Syria and Palestine, where Erdogan supports Hamas. It also includes the so-called "Kurdistan."

During the Iranian campaign, Israeli intelligence Mossad tried to involve the Iraqi Kurds (PJAK) in the war against the ayatollah regime, but Ankara thwarted these plans by threatening to strike them if they attacked Tehran.

Ahhh. I’d wondered what happened there.

In strategically important Somalia on the Gulf of Oman (the gateway to the Red Sea), Turkey supports the official authorities and has its largest military base abroad, while Israel has recognized Somaliland and projects its influence there.

And Israel apparently has quietly based a small unit in Somaliland for a bit, unbeknown to either Somalia or Turkey. Heaven only knows what mischief they’ve been getting up to…

In an interview, Yeditepe University geopolitics professor Furkan Kaya outlined the details of the plan to create a "Greater Israel." The first component is establishing control over water sources (the Litania and Jordan rivers) and energy hubs in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Uh huh. Quite unlike the work Sultan Recep Tayip Erdogan I “the much beloved” has been doing to reassemble the Ottoman empire, amirite?

The second is the expansion of the Leviathan gas field (which is the purpose of destabilizing Lebanon) and the construction of the Ben-Gurion Canal from Gaza to the Gulf of Aqaba.

The what?? First I’ve heard of that!

And finally, the implementation of the "Kurdistan project" through support for the PKK and YPG.

The entire Eastern Mediterranean region can be added to the listed fronts of confrontation. Cyprus, Greece, and Israel are forming a military alliance aimed at containing Turkey and advancing energy projects, such as the EastMed gas pipeline.

Israel is reacting nervously to Turkish lawmakers' attempts to legislate the "Blue Homeland" concept, which aims to restore Turkey's former influence in the Mediterranean, Aegean, and Black Seas.

See? There’s the neo-Ottoman thing again.

Israeli media see the project as a tool for transforming Turkey into a dominant regional power, capable of controlling key maritime routes between the Black and Mediterranean Seas and gaining access to the energy resources of the Eastern Mediterranean.

Ya think?

According to their assessment, Ankara is not only promoting this doctrine, but also reinforcing it with a military and political presence in Syria, Libya and the Horn of Africa, forming a strategic arc of influence from Greece to Yemen.

Such insight, those Israeli analysts — able to see the nose on their face.

"Turkey's rise as a dominant power poses a complex and unprecedented challenge for Israel," says a report on Israeli television channel Channel 13.

Turkey is a NATO member, the bloc's southeastern flank, a window on the Middle East and an important player in the Black and Mediterranean Seas, as well as in Syria, and this factor limits Israel's options.

About that. Why are we keeping Turkey in NATO again? They’re less helpful than France or Spain, nowadays.

The United States is also holding back the escalation of the conflict: while Trump criticizes Netanyahu behind closed doors for the attacks in Lebanon, he does so publicly for the escalation with Turkey in Syria.

But he doesn’t criticize Turkey, which definitely deserves it.

Since the outbreak of the war in Iran, energy flows have become a new source of competition between Turkey and Israel. Both Erdogan and Netanyahu are proposing to create alternative oil and gas supply routes to the Strait of Hormuz. Israel is proposing to revive the IMEC project, while Türkiye is proposing to build gas and oil pipelines through Syria.

To be fair, despite the mutual hostility and long-standing threats, neither side wants to allow a direct confrontation. It's worth noting that the latest report from Turkey's National Intelligence Organization (MIT) notes that the 40-day war between the US and Israel against Iran has changed the balance of power in the Middle East.

Turkish politicians, witnessing the aggression against Iran, said that Turkey could be the next target. Therefore, they needed to strengthen their military-industrial complex, air defense systems, and the protection of critical infrastructure. And this refers to potential attacks from not only Iran but also Israel.

Why would Iran attack Turkey?

However, despite growing strategic competition, the MİT strongly recommended that its government maintain channels of communication with the Jewish state.

The better to communicate their insults to Bibi’s shell-like ear? Goody.

I searched the Ben Gurion Canal, and discovered it’s a thing:
From May in the Jerusalem Post: Israel needs a Suez alternative, the Ben-Gurion Canal offers one
The Ben-Gurion Canal would give the world a new trade route while boosting Israel’s economy and strategic power.
And from early 2024 in the Times of Israel: The Ben Gurion Canal: Vision Amidst Upheaval

Link

The Grand Turk

Erdogan is preparing to quarrel with the West when he has squeezed the maximum out of it

2026-06-18

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Kamran Gasanov

[REGNUM] Despite economic difficulties and a complex domestic political struggle, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan continues to rely on foreign policy and the military. By the next elections, he plans to codify his geopolitical claims to the Mediterranean, Aegean, and Black Seas.

It’s long been his ambition to reassemble the Ottoman sultanate.
The "Blue Homeland" concept has long ceased to be simply a catchy geopolitical slogan and a subject of academic analysis. For months, the Turkish parliament has been seriously discussing elevating it to law.

The doctrine was developed in 2006 by retired admirals Cihat Yaycı and Cem Gürdeniz. They believe that Turkey needs to restore the Ottoman Empire's former dominance in the seas—the Aegean (disputed by Greece), the Mediterranean (where Ankara clashes with Israel and Cyprus and is expanding its influence in Syria and Libya), and the Black Sea.

See?

Beyond a military presence, the concept also implies claims to energy resources. Turkey has been conducting geological exploration off the coast of Northern Cyprus since the late 2010s, angering the Greeks. To legitimize its geoenergy interests, in 2019 Ankara signed a memorandum of delimitation of maritime boundaries with the Libyan government in Tripoli, linking the two countries' economic zones.

The treaty effectively ignores the claims of Cyprus, Greece, and the EU to the continental shelves of Greek islands, including Crete. Subsequent agreements allowed Turkish companies (such as TPAO) to conduct geological exploration and drilling operations on the Libyan shelf and onshore. Following the change of power in Damascus, Türkiye wants to sign similar agreements with Syria.

Why make a simple doctrine into law? Journalist Saygi Öztürk answers this question in his article, "Why the 'Blue Homeland' Law?"

According to him, this isn't a simple legal amendment, but a long-term process that should integrate maritime doctrine into the state system. In an article for the newspaper Sozcu, the author cites the concept's author, Cihat Yaycı: "It's not enough to have maritime rights; these rights must be defined by law, declared, enforced, and protected."

In short, the norm should not simply describe Turkey's maritime policy but transform it into a sustainable legal norm. Yaycı proposes to stop fending off external challenges, which constantly arise with Turkey's increased activity in the Aegean or Mediterranean, and instead set the tone for the legal language itself. The idea is that the legal status will legitimize the policy in any controversial situations.

Yaycı is not only the concept's author but also its active lobbyist. He admits to having spent 22 years working on the maps and the "Blue Homeland." A key aspect of implementing the idea remains strengthening the Turkish Armed Forces, something the Erdoğan government is seriously pursuing. Not only are UAVs being built, but also fifth-generation KAAN fighters, GÖKSUR air defense systems, Istanbul-class frigates, and even aircraft carriers are in development.

The retired admiral is confident that the successful implementation of the doctrine requires focusing on all types of weapons. In one of his regular speeches to students, he made it clear that Turkey's security cannot be divided into land and sea. This is why he views the "Blue Homeland" and the multi-layered "Steel Dome" (Çelik Kubbe) system being developed as a single entity. If the latter is a shield in the sky, then the "Blue Homeland" law is a legal shield at sea.

Pro-government newspaper Daily SabahThe author sees the bill as a response to the structural problems of maritime policy. For Turkey, the sea is not the periphery, but the center of its geopolitical position, he explains. While Turkey's maritime policy was previously implemented through "disparate legislation," after the law's adoption, it will be possible to conduct it within a unified framework defining the continental shelf, exclusive economic zone, and territorial waters, he says.

Turkish authorities believe a unified legal framework is necessary to eliminate fragmentation and ensure long-term policy sustainability. With the new law, Ankara will be able to shift "from a strategy of protecting the legality of its rights within the limits it has defined and declared to a strategy of their practical implementation."

Politically, it's important for Erdoğan's government to legitimize its claims to disputed territories, such as the Aegean Sea. "Delays at sea are costly. Undeclared rights become disputed over time," says Yaycı. Economically, companies will gain grounds for fishing, oil and gas exploration, and production.

However, it's clear that Erdoğan's unilateral fatwa issued to his military, oil workers, and fishermen will still not resolve the dispute with the Greeks in Cyprus, near Crete, and around the Aegean islands. Greek MEP Nicholas Farantouris wrote in his column for Euractivwrites that the issue of the "Blue Homeland" law is not just an internal matter for Turkey, but a pretext for a new potential crisis in Ankara's relations with the EU and NATO.

The MP writes that the Republic of Turkey is effectively "formalizing as a state policy the seizure of greater control over the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean." If the law is passed, Turkey will be able to establish a more robust legal framework for maritime claims, which will inevitably increase tensions with its neighbors.

The Greek is confident that the European Union will immediately act in Athens' favor and impose sanctions against Ankara. "If Turkey continues to deprive Greece—and therefore the EU—of its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf around the islands, the EU will have no choice but to impose sanctions and invoke Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union on mutual defense assistance," the Greek socialist notes.

It must be said that there is no consensus regarding Turkey within the EU. On the one hand, there is a group of skeptics, led by Greece, Cyprus, and France and supported by the head of the European Commission. It is no coincidence that Ursula von der Leyen recently ranked Turkey alongside Russia and China on her list of "threats."

On the other hand, since Donald Trump's return to the White House, there has been a thaw in European-Turkish relations. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz have agreed to the delivery of Eurofighter fighter jets, while the European Union is turning a blind eye to the persecution of the opposition Republican People's Party and its leaders, including the arrested Ekrem İmamoğlu and the ousted chairman Özgür Özel. Turkey is needed as an element of the new European security system, from which the United States is branching off.

Nevertheless, passing a law that, if not putting Turkey in a state of war with the Greeks, would significantly escalate the confrontation, is a risky undertaking. That's why the planned May approval was postponed until October. According to the Swedish publication Nordic Monitor (run by fugitive anti-Erdoğan journalists), the pause is due to the upcoming NATO summit, scheduled for early July in Ankara.

"The postponement comes at a delicate diplomatic moment. In July, Turkey will host NATO leaders in Ankara, placing President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at the center of the alliance's diplomacy at a time marked by war in Ukraine, instability in the Middle East, and growing uncertainty in transatlantic relations. <…> Avoiding a new dispute with Greece before the summit appears to be in line with Ankara's immediate diplomatic priorities," the article states.

In other words, in a situation where Erdogan is trying to position himself as a co-author of the US-Iran peace deal, and Trump intends to re-energize the peace process around Ukraine, where Istanbul is still seen as a negotiating platform, and where the EU is looking with hope at Turkish patrols over the Baltic Sea, this is not the time to quarrel with NATO partners and deprive oneself of advantages.

However, Erdoğan's government hasn't abandoned the idea of the "Blue Homeland" law. After all, amid growing domestic political strife and intensifying talk of early elections, where representatives of the ruling Justice and Development Party are still considering nominating Erdoğan personally, rather than Hakan Fidan's successor, the president needs heroic steps. As Nordic Monitor writes, the new law will allow him to "present himself as a defender of national interests against external pressure."

Will the doctrine ultimately become law? Probably. Erdogan will remove it from office closer to May 2028, and even sooner if snap elections are held. Sanctions and worsened relations with the EU, a key trading partner, are bad news for the lira and the Ministry of Finance. However, when maintaining power, which in Erdogan's eyes is tantamount to preserving Turkey's sovereignty, is at stake, the risk is worth it.

Ankara's military operations in Syria and Iraq were often timed to coincide with election campaigns. Erdoğan still has time. He won't rush. At a vulnerable time of transatlantic rupture, the EU needs to be squeezed to the limit in trade and military-industrial cooperation, while Trump needs support in his peacekeeping ambitions in Ukraine, Iran, and Gaza. Potential success in these three areas could boost Erdoğan's ratings.

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