I came across this, from January 2025, while looking for an explanation of Tehreek-e-Taliban Ghazwatul Hind. [MilitancyChowk] An analysis of the activities and recent developments of the major Pakistani Taliban factions
January 2025 has seen a dramatic uptick in the activities of the Pak Taliban
 ...Arabic for students ...
conglomerate. Not only have several groups increased the number of attacks, following an ongoing trend that started between 2023 and 2024 but also the relations between factions, sub-factions, and commanders have mutated.
Since August 15, 2021, when the Afghan Taliban took over Afghanistan, the murderous Moslem scenario in Pakistain has been rapidly changing. Today, it is marked by a number of key factors that have been developing since 2021 and of which January 2025 is remarkably representative.
A first factor is the hyperactivity of jihadist murderous Moslem organizations. While several attacks have been repeatedly denied by security forces on the ground, often debunking murderous Moslems’ allegations that they carried out an attack and inflicted casualties, still, Pak Taliban groups have been consistent in claiming a high number of attacks, highlighting the pressure they intend to exercise on security forces and the larger public, physically and psychologically. For instance, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistain (TTP) has claimed an increasing number of attacks since 2021, when it claimed 282: in 2022, the group claimed 367; in 2023, 881: and in 2024, 1,758. While many of these attacks could not be verified, they underscore the operational growth of the TTP.
Furthermore, while this is not an entirely new phenomenon, for some Pak Taliban factions more than others, the high number of claims is part of a larger design aimed at redefining their image through the articulation of a new structure. Pak Taliban have been focusing on improving their power-projection capabilities through the establishment of ever more complex structures that can convey the sense that the murderous Moslem groups are expanding and increasing their strength. In 2024, for instance, the Hafiz Gul Bahadur
...a member of the Madda Khel clan of the Uthmanzai Waziris. Educated in a Deobandi madrassa located in Multan, he is affiliated with the Jamaat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) political party. Upon the formation of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in December 2007, he was announced as the group's overall naib amir under Baitullah Mehsud, who was based in South Wazoo, but has largely distanced himself from the TTP due to rivalries with the Mehsuds and disagreements about the TTP's attacks against the Pak state..
group (HGB, or Tehrik-e-Taliban Ghazwatul Hind, TTG), framed a new structure that for the first time signaled that HGB was shifting from a jihadist tribal militia into a local powerhouse following the example of the TTP.
Thus, as the Pak Taliban attempt to expand their influence and power of attraction, they inevitably end up competing with each other for recruits and resources. This competition becomes manifest with the mergers of murderous Moslem groups with the faction that outbids the others. The consequence is a political game between commanders and sub-factions who switch sides for opportunistic reasons or to consolidate their power-base on the local population.
Three major factions have monopolised the murderous Moslem jihadist landscape in Pakistain: Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistain (TTP), Hafiz Gul Bahadur group (HGB, or Tehrik-e-Taliban Ghazwatul Hind, TTG), and Tehrik-e-Lashkar-e-Islam
...a group of Islamic bandidos infesting Khyber Agency. It was headed by a former bus driver and eventually folded into the TTP...
Pakistain (TLIP or simply LeI). While focusing solely on these three factions would underestimate the complexity of murderous Moslem dynamics on the ground, they still represent an indicator of jihadist groups' changing approach to their ultimate politico-military goal. They also address some of the main factors that are affecting the murderous Moslem scenario of Pakistain.
In the first three weeks of January 2025, the TTP, HGB, and LeI combined claimed more than 120 attacks across Pakistain. The areas of operations of their attacks remain within the trend of the previous year. The TTP claimed the majority of attacks in every province of Pakistain except Islamabad Capital Territory. While the TTP quantity of attacks is following the number of attacks claimed in December 2024 (182), the group has already exceeded the 75 attacks claimed in January 2024.
Similarly, HGB and LeI have both claimed several attacks concentrated in their usual operational areas: Khyber’s Tirah Maidan area for LeI and Bannu, North Wazoo, and even Dera Ismail Khan
... the Pearl of Pashtunistan ...
for HGB.
Furthermore, since the start of 2025, the jihadist murderous Moslem environment in Pakistain has been marked by a series of changes that involve alliances between different Pak Taliban factions. In the span of just 19 days, the TTP was able to merge four new groups into its fold, while HGB suffered from the defection of a prominent commander and officially incorporated some commanders already affiliated and reinforced its alliance with an important murderous Moslem faction.
Between January 14 and 16, the TTP announced that three murderous Moslem groups from Balochistan
...the Pak province bordering Kandahar and Uruzgun provinces in Afghanistan and Sistan Baluchistan in Iran. Its native Baloch propulation is being displaced by Pashtuns and Punjabis and they aren't happy about it...
Province had joined the group. Located in the Khuzdar and Mastung areas, which fall under the shadow province of Qalat and Makran for the TTP, Shahid Umar Baloch, Mawlawi Shoaib Baloch, and Mawlawi Yasir joined the TTP alongside their companions. Among these, Yasir is said to have several hundred murderous Moslems, being one of the major groups that joined the TTP from Balochistan.
These mergers followed the defection to the TTP of another murderous Moslem commander, Ali Dawar aka Alamgir, the supreme commander of the Jaish-e-Omeri (JeO) faction of HGB, on January 12. This marked the first major loss for HGB since 2020 after losing its own deputy, Commander Aleem Khan, who had also joined the TTP. Ali Dawar joined the TTP together with some of his own sub-commanders and murderous Moslems of JeO; however, since JeO is a special faction of HGB made by murderous Moslems coming from different groups of HGB, the special unit remains active under the leadership of HGB, who nominated Maulvi Farooq aka Maulvi Shafaq as the new head of JeO. Meanwhile,
...back at the dirigible, Jack stuck the cigar in his mouth, stepped onto the gantry, and asked Got a light, Mac?
Von Schtinken stopped short, lowering the dagger and trying to control his features.
If you light that thing, Herr Armschtröng, he pointed out, his voice tense, we all die! ...
TTP murderous Moslems affiliated with Ali Dawar published pictures and videos of the commander head of the suicide bomb squad of Ali Dawar together with jacket wallahs carrying the TTP flag.
While murderous Moslems from both Pak Taliban factions repeatedly stated that no enmity is sparked by these mergers, highlighting that TTP and HGB have the same goal, follow the same jihadist path, and differ only in tactics, a competition focused on power projection started between the TTP and HGB.
Between January 13 and 14, a day after Ali Dawar defected to the TTP, HGB announced the official incorporation of another commander into their jihadist platform. Mawlawi Abu Zar Bangash and his group from the Kohat area of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa pledged allegiance to HGB via another prominent commander already affiliated with HGB: Mukhlis Mehsud. Both of them belong to the Hakeemullah Mehsud Karwan group, which pledged allegiance to HGB already in November 2024 via its commanders Mukhlis Mehsud and Zarar, led by Umar Mehsud. Later, on January 22, a commander from Dera Ismail Khan, Iftikhar aka Umar, pledged allegiance to HGB, with the group claiming also attacks in the district in the name of HGB.
While the mergers were important because they further expanded HGB's foothold outside the traditional North Waziristan-Bannu region, they were minor mergers. However,
death is not the end. There remains the litigation over the estate...
between January 16 and 18, rumors started to circulate among Pak Taliban members that HGB was set to announce a major development regarding Lashkar-e-Islam (LeI) on January 18. Shortly after, LeI and HGB announced that the two groups had decided to reinforce their alliance by pledging unity of struggle.
Based in the Khyber tribal district's Tirah Valley, LeI is a powerful group that resurged in recent years, mostly after August 2021 and particularly since 2022. After the killing of its founding leader, Mangal Bagh
 ...a former bus driver, now head of the Deobandi bandido group Lashkar-e-Islam and the Terror of Khyber Agency...
, in January 2020 in a mysterious blast in Nangarhar
The unfortunate Afghan province located adjacent to Mohmand, Kurram, and Khyber Agencies. The capital is Jalalabad. The province was the fief of Younus Khalis after the Soviets departed and one of his sons is the current provincial Taliban commander. Nangarhar is Haqqani country..
Province of Afghanistan, LeI had been led briefly by Zala Khan Akakhel; however, as a prominent commander of the group revealed, due to an illness that struck the latter, Tayyab Afridi aka Ajnabi, one of the sons of Mangal Bagh and previously deputy to Zala Khan, became the new leader of LeI.
LeI has maintained independent leadership while nurturing close relations with both the TTP and HGB, mostly through connections with Jamaatul Ahrar
...A Pak Taliban splinter group that split off from the Mullah Fazlullah faction because it wasn't violent enough...
(JuA) commanders and Majlis-e-Askari Karwan's leader, Akhtar Muhammad Khalil. Videos featuring tashkeel (fighting units) of Akhtar Muhammad Khalil and LeI walking in different areas of Tirah Valley in the Khyber tribal district were not uncommon, while occasionally, LeI and JuA murderous Moslems conducted joint attacks in the same area.
Rumors about LeI and potential merger and/or unity are not new. In late February 2024, following a major crisis within the TTP involving JuA and some sections of the TTP leadership, there was news circulating among Pak Taliban circles that HGB, TTP, and LeI were considering forming a consolidated platform. At that time, talks were held between TTP, HGB, LeI, and JuA for 5/6 days allegedly facilitated by Afghan Taliban officials, according to a front man for HGB. However,
death is not the end. There remains the litigation over the estate...
no agreement was reached, mostly due to some reservations that HGB and LeI had concerning the TTP in relation to the murder of JuA founding leader, Omar Khalid Khorasani, for which at that time JuA had accused members of the TTP leadership of being involved. Eventually, the TTP and JuA managed to solve their contrasts, hence practically ending the experiment for creating a unified platform. However,
death is not the end. There remains the litigation over the estate...
different commanders of HGB, LeI, and JuA repeatedly said to The Khorasan Diary at that time that talks between HGB and LeI were still ongoing, and that the possibility of merging the two was not completely off the table.
Less than a year later, rumors started to circulate again. However,
death is not the end. There remains the litigation over the estate...
this time, the commanders of HGB and LeI confirmed that the pledge of unity of struggle had been taken. It became official when the spokespersons of the two factions openly acknowledged it.
Meanwhile,
...back at the dirigible, Jack stuck the cigar in his mouth, stepped onto the gantry, and asked Got a light, Mac?
Von Schtinken stopped short, lowering the dagger and trying to control his features.
If you light that thing, Herr Armschtröng, he pointed out, his voice tense, we all die! ...
on January 18, the TTP inaugurated its new structure for the year 2025. An annual practice started in 2022, the structure of the TTP has been increasingly expanding in its multiple articulations. In mid-2022, the TTP displayed a limited number of shadow provinces, first seven and then eight by the end of the year. At the same time, for the first time, it openly revealed the presence of an internal administration divided into different ministries. The structure outlined for 2024 included 11 shadow provinces whose number increased during the year, reaching a total of 14. However,
death is not the end. There remains the litigation over the estate...
in 2025, the TTP massively expanded its structure by reaching the number of 37 shadow provinces, adding new ones for Balochistan while fragmentation larger provinces into small ones, often matching the actual district-level administration of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. Additionally, the 2025 chart outlined in detail the administration of every province and every ministry. Furthermore, the TTP inaugurated new committees for overseeing the overall administration of the provinces in addition to the already established commissions for military operations.
For the first time ever, the TTP also disclosed the members of the Rahbari Shura or Leadership Council. Comprising 17 members, it includes big shots of the TTP and founders but also prominent commanders and veterans. It also reveals that the TTP opted for a balance of power among factions and institutions in the Leadership Council while reinforcing the grip of the leader of the group, Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud.
All of these changes highlight the fluid characteristics of the composition of the murderous Moslem landscape in Pakistain. They also underscore how Pak Taliban factions have been able - to different degrees - to accommodate both a long-term, ambitious vision and local, warlord-like short-term objectives. This is possibly the deadliest combination for Pakistain’s security environment because it encapsulates local conflicts and grievances into a higher goal. And for now, the Pak Taliban seem to have found an effective strategy to streamline both. |
...mindless ferocity in a turban...
...mindless ferocity in a turban...
...Arabic for