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Recent Appearances...

Aslan Maskhadov	Aslan Maskhadov	Chechnya	Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia	Chechen	Deceased	Supremo	20031117
		President of Chechnya

Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia

'Half an Hour's Respite - and Again the Attack.' How 90 'Greenhorns' Turned the Tide of the 2nd Chechen War

2025-03-02

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Daniil Pelymov

[REGNUM] "The battalion was carrying out a blocking mission. Intelligence discovered the caravan. The battalion commander moved to the battlefield and commanded the unit. The soldiers fulfilled their duty with honor. I am proud of my people." These few words of Colonel Sergei Melentyev, commander of the 104th regiment of the 76th Pskov Airborne Division, at a briefing on March 5, 2000, became the first official testimony of the bloody battle that took place several days earlier in the Argun Gorge of Chechnya.

Only later, from the words of the survivors, it became clear that this was an event that would forever enter the history of the Russian army.

Exactly twenty-five years ago, 90 young fighters of the 6th company of the 104th regiment found themselves in the path of militants who were many times superior in force – and at the cost of their lives, they thwarted the breakthrough through the mountains of a large group of Shamil Basayev and the international terrorist Khattab. At the same time, the feat of the “Spartans from the Airborne Forces” revealed the systemic problems of the Russian army of that time, which had to be solved already in the new century.

ENEMY BREAKTHROUGH IN TWO DIRECTIONS
The last year of the 20th century, 2000, was a leap year, so the last battle of the 6th company of the Pskov landing force fell on a rare date - February 29.

Leap years are considered difficult years – and in this case it was not just a matter of popular superstition. It was the last war that Russia had waged this century – the Second Chechen War.

Since September 1999, the army, at the cost of heavy losses, but steadily corrected the mistake made in 1996 - when the First Chechen War was ended by the Khasavyurt Peace. The conflict was supposedly stopped, but the "deal" only extended the life of the criminal-terrorist enclave that called itself the "Chechen Republic of Ichkeria". The regime that captured Chechnya quickly drifted from separatism to Islamism and could not help but begin "exporting jihad" - the invasion of Khattab and Basayev's gangs into Dagestan without the knowledge of the "President of Ichkeria" Aslan Maskhadov was inevitable.

By the end of 1999, the militants' attack was repelled by the regular army and Dagestani militias, and the war continued on enemy territory. The cities of Gudermes, Achkhoy-Martan, Argun, Shali, and the village and airfield of Khankala had already been liberated, and the battle for Grozny was underway (November 1999 - February 2000).

During the retreat from the Chechen capital, the "Ichkerians" lost many fighters who were blown up in their own minefields. Unable to confront the regular army in open combat, the enemy retreated to the mountains of the Shatoi and Itum-Kalinsky districts, where they felt more confident.

The absence of problems with food, the support and training of Arab professional terrorists (who were supervised by the “Black Arab” Khattab and the main “specialist” in airborne and subversive operations Abu al-Walid ), knowledge of the terrain - all this contributed to the effective operations of the Wahhabis and the difficulties of the advancement of the “federalists”.

The gang of "division general" Ruslan Gelayev moved towards the village of Komsomolskoye (Urus-Martanovsky district), trying to gain a foothold in this strategically important point of mountainous Chechnya. Gelayev hoped for the effectiveness of the tactics of the first war, when Salman Raduyev's terrorists successfully held Pervomayskoye together with the hostages. The battles for Komsomolskoye (March 5-20, 2000) became the last major battle of the Second Chechen War and require a separate story. We will turn our attention to another group.

The formation under the dual command of Basayev and Khattab concentrated in the area of the village of Ulus-Kert in the Shatoi district and the adjacent mountains along the Argun gorge. From here, the enemy planned to wage a sabotage war and wait for spring to begin full-scale guerrilla operations. Ulus-Kert became a "stronghold" for the separatists.

The goal of our army was to encircle and eliminate the remaining large groups in the Argun Gorge. The enemy hoped to break out of the encirclement being formed and, possibly, break through the mountains into Dagestan again.

YOUNG, INEXPERIENCED
In this difficult situation, the 6th Company of the 2nd Battalion of the 104th Regiment, consisting mainly of young, “green” soldiers (many were only 19 years old), was ordered to occupy the dominant height 776 in the Argun Gorge.

The problems began even before the operation. The better prepared and equipped 4th company was originally planned to be assigned to fortify the heights, but due to problems with transport, the "green" 6th company was sent on the mission.

It is worth adding that right before being sent to the combat zone, the company was staffed from different units, which affected its coherence and combat training. The commanders were able to get to know the fighters only at the front. This is exactly the situation that Guards Major Sergei Molodov, appointed as the group leader, found himself in. Together with him, the battalion commander, Guards Lieutenant Colonel Mark Yevtyukhin, took command.

The concept of the operation was quite simple. By this time, the 3rd company of the same 104th regiment, already occupying a fortified height, successfully held off the onslaught of superior enemy forces, using machine gun fire and artillery support with a smaller staff. Therefore, the "youngsters" from the 6th company were given a similar task.

A major problem in planning the operation was the lack of proper information about the enemy's forces and movements. There was a lack of technical equipment and scale of reconnaissance operations, and Basayev's men themselves skillfully camouflaged themselves in the mountain forests and carried out large-scale regroupings only at night.

"NO, THEY'RE GOBLINS."
On the afternoon of February 29, the paratroopers encountered a small enemy reconnaissance group. After a short firefight, the militants retreated, and then Major Molodov was tragically killed by a sniper shot, which was a blow to the morale of the personnel.

It was an alarming signal, but no one realized the scale of the impending threat. They thought everything was all right. The separatists, noting that the detachment was small, had a lot of cargo, and was poorly trained in moving in the mountains (the company was scattered in a long chain along the mountains), decided to break through the chain right here, sensing what they thought was a weak bleeding spot.

Khattab was confident of success, but Basayev still initially doubted the success of the fight even with such an advantage.

A recording of their radio communications from February 29, intercepted by our intelligence, has been preserved.

Basayev: If there are dogs in front (in militant jargon - soldiers of the internal troops), we can come to an agreement.

Khattab : No, they are goblins (paratroopers)

Basayev: Listen, maybe we should go around? They won't let us in, as soon as we reveal ourselves...

Khattab: No. We will cut them down.

The separatists were counting on success, as they outnumbered the paratroopers, outsold them in experience and mobility. As veteran of the 104th regiment Andrei Lobanov noted, the field commanders were far from being "schoolchildren", they were experienced, trained people with disciplined fighters. Also, unlike the "federals", who carried all their belongings, including potbelly stoves, the militants could leave most of their equipment and provisions in Ulus-Kert and actively used pack animals.

TWO DAYS IN HELL
During the day, the jihadists secretly approached the army positions and began to dig in. In the evening, a fierce battle began. The exact number of attackers is unknown, but according to various estimates, up to 2,500 people. Only the first waves of attacks involved 300-400 militants armed with mortars, machine guns, and sniper rifles.

“They were simply coming at us like a wall, their eyes bulging, shouting: ‘Allahu Akbar!’” Guards Sergeant Andrei Porshnev, one of the six who survived the battle at Height 776,told Rossiyskaya Gazeta in 2014.

“We’d shoot one wave, have a half-hour break, and then attack again... There were a lot of them,” the soldier recalled.

The battle flared up with incredible force. The paratroopers, despite the enemy's numerical superiority, put up a desperate resistance. Every meter on the approach to the dominant height was drenched in blood.

By midnight on March 1, the shooting had died down. The unit, previously stretched out along the heights, began to regroup, help the wounded and remove the dead. Artillery support was ineffective due to inaccurate calculations, poor intelligence and the stressed state of the gunners. Nevertheless, according to enemy information, at least 30 "mujahideen" were killed by artillery fire.

On the night of March 1, the 1st company of Guard Major Sergei Baran tried to break through to help: only they had the opportunity to cover the distance to the heights in the shortest time and help their comrades. But, probably, the fighters encountered a blocking detachment of militants while crossing the Abazulgol River and were forced to retreat.

At the same time, the paratroopers, tired and having lost a third of their number, were unable to dig trenches in the frozen ground, despair gripped everyone, and the only hope was for dawn, which would dispel the darkness for artillery and reinforcements. Around 6 a.m., the enemy made a final attempt to break through.

The wounded paratroopers continued to fight, covering the retreat of their comrades. When their ammunition ran out, not wanting to surrender, they blew themselves up with grenades, taking their enemies with them to the grave. By order of Captain Viktor Romanov, who took command after Yevtyukhin's death, the heights were covered with artillery fire.

By morning, the 6th company had practically ceased to exist. Only six remained alive. The enemy's loss figures vary. Colonel General Gennady Troshev, who commanded the united federal forces during the Second Chechen War, wrote in his memoirs about 400 "Ichkerians" killed, while the newspaper " Krasnaya Zvezda " wrote about half a thousand fighters in an article for the first anniversary of the battle.

LESSONS OF TRAGEDY AND HEROISM
In any case, at the cost of its life (and at the cost of tragic mistakes), the 6th Company greatly influenced the outcome of the war. The active combat phase of the Second Chechen War - with the capture of cities and large-scale battles "in the field" - ended by April 2000.

On the other hand, the tragedy at the 776th height stirred up all of Russia. A mass of legal proceedings followed, connected with the death of soldiers, in every corner of the country they knew about the battle for the 776th height.

The unit was able to delay the advance of the militants, but in the future the shortcomings of the old military system (understaffing, sending "green" conscripts to the front lines, the quality of planning operations and coordination between units) will lead to tragic episodes and a number of military failures. It is enough to recall the destruction of a column of Perm OMON near the village of Dzhani-Vedeno in March 2000. And some of Basayev's and Khattab's men managed to break through from the Argun Gorge in other areas. The "Black Arab" himself was liquidated in 2002, Basayev was "gotten" only in 2006.

But, be that as it may, the experience of mistakes, successes and exploits of the Second Chechen Campaign - completed successfully, but at a high price - was laid as the basis for the military reform of 2001-2004 and, in general, became the beginning of the revival of the Russian Armed Forces, which distinguished themselves during the five-day war in South Ossetia, and in the Syrian operation, and on the fields of the North Caucasus Military District.

The special operation added new pages to the annals of the Airborne Forces' history (it is enough to recall the defense of the airport in Gostomel in February 2022), but the paratroopers do not forget the feat of the generation of fathers and older brothers. The whole of Russia remembers them, which is especially important now, when, on the initiative of the president, 2025 has been declared the Year of the Defender of the Fatherland.

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Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia

War Without Victory Day: How Russia Almost Lost Chechnya

2024-12-12

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.

Back in the good old days, I read Lester Grau's narrative on the Battle of Grozny from the website of the US Army's Office of Foreign Military Studies. You can find one of his works published in 1996 here. Not the same as the article I read, but it is engaging if interested in this period of Russian military history.

Like me, Grau is a student of Russian military history, and has a number of books published on the matter.
by Andrey Zvorykin

[REGNUM] "Our war began on the morning of December 11, 1994... And we don't have our own Victory Day," these words of Andrei Palachev, a veteran of the first Chechen war and participant in the battles in Grozny, are perhaps typical for memoirs about the events of thirty years ago. In any case, the expression "a war without a Victory Day" is often found in the testimonies of veterans who, in the mid-nineties, were on average about twenty years old, like the Primorsky OMON fighter Palachev.

"As the poet said: "You can't make drums out of our skin - it's thin. Napoleonic plans are often pulled out of thin air," - these are already lines from the memoirs of General Gennady Troshev, who during the years of the first Chechen campaign was the commander of the Joint Group of Forces of the Russian Ministry of Defense.

The war began with the failed December assault on Grozny, cost the lives of 5 to 14 thousand “federals,” as the Russian press called Russian soldiers at the time, and ended with the Khasavyurt Peace Treaty in August 1996, which effectively handed victory to the Islamists and separatists of “Ichkeria”*.

"DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES"
"Any war is started and ended by politicians. Can the political decision to send troops in December 1994 be considered an adventure? To some extent, yes," admitted General Troshev, for whom Grozny was no stranger - he spent his childhood there. "To some extent" - because by the end of 1994 there were clearly no other ways, except military ones, to liquidate the criminal-terrorist regime that had seized power in Chechnya. But seized it at least with the connivance of the federal center.

In June 1991, even before the GKChP putsch, the leader of the All-National Congress of the Chechen People (ANCP), former Soviet Air Force Colonel General Dzhokhar Dudayev took control of part of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR. In July of the same year, Dudayev announced the secession of the "Chechen Republic of Nokhchi-cho" from the RSFSR and the USSR.

The federal leadership of the time — President Boris Yeltsin, Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi, and Supreme Council Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov — clearly had other things on their minds. On the eve of the collapse of the USSR, for example, the redistribution of Union property seemed more important. Radicals from the “general democratic forces of Chechnya” were seen as allies in the fight against the “reactionary party bureaucrats.”

When on September 6, 1991, Dudayev’s “guard” stormed the building of the Supreme Council of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, the television center and the radio house (during these events, the first blood of this conflict was shed, the head of the Grozny city council, Vitaly Kutsenko, was thrown out of a window), Khasbulatov sent a telegram to his small homeland:

“A favorable political situation has finally arisen, in which the democratic processes taking place in the republic are being freed from overt and covert shackles…”

In November 1991, the federal government tried to solve the Dudayev problem with a cavalry charge. Yeltsin declared a state of emergency in Chechnya, and to pacify the separatists, not even the notorious "two parachute regiments" were sent, but one "transport plane" with special forces of the Airborne Forces. At the Grozny airport, Dudayev's men blocked the plane and "offered" the fighters to return in a friendly manner.

THE KINGDOM OF THE "COCKROACH MUSTACHE"
While the rest of Russia was experiencing the shock of Gaidar’s reforms and was drawn into the confrontation between Yeltsin and the same Khasbulatov and Rutskoi, in Chechnya the process of the semi-disintegration of the state (which was also evident in Tatarstan, the Urals, and other parts of the weakened country) had gone too far.

By June 1992, de jure, the Russian Armed Forces had left the region, leaving the militants with a huge amount of military equipment and ammunition depots. According to the agreement signed with Dudayev by Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, the "Ichkerians" were to receive half of the arsenal - but in reality, our officers could only take their service weapons.

This is how the separatists got their army.

At the same time, the federal center continued to financially support Chechnya, which had not signed the federal treaty. Thus, in 1993, the republic was allocated 11.5 billion rubles for social payments. The money did not reach the recipients, but ended up in the pockets of the leadership of "Ichkeria", including the military leaders of the separatists.

Dudayev "stopped paying pensions to old people, teachers' salaries... Schools closed. It was enough of a primary education for us, if only they could count money," recalled a builder from Grozny, Gunki Khukiev. Only criminal elements could count money in the "independent state." The center "did not notice" the notorious Chechen avisos - the execution of a fake transaction with the subsequent "disappearance" of the swindlers. According to experts, more than 4 trillion rubles of the then rubles were received from these avisos.

They also failed to notice the displacement of the non-Chechen population - essentially, ethnic cleansing. If according to the 1989 census, 294 thousand Russians lived in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR (with a total population of 1 million 270 thousand), and 270 thousand Russians out of a population of 397 thousand lived in Grozny, then in the 21st century, about 1.9% of ethnic Russians live in the Chechen Republic, about 24 thousand people. About 250 thousand people left the republic even before the start of the first campaign.

Already in the first half of the 1990s, the rampant banditry (including armed banditry) sobered up many residents of the "sovereign state", especially city dwellers. "My brother... got nothing from the revolutionary pie, now he called his idol Dudayev nothing other than "ts1eza mekhash" (cockroach mustache). There were tens of thousands of such repentants," Khukiev recalled.

But the leaders of Ichkeria already felt strong enough to suppress any discontent. On June 4, 1993, field commander Shamil Basayev made his presence known for the first time - his fighters stormed the headquarters of the anti-Dudayev opposition, which was headed by the mayor of Grozny Bislan Gantamirov (who had previously had a falling out with Dudayev over the income from the oil business).

The Ichkerians were making plans to "export the revolution." It was not for nothing that Dudayev gave shelter to the ousted former President of Georgia Zviad Gamsakhurdia and simultaneously supported the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, whose militias had recently fought against the Georgians in Abkhazia.

PROLOGUE TO THE WAR. THE "GANTAMIROV" ASSAULT
The federal center, having “blown away” Chechen separatism, decided to play its own subtle game, overthrowing Dudayev with the hands of the opposition, which became a more or less organized force after the “president of Ichkeria” dissolved the Chechen parliament.

The opposition was supported by the urban population (which was gathered under the wing of Dudayev's personal enemy, Gantamirov) and some clan leaders who did not fit into Dudayev's system. An example is the former head of Dudayev's security, Ruslan Labazanov, who spoke out against Dudayev's men on the side of the Russian Armed Forces, but was not much different from them in essence.

In the summer of 1994, a civil war broke out in Chechnya between the "president of Ichkeria" and the militants loyal to him (led by Basayev and Ruslan Gelayev ) on one side and the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic on the other. Several "federal" tank crews appeared at the disposal of the opposition. Gantamirov and Labazanov's militia took control of the cities of Urus-Martan and Argun and on November 26, 1994, they moved on Grozny.

After the first shelling from Dudayev's men, the opposition infantry scattered, the tank crews, left without cover and not knowing the terrain, found themselves in a hopeless situation, 28 of them were taken prisoner, about 18 (data based on lists of names) were killed.

This event had a decisive impact on Yeltsin's decision to send in troops. On December 9, he signed a decree "On measures to suppress the activities of illegal armed formations on the territory of the Chechen Republic and in the Ossetian-Ingush conflict zone." A few days before, on December 1, a Russian air raid completely destroyed the planes that had been captured and bought by the separatists.

“THEY DIDN’T EVEN HAVE TIME TO COME UP WITH A NAME”
Finally, on December 11, 1994, units of the Russian Armed Forces, in accordance with Yeltsin’s decree, entered the Russian region of Chechnya.

The troops advanced in three groups. The first, under the command of Lieutenant General Vladimir Chilindin, advanced from the northwest, from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia. The second, from Vladikavkaz, under the command of Lieutenant General Alexander Chindarov, moved from the northwest through Ingushetia. The third, from Kizlyar, under the command of Lieutenant General Lev Rokhlin, headed from the northeast from the territory of Dagestan.

The overall command of the operation to restore constitutional order was entrusted to Defense Minister Grachev. "Pavel Grachev brought the army to a terrible state," Rokhlin later lamented. This concerned supplies, weapons, and the level of training of conscripts. However, it is unlikely that the problem was solely Grachev's, since he did not possess such outstanding abilities to destroy the mighty army organism to its foundations in just a few years. Structural problems in the armed forces arose much earlier.

An important point: it was difficult to talk about broad public support for the military operation. The media, controlled by media oligarchs Vladimir Gusinsky and Boris Berezovsky, broadcast if not a pro-Dudaev, then a "neutral" position. Not only liberals, but also the left opposition, including the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, criticized the operation.

Meanwhile, our group's problems began almost immediately: only the Mozdok group achieved relative success, reaching the village of Dolinskoye (10 kilometers from Grozny) the next day. The Vladikavkaz and Kizlyar groups were soon blocked and forced to either break through with a fight or bypass enemy-controlled settlements along a longer route.

Finally, 16 days after the start of the march (according to the plan, 3 days were given for the advance), all groups reached Grozny, blockading it from three sides. General Troshev later noted :

"According to some generals, the initiative for the "festive" New Year's assault on Grozny belonged to people from Pavel Grachev's inner circle, in order to coincide the capture of the city with the birthday of the Russian Minister of Defense (January 1). I don't know how serious this is. Another thing is that the operation was prepared hastily, without a real assessment of the enemy, his forces and resources, without careful preparation. This is a fact. They didn't even have time to come up with a name for this operation!"

"GOD, HELP ME BREAK FREE..."
The southern outskirts of Grozny remained unblocked. It was assumed that civilians would be evacuated this way, but in fact the militants were receiving supplies from here throughout the assault. On December 19, the first bombing attack was carried out on the city center, and on the 31st, the bloodiest battle of the war began - the storming of Grozny.

According to General Troshev, "many commanders with big stars, federal-level chiefs, believed that it was enough to go to Grozny, fire a couple of times in the air, and that would be the end of it." The military leader believed that it was precisely this method of intimidation that was the basis for the hastily approved plan to take Grozny, and, Troshev believed, it was approved "at the very top."

About 250 units of equipment entered the city with infantry cover, but the fallacy of this plan soon became apparent. The number of militants, their wide variety of anti-tank weapons, and their completely fanatical resistance were unexpected.

The units of the northern group were the most unlucky.

The fighters of the 131st Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (better known as the Maikop brigade) received an order from the commander of the "North" group, Konstantin Pulikovsky : together with the motorized riflemen and tankers of the 81st Motorized Rifle Regiment (who had 10 tanks at their disposal), reach the city center and fortify themselves in the railway station building.

The combined group of "Maikopts" and fighters of the 81st regiment carried out the order, but by 19:00 the station they had occupied was surrounded by superior forces of militants. When reinforcements broke through here on the evening of January 1, no more than a third of the defenders remained alive. The commander of the 131st brigade, Colonel Ivan Savin, was also killed in the battle.

Captain Vyacheslav Mironov, a participant in subsequent battles in Grozny, testifies in his book I Was In This War: “As we approached the railway station, we began to come across burnt, mutilated equipment and many corpses. Our corpses, our Slavic brothers, were all that remained of the Maikop Brigade, the one that was burned and shot by the “spirits” on New Year’s Eve from 1994 to 1995. God, help us escape…”

HARD VICTORIES AND STRANGE DEFEATS
War plans had to be changed on the fly and "in the field," Troshev noted. The troops held up in other directions changed their tactics by January 7, focusing on maneuverable groups, which gradually yielded results. On January 9, the Grozny Oil Institute and airport were occupied with heavy fighting, and on the 19th, the city center and the presidential palace. The militants retreated behind the Sunzha River.

It was only on February 3 that the decision was made to close off the southern direction and completely blockade Grozny. The city was surrounded only by February 9. The Chechen capital was completely occupied by March 6, when Shamil Basayev's fighters retreated from Chernorechye, the last district in the hands of forces loyal to Dudayev.

With the fall of Grozny, the actions of the Ichkerians finally acquired a partisan character - and our army was not ready for this.

Although the entire flat part of Chechnya and most of the mountainous regions were occupied over the following months, the army was unable to actually ensure control over the territory. On the one hand, ambushes and raids by militants became frequent occurrences, and on the other, our troops repeatedly occupied the same "inhabitants", which were again captured by the separatists after the redeployment of the "federals".

"One of the peculiarities of this strange war, which literally drove us crazy, is that we passed through and cleared the same villages several times. In the end, I studied the area so well that I could fight there blindfolded," the publication "Chelyabinsk Segodnya" cited the testimony of Alexander Berezovsky, who during the first Chechen war was the head of the reconnaissance group of the 17th detachment of the special forces of the internal troops "Edelweiss".

A NEW TYPE OF ENEMY
Thus, simultaneously with the exhaustion – moral and physical – of the Russian troops, the actions of the militants became ever bolder. Beginning in March 1996, raids on Grozny became an everyday reality. In addition to guerrilla warfare, the enemy used a method of warfare for which we were even less prepared – terror.

On June 14, 1995, about two hundred of Basayev's militants broke through the border of Chechnya and Stavropol Krai and seized a hospital in Budyonnovsk. About 1,200 city residents were taken hostage, herded into the hospital buildings. After negotiations, Basayev's men were allowed to leave. At that time, 143 Russian fighters were killed (including 46 special forces), 415 were wounded, with enemy losses of 19 killed and 20 wounded.

In January 1996, Salman Raduyev's group attacked the Dagestani city of Kizlyar. At the captured helicopter base, the bandits destroyed several units of equipment and took hostages. While security forces were approaching the city, the militants captured a hospital and a maternity hospital, driving about 3 thousand more residents there. During negotiations, the terrorists, along with some of the hostages, were released from the encirclement. Retreating, Raduyev's men also captured the village of Pervomayskoye. As a result, the terrorists were released.

Also, in parallel with the military actions, the Ichkerians captured airplanes, buses, and attacked railways.

In response, Russia took the first – and sometimes successful – steps in the fight against terrorism.

Thus, on April 21, 1996, our special services managed to track the mobile communication channels of the "Generalissimo of Ichkeria" Dudayev. During a conversation with the State Duma deputy, liberal Konstantin Borovoy, two Su-24s struck the location of the separatist leader.

Dudayev's successors as "presidents of Ichkeria" - Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev and Aslan Maskhadov - could no longer effectively control the "brigadier generals" and other field commanders. This defect in the system, however, would come back to haunt him in 1999, when the gangs of Basayev and Khattab attacked Dagestan without Maskhadov's knowledge.

THE SECOND "OBSCENE WORLD"
On August 6, 1996, the militants "turned the tide" of military operations: another attack on Grozny allowed them to take control of the city. At the same time, the separatists captured the large cities of Gudermes and Argun. The loss of three key centers, ongoing terrorist attacks, the shadow of Budyonnovsk and Kizlyar - all this demoralized the army.

Yeltsin (who had recently narrowly escaped defeat in the elections) was threatened by the political consequences of continuing the conflict. Everything was pushing the federal center of that time to conclude peace on terms unfavorable for Russia.

On August 31, in the Dagestani city of Khasavyurt, the Secretary of the Russian Security Council, Lieutenant General Alexander Lebed, and the "Chairman of the Government of Ichkeria" Aslan Maskhadov signed a ceasefire agreement. Russia was obliged to withdraw its troops from Chechen territory, and the decision on its political status was postponed until 2001.

Later, the Khasavyurt agreements were compared with another “shameful peace” – the Brest peace.

The Chechen people suffered first and foremost from the “peace”.

The "Ichkeria" of 1996-1999 plunged into chaos and became not only a "hub" for drug trafficking and a sanctuary for criminals, but also a springboard for international terrorism. Instead of national separatists like the "Minister of Culture and Brigadier General" Akhmed Zakayev or the "Chechen Goebbels" Movladi Udugov, the leading role was played by supporters of Sharia rule and a worldwide caliphate.

Maskhadov, elected president in 1997, not only failed to control his "prime minister" - the convinced Wahhabi Basayev, but also increasingly fell under the influence of foreign emissaries such as Khattab, Abu al-Walid and Abu Hafs al-Urdani. The transformation of the "Republic of Ichkeria" into the "Caucasus Emirate"*, which eventually swore allegiance to the "Islamic State"*,

…first Al Qaeda then later ISIS, but do go on…

was entirely expected. Just as the "export of jihad" was a matter of time, resulting in the attack on Dagestan in August 1999.

THREE BOGATYRS SQUARE
To correct political mistakes (which had been accumulating since the early 1990s and, in fact, led to the war) and miscalculations of the military command, whose Napoleonic plans did not always correspond to their capabilities, the Second Chechen Campaign was needed, no less difficult, but ended in success.

A change in political leadership, a clear national policy and a change in the quality of military planning played their role. During the second campaign, the Russian army proved its combat capability, which it has repeatedly confirmed subsequently - in the defense of South Ossetia, in peacekeeping operations - and is confirming now, in the SVO zone, where units from Chechnya are also proving themselves.

General Troshev died in 2008, having witnessed the beginning of the restoration of the republic under Akhmad-hadji and Ramzan Kadyrov — the military leader writes about the beginning of reconciliation in the finale of his memoirs. The afterword contains a vivid image. In one of the squares of Grozny in the 1970s, a monument was erected to three heroes of the Civil War: the Russian Odessan Nikolai Gikalo, the Chechen Aslanbek Sheripov and the Ingush Gapur Akhriev. "The people immediately nicknamed this place "the square of the three heroes," the general recalled.

Under Maskhadov, there was a slave market here, near the monument, and executions were carried out here according to Sharia law. “The war destroyed the monument to the representatives of three nations. But the pedestal remained. Maybe the monument will be restored, or maybe a new one will be erected?” Troshev wondered and added, “I believe that nothing will ever destroy the surviving foundation, not even the war, which left a deep mark on people’s souls.”

In 2008, Friendship of Nations Square was opened in Grozny after reconstruction, with a restored monument to the “three heroes”.

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Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia

Court approves the sentence of Daria Polyudova

2023-10-20

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
[KavkazUzel] The Supreme Court of Russia refused to change the sentence of Kuban activist Daria Polyudova, who is serving a nine-year sentence in the case of creating an extremist community and publicly justifying terrorism.

As the "Caucasian Knot" wrote, Kuban activist Daria Polyudova remains in strict conditions of detention in a colony in Kabardino-Balkaria, where she is serving a sentence in the case of creating an extremist community and publicly justifying terrorism, said the mother of the activist, who was able to get a meeting with her daughter.

In May 2021, a court in Moscow sentenced Polyudova to six years in prison. The reason for the criminal prosecution was publications on the social network in which Polyudova, according to the court, justified the activities of the Chechen field commanders Shamil Basayev and Aslan Maskhadov , as well as Yevgeny Manyurov, who in December 2019 opened fire near the FSB building in Moscow.

The defense insisted that Polyudova made no direct calls for terrorism. In December 2021, it became known that a new case had been filed against the activist. According to the FSB, she created a movement with the aim of publicly justifying terrorism and extremism. The court sentenced her to nine years in prison in December 2022.

In 2015-2017, Polyudova was in a penal settlement on a case of public calls for separatism and extremism, initiated after an attempt to hold an action “For the federalization of Kuban,” according to her biography published on the “Caucasian Knot.” In 2018, Daria Polyudova became the laureate of the Sakharov Prize “For Journalism as an Act.” The Memorial Human Rights Center* recognized Daria Polyudova as a political prisoner.

The Supreme Court approved the sentence for Daria Polyudova - nine years in prison, the human rights project OVD-Info** reported today. “I have the right to my opinion. In other countries there are also socialists, but they sit in parliaments, and not like me in prison,” the publication quotes her words in court.

The activist's defense insisted that unacceptable evidence was used in the case, and in her publications she expressed her personal opinion, the human rights project "Support for Political Prisoners. Memorial" reported today.

Witness Kirill Kotov, sentenced to three years of probation under the article on participation in an extremist community, stated that he testified against Polyudova under pressure from the investigation: he was threatened with a real prison term. According to Kotov, Polyudova is not the organizer of any community, the report says.

The "Caucasian Knot" also wrote that in October the ECHR upheld Polyudova's complaint about long-term detention.

Memorial Human Rights Centre calls for the immediate release of Daria Polyudova.

WHO IS DARYA POLYUDOVA AND WHAT ARE THE CHARGES AGAINST HER?
The 31-year-old Communist Darya Polyudova first came to public attention in 2014 when she became the first victim of the newly introduced Article 280.1 of the Russian Criminal Code (incitement of separatism) after an attempt to organise a ‘March for the Federalisation of Kuban’ in Krasnodar. In 2015 the activist was found guilty and sentenced to two years in a low security penal colony. Memorial at that time declared Polyudova a political prisoner.

In the autumn of 2017 Darya was released and continued her political activism.

In January 2019 she held a single-person picket in Moscow displaying a poster that read: ‘Hey, Kuril Islanders! Stop feeding Moscow! Long live the Far Eastern Republic!’

The activist suggested that the residents of these islands hold a referendum on withdrawing from the Russian Federation. On her page on the Vkontakte social network site she wrote that it would benefit Russia if it divided into several countries.

In February of the same year on VKontakte Polyudova reposted someone else's publication which consisted of a photo of the militant Shamil Basayev with the inscription ‘when we demanded a referendum, the Russians came and killed everyone who did not have time to hide.’ This was accompanied by a text that stated: ‘the Urals and other republics that will separate from Russia in the future need individuals such as Dzhokhar Dudayev, Shamil Basayev, Aslan Maskhadov’ and that the residents of the Urals must learn to ‘fight against the Muscovites to defend their independence.’

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Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia

Dzhambetov's father agreed to his son's murder

2023-05-24

Direct Translation via Gogle Translate. Edited.
[KavkazUzel] Hussein Dzhambetov's father stated on the audio recording that he forgives the blood lover who will kill his son. Hussein Dzhambetov, having arrived in Chechnya, began to hand over to the authorities those Chechens who had been in their house and expressed disagreement with the actions of the Chechen authorities, including Imam Valid Kuruev, a clergyman said.

The "Caucasian Knot" has reported that in October 2022, a criminal case was initiated against a 40-year-old resident of Chechnya, Hussein Dzhambetov, under the article on participation in the creation of a terrorist community. According to security officials, he took part in the creation of the "Separate Special Purpose Battalion of the Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria", which is part of the foreign legion of the armed forces of Ukraine. On May 14, it became known that Dzhambetov returned to Chechnya.

Dzhambetov's defection to the side of Ramzan Kadyrov caused wide discussion, but this did not affect the activities of the Ichkerians, supporters of the self-proclaimed Ichkeria said. Dzhambetov, after returning to Chechnya, published a video in which he boasted of participating in the murder of the Ukrainian military.

Video clip "Dzhambetov's father allowed his son's blood for Muslims" with an audio recording in Chechen, which sounds against the background of a photograph of a gray-bearded man, was published on May 22 by the Crime State YouTube channel.

"These videos were sent to me a lot. Maybe because of sympathy, or maybe for support. I can only pray to Allah with one dua ( prayer in Islam, - note of the "Caucasian Knot" ): I forgive the blood of my son to the one who, upon meeting, will deprive him of his life, and I ask Allah to first accept his death," the "Caucasian Knot" translated the man's words.

The man whose voice is heard in the video is really Khusein Dzhambetov's father, who received the nickname "Khusein the Butcher" in Europe, a representative of the clergy of the republic, who is familiar with Dzhambetov's family, told the "Caucasian Knot" correspondent on condition of anonymity.

According to him, representatives of the Chechen clergy often came to Europe. "Not Kadyrov's people, just honest imams, truly believers. They were worried that young people were moving away from faith, that customs and habits were being forgotten.

Naturally, these visits were not coordinated with the Chechen authorities. Among them was a particularly respected imam, Valid Kuruev. He, among other things, he was a longtime friend of Dzhambetov's father and was a guest in their house for several days. A guest for Caucasians is a person who is under the protection of the one under whose roof he found shelter and food, "the source said. However, according to him, Hussein Dzhambetov began to "surrender to the authorities of Chechnya" those who "weave plots" in Europe.

The interlocutor noted that for several days no one knows where Valid Kuruev disappeared.

"He disappeared a few days after he returned from Europe. It is a great shame for the old man that his son betrayed everyone who said something bad about . But the worst thing is the thought that his guest, his old friend, turned out to in all likelihood, in the dungeons. Perhaps nothing bad is done to the old man, but the very fact that he got there on a tip from his own son - Dzhambetov Sr. is difficult to survive. That's why he made such a decision," he commented on the statement of Dzhambetov's father.

Valid Kuruev in the past served as deputy mufti of Chechnya, in 2011-2017 he was repeatedly quoted in this capacity by the official republican media. The "Caucasian Knot" has no information on how long Kuruev has not contacted his relatives and confirmed the assumptions about his disappearance.

A reader of the "Caucasian Knot" drew attention to the video in which Dzhambetov's father condemns his actions .

"It is difficult to say whether this statement comes from Father Hussein Dzhambetov or not. Although, given the circumstances of the latter’s return to Chechnya (leaving the battlefield in Ukraine, betrayal of his yesterday’s comrades), this is quite possible.<...> Refusal father from son, especially allowing him to be killed, is an extreme measure for Chechens, which is allowed only in exceptional cases, and this will certainly become public. cursed by his father," he wrote.

Akhmed Zakayev said on May 18 that Dzhambetov Sr. was shocked by his son's act. "He was the son of my comrade-in-arms, who went through the war, the first war. His father is an exceptionally decent man. I talked to him on the phone yesterday. I expressed my condolences to him in connection with the betrayal. He is very seriously worried about this," Zakayev said in interview on YouTube channel Radio NV.

Akhmed Zakaev - Special Representative of Aslan Maskhadov in the West (2001), Prime Minister of the self-proclaimed Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (2007-2009). He was put on the international wanted list on charges of terrorism and received political asylum in Great Britain, according to the biographical information prepared by the "Caucasian Knot" about Akhmed Zakayev.
Akhmed Zakaev: not related to Imran Zakaev (Call of Duty inside joke)
The "Caucasian Knot" also wrote that on May 14, a video message was published in which Khusein Dzhambetov stated that he came to Chechnya thanks to the "fathers of the country" and voiced threats against those who imagine the situation in Chechnya is not the same as it really is.

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Europe

Human rights activists lost contact with close relatives of Tumso and Mohamad Abdurakhmanov

2022-12-07

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
[KavkazUzel] The power structures of Germany do not comment on the whereabouts of Tumso's brother Abdurakhmanov Mohamad, Deutsche Welle informed. There is also no contact with the closest relatives of the Abdurakhmanov brothers, according to the Vayfond human rights association.

The "Caucasian Knot" has reported that on December 1, information about the murder of Chechen blogger Tumso Abdurakhmanov in Sweden was circulated on the Internet, while on December 2, representatives of the Vayfond association and the Assembly of Chechens of Europe noted that publications about the blogger's murder did not look reliable.

However, on December 5, the murder of Tumso Abdurakhmanov in Sweden was reported by his associates. The son of the President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Aslan Maskhadov, Anzor, who had previously confirmed the information about the death of the blogger, said on the night of December 6 that he was not completely sure of the reliability of his sources. Shamil Albakov, a member of the Assembly of Chechens in Europe , hopes that an operation by the Swedish special services is behind Tumso's disappearance.

On December 1, unconfirmed reports about the murder of Abduramkhanov in Sweden circulated on the Internet, but representatives of the Vayfond association and the Assembly of Chechens of Europe noted that these publications did not look reliable. The Swedish police and Abdurakhmanov's lawyer declined to comment on his death.

According to human rights activist Alexander Cherkasov, it is impossible to comment on the rumors about the murder of Abdurakhmanov without confirmed information, but Chechen political emigrants in Europe have been killed for more than a decade and the European authorities do not perceive the threat to their lives as a systemic one .

Employees of the Swedish-based Chechen human rights association Vayfond noted that not only Tumso and Mohamad (also referred to in the media as Mokhmad) Abdurakhmanov, but also their immediate family members, have disappeared, or rather, do not answer phone calls, Deutsche Welle reported.

At the same time, the human rights organization added that none of its members were at the home of the Tumso brothers or Mohamad Abdurakhmanov, since "no one knows where they live to go and check," the material says.

In Germany, the police authorities have not yet responded to the publication's request for the location or condition of Mohamad Abdurakhmanov, who is under the protection of the German security authorities. His lawyer Johanna Kühne did not respond to the publication's request, according to a publication dated December 5.

COMPANION OF ABDURAKHMANOV QUESTIONED THE VERACITY OF INFORMATION ABOUT HIS DEATH
Information about the assassination attempt on Tumso Abdurakhmanov looks true, but the murder could not have taken place, said the chairman of the political movement of the Chechen diaspora "Unified Force" Dzhambulat Suleymanov.

He stressed that the Telegram channel opposed to the authorities of Chechnya, which reported that the death of Tumso Abdurakhmanov was confirmed, did not indicate the sources of information, follows from the video. published today in the Telegram channel "Nokhchiin Ghulam".

Emigrants opposed to the Chechen authorities are in danger, Suleimanov said. “Just the day before, I was informed that a group of killers was operating in Europe, the purpose of which were Chechen activists and politicians. The list of alleged victims includes the Yangulbaev brothers, Anzor Maskhadov, myself and several other people,” Kavkaz.Realii quoted him as saying on December 5."

Ibragim Yangulbaev, put on the federal wanted list in the case of justifying terrorism, Rosfinmonitoring included him in the register of extremists and terrorists, on November 22, Baysangur Yaglubaev was included in the same list . On March 30, it became known that investigators in Chechnya refused to investigate threats to the Yangulbaev family.

In February 2020, Ibragim and Baysangur Yangulbaev left for Europe. Details about the conflict between Kadyrov and the Yangulbaevs are given in the references of the "Caucasian Knot" " How the Yangulbaevs became enemies of Kadyrov " and " The main thing about the struggle between the Kadyrovites and the Yangulbaevs."

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Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia

Former militant elected Chechen parliament speaker

2015-07-07

[RFE/RL] Chechnya's parliament has unanimously elected presidential and government administration head Magomed Daudov as its new speaker. Daudov, aka Lord, succeeds Dukvakha Abdurakhmanov, who died last month.

Daudov, one of Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov's most trusted associates, is a controversial figure. He reportedly fought against Russian forces in the early 2000s under the direct command of radical field commander Shamil Basayev before surrendering in 2004 and pledging his loyalty to Kadyrov. Indeed, Kadyrov himself is said to have told a visiting Russian State Duma delegation in 2009 that Daudov was a former insurgent.

Unconfirmed reports say it was Daudov, then a district police chief, who commanded the operation in June 2006 in which Abdul-Khalim Saydullayev, Aslan Maskhadov’s successor as Chechen Republic Ichkeria president, was killed. He has also been implicated in the detention in February 2010 of human rights activists who sought to help the families of Chechens who had been seized by security forces.

It was Daudov who escorted 17-year-old Kheda Goylabiyeva to her controversial wedding last May to a district police chief old enough to be her father. He was subsequently quoted as advocating the legalization of bigamy within the framework of Islamic law.

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Europe

Chechen separatist leader Zakayev 'arrested' in Poland

2010-09-17

Chechen separatist leader Akhmed Zakayev has been arrested in Poland where he was due to attend a two-day Chechen congress, media reports say.

He had earlier been warned by Polish authorities he faced arrest because of a Russian warrant issued through Interpol.

Polish television said Mr Zakayev was detained on his way to the prosecutor's office in Warsaw.

A close aide had said he would ask prosecutors why he was being sought.

Mr Zakayev, who is considered a terrorist by Russia, was spokesman for Chechen separatist president Aslan Maskhadov, who was killed fighting Russian forces in 2005. He has been living in the UK where he was given political asylum in 2003.

Before travelling to Warsaw, he said that he had received his Polish visa and meant to attend the event which is expected to attract hundreds of people at Pultusk, around 40 miles (60km) north the capital.

Speaking yesterday, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said that if the Chechen separatist leader were to be arrested, the courts might not agree to extradite him to Russia. "The extradition procedure isn't the same as extradition," he told Polish media.

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Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia

Count Dooku declares himself North Caucasus emir; Zakayev fires him as Chechen president

2007-11-04

(RFE/RL) -- In the two years since the raids on police and security facilities in Nalchik, the capital of the Kabardino-Balkaria Republic, the North Caucasus resistance has not launched a single major attack that has made world headlines. At least seven prominent resistance commanders have been killed since June 2006, including Abdul-Khalim Sadullayev, Aslan Maskhadov's successor as president of the Chechen Republic Ichkeria (ChRI), and radical field commander Shamil Basayev.

Russian and pro-Moscow Chechen politicians claim that those losses have broken the back of the resistance and reduced its total strength to a few hundred men who will be killed or apprehended within months. Resistance websites, however, paint a very different picture, chronicling almost daily strikes against Russian military and security personnel and alleging a continued steady influx of recruits to swell the resistance ranks.

In late September 2006, Doku Umarov, who succeeded Sadullayev as president and resistance commander in June 2006, divided the North Caucasus into six areas of responsibility, or "fronts," some further subdivided into sectors, and each headed by its own amir who reports to Umarov personally. The intensity and nature of resistance activity since then has differed from republic to republic.

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Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia

More gunmen killed in Chechnya, including Basayev associate

2007-04-05

(Itar-Tass) - Several gunmen have been liquidated in the Vedeno district of Chechnya together with a closest associate of Shamil Basayev and the ringleader of a major bandit group Suleiman Elmurzayev with the nickname Khairulla. Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov said, The operation preparation took two weeks and few people knew about it.

According to him, Ten more gunmen were together with Elmurzayev and there were wounded and killed among them. The Chechen republic head stressed that Elmurzayev had said in his time that he was involved in the terrorist attack at the Dynamo stadium in Grozny on May 9, 2004 in which the first Chechen President Akhmat-khadzhi Kadyrov was assassinated and said that Ramzan Kadyrov was going to be the second. Kadyrov said that the work to search for other ringleaders of bandit groups is continuing. I think the results will appear by May 9, said the Chechen president.

According to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) department for the Chechen republic, Suleiman Elmurzayev, 32, born in the Chapayevo settlement of the Novolaksk district of Dagestan, had been put on the international wanted list through the Interpol back in 2004. According to law enforcement agencies, he was involved in firing at a Mi-8 helicopter in the area of the Dyshne-Vedeno settlement on August 1, 2003. The helicopter that came under fire from the ground exploded in the air. The crew commander was killed, the second pilot and flight engineer got burns and injuries.

Khairulla was a closest assistant of terrorist leader Shamil Basayev. In October 2004, Basayev appointed him the so-called emir responsible for the Nozhai-Yurt, Kurchaloi and Vedeno districts and in November 2004 became the first deputy of Basayev. On instruction of Ichkeria head Aslan Maskhadov, Elmurzayev was in command of an attack of gunmen on the Avtury settlement on July 12-13, 2004. In September 2006, he was given the brigadier general rank. Then there were 50-60 militants under his command.

According to the republics FSB department, he was involved in a number of serious and socially grave crimes assassination of Akhmat Kadyrov on May 9, 2004, as well as attacks on and murders of servicemen of federal troops, Chechen policemen and peaceful civilians of the republic, as well as organisation of a mutiny in Dagestan in September 2004.

Chechen Vice Prime Minister in charge of security affairs Adam Delimkhanov told Itar-Tass earlier on Wednesday, Officers of the FSB, republics special police force OMON and Akhmat Kadyrov regiment conducted the operation at the outskirts of the Agish-Batoi settlement at about 03:00 a.m. There were no losses among the personnel, the vice prime minister noted. According to him, the operation was conducted under the order of the Chechen President, Ramzan Kadyrov, and very few people knew about it. The Russian Interior Ministry told Itar-Tass that the operation was conducted based on information available to the FSB about the gunmen ringleaders whereabouts. He offered fierce resistance when an attempt to detain him was made and was killed by retaliatory fire. A whole arsenal of automatic weapons was found at his place, the ministry noted.

Besides, another gunman was liquidated in the Grozny district of Chechnya in the 60 Let Oktyabrya settlement. He exploded himself by a grenade when police made an attempt to detain him. His identity is currently being verified. It is not ruled out that he might be linked with Elmurzayev.

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Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia

4 militants dead as terrorist blast goes wrong in south Russia

2006-07-10

(RIA Novosti) - Four militants, including a close associate of Chechen warlord Doku Umarov, were killed when their truck packed with explosives blew up in southern Russia, security services said Monday. The terrorists were on their way to carry out a major terrorist attack in Russia's North Caucasus republic of Ingushetia but they blew themselves up by accident, the Federal Security Service said. "A truck with explosives, weapons and militants exploded, and four militants were killed," the service said. "One of the militants in the truck has been identified as Tarkhan Ganizhev, a close associate of warlord Doku Umarov," the representative said, adding that the other three militants remained to be identified.

Umarov, 42, a successor to slain separatist leader Aslan Maskhadov, has claimed responsibility for a string of bloody attacks in Russia, including an armed raid on Ingushetia in June 2004 in which police said militants attacked 19 police precincts and prisons in the North Caucasus republic. The security official said Ganizhev had a nickname of Tarella and coordinated several gangs operating in Ingushetia. Like Umarov, he helped carry out the 2004 attack on Ingushetia, and was also involved in the kidnapping of Ingush President Murat Zyazikov's father-in-law. The security service said he had been wanted on several charges, including banditry and hostage taking, and added that the truck had been escorted by three cars. "The explosion was so powerful that only some fragments of the truck were left intact," he said.

From AFP...

No details on the special operation that resulted in Basayev's death were immediately available. Russian media earlier however reported that four suspected Chechen militants were killed while they were sitting in two separate passenger cars beside a truck laden with explosives that blew up during a special operation in Ingushetia. The reports said one of the four militants was related to Doku Umarov, the new leader of the self-styled Chechen rebel "government".

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Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia

High tech hit on "president"

2006-06-17

Abdul-Khalim Saidullayev, the Chechen rebel "president" killed Saturday by pro-Russian forces, was the fourth pro-independence leader of the Muslim province to be killed in more than a decade of conflict with Moscow. Saidullayev's precedessor, Aslan Maskhadov, was also killed by pro-Russian forces in Chechnya on March 8, 2005. His death came after those of Akhmad Kadyrov, Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev and Djokhar Dudayev. Maskhadov was killed after a battle with Russian forces in the Chechen village of Tolstoi-Yurt after he was, according to Russian officials, trapped in a bunker under a house there.

Dudayev's killing, in April 1996, resulted from a bizarre blend of high technology and long-distance military intelligence as the Russian air force finally got their man after several attempts. Dudayev, 52, was in the village of Gekhi-Chu, about 30 kilometers southwest of the capital Grozny, when he answered a satellite telephone call from a Russian politician in Moscow who was ostensibly acting as a go-between in impending peace negotiations. But minutes later, two missiles exploded at the exact spot where he was standing and he died of his injuries shortly afterwards. Russian authorities at the time confirmed that the missiles had been guided to their target by the signal emitted by Dudayev's satellite phone.

Previous attempts by the air force to eliminate the man whose proud boast was "I have only one bodyguard - Allah," had failed as Dudayev had hung up too quickly. Dudayev had been elected president in October 1991 and proclaimed unilateral Chechen independence the following month.

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Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia

Rebel leader 'killed' in Chechnya

2006-06-17

Chechen separatist rebel leader Abdul-Khalim Saydullayev has been killed in a police operation, the pro-Moscow government says. Police had located him in the town of Argun and he was killed in a gun battle when they moved in, said Chechen cabinet minister Muslim Khuchiyev. No comment from the rebels was immediately available.

Mr Saydullayev was appointed in 2005 to replace Aslan Maskhadov after the rebel president died in a Russian attack. Details of his death are still being investigated, Mr Khuchiyev added. Chechen Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov welcomed the news as "a severe blow" to the separatists. "The terrorists have been virtually beheaded... and they are never going to recover from it," he told Russian news agencies.

Though appointed leader, Mr Saydullayev was a relatively obscure figure, correspondents say. He used to make religious programmes for the separatists' TV station and speeches he released as leader are couched in Islamist language.
He was much less prominent than veteran separatist commander Shamil Basayev who appeared on a rebel website last week in what was billed as a new video.

Bad Guyz confirm...
The Press Service and the Administration of the President of the CRI have officially confirmed the death of the President of CRI, the Amir SDK Majlisul Shura of CRI, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of CRI Armed Forces, the Amir of Caucasian Mujahideen Sheikh Abdul-Halim Sadulayev.

Sheikh Abdul-Halim has been martyred (Insha Allah!) in an unequal battle with Russian invaders and national traitors in his hometown Argun.

The invaders and puppets report that Sheikh Abdul-Halim died in a battle that took place in the town of Argun on Saturday morning of June 17, 2006. Two members of the FSB were killed in this battle. Because of this, two of the people who took up the fight in a private house in Argun were able to break through the ring of encirclement and to get away.

Ringleaders of puppet formations declared that the assassination of Chechen leader and Amir of Caucasian Mujahideen was "a big success of exceptional importance" which "will deal a severe blow" to Mujahideen.

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