Hello !
| Abu Ismail | Abu Ismail | al-Qaeda | Down Under | 20040525 | Link | ||||
| Ahmad Yani Ismail | Ahmad Yani Ismail | Jemaah Islamiyah | Southeast Asia | 20040221 | |||||
| Dirar Ismail Abu Aboud | Dirar Ismail Abu Aboud | al-Qaeda in Iraq | Iraq-Jordan | 20050907 | |||||
| Diyar Esmail Mahmoud | Diyar Esmail Mahmoud | Omer Brigade | Iraq | 20060718 | Link | ||||
| Ehab Ismail | Ehab Ismail | Egyptian Islamic Jihad | Middle East | Egyptian | Arrested | Big Shot | 20030106 | ||
| detained for planning attacks against foreign targets in Egypt | |||||||||
| Esmail Ahmadi-Moqaddam | Esmail Ahmadi-Moqaddam | Iran | Syria-Lebanon-Iran | 20050711 | |||||
| Esmail Ahmadi-Moqaddam | Basij | Syria-Lebanon-Iran | 20050711 | ||||||
| General Haj Ismail | General Haj Ismail | Palestinian Authority | Middle East | Palestinian | Big Shot | 20020824 | |||
| Negotiator on military affairs | |||||||||
| Hassan bin Ismail | Hassan bin Ismail | Jemaah Islamiyah | Southeast Asia | 20031126 | |||||
| Ismail Abu Awda | Ismail Abu Awda | al-Qaeda in Iraq | Iraq-Jordan | 20050805 | |||||
| Ismail Abu Shanab | Ismail Abu Shanab | Hamas | Israel-Palestine | Palestinian | Deceased | Big Shot | 20030825 | ||
| Member of Hamas politburo. Helizapped. | |||||||||
| Ismail Abou Shanab | Hamas | Middle East | 20030523 | ||||||
| Ismael Abu Shanab | Hamas | Middle East | 20020623 | ||||||
| Ismail Diab | Ismail Diab | Islamic Assembly of North America | Home Front | 20030316 | |||||
| Ismail Eskiyev | Ismail Eskiyev | Chechnya | Caucasus | 20030807 | |||||
| Ismail Grabli | Ismail Grabli | Hezbollah | Israel-Palestine | 20040310 | |||||
| Ismail Haneyya | Ismail Haneyya | Hamas | Middle East | Palestinian | At Large | 20031226 | |||
| Ismail Haniyeh | Ismail Haniyeh | Hamas | Middle East | Palestinian | At Large | 20030907 | |||
| Prime Minister | |||||||||
| Ismail Haniyeh | Hamas | Israel-Palestine | 20040324 | ||||||
| Ismail Haniyye | Ismail Haniyye | Hamas | Israel-Palestine | 20050814 | |||||
| Ismail Israpilov | Ismail Israpilov | Chechnya | Russia | 20040629 | Link | ||||
| Ismail Jabber | Ismail Jabber | Palestinian Authority | Israel-Palestine | Palestinian | 20040422 | Link | |||
| Ismail Kadir | Ismail Kadir | Islamic Movement of East Turkestan | Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia | 20020528 | |||||
| Ismail Kamoka | Ismail Kamoka | Libyan Islamic Fighting Group | Africa: North | 20051108 | Link | ||||
| Ismail Khalilov | Ismail Khalilov | Chechnya | Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia | 20060120 | Link | ||||
| Ismail Khan | Ismail Khan | Ikhwan-e-Muslimeen | Afghanistan | 20020919 | |||||
| Ismail Lufti | Ismail Lufti | Yala Islamic College | Southeast Asia | 20040516 | Link | ||||
| Ismail Lufti | Supreme Council of Global Jihad | Terror Networks | 20030813 | ||||||
| Ismail Lutfi | Ismail Lutfi | Yala Islamic College | Southeast Asia | 20040506 | Link | ||||
| Ismail Mohammed Amasi | Ismail Mohammed Amasi | Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine | Middle East | 20030803 | |||||
| Ismail Musa Muhammad Hamdan | Ismail Musa Muhammad Hamdan | Fatah Tanzim | Israel-Palestine | 20020410 | |||||
| Ismail S | Ismail S | al-Tawhid | Europe | 20030516 | |||||
| Ismail Sa-i | Ismail Sa-i | Thai insurgency | Southeast Asia | 20040629 | Link | ||||
| Ismail Salae | Ismail Salae | Thai insurgency | Southeast Asia | 20040629 | Link | ||||
| Ismail Sayyed Imam al-Sherif | Ismail Sayyed Imam al-Sherif | al-Qaeda in Europe | Africa: North | 20040319 | |||||
| Ismail Shalabi | Ismail Shalabi | al-Qaeda | Europe | 20051027 | Link | ||||
| Ismail Shalabi | al-Tawhid | Europe | 20051026 | Link | |||||
| Ismail Subeh | Ismail Subeh | al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade | Home Front: WoT | 20040424 | Link | ||||
| Ismail Yedayev | Ismail Yedayev | Chechnya | Caucasus | 20040629 | Link | ||||
| Ismail Zaheer | Ismail Zaheer | Hizbul Mujahideen | Afghanistan/South Asia | Kashmiri? | Big Shot | 20020203 | |||
| Regional commander, survived hit attempt by Lashkar e Taiba in intramural festivities. | |||||||||
| Ismail al-Masri | Ismail al-Masri | Hamas | Israel-Palestine-Jordan | 20060704 | Link | ||||
| Issa Mahmud Ismail Batat | Issa Mahmud Ismail Batat | Islamic Jihad | Israel-Palestine | 20040415 | Link | ||||
| Jamal Ismail | Jamal Ismail | Islamic Jihad | Middle East | 20021123 | |||||
| Jamal Ismail | Fatah | Middle East | 20021206 | ||||||
| Malik Ismail | Malik Ismail | Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal | India-Pakistan | 20030302 | |||||
| Maulana Ismail | Maulana Ismail | al-Qaeda | Terror Networks | 20060813 | Link | ||||
| Maulana Ismail | Clifton mosque | Terror Networks | 20060813 | Link | |||||
| Maulana Muhammad Ismail | Maulana Muhammad Ismail | Baqiautush Shuhada | India-Pakistan | 20040112 | |||||
| Mohammed Ismail | Mohammed Ismail | Libyan Islamic Fighting Group | Africa North | 20060209 | Link | ||||
| Mohammed Ismail Agha | Mohammed Ismail Agha | Taliban | Afghanistan | 20040208 | |||||
| Moulvi Ismail Hossain | Moulvi Ismail Hossain | Jagrata Muslim Janata | Afghanistan/South Asia | 20050922 | Link | ||||
| Mukhtarpasha Ismailov | Mukhtarpasha Ismailov | Chechnya | Caucasus | 20030513 | |||||
| Nasser Ismail Zaki Aman | Nasser Ismail Zaki Aman | Fatah | Israel-Palestine | 20020527 | |||||
| Othman Ismail Dalimi | Othman Ismail Dalimi | al-Qaeda in Iraq | Israel-Palestine-Jordan | 20060315 | Link | ||||
| Ramzi Ahmad Ismail | Ramzi Ahmad Ismail | Islamic Front for the Liberation of Iraq | Iraq | 20060311 | Link | ||||
| Sheik Ismail Aal Ghadwan | Sheik Ismail Aal Ghadwan | Learned Elders of Islam | Middle East | 20031223 | |||||
| Sheikh Ismail Nawahda | Sheikh Ismail Nawahda | Learned Elders of Islam | Terror Networks | 20060228 | Link | ||||
| Sheikh Yehia Ismail Ahmad | Sheikh Yehia Ismail Ahmad | Learned Elders of Islam | Africa North | 20020110 | |||||
| Zainodin Ismail | Zainodin Ismail | Jemaah Islamiyah | Southeast Asia | 20040115 | |||||
| Zainon Ismail | Zainon Ismail | Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia | Southeast Asia | 20050820 | |||||
| Iraq | |
| Why Kata’ib Hezbollah backed away from confrontation over Jurf al-Sakhr | |
| 2026-11-21 | |
[Rudaw] After more than a decade of exercising near-exclusive control over Jurf al-Sakhr, Iran-aligned paramilitary group Kata’ib Hezbollah
In a statement on Thursday, Kata’ib Hezbollah Secretary-General Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi indicated that his group would seek to resolve its dispute with Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi through private channels, following days of escalating tensions and warnings that a government attempt to enter the area could trigger armed confrontation. "We affirm that the existing disagreements with the head of the authority will be addressed through private channels, denying our real enemies the opportunity to exploit them," Hamidawi said, without mentioning Zaidi by name. He also thanked Iraqi security forces and the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) for their positions during the confrontation, while instructing his fighters to resume their normal duties. The apparent de-escalation follows an agreement on Thursday under which Kata’ib Hezbollah fighters would move out of Jurf al-Sakhr, with a joint security force expected to deploy on Friday. However, some people cause happiness wherever they go; others whenever they go... the faction has not explicitly announced its withdrawal, and whether it will surrender effective control of the area remains uncertain. The confrontation represents more than a dispute over security arrangements in a town approximately 60 kilometers southwest of Baghdad. It is a test of whether Iraq's government can dismantle an entrenched armed faction's territorial and economic power without triggering conflict within the country's Shiite political establishment. Several developments suggest that Kata’ib Hezbollah is confronting a political and regional environment considerably less favorable than the one that allowed it to consolidate control after the Islamic State ...formerly ISIS or ISIL, depending on your preference. Before that they were al-Qaeda in Iraq, as shaped by Abu Musab Zarqawi. They're really very devout, committing every atrocity they can find in the Koran and inventing a few more. They fling Allaharound with every other sentence, but to hear western pols talk they're not reallyMoslems.... 's (ISIS) defeat in 2014. IRAN'S WEAKENED REGIONAL POSITION Perhaps the most significant change is the weakening of Iran, Kata’ib Hezbollah's principal foreign backer, following a series of military and geopolitical setbacks that have diminished Tehran's ability to protect its regional allies. The collapse of Bashir Pencilneckal-Assad Despoiler of Deraa... 's government in Syria in December 2024 deprived Iran ...a theocratic Shiite state divided among the Medes, the Persians, and the (Arab) Elamites. Formerly a fairly civilized nation ruled by a Shah, it became a victim of Islamic revolution in 1979. The nation is today noted for spontaneouslytaking over other countries' embassies, maintaining whorehouses run by clergymen, involvement in international drug trafficking, and financing sock puppet militiasto extend the regime's influence. The word Iranis a cognate form of Aryan.The abbreviation IRGCis the same idea as Stürmabteilung (or SA).The term Supreme Guideis a the modern version form of either Duceor Führeror maybe both. They hate of a crucial regional ally and disrupted the land corridor through which Tehran had supplied Leb ...The Lebs have the curious habit of periodically murdering their heads of state or prime ministers...'s Hezbollah. Israel's military campaign against Hezbollah further weakened an important component of Iran's regional network. The 12-day war with Israel in June 2025 inflicted further damage on Iran's military capabilities and leadership. The US-Israeli war launched on February 28 dealt another severe blow, killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ...the very aged actual dictator of Iran, successor to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini...> and senior military commanders while damaging critical Iranian military infrastructure. The consequences have become increasingly apparent in Lebanon. In September, Iran warned Washington against an Israeli operation targeting Hezbollah's fortified positions on the strategic Ali al-Taher ridge in southern Lebanon. Israel subsequently announced that it had destroyed Hezbollah's underground infrastructure there, illustrating the limits of Tehran's ability to deter military action against its allies. These developments do not mean Iran has lost its ability to influence Iraqi politics or support armed factions. However, some people cause happiness wherever they go; others whenever they go... they suggest that Tehran faces far greater constraints on its ability to intervene militarily on behalf of an ally confronting the Iraqi government. Iran's response to the Jurf al-Sakhr crisis appears to have been diplomatic rather than military. Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani met Zaidi on Monday, according to two senior Iraqi officials who spoke to Rudaw, attempting to persuade the premier to accept a negotiated settlement. Kata’ib Hezbollah subsequently confirmed that Hamidawi had met Qaani, Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Ameri, and PMF Chairman Falih al-Fayyadh, describing the discussions as positive. The mediation illustrates that Tehran retains considerable political leverage in Iraq, even as its capacity and willingness to protect allies through direct military intervention appear increasingly constrained. OIL SMUGGLING AND THE BATTLE FOR PUBLIC LEGITIMACY The second factor is the government's use of alleged corruption to challenge Kata’ib Hezbollah's control over Jurf al-Sakhr. Beginning November 9, several Iraqi media outlets published details of a leaked intelligence report alleging that oil had been siphoned from pipelines crossing the town since 2021. Subsequent reporting detailed suspected concealed storage facilities, unauthorized oil-processing operations and tanker movements. The allegations emerged as Iraq struggled with severe financial pressures caused by disruptions to oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz. At a time when the government has faced difficulties financing expenditure and public-sector salaries, allegations involving the theft of valuable oil resources carry particular political weight. The revelations also transformed the confrontation from an argument over the legitimacy of armed resistance into one involving the alleged misuse of public resources. Zaidi subsequently ordered a high-level investigation, dismissed nine security and administrative officials, and referred suspected violations to the judiciary. Kata’ib Hezbollah denied the allegations. No, no! Certainly not! and accused the government of manufacturing the controversy to force it to surrender its weapons. However, some people cause happiness wherever they go; others whenever they go... the sustained media coverage and official investigations have made the allegations difficult to dismiss through denials or displays of military strength alone. The campaign has provided Zaidi with a potentially powerful source of domestic legitimacy: presenting his confrontation with Kata’ib Hezbollah as an effort to protect public money and enforce the law rather than a political attack on the resistance. GROWING ISOLATION AMONG FORMER ALLIES Kata’ib Hezbollah has also found itself increasingly isolated from armed factions that previously shared its opposition to restrictions on independent military activity. Rudaw reported earlier that figures affiliated with factions such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq, led by Qais al-Khazali, and the former Kata’ib Imam Ali have backed efforts to bring weapons under state control. These factions have increasingly pursued political influence through government institutions, parliamentary representation and state security structures, making confrontation with the government less attractive than integration into the system. Kata’ib Hezbollah, by contrast, has maintained an independent military command and a regional ideological commitment to Iran's Axis of Resistance®, despite having formations within the officially recognized PMF. The divide does not mean other armed factions have fully relinquished their weapons or severed their informal command structures. Nor does it mean Kata’ib Hezbollah has lost every ally. But the political consensus that once enabled armed factions to resist government measures collectively appears to have weakened. Even within the ruling Shiite Coordination Framework, influential figures have sought a negotiated replacement of forces in Jurf al-Sakhr rather than support an armed confrontation with Zaidi. The calculations extend beyond the town itself. A regional war involving Kata’ib Hezbollah could expose Iraq to military retaliation, sanctions and further economic damage, threatening the interests of Shiite parties that now hold significant positions within the state. A DECLINING SECURITY JUSTIFICATION Another factor is the weakening of the security argument traditionally used to justify Jurf al-Sakhr's closure. Kata’ib Hezbollah and other PMF figures have long maintained that retaining control of the town is necessary to protect Baghdad, Babil and the Shiite holy cities of Karbala and Najaf from krazed killer attacks. However, some people cause happiness wherever they go; others whenever they go... ISIS no longer possesses the territorial capabilities it demonstrated in 2014, while Iraqi security forces have become increasingly capable of confronting its remaining cells. The US-led coalition's withdrawal from Iraq on September 30 further reinforced the government's argument that Iraqi forces can assume primary responsibility for national security. Although ISIS remains a threat, its diminished capabilities raise questions about the continued exclusion of Jurf al-Sakhr's predominantly Sunni residents, many of whom have been displaced for more than a decade. The government has now pledged to facilitate their return, potentially undermining another important justification for the faction's exclusive control. US BACKING AND BAGHDAD'S CHANGING CALCULATIONS Zaidi's political position is also strengthened by Washington's support for efforts to restrict weapons to state authority. The Trump administration demonstrated its willingness to exert economic pressure on Iraq earlier this year when it opposed former premier Nouri al-Maliki's return to power, warning of consequences for Baghdad's relationship with Washington. The US retains significant financial leverage through Iraq's access to dollar revenues generated by oil exports, a vulnerability that has influenced the calculations of Iraqi political parties. On Wednesday, a US State Department spokesperson told Rudaw that Washington expected Zaidi to hold Iran-aligned factions accountable for actions undermining Iraq's illusory sovereignty and economy. Whereas it does not establish that Washington would militarily intervene if festivities erupted, it does strengthen Zaidi's diplomatic position while raising the potential cost to political actors seeking to obstruct his campaign. Yet, the emerging agreement also exposes the limits of the government's success. A WITHDRAWAL, BUT NOT NECESSARILY A DEFEAT Under the approved security plan, the federal police will assume responsibility for central Jurf al-Sakhr, while an army brigade and two PMF brigades will secure surrounding areas. Energy police will guard oil pipelines, and a new joint command began operating early Friday. The arrangement allows Kata’ib Hezbollah to avoid a potentially costly confrontation while permitting Baghdad to demonstrate that its orders are being implemented. Importantly, it does not require the faction to disarm entirely or dissolve its broader military network. This may be the decisive additional explanation for Kata’ib Hezbollah's apparent retreat: a negotiated redeployment offers the faction a way to preserve much of its military and political power while surrendering a territory that has become increasingly difficult to defend politically. For Zaidi, the arrangement offers a significant opening. But the true measure of success will not be the arrival of government troops alone; it will be whether Baghdad gains effective command over the area, prevents further illicit economic activity, restores civilian administration and allows displaced residents to return. Kata’ib Hezbollah's apparent retreat may therefore mark an important change in the balance of power between Iraq's government and its armed factions. Whether it represents a lasting restoration of state authority or another negotiated accommodation remains to be seen. Related: Kata’ib Hezbollah: 2026-11-19 US expects Iraq’s PM to hold Iran-aligned militias accountable: Official Kata’ib Hezbollah: 2026-10-02 Iran-aligned groups demand end to Iraq’s US financial dependency before disarmament: MP Kata’ib Hezbollah: 2026-08-30 Iraqi armed group sets 10 conditions for giving up weapons Related: Jurf al-Sakhr: 2026-11-20 Baghdad’s standoff with Kata’ib Hezbollah an ‘extraordinary moment’ for Iraqi sovereignty: Former US diplomat Jurf al-Sakhr: 2026-11-19 US expects Iraq’s PM to hold Iran-aligned militias accountable: Official Jurf al-Sakhr: 2026-11-12 Kataib Hezbollah increasingly isolated as former allies back Iraqi PM's disarmament drive | |
| Link |
| Britain | |
| Hamas in Britain: How alleged terror operatives made the UK their home | |
| 2026-11-19 | |
| [Jpost] The Jerusalem Post investigated multiple individuals, their connections to Hamas, and their immigration status, revealing a history of alleged Hamas activity in Britain that stretches back decades. On November 13, 2026, it was revealed that Mohammed al-Fatah, the former bodyguard of assassinated Hamas ..the braying voice of Islamic Resistance®,...leader Ismail Haniyeh ...became Prime Minister of Gaza after the legislative elections of 2006 which Hamas won. President Mahmoud Abbas dismissed Haniyeh from office on 14 June 2007 at the height of the Fatah-Hamas festivities, but Haniyeh did not acknowledge the decree and continued as the PM of Gazoo while Abbas maintained a separate PM in the West Bank. Zapped during the 2023-24 war, to eveyone's satisfaction... , was granted British asylum and citizenship. The news came to light after a British court convicted al-Fatah of unlawfully wounding a bailiff, possessing knives, and criminal damage. Al-Fatah is far from the only individual with alleged or documented ties to Hamas who has made Britannia home. The Jerusalem Post investigated multiple individuals, their connections to Hamas, and their immigration status, revealing a history of alleged Hamas activity in Britannia that stretches back decades. MOHAMMED AL-FATAH Mohammed al-Fatah, 40, also known as Mohammed Naim, is the son of senior Hamas official Bassem Naim. Al-Fatah was convicted last Friday at Birmingham Crown Court in the UK of wounding an enforcement officer and causing criminal damage. At the time of the attack, a British counterterrorism unit was already surveilling al-Fatah. He had previously been arrested and released on bail on suspicion of an offense related to supporting Hamas. Al-Fatah is also wanted in Germany on suspicion of playing a central role in the foiled Hamas ploy to carry out terrorist attacks against Israelis and Jews in Europa ...the land mass occupying the space between the English Channel and the Urals, also known as Moslem Lebensraum... around the second anniversary of the October 7 attack. Born in Germany, al-Fatah was raised in the Gazoo ...Hellhole adjunct to Israel and Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, inhabited by Gazooks. The place was acquired in the wake of the 1967 War and then presented to Paleostinian control in 2006 by Ariel Sharon, who had entered his dotage. It is currently ruled with a rusty iron fist by Hamas with about the living conditions you'd expect. It periodically attacks the Hated Zionist Entity whenever Iran needs a ruckus created or the hard boyz get bored, getting thumped by the IDF in return. The ruling turbans then wave the bloody shirt and holler loudly about oppressionand disproportionate response... Strip. He arrived in the UK in 2014, was granted political asylum in 2015, and finally became a British citizen in 2020. Al-Fatah was partially named in a separate indictment in Germany issued in September. Referred to in German court documents as "Mohammed A.," he is said to have played a prominent role in the Hamas network and had connections to the organization’s leadership. One of the most serious allegations is that al-Fatah had prerecorded a video claiming responsibility on behalf of Hamas for the planned attack that was eventually thwarted. Despite this, the UK judge instructed jurors to consider al-Fatah a person of previous good character because he had no prior criminal convictions in Britannia. He is said to have been living in Birmingham with his wife and children. MUHAMMAD QASSEM SAWALHA Another known Hamas member who lives in the UK is Muhammad Qassem Sawalha (also known as Abu Obada). According to a 2019 Israeli government report, Sawalha, born in 1961 in Tubas, served as a senior Hamas military official in the West Bank in the late 1980s, around the time of Hamas’ founding. Sawalha then fled the West Bank to Jordan using forged identity documents in October 1990, continuing on to Britannia, where he has lived since. Despite leaving the region, Sawalha continued to be active in Hamas. An August 20, 2004 US Department of Justice federal indictment named Sawalha as a coconspirator in a case involving Hamas financing and terrorist operations. According to the filing, Sawalha met senior Hamas figures Muhammad Salah and Mousa Abu Marzook in August 1992 to discuss reviving terrorist operations in the West Bank, identifying operatives who could participate in the effort. In January 1993, Sawalha allegedly met Salah in London and instructed him to provide funds to Hamas members in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. According to an Israeli intelligence report, Sawalha continued to be active in Hamas for at least the next two decades, serving as a member of Hamas’s Political Bureau between 2013 and 2017 while in London. During this time, he participated in two delegations of senior Hamas officials to Moscow (September 2017 and July 2019). While in the UK, Sawalha founded the Moslem Association of Britannia and later the British Moslem Initiative. He was also a key figure in planning the MV Mavi Marmara flotilla in 2010, and in 2013, Israel’s defense minister designated him as a Hamas member. In 2013, the Sunday Times ran a front-page investigation revealing that Sawalha lived in north London, had obtained British citizenship, and had purchased a former council property in Colindale at a substantial discount. According to the Sunday Times, Barnet Council gave the father of four a £112,300 discount on the £320,700 home, despite being informed in 2020 by the UK Lawyers for Israel campaign group about his ties to a proscribed terror organization. ZAHER BIRAWI Just a few miles away from Sawalha’s London residence, another alleged Hamas operative can be found: Zaher Birawi. Barnet resident Birawi has been active in Paleostinian political and advocacy organizations in Britannia, including the Paleostine Forum in Britannia and initiatives organizing flotillas to Gaza. Israeli government publications identify him as a Hamas-linked activist based in Britannia, for which he is designated. In October 2023, Labour MP Christian Wakeford named Birawi in Parliament as an alleged Hamas operative living in north London. Birawi was also officially sanctioned by the US in January 2026 due to his role in assisting and supporting a group with ties to Hamas. Both Birawi and the organization he founded, now serving as its general secretary — the Popular Conference for Paleostinians Abroad (PCPA) — are designated by the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). OFAC sanctioned the PCPA for being owned, directed by, or having acted on behalf of Hamas. Birawi himself was sanctioned for supporting the PCPA. On November 19, 2021, Birawi told Hamas’s al-Aqsa TV that "Paleostine has the right to resist Zionist occupation" and "Hamas is the largest Paleostinian political party that won the elections. Britannia will soon be forced to apologize for its decision against Hamas." It is important to note that Birawi himself has rejected allegations that he is a Hamas operative, and has referred to parliamentary accusations as baseless. Despite residing in London, the Post could not confirm whether Birawi holds British citizenship or was granted refugee status. MOSAB ABDULKARIM AL-GASSAS Another recent case is that of Mosab Abdulkarim al-Gassas, also known as Abu Wadee or Abu Wadei. Abu Wadei entered the media spotlight in March 2025 when footage emerged of him arriving in Kent, UK, on a migrant boat. This followed several unsuccessful asylum applications in Greece, Germany, and Belgium. He was born in Khan Yunis and has pictures and videos on social media showing him posing with AK-47s and throwing pipe bombs. He is believed to have been a member of Gaza’s tire-burning units. Abu Wadei pleaded guilty to trying to enter the UK on a small boat without leave or valid entry clearance, and was imprisoned for nine-months. However, there's no worse danger than telling a mother her baby is ugly... in October 2026, it was reported that Abu Wadei was living in a taxpayer-funded asylum accommodation on Corby’s Lloyds estate with three other According to British media outlets, the Home Office is seeking to deport him but has struggled to do so because of the government’s asylum policy which restricts returning individuals to active conflict zones. Wadei was recorded telling the Northamptonshire Telegraph he no longer supported Hamas. "That was back when I lived in Gaza under Hamas rule," he said. "Everyone knows that Hamas is a terrorist organization that would kill us if we didn’t speak against the Jews while living there." The Post could not establish whether he was a formal Hamas member. MAJED KHALIL MOUSSA AL-ZEER One highly documented case involves British-Jordanian citizen Majed Khalil Moussa al-Zeer, often referred to as "Hamas’s official representative in Germany." Al-Zeer was born on December 8, 1962, near Bethlehem. According to the Amit Terrorism and Intelligence Research Institute, al-Zeer is a British citizen who moved to Germany in 2014. He previously headed the London-based Paleostinian Return Centre — considered an important Hamas arm in Europe. On October 7, 2024 (the same day as the Birawi designation), the US Treasury sanctioned al-Zeer, citing his involvement in the PCPA. "The PCPA operates at Hamas’s behest," it said. "Al-Zeer, who served as the chairman and president of the PCPA, as well as other senior positions, plays a central role in Hamas’s fundraising efforts in Europe and was the senior Hamas representative in Germany." Al-Zeer was also previously documented with former Hamas Political Bureau head Haniyeh and claimed that the October 7, 2023, attack and massacre had been in "self-defense." While the official US sanctions record documents a British passport issued in November 2022, it does not establish when or how citizenship was acquired by al-Zeer. PALESTINE FORUM IN BRITAIN'S ZIAD EL ALOUL AND ADNAN HMIDAN The Paleostinian Forum in Britannia (PFB) is a UK-based organization that has faced scrutiny regarding its ties to Hamas and the Moslem Brüderbund, as discussed previously in relation to Birawi. Two of its prominent members have been linked to Hamas. The first is Ziad El Aloul, a former PFB chairman, whom Wakeford named alongside Sawalha, Birawi, and al-Zeer as a Brit with Hamas links. Adnan Hmidan has held senior positions in the PFB and has been associated with the UK-based al-Arab media outlet. A Jerusalem Post investigation published earlier this year identified him as the founder of the Red Ribbons campaign, which advocates for Paleostinian security prisoners. Britannia’s Independent Press Standards Organization found sufficient evidence for The Telegraph to describe Hmidan as pro-Hamas. In July 2026, Hmidan was among five people specifically named in a House of Lords question about potential financial sanctions against individuals residing in or operating from Britannia who were allegedly linked to Hamas. ESSAM YUSUF MUSTAFA, ALSO KNOWN AS ESSAM MUSTAFA A more disputed case involves Essam Yusuf Mustafa, also known as Essam Mustafa, a former prominent figure in Interpal, a British charity that US authorities designated in 2003 over alleged Hamas financing. In addition to serving as one of Interpal’s founding trustees, Mustafa was formerly the secretary-general of the Union of Good. On November 12, 2008, the US Treasury Department designated the Union of Good as a terrorist financing organization, accusing it of channeling money to Hamas. The statement specifically identified the Union of Good’s secretary-general, who was also vice chairman of the UK-based charity Interpal, as a member of Hamas’s executive committee under Khaled Mashaal as of mid-2007. It did not name that official, but contemporary sources identified Mustafa as the person holding those positions. Mustafa has denied ever serving on Hamas’s executive committee or holding any other position in the organization. He is understood to live in Britannia. AZZAM AL-TAMIMI Another prominent Hamas supporter living openly in Britannia is Paleostinian-born academic Dr. Azzam al-Tamimi, who has previously acknowledged advising the terrorist organization and maintaining close ties with its leadership.
"I am someone who is closely associated with the movement. I don’t have an official capacity, but I help as much as I can within the limits of the law," he told the Post at the time. He also said the workshops had involved Hamas leaders and experts discussing proposed charter changes in Beirut and Damascus. Al-Tamimi, who has been identified as a Brit and founded the London-based al-Hiwar television channel, has denied being a Hamas member. In December 2008, the Israeli embassy called him Hamas’s de facto representative in London. His activities have attracted scrutiny in Britannia since at least 2003, when then-Labour MP Louise Ellman accused him in Parliament of maintaining connections to the organization, allegations he disputed. In 2007, he published a book called Hamas: A History from Within. Much of the book is based on interviews with Hamas leaders or on participant observation among the movement’s "rank and file," according to the publisher. Al-Tamimi was also described in the press as "close enough to Hamas to have been able to choose such a title for his book confidently." WHAT BRITISH LAW SAYS Britannia originally proscribed only Hamas’s military wing in 2001. In November 2021, the government extended the prohibition to the whole organization, including its political wing. However, there's no worse danger than telling a mother her baby is ugly... membership in a terrorist organization and eligibility for refugee protection are not mutually exclusive under the law; Official UK asylum guidance states that membership in a terrorist group does not automatically establish exclusion from refugee status. Interestingly, British politicians have repeatedly warned of alleged Hamas operatives in the country. Labour MP Christian Wakeford raised the cases of Muhammad Sawalha and Zaher Birawi in the House of Commons in October 2023. Wakeford then raised the issue a month later, adding Majed al-Zeer and Ziad El Aloul, asking what the Home Office planned to do regarding alleged Hamas operatives living openly in Britannia. He in fact used his parliamentary privilege to name Birawi as one of four "senior Hamas operatives" active in Britannia. The issue of Hamas operatives in England, especially those with British passports, has also been posed to the House of Lords (October 2024) and the government (in December 2025 and January 2026). More recently, in July 2026, Baroness Deech asked whether the Treasury had considered sanctions against five named people: Birawi, Sawalha, El Aloul, al-Zeer and Hmidan. The government replied that it would not disclose ongoing or potential sanctions investigations. The concerns, therefore, are not new; Friday's al-Fatah case has simply brought the topic back into focus, particularly how individuals with ties to Hamas have been able to establish lives in Britannia, and in some cases obtain British citizenship. The cases raise a more troubling question: How thoroughly does Britannia investigate an applicant’s past before granting asylum or citizenship, and what happens when individuals with alleged terrorist ties obtain a British passport that allows them to travel more freely across Europe? Related: Azzam al-Tamimi 07/19/2018 The BBC exposes Qatar Azzam al-Tamimi 02/12/2006 UK Muslim rallies weren't exactly made up of moderates Related: Tamimi 11/09/2026 14 ‘anti-Israel’ activists arrested in West Bank during Palestinian olive harvest to be deported Tamimi 11/05/2026 Sbarro bombing terrorist Ahlam Tamimi served with US lawsuit via X Tamimi 09/02/2026 Reality check: It’s like the IDF are not that evil | |
| Link |
| Africa Horn |
| Somalia Targets Al-Shabaab Leadership in Twin Operations in Hiraan Region |
| 2026-11-18 |
Two al-Shabaab ... the personification of Somali state failure...members were killed, and three commanders were seriously maimed in two operations in Somalia's Hiraan region, the Somali National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) said Tuesday. One of those killed was a commander identified as Ismaaciil, who was the al-Qaeda-affiliated terror group al-Shabaab’s finance chief for the Aboorey area in the region. NISA said that the strikes hit the Moqokori district and the Kheyraanle—Butaale area in operations conducted with support from international security partners. It said vehicles and weapons were destroyed during operations in South-central province. "In the area between the villages of Kheyraanle and Butaale, Ismail, head of Khawarij finance for the Aboorey area, was killed, along with Makaraan, who was the driver of the group's leader in Maxaas district," according to the spy agency. Khawarij is a term the Somali government uses to describe the al-Shabaab terror group. In the second air raid, a house where the group’s leaders were staying in Moqokori town was targeted, wounding two terror commanders Al-Shabaab has waged an insurgency against the Somali government for more than 16 years, frequently targeting security forces, government officials and civilians. The army, backed by the African Union ...a union consisting of 53 African states, most run by dictators of one flavor or another. The only all-African state not in the AU is Morocco. Established in 2002, the AU is the successor to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which was even less successful... Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) and other international partners, has intensified operations against the group since July. The UN Security Council renewed AUSSOM's mandate for another year in December, adopting a UK-backed resolution extending its authorization until Dec. 31. |
| Link |
| Israel-Palestine-Jordan |
| Gaza: The strike on Nasser Hospital targeted hospital room and floor used by Hamas as HQ |
| 2026-11-17 |
Translated Text: Among those killed at Nasser Hospital who were presented as innocent civilians were terrorists from the Hamas terrorist organization: one of them took part in the abduction of Adina Moshe during the October 7 massacre. ⭕️The strike carried out on Nasser Hospital on Thursday targeted a room and a floor in the hospital building that were used as a military headquarters for Hamas. Senior commanders of the organization’s military wing were present on the floor and conducted military activities from there, as happens in other hospitals in the Gaza Strip. Civilians are also barred from entering this floor, which is under heavy guard. ⭕️While Hamas rushed to present those killed in the strike on Nasser Hospital as innocent civilians, the Israel Defense Forces and the Shin Bet now reveal that the strike eliminated terrorists from the military wing of the Hamas terrorist organization, including: 🔻Murad Tawfiq Mahmoud Abu Zarifa - a team leader in an engineering cell who stormed into the territory of the State of Israel during the October 7 massacre and took part in the abduction of Adina Moshe. 🔻Khaled Osama Abu Anza - head of the communications department in the military intelligence operations division. 🔻Mohammed Nafez Abu Awad - an elite terrorist in the Khan Younis Brigade. ⭕️Before carrying out the strike, the IDF issued warnings on several occasions, including recently, and demanded that military activity inside the hospital stop. Despite these warnings, military activity in the hospital did not stop. ⭕️The IDF operates in accordance with international law and carried out the strike only after the hospital continued to be used for military purposes despite the warnings. Related: Nasser Hospital: 2026-11-16 Israel is killing Hamas's next generation of commanders - can it break the cycle? Nasser Hospital: 2026-11-16 Israel kills top Hamas commander who had plans to ‘carry out terror attacks' Nasser Hospital: 2026-11-13 IDF directed by the Shin Bet, attacked the terrorist Muhammad Abu Ismail and other terrorists in Nasser Hospital in Khan Yuni |
| Link |
| Israel-Palestine-Jordan |
| Israel is killing Hamas's next generation of commanders - can it break the cycle? |
| 2026-11-16 |
If it doesn’t at least they’ll be dead, reducing the scum in the gene pool. After 10/7 Israel is considerably less interested in having someone to negotiate with than in ensuring the Hamas leadership doesn’t get the chance to become competent and get bright ideas. [Jpost] By targeting replacement commanders soon after their appointments, Israel may seek to prevent Hamas's ability to re-establish its command and control.The IDF’s elimination of Hamas ..one of the armed feet of the Moslem Brüderbund millipede,...Rafah Brigade commander Samir Mahmoud Hassan Abu Younis overnight from Saturday to Sunday illustrates an emerging pattern in Israel’s operations in Gazoo ...Hellhole adjunct to Israel and Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, inhabited by Gazooks. The place was acquired in the wake of the 1967 War and then presented to Paleostinian control in 2006 by Ariel Sharon, who had entered his dotage. It is currently ruled with a rusty iron fist by Hamas with about the living conditions you'd expect. It periodically attacks the Hated Zionist Entity whenever Iran needs a ruckus created or the hard boyz get bored, getting thumped by the IDF in return. The ruling turbans then wave the bloody shirt and holler loudly about oppressionand disproportionate response... The Israeli military is systematically targeting Hamas commanders who have recently been appointed to replace senior officers killed earlier in the war. Will this prevent Hamas from rebuilding its forces? If the tactic is not paired with a strategy to permanently remove Hamas, will this merely be another iteration of what the IDF has done in the past? The IDF and Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) reported on Sunday that they eliminated Abu Younis in a strike in the southern Gaza Strip. "Samir Abu Younis served as the commander of the Rafah Brigade for only approximately two months, following the elimination of the brigade’s previous commander, Nael Abu Obeid, on September 15," the IDF said. The Israeli military said that Abu Younis had previously served as deputy commander of the Rafah Brigade and commander of the Tel al-Sultan Battalion. He was not a new figure within Hamas’s military hierarchy. He was an experienced officer promoted to replace commanders who had been eliminated. It’s surprising he survived this long since most Hamas battalion and company commanders have been eliminated in the last three years of war. According to the IDF, Abu Younis had directed attacks against Israeli civilians and soldiers and sought to rebuild the brigade’s capabilities after its losses in the Israel-Hamas War. Purportedly, he joined Hamas’ Izzadin al-Qassam Brigades in 1991 and was involved in planning and overseeing the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel. In yet another example of the cycle of Gaza fighting. Abu Younis’ targeting follows a series of strikes against commanders of Hamas’s two southern Gaza brigades. On November 12, the IDF targeted Muhammad Abu Ismail, identified by the military as the commander of Hamas’s Khan Yunis Brigade, in a strike at the Nasser Hospital complex in Khan Yunis. On September 11, the IDF announced that it had eliminated Muhammad Yazouri, who had previously commanded the same brigade. The IDF has cleared Khan Yunis of Hamas several times in the war, beginning in early 2024. It also had cleared Nasser Hospital. Each time, the area was handed back to Hamas control. Even though the IDF today controls around 65% of Gaza, Hamas is still in control of the rest and of the lives of two million civilians. The Rafah Brigade has experienced turnover similar to that of Khan Yunis. Rafah was conquered by the IDF in the spring and summer of 2024. It was then partially razed. The IDF took over most of Rafah again in March and April 2025. Hamas returned to some areas and had to be cleared out again. Even after the ceasefire in October 2025, some Hamas members remained underground in a tunnel complex. Abu Obeid, eliminated in September, had replaced Muhammad Shabana, killed in an Israeli strike on May 13, 2025, alongside senior Hamas leader Mohammed Sinwar. The succession of commanders illustrates the difficulty Hamas faces in keeping these men alive in their roles, only to see even their replacements killed. IDF STRIKES HAMAS COMMANDERS ACROSS ENTIRE MILITARY STRUCTURE Historically, Hamas’s military wing was organized into five regional brigades: North Gaza, Gaza City, Central Gaza, Khan Yunis, and Rafah. These included battalions and smaller units responsible for operations in their respective areas. During more than three years of war, the IDF has targeted commanders throughout this structure, from brigade leaders to battalion and company commanders. Israel has also sought to dismantle command centers, tunnel networks, weapons production facilities, and other military infrastructure. However, you can observe a lot just by watching... the elimination of a commander does not necessarily mean the elimination of a military formation. Hamas can appoint replacements, transfer surviving officers between units, and attempt to rebuild its command networks. This is particularly important in southern Gaza. Israel controls Rafah, yet Hamas continues to appoint commanders to its Rafah Brigade. These commanders may be operating from other parts of Gaza, such as Khan Yunis. The latest strike shows the difference between controlling territory and preventing a terrorist army from regenerating. By targeting replacement commanders soon after their appointments, Israel may seek to prevent Hamas’s ability to re-establish its command and control. However, you can observe a lot just by watching... so far Hamas has not collapsed and continues to hold on as it has in earlier rounds of war in previous decades. Experienced Hamas members are being targeted, though. How deep is Hamas's bench of commanders? This approach by Israel creates a dilemma for Hamas. The gunnies must continue appointing commanders to maintain a semblance of military command, but each new appointment potentially exposes another senior officer to being killed. The IDF said that Abu Younis had been working to restore the brigade’s force buildup, indicating that efforts to rebuild Hamas’s capabilities remained a problem. The military also said it had taken precautions to reduce civilian casualties during the strike, including through the use of precision weapons and aerial surveillance. IDF CAMPAIGN AGAINST HAMAS LEADERSHIP ENTERS NEW PHASE The broader significance of these operations is that Israel appears determined to prevent Hamas from reconstituting its military command even after major combat operations have subsided. The repeated targeting of replacement commanders in Rafah and Khan Yunis suggests that the campaign against Hamas’s leadership has entered a new phase. Most Hamas fighters and commanders alive on October 7, 2023, have been killed. In July 2024, the IDF reported that it had eliminated six brigade commanders, more than 20 battalion commanders, and approximately 150 company commanders in Gaza since the beginning of the Israel-Hamas War. In October 2025, the IDF reported that the 99th Division alone had eliminated five battalion commanders and nine company commanders along with their deputies during four months of operations in northern Gaza. The IDF also confirmed that Shabana, the Rafah Brigade commander, was killed alongside Sinwar and South Khan Yunis Battalion commander Mahdi Quara on May 13, 2025. Israel has spent years seeking to erode Hamas’s command structure, and the latest operations are a continuing effort to prevent its regeneration. The terrorist group, meanwhile, continues to recruit, as well as to appoint new commanders. As time elapses, Hamas will rebuild, as it has in the past. It remains to be seen whether killing replacement Hamas commanders, and then their replacements, will have a strategic effect. |
| Link |
| Israel-Palestine-Jordan |
| Israel kills top Hamas commander who had plans to ‘carry out terror attacks' |
| 2026-11-16 |
More about this story from yesterday, with photos. [NYPost] A top Hamas commander with plans “to advance and carry out terror attacks” was killed by Israeli forces on Sunday – only two months after replacing his predecessor, military officials said. Samir Mahmoud Hassan Abu Younis, who had allegedly directed attacks against Israeli civilians and soldiers, was killed in an early morning airstrike in southern Gaza, the IDF said. Hamas officials confirmed in a statement that Abu Younis died in the strike and that a funeral would be held for him later Sunday. Abu Younis was a longtime member of Hamas’ military hierarchy, joining the Izzadin al-Qassam Brigades in 1991, the IDF told the Jerusalem Post. Israeli officials said that Abu Younis also had a hand in planning and overseeing the Oct. 7 attack that killed over 1,000 Israeli citizens and soldiers. Officials said that other Hamas militants were targeted in the Sunday night strike, but provided no further details. Last month, two Hamas commanders, including one involved in holding three Israeli hostages during the ongoing Israeli-Hamas war were killed. Israeli military officials said that Muhammad Yazji, a Hamas commander in the Shati Battalion, was killed in an airstrike in Gaza City on Oct. 5. The IDF said that Yazji had been involved in holding Emily Damari, Romi Gonen and Matan Angrest hostage for over a year. Hamas commander targeted at Nasser Hospital loses leg, suffers severe head injury [Jpost] Muhammad Abu Ismail, commander of Hamas's Khan Yunis Brigade, suffered a severe head injury and had his leg amputated after surviving an Israeli targeted strike at Nasser Hospital in the southern Gaza Strip on Thursday, according to Israeli sources. The strike against Abu Ismail was part of a series of operations targeting senior Hamas commanders in southern Gaza, with another targeted strike carried out overnight between Saturday and Sunday. Security officials said the operation was the fifth attempt to eliminate a Hamas brigade commander in the past two months, as part of a systematic effort to dismantle the senior chain of command of Hamas's military wing. The list includes the elimination of Ahmed Ghandour, commander of Hamas's northern Gaza Brigade, and two strikes targeting commanders of the Khan Yunis Brigade. The first resulted in the elimination of Rafa'a Salameh, while the second critically wounded his successor. Two additional targeted strikes were carried out against commanders of Hamas's Rafah Brigade: Nael Abu Obeid, who was killed on September 15, and Samir Abu Younis, who was targeted overnight between Saturday and Sunday. Related: Muhammad Abu Ismail 11/13/2026 IDF directed by the Shin Bet, attacked the terrorist Muhammad Abu Ismail and other terrorists in Nasser Hospital in Khan Yuni Muhammad Abu Ismail 11/12/2026 IDF strikes Hamas terrorists planning attacks from Khan Yunis's Nasser Hospital |
| Link |
| India-Pakistan |
| Major among 4 troops martyred, 24 terrorists killed during operations in KP and Balochistan: ISPR |
| 2026-11-15 |
| [Dawn] Four troops, including a major, were martyred while 24 bad boyz were potted in multiple intelligence-based operations (IBOs) in Balochistan ...the Pak province bordering Kandahar and Uruzgun provinces in Afghanistan and Sistan Baluchistan in Iran. Its native Baloch propulation is being displaced by Pashtuns and Punjabis and they aren't happy about it... and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa’s North Wazoo, the military’s media wing said on Saturday. In a statement, Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) said that since Nov 13, armed forces have been conducting multiple IBOs "around Kolpur, Kardagap and Nushki, including area domination and patrolling of the Quetta-Taftan National Highway (N-40) to keep it secure for local traffic and sustain operations". On the night of Nov 13/14 in Kolpur, security forces "successfully neutralised eight Indian-sponsored …a snide group label for the Baloch liberation groups… including a jacket wallah, and recovered a large cache of weapons and ammunition", ISPR said.The state has designated Balochistan-based terrorist groups as Fitna al-Hindustan to highlight India’s alleged role in terrorism and destabilisation across Pakistain. It added that on Nov 14, FAH "This cowardly act has not shaken the resolve of the security forces. The tempo of operations will be maintained and IBOs will continue with the same vigour to secure the local population and eliminate the menace of terrorism," ISPR affirmed. It added that clearance operations in these areas will continue "until the threat is completely neutralised". It further said: "Backed by India and other hostile intelligence agencies, FAH is actively trying to use drones and other technical means, including IEDs (improvised bombs), to target innocent civilians and security forces, so as to undermine the efforts of the government and security forces to maintain peace and normality in the area." Accusing India of providing ISPR affirmed that the "relentless counterterrorism campaign under vision ’Azm-e- Istehkam’, as approved by the Federal Apex Committee on the National Action Plan, will continue at full pace". The military’s media wing warned that security forces and law enforcement agencies "will continue at full pace to wipe out the menace of foreign-sponsored and supported terrorism from the country". In an earlier statement, ISPR said two soldiers were martyred and 16 bad boyz were potted as security forces continued a series of IBOs in North Waziristan. According to the military’s media wing, multiple khwarij locations were engaged in the general areas of Mir Ali, Datta Khel and surrounding areas in North Waziristan. "Following fierce fire exchanges, in last twelve hours, 12 khwarij, including two Afghan nationals belonging to Indian-sponsored Fitna al Khwarij were sent to hell in Ali Khel, while two khwarij each were neutralised in Mir Ali and Datta Khel, thereby causing a significant blow to the khwarijs’ network operating in the area," ISPR said. Fitna al Khawarij is a term used by the state for ...the Pashtun equivalent of men...Pakistain (TTP). ISPR said that during the operations, 43-year-old Havildar Asmat Ali and 32-year-old Naik Aftab Ali embraced martyrdom. "Weapons and ammunition were also recovered from the killed Indian-sponsored khwarij, who remained actively involved in numerous terrorist activities, including the killing of innocent civilians," it said. The statement said that sanitisation operations would continue to eliminate "remaining holed-up khwarij from these areas", adding that the counterterrorism campaign would continue at full pace to wipe out the menace of foreign-sponsored terrorism from the country. Police foil attack on checkpost in KP's Bannu, eliminate four terrorists [Dawn] Police foiled a terrorist attack on Kingar Pul Police Checkpost in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Bannu district on Friday night, eliminating four terrorists in retaliation, a police spokesperson said. According to the police spokesperson, heavily armed terrorists launched a sudden attack on the checkpost last night. “However, police personnel deployed at the checkpost responded promptly and successfully repelled the assault,” he stated. Following the incident, the Rapid Response Force (RRF) and additional police personnel were rushed from Police Lines to the scene. They cordoned off the area and launched a clearance and search operation, the spokesperson added. “During the operation, the bodies of four terrorists were recovered,” he added. The spokesperson said that police also seized four Kalashnikov rifles, several magazines, a substantial quantity of ammunition, hand grenades and bandoliers, adding that the identification of the slain terrorists was underway. Related: Kolpur: 2025-06-07 Two Indian-sponsored terrorists killed in Balochistan''s Kachhi district: ISPR Kolpur: 2025-03-13 Pakistan accuses India of Jaffar Express deadly terrorist attack Kolpur: 2024-05-17 Iranian oil smuggling into Pakistan exposes official terrorist-ties Related: Balochistan: 2026-11-13 3 terrorists killed, 2 civilians dead as attack on Mastung post repelled: state media Balochistan: 2026-11-10 Security forces neutralise terrorists’ hideouts in North Waziristan’s Mir Ali: ISPR Balochistan: 2026-11-09 Bomb Disposal Squad official martyred as IED goes off in KP's South Waziristan Related: North Waziristan: 2026-11-13 3 terrorists killed, 2 civilians dead as attack on Mastung post repelled: state media North Waziristan: 2026-11-10 Security forces neutralise terrorists’ hideouts in North Waziristan’s Mir Ali: ISPR North Waziristan: 2026-10-26 6 terrorists killed, 2 soldiers martyred during Dera Ismail Khan IBO: ISPR |
| Link |
| Syria-Lebanon-Iran |
| Iran's fuel rationing system reaches breaking point with hours-long lines, protests on eve of ‘Bloody November' |
| 2026-11-15 |
[NY Post] Motorists across Iran were trapped in grueling hours-long lines at gas stations and taxi drivers took to the streets in protest Saturday, as the state’s fuel rationing system reached a breaking point — hours before the infamous anniversary of "Bloody November."In one video shared on Telegram, drivers at a gas station in the southern city of Kazeroun are heard shouting in anger about the fuel shortages. "To the officials: don’t mess with Kazeroun. This city has shown many times that it does not remain silent in the face of neglect and ignoring the demands of the people," one Iranian Telegram account commented Saturday. "These days, long queues at gas stations in Kazeroun have become one of the main concerns of the people." In other videos, lines of cars can be seen stretching for miles in southern Iranian cities that include Kazeroun, Bandar Abbas, Evaz and Lordegan. In Ardabil in the north, footage shows taxi drivers parking their cars in protest, leaving passengers stranded as they refuse to pick them up. Sunday marks seven years since Iran was rocked by "Bloody November." Just after midnight on Nov. 15, 2019, Iran announced a dramatic price hike — from 10,000 to 15,000 rials per liter for the first 60 liters of gas a month, then 30,000 rials after that — an increase of 50% and 300%, respectively, overnight. Within hours, nationwide protests sparked, with Iranians blocking highways with their cars, burning banks and tearing down images of then Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. After a day of unrest, the iron-fisted Ayatollah told senior commanders to "do whatever it takes to end it," resulting in one of the deadliest crackdowns in the Islamic Republic’s hardline history. An estimated 1,500 Iranians were slaughtered over the course of less than two weeks. Fearing a possible repeat, the government has avoided another price hike since, instead rationing gasoline to 160 liters a month per vehicle. But a collapsing economy, due to Washington’s crippling sanctions, government corruption and now the US blockade on the Strait of Hormuz, has deeply worsened shortages and put tensions inside Iran on the brink. Until last month, Iranians could fill up with a gas station’s own "emergency card" after they ran out of their monthly ration, at a higher price of 100,000 rials. That accounted for nearly half the gasoline sold across the country. But since Nov. 1, the regime has taken away emergency cards in more than a third of Iran, with plans to strip the rest within weeks. A state official even admitted this week, "we really have a supply problem" — in comments that have raised the ire of the government, Iran International reported. "All the gasoline the government has, it has given to the people," said Esmail Sagheb Esfahani, vice president of the State Energy Efficiency Agency. "Nothing has been held back to supply more." |
| Link |
| Britain |
| Haniyeh's ex-bodyguard convicted of knife attack in UK, wanted in Germany over Hamas terror plot |
| 2026-11-14 |
| [Jpost] Mohammed Al-Fatah, son of senior Hamas official Bassem Naim, was convicted in Britain while facing German allegations of plotting terrorist attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets. Mohammed Al-Fatah, 40, the son of senior Hamas ..the braying voice of Islamic Resistance®,...official Bassem Naim and a former bodyguard of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh ...became Prime Minister of Gaza after the legislative elections of 2006 which Hamas won. President Mahmoud Abbas dismissed Haniyeh from office on 14 June 2007 at the height of the Fatah-Hamas festivities, but Haniyeh did not acknowledge the decree and continued as the PM of Gazoo while Abbas maintained a separate PM in the West Bank. Zapped during the 2023-24 war, to eveyone's satisfaction... , according to media reports, was convicted on Friday at Birmingham Crown Court in the UK of wounding an enforcement officer with a bladed weapon, possessing two knives, and causing criminal damage. Al-Fatah is also wanted in Germany on suspicion of playing a central role in a Hamas plot to carry out terrorist attacks against Israelis and Jews in Europa ...the land mass occupying the space between the English Channel and the Urals, also known as Moslem Lebensraum... around the second anniversary of the October 7 attack. Also known as Mohammed Naim, Al-Fatah was born in Germany and raised in the Gaza Strip. He arrived in the UK in 2014, was granted political asylum in 2015, and became a British citizen in 2020. He was born in Germany. Why did he get asylum in England instead of Germany? British media reports have identified him as a former member of Haniyeh's security detail. His identity was protected by a court-imposed reporting restriction throughout the trial, but the order was lifted on Friday following his conviction.The incident occurred on October 14, 2025, when enforcement officer Kevin Becknall arrived at al-Fatah's home in Birmingham's Kings Heath neighborhood to collect more than £2,250 in unpaid parking fines incurred by his wife. "Do you know who I am?!?" FORMER HAMAS OFFICIAL ARRESTED IN UK FOR KNIFE ATTACK A confrontation broke out inside the house, after which al-Fatah went outside armed with two large kitchen knives and half a brick. Footage shown in court captured him chasing Becknall's vehicle, swinging the knives toward the window, and smashing the glass. Becknall suffered a head injury, with blood running down his neck and back, and required hospital treatment. Al-Fatah argued that he had acted in self-defense, citing traumatic experiences in Gaza and Egypt. He told the court that he had been shot twice in the past and had learned of his brother's death in Gaza the day before the incident. A psychiatrist who testified during the trial said al-Fatah suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder. The jury rejected his self-defense claim and convicted him by a majority of 10 to two. However, death is not the end. There remains the litigation over the estate... he was acquitted of the more serious charge of wounding with intent. Judge George Lubega ordered him to remain in jug and scheduled his sentencing for January 11, 2027. GERMAN PROSECUTORS ACCUSE AL-FATAH OF CENTRAL ROLE IN HAMAS TERROR PLOT Al-Fatah is also implicated in a separate, more serious terrorism case in Germany. In an official statement issued in September, announcing charges against seven other suspects, German federal prosecutors alleged that al-Fatah, identified in German court documents as "Mohammed A.," had played a particularly prominent role in the Hamas network and had connections to the organization's leadership. According to prosecutors, al-Fatah met twice in Berlin with another member of the network during the summer of 2025 and received five handguns and ammunition. He then transported the weapons to Austria, where he stored them in Vienna as part of preparations for attacks targeting Israeli representatives, Jews, and people associated with Israel in Germany and Austria. An investigation published by the Austrian newspaper Der Standard on October 1, 2026, based on materials from the German investigation, identified two potential targets in Vienna: the Jewish Museum and the Austrian-Israeli Society. German prosecutors said that by the time members of the network were arrested on October 1, 2025, the group had accumulated an automatic rifle, 13 functioning handguns, and more than 700 rounds of ammunition. One of the most serious allegations was that al-Fatah had recorded a video in advance claiming responsibility on behalf of Hamas for the planned attack, even before it had taken place. According to reports in Germany and Britannia, he appeared in the recording wearing a mask. Britannia's The Guardian reported that the plot was foiled after Israel's Mosssd ...sees all, knows all, gets 'em all in the end... provided intelligence to German security services. Al-Fatah was arrested in the UK in November 2025 under a German arrest warrant. He is now expected to face extradition proceedings to Germany after serving whatever sentence is imposed on him in Britannia. BRITISH JURY UNAWARE OF ALLEGED HAMAS CONNECTIONS One of the most unusual aspects of the Birmingham trial was that jurors were never told about al-Fatah's suspected Hamas connections, his alleged position within the organization, or the German prosecution's allegations that he had helped plan terrorist attacks against Jews. The judge also instructed jurors to consider al-Fatah a person of previous good character because he had no prior criminal convictions in Britannia. However, a lie repeated often enough remains a lie... at the time of the attack, al-Fatah was already under surveillance by a British counterterrorism unit. He had previously been arrested and released on bail on suspicion of an offense related to supporting Hamas. That investigation was later closed without charges being filed. The case has also raised questions in Britannia about how al-Fatah was granted political asylum and subsequently obtained British citizenship. According to The Times, the British Home Office is reviewing his naturalization file to determine whether he provided false information or concealed relevant details during the application process. In response to the case, the Home Office said there was no place in British society for those who resort to violence or seek to facilitate terrorist attacks against innocent people. It also emphasized that Hamas is a proscribed terrorist organization in the UK and that the government condemns anyone who chooses to support its activities or further its objectives. Related: Bassem Naim 08/02/2026 Board of Peace says Hamas to start disarming in coming days; IDF hits Gaza arms depots Bassem Naim 05/14/2026 US thought Iran war would hasten Gaza’s demilitarization. Instead, Hamas is emboldened Bassem Naim 05/14/2026 Board of Peace envoy: Hamas tightening its grip on Gaza, taxing those with nothing left Related: Mohammed A 11/05/2026 IDF's pursuit of Deif distracted from warning signs Hamas was planning October 7 attack Mohammed A 11/05/2026 Iraqi CTS arrests ‘high-value’ militant suspect in disputed Kirkuk Mohammed A 10/29/2026 College students fire back after Democratic Sen. Slotkin vows to target young conservative staffers |
| Link |
| India-Pakistan |
| Under fire |
| 2026-11-14 |
| [Dawn] THE bloodshed continues unabated. On Wednesday, at least 12 coppers were martyred in the line of duty in KP. Ten lives were lost in an ambush in Kohat while a police party was returning from a clearance operation, and two more were martyred in Swabi when a police patrol came under fire. Separately, an explosive-laden pickup slammed into the main gate of a cop shoppe in Dera Ismail Khan ... the Pearl of Pashtunistan ... , but the attack was promptly repelled. Thankfully, no police casualties were reported in the latter incident. Still, a dozen lives lost in a single day and at least a dozen more injured and hospitalised is a heavy toll for a provincial police force engaged in a relentless, fierce fight against gunnies threatening the state’s writ every day. The Kohat ambush, in particular, appears to have been a major security incident. By police accounts, a team that conducted a joint operation with the civil administration against illegal gold mining in the Darbukach area was returning after completing its objectives when it was ambushed by what appears to have been a very large group. At least 18 attackers were killed as the police fought back. Official data shows that police fatalities and injuries in the first half of this year alone had doubled from the year before. The number of attacks, on the other hand, had risen by 34pc. The data suggests that attacks on police have become increasingly deadly, and, coupled with shortfalls in personnel, arms and necessary equipment, the KP police are increasingly vulnerable as they play a frontline role in ongoing operations against terrorists. Though October saw a marked improvement in the number of attacks compared to just a month earlier, the three incidents on Wednesday underline how fragile those gains can be if the police are not strengthened while the state has the upper hand. After the centre took control of the province, it bears full responsibility for the police’s protection. The new administration appointed to oversee KP’s affairs must immediately ensure that the provincial security forces receive all the funds they have requested and fill vacant posts on an urgent basis. It must ensure armoured vehicles, protective equipment, night-vision devices and better weapons are supplied to frontline personnel, and that intelligence and army backup are available during police operations in high-risk areas. Related: Kohat: 2026-11-02 Pakistan responds to unprovoked firing from Afghan posts along border in Lower South Waziristan: DC Kohat: 2026-10-31 Cop martyred in KP's Bajaur as terrorists attack police post: official Kohat: 2026-10-31 Pakistan Army destroys Afghan Taliban posts in response to firing at Angoor Adda: state media Related: Swabi : 2026-02-28 Unmanned aerial vehicles banned countrywide amid escalating tensions with Afghanistan Swabi : 2024-09-29 Three policemen injured in Bajaur blast Swabi : 2024-09-27 One dead, 18 wounded in blast at Swabi police station Related: Dera Ismail Khan: 2026-10-31 Cop martyred in KP's Bajaur as terrorists attack police post: official Dera Ismail Khan: 2026-10-26 6 terrorists killed, 2 soldiers martyred during Dera Ismail Khan IBO: ISPR Dera Ismail Khan: 2026-10-07 Security forces kill 13 terrorists in North Waziristan IBO: state media |
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| Israel-Palestine-Jordan | |
| IDF directed by the Shin Bet, attacked the terrorist Muhammad Abu Ismail and other terrorists in Nasser Hospital in Khan Yuni | |
| 2026-11-13 | |
Translated Text: In a targeted strike overnight, the Air Force, directed by the Shin Bet, attacked the terrorist Muhammad Abu Ismail, who served as commander of the Khan Yunis Brigade, and other terrorists who were hiding in Nasser Hospital in Khan Yunis in the southern Gaza Strip. In his role, Muhammad Abu Ismail was responsible for managing the brigade’s terrorists’ activities and directing them to plan and carry out terrorist plots against IDF forces and Israeli civilians. He was also responsible for holding many hostages captive throughout the war. The terrorists were attacked to eliminate the threat after they had turned the compound at Nasser Hospital into a headquarters and used it to advance dozens of terrorist plots against our forces and rebuild the brigade’s capabilities after it had suffered severe damage throughout the war. Before the strike, advance warnings were issued to the population, and precision munitions and aerial surveillance were used to minimize the risk of harming civilians. IDF warned parties at hospitals in the Gaza Strip against continuing to use them for terrorist purposes
Translated Text: The IDF warned parties at hospitals in the Gaza Strip over the past few days against continuing to use them for terrorist purposes ⭕️Following the strike carried out last night on Nasser Hospital, the IDF reveals that over the past few days, officers from the Gaza Coordination and Liaison Directorate of the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories made warning calls to parties at hospitals and within the healthcare system in the Gaza Strip. During these calls, they explained that terrorist organizations continue to use hospitals and medical centers to carry out terrorist activities against IDF forces and the State of Israel. ⭕️As part of these calls, the IDF demanded an immediate halt to any military or terrorist activity from within hospitals, in their vicinity, or through the exploitation of medical infrastructure. It explained that if these activities were not stopped, the IDF would be forced to take action to eliminate the threats they pose. ⭕️The message is clear: the terrorist Hamas movement continues to exploit hospitals and civilian infrastructure in the Gaza Strip for terrorist purposes, repeatedly endangering civilians and patients and compromising facilities that are supposed to be used for medical purposes. More The terrorist Abu Ismail is currently a key figure in managing and commanding the Khan Younis Brigade
Translated Text: Holding hostages and using the hospital as a terrorist command center: The Khan Younis Brigade commander who was targeted was involved in holding hostages captive in Hamas’s terrorist organization during the war, including inside the hospital where he was targeted. ⭕️The terrorist Abu Ismail is currently a key figure in managing and commanding the Khan Younis Brigade, particularly following the elimination of the brigade’s commander, Muhammad al-Yazouri, in early September. ⭕️Like other hospitals in the Gaza Strip, Hamas’s terrorist organization uses Nasser Hospital in Khan Younis. For example, the hospital’s second floor is used as a military command center for Hamas. Civilians are barred from entering, and it is under heavy guard because it is used by the organization’s leaders, including Muhammad Abu Ismail. Throughout the war, dozens of hostages were held inside Nasser Hospital, many of them from Kibbutz Nahal Oz, including women, children, elderly people, and foreign nationals. ⭕️Abu Ismail was also responsible for holding many hostages captive in Hamas’s terrorist organization throughout the war, including Nimrod Cohen, Matan Zangauker, Idan Alexander, Avera Mengistu, Colonel Asaf Hamami, may God have mercy on him, First Sergeant Oz Daniel, and Captain Omer Neutra, may God have mercy on him. ⭕️In addition to Abu Ismail, other terrorists who were inside the building in the hospital complex were targeted, including Murad Tawfiq Mahmoud Abu Zarifa, a team leader in the engineering section of the combat and administrative support company, and Khaled Osama Abu Anza, head of the communications section in the operations department at Hamas’s terrorist organization’s intelligence headquarters. ⭕️The terrorists were attacked from the air to remove the threat after they turned the Nasser Hospital complex into a command center and used it to advance dozens of terrorist plots against our forces and rebuild the military strength of the brigade, which had suffered a severe blow throughout the war. ⭕️Before the strike was carried out, steps were taken to minimize, as much as possible, the likelihood of damage to the hospital building and harm to uninvolved people. The strike was also carried out in a focused manner, targeting the room from which the brigade commander and the terrorists conducted their military activities. ⭕️In addition, before the strike was carried out, the IDF repeated its warnings and demands to stop military activity inside the hospital on several occasions, including recently. Despite these warnings, military activity in the hospital did not stop. ⭕️The IDF operates in accordance with international law, targets only military objectives, and respects the special protection afforded to medical institutions and personnel, without targeting them as such. Security forces are deployed in the area in accordance with the agreement and will continue working to remove any threat. | |
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| Israel-Palestine-Jordan | |
| IDF strikes Hamas terrorists planning attacks from Khan Yunis's Nasser Hospital | |
| 2026-11-12 | |
| [Jpost] The IDF said Hamas used Nasser Hospital to store weapons, operate command centers, and plan attacks against Israel before the strike targeted the terror cell. The IDF and Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) struck a Hamas ..a regional Iranian catspaw,...terror cell, including a "senior Hamas terrorist," planning to advance terror attacks from within Nasser Hospital in Khan Yunis, the military confirmed on Thursday. A military source told Maariv that the "senior" terrorist who was targeted in the strike was the terror group's Khan Yunis Brigade commander. The ... KABOOM!... occurred at the southern Gazoo ...Hellhole adjunct to Israel and Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, inhabited by Gazooks. The place was acquired in the wake of the 1967 War and then presented to Paleostinian control in 2006 by Ariel Sharon, who had entered his dotage. It is currently ruled with a rusty iron fist by Hamas with about the living conditions you'd expect. It periodically attacks the Hated Zionist Entity whenever Iran needs a ruckus created or the hard boyz get bored, getting thumped by the IDF in return. The ruling turbans then wave the bloody shirt and holler loudly about oppressionand disproportionate response... Strip hospital during the night between Wednesday and Thursday, the military stated. Hamas-linked Gazook media reports claim that six people were killed in the strike. The IDF has not yet announced a specific number of casualties. The strike also came after Hamas murderous Moslems "had established a presence within the hospital complex and used it as a command center for military and terrorist activities against IDF troops and the State of Israel," the military added. Such terror activity constitutes a blatant violation of international law and a cynical exploitation of civilian infrastructure," the military said, noting several examples of this. These included "storing weapons within the hospital complex, conducting interrogations and torture by Hamas's internal security and intelligence services within the hospital complex, operating command-and-control rooms within the hospital complex, using hospital facilities as observation posts and shelters for terrorists," and more, the military said.
The airstrike reportedly killed several and wounded dozens of others, including hospital officials. Late Thursday, the IDF noted that at least two other senior Hamas officials were killed in the same strike, one in combat engineering and one in operations communications. It was unclear whether Abu Ismail had survived or not, but there was initially wide speculation over the issue since the IDF did not issue any announcement for around half a day after initial Gazan reports about the attack. IDF sources whom The Jerusalem Post communicated with did not clarify if the assassination might have been successful, but said that the IDF is conservative about battle damage assessments until it receives all Related: Nasser Hospital: 2026-08-23 IDF says Hamas tunnel commander and Oct. 7 hostage-holder killed in Gaza strikes Nasser Hospital: 2026-08-21 Hamas using Gaza hospital for ‘torture’ of Palestinians amid eroding support, says Israel Nasser Hospital: 2026-08-14 ‘Just like before Oct. 7’: Gaza border surveillance troops say they’re seeing terror activity | |
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