Warning: Undefined array key "rbname" in /data/rantburg.com/www/pgrecentorg.php on line 14
Hello !
Recent Appearances... Rantburg
Ziaul Haq Ziaul Haq Lashkar-e-Jhangvi India-Pakistan 20031108  

India-Pakistan
Opposition’s rigging allegation: Arrests as activists besiege police station
2015-12-11
SAHIWAL: Nineteen losing candidates of the second phase of local elections and their 300 supporters on Wednesday dared police to arrest them after marching on the city police station to protest registration of a case.

Having lost elections for the slots of chairman, vice chairman and councillor, they had arranged a gathering at Jogi Chowk on Sunday last to protest what they said rigging. Police registered a case against 22 losing candidates of the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf, the Jamaat-i-Islami and some independents and their supporters under 16 MPO.

As the protesters besieged the police station, officials arrested the 19 candidates and detained them in lock-up. They refused to arrest 300 supporters on the plea that such an arrest could be made only after identification through videos.

City police station SHO Masood Ahmed is the complainant in the FIR and interestingly he was not present at the time of arrests.

These candidates blamed the PML-N district leadership, Punjab Minster for Ushr and Zakat Malik Nadeem Kamran, MPA Malik Arshad and MNA Pir Imran Shah for political victimisation through police action.

Sheikh Ijaz, president of Tahaffuz-i-Sahiwal Forum, told the media that “we have been politically victimised for questioning rigging in urban union councils of Sahiwal city.”

DSP Ziaul Haq, along with a heavy contingent of police and Elite Force, remained alert at the police station and had to resort to baton-charge of the crowd to disperse it. Police registered case against nine of the protesters and the DSP said more cases would be instituted if they refused to disperse.

It merits mention that the returning officer of Union Council 6 has already written to the DRO that two bags of rejected votes had been misplaced at polling stations 64 and 69. Shafqat and Sheikh Ijaz contested election in the UC as independent candidates and they both challenged incomplete consolidation of final results by RO Khalid Khan on Nov 23.

The Lahore High Court’s Multan Bench has already asked the Election Commission of Pakistan to stop the gazette notification of UC 6 chairman result which was won by Haji Latif of the PML-N with one vote.

Sarmad Shafqat alleged that the RO consolidated results without counting 85 votes misplaced in two polling stations.

Meanwhile, the opposition parties condemned police action and the Bar Council and different wings of the Anjuman-i-Tajran announced protest.

Published in Dawn, December 10th, 2015
Link


India-Pakistan
Glass half full
2015-08-09
[Dawn] By far the biggest threat we have faced is that of violent extremism. And while the highly successful ongoing military operation has defanged most of the militant networks in Fata, the poisonous ideology that gave birth to them continues to circulate unchecked in our classrooms, mosques, madressahs and the media. Despite the resolve expressed in the National Action Plan, little has been done to crack down on the purveyors of a violent extremist ideology.

Other long-term reforms remain largely ignored. Our public educational and health systems have virtually collapsed. The population continues to grow at an unsustainable rate. Our shortfall in energy generation is hobbling industrial growth. The violent insurgency in Balo­chis­tan, and the state's ruthless attem­pts to quell it, go on claiming innocent lives. And sadly, Sindh is still controlled and strangulated by a cynical, venal PPP leadership.

As you can see, I'm back in my doom-and-gloom mode. But if we are to indeed put Pakistan on track towards peace and prosperity, some serious decisions need to be taken, and a consensus evolved. And while the military has taken the lead in the anti-terror campaign, it obviously cannot deliver on the economic and social fronts.

One problem in reforming the madressah system as well as our school curricula, where deemed problematic, is that such a step would lead to an immediate confrontation with our clerics and religious parties. Over time, their street power has increased, even if their representation in our assemblies has not. Musharraf, at the height of his power, backed down when it came to reforming the madressahs.

So how to evolve a consensus on this divisive issue? In a country that has been tending to move towards fundamentalism since Ziaul Haq, no politician wants to take on our clergy. With the space for rational debate shrinking rapidly, we seem stuck in our trajectory.
Link


India-Pakistan
Nawaz Sharif was destined to be eclipsed by the army chief
2015-07-24
[DAWN] A year or so ago, those in Lahore who didn’t approve of the Sharif brothers’ rule had in a majority of cases placed their bets on Imran Khan. The skipper has since been dropped in favour of a more forthcoming and more empowered Gen Raheel Sharif. Any further developments in which Mr Khan is seen to be blocked – such as a judicial commission report that does not favour his cause – is going to add to Gen Sharif’s appeal as the only likely change-maker.

The general’s rise has been swift. For a brief period after the dharna in Islamabad was called off, it seemed to some that the old PML-N alliance with the army had been restored. That the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) had failed to get from the military the relief it was looking for brought back the old grand theories about Mian Nawaz Sharif’s ‘natural’ bonding with the military, established meticulously over time under the tutelage of Gen Ziaul Haq.

The PML-N government was thought to have left the worst behind it and was certified to not be threatened with any imminent danger. But considering how much history and common sense was invested in the theory, the moment passed all too quickly. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was destined to be eclipsed by the army chief.

The old theory was replaced by new ones, many of which sought not to unduly disturb the visible sensitive balance with the military the Sharif government had managed to ‘restore’. The agreement was that Gen Sharif was a rival of Prime Minister Sharif’s choosing in public gallery. With a quick recall of his past it was decided that PML-N leaders were once again willing to live by an illusion of power while the real authority rested elsewhere — so long as it kept Mr Khan at bay. Thus the most talked about of the explanations was that which projected the prime minster as a satisfied junior partner to Gen Sharif.
Link


India-Pakistan
Gullu Butt: An Auto-smashing-biography
2014-06-21
[DAWN] Nadeem F. Paracha in classic form. Some pieces shouldn't just be read, they should be memorized. Just a sample or two:
Jatt and his wife moved to Lahore in 1975 and earned a meagre living by selling old spare-parts of the cars and bikes that Jatt would smash and dismantle just for the heck of it. Jatt's antics in this regard got him arrested and he was sentenced to 10 years hard labour in a Lahore jail.

Meanwhile, Nuri Nutt gave birth to their first child whom she named Gullu Butt (Rosy Butt- cheeks). Two years later Jatt was paroled and gained an early release from jail, thanks to the government of General Ziaul Haq who had taken over power in July 1977. The Zia regime considered Jatt to be a political prisoner, arrested by the fallen ZA Bhutto regime.

Meanwhile, Jatt had acquired some basic education in jail and re-discovered faith. After he was released in 2001, he first set-up a madrassah in Lahore (which was a huge spiritual, ideological and commercial success), and then joined a TV news channel as an anchor and talk-show host.

Jeera rose to become an ASI in the police (only because his tummy was the biggest the precent) and Nutt went nuts, now claiming she was Madam Noor Jehan. She was recruited by PTI trolls.

Gullu continued to smash cars (still just for the heck of it), but from 2005 onward he tried to give a semblance of meaning to his art by smashing cars and bikes during anti-US/India/Rwanda rallies and during protests against Pakistan's gazillion enemies - especially Godzilla nurtured by famous Zionist scientist, Amrish Puri.

But, alas, this great artiste's luck finally ran out when in June 2014, while he was in the process of smashing his 5,000th car (to set a new Shahbaz Sharif-backed Guinness World Record), some jealous folks claimed that he was one of the instigators of violence against the supporters of Canadian Moose-breeder, Tahir-ul-Kennedy.

Gullu was arrested and booked for injuring a Toyota car and then he was himself injured when he was attacked by a group of lawyers who were otherwise famous for showering rose petals on heroic killers.

Gullu's fan-club, 'Gullu Kay Pathey', at once initiated a powerful campaign on Twitter against Gullu's arrest with such hashtags: #JusticeForGullu; #WeAreAllGulluToday; #ButtHe'sInnocent; and #JustinBieberForPresident.
Link


Bangladesh
Ansarullah led by 5, Son-in-law of JMB chief one of them
2013-09-01
[Bangla Daily Star] Led by five persons, the newly emerged krazed killer group Ansaruallah Bangla Team follows the ideals and policies of international terrorist outfits such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Pakistain-based Tehrik-e-Taliban, revealed detectives.

Among the five, its spiritual leader Jasimuddin Rahmani was tossed in the calaboose
Don't shoot, coppers! I'm comin' out!
on August 15.

During interrogation, Jasim disclosed the names of Izaz Hossain, son-in-law of Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) chief Saidur Rahman, and Major (sacked) Ziaul Haq, one of the conspirators of the foiled coup plot in 2012, a source in the Detective Branch (DB) of police told The Daily Star.

Saidur is now behind bars and Ziaul has been absconding.

The DB source, however, refused to name the two other leaders of Ansaruallah for the sake of investigation. At times, the two were even more influential than Jasim.

Monirul Islam, joint commissioner DB of Dhaka Metropolitan Police, yesterday said Izaz, who controls the web activities of the krazed killer group from Pakistain, had come to Dhaka a month ago.

"Staying for an hour at his residence in Mohammadpur, Izaz had contacted his three brothers," he added.

Izaz runs a computer business with his brothers. The DB on August 25 arrested one of his brothers Naimul Hasan, a suspected member of Ansarullah.

According to a previous DB blurb, Izaz, as the ameer of Jamaat ul Moslemeen, Bangladesh, about a decade ago used to preach the doctrine of Jihad if "establishing Deen [Islamic Sharia based law] was not possible in a non-violent way."

However,
women are made to be loved, not understood...
the organization became inactive when the leader of the international Jamaat ul Moslemeen, Jordan-born British citizen Sheikh Abu Isa Ali Arrifai Al Hashmi Al Koraisi alias Abu Isa, was arrested by British police in 2002. Later in 2008, Izaz escaped to Pakistain.

"A day after the last Eid-ul-Fitr, Jasimuddin Rahmani married the sister of two JMB members," said Monirul.

Regarding Major Ziaul, a source in the DB said he is the military commander of Ansarullah and helped the group develop its weapon and arms training manuals.

Despite being a resident of the cantonment area while in service, Ziaul used to offer his Juma prayers at Hatembagh mosque in the capital's Dhanmondi, where Jasim had been the Imam around 2008-2009.

The two came to know each other at that time, mentioned the DB source.

Jasim has connections with top leaders of Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami's (HuJI
Founded in 1984 by Fazlur Rehman Khalil and Qari Saifullah Aktar. The Bangla branch was established in 1992 with assistance from Osama bin Laden. Recruits come mostly from Deobandi madrassahs. HuJI and Fazlur Rehman Khalil are signators of bin Laden's declaration of war on the west.
) leaders, including Mufti Hannan and Maulana Abdur Rouf. Both leaders are now behind bars in the August 21 grenade attack cases, said Monirul.

Though Ansarullah does not have direct links to al-Qaeda, its top leaders had contacted several leaders of al-Qaeda at different times, noted the DB official.

For the affiliation of al-Qaeda, the krazed killer group is doing whatever is needed, he maintained.

Link


India-Pakistan
Save us from our 'saviours'
2012-07-05
[Dawn] "THE state is being run to the ground at the moment, and people are again running to the military to save the country. Should we save the country and do something unconstitutional, or uphold the constitution of the country and let the state go down?"

It is perhaps fortuitous that these deathless words were uttered last Saturday not by an incumbent general but by Pakistain's most recent coup-maker. It would have been more satisfying to say 'last' instead of 'most recent', but who can be entirely confident on that score?

Pervez Perv Musharraf
... former dictator of Pakistain, who was less dictatorial and corrupt than any Pak civilian government to date ...
was speaking at the Aspen Ideas Festival, where he also reiterated for the umpteenth time his resolve to return to the country whose fortunes he presided over for nearly a decade without a credible mandate.

His evident advocacy of a military takeover can hardly be expected to enhance his stature as a potential political player in a country that has declared him a proclaimed offender and asked Interpol to take him into custody.

That, too, is a political manoeuvre, and there's no evidence Interpol has taken it seriously. (It's perfectly possible the Swiss authorities would be equally dismissive of a missive from any given Pak prime minister.)

In Musharraf's quest for political intercession, his main problem is not the potential charges against him but the fact that the All-Pakistain Moslem League he founded a couple of years ago boasts little more than a disembodied head.

Musharraf's primary constituency -- certainly the only one that really mattered -- during his years in power was the army. The breakaway faction of the Pakistain Moslem League (PML-Q) that he nurtured disowned him long ago and now shares power (or at least office) with the PPP.

The retired general may not realise it, but his sporadic threats to return to Pakistain echo those of Benazir Bhutto
... 11th Prime Minister of Pakistain in two non-consecutive terms from 1988 until 1990 and 1993 until 1996. She was the daughter of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, founder of the Pakistain People's Party, who was murdered at the instigation of General Ayub Khan. She was murdered in her turn by person or persons unknown while campaigning in late 2007. Suspects include, to note just a few, Baitullah Mehsud, General Pervez Musharraf, the ISI, al-Qaeda in Pakistain, and her husband, Asif Ali Zardari, who shows remarkably little curiosity about who done her in...
-- who divided her time between London and Dubai, much as Musharraf does, and finally returned home only after he facilitated it under western pressure. With tragic consequences. And now there's a warrant out for him in connection with her liquidation.

Musharraf's chances of a political resurrection have anyhow been minimal, but his apparent support for a military should, in the public eye, completely disqualify him as a contender.

It may be entirely coincidental that Musharraf's wishful thinking about doing "something unconstitutional" to "save the country" came on the eve of the anniversary of Pakistain's darkest moment in this context: it was 35 years ago tomorrow that Gen Ziaul Haq violated the constitution by seizing power from an elected government. His stated intention, too, was to 'save the country'; he almost destroyed it instead. He certainly succeeded in ruining it for more than a generation.

The preponderance of faith-based initiatives, all too many of them wedded to violence, are but one of the Zia regime's odious legacies. It isn't one that Musharraf sought to reinforce, although the fact that Zia's undistinguished son was catapulted into the post of religious affairs minister suggests he felt obliged to appease some retrograde section of his military constituency. More generally, he was in many ways a considerably less unreasonable and more polished military dictator than his crude predecessor in the post.

His enlightenment did not, however, extend far enough for him to realise that there is really no scope for khaki-clad saviours in national politics.

It is true that varying proportions of the populace, including some political parties, have invariably greeted the advent of military rule with glee. Quite a few took Ayub Khan at his word when he declared he had assumed power, forestalling the first national elections, because the politicians were making a mess of things. One of his subsequent justifications for dictatorial rule was the novel claim that Pakistain's climate rendered it unsuitable for democracy.

Zia's 1977 coup followed months of rioting and state-sponsored retaliatory violence. It's pertinent to recall, though, that it came after the agitation had more or less petered out and an agreement had been reached in negotiations between Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
...9th PM of Pakistain from 1973 to 1977, and 4th President of Pakistain from 1971 to 1973. He was the founder of the Pakistain Peoples Party (PPP). His eldest daughter, Benazir Bhutto, would also serve as hereditary PM. In a coup led by General Zia-ul-Haq, Bhutto was removed from office and was executed in 1979 for authorizing the murder of a political opponent...
's government and the multi-party opposition. Zia initially acknowledged that the PPP would have won that year's elections even if there had been no rigging, and promised fresh polls within 90 days.

Less than two years later, Pakistain's first democratically elected prime minister had been consigned to his grave; the resurgence in his popularity following his overthrow had transmogrified him into a candidate for elimination.

Ironically, some of those who found cause for rejoicing in this profound travesty of justice today share common cause -- and power -- with those who rely on Z.A. Bhutto's 'martyrdom', as well as that of his elder daughter, as a source of political legitimacy.

Meanwhile,
...back at the wrecked scow, a single surviver held tightly to the smashed prow...
those who periodically paid tribute to Zia -- notably Mian Nawaz Sharif
... served two non-consecutive terms as prime minister, heads the Pakistain Moslem League (Nawaz). Noted for his spectacular corruption, the 1998 Pak nuclear test, border war with India, and for being tossed by General Musharraf...
and his cohorts -- seem to have suspended their public displays of devotion to the vilest of Pak tyrants.

Many of those who ought to have known better found cause for jubilation in Musharraf's 1999 cockpit coup. There were reasons aplenty to detest Nawaz Sharif's second government, but it ought to have been reasonably clear that the re-establishment of military rule was hardly likely to serve as a solution.

Much the same holds true today. The quality of governance is appalling, but elections are due within less than a year. It is perfectly possible that another incompetent administration will thereafter be sworn in. But what is the alternative? Pakistain's nearly 65 years of existence have been marred by around 33 years of military rule. Had that been a viable path to progress, it would have manifested itself as such long ago.

The democratic process, whatever its shortcomings -- and there are many -- at least holds out the prospect of meaningful change. That may seem like an audacious claim, given a narrow spectrum that stretches from Asif Ali Zardari to Imran Khan
... aka Taliban Khan, who ain't the sharpest bulb on the national tree...
, but there is at least the prospect of other forces arising in due course to challenge, and perhaps ultimately transform, the untenable status quo.

A sine qua non of a sustainable Pakistain is the military's relegation to the subservient role it plays in most democracies. Musharraf's contrary inclinations ought not to debar him from the political process; the lessons he refuses to learn may become unavoidable were he to end up with the lowest tally of votes in a proper electoral contest.
Link


India-Pakistan
Nuggets From The Urdu Press
2012-06-17
DR AQ Khan turns pro-Imran
Pakistain's father of the nuclear bomb Dr AQ Khan told Mashriq that Zardari was a PhD in politics but he should learn politics of reconciliation from Imran Khan. Nawaz Sharif learned nothing from his decade of exile and when he got ready to return to Pakistain he left his brains abroad. He said PPP, ANP, N-League and JUIF were all opportunists. He said he had not yet decided to join Imran Khan. (He later did?)

Taliban spent 2 crore on Bannu jailbreak
Daily Mashriq reported that the Taliban had admitted that they spent Rs 2 crore
According to this handy on-line converter, 2 crore equals US $0.359 million, or as we would say $359,000, which is a lot of money. Oops - my apologies, that was using Indian rupees. In Pakistani rupees it equals $213,000, which is somewhat less.
to bribe the bureaucratic chain of commend to effect the jailbreak that released 186 Islamic fascisti and criminals. They said that they were successful because of the support they got from the local population of Bannu. Maps of the jail building were provided to them.

AQ Khan on Nawaz Sharif's corruption
AQ Khan wrote in Jang that Nawaz Sharif
... served two non-consecutive terms as prime minister, heads the Pakistain Moslem League (Nawaz). Noted for his spectacular corruption, the 1998 Pak nuclear test, border war with India, and for being tossed by General Musharraf...
's yellow cabs scam cost the banks $500 million, of which he pocketed about $60 million. His Lahore/Islamabad Motorway scam was worth $160 million. He had got loans written off worth $140 million. He pocketed $60 million as refund for the export of sugar. He siphoned off $58 million in the purchase of wheat from the US and Canada. There may be many more such instances, he wrote, which have not been reported.

Imran Khan upbraids courts
Quoted in Mashriq Imran Khan
... aka Taliban Khan, who is the lightweight's lightweight...
said that he was not satisfied with the working of the Supreme Court and he felt that it had come under pressure. He said the people too were disappointed. He said if the government was made to stay in office a few months more Pakistain would be overtaken by a storm of high prices and unemployment. He said his party will change the fortunes of the country.
He works by the Poof Method, you know. He says, "Poof!" and it is so.
Loans of Foreign Minister's family
Daily Jinnah reported that the father in law of the foreign minister Mrs Khar, Arif Gulzar, husband Feroz Gulzar, and brother in law Asad Gulzar had cases of default against them which were taken on Galaxy Textile Mill but were written off.
I think I'm distantly related to the family, too: second cousins four times removed through my paternal great-aunt. Family lore says that's where we got our eyebrows.
What about your high cheekbones?
Those came from the other Indian continent...and in the end I couldn't get any money for having them, darn it. But the above story makes me hope for some profit from the eyebrows.
Siachen not disputed!
Daily Nawa-e-Waqt editorialised that Nawaz Sharif while in Gyari sector of Siachen where Pak troops were buried by an avalanche recommended that Pakistain should unilaterally come down from the 'disputed' glacier so that Pakistain could cut down on expenses and spend the money on the poor masses. But Nawaz Sharif should know that Siachen was not disputed but a part of Azad Kashmire which is inside Pakistain and that India had occupied it.
Allah recreates history at his whim as well as the entire universe, which is how we know the above is true.
AQ Khan on Zardari's corruption
Writing in Jang father of Pak nuclear bomb Dr AQ Khan stated that when Benazir became prime minister in late 1988 after the death of Gen Ziaul Haq, she immediately posted 26,000 hardcore PPP activists on important positions, including those in the nationalised banks. She and Zardari gouged bank loans and skimmed off Rs 410 million, with which they bought majority shares in three sugar mills. Zardari managed to receive Rs40 million through his crony, the fake doctor Usman Farooqi, managing director of Pakistain Steel Mills.

Nawaz Sharif stands firm on Siachen!
Daily Express quoted Nawaz Sharif as saying that despite criticism of his statement that Pak troops should withdraw from Siachen unilaterally he still believed that there would be no harm if Pakistain called down its troops without India first agreeing to withdraw simultaneously (pehlay fauj bulanay mein koi qabahat nahim).

Imran opposed to unilateral climb-down
Daily Express quoted Imran Khan as saying that Nawaz Sharif was wrong to advise that Pak troops should unilaterally climb down from Siachen heights. He said the solution lay in both India and Pakistain agreeing to recall their troops together.

Who will own eunuchs?
"Not I," said the duck.
Daily Express reported that khwaja sara (eunuch) community was at a loss to write their father's name on the ID card applications. Some did not know who their father was and had known only the guru whose property they also inherited by reason of being a part of the guru's household. The ID card for the khwaja sara persons had become a subject of disagreement.

General Aurakzai speaks out
Retired General Ali Jan Aurakzai told Nawa-e-Waqt that in his latest book he had recounted how he had arranged peace deals with the Taliban in 2002 which were violated under the influence of the Americans. Aurakzai was first corps commander then governor NWFP and was known for the peace deals he made in the Tribal Areas. He said he had told the story in his book. Once President Bush asked whether he was scared of Taliban killing him; to which Musharraf had replied that he himself belonged to the Tribal areas and was popular there. Aurakzai was given a bullet proof vehicle by Musharraf.

Hindu girls convert of free will?
No. What fun would that be?
Reported in Jinnah the Supreme Court let the Hindu girls who had converted to Islam and married Mohammedan boys walk away with their new partners after ascertaining from them their willingness. On the other hand the Hindu parents of the girls objected that their daughters were under pressure and could not express their real intent - which was to return to the parents. They said they would appeal once again to the Court to pay regard to the fact that the girls converted because of the tough lowly status of the Hindu community.
Of course there are good Pakistanis. But the Land of the Pure has chosen to embody every form of evil.
Haroon Rashid versus Nawaz Sharif
Writing in Jang Haroon Rasheed stated that Nawaz Sharif was wrong to say that Pakistain should unilaterally (pehel karo) withdraw its troops from the Siachen front. This would be like letting someone occupy a piece of one's property and then instead of ousting him get oneself ousted so that the trespasser should stay there permanently. Will Nawaz Sharif satisfy his party workers in Azad Kashmire on this position?

Col Safdar on Siachen
Columnist Hamid Mir wrote in Jang that the visit of Nawaz Sharif to Gyari post will do a lot of good in the Gilgit-Baltistan region whose 60 sons had been lost under the avalanche. He added that Nawaz Sharif's pilot Col Safdar once saved the life of a British climber but was served a show-cause notice for doing so against the rules; but after the BBC announced that Col Safdar was cited in the UK for bravery the show-cause notice was withdrawn and Tamgha-e-Shujaat given to him.

Haroon Rasheed versus Imran Khan
Prize winning columnist Haroon Rasheed wrote in Jang that Imran Khan was wrong in saying that contact of Pakistain with the people of Kashmire had weakened because the Kashmiris are now set on the road to seeking independence. This was a wrong position to take because Imran Khan cannot shape his strategy like this (khaak lahiya amal ikhtiar karen gay.) Imran Khan did not understand the significance of the half a century of struggle of the Kashmire cause.

People steal Imran Khan's chairs
Daily Express reported that the grand meeting of Imran Khan's Tehrik Insaf in Quetta became unruly after Imran Khan had delivered his speech. About 12,000 people got out of control and workers got on to the stage and started breaking everything in sight. People began taking away the chairs provided for their seating while others simply resorted to throwing them around. Some disgruntled workers also indulged in hostile slogan-raising.
OMG! Hostile slogan raising? One simply cannot associate with such people!
Link


India-Pakistan
The Pakistani spring
2012-06-04
[Dawn] EVEN after several attempts in the last few decades, Pakistain has been waiting for its own version of the Arab spring.

The Arab spring in the Middle East is itself in transition and it is difficult to predict the course it will take. The Islamist forces there have not only become part of the mainstream but have also gained a substantial stake in power. Many wonder if the Islamists in Pakistain can go down the same road.

The Islamists in the two scenarios operate in contexts that are poles apart. In the Arab world, Islamist forces suffered for long under very harsh dictatorships, while their namesakes in Pakistain enjoyed perks and power as supporters of almost all governments; here, they have influenced the policy discourse.

The lessons the Islamists learned in the Arab world persuaded them to modify their approach and this has contributed towards their successful entrance into the corridors of power. They have also succeeded where others failed, leaving the West no option but to recognise their mandate -- which was not the case when the Islamic Salvation Front scored an electoral victory in Algeria or Hamas, always the voice of sweet reason, in Paleostine. The West may simply have learned that pressure on liberal democracies may be counterproductive but credit is also due to the Islamists whose accommodative, persistent and flexible attitude paved the way for 'Islamist democracies'.

Constitutionally, Pakistain is already an Islamic republic -- a status which has eluded most of the Islamic world so far.

Making comparisons in two important aspects would be worthwhile; first, the level of anger and frustration among Mohammedan youth, and secondly, what they want to achieve. In Pakistain, the anger against the ruling elite is rising. The major contributing factors identified are political, economic and ideological.

By contrast, in the Arab world, demands for freedom of expression and better economic conditions were the triggers for the spring. On that stage, the constitutional legitimacy of Islam was not the protesters' destination. The Islamists are trying to develop good governance models and trying not to disturb the social contract which their societies have had for a long time.

That has been the key to their success.

In Pakistain, whenever the Islamists have got the opportunity to taste power, whether through democratic means or by allying with military dictators, they have influenced the constitutional sphere to push through their narrow agendas. This has created resentment against them among the urban classes.

From Mufti Mehmud's government in the then NWFP in the 1970s to Gen Ziaul Haq's Majlis-e-Shura and the Muttahida
Majlis-e-Amal's provincial governments in the western border provinces, the Islamists have tried to build legal fortifications around the fort of Islam of their interpretation.

Despite the contrasts, the Arab world has remained a source of inspiration for Islamists in Pakistain. Different religious parties in the country have maintained links with the governments and Islamist elements in the Arab world, although often these links have only remained confined to groups with a shared sectarian identity. It seems that the religious political parties in Pakistain have failed to make use of the anxiety prevailing among the masses to start a meaningful movement aimed at realising the change they seek.

The Jamaat-e-Islami
...The Islamic Society, founded in 1941 in Lahore by Maulana Sayyid Abul Ala Maududi, aka The Great Apostosizer. The Jamaat opposed the independence of Bangladesh but has operated an independent branch there since 1975. It maintains close ties with international Mohammedan groups such as the Moslem Brotherhood. the Taliban, and al-Qaeda. The Jamaat's objectives are the establishment of a pure Islamic state, governed by Sharia law. It is distinguished by its xenophobia, and its opposition to Westernization, capitalism, socialism, secularism, and liberalist social mores...
(JI), which has considerable links with Islamist movements abroad (mainly with likeminded Brotherhood movements in the Arab world) has failed to mobilise its supporters. Some analysts argue that Paks appear least concerned about the sea change in the Arab world on account of internal political, economic and security crises. This may not be the case after all, as religious publications have certainly focused on the changes in the Arab world -- yet unfortunately along sectarian lines. The Arab spring is indeed influencing the Pak youth and Islamists in certain ways.

As Pakistain's young are largely confused in their ideological and political vision, the thinking patterns in Pakistain are
dominated by an ideologically strong national state vision with a good governance model. In the peripheries, ethnic identity and secular tendencies have taken on growing importance. Islamist forces were used to force peripheral tendencies through the 'mainstream' vision, but now it seems that divergent trends are also emerging.

The prevailing trends offer space for new political forces that can satisfy both tendencies. The Pakistain Tehrik-e-Insaf
...a political party in Pakistan. PTI was founded by former Pakistani cricket captain and philanthropist Imran Khan. The party's slogan is Justice, Humanity and Self Esteem, each of which is open to widely divergent interpretations....
is trying to exploit mainstream tendencies and Islamists have the potential to manipulate a favourable outcome in other areas.

But the political landscape in Pakistain is diverse, competitive and complex. It would be a harder task to generate a change on the pattern of the Arab spring.

The Jamaat Ulema-e-Islam
...Assembly of Islamic Clergy, or JUI, is a Pak Deobandi (Hanafi) political party. There are two main branches, one led by Maulana Fazlur Rahman, and one led by Maulana Samiul Haq. Fazl is active in Pak politix and Sami spends more time running his madrassah. Both branches sponsor branches of the Taliban, though with plausible deniability...
(Fazl) (JUI-F) seems to believe that it has correctly assessed the changing scenario, is taking a more pronounced anti-establishment stance and trying to gain ground in the political mainstream. However,
the hip bone's connected to the leg bone...
the party is beset by a conformist support base and deficient organizational structure. Although the madrassahs have increased their influence in Pakistain, their students and teachers come mainly from the peripheries and lack the capacity to influence the local political discourse.

For mobilising the required wave of change, a good organizational network and likeminded people among the leadership are needed -- and the JUI-F lacks both. The JI qualifies on both counts but it is persisting with its traditional political path despite recent changes.

Pakistain has received some negative influences from the changes in the Arab world, too. Each school of sectarian thought is trying to interpret those changes through a sectarian prism. During the unrest in Bahrain, Pakistain's religious parties held street demonstrations in support of their faith-fellows. Even the Jamaat-ud-Daawa was quite active in supporting Soddy Arabia
...a kingdom taking up the bulk of the Arabian peninsula. Its primary economic activity involves exporting oil and soaking Islamic rubes on the annual hajj pilgrimage. The country supports a large number of princes in whatcha might call princely splendor. When the oil runs out the rest of the world is going to kick sand in their national face...
. Investigators connected attacks on the Saudi consulate in Bloody Karachi
...formerly the capital of Pakistain, now merely its most important port and financial center. It may be the largest city in the world, with a population of 18 million, most of whom hate each other and many of whom are armed and dangerous...
and the killing of a diplomat with the events in the Gulf. As tensions increase in the Gulf, the sectarian divide increases in Pakistain.

The current trends show that the Arab spring may not trigger the same wave in Pakistain but its influence over the religious discourse may continue to have a negative effect, at least until the fate of the change in the Arab world itself takes definite shape.
Link


India-Pakistan
Pakistan imploding under sectarian violence
2012-04-19
[Dawn] After decades of waging the propaganda war against India for its highhanded treatment of Kashmiris, Pakistain is now the subject of a similar campaign by India who has highlighted the plight of Shias being murdered by sectarian cut-throats in Gilgit-Baltistan.

The Asian News International reported recently that "in Gilgit-Baltistan, Pakistain's only Shia dominated province, ethnic cleansing is being carried out systematically." At the same time, the Shia-dominated town of Kargil
... three months of unprovoked Pak aggression, over 4000 dead Paks, another victory for India ...
in the Indian controlled Kashmire recently shut down the main bazaar in solidarity with the Shias of Gilgit and Chilas who were murdered in cold blood in early April. Several Sunni Mohammedans also bit the dust a few days later when sectarian violence broke out in the region.

The comparative statistics on terrorist violence between India and Pakistain speak volumes of how the tide has indeed turned against Pakistain. The data compiled by South Asian Terrorism Portal reveals that in the current year alone, approximately 150 civilians, mostly Shias, have died in sectarian violence in Pakistain. In comparison only 23 violent deaths were recorded in the Indian controlled Kashmire in 2012.

Even with a six-times larger demographic footprint, 62 civilians reportedly died in terrorist violence in India in 2012, whereas 734 civilians became victims of terrorist violence in Pakistain during the same time period. For decades, Pakistain had pointed finger at India and accused her of failing to protect the life and property of religious minorities. Today, Pakistain stands accused of the same where Mohammedans belonging to minority sects and others are being murdered while the state's machinery has failed miserably to protect their lives and property.

Sectarian violence has spread to all corners of Pakistain. Only last week several Shias belonging to the Hazara tribe were bumped off by the Sunni Death Eaters in a crowded market in Quetta. Later, Sunni hard boyz called local newspapers and grabbed credit for their murderous accomplishment. Over the past few years hundreds, if not thousands, of Shias have been murdered in Kurram Agency
...home of an intricately interconnected web of poverty, ignorance, and religious fanaticism, where the laws of cause and effect are assumed to be suspended, conveniently located adjacent to Tora Bora...
by Sunni Death Eaters and Taliban factions who are reportedly aligned with Pakistain's intelligence agencies. In other parts of Pakistain Shias have been taken off buses, lined up, and bumped off.

As of late, the followers of majority Sunni sects, such as Barelvis, have increasingly become targets of hard boyz who are followers of radicalised Sunni sects. The attack on Data Darbar, the mausoleum of Lahore's patron saint, in July 2010 left almost 50 moderate Sunni Mohammedans dead. In an earlier post, I reported police statistics which showed that almost 90 per cent of incarcerated cut-throats in Pakistain were followers of the Deobandi sect.

It is only recently that the moderate Sunnis have been targeted by the followers of radical Sunni sects in Pakistain. However,
the way to a man's heart remains through his stomach...
for decades, Shias and other minorities were the only victims of turban violence. The majority Sunnis, who never agreed with the murderous agenda of the few radicalised groups, however remained complacent and maintained a deafening silence over the murders of Shias and others, which escalated during the dark days of General Ziaul Haq. It was during General Zia's time when madrassas were turned into military academies where intelligence operatives trained hundreds of thousands of Afghans, Arabs, and Paks in warfare; equipped them with Kalashnikov assault rifles and Stringer missiles; and marched them into Afghanistan.

The widespread distribution of small arms weaponised the Afghan society to such extremes that after the withdrawal of the Soviet Army in 1989 successive Afghan regimes collapsed because of the in-fighting that continued between heavily armed Afghan militias who could not agree on a post-Soviet governance formula. While Afghanistan imploded in the early 90s as a direct result of military interventions by the Soviets, Americans, Saudis, and Paks, several thousand alumni of the Afghan war returned to Pakistain to establish their own mini jihad factories in every nook and corner of Pakistain. For over a decade, the jihadis used Shias for target practice until they waged a full-fledged war against Pakistain's establishment in 2001.

The patron-in-chief of the jihadis, including the Taliban, has been General Hameed Gul, who headed Pakistain's Inter-Services Intelligence during the formative years when Russian-made weapons were shipped from Egypt and elsewhere to equip Afghans and others to fight the Red Army in Afghanistan. General Gul was recently confronted by an inimical group of Shias who were protesting outside the Parliament in Islamabad. As the crowd complained against his longstanding relationship with the hard boyz leading terrorist attacks against Shias, the General instead came off as the biggest dove as he addressed the crowd while his son whispered speaking notes in his ear. General Hameed Gul claimed to have initiated deweaponising the hard boyz before he was removed from ISI in June 1989.

I happened to meet General Hameed Gul in a suburb of Toronto in the mid-90s when he visited Canada. Sitting among a large group of devotees, General Gul spoke with pride of the "successes" achieved by the Taliban in Afghanistan. I specifically asked the General if he was at all concerned about the excessive spread of small arms and assault weapons in Pakistain and Afghanistan. His answer then was quite different from what he stated on April 10 in Islamabad. General Gul looked at me with barely concealed disgust and observed that weapons were the ornaments for men. "It is the same weapons that will come in handy to ward off the enemy," proclaimed General Gul.

Since his proclamation in the mid-90s, the same ornaments have dispatched thousands of Paks to their graves and have brought the state and the society to a near default. In the comity of nations, Pakistain is increasingly being referred to as a pariah state. Even the overseas Paks now march outside Pak embassies to protest against the massacres of minorities that continue unabated. Wherea,s once Pakistain complained of human rights
One man's rights are another man's existential threat.
violations by India in the United Nations
...the Oyster Bay money pit...
, other are now accusing Pakistain of the same.

As the violence increases in Pakistain, the rest of the world loses its confidence in Pakistain's ability to meet her economic, legal, and moral obligations. If the sectarian and factional violence, which no longer targets only the Shias and other minorities, continues in Pakistain, it is likely that the state and the society will implode, as it has already in the neighbouring Afghanistan.

It is imperative for Pakistain's military and civilian establishment to recognise that the time to act decisively against Death Eaters in Pakistain has arrived. There is no room or time to play favourites and support the "good beturbanned goons" who may side with the establishment for a short while, but the same good hard boyz will most likely turn against their handlers, as they have done so repeatedly in the last few years.
Link


India-Pakistan
From the wreckage of sectarianism
2012-04-14
[Dawn] DESPITE the virtual media blackout of Gilgit-Baltistan it is becoming increasingly clear that sectarian violence in the entire region is spiralling out of control.

Meanwhile,
...back at the wreckage, Captain Poindexter awoke groggily, his hand still stuck in the Ming vase...
the systematic attacks on the Hazaras of Quetta continue unabated. It is hardly surprising then that Shias everywhere are talking conspiracy even as beturbanned goon Sunnis of all varieties are doing everything in their power to prove the conspiracy theorists right.

A conspiracy is that which is hidden from the public eye, a plan hatched by unknown elements hell-bent on causing maximum possible harm to the adversary. By this definition, organised attacks such as those that have been carried out in recent times are a conspiracy only in the sense that immeasurable harm has been caused to the community being targeted. Who is doing the killing is hardly a secret.

In Quetta, a couple of 'banned' and 'defunct' organizations have taken responsibility for most of the attacks. It scarcely matters that the killers have not been as forthcoming in Gilgit-Baltistan (or the media willing to break with the 'greater national interest' in its adhering to the terms of the blackout).

The Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
... a 'more violent' offshoot of Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistain. LeJ's purpose in life is to murder anyone who's not of utmost religious purity, starting with Shiites but including Brelvis, Ahmadis, Christians, Jews, Buddhists, Rosicrucians, and just about anyone else you can think of. They are currently a wholly-owned subsidiary of al-Qaeda ...
(LJ), after all, is just another name for a nexus of social forces and state institutions that has unapologetically transformed Pakistain's social and political landscape since the dark years of Ziaul Haq.

Madressahs, a retrogressive public educational curriculum, a pro-jihadi media discourse -- these and many other dimensions of Pakistain's love affair with millenarianism have been in and out of the news for years, in the English press at least.

Commentators, myself included, have emphasised the continuing refusal of our holy guardians to give up on hare-brained schemes such as strategic depth that have shredded the innards of this society.

But there has been, till now, not enough focus on arguably the most dangerous trend of all: that otherwise forward-thinking people spread out across the length and breadth of this country, almost despite themselves, are starting to conform to the exclusivist discourse that the gunnies on all sides are championing.

Beyond the alarmism that afflicts the chattering classes the objective evidence is relatively conclusive; most Paks are not bigots, even if many are cowed into silence by the issuers of the proverbial fatwas.

At best most of us are hypocrites who have imbibed the Ziaist imperative of demonstrating religiosity in public and otherwise engaging in distinctly 'un-Islamic' practices -- as far as the mullahs are concerned -- in the comfort of our own homes.

Minority communities that have been victimised consistently over a period of time -- some even before the 1980s -- have understandably looked within themselves to cope with the tyranny of the majority. This tendency has, however, not necessarily given rise to reaction. In fact, there have been many notable progressive outcomes, including a marked desire of more affluent members of the community to look after those endowed with much less.

Where some form of reaction has come to light, as in the case of Shia militancy in the 1990s, a significant part of the community has rejected it. Many young, educated Shia who have, for one reason or the other, been taken in by the appeal of Shia militancy, subsequently recanted and generally espouse a principled politics of non-violence and promote inter-faith harmony.

But it is now important to ask whether or not there may be countervailing trends emerging. Individuals hailing from minority communities active in the social media are starting to evince more alienation than might have been the case even a few years ago. Anger and resentment are becoming more common as the perception of perennial victimhood becomes more pronounced.

Balochistan
...the Pak province bordering Kandahar and Uruzgun provinces in Afghanistan and Sistan Baluchistan in Iran. Its native Baloch propulation is being displaced by Pashtuns and Punjabis and they aren't happy about it...
is the best example of how systematic brutalisation can precipitate extremely dangerous social conflicts between relatively disempowered communities. Ethnic Baloch have long felt victimised by the Pak state, but xenophobic trends within the Baloch nationalist movement have historically remained relatively muted.

The Shia Hazara community settled mostly in Quetta has, for the most part, coexisted with Baloch and Pakhtuns and integrated itself into the wider society. Pakhtuns are probably the most upwardly mobile of the three major communities, but this is not to suggest that they constitute a dominant ethnic group per se.

It is impossible to ignore the fact that tensions between all three communities have intensified greatly in recent times. Hazaras and Baloch in particular have become less likely to express any measure of empathy for one another, and it is noticeable that otherwise eloquent progressives on both sides are now in the business of competing over which community faces more systematic and structural violence.

The situation in Gilgit-Baltistan has been on knife-edge for much longer. Sectarian festivities which were a minor speck on the social landscape before the Zia years erupt in all their fury at almost regular intervals, radicalising otherwise ordinary people and arousing suspicions that persist long after the particular phase of violence has passed.

Of course, it matters that those charged with protecting the public peace are heavily implicated in destroying it, and that our holy guardians and their sycophants jealously guard the ideological apparatuses that produce hate and violence.

But simply reiterating that the state is culpable will not force it to change its historical posture. The fact of the matter is that too many people in society are starting to believe they have to take sides in a manner that makes it more difficult in the long-term to build an alternative consensus. It is necessary to face up to this growing polarisation and then do something about it.

In particular, as many of us as possible need to speak up not only for our own but for all those who are victims of wanton violence and systematic exclusion. The biggest burden must be owned by majorities, especially religious and ethnic ones. But the sane voices within minority communities have a role to play too, as they have in the past.

If all those who believe that there is still something to be salvaged from the wreckage of sectarian and all other forms of organised violence do come together and say what needs to be said, there is hope yet that all the blood that has been spilt will not have been in vain.
Link


India-Pakistan
Origin Of Our National Mindset
2012-03-11
The 'vitality' and 'dynamism' of the middle class in Pakistan are channelled into ideological aspirations that negate the modern state

The economist says the middle class anywhere in the world is a factor of dynamic growth: a growing middle class means the country will post good growth rates. But for the non-economist, no two middle classes may be alike. In Pakistain, the middle class is conservative, just like India's; but unlike India, it is ideological, anti-American and pro-Taliban.

The Indian Constitution informs the attitude of the Indian middle class, which is tolerant of secularism. In Pakistain, the Constitution inclines the middle class to desire sharia and consequently prefer the 'harder' sharia of al Qaeda to state ideology. It is the sentinel of the unchanging character of the medieval state presented as a utopia by state ideology.

Many factors are common between India and Pakistain. The middle class lives in the city and votes rightwing. The BJP gets its vote in the city; the Congress Party gets it from the rural areas. The PMLN gets its vote from the cities of Punjab; the PPP gets it from the rural areas of Punjab and Sindh. In Bloody Karachi
...formerly the capital of Pakistain, now merely its most important port and financial center. It may be the largest city in the world, with a population of 18 million, most of whom hate each other and many of whom are armed and dangerous...
, the middle class is conservative but its 'secularism' is strongly tinged with ethnicity, which means it is being unnaturally blocked from its internal dynamic by the leadership in exile of Altaf Hussain.

Today, Musharraf is the most hated man by the class that he created with his consumerist economics
The middle class of Punjab hates the middle class of Bloody Karachi and Hyderabad. Can we call the latter an 'unnatural' middle class? If Altaf Hussain had not dictated its conduct, wouldn't it have persecuted the Ahmadis and other minorities or acquiesced in their persecution just like the middle class of Punjab as influenced by Pakistain's Constitution? Or wouldn't its lawyers - the vanguard of the middle class in the country - have celebrated the killers prowling the land under Blasphemy Law the same way as the lawyers of Punjab?

Economist Ijaz Nabi writes: 'Sensible economists argue that what really matters for economic and political stability is the size of a country's middle class. Societies with a large middle class find non-violent means of resolving conflict. This hastens recovery from political and economic crises and deepens confidence. Such countries are durable destinations for investment and prosperity...Political instability threatens this system of governance and therefore is anathema to the middle class'.

The plaint about Pakistain is that it is a nation-state without a nation. It actually points to the ideology that advocates the concept of umma, importing the instability of other states into itself, and making it vulnerable to the idea of an imagined utopia, thus creating a middle class dissatisfied with an imperfect existential state
Political scientists too agree. They think that the state was created out of a need for security - mainly of property rights - and law and order. But if the state inculcates concepts that militate against the nation-state itself, its middle class is bound to be moulded by it. The plaint about Pakistain is that it is a nation-state without a nation. It actually points to the ideology that advocates the concept of umma, importing the instability of other states into itself, and making it vulnerable to the idea of an imagined utopia, thus creating a middle class dissatisfied with an imperfect existential state. The result is a middle class unhappy with status quo, which is a contradiction in terms of its conservative definition.

Here comes the cruel bite of additional irony. The middle class bulge in Pakistain was created under the decade of General Musharraf, an apparently non-ideological ruler finally rejected by the Army for calling off jihad. Today he is the most hated man by the class that he created with his consumerist economics.

Economist Nadeemul Haq of the Planning Commission gives us the tiding that, in proportion to the total population, Pakistain's middle class is twice as big as India's. He defines the middle class thus: 'Pakistain is now more urbanised with a larger middle class than India as percentage of the population. In 2007, Standard Chartered Bank analysts and State Bank governor Dr Ishrat Husain estimated there were 30 to 35 million Paks earning an average of $10,000 a year. Of these, about 17 million are in the upper and upper middle class, according to a recent report'.

[box3]The political scientist will add that the middle class is the pillar of a state's nationalism. State education targets it and resultant indoctrination embeds the designated enemy in the minds of the middle class population more than the other two polarised segments, the rich and the poor. The most prominent symbol of nationalism - which invariably aspires to war through the designation of an external enemy - is the Army.

Consequently, the middle classes of Pakistain and India focus on military preparedness as their favoured feature of the nation-state. In Pakistain it was the PMLN that completed the cycle in the production of the Army's ultimate symbol - the atom bomb - while the PPP was always suspected of 'capping' the nuclear programme. In India, it was the BJP whose more declaratory policy on the bomb pushed the country into becoming a nuclear power.

Some people have studied the nexus between the Army and the middle class but may have neglected all the causes behind why the middle class celebrates every time there is an Army takeover following a chaotic civilian interregnum ruling on the basis of middle class values.

The explanation may lie in the composition of the officers' corps in the Army, which is overwhelmingly middle class. First of all let's be clear about the distribution of population in South Asia. Over 60 percent of the population here lives in the countryside unlike most Arab states where the ratio is reversed. In Pakistain, the province of Punjab contains the largest number of cities, urban centres, where the middle class lives. Since Punjab's population is 60 percent of the country's population, the Army is composed of Punjabis up to 80 percent. Even the Navy, which should normally absorb coastal populations, is composed almost exclusively of Punjabis.

A Punjabi middle class Army must be informed with middle class values. A website under the heading of Pakistain Defence (http://www.defence.pk/) has the following observation to make about how the Army is now informed by Punjab's middle class values: 'The Islamisation of the Army plays into the hands of the Taliban. Islam is meant to be the unifying force, primarily to fight the kafirs of Hindu India. The process of Islamisation was boosted by Gen Ziaul Haq when he upgraded the status of the unit mullah and required him to go into battle'.

The 'vitality' and 'dynamism' of the middle class in Pakistain are channelled into ideological aspirations that negate the modern state. Moulded by religion, the nationalism inculcated by the state is upheld in full measure only by the middle class. The middle class and the Army are mutually empowering each other. The middle class officers in the army constantly remind the Army of neglected ideology by trying to stage coups, from Zaheerul Islam Abbasi, the creator of Hizbullah, to Brigadier Ali, the agent of Hizbut Tahrir
...an al-Qaeda recruiting organization banned in most countries. It calls for the reestablishment of the Caliphate...
Today the attitude of the state of Pakistain is dictated by what the middle class thinks under democracy and dominance of the media. TV channels are all Urdu after an effort to start up English-language channels failed because the middle class rejected the values they were suspected of purveying. Urdu conveys the middle class worldview. The Urdu press carries the middle class message which simply cannot be translated onto the pages of English-language press. Urdu is the language of Pak nationalism, not English.

The Mighty Pak Army forgets strategy and thinks of honour because it is middle class in composition. It is honour which isolates, as first explained by Plato when he looked at the 'hubris' of the hero in Greek tragedy. Today Pakistain's favourite foreign policy edict is honour. South Asian middle class abroad is created after financial improvement of the migrant families. The Indian expat is rightwing, religious and pro-BJP. The Pak expat too is conservative-religious and pro-PMLN and pro-Imran Khan
... aka Taliban Khan, who ain't the sharpest bulb on the national tree...
. The difference is lack of assimilation in the case of the Pak expat.

Lack of assimilation of the expat Pak middle class is its preoccupation with the umma and the resultant agitation it brings from extra-nationalist causes. The other responsible factor is the inability to teach acceptance of host cultures: Mohammedans don't suit themselves to circumstance; they must suit the world to the diktat of their faith, making Islam the religion of dominance.
Link


India-Pakistan
A PU election
2012-03-05
[Dawn] The Punjab University (PU), Lahore, has been a stronghold of the Islami Jamaat Taleba (IJT) for over 30 years now. The IJT is the student-wing of the fundamentalist Jamat-e-Islami (JI). It is interesting to note that whereas (by the early 1990s) a majority of state-owned colleges and universities were able to shrug off the electoral as well as the 'extra-electoral' hegemony of the IJT, its ubiquitous domination at PU has continued unchallenged.

But why does such a scenario need to be challenged? The answer lies not only in the way IJT willfully retarded the evolution of student politics at the PU (by introducing guns and thuggery in the early 1980s), but also in the way it has been using threats, intimidation and violence to curb some entirely natural and positive cultural initiatives on campus in the name of faith, morality and patriotism. A rather long list of IJT's deeds can be drawn but space constraints allow me to present only a most recent example of IJT's continuing shenanigans at the PU.

In the wake of the bigoted ban on the products of an 'Ahmadi-owned' company by a far-right faction of the Lahore Bar Council, the IJT, quite like its mother party, after suffering from the affects of a long decaying bout of intellectual bankruptcy, decided to adopt the 'ban' for the PU. Yes, faithful IJT jocks at the PU have disallowed the sale of the company's juices and other food products at university canteens. And not surprisingly, so far it has not met with any opposition.

But were the students of the PU always so submissive in the face of IJT's myopic onslaughts? Largely yes, and they still are, especially ever since 1984 when the Zia ul Haq
...the creepy-looking former dictator of Pakistain. Zia was an Islamic nutball who imposed his nutballery on the rest of the country with the enthusiastic assistance of the nation's religious parties, which are populated by other nutballs. He was appointed Chief of Army Staff in 1976 by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, whom he hanged when he seized power. His time in office was a period of repression, with hundreds of thousands of political rivals, minorities, and journalists executed or tortured, including senior general officers convicted in coup-d'état plots, who would normally be above the law. As part of his alliance with the religious parties, his government helped run the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, providing safe havens, American equipiment, Saudi money, and Pak handlers to selected mujaheddin. Zia died along with several of his top generals and admirals and the then United States Ambassador to Pakistain Arnold Lewis Raphel when he was assassinated in a suspicious air crash near Bahawalpur in 1988...
dictatorship banned student unions. Across the 1960s and till about the early 1970s, campus politics and unions in Pakistain were hotbeds of left-wing student groups, an achievement largely attained through student union elections.

Interestingly, from 1974 onwards, it was the same electoral process that also turned the IJT into a force, especially in Bloody Karachi
...formerly the capital of Pakistain, now merely its most important port and financial center. It may be the largest city in the world, with a population of 18 million, most of whom hate each other and many of whom are armed and dangerous...
and Punjab.

Cashing in on the ideological bickering and splits witnessed within the left-wing student outfits at the time, IJT coupled this opportunity by doing some excellent administrative work associated with student governments, and consequently began to win union elections on a regular basis.

However,
man does not live by words alone, despite the fact that sometimes he has to eat them...
it soon lost the plot when after Ziaul Haq's military coup in 1977 it became a willing tool of the reactionary dictatorship, helping it (through violence) to wipe out anti-Zia and progressive student groups from campuses. It finally paid the price when during the last widespread student union elections in the country in 1983, IJT faced devastating defeats at the hands of progressive student alliances. Not surprisingly, the very next year, the Zia regime banned the student unions. That was also the year when IJT faced its toughest (and last) major challenge at the PU.

It had been sweeping student union elections at the PU since 1971 and ever since the Zia coup it had also become an organization to fear. The fear factor also worked in discouraging anti-IJT students to stand in an election against particular IJT heavyweights, especially Hafiz Salman Butt, who was always expected to win uncontested.

Butt who today is a prominent member of the JI, was IJT's main man at the PU and was winning student union elections without even bothering to campaign. He was also known to be a trigger-happy hothead. Encouraged by the large gains made by leftist student groups in the 1983 student union elections across Bloody Karachi, Sindh and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa
... formerly NWFP, still Terrorism Central...
, the progressive student alliance at the PU decided to put up candidates for all posts of the student union. The alliance was mainly made up of the radical Marxist outfit, the Black Eagles, the PPP's student-wing, the PSF, factions of the left-wing NSF and the student unit of Asghar Khan's Tehrik-e-Istaqlal, the Istaqlal Students Federation.

Iqbal Haider Butt's excellent book, Revisiting Student Politics (2007) presents a vibrant telling of what happened next. There were 27 candidates for the top post of General Secretary of the union, but the moment IJT's Hafiz Salman Butt announced his candidature for the post, all other candidates withdrew from the race.

All but one: Illyas N. Shahzad, a young man from Gujranwallah who'd come down to PU for further studies. He was an unassuming member of the PSF. Illyas was first given 'friendly advise' to leave the field, but when he refused, he was threatened by IJT goons and then even abandoned by some of his own friends!

In an amusing account of the threats he was facing, Illyas is quoted (in Haider's book) as saying that even women students belonging to IJT taunted him and showed mock sadness about what Hafiz was about to do to him. Unable to openly campaign (and in hiding), much of Illyas's campaigning was done by some women belonging to Black Eagles and a few students of the National College of Arts (NCA), who used to visit the PU during election time.

llyas who today runs a textile mill says he still gets tense and anxious about those days. He was expected to eventually back down and if not, then certainly lose heavily to the IJT heavyweight. But lo and behold, PU students might have begun to stay clear of him, they decided to vote against IJT's strong-armed tactics and handed a convincing victory to Illyas. This was also the first time ever since 1971 that an IJT member had lost an important election at the PU.

But IJT's electoral demise did not last long. It bounced back when student unions were disbanded by Zia and IJT re-established its muscular domination on campus. A domination that remains unchallenged for over 30 years now.
Link



Warning: Undefined property: stdClass::$T in /data/rantburg.com/www/pgrecentorg.php on line 132
-12 More