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| Israel-Palestine-Jordan |
| Mossad kidnapped Iranian official, dumped body in Black Sea while searching for Ron Arad - report |
| 2026-11-16 |
In Iran those jobs are high risk/high reward. Or in this case, the opposite. [Jpost] Former Mossad director David Barnea said at the time that he had authorized an operation to obtain information about Arad, describing it as daring but unsuccessful.The Mosssd ...sees all, knows all, gets 'em all in the end...kidnapped former Iranian deputy defense minister Ali Reza Asgari in ...the only place on the face of the earth that misses the Ottoman Empire... , interrogated him for weeks about the disappearance of Israeli Air Force navigator Ron Arad, and killed him after the questioning failed to uncover evidence linking him to the case, according to an extensive investigation published by The New York Times ![]() ...which still proudly claims Walter Duranty's Pulitzer prize... on Sunday. The investigation was based on interviews with dozens of Israeli, Iranian and American officials, as well as individuals involved in the search for Arad. One of three former senior US officials who described the operation told the newspaper that Asgari was interrogated aboard a vessel and that his body was dumped into the Black Sea. According to Asgari's wife, he disappeared from a hotel in Istanbul in December 2006. Asgari, a general in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' Quds Force, had maintained contact with senior Hezbollah officials and arrived in Leb ...The Leb civil war, between 1975 and 1990, lasted a little over 145 years and produced 120,000 fatalities. The average length of a ceasefire was measured in seconds. Only one of those statements is an exaggeration.... shortly after Arad disappeared. Israel has denied involvement in Asgari's disappearance over the years. According to a former senior US official, when Iran ...a theocratic Shiite state divided among the Medes, the Persians, and the (Arab) Elamites. Formerly a fairly civilized nation ruled by a Shah, it became a victim of Islamic revolution in 1979. The nation is today noted for spontaneouslytaking over other countries' embassies, maintaining whorehouses run by clergymen, involvement in international drug trafficking, and financing sock puppet militiasto extend the regime's influence. The word Iranis a cognate form of Aryan.The abbreviation IRGCis the same idea as Stürmabteilung (or SA).The term Supreme Guideis a the modern version form of either Duceor Führeror maybe both. They hate raised his case during talks with the United States years later, Israeli officials told the American negotiating team that Asgari was dead. THE DAMASCUS ABDUCTION THAT ENDED ON A JOHANNESBURG STREET The investigation also reveals for the first time how Iranian Gen. Abdullah Saberi was kidnapped in September 2021. According to Iranian officials close to Saberi and a Syrian source who reviewed footage of the abduction, Israeli intelligence operatives disguised themselves as movers and passed through checkpoints in Damascus's diplomatic quarter. When Saberi went out for a morning run, the operatives seized him, drugged him, covered his head with a refrigerator box, and placed him inside a white commercial van. Saberi was taken to Israel, where, according to Iranian sources, his interrogators questioned him exclusively about Ron Arad. After a lengthy interrogation, he was left on a street in Johannesburg, South Africa. He later claimed that he had been tortured. Then-Mossad director David Barnea said at the time that he had authorized an operation to obtain information about Arad, describing it as daring but unsuccessful. According to people close to Barnea, he subsequently told Mossad personnel that everything they knew about the case could be shredded. The Mossad then began concentrating its search efforts on the village of Nabi Chit in eastern Lebanon. REPORTS POINTED TO LEBANON MORE THAN TWO DECADES AGO One of the investigation's revelations concerns a search conducted by Iran and Hezbollah as early as 2004, during negotiations in which Israel was prepared to release a senior Lebanese prisoner in exchange for genetic evidence that would establish what had happened to Arad. According to three former senior Iranian officials, a classified report compiled following the search concluded that Arad had died in Nabi Chit in 1988 and was likely buried in the area. Former Iranian president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani ... the fourth President of Iran. He was a member of the Assembly of Experts until he was eased out in 2011 He continues, for the moment, as Chairman of the Expediency Discernment Council. In 2005 he ran for a third term as president, ultimately losing to rival Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who was in Khamenei's graces back then. In 1980 Rafsanjani survived an assassination attempt, during which he was seriously injured. He has been described as a centrist and a pragmatic conservativewithout all that much reason. He is currently being eased out of any position of actual influence or power and may be dead by the end of 2012... sent one of his children to Germany to personally deliver the findings. At the time, Israel's Military Intelligence Directorate interpreted Iran's decision to send Saberi to Lebanon to assist with the search as reinforcing suspicions that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had been involved in Arad's disappearance. Raz Zimmt, who participated in the 2005 intelligence assessment implicating Iran, told The New York Times that, in retrospect, the assessment was probably mistaken. Saberi himself was kidnapped by the Mossad 17 years later and questioned about Arad. A review led in 2006 by then-Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) director Yuval Diskin concluded that reports claiming Arad had been transferred to Iran were based on unreliable information or errors in intelligence analysis. Another review, led in 2016 by Avi Kalo, a former head of the IDF's missing-persons unit, concluded that Arad had most likely died in 1988, probably in Nabi Chit. According to officials familiar with the intelligence, information gathered during wars against Iran and Hezbollah strengthened the assessment that Arad had never been held in Iran and that Tehran had not been involved in his disappearance. SUSPECTED EXECUTION AND CEMETERY SEARCH In December 2025, Ahmad Shukr, a retired Lebanese security official, disappeared after leaving for what he believed was a meeting concerning a commercial transaction. Lebanese officials believe Israeli agents kidnapped him. According to former Israeli officials and Lebanese sources, Shukr was among the few people suspected of knowing where Arad had been in 1988. His whereabouts remain unknown, and it is also unclear whether he provided any information about Arad. Shukr's niece told The New York Times that her uncle had no connection to the case. Israeli officials told the newspaper that the leading theory is now that Arad was executed in retaliation for the killing of Shukr's brother, who died in a battle with Israeli troops on the same night in 1988. In March 2026, IDF troops raided Nabi Chit and opened a grave in the village cemetery while searching for Arad's remains. Dozens of Lebanese were killed and maimed in exchanges of fire and strikes surrounding the operation. The search of the grave yielded no findings. According to the officials who spoke to The New York Times, the search for Arad continues in Lebanon. Related: Ali Reza Asgari 11/09/2011 IAEA report thrives on laptop of lies Ali Reza Asgari 11/17/2009 Mossad took minister: Iran Ali Reza Asgari 12/29/2008 Colonel in Iranian Military defects to Turkey Related: Ron Arad 06/25/2026 4 demands presented by Israel in the fifth round of negotiations with Lebanon as ceasefire mostly peacful Ron Arad 03/12/2026 'Another Man's War': Why the Kurds Quickly Changed Their Minds About Fighting Iran Ron Arad 01/24/2026 Drone strikes miss car twice in southwest Baalbek |
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| Israel-Palestine-Jordan | |
| 'Vested Interest': 40 Generals Set a Quiet Professor on Netanyahu | |
| 2026-02-19 | |
| Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited by Leonid Tsukanov
![]() The appeal was signed by around forty influential "retirees," five of whom previously headed this agency. The prime minister is being criticized for attempting to shift responsibility for the failures in the initial stages of the war with Hamas to the national intelligence services, and primarily to counterintelligence, which allegedly prevented the leadership from making the right decisions until the very end. However, in reality, the struggle between the parties is not so much for truth, but for seats in the new convocation of the national parliament. ZERO READINESS The open letter from the "security officials" was a reaction to the Israeli Prime Minister's scathing speech in the Knesset in early February. From the podium, Netanyahu practically bluntly accused the counterintelligence service of unprofessionalism. Among other things, he accused the security forces of failing to decipher Hamas's "secret language": the field commanders who organized Operation Al-Aqsa Flood used emojis to encrypt their orders, which prevented the counterintelligence agency's much-vaunted automatic message filtering system from detecting them in advance. Meanwhile, the Shin Bet "human operators," supposedly tasked with selectively reviewing messages filtered by the system, ignored this task. The prime minister's accusations included other ones. Netanyahu cited declassified reports and statements from former heads and high-ranking commanders of the intelligence services (primarily the Shin Bet) to the members of parliament present at the meeting, which echoed the idea of "cautious appeasement" of the enemy. The Prime Minister said the number of Hamas forces in the reports received was "dramatically underestimated," and their combat readiness level was assessed as "insignificant" even on the eve of the October 7, 2023, attack. Moreover, the security forces allegedly constantly put a spoke in the wheel of their superiors—opposing the "proactive occupation" of the Gaza Strip, which Netanyahu and several other "hawks" insisted on; criticizing the idea of mass assassinations of Hamas field commanders according to the "Iranian model," fearing the exposure of their own agents in the Palestinian exclave; and torpedoing the launch of the offensive on the Rafah crossing and strikes against Hamas-allied forces in Lebanon and Yemen until the very end. Netanyahu did not miss the opportunity to summarize that some of the successful operations against Hamas were carried out by Israel “not thanks to, but in spite of” its own counterintelligence. RIGHT OF REPLY The retirees reacted harshly to the accusations, accusing Netanyahu of "undermining the country's security for the sake of his own selfish interests." The ringleader of the critical campaign was the previous head of counterintelligence, Ronen Bar, with whom Netanyahu is in ongoing open conflict. It was his idea to gather together respected security officials and jointly approach the prime minister with an open complaint. They even managed to persuade Ami Ayalon (the service's director from 1995 to 2000), who had been absent from the country's political life for over a decade and had been living a quiet life as a professor, to join in. Bar is playing a dangerous game. And not only because he resigned only recently (and was sent into exile amid scandal and the use of every bureaucratic lever available to the Knesset). It's because of his plans to reshape the country's political landscape. For example, former Shin Bet chiefs Yuval Diskin and Yoram Cohen, who signed the complaint, received repeated invitations from centrist parties to join them as delegates, but declined these offers under the pretext of their own apoliticality. Netanyahu's challenge, however, is forcing them into active political games and pushing them to join the opposition. The simultaneous return of so many influential heavyweights to Israeli politics could dramatically shift the balance of power in favor of the left. Public opinion polls already show a symbolic gap in the hypothetical mandates between the government and the in-system opposition, and the emergence of new prominent players on the other side of the fence will only reinforce this trend. Moreover, Bar himself, as a "victim for the truth," appears to the opposition as an excellent coalition driver. DIVIDE AND CONQUER There are many pressure points that disgruntled "security officials" can exploit—from stalled judicial reform and the controversial law conscripting ultra-Orthodox Israelis into the military, to the country-dividing case of top Israeli officials lobbying for Qatari interests. Netanyahu and his lieutenants are directly involved in most of these crises. Out of professional solidarity, the prime minister will clearly be reminded of the controversial appointment of David Zini, a loyal "army man," to the post of Shin Bet head. Zini not only demonstrated incomplete suitability, failing some of the specialized entrance tests, but also found himself at the center of a scandal involving a smuggling bridge to the Gaza Strip, one of the organizers of which was his own brother. The combined charges are enough to damage the ratings of the Prime Minister's Likud party, not to mention the numerous corruption scandals that regularly rock the ruling bloc. However, as last year's experience with the "pilots' letter" (signed by over a thousand Israeli officers, including top generals) demonstrated, Netanyahu has the resources to divide his opponents and prevent the full-fledged formation of a security wing in the Knesset on the eve of the elections. Partly in the prime minister's favor is the fact that most of the former heads of counterintelligence are in conflict with the "army" MKs (including their leader, former Defense Minister Benny Gantz ), who, although they criticize Netanyahu, like him, mainly blame the failures of the Shin Bet. Building a strong inter-party alliance under these conditions will be difficult, if not impossible, and Netanyahu understands this perfectly well. Therefore, he is increasingly welcoming the army, calling them the aggrieved party in the multi-faceted conflict in Gaza. | |
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| Israel-Palestine-Jordan |
| Former Shin Bet deputy director Yitzhak Ilan died from COVID-19 at 64 |
| 2020-10-16 |
| Former Shin Bet deputy director Yitzhak Ilan passed away at the age of 64 on Friday after contracting coronavirus a month ago and being hospitalized in a critical condition. Born in Surami, Georgia as Yitzhak Debrashvili, Ilan became known in Israel's security services as "the Georgian." He is considered to be the living Israeli who has investigated and interrogated the largest number of terrorists. Ilan served as an officer in the IDF Air Defense Force and was a Shin Bet detective in Ramallah during the First Intifada, the head of Shin Bet's Samaria division in the Second Intifada, the head of the counterterrorism unit in Gaza and the head of the Investigations Department. At the beginning of 2010, he was appointed Shin Bet deputy director, and served in this position for nearly two years. Ilan was supposed to be appointed as the Israeli Security Agency's new director after Yuval Diskin, but Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's decision to give the position to Nadav Argaman in 2016 led to him retiring. "The late Yitzhak Ilan was one of the pillars of the service. Outstanding researcher and first-rate intelligence man. Over the years, Yitzhak has conducted many hundreds of intelligence, investigation and counterterrorism operations, which have saved many lives - many Israelis owe their lives to him without knowing it," ISA director Nadav Argaman declared. |
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| Israel-Palestine-Jordan |
| Fatah Official: Two-State Solution Is Dead |
| 2014-12-10 |
| [IsraelTimes] The two-state solution is dead, a senior member of the ineffectual Mahmoud Abbas ... a graduate of the prestigious unaccredited Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow with a doctorate in Holocaust Denial... ?s Fatah organization said on Monday, calling on the Paleostinian leadership to seek ?new solutions.? Speaking to Jerusalem-based TV channel Hona Al-Quds, Tawfik Tirawi, former head of the General Intelligence Agency in the West Bank and a member of Fatah?s Central Committee, accused Israel of turning the Arab-Israeli war into a ?religious war? and ignoring 67 years of UN decisions stipulating territorial withdrawals and the return of Paleostinian refugees. ?The two-state solution has ended and no longer exists after Israel abolished it completely,? Tirawi was quoted by the official Fatah website as saying. ?Therefore, we must search for other solutions. I personally do not believe that a two-state solution will materialize, and say that within approximately 50 [years] there will be no solution but one state.? Tirawi has been known not only for his hawkish statements but also for involvement in overseeing acts of terror during the Second Intifada period, according to Israeli intelligence. Former Shin Bet security agency chief Yuval Diskin described Tirawi ? who was appointed Paleostinian Authority national security adviser with the rank of minister by Abbas in 2008 ? as ?psychopathic, cruel, dangerous and prone to extreme mood swings? in leaked minutes of a meeting with the American ambassador in Tel Aviv in June 2007. Given the impossibility of a political resolution to the conflict, Tirawi said, a coordinated national strategy must be devised to oppose Israel. The strategy could either be directed from within the PLO or without it, he said, alluding to the inclusion of Hamas, always the voice of sweet reason, and Islamic Jihad ...created after many members of the Egyptian Moslem Brotherhood decided the organization was becoming too moderate. Operations were conducted out of Egypt until 1981 when the group was exiled after the assassination of President Anwar Sadat. They worked out of Gaza until they were exiled to Lebanon in 1987, where they clove tightly to Hezbollah. In 1989 they moved to Damascus, where they remain a subsidiary of Hezbollah... ?No Paleostinian leader can sign away our rights in Jerusalem, the refugees, water, or leave the settlements,? said Tirawi, who was filmed seated next to Abbas during a meeting with Fatah?s regional leadership on Saturday. ?Whatever Arafat didn?t sign on, no one else can sign on. The conflict will remain in force,? he concluded. |
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| Israel-Palestine-Jordan |
| Six Terror Attacks In A Day: The Shin Bet Story You Didn't Hear / Part 2 Of 2 |
| 2014-02-02 |
| [Ynet] In segment not included in award winning documentary 'The Gatekeepers,' former Shin Bet chiefs Yuval Diskin, Avi Dichter discuss their experiences with terror threats In 2012, the six surviving former heads of Israel's internal security service, known as the Shin Bet, went on camera to give an honest account of their experiences. The film, "The Gatekeepers," directed by Dror Moreh, was nominated for an Academy Award for best documentary and received wide international acclaim. |
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| Israel-Palestine-Jordan |
| Six terror attacks in a day: The Shin Bet story you didn't hear / Part 1 of 2 |
| 2014-02-01 |
| [Ynet] In segment not included in award winning documentary 'The Gatekeepers,' former Shin Bet chiefs Yuval Diskin, Avi Dichter discuss their experiences with terror threats In 2012, the six surviving former heads of Israel's internal security service, known as the Shin Bet, went on camera to give an honest account of their experiences. The film, "The Gatekeepers," directed by Dror Moreh, was nominated for an Academy Award for best documentary and received wide international acclaim. In a segment that was not included in the final film, Yuval Diskin (Shin Bet chief 2005-2011) and his immediate predecessor Avi Dichter (2000-2005) discuss what it really means to be the man in charge with forces of Evil on the loose. This is what they said in that unseen outtake: Diskin: I'll tell you a real story. In March 2006, a jacket wallah sets out from the Jenin area, and starts making his way to cross the West Bank. He gets to what we call the "Jerusalem envelope". He crosses the Jerusalem envelope and starts heading for the Check Post junction on the outskirts of Haifa, where he was actually supposed to commit suicide. We are getting the information piecemeal, and begin to understand that first and foremost someone has set out from the Jenin area with very bad intentions, and he is heading southwards across the West Bank. Why south? Because there was by then a fence, a buffer that did not allow him to take a shorter route from the Jenin area to the Check Post junction, and the most permeable area was the Jerusalem envelope. He moved towards Jerusalem, where there are all sorts of ways to bypass the checkpoints using human smugglers. We know that someone like this is moving, but since we were in a period of relative calm, we were a bit "rusty" -- leading to a gap between our intelligence and our operations. The terrorist had already reached the Jerusalem area and started moving on Route 1. He exits towards the Sha'alvim area. A little while before this we had mobilized our operations unit with a team from the Special Police Unit (SPU). In practice we work as one unit, and together they had taken care of dozens such cases in the past. Essentially, we're trying to locate which vehicle the suicide bomber is in. From our point of view this is a guided missile that is on the way to its destination, and we must intercept it. If you will, the "Arrow" missile that needs to be launched is this same operations unit with the SPU. Eventually we arrive at Sha'alvim, set up a roadblock, and begin searching vehicles. Dichter: So now you have to go from car to car to get him. You need to understand, the people doing this are the combat officers, and it doesn't matter if they are Shin Bet or SPU or police, you know that when one reaches the terrorist, the terrorist is going to blow himself up. He's on his way to a suicide kaboom, what does he care if he blows himself up at the intended destination, or right there in the traffic jam? If you had slightly more accurate information, you could start to get a handle on him. If they say to you, "listen, he's wearing a red shirt", then suddenly you know to look for someone more specific. You're trying to look for a car that you know has Arabs in it. And eventually you reach the car. You know that he's inside this car. So what do you do now? You can see people (the combat officers) trying to disconnect from what they know is going to happen to them, and what they know will happen if they don't get to that car. What goes through the mind of these officers? Their realities, their jobs are "ticking time-bombs." Think about it, you're running towards a security event, knowing that it's a "ticking time-bomb" and that you may pay with your life. Sometimes it's chilling, obviously. You can't say for certain what the reasons are. Does he have an boom belt on him? Will he press the trigger? I try to get into the head of the people in the operations unit chasing after such men, knowing that if they try to arrest them, they will blow up right next to them. How do they manage? Diskin: Look, the guys in this unit are of the highest caliber, and I think that during an operation you don't have too much time to think, or even fear. You're feel fear in between operations, but when you're in the middle of one, in my opinion, you don't have much time to think. We had more than one such incident. For example, the story of the terrorist from the Jenin area who had a Jewish-Russian girlfriend, who had put an bomb at a kiosk on Allenby Street. We chased after him; we understood he was returning from Tel Aviv to the Jenin area through Wadi Ara, and we're chasing after him there. Eventually we manage to isolate some vehicles, and the personnel of the operations unit chased the suspect in a way that few action movies present, in terms of the risks they took during the pursuit, until they managed to block off the terrorist, and then the guys went over and searched the vehicle. Look, you are searching for a vehicle that has a suicide bomber, it's very possible that you'll open the door and he'll press the trigger and in that moment you and him are heading skywards. Then one of the guys arrived, one of our commanders there, and stuck his head in the vehicle; the terrorist took the gun he had and shot the bomb in order to detonate it. Luckily, our man wasn't hurt, since he only put his head inside and not his whole body. He was hurt, but sustained a relatively light injury. It's sticking your head in the lion's mouth. Later on we improved the tools and the methods to minimize the risks for our agents. You can write a lot of thriller stories from these things. Even stories that are much harder than this. |
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| Syria-Lebanon-Iran |
| 'Iran could accelerate nuclear program if Israel attacks' |
| 2012-05-02 |
| Former IDF Intelligence head Gazit tells 'Post' he agrees with Diskin that attack wouldn't destroy Iran's program, and could even accelerate it, while enabling the Islamic Republic to legitimize efforts diplomatically. Iran would possibly accelerate its nuclear weapons program after a future Israeli military strike, former IDF Intelligence head Shlomo Gazit told The Jerusalem Post on Tuesday. After the decade they spend recovering from the strike, they mean... Gazit, a senior research fellow at Tel Aviv University's Institute for National Security Studies, made the comments in response to a question put to him by the Post over recent views aired by former Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) director Yuval Diskin, who questioned the effectiveness of an Israeli strike. |
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| Israel-Palestine-Jordan |
| Analysis: Schalit and the Arab Spring |
| 2011-10-12 |
| The Arab Spring is behind Israel's change of heart on the Gilad Schalit deal, which has not changed dramatically since 2006. The deal to release Gilad Schalit is without a doubt controversial. The main change, though, took place on the Israeli side, which in recent months changed its position on the deal that has retained mostly the same format since Hamas, always the voice of sweet reason, kidnapped Schalit in June, 2006. The big question is what brought about this change. The main answer is the so-called Arab Spring. Israel is concerned that the Arab regimes now in power will not be here tomorrow and that the Egyptian regime currently in power - the deal's main mediator - will not be there in a few months after elections are held in Cairo. Israel is genuinely concerned about the outcome of elections in Egypt, expected to be held sometime next year. Predictions are that the elections will see the rise of a more anti-Israel regime to power, particularly if the Moslem Brüderbund wins a significant percentage of the seats in parliament. These changes were also internalized by Hamas, which understood that fallout between Israel and Egypt would also impact its ability to reach a deal with Israel. This led Hamas to take a more pragmatic approach, moving it to change its own position on some of the names on the list of faceless myrmidons set to be released. A significant number of the faceless myrmidons will be deported to the Gazoo Strip. While this will be a boost to Hamas and other terrorist organizations there, it will have less of an effect on Israel than if they were to be released to the West Bank. There, they would be able to help Hamas and Islamic Jihad ...created after many members of the Egyptian Mohammedan Brotherhood decided the organization was becoming too moderate. Operations were conducted out of Egypt until 1981 when the group was exiled after the liquidation of President Anwar Sadat. They worked out of Gaza until they were exiled to Lebanon in 1987, where they clove tightly to Hezbollah. In 1989 they moved to Damascus, where they remain a subsidiary of Hezbollah... reestablish their terror infrastructure, which has been severely damaged in recent years by the IDF and Paleostinian Authority security forces. Egypt also successfully used as leverage the ongoing revolution in Syria and Hamas's fears that it will have to evacuate its headquarters in Damascus ...The City of Jasminis the oldest continuously-inhabited city in the world. It has not always been inhabited by the same set of fascisti... if Bashir al-Assad falls. The change at the top of Israel's various defense agencies also played a role. Yoram Cohen, who was appointed head of the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) in March, is said to have been more flexible than his predecessor Yuval Diskin. The same is said about Tamir Pardo who replaced Meir Dagan as head of the Mossad. In the IDF, the position has always been the same - to pay the price and release Schalit. In the cabinet meeting in 2008 that debated the swap for Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser - the reservists kidnapped by Hezbullies in 2006 - then-Chief of General Staff Gabi Ashkenazi used all of his influence to push the deal through, raising the ire of then-head of the National Security Council Uzi Arad. His successor Lt.-Gen. Benny Gantz shares the same view. While Schalit's release is without a doubt dramatic, so is the day after. Hamas will be strengthened by this deal, will have brought about the release of 1,000 prisoners and will be able to use this as leverage in future reconciliation talks with Fatah, as well as in gaining popularity ahead of Paleostinian Authority elections, if they are ever held. Israel will need to work to ensure that PA President the ineffectual Mahmoud Abbas ... a graduate of the prestigious unaccredited Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow with a doctorate in Holocaust Denial... does not view this as a blow and will still be willing to renew negotiations with Israel. The boost to Hamas will not just be for its morale but also for its operational abilities. Kidnappings, Hamas and Hezbullies have learned, pay off. They will likely try again. |
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| Israel-Palestine-Jordan |
| Cabinet approves deal with Hamas: Schalit to return home |
| 2011-10-12 |
| Deal passes 26-3 in cabinet vote; Israel to release 1,000 prisoners in two-stage process, including 1/3 serving life sentences; Netanyahu: "My heart is with the families of terror victims." Exactly 1,934 days after Hamas, always the voice of sweet reason, kidnapped Gilad Schalit near Kerem Shalom on the border with Gazoo, the cabinet met in a dramatic meeting Tuesday night, approving a deal for his release. Twenty-six ministers voted to approve the prisoner exchange deal signed with Hamas, with only three voting against the deal. Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, Strategic Affairs Minister Moshe Ya'alon and National Infrastructures Minister Uzi Landau voted against the deal. "The Jewish people is a special people, responsible for one another," Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu said at the opening of the cabinet meeting. "Our sages teach that those who save one Jewish life, it's as if they have saved an entire world. Today I am bringing a proposal for the saving of Gilad Schalit in order to bring him back, finally, after five years, to his home, to Israel." The cabinet vote brought close to conclusion a saga that tortured the Schalit family - and the country - for more than five years, and which made the kidnapped soldier, now 25, a household name in large parts of the world. In return for Schalit, Israel will release 1,027 prisoners, some 400 of them prisoners serving long sentences for some of the worst terrorist atrocities in the country's history. Netanyahu said that the deal, which has been in the works for weeks, was initiated in Cairo on Thursday of last week, and Tuesday received the final approval. The framework for this deal has been on the table for years, but was rejected as Israel demanded that the snuffies with blood on their hands be deported to Gazoo or abroad, and Hamas demanded that all the names they submitted be on the list. In the final analysis, both sides showed flexibility, with Israel agreeing to let hundreds, but not all, of the released terrorist remain in the West Bank, and Hamas dropped some of the names on its list. Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) head Yoram Cohen said that the Shin Bet would be able to deal with those returning to the West bank. His predecessor, Yuval Diskin, was adamantly opposed to letting the prisoners return to the West Bank. Cohen, as well as the heads of the Mossad and the IDF all expressed support for the prisoner exchange deal at the cabinet meeting. The Shin Bet chief said that while the deal to free Schalit would be difficult for Israel, there is no better alternative in the near future to bring the captured soldier home. "There is no question that for many families who lost loved ones to terror this is a difficult deal. If we want to bring Schalit home though, this is the way," he said. |
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| Israel-Palestine-Jordan |
| Egypt turmoil helping arms smuggling to Gaza |
| 2011-05-14 |
Jerusalem--Smugglers of arms into the Gaza Strip are operating almost freely after a change of leadership in Egypt, Israel's Shin Bet security agency said. A report by the domestic spy agency said with Egypt's new leaders preoccupied with stabilizing their country, "governance in Sinai is not high and this allows smugglers to operate almost without hindrance."Today the Egyptian regime's attention is focused on stabilizing the new government and this eases the Sinai smugglers' task," the report said. The Bedouin people of the Sinai, for whom smuggling is a major source of income, were mostly involved in getting weapons into Gaza to supply the Palestinian Islamist movement Hamas which controls the enclave and other smaller militant groups, it said. It also reaffirmed Israel's belief that Iran, in seeking to strengthen its influence in the region, was supplying Hamas and Islamic Jihad militants with "choice military-grade weaponry." It said hundreds of rockets with a range of 20-40 kilometers, at least 1,000 mortar bombs, some anti-tank missiles and tons of high explosives and raw material to make high explosives had entered Gaza since the start of 2010. Outgoing Shin Bet chief Yuval Diskin, who hands over to his successor on Monday, said in a rare speech earlier this week: "In Egypt it is very hard to assess what will happen in the elections expected in the summer ... it's not a good idea to rest on our laurels." Even under the rule of ousted president Hosni Mubarak, a partner of Israel in the Middle East, "Egyptian actions did not significantly reduce the scale of munitions smuggling," the report said. But matters had now worsened. The Shin Bet report said munitions were transported from Iran to Sudan, across Egypt's Sinai peninsula and through smuggling tunnels into the Gaza Strip. Sudan accused Israel of launching an air strike in April near Port Sudan airport that killed two people. Khartoum has close ties with Hamas, but denies giving it direct support. Israel is also suspected of carrying out an air strike on an arms convoy in eastern Sudan in 2009 for which it has neither admitted nor denied responsibility. |
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| Israel-Palestine-Jordan |
| Haaretz Defends Treason and Espionage |
| 2010-04-14 |
| The partial lifting of the gag order on the Anat Kam espionage affair, which had already been exposed to the world media in March by Judith Miller, is stirring up a storm in Israel. The charge sheet accuses Kam of divulging secret information with the intent to harm the security of the state,' which falls under serious espionage' and carries a maximum life term. Haaretz, Israel's left-wing daily, is at the center of the storm and tying itself in knots to defend Kam, its journalist Uri Blau, and itself. When sources in the defense establishment saw the stories, they worried about where they could have come from. The Israel Security Agency, better known as Shin Bet, eventually worked out a deal with Blau where he returned his documents and was promised they wouldn't be used to incriminate him or his sources. A few months later, in December 2009, the Shin Bet identified Kam as the source of the documents but the problem was that she admitted to giving Blau far more documents than he had turned over. Kam was put under house arrest; Blau fled the country and is now in London. The Shin Bet negotiated with Blau's lawyers in an attempt to retrieve the documents. It was when they concluded this was futile that the gag order was lifted. As things now stand, Kam has been indicted and the trial is supposed to begin in May; the head of the Shin Bet, Yuval Diskin, has warned that Blau is endangering himself and the country by holding onto his documents in a foreign location, but Blau still has not agreed to return to Israel and give them up. Haaretz is rattled, and a sense of shock is said to hang over its editorial offices. It's not only that Kam acted out of what the charge sheet called ideological motivations' arising from the extreme left an outlook given much voice in Haaretz. It's also that Haaretz's own journalist, Blau, is involved and people are good and mad. Yisrael Hasson, a former deputy head of the Shin Bet and a Knesset member from the center-left Kadima Party, called on people to cancel Haaretz subscriptions until Blau is fired and returns all the documents. And yet, amid the storm, Haaretz is sticking to its guns and to its reporter. On Sunday it published a piece called Haaretz Answers Four Key Questions on the Anat Kam Case' that shows how low Israel's security actually ranks in its priorities. Haaretz,' the article states, believes that it cannot pass on all the documents Blau has to the defense establishment because its senior officials may use them to trace his sources.' The article also accuses the Shin Bet of reneging' on its agreement with Blau even though it was Blau who hoodwinked the Shin Bet by handing over only a fraction of his contraband. Yet Haaretz admits that it decided to instruct Blau to remain abroad' despite the danger entailed. (It's even speculated that Diskin, out of desperation, sought to scare Blau into returning.) Also on Sunday Haaretz ran an op-ed by its columnist Yossi Sarid, a former leftist politician, arguing that what Kam did was fine because the institutions and country whose laws she violated aren't worth much anyway. Let every Israeli mother decide,' Sarid intoned, "if she has entrusted her sons to an army and government worthy of her trust." By Monday Kam had waived her journalistic immunity, and her lawyer was trying to convince Blau to return to Israel and hand over the documents on the understanding that he wouldn't be charged. But even if such a deal is reached, Haaretz, for the bulk of the Israeli public, won't smell like roses in this affair. Indeed, the Israeli left as a whole has fallen on hard times lately. In the 2009 elections the two parties that most embody it, Labor and Meretz, won a total of 16 seats out of 120. Last February it was revealed that the New Israel Fund, a major and wide-ranging left-wing NGO, had supplied most of the false information enabling the Goldstone Report recognized as an anti-Israeli calumny across the Israeli spectrum, that is, except for the far left. |
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| Israel rejects US call to halt Jerusalem project | ||
| 2009-07-19 | ||
| -- Israel on Sunday rejected a U.S. demand to suspend a planned housing project in east Jerusalem, threatening to further complicate an unusually tense standoff with its strongest ally over settlement construction. Israeli officials said the country's ambassador to Washington, Michael Oren, was summoned to the State Department over the weekend and told that a project made up of 20 apartments developed by an American millionaire should not go ahead.
Although Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently yielded to heavy U.S. pressure to endorse the establishment of a Palestinian state, he has resisted American demands for an immediate freeze on settlement expansion. On Sunday, Netanyahu told his Cabinet there would be no limits on Jewish construction anywhere in "unified Jerusalem." "We cannot accept the fact that Jews wouldn't be entitled to live and buy anywhere in Jerusalem," Netanyahu declared, calling Israeli sovereignty over the entire city "indisputable." "I can only imagine what would happen if someone suggested Jews could not live in certain neighborhoods in New York, London, Paris or Rome. There would certainly be a major international outcry," Netanyahu said. Also at the Cabinet meeting, the head of Israel's Shin Bet internal security service, Yuval Diskin, said both the Western-backed administration of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and the militant Islamic Hamas were carrying out "covert activity" in east Jerusalem to stop Jews acquiring property there. An official present at the meeting, speaking on condition of anonymity in line with Cabinet rules, did not elaborate on what the activity entailed but quoted Diskin as saying that hardline Egyptian cleric Sheik Youssef al-Qaradawi earmarked $25 million to be funneled to Hamas activists in Jerusalem. Al-Qaradawi is a well-known Abbas aide Rafiq Husseini dismissed the report. "We wish there was Arab money to buy threatened houses," he told The Associated Press, "but that's not the case." Qaradawi could no be reached for comment. | ||
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