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Israel-Palestine-Jordan
Israel Electric Corporation ends West Bank power cuts after Palestinian payment
2020-01-24
[IsraelTimes] Firm says it imposed power cuts of several hours a day in parts of Ramallah and other cities in bid to recover $500 million owed.
That’s a much better use for all those donations from the EU, etc. than all had originally intended.
Israel’s state-owned electric company said Wednesday it was ending power cuts to the West Bank after the Paleostinian Authority paid over half of its outstanding debt.

In September, the Israel Electric Corporation began cutting power in parts of the West Bank over the NIS 1.7 billion ($500 million) debt owed by the main Paleostinian power distributor for the West Bank.

On Wednesday, the IEC said it had received NIS 920 million ($267 million) from the Paleostinians.

"The electric company will cease the power cuts over the debts," a statement from the IEC said, adding it would hold further negotiations with the power distributor and the Paleostinian Authority on the repayment of the remainder of the outstanding funds.

The IEC called the payment a "breakthrough" and "the basis to a comprehensive solution the sides strive to reach."

There was no immediate confirmation from the Paleostinian side.

IEC chairman Yiftah Ron-Tal called the payment "a significant step in reducing the debts," adding his company was working to "upgrade the quality of supply."

The company had imposed power cuts of several hours a day in parts of Ramallah and other West Bank cities in a bid to recover the money owed.
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Israel-Palestine-Jordan
Winograd Likely to Pin 33 Deaths on Olmert
2007-11-18
The final report of the official inquiry into the 2006 Second Lebanon War is expected to accuse PM Ehud Olmert of having caused 33 pointless IDF deaths in the last 60 hours of warfare.

The Winograd Commission was appointed a month after the end of the war, as a result of heavy public pressure and criticism of the war's poor results. The commission's mandate was to investigate the errors in running the war. It had been announced of late that the commission would not call for Olmert's resignation - but the Sunday Times of London now reports that it is likely to come close: The commission will sharply censor the Prime Minister for the battles of the war's last three days, in which 28 soldiers were killed in battle and another five were killed when their helicopter was shot down.

In the final 60 hours of fighting, Israel launched a major ground offensive which began while the United Nations was nearing a ceasefire resolution. Though some would say that Olmert wished to seize a victory from the jaws of defeat, or at least end the war with Israel in its best possible position, the Winograd Commission sees the situation differently.

The British paper quotes a "source close to the Winograd Commission" saying that Olmert, "aware that a ceasefire agreement was underway, ordered the army to carry out an impossible operation to wind up a failed war against Hizbullah with a big showdown." Another source told the Times: “My hunch is that the report will blame Olmert in the harshest way possible, and the last 60 hours of the war will be the hook on which they hang him.”

The paper reports that the final operation of the war, codenamed Direction Change 11, was launched on August 11, 2006, as the final details of a ceasefire were being hammered out in New York. The ceasefire went into effect on Monday, Aug. 14. “This was the operation the army had planned for months – to crack down decisively and finish off Hizbullah,” the Times quoted an officer as saying. “But it should have begun the war, not ended it and we needed 96 hours to trap Hezbollah and then a week to finish them off.”

The Commission may take its lead from an Israeli book on the war by journalists Ofer Shelah and Yoav Limor, which recounts a phone conversation between Olmert and former Defense Minister Sha'ul Mofaz. Olmert reportedly tells Mofaz that an "excellent proposal has been agreed in the security council, exactly what we wanted" - but still insists on continuing the offensive. When Mofaz asks, “What are you going to say to the families of the soldiers who will die in this pointless operation?,” Olmert reportedly responds, “Well, that’s a tough one... I don’t think I’ve got a good answer.”

The Times does not note that Mofaz himself was the only Cabinet minister not to vote in favor of the ceasefire proposal.

Arutz-7 asked ex-IDF Ground Forces Commander Maj.-Gen. (ret.) Yiftah Ron-Tal if criticism of Olmert for waging an offensive in the shadow of an approaching ceasefire would deter future Israeli leaders from ordering strong offensives when necesssary. "I do not believe so," Ron-Tal said. "I trust that Israeli leaders know their responsibility, and will do what is necessary - but they must do so with the proper mechanisms in place to ensure that their actions are of value. In this case, there was no way that there could have been enough time for the final offensive to succeed. It was carried out without proper coordination between the government and the army, and it was such a large-scale offensive - with three divisions, over a large area, etc. - that it simply could not have succeeded under those conditions."

Gen. Ron-Tal, who retired from active service shortly before the war began, was asked what he felt was the major blunder in the way the war was run. After saying that there had been no coordinated ground campaign, he said that the main errors were that the objectives were not properly defined; the actions that were taken - including air raids and isolated ground attacks - did not match the objectives; and the coordination was poor and even non-existent.

Though Hizbullah's long-range Katyusha rockets were destroyed by the Israeli air campaign, Ron-Tal said, "the short-range rockets were not; it is unbelievable that even on the last day of fighting, 100 Katyushas were still being fired at northern Israel!"

The 33 soldiers who were killed during the last weekend of the war included eight infantrymen hit by Hizbullah anti-tank rockets in three different incidents, an officer killed by a mortar shell, and two killed by anti-tank fire just hours before the ceasefire took effect. In addition, three tanks, and their crews, were destroyed by rockets. Over 50 Hizbullah terrorists were reported killed over that weekend, and more were presumably killed in the last 24 hours of warfare. Katyusha rockets continued to rain down upon Israel over that last weekend; public radio broadcasts were continually interrupted every 3-4 minutes with news of sirens in different localities, accompanied by Home Front Command instructions directing residents to take cover.
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Israel-Palestine-Jordan
Israeli Army Chief Fires Top General
2006-10-05
JERUSALEM (AP) - Israel's army chief fired a top general Wednesday over his criticism of the war in Lebanon and government policy, the army said. The dismissed officer, Maj. Gen. Yiftah Ron-Tal gave unauthorized interviews to several Israeli news media earlier Wednesday, an army statement said.

Ron-Tal said army chief of staff Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz must "accept responsibility" for the shortcomings of Israel's 34-day war with Lebanese Hezbollah guerrillas, which ended Aug. 14.

Halutz, in a letter to Ron-Tal, said he was terminating the general's stay in the military immediately. Halutz said Ron-Tal's decision to make public statements was "unacceptable," the army statement said. "Israeli soldiers are forbidden to deal with political subjects and make public comments on political and diplomatic issues, and all the more so, it is forbidden for soldiers to publicly criticize the government," it said.

Ron-Tal is the second general to exit over the war. The commander of the northern sector, including the Lebanon border, Maj. Gen. Udi Adam, resigned after Halutz posted another general to oversee his command during the fighting.

Ron-Tal, who was already on leave before his scheduled retirement in December, was the commander of Israeli ground forces, a senior position. In the interviews, he also criticized Israel's unilateral pullout from Gaza a year ago.
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Israel-Palestine
Israel adopts new military tactics, weapons to combat insurgency
2004-03-29
From World Tribune.com
Israel’s military has changed its training and weapons development concept over the last two years to adapt to the current Palestinian insurgency war. Military commanders said the war, well into its fourth year, has resulted in the acceleration and merging of processes in training, weapons development and procurement. They said the aim has been to ensure a rapid response to the changing tactics of Palestinian tactics.
Tactics of increased despiration
"We started out as one army," Maj. Gen. Yiftah Ron-Tal, chief of the military’s Ground Forces Command, said. "Now, we have an army with several totally different sets of capabilities." The general said that since 2002 the Ground Forces Command changed its training doctrine to ensure that troops could enhance capabilities even while they maintained operational duty in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This has resulted in the decrease in training to two periods per year. "Until two years ago, we had a separate operational period and a training period," Ron-Tal said. "Now we have integrated training in areas of mission. You have to prepare yourself during your operational mission."

Other commanders discussed the training of armored and artillery forces in infantry duties. They said these forces as well as their commanders have undergone additional training to fulfill infantry missions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in an effort to increase manpower flexibility. Commanders said the military has drastically shortened its period of weapons development and procurement. They said that in some cases the period of development of weapons and systems has taken as little as four months. Lt. Col. Yoram Abecasis, chief of LIC in the Weapons Development and Procurement Department, said the acceleration of weapons development was the result of a new organizational structure in which field commanders played a key role in decision-making. Abecasis said the result has sometimes been the introduction of uncertified and even unsafe weapons in the field for operational testing. In one case, Abecasis said, an unspecified remote-control system was introduced into operations after six months of development. The system was returned for further development after an unspecified period in the field. "We are taking a risk in safety," Abecasis said. "But we are achieving operational capability very fast." Commanders also initiated a development program to eliminate the vulnerability of the Merkava main battle tank to snipers and attackers. Commanders said the Ground Forces Command installed a sniper position on the Merkava Mk-3 and Mk-4 tank to prevent attacks from the rear of the tank.
Gotta watch your six
Col. Yossi Turgeman, head of doctrine at the Armored Corps, said commanders had complained that their tanks were vulnerable to snipers and unarmed civilians when the hatches of the vehicles were closed in urban warfare operations. He said the commanders warned that they could neither see threats from the rear of the tank nor swerve its turret in the narrow streets and alleys of urban areas. Turgeman said the sniper position – meant to be manned by a member of the infantry forces – was established from the escape hatch in the rear of the tank. He said the development project sought to armor the proposed sniper position.

The rapid development of weapons also reflects a close cooperation with Israel’s defense contractors, commanders said. They said the intimate relations between the military and the defense industry has resulted in crash development programs even before full funding was obtained. "The development and fielding of weapons in record time takes advantage of the unique relationship with the defense industry," Ron-Tal said. "We call ourselves one family." Ron-Tal said the army has created new units to focus on the Palestinian war. He cited the establishment of three battalions for reconnaissance. He said the Ground Forces Command also established special forces units as well as those to operate the armored D-9 bulldozer.
The St. Pancake Mark I and II models.
The changes in organization and doctrine have been the result of an assessment by the General Staff that the Palestinian war would continue for another few years. Commanders said the military will be required to fight a continuous war while maintaining its conventional capability. "The main challenge is to build up while fighting," Ron-Tal said.
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Middle East
Israel: Sensitive IAI missile launch recorded by Channel 10
2003-11-06
Hat tip to Drudge
Israel Aircraft Industries was frantically engaged in damage control yesterday after an unprecedented security lapse allowed a Channel 10 television technician to capture an internal screening of a secret missile test via an ordinary satellite dish. The technician said that he captured the unencrypted footage via an ordinary household dish with a one-meter diameter - the kind owned by the tens of thousands in Israel and by millions throughout the Middle East. Thus, as Channel 10’s military correspondent, Alon Ben David, noted, the intelligence services of any hostile country could have captured the film the same way.
Anybody believe they didn’t know this was going out? How about a veiled warning to Tehran and the blackhats?
After the initial shock, IAI officials tried to portray the slip-up as less serious than it seemed. "This a completely unclassified project," IAI’s security officer, Naor Zeidman, told Haaretz. "We do dozens of missile tests. So what? You don’t run to the media with every test. We don’t even have a customer for this missile. Had this been anything connected to the Israel Defense Forces, I assure you that there would have been IDF encryption on [footage of] the launch." But despite the denials, senior defense officials exerted massive pressure on Channel 10 in an effort to stop it from screening the footage. Moreover, after Ben David asked the defense establishment for comment, IAI was immediately ordered to shut down its internal television network. And, despite the fact that the project was "unclassified," the military censor demanded that Ben David’s report be sent to it for approval. According to Ben David, the censor nixed significant portions of the report, including anything that could have identified the missile or revealed technical details such as its range and flight path.

In a terse statement released yesterday, IAI said that it "fired a long-range and accurate artillery projectile in a test conducted off the coast of Israel. Not all the goals of the test were achieved." It added that the projectile was developed on the assumption that there is a global market for an accurate, long-range weapon. Malam, the IAI division that conducted the test, is also the maker of the Arrow anti-missile missile, the Shavit satellite launcher and, according to foreign reports, the Jericho surface-to-surface missile.

The incident began on Monday, when the Channel 10 technician, doing a routine scan of all frequencies broadcast via Israel’s Amos satellite, captured some unusual pictures that were being broadcast live. The pictures resembled control-room activity before a missile launch and appeared to have been transmitted from one control room to another. However, the technician was unable to capture footage from the second source, as that was encrypted. The technician called Ben David, who advised the technician to monitor that frequency continuously. Over the next 48 hours, Channel 10 thus filmed all the launch preparations plus the tests themselves - which took place over the Mediterranean Sea Tuesday and yesterday mornings. The missile, which was supposed to hit its target within three minutes, went wild after two minutes and fell into the sea.

The presence at the launch of high-level officials - including CEO Moshe Keret, Deputy IDF Chief of Staff Gaby Ashkenazy and commander of the ground forces Major General Yiftah Ron Tal - seems to indicate that the defense establishment had high hopes for the missile. Zeidman, however, said that senior IDF officers are invited to all such tests, in the hopes that the army can be persuaded to buy. Today, IAI will begin investigating the lapse. According to Zeidman, Malam was responsible for all the arrangements.
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