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| Syria-Lebanon-Iran |
| Kobane prison fire death toll rises amid efforts to deescalate tensions |
| 2026-09-13 |
| [Rudaw] At least nine people were killed and more than a dozen injured in an overnight fire at a prison in the Kurdish city of Kobane in northern Syria, Rudaw has learned, as Kurdish and Syrian officials sought to defuse tensions following days of protests over the killing of a Kurdish soldier. The fire, believed to have been started by protesting prisoners, came after demonstrations across Kurdish areas of northeast and northern Syria over the killing of Sipan Hizni, a Kurdish member of the Syrian army. WHAT HAPPENED? Hizni, a member of a Syrian army brigade comprising fighters from the now-dissolved Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), was killed near Hasaka city earlier this week after being kidnapped by armed men believed to be members of a prominent Arab clan. State-affiliated security forces said they had identified the main suspect but had yet to arrest him. The killing and the failure to arrest those responsible sparked anger among Kurds and triggered protests across Kurdish areas of northeast Syria (Rojava). Despite calls for restraint by Kurdish authorities, peaceful demonstrations turned violent in Kobane on Friday, with some protesters attacking security forces. The government deployed additional security forces to Kobane, in Aleppo province, and detained a number of protesters. An eyewitness said tensions inside the prison escalated after detainees, including people arrested earlier in the day, learned that they would be transferred to facilities in areas of Aleppo city under full government control. Some prisoners then set their cell on fire in protest, the witness said. More at the link More Shooting in the air is by the withdrawing forces to stop the motorcycles that were chasing them
Text: #Syria As I visited Ain al-Arab - Kobani two months ago, I can confidently assert that what we are seeing is the internal security forces arriving from inside the city to the checkpoint outside Kobani. And according to a reliable source on the ground, the shooting in the air is by the withdrawing forces to stop the motorcycles that were chasing them, and not "Asayish preventing the entry of security" as rumored Related: Kobane: 2026-09-08 Kurdish all-women force says reached initial deal on integration with Damascus Kobane: 2026-08-28 Integration: Kurdish female fighters (YPG) could join Syrian interior ministry as 'distinct’ force, 20,000 Rojava employees moved to Syrian gov’t, border crossings to Kurdistan, Turkey prepped to reopen Kobane: 2026-08-27 Syrian Kurdish leader says armed force dissolved, capping integration with Damascus Related: Hasaka city: 2026-09-02 Syrian interior ministry forces deployed across Hasaka province, include Asayish personnel: Official Hasaka city: 2026-03-10 First convoy of displaced Afrin families set to return under Damascus-SDF agreement Hasaka city: 2026-01-31 SDF says reached integration agreement with Damascus Related: Ain al-Arab: 2026-02-01 Turkey blocks aid convoy to besieged Kurdish town in north Syria, NGO and MP says Ain al-Arab: 2026-01-22 Erdogan's quiet victory: Türkiye eliminates Kurds as one of the main threats Ain al-Arab: 2026-01-19 You trusted the predator in the hope that it wouldn't swallow you. |
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| Syria-Lebanon-Iran |
| Kurdish all-women force says reached initial deal on integration with Damascus |
| 2026-09-08 |
| [Rudaw] The Women's Protection Units (YPJ) has reached an initial understanding with the Syrian government to integrate the all-female force into the interior ministry as a special mission unit, a YPJ spokesperson said on Monday. Ruken Jamal told Rudaw's Nalin Hassan that during meetings with Syrian interior ministry officials in Damascus in late August, officials "approved in principle" the YPJ's proposal to join the ministry as a unified special mission force rather than having its fighters join individually or joining under other names. The YPJ delegation, which included its commander Newroz Ahmed and Jamal, told central government officials, including the interior minister, that the force had initially sought to join the defense ministry but the proposal was rejected. The YPJ now considers integration into the interior ministry a "suitable" alternative. Syria's Islamist-led army does not include women. "We found it suitable to join the ministry of interior. For us, the priority is preserving our status as an organized entity—keeping our fighters, institutions, and commanders intact. When we saw a positive approach from the ministry of interior to integrate us specifically as a special mission force, we found it appropriate," Jamal said. Damascus has not commented on the understanding. Jamal said interior ministry officials told the delegation they would study the possibility of allowing the YPJ to join as a special mission unit before making a final decision. She added that the YPJ had not encountered any obstacles to the proposal so far, noting that such a unit would be the first of its kind in Syria. The proposed force would be deployed in cities across northeast Syria (Rojava), she said. Mazloum Abdi late last month announced the dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), days after declaring that the process of integrating the military, security and administrative institutions of Rojava into the Syrian state had been completed. The YPJ is the women's branch of the People's Protection Units (YPG), which formed the backbone of the SDF. The integration process is the outcome of a January agreement between the SDF and Syria's interim government following weeks of festivities. The deal was mediated by the United States and La Belle France and endorsed by several regional countries, including ...a NATO ...the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Originally it was a mutual defense pact directed against an expansionist Soviet Union. In later years it evolved into a mechanism for picking the American pocket while criticizing the cut of the American pants... member, but not the most reliable... Following Abdi's announcement, Syrian interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa appointed the former SDF commander as a presidential envoy. Abdi said in a recent interview that he has yet to officially begin his work. The YPJ had around 3,500 fighters when it joined the SDF in the January festivities, but its ranks have since fallen to around 1,500, according to Jamal. She said some fighters had been transferred to state-affiliated internal security forces "voluntarily and following our approval," while others chose to work in civilian institutions in Rojava or return to civilian life. The YPJ played a prominent role in the US-backed campaign against the Islamic State ...formerly ISIS or ISIL, depending on your preference. Before that they were al-Qaeda in Iraq, as shaped by Abu Musab Zarqawi. They're really very devout, committing every atrocity they can find in the Koran and inventing a few more. They fling Allaharound with every other sentence, but to hear western pols talk they're not reallyMoslems.... (ISIS), which lost its last territorial stronghold in Syria in 2019. The force also fought Turkey and Ankara-backed Syrian groups before the fall of Bashir Pencilneckal-Assad The Scourge of Hama... 's government, as well as forces affiliated with the new Syrian authorities during festivities in January. Jamal said 979 YPJ members were killed in all conflicts. She also said six YPJ members remain in captivity. Three were captured during festivities with Turkey and its Syrian proxies in Afrin in 2018, while Cicek Kobane was detained in Gire Spi (Tal Abyad) in 2019 and later sentenced to life imprisonment in Turkey. Two others were captured during festivities with Turkey-backed Syrian forces in Manbij weeks before the fall of Assad. Related: YPJ: 2026-08-28 Integration: Kurdish female fighters (YPG) could join Syrian interior ministry as 'distinct’ force, 20,000 Rojava employees moved to Syrian gov’t, border crossings to Kurdistan, Turkey prepped to reopen YPJ: 2026-08-05 Good Morning YPJ: 2026-08-05 YPJ says talks with Damascus continue under Jan. 29 agreement |
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| Syria-Lebanon-Iran |
| Syrian interior ministry forces deployed across Hasaka province, include Asayish personnel: Official |
| 2026-09-02 |
| [Rudaw] Syrian interior ministry forces deployed to the Kurdish-majority Hasaka province in northeast Syria (Rojava) on Tuesday and are set to expand across it, the province's deputy governor told Rudaw, adding that the force includes personnel from the Kurdish Internal Security Forces (Asayish) integrated under the landmark January agreement between Rojava and Damascus. "Hasaka province will be treated like any other Syrian province - no differently," Ahmad al-Hilali told Rudaw's Vivyan Fatah, noting that "the nature of today's deployment is one of internal security" and that since Asayish members were "integrated into the state structure" under the interior ministry, they are naturally included in the deployment. Hilali also serves as a senior member of Syrian interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa's team overseeing implementation of the January 29 Agreement, which aims to integrate Rojava's civil and military institutions under Syrian state structures. He told Rudaw that Hasaka needs reinforcements, noting that the dispatched forces "will be deployed across the entire province - in Qamishli, in Derik, everywhere," and that "road security will also be established, and traffic police will be present." "Across the board, under the umbrella of the interior ministry, forces will be deployed throughout the entire province under this name and in this form," he said. A well-placed source in Hasaka also told Rudaw on Tuesday that the forces deployed to the province comprise "three regiments of special forces, all made up of Hasaka residents," adding that "two special-missions regiments had previously been formed from Asayish personnel and that a third regiment of around 300 members entered Hasaka city on Tuesday." The developments follow remarks Hilali made to Rudaw last week, in which he said that over 20,000 employees in Rojava have been integrated into Damascus' state structure. "The integration process is ongoing. It is happening, and employees [in Rojava] are being transferred into the state system," he said, adding that 4,000 fighters from the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have been integrated and have been on the government's payroll for the past three months. Hilali also pointed to "very good steps [that] have been taken" toward formalizing the Semalka-Fishkhabur border crossing between Rojava and the Kurdistan Region, as well as the Nusaybin crossing between Rojava and ...the occupiers of Greek Asia Minor..., which has been closed since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011. On the services situation in Hasaka, Hilali said the province's electricity situation would gradually improve, after the Kurdish-majority province faced severe shortages in recent months. "I can say the situation will improve step by step," he said," adding that "the coming days will bring improvement on that front." Related: Hasaka province: 2026-08-28 Integration: Kurdish female fighters (YPG) could join Syrian interior ministry as 'distinct’ force, 20,000 Rojava employees moved to Syrian gov’t, border crossings to Kurdistan, Turkey prepped to reopen Hasaka province: 2026-08-15 Kurdish families forced back to camps after Sare Kani attack Hasaka province: 2026-08-11 First convoy of Kurdish displaced families returns to Rojava, is attacked by squatting Arabs Related: Rojava: 2026-08-30 More than 200 Kurdish candidates contest Sweden elections Rojava: 2026-08-29 Syrian president appoints Kurdish leader Abdi as adviser, days after SDF dissolved Rojava: 2026-08-28 Integration: Kurdish female fighters (YPG) could join Syrian interior ministry as 'distinct’ force, 20,000 Rojava employees moved to Syrian gov’t, border crossings to Kurdistan, Turkey prepped to reopen Related: Qamishli: 2026-08-28 Integration: Kurdish female fighters (YPG) could join Syrian interior ministry as 'distinct’ force, 20,000 Rojava employees moved to Syrian gov’t, border crossings to Kurdistan, Turkey prepped to reopen Qamishli: 2026-08-22 Mazloum Abdi announces full integration of SDF as ‘new phase’ begins Qamishli: 2026-08-17 Nearly 7,000 displaced families remain in Afrin camps: Official Related: Derik: 2026-05-21 New batch of Afrin families set to return home Thursday: Official Derik: 2026-01-22 Fate of IS detainees uncertain as Damascus reins in Kurds Derik: 2026-01-20 SDF urges Kurds worldwide to ‘join the resistance’ as clashes escalate in Rojava: HTS allies free thousands of ISIS prisoners, slit throats and take slaves like ISIS did |
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| Syria-Lebanon-Iran |
| Syrian president appoints Kurdish leader Abdi as adviser, days after SDF dissolved |
| 2026-08-29 |
| [IsraelTimes] Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa appoints Kurdish leader Mazloum Abdi as a presidential adviser, state media says. “Mustafa Khalil Abdi is appointed as adviser to the presidency of the republic,” announces the decree, signed by Sharaa and published by state news agency SANA. The declaration comes days after Abdi announced the dissolution of his Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces under an integration deal with Damascus. The Syrian education ministry also publishes a decision authorizing Kurdish-language instruction in public and private schools. Related: Mazloum Abdi 08/28/2026 UK backs SDF integration as Syria demands Israeli withdrawal Mazloum Abdi 08/28/2026 Integration: Kurdish female fighters (YPG) could join Syrian interior ministry as 'distinct’ force, 20,000 Rojava employees moved to Syrian gov’t, border crossings to Kurdistan, Turkey prepped to reopen Mazloum Abdi 08/27/2026 Syrian Kurdish leader says armed force dissolved, capping integration with Damascus |
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| Syria-Lebanon-Iran | |
| Integration: Kurdish female fighters (YPG) could join Syrian interior ministry as 'distinct’ force, 20,000 Rojava employees moved to Syrian gov’t, border crossings to Kurdistan, Turkey prepped to reopen | |
| 2026-08-28 | |
Communist, atheist fighting females in uniform with weapons, while in Afghanistan the analogous Taliban are not allowing girls to go to school beyond sixth grade or wander outside uncovered and unguarded by a male relative. You understand my perplexity, dear Reader — this is nothing like the female units of the Morals Police fielded by ISIS and Iran.The YPJ said in a statement that its general command met with an official delegation from the Syrian interior ministry, where "issues of security and stability in Syria" and "cooperation and coordination between the two sides" were discussed extensively. The future of the all-women units "was the main focus of the meeting," the statement added, noting that "it was emphasized that the YPJ could be integrated, as a distinct and organized force, into the structure of the Ministry of Interior." The meeting was held in a "positive and constructive atmosphere" to advance "the integration process within the framework of the January 29, 2026 Agreement," the YPJ said, pointing to further "meetings and discussions" ahead. The YPJ, an all-female force affiliated with the People's Protection Units (YPG), forms a core component of the SDF. It played a pivotal role in liberating the symbolic Kurdish city of Kobane in northeast Syria (Rojava) from the Islamic State (ISIS) in early 2015, with significant backing from the US-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. The YPJ's Thursday statement comes days after SDF chief Mazloum Abdi on Tuesday announced the dissolution of the forces he heads.Abdi's announcement pertained to the January 29 accord with Damascus, under which the two sides agreed to integrate the Kurdish-led forces - along with the institutions of the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES), which governs Rojava - into Syrian state structures. Over 20,000 Rojava employees integrated into Syrian state structure: official [Rudaw] Over 20,000 employees in northeast Syria (Rojava) have been integrated into Damascus' state structure, a senior member of Syrian interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa's team overseeing the integration process told Rudaw on Wednesday, further pointing to efforts to reopen key border crossings between Rojava, the Kurdistan Region and Turkey. "The integration process is ongoing. It is happening, and employees [in Rojava] are being transferred into the state system," said Ahmad al-Hilali, who also serves as deputy governor of the Kurdish-majority Hasaka province, speaking to Rudaw's Solin Mohammedamin on the sidelines of the 64th Damascus International Fair. Hilali further noted the completion of integration of 4,000 fighters from the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), adding that they have been on the government's payroll for the past three months. SDF chief Mazloum Abdi on Tuesday announced the disbanding of the force, declaring its mission complete. The announcement pertained to the landmark January 29 Agreement between Damascus and the SDF to integrate Rojava's civil and military institutions. Under the accord, border crossings previously administered by the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES), which governs Rojava, were handed over to the Syrian state and incorporated into the national customs system. Hilali on Wednesday pointed to "very good steps [that] have been taken" toward formalizing the Semalka border crossing between Rojava and the Kurdistan Region. Semalka, known as Fishkhabur on the Iraqi side, is a critical transit point established in 2012-2013 that has served as the primary artery for civilian travel, medical evacuations, trade, and humanitarian aid into Rojava. Hilali explained that formalizing the Semalka crossing is linked to the opening of a Syrian consulate in Erbil - "a step currently being studied by the Syrian foreign ministry," he said. "When the consulate opens, the status of the Semalka crossing between us and the Kurdistan Region will certainly improve," he added. The deputy governor of Hasaka further pointed to ongoing efforts to reopen the Nusaybin border crossing between Rojava and Turkey, which has been closed since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011. Hilali attributed the delay in inauguration to the old structure being “too small. Now there is a larger area that engineers are studying. I expect it to be completed by the new year," he said. | |
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| Syria-Lebanon-Iran |
| Former Kurdish YPG commander, Sipan Hamo, accuses Israel of disrupting the integration of Kurds into the Syrian state |
| 2026-08-22 |
Translated Text: 🇸🇾 Syria: The former Kurdish YPG commander, Sipan Hamo, accuses Israel of disrupting the integration of Kurds into the Syrian state: "Some forces, with Israel at the forefront, are trying to provoke and disrupt this process. […] Damascus is now the shared capital of us all. Those who wanted to use the Kurds as a potential military force and had other plans have lost. Turks, Arabs, Kurds, all the peoples of the region have won. It is now time, in this climate of peace, to foster brotherhood." Before the collapse of the SDF in January 2026, Sipan Hamo was considered one of the toughest leaders of the YPG. In an interview with Reuters, he had even expressed hope for an Israeli intervention in favor of the Kurds, citing the example of Israeli strikes in Suwayda. Today, he appears to have fully sided with the Syrian state: now deputy minister of Defense, he defends integration, presents Damascus as th |
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| The Grand Turk |
| Turkey removes former SDF commander from terror list: Report |
| 2026-08-16 |
[Rudaw] ...the occupiers of Greek Asia Minor...’s interior ministry has removed Sipan Hamo, a former commander of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), from its red-category list of people wanted on terrorism charges, following his appointment as a deputy Syrian defence minister, a Ottoman Turkish media outlet reported. Cumhuriyet, a Ottoman Turkish opposition newspaper, reported on Friday that Hamo’s name no longer appears on the interior ministry’s wanted list, indicating that Ankara had quietly removed him. Other reports said his name was still on the list when he was appointed to the senior post in Syria’s transitional government. Rudaw English confirmed on Saturday that Hamo’s name no longer appears on the list. Ottoman Turkish authorities have not publicly explained the reason for his removal. The Syrian government and the SDF signed an agreement in late January, brokered by the US and La Belle France and endorsed by Turkey, following weeks of festivities that significantly reduced the SDF’s control over areas it had held in Syria. The deal centers on integrating the SDF, as well as civilian and security institutions in Kurdish-held northeast Syria (Rojava), into Syrian state structures. As part of the agreement, Damascus has offered several senior positions to former SDF commanders and Kurdish politicians, including Hamo. The integration process is reportedly in its final stages, with some expecting the SDF to be dissolved soon. The integration comes as Turkey advances a grinding of the peace processor with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) at home. The process, also described as being in its final stages, could pave the way for a rapprochement between Ankara and its longtime foe in Syria, the SDF. Turkey says the People’s Protection Units (YPG), the backbone of the SDF, is the Syrian branch of the PKK. The YPG denies the accusation. Hamo is not the first person Ankara has removed from its wanted list after receiving a senior position in Syria’s new state institutions. The Ottoman Turkish government earlier removed Omer Muhammed Ciftci, a Ottoman Turkish citizen accused of ties to al-Qaeda, from the list after he was appointed commander of the Syrian army’s 62nd Division earlier this month. |
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| Britain | ||
| Man, 26, arrested on suspicion of murder after Ann Widdecombe found dead at home - BBC News | ||
| 2026-07-11 | ||
Devon and Cornwall Police say a white British male is in jug after the 78-year-old was found at her home on Thursday with serious injuries The incident is not being treated as terrorism and there is "no information" to suggest it was politically motivated, they add Police say it is too early to comment on whether the suspect was known to Widdecombe PM Keir Starmer says the murder investigation is "shocking news", while Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch says she is "stunned" over the "horrific" incident Widdecombe, a former Conservative minister turned Reform UK spokeswoman, served as the MP for Maidstone in Kent for 23 years.
She served in the House of Commons as an MP from 1987 to 2010 and was known for socially conservative views opposing She was also a supporter of Israel, belonging to the Conservative Friends of Israel group for many years and speaking at B’nai Brith events, according to a report in the Jewish Chronicle. Additionally, Widdecombe wrote a novel set during the Holocaust; the story focused on the tension between a German officer’s patriotism and his opposition to the Nazi regime. Former Prime Minister Boris Johnson ...pro-Brexit British prime minister, succeeding no-Brexit Theresa May. BoJo is noted as much for his sparkling personality and his hair as for his Conservative policies....>called Widdecombe a "heroic Brexiteer and a great speaker who could move Tory audiences to such ecstasy that she was a very hard act to follow." The management company that represented her after she left politics said her life and career were driven by strong Christian values and a commitment to public service. "She loved the cut and thrust of political debate and, 16 years after leaving Parliament, was still actively campaigning for Reform UK and offering forthright views on the hot topics of the day," Cloud9 Management said. "As Ann once said...’we get one go this side of eternity, one go. Life is not a dress rehearsal, you take opportunities that you like and you go for it, that’s my philosophy’."
Related: Ann Widdecombe 04/13/2010 Army faces £100,000 payout after tribunal backs single mother who went AWOL over childcare Ann Widdecombe 09/23/2009 Age of consent storm over BBC debate about making sex legal for girls under 16 Ann Widdecombe 01/01/2008 Barclaycard chief quits over Muslims remark Related: Keir Starmer 07/05/2026 Names and Titles of Attendees at the Ayatollah's Funeral - Can't tell the players without a scorecard Keir Starmer 07/01/2026 UK unveils biggest defence spending increase in decades Keir Starmer 06/30/2026 ‘Bankrupting Britain' ‐ Migrants Using ECHR to Stay in U.K. Will Cost Taxpayers Billions Related: Kemi Badenoch 06/23/2026 Yielded to the 'King of the North': 'Toxic' Starmer resigns as Prime Minister Kemi Badenoch 06/06/2026 Labour peer accuses JD Vance of 'insulting' Britain by making 'extremist statements' about the murder of Henry Nowak Kemi Badenoch 06/04/2026 'I can't breathe': Briton bleeds to death while being arrested for 'racism' | ||
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| The Grand Turk | |
| 'You all lack charisma.' Erdogan has decided who will take his seat | |
| 2026-06-25 | |
| Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited by Kamran Gasanov [REGNUM.RU] For the past two years, the Republic of Turkey has been abuzz with debate over one important topic: will Recep Tayyip Erdoğan run for office? Now it's clear—he will. ![]() Turkey held presidential elections in 2023. The current leader won, not without difficulty. Officially, he still has two years left in his current term. However, there's a catch. According to the law, he's not allowed to run in subsequent elections under the usual procedure—he can serve no more than two consecutive terms. But there are two options. The first is to return the country to a parliamentary form of government, where the prime minister can rule indefinitely as long as his party wins. But Erdoğan himself transformed the system from parliamentary to presidential in 2017—precisely to extend his stay in power. So no one will understand or appreciate this reversal.
The second option—more obvious and simple—is to call snap elections. While previously these were merely rumors, speculation, and hints, recently AKP spokesman Ömer Çelik officially announced that Erdoğan will be a candidate in the new presidential elections. And since Erdoğan is running, the elections will be early. But even if the snap vote opens the door for the president to the political race, it still doesn't guarantee his victory. And the issue isn't even the results of individual candidates, but rather the parliament. To call an early presidential election, a minimum of 360 votes out of 600 is needed. The AKP and its nationalist coalition partners (MHP) can expect 327. The pro-Kurdish party DEM is opposed, so the outcome depends on the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP). WHY ERDOGAN? The current president's decision is, on the one hand, his personal choice. Over the past 20 years, he has built a new political system in which, for example, the army is no longer independent but is completely subordinate to the head of state. On the other hand, his fellow party members and MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli are nominating him. They fear losing their seats, and after the 2017 constitutional changes, the president is the key figure in power. In recent years, the media have actively discussed potential successors. The list included Erdoğan's sons and sons-in-law, as well as the current Foreign Minister, Hakan Fidan. However, none of them have comparable charisma or approval ratings. Attempting to nominate any of them could prove a risky maneuver. A potentially weaker leader could exacerbate competition within the AKP and the government, which would reduce the government's effectiveness. Erdoğan himself may be perceived as the best guarantee of succession. Fidan has regularly figured in discussions as the leading potential successor, eclipsing even Erdoğan's son, Bilal. Among the president's other favorites (including, for example, his son-in-law, Selçuk Bayraktar, the head of a drone manufacturing company), the 57-year-old foreign minister is the most experienced politician. He has been a member of government structures for 25 years. He held the posts of head of the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency and head of the National Intelligence Organization of Turkey (MIT). But despite Fidan's recognizability, nominating him while Erdoğan is alive and well would undermine the government's chances of victory. After all, the current president represents the elite consensus. Fidan, on the other hand, could be controversial. Even if it is approved from above, a conflict of interest could arise later. For example, with Ibrahim Kalın, the former presidential spokesman and current head of the MİT. Kalın and Fidan's approaches to the Kurdish issue differ: the former advocates a moderate course, the latter advocates harsh measures. In December 2025, some AKP MPs criticized statements Fidan made during a visit to Syria. At the time, the Foreign Minister threatened a military operation against the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG). WHAT ABOUT THE OPPOSITION? Ataturk's CHP would have had a good chance if Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu had not been under investigation in 2023 and then jailed in March 2025, where he was soon given a one-year, eight-month sentence. The end of this sentence does not guarantee freedom or participation in the elections, as the investigation is being conducted into a major corruption case. The prosecutor's office is demanding up to 2,430 (!) years in prison. The remaining candidates are clearly inferior to the mayor in popularity, and they face other challenges. Özgür Özel lost his position as CHP chairman after an Ankara court overturned the results of the party congress. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu was formally reinstated as party leader. Özel is currently challenging the court's decision, calling for a party congress to be held as soon as possible and for himself to be elected as the sole and undisputed leader. Had Özel accepted Kılıçdaroğlu's leadership, party unity would have been preserved. But Kılıçdaroğlu is objectively less popular. He lost to Erdoğan in the last election. Furthermore, his reputation has been tarnished after he was reinstated as chairman of the Republican People's Party by a pro-government court ruling. He could be seen as a Trojan horse. There's also the well-known and quite popular mayor of Ankara, Mansur Yavaş. But he's a relatively quiet politician and less charismatic than Özel. His nationalist views could alienate the Kurdish opposition. Moreover, the capital's mayor himself isn't trying to push his candidacy forward. EARLY PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS? Meanwhile, early parliamentary elections may take place in the republic, which could affect the balance of power. Until recently, the opposition was the one seeking them more. Economic problems, inflation, ineffective governance, and outrage over Imamoglu's arrest gave the RPP an advantage, fueling public disapproval of the government. But now, the ruling party is the one most eager for snap elections. Her argument is this: yes, the economy has slumped, but it's recovering. Inflation has fallen from a record 75% in May 2024 to 33%. The government is preparing a large-scale social support package to regain the trust of pensioners. Politically, the AKP has the advantage over the RPP: the opposition is riven by internal contradictions. Özel fears the authorities will suddenly call snap elections. And there's a risk the RPP won't be able to participate, as it won't have time to hold its congress and elect its leadership. Tensions within the RPP make it impossible to quickly develop a unified strategy against Erdoğan and undermine the electorate's trust. As a result, the opposition is unable to turn fair criticism of the socio-economic situation to its advantage. According to polls, around 30% are prepared to vote for the RPP, and the same percentage for the AKP. Neither party will win with certainty; the result will be, as before, a close race. But the government could outmaneuver the opposition using administrative resources and form a coalition with the support of nationalists and other small parties. INTERESTS OF GLOBAL PLAYERS It's too early to say how the elections will play out. By Turkish standards, two years is a long time. Erdoğan's adviser, Mehmet Üçum, announced that presidential elections will be held on April 16, 2028, the anniversary of the constitutional referendum that established the country as a presidential republic. But one thing is certain: unless his health deteriorates, Erdoğan will stand for his next (and likely final) election at age 75. If he wins, he will rule until 2034. The usually critical West is unlikely to object to the very fact of early elections. Under Donald Trump, the United States pursues a non-ideological policy. For the sake of a deal, he is willing to negotiate with Ahmed al-Sharaa and even with the hated regime in Iran. And Erdogan is Trump's friend. Incidentally, during a meeting with him, the American once joked that the Turk is well versed in the art of falsification. As for Europe, Brussels, Paris, and Berlin continue to feign a commitment to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. But with the US retreating from European security, Turkey is becoming increasingly important to the Old World. This is being made clear by the leaders of the "EU-3" (Britain, Germany, and France). Since no one has charged the Turkish president with İmamoğlu's arrest, will Europeans be concerned about his run for reelection? Deep down, the French and Germans will hope for the long-time leader's defeat, but they won't risk supporting the opposition ahead of time. After all, a victorious Erdoğan could be vengeful. Moscow will be watching developments with interest. The Turkish opposition is not overtly anti-Russian, but some of its leaders, including Kılıçdaroğlu, have made vocal statements against the Kremlin. The AKP is critical of the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant project, which is being implemented by Rosatom. If this party's representative wins, Turkey will move closer to the EU and pursue a more pro-Atlantic course. Under Erdoğan, relations between Russia and Turkey will remain more predictable. One way or another, any Turkish government will act in its own interests. And no one will sever ties with the main importer of oil and gas. Related: Turkey: 2026-06-24 Something to ponder Turkey: 2026-06-23 Ukrainian Perspective: Invasion of Ukraine: June 22, 2026 Turkey: 2026-06-22 US-Iran talks in Switzerland shunt Israel to the sidelines, but it's not out of the fight Related: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 06/24/2026 Putin stated that four principles must be taken into account for negotiations with Kyiv Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 06/21/2026 'Chaos Factory': Who will win the Erdogan-Netanyahu Cold War? Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 06/18/2026 Erdogan is preparing to quarrel with the West when he has squeezed the maximum out of it | |
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| Israel-Palestine-Jordan | |||||||||||||||
| 'Chaos Factory': Who will win the Erdogan-Netanyahu Cold War? | |||||||||||||||
| 2026-06-21 | |||||||||||||||
| Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited by Kamran Gasanov [REGNUM] Since the IDF's operation in Gaza, which claimed tens of thousands of lives, Israel has become Turkey's number one enemy. Israeli experts, meanwhile, believe that after Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran, Ankara poses the most serious threat to their country's security. ![]() A curious fact: when the State of Israel was founded, its main threats came from Arab countries—Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and even Saudi Arabia. Today, its main rivals are Shiite Iran, with its network of proxies from Lebanon to Yemen, and Sunni Turkic Türkiye.
"Those who follow in Hitler's footsteps will end up like all tyrants throughout history," he said, referring to Benjamin Netanyahu and his war crimes in the Gaza Strip. "Under the current administration, Israel is nothing more than a factory churning out instability and chaos," he added. Comparing any of their politicians to Hitler offends Israelis in much the same way that accusations of mass murder of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire offend Turks. Incidentally, Netanyahu, who has long and steadfastly refused to recognize the Armenian Genocide, broke with this consensus in an interview. As expected, Netanyahu's office didn't let Erdoğan's attack go unanswered. This time, he reminded him not of the Armenians, but of the Kurds, which is no less painful for Turkey's Justice and Development Party, especially at a time when it has launched a process of disarming the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and reconciling with Turkey's Kurds. "The anti-Semitic dictator Erdogan, who commits genocide against the Kurds, supports the terrorist organization Hamas, oppresses his own people and imprisons political opponents, is the last one who can preach morality to the State of Israel," the Netanyahu administration said in a statement. The day before, Erdogan called the Israeli government a "criminal network" that is posing a threat to Turkey with its attacks in Syria and Lebanon. It's difficult to be definitive about Lebanon, as it's not Erdogan's "office," but Iran's. The Islamic Republic stands behind Hezbollah.But Syria is truly Turkey's domain. Israel occupies the Golan Heights and periodically launches forays into the southern provinces or bombs Damascus and former Iranian, now Turkish, bases in the remaining provinces.
If you look at the map, the frontline between Turkey and Israel is quite extensive. It includes Syria and Palestine, where Erdogan supports Hamas. It also includes the so-called "Kurdistan." During the Iranian campaign, Israeli intelligence Mossad tried to involve the Iraqi Kurds (PJAK) in the war against the ayatollah regime, but Ankara thwarted these plans by threatening to strike them if they attacked Tehran.
The entire Eastern Mediterranean region can be added to the listed fronts of confrontation. Cyprus, Greece, and Israel are forming a military alliance aimed at containing Turkey and advancing energy projects, such as the EastMed gas pipeline. Israel is reacting nervously to Turkish lawmakers' attempts to legislate the "Blue Homeland" concept, which aims to restore Turkey's former influence in the Mediterranean, Aegean, and Black Seas.
Turkey is a NATO member, the bloc's southeastern flank, a window on the Middle East and an important player in the Black and Mediterranean Seas, as well as in Syria, and this factor limits Israel's options.
To be fair, despite the mutual hostility and long-standing threats, neither side wants to allow a direct confrontation. It's worth noting that the latest report from Turkey's National Intelligence Organization (MIT) notes that the 40-day war between the US and Israel against Iran has changed the balance of power in the Middle East. Turkish politicians, witnessing the aggression against Iran, said that Turkey could be the next target. Therefore, they needed to strengthen their military-industrial complex, air defense systems, and the protection of critical infrastructure. And this refers to potential attacks from not only Iran but also Israel.
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| The Grand Turk |
| Turkey Prepares: Why Erdogan Isn't Getting Involved in War |
| 2026-03-17 |
| Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited by Kamran Gasanov [REGNUM] The conflict in the Middle East is expanding. In its early days, Iranian missiles and drone strikes primarily targeted Arab countries hosting US bases, but the war quickly spread to Turkey. ![]() Despite three recorded instances in which the Turks had to shoot down Iranian missiles, presumably over their territory, Ankara is in no hurry to respond, although it allows itself to engage in threatening rhetoric. BROTHERLY TIES The first incident occurred in early March. The Turkish Ministry of Defense reported that NATO air defense and missile defense forces intercepted a ballistic missile over Gaziantep province. The debris fell in an empty field; no one was injured. At first, it was claimed that the strike never occurred. Then doubts arose that the final target was on Turkish territory. But even after the "landing" had been established, the Republic's Ministry of Foreign Affairs was in no hurry to escalate the situation. After speaking with Iranian diplomats, Minister Hakan Fidan stated the following: "If it was a missile that went off course, that's one thing." He then advised the Iranians "not to embark on an adventure." Four days later, Turkey detected and shot down a second missile fired from Iran. It then became clear that the US bases were being targeted. The rhetoric began to escalate. "The necessary warnings have been sent to Iran," Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said after an emergency government meeting. Ankara, according to Erdoğan, had already warned Tehran several times, but it continued its "provocative steps." The Turkish president had made every effort to demonstrate his interest in avoiding his country's involvement in the war, and therefore softened his language at the end of his statement, calling on Iran not to tarnish "the millennia-old neighborly and fraternal ties." Telephone conversations took place between the presidents and foreign ministers. Erdoğan told Masoud Pezeshkian that his country had suffered but was not a party to the conflict. Fidan called on his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi, to take action. While Iran made no secret of its intentions in the Persian Gulf—to strike US bases and those assisting Washington—here, Tehran refused to take responsibility. Araghchi told Fidan that the missiles aimed at the Incirlik air base were not launched by Iran. Be that as it may, on March 13, a third missile was destroyed in Turkish airspace. On the one hand, when missile launches against Turkey become a pattern, Ankara needs to react. After the third incident, few doubts remain that the Iranians were behind it. On the other hand, there may be "mitigating circumstances" here, too. Sources of the Turkiye newspaper believe that after the start of the US and Israeli aggression against Iran and the liquidation of part of the political and military command of the Islamic Republic, a so-called “mosaic defense” regime was launched there. According to it, every general on the ground makes independent decisions. Furthermore, those made earlier automatically took effect. That is, the Iranian Ministry of Defense does not coordinate every step of its military; they act according to pre-war instructions, where Türkiye, as a NATO country with US bases on its territory, is also designated as a target. A STREAM OF INSULTS On the other hand, Ankara is aware that its “friends” from NATO are trying in every possible way to draw it into the conflict. The intelligence services told journalists that the country would adhere to a course of containment and a cold-blooded approach—Ankara “will not participate in any scenario that would lead to being drawn into war.” Turkish military expert Cihat Yayci is still not at all certain that the missiles were launched on orders from official Tehran. He believes such serious decisions are made at the highest level, and since Iran's political leadership was temporarily decapitated, the Mossad and the CIA have found openings to fill the gap. Yayci is inclined to believe that the attacks could be carried out from Iranian territory by troops paid by Israeli and American intelligence. The Turkish President does not approve of the assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and – contrary to NATO’s line – expressed condolences and “deep sadness” over the death of the spiritual leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran. On the day of the third missile launch, Fidan, in a conversation with his German counterpart, Johann Wadephul, spoke out against fueling civil war in Iran and "ethnic and religious conflicts." Turkey "will not allow this," the minister emphasized. He added that the US and Israeli attack on Iran occurred “without any reason” and is illegal, but Iran’s strikes on its neighbors are also unlawful. In almost all statements, Turkey tries to use generalities and avoid mentioning Donald Trump. However, insults are sparing for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu : the speaker of the Turkish parliament, Numan Kurtulmuş, compared him to Hitler. Unlike German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who says that Germany is “on the same side as the United States” and that the ayatollah regime is illegitimate, and the EU leadership, which is increasing sanctions against Iran, Ankara is unequivocally in favor of a ceasefire. AVOIDING CONFLICT WITH TRUMP Europe also has a lot to lose—no less than Turkey. Oil and gas prices have already created the risk of stagflation for the EU. But Ankara is demonstrating that it has more sovereignty – Erdogan has risked conducting operations against Kurdish militias against the will of Washington. Trump is a temporary friend of Ankara. Erdogan is pleased to hear praise, recognition of his influence in Syria and his role as a mediator in Gaza. But is this worth the long-term risks lurking behind the chaos in Iran? Millions of Iranian refugees in addition to millions of Syrians. The possibility of a "second Afghanistan" emerging along a 560-kilometer-long border (after Syria, Turkey shares its longest border with Iran). A failed state always poses the threat of terrorists. Residents of Ankara and Istanbul experienced ISIS attacks firsthand during the Syrian civil war, where Erdoğan supported Bashar al-Assad's opponents. Iranian Kurdistan is a particular headache. Trump tried to use the Kurds to launch a campaign against Tehran, but the fighters of the Kurdistan Free Life Party are in no hurry to expose themselves. Ankara is closely monitoring the activities of the Iranian Kurdish party. A statement from the Turkish Ministry of Defense, published by Clash Report, stated that Ankara "reserves the right to respond to hostile actions." The ministry is clearly hinting at a military operation. The Turkish armed forces have similar experience in Iraq and Syria. The problem is that if Washington wants to push the Kurds against Tehran, Turkey's intervention would effectively ignite a conflict between Trump and Erdoğan. Clashes between Turkish forces and Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) during Operation Peace Spring in Syria outraged Trump, prompting him to threaten to "destroy the Turkish economy." The risk of the emergence of a new Kurdish state entity, capable of triggering a "domino effect" in Turkey itself, is hardly offset by the prospect of creating a "South Azerbaijan" with a 30 million Turkic-speaking population. Trump is bogged down in Iran. He needs a combined attack from separatists (starting with the Kurds) and neighboring countries, including Turkey. Such a coalition could possibly inflict serious damage on the Islamic Republic's defenses. However, there is no guarantee that Iran will collapse. The US military operation will end sooner or later, but the Arabs and Turks will still have to live next door to the Persians. No one wants to make enemies for years to come. Given the likelihood of growing Kurdish separatism, Ankara will think twice before responding to the missiles. Even if we imagine a scenario of a complete victory by a united coalition of the US, Turkey, and the Arab League over Iran—provided Washington does not encourage Kurdish separatism—Ankara is asking: what awaits the region afterward? There are many risks and unknown variables here. What is certain is that Israel will strengthen its position. Turkey, according to former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, is the next target. Iran has been diverting the Jewish state's forces and resources, and after its defeat, there will be no one to do so. Moreover, the new Iran could become entirely pro-American, and Türkiye will no longer be able to rely on it in the event of disagreements with NATO. Finally, the success of the operation to dismantle Iranian sovereignty will create another precedent, and Turkey, with its numerous disagreements with the West, will have something to think about. |
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| The Grand Turk |
| Playing on Europe's fears: Erdogan churns out fighter jets and eyes aircraft carriers |
| 2026-02-23 |
| Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited by Kamran Gasanov [REGNUM] Despite systemic and long-standing economic difficulties, Turkey has surprisingly maintained its geopolitical and military influence. Syria is a case in point. In the midst of the lira crisis and inflation, Ankara almost single-handedly succeeded in changing the government in Damascus and transformed itself from a minority group into the dominant force in the Arab country. Recently, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's government built on its success by forcing the disarmament and disbandment of its primary source of intervention—the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG). ![]() Turkey is actively promoting its influence in all areas, including Libya, Somalia, Central Asia, and the South Caucasus. In Europe, Turkey's main stronghold is the Balkans, where Ankara manages to befriend both Albanians and Kosovars, Bosnian Muslims, and their adversaries in Belgrade. For the Balkans, Turkey serves both as a hub for the spread of Islam and as an economic partner. The Turkish Stream, which operates through interconnectors in Serbia, Romania, and Hungary, has become a key source of energy security for the region, especially in light of anti-Russian sanctions. As for the rest of Europe, with the exception of the UK, a traditional ally of Turkey, which has since left the EU, it has been hostile to the Erdoğan administration, with a few exceptions, such as Viktor Orbán, who joined the Organization of Turkic States. Brussels, Paris, and Berlin constantly poured in accusations of human rights violations and criticism of Turkey's military activity in Libya, Syria, Cyprus, and elsewhere. Greece and Cyprus, as EU members, created obstacles to normalizing relations, expanding the customs agreement, not to mention EU accession. However, with Donald Trump's return to power, Turkey has become a privileged partner of the EU. Amid doubts about American guarantees and Trump's unpredictability, Brussels, along with London, is making every effort to integrate Turkey into the future European security system. After the US and Russia met for the first time in Riyadh, which Europeans perceived as a betrayal of the EU, Erdoğan was invited to the EU leaders' summit in London in early March 2025. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan attended and supported the idea that European security without Turkey is unthinkable. Subsequently, contacts between Turkey and Europe intensified. In October, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz visited Ankara to pay their respects to Erdoğan. The latter finally approved the supply of Eurofighter fighter jets to Turkey, while the former brought some with him. Italy and Poland are among Turkey's most reliable partners in the EU. Warsaw, through Donald Tusk, openly supported Turkey's accession to the EU, and Italian Prime Minister Giorgio Meloni facilitated the signing of a defense contract between Baykar and Leonardo for the development of unmanned aerial vehicles. Turkish Defense Minister Yaşar Güler began participating in meetings with his EU counterparts. Europe wants to draw Turkey into its defense and use it to cover the rear areas that would emerge in the event of a possible US troop withdrawal from the Old World. Trump and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, at their recent meetings in Davos and Munich, made it clear to Europe's freeloaders that it's time for them to take their own defense into their own hands. The EU tirelessly trumpeted that Russia plans to attack it in the next three to five years. Therefore, Turkey is being cast as a shield. Turkey is pandering to the wishes and hopes of Europeans. Recently, its armed forces deployed drones to participate in the NATO Steadfast Dart 2026 military exercise in the Baltic Sea. The total number of troops deployed reached 10,000. Ankara deployed Bayraktar-TB3 UAVs (with a range of 2,000 km) from the deck of the landing ship TCG Anadolu. The drones, which struck targets at sea, practiced missions in the "harsh winter conditions" of the Baltic Sea. Matthias Böhnke, spokesman for NATO's Joint Force Command Brunssum, boasted that Turkey made the "largest contribution" to these exercises. The Turkish delegation was indeed impressive: the task force comprised 1,500 personnel. In addition to the landing ship, the ship Derya and the frigates TCG Istanbul and TCG Oruçreis were also present in the Baltic. The latter made headlines in the early 2020s when it accompanied gas exploration offshore Cyprus, antagonizing Paris, Athens, and Nicosia. Judging by the fact that all the Baltic countries are NATO members, it's not hard to guess who the maneuvers were aimed at. Turkey, unlike its NATO partners, doesn't mention the Russian threat. Naval Commander-in-Chief Ercüment Tatlıoğlu is no exception. He explained the purpose of his forces' participation as "demonstrating the capability of long-range force projection as part of allied cooperation" and "integrating unmanned systems into amphibious operations." Analyzing the specifics of Turkish foreign policy, it's easy to see that it lacks any commitment or solidarity to Euro-Atlantic security. Especially since NATO has repeatedly demonstrated its friendship with Turkey by criticizing its actions against the PKK in Syria, harboring coup plotters, and stepping aside during the Russia-Turkey conflict over the Su-24. So, Ankara will play on the fears and incentives of the EU and other NATO countries to monetize its own profits. Are Bayraktar sorties in the Baltic not just another advertisement for them, aimed at expanding their European markets? But whether Turkey will participate in a real battle between the EU and Russia for the sake of Europe, or participate in the arrest of the Russian fleet in the Baltic, risking multi-billion dollar trade, nuclear power plants, and precious oil and gas supplies, is a rhetorical question. So the key word in Tatlioglu's statement is "long-range power projection." Turkey's ambitions are growing in the face of global confrontation and competition. The more powerful Turkish weapons are, the easier it will be to advance its geopolitical interests. Understanding this simple truth, the leadership in Ankara is busy building up and modernizing its military capabilities. Thus, immediately after the NATO exercises, Erdogan made it clear that his country, which already independently produces drones, tanks, missiles, ships, and helicopters, is aiming to build aircraft carriers. It must be said, not every country in the world has these "floating airfields." Of course, owning aircraft carriers doesn't automatically make you a great power. Examples include Thailand and, to some extent, Italy. But Turkey wants all the attributes of a great power. Otherwise, Erdogan's statement, "Not a single problem in the world can be solved without us," seems populist. Other missing attributes include a strong economy, a strong currency, a seat on the UN Security Council, and nuclear weapons. Ankara's currency and economy are faring poorly. However, Erdogan has been talking about revising the UN Security Council for a long time. The Turkish government is less forthcoming about nuclear weapons. However, in February, Fidan first raised the possibility of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East if the US pushes Iran to acquire WMD. For now, Turkey, like Europe, relies more on NATO's nuclear shield. However, if Ankara plans to remove American warheads from Incirlik Air Base, they can only be replaced with domestic ones. Nuclear weapons are a long-term prospect, while aircraft carriers are a medium-term project. A more feasible and anticipated defense project in the near term is fighter jets. The Turkish company TAI has already built the second prototype of the state-of-the-art fifth-generation KAAN fighter. These aircraft are being considered as an alternative to the F-35, which the US has not jointly produced with Turkey due to its purchase of Russian S-400 air defense systems. The modified KAAN is 20 meters shorter than the first version and is wider in the middle to accommodate more missiles. Three completed prototypes are already at the factory, with their first flights scheduled for May–June 2026. Serial production will follow three years later. Like the F-35, the KAAN incorporates stealth technology. Despite the Trump administration's friendly approach, the US is not happy about Turkey's military-industrial complex becoming independent. Congress still refuses to grant licenses for General Electric engines. Fidan has already complained about this. Not only is the US slowing down KAAN production, but they are also hindering its future exports. The White House has already demanded an explanation from Saudi Arabia for its intention to purchase Turkish F-35 equivalents. In short, while news about the militarization of Europe dominates the news agenda, Turkey is doing the same. Ankara is clearly aiming to expand beyond its status as a regional power and will seek to increase its influence in Central Africa, the Mediterranean, the Caspian Sea, and the Persian Gulf. And achieving all these goals without aircraft carriers, fighter jets, and bombers will be extremely difficult. |
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