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'Those who believe have migrated.' Emigration as the Basis of Islam
2025-07-18
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Sergey Adamov
The only way to conclude that Islam is a kind and gentle faith is to ignore the history of Mohammed’s conquests including the Battle of Khaybar, and the next several generations of rapid expansion by the sword — compared to that, ISIS and Al Qaeda are truly kinder and gentler Islam.
[REGNUM] Even those who are not very familiar with the dogma and cultural traditions of Islam most likely know that the Muslim calendar differs from the Christian one. Thus, July 16, 2025 from the Nativity of Christ corresponds to the 21st day of the first month (the month of Muharram) of 1447 Hijri. Christians count the years from the coming of the Savior into the world - which they consider the main event not only of sacred, but also of world history. But Muslims count the dates not from the birth of Muhammad, but from a moment more significant for their religion.

The Hijra (literally translated as “migration,” and in modern interpretation as “emigration”) of the Prophet is what changed the character of his religion and still influences the culture, politics, and social psychology of the ummah, the global community of the faithful.

On one of the last days of July 622 AD, Muhammad secretly left his hometown of Mecca, where he had received revelations, began preaching monotheism and created the first community. The reason for the resettlement, or in fact, a hasty escape, was a threat to the life of the prophet.

Most of Muhammad's relatives from the Quraysh tribe that inhabited Mecca remained pagans. For a time, they tolerated the denunciations of idolatry. But when Muhammad said that the ancestors of those who did not believe in Allah were imprisoned in Jahannam - the fiery Gehenna (and thus openly broke with the tradition of honoring the forefathers), the leaders of the Quraysh decided to deal with the preacher.

Hiding from his fellow tribesmen, Muhammad stayed in the house of one of those he could trust - Abu Bakr as-Siddiq, his father-in-law and future successor (after the death of the prophet, Abu Bakr would become the first caliph). But it was dangerous to live there too.

Muhammad and Abu Bakr fled at night into the desert near Mecca, where they hid for three more days. Only when the Quraysh lost track of the troublemaker did the prophet and his father-in-law leave for the city of Yathrib (340 kilometers as the crow flies). Yathrib, from the moment of Muhammad's arrival there, received a new name - Medina, or more precisely Al-Madina an-Nabawiyya, the City of the Prophet.

"THOSE WHO GAVE SHELTER"
Muhammad, forced to leave his homeland in a hurry, did not come to an "empty place". In Yathrib, where the preaching of Islam was more successful than in Mecca, by the time of the Hijra there already existed a community of Ansars - local residents who had accepted the new faith. Even before the Prophet's resettlement, many Meccans had immigrated to this city, hiding from the pagans - they were called muhajdirs, that is, literally migrants, from the Arabic "hajar" - "to migrate".

It should also be noted that the motive of migration has accompanied the history of Islam from its earliest years. Already in the fourth year of Muhammad's preaching in Mecca, in 614 CE, due to problems with the top of the Quraysh, the prophet suggested that part of the faithful move across the Red Sea and take refuge in the Christian Kingdom of Aksum (the territory of present-day Ethiopia). The first group of emigrants headed by Usman ibn Affan, the son-in-law of the prophet and the future third caliph, left for Aksum. Another group of muhajirs moved across the sea in the fifth year of preaching, in 615.

Thus, even when the Prophet of Allah lived in his hometown, Islam began to expand territorially, without reference to any “historical homelands.”

By the time of the Hijra, the Islamic community had existed for almost ten years, and the Prophet had written the first Meccan suras (chapters) of the Koran. However, in the Muslim tradition, the time up until the migration from Mecca to Medina is called the era of jahiliyyah - pagan ignorance, and the era of Islam is only counted from the Hijra. Therefore, the day of Muhammad's "immigration" became the first day of the new chronology.

“Indeed, those who believed and migrated and fought with their wealth and their lives in the way of Allah, and those who gave refuge to the emigrants and helped them, these are indeed helpers and friends of one another,” says the 72nd verse of the 8th surah of the Quran, Al-Anfal (The Spoils).

FOREIGN CITY, OTHER SURAS
Many founders of world religions have spoken of the fact that they essentially have no home in this world. The Gospel of Matthew quotes Jesus Christ as saying, “Foxes have holes, and the birds of the air have nests, but the Son of man has nowhere to lay his head” (Matthew 8:20). The Church Fathers interpreted these words of Christ as evidence that His Kingdom is not of this world.

In the case of Islam, a different context is important: when the prophet lost his home and city, this became the beginning of the ummah as a religious and at the same time political and military association (this is the difference between the Islamic community and the Church and the state in the Christian understanding), called upon to convert the world into dar-al-Islam, the territory of Islam, through peaceful and armed jihad.

If you strictly follow the text of the Koran, then this turning point is quite difficult to track. The holy book is not built chronologically, but from the most voluminous suras to the shortest. This is the appearance that the Koran took from the moment of its codification under the aforementioned third caliph Uthman ibn Affan.

But depending on the time of revelation, the chapters of the Quran are divided into two categories: “Meccan” and “Medina”, which also differ in their focus.

The bulk of the Koran (approximately two-thirds) consists of Meccan suras, revealed before the Hijra. They reveal the foundations of the doctrine, questions of ethics and morality, and arguments in favor of monotheism.

The 16th verse of the Meccan Surah An-Nahl (The Bees) states the following:

"Invite to the way of your Lord with wisdom and good advice, and argue with them in the best way. Indeed, your Lord knows best who has strayed from His path, and knows best who is guided."

But after the resettlement, the tone of the text changes.

The Medinan suras are not so much about how to convert fellow Arabs to the true faith, but rather about how the new armed religious-political community should build relations with the outside world - the pagans and the Ahl al-Kitab, the “people of the book” (Christians and Jews).

The 29th verse of the Medinan Surah At-Tawbah (Repentance) states:

“Fight those of the People of the Book who believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, nor do they hold unlawful what Allah and His Messenger have forbidden, nor do they follow the true religion, until they pay the tribute with their own hands, and are humbled.”

This situation marked the moment when the Ummah, through migrations and military campaigns, had covered the Arabian Peninsula. By the time of Muhammad's death in 632 (10th year of the Hijra), the Islamic community had approached the borders of Zoroastrian Iran and the Christian Byzantine Empire.

"The writing of the Koran took place when Muslims lived among pagans, it is quite natural that Islam was spread through proselytism. The first to be converted were pagans, but also Christians and Zoroastrians. Here is an example - Muslim Iran, the entire nation was converted," noted Roman Silantyev, an Islamologist and deputy chairman of the expert council for conducting state religious studies examinations at the Ministry of Justice, in a commentary to Regnum News Agency.

"BE LIKE ME"
The spread of the Islamic religion within the framework of the Caliphate in the Middle East and Maghreb - North Africa was accompanied by the migration of Arab tribes. It is not surprising why now from Morocco to Iraq and from Syria to Sudan people speak different dialects of Arabic. Some of them are descendants of immigrants, some are descendants of Syrians, Egyptians, Berbers and other peoples who accepted the new faith and assimilated. And assimilated not always under duress.

Zoroastrianism gave way to Islam and "shrank" to a few communities because it was an ethnic religion, "the faith of the Persians." But Islam, from its inception, was not the faith of the Arabs, just as Christianity was not the faith of the Syrians, Greeks, and Romans.

Catholicism, Orthodoxy and Protestantism know a separate institution of missionaries (as a rule, the faith was preached by priests and monks). But in Islam there is no such institution of priesthood, and the conversion of non-believers to the faith of the prophet is the duty of every member of the ummah. The process of conversion - dawah also implies a reward from the Almighty for the Muslim who brought the newly converted to the community.

The concept of jihad (literally, "zeal"), as is known, is not equivalent to a holy war. The struggle for faith implies both self-improvement and preaching Islam in the non-Muslim world ("great jihad"), and the affirmation of faith in the fight against its opponents - "small jihad".

The Medina Surah Al-Imran states: “O People of the Book! Let us come to a common word between us and you, that we will not worship anyone except Allah, nor will we associate anything with Him, nor will we take one another as lords besides Allah.”

In other words, non-believers from among the people of the book are invited to reconsider their views and join the ranks of the faithful.

When political Islam – already in the form of the Caliphate – expanded beyond the Arabian Peninsula, the concept of “tribute” or “poll tax” (jizya) mentioned in Surah At-Tawba became fundamental for building relationships between the Caliphs and their subjects who did not convert to Islam.

The established order of things gently "nudged" people to change their faith: if you don't want to pay tribute, convert to a new faith; if you want to participate in political and economic activity, change your faith. So there were economic reasons for adopting the religion and way of life that the settlers brought with them.

Also important is the approach that can be called “ be like me,” notes Silantyev. “Roughly speaking, you are friends with Muslims, you live in their environment, you accept their customs,” explains the religious scholar.

This method of “great jihad” – appeal through soft power, through communication and example – was effective not only during the time of the first caliphs. And not only when Islam was spreading in a non-Arab, foreign-cultural environment – in Persia, Khorezm, the Indus Valley, the Volga region, Bengal or the island of Java.

Similarly, “preaching through communication and interaction” works in our time, when Islamic communities exist all over the world and spread the faith beyond the “ethnic Muslim” environment.

"There are recent examples in our society, for example, the actor Sergei Romanovich, he converted to Islam under the influence of friends, and then left this religion. A classic of the genre. Or the MMA wrestler Alexander Emelianenko trained with Muslims, and also converted. The environment plays a key role," notes Silantyev.

The global task of such an action is to constantly expand and agitate so that the ummah expands. In practice, the mechanics of conversion can be built on different models, for example, through marriage. In the modern world, Muslims can find partners online, create relationships, and then set a mandatory condition for marriage - a change of faith. Moreover, the target "audience" of preachers is, as a rule, women or children.

The "Great Jihad" is facilitated by economic processes that stimulate the migration of Muslims from the countries of "Dar-al-Islam" to places historically inhabited by non-believers. In the modern world, these non-believers often turn out to be unbelievers, i.e., unconverted. We are talking, we note, about the struggle for faith through preaching, communication and personal example - as the immigrant muhajirs from Mecca preached faith among the Arabian pagans.

EXTREMELY HIGH PERCENTAGE OF RADICALS AMONG NEOPHYTES
But if we are not talking about traditional Islam, but about its radical distortions (for example, about modern Salafism or Wahhabism), then here the “struggle for faith” in a non-Islamic environment is understood differently. Extremists, who proclaim the goal of restoring the state-ummah of the first caliphs (this is what the ISIS* “caliphate” was supposed to be), see the outside world as an object of aggression, and Muslim migrants as a potential vanguard of the armies of Islam. The historical caliphate of the 7th century expanded not only by “fire and sword,” but the Salafis of the 21st century see the situation differently.

And here the methods of proselytism – preaching, involvement in the community – can be dangerous. “Radicals often recruited women online, often, excuse me, ugly ones. They say: even if you are not a beauty, come to us in the Islamic State*, in Iraq, Syria, we guarantee you family happiness. A quarter of the widows of ISIS members are neophytes, it is a well-known fact,” notes Roman Silantyev.

There are known cases of "honey traps" when lonely men are approached through social networks and dating sites. However, the motives of men who fall for the hook of radicals may differ. Extremist preaching of the supposedly "correct" understanding of religion and jihad is carried out not only among migrants from "traditionally Islamic" ethnic groups, but also among "infidels" from the indigenous population.

"We have an extremely high percentage of radicals among neophytes. The most active preaching is done by Wahhabis, on the Internet, in Wahhabi mosques, prayer houses, many go to them. Some people are attracted by radical political motives - I hate the government, the police - I will go to ISIS*, I will kill, blow things up," Silantyev notes.

Such "proselytism" also threatens traditional Islam. As an example, we can cite the story of the newly converted Alla Saprykina, who received the name Aminat after accepting Islam. Having been recruited by radicals, the woman committed a terrorist act, killing a representative of the Muslim clergy of Dagestan, Sheikh Said Chirkeysky, who defended the dogmas of traditional Islam against extremists. Another example is one of the leaders of the terrorist underground in the North Caucasus, Said Buryatsky ( Alexander Tikhomirov ).

Therefore, the attitude towards neophytes in the Islamic environment itself is often wary, despite the fact that Islam historically arose as a religion based on migrations and preaching among neophytes. Thus, active proselytism, which can be skillfully manipulated by radicals, often plays a destructive role in society, despite the fact that it was initially dictated exclusively by good intentions.

Link


Syria-Lebanon-Iran
Pause to Disguise: West Prepares for Main Task in Iran
2025-06-25
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Kirill Semenov

[REGNUM] The temporary pause in mutual attacks between Israel, the US and Iran so far leaves more questions than it answers.

Given that neither side has achieved its objectives,
…Iran has not erased Israel, but Israel has severely damaged Iran’s nuclear program, killed or wounded many of its civilian and military leaders, and made a severe dent in Iran’s war matériel, hindering both their ability to wage war and rule the country. Also, there’s that little thing about Israel wiping out most of the leadership, funding, and war matériel of Hamas and Hezbollah, and the ports used by the Houthis, severely reducing the ability of Iran’s catspaws to attack Israel at home, though they are thus far mostly untouched in Europe and the Americas…
a new escalation can be expected soon. Although it is also likely that Iran's opponents will move to a new stage and focus their efforts on subversion within the country in order to bring about a change of power and the dismantling of the Islamic Republic.

NEW METHODS OF OVERTHROW
In the event of a long-term truce, Washington and Tel Aviv are counting on the Yugoslav scenario being launched in Iran. Then, strikes on the country caused significant damage and, although not immediately, paved the way for a “color revolution” and a change of power.

Trump has most likely generally accepted Israel's view on the need to dismantle the political system of the Islamic Republic. At the same time, the range of possible actions to achieve this goal is very wide, including the assassination of Iran's supreme leader, which could trigger revolutionary events.

Therefore, what is happening is a serious challenge for Russia as well. Iran is being used to develop elements of future subversive activities against both us and China, Donald Trump's main adversary.

First of all, the creation and launch of not only effective terrorist and sabotage networks, but also cells engaged in subversive activities through the dissemination of narratives favorable to the United States and Israel and organizing protests in Iranian society is being tested.

Perhaps the previous principles and methods of "color revolutions" that worked against weak political regimes, such as those in Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, etc., have already been revised. They have proven ineffective against countries such as Russia or Iran.

It is also worth recalling that the subversive actions of the US and Israel in Iran occurred immediately after Operation Spider Web, when strategic aviation bases were attacked by sabotage terrorist groups using drones from Russian territory. And earlier, there were explosions of transport infrastructure, murders of Russian generals and public figures.

Both operations—the actions of cells in both Iran and Russia—followed similar algorithms, so they most likely had a single foreign coordination and decision-making center.

If we consider the geopolitical consequences, then, by continuing their subversive activities against the Islamic Republic, the United States and Israel also intend to destroy the “One Belt, One Road” and “North-South” transport corridor systems that are being built.

Therefore, the actions of the American-Israeli bloc are a common threat, and it would be good if it led to strengthening cooperation in the Moscow-Tehran-Beijing triangle with the possible involvement of Pakistan to the extent that it does not cost the break in the strategic partnership with India.

A LIBERAL SHOWCASE WITH RADICAL CONTENT
Naturally, if the enemies of the Islamic Republic aim to change power in the country, then they must prepare a leader who will personify a new Iran “without mullahs, hijabs and Sharia.”

The most acceptable candidate was chosen to be the shahzade, that is, the prince, the son of the last shah, Muhammad Pahlavi, who, like his grandfather, the founder of the dynasty, bears the name Reza.

As early as February 2025, Pahlavi was chosen by various fringe factions of the Iranian opposition as their leader and head of a future transitional government “until the formation of the first national assembly and the beginning of democratic rule through free elections.”

In reality, however, his supporters do not wield any real influence within the country. Reza, like his father, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, was never a popular leader.

Reza Pahlavi, the grandfather, the first shah of the dynasty, essentially usurped power after a military coup and declared himself the new monarch in 1925, rather than establish a republic in Iran. In this sense, both shahs resemble the father and son of the Assad family in Syria, who led the country to collapse and revolution.

Therefore, the legitimacy of the Pahlavis themselves is very conditional - they came to power through a coup and, by historical standards, soon lost power through a revolution. It is not possible to compare them with the Romanovs in Russia or other dynasties - overthrown, but having deep foundations for legitimacy.

At the same time, there are more serious opposition forces in Iran, which, unlike the freak monarchists, have their own networks of influence and can really lay claim to power in the event of a hypothetical collapse.

This includes, for example, the Organization of the Mujahideen of the Iranian People (OMIN), a revolutionary leftist-Islamist organization that waged armed struggle against the Islamic Republic for a long time while in Saddam Hussein's camp. The ideology of this organization is a mixture of Marxist, Leninist and Islamist positions.

The MEK participated in the Islamic Revolution in Iran, but then lost the struggle for power to the "Khomeinists" and its supporters were subjected to repression. The mujahideen responded to this with a wave of terror and mass murder of supporters of the new authorities.

The MEK had its own National Army of Liberation of Iran (NAL), based in Iraq and numbering 7,000 fighters. In 1988, six days after Ayatollah Khomeini announced his acceptance of a UN-brokered ceasefire, the NLA advanced under heavy Iraqi air cover, crossed the border, and captured the city of Islamabad-e-Gharb. But it was then driven back with heavy losses.

In 2003, the MEK and NAO, still based in Iraq, fought on Saddam's side against the US and its allies who had attacked Iraq, but a ceasefire was then agreed upon.

However, since 2009, the new Iraqi government, close to the Islamic Republic, has demanded that MEK leave Iraq. Then, pro-Iranian Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki announced that the group would be banned from basing itself on Iraqi territory. He backed up his statements with repression and arrests of its members.

After that, the US began to remove the organization's fighters from Iraq. At the same time, OMIN was removed from the terrorist lists, and the US was able to convince Albania to accept the remaining 2,700 NAO members who were brought to Tirana between 2014 and 2016. It is obvious that the CIA, by showing such patronage over OMIN, expected to use its resources in the future.

A 2008 report by the U.S. Army Intelligence Center said the MEK operates a large network of supporters in Iran, sparking debate among intelligence experts about whether Western powers should use the opportunity to better build their own intelligence picture of the Iranian regime’s goals and intentions.

Iran has also carried out operations to expose MEK networks, for example, in 2010 and 2011, Ali Saremi, Mohammad Ali Hajj Aghaei and Jafar Kazemi were executed for collaborating with the organization .

Donald Trump, even during his first presidency, wanted to use MEK against the Islamic Republic. In January 2018, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani called French President Emmanuel Macron and asked him to order the expulsion of MEK from its French base in Auvers-sur-Oise, claiming that the organization had provoked the Iranian protests of 2017–2018.

The main base of the OMIN, however, remained Albania, where more than 4,000 of its members were located. There, during the Free Iran 2019 conference, former New York City Mayor and Trump’s personal lawyer Rudy Giuliani described the group as a “government in exile,” saying it was a ready-made alternative to lead the country if the Iranian government fell.

Moreover, the Trump administration then stated that it did not rule out the MEK as a viable replacement for the current Iranian regime.

In turn, OMIN networks in Albania were subjected to cyber attacks in 2022, which the Albanian authorities blamed on Iran, leading to a rupture in diplomatic relations between the countries.

Thus, if the Shah is a kind of “face” of the pro-Western opposition, then in reality the change of power in the Islamic Republic will be carried out by networks of radical organizations such as OMIN.

Of course, it now positions itself as a respectable structure that shares Western values, but in reality this group has hardly moved far from its previous principles.

Therefore, even if we assume that the West will succeed in dismantling the current state system in Iran, this does not mean that they will succeed in bringing to power their own supporters, who are not an organized force.

GUARDIANS OF THE REVOLUTION
At the same time, there are serious obstacles to such plans for a change of power in Iran. Thus, despite the split in Iranian society, its pro-government part has united around the supreme leader.

It is a foundation that can withstand any pressure, even from the majority of Iranians themselves, who are unable to crack it until it cracks itself. However, its foundation still appears monolithic, despite attempts to drive wedges through military actions by the US and Israel.

At the core of this foundation is the very ideology of the Islamic Republic, the guardians and cement of which are the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Unlike the CPSU and the Komsomol of the late USSR, the IRGC is not just a party of supporters of the Islamic regime or special services, which are also there. The IRGC is a multi-million army, an armed force of supporters of the Islamic Republic and the ideas of the Islamic revolution, whose tentacles are present in all spheres of society, holding it back from disintegration.

And the opposition, even one as organized as OMIN, has nothing to counter this “monster” with.

It is pointless to look for complete analogues of the IRGC: this is a purely Iranian specificity. The formation of the Corps took place without looking back at any Western examples. And what it has now become - with its own industry, aviation, navy and special services - was clearly not envisaged at the time of its creation.

The IRGC emerged primarily as a military structure, a kind of guard during the war with Iraq. At that time, assault battalions were created from the most zealous Muslim supporters of the Islamic Revolution, which were then united into the divisions of "Prophet Mohammad", "Imam Hussein", "Ashura" and "Najaf", which became some of the most combat-ready during the Iran-Iraq war.

Initially these were formations designed to fight Iraq on the battlefield, but were recruited from motivated volunteers who later found wider use.

Thus, the IRGC rather reflects the Middle Eastern, Islamic specificity, and the most similar to it is probably the National Guard of Saudi Arabia. It arose from the religious militia of zealous Wahhabis, the "Ikhwan" (not to be confused with other "Ikhwan", the "Muslim Brotherhood").

The Saudi Ikhwan might have also secured for themselves powers as broad as those of the IRGC in Iran, if not for their conflict with the king, the unsuccessful uprising in 1929, and the transformation of those of them who remained loyal to the monarch despite their own understanding of religion into the National Guard. Instead of guardians of religion, they became guardians of the oil fields and borders of the House of Saud.

That is, both the Saudi Ikhwan and the IRGC are, first and foremost, defenders, guardians of religion and a state based on religious principles. And they must protect religion from enemies, both external and internal.

This is the main difference between the IRGC and the Iranian army. If the army must protect the state as a territory, then the IRGC stands guard over the Islamic revolution, its goals and ideals. Therefore, they are called upon to act both inside the country and far beyond Iran. That is why the range of tasks of the IRGC is much wider.

For example, for the "export of the Islamic revolution" there is the Al-Quds command - an organization with its own structure. It is intended for foreign operations, support of allied movements and countries.

That is, if we imagine the IRGC as a matryoshka doll, as a state within a state, then Al-Quds is also a state, a matryoshka doll, but already within the “IRGC state”. With its own separate intelligence structures, special forces, ground forces. And it seems that it will be difficult to find a suitable analogue for this.

The IRGC has its own intelligence and counterintelligence, but so does the Quds Force command. At the same time, the Islamic Republic itself as a state also has its own intelligence and counterintelligence, not connected to the IRGC.

But functions similar to those of, for example, our Federal Security Service are concentrated in the IRGC. The Ansar al-Mahdi unit operates to protect senior officials and religious centers, and the Supreme Leader himself is protected by the Wali-e Amr unit.

The IRGC also has rapid reaction forces and special operations forces that duplicate the army special forces, including the Saberin Takavor Brigade, the 110th Salman Farsi Special Operations Brigade, the 33rd Al-Mahdi Airborne Brigade and separate battalions in provincial corps. While in the Army, the Special Forces are represented by the 55th and 65th Brigades.

The IRGC's ground forces are organized into 32 infantry territorial corps, which were deployed from regular divisions from the Iran-Iraq War, combined with regular battalions and militias from the Basij command.

Unlike the army divisions, the IRGC divisions are mostly infantry. Although they do have tank units, they are significantly fewer than the army. There are probably 8 IRGC "operational" divisions deployed at all times in peacetime, but in wartime there may be more than 40.

The core of the land component in the provinces is the "Hussein Battalions", which are part of the Basij and serve as the basis for the reserve infantry divisions in wartime that will be deployed from the militias. These battalions can also be used as expeditionary forces. They have, for example, participated in the fighting in Syria.

Therefore, the Basij is not only the militia and reserve of the IRGC, but also the regular units. This includes the first-priority reserve and the so-called “army of 20 million” - a broader, mass militia that can be called up to suppress internal threats.

If the Hussein Battalions are the backbone of the IRGC ground forces, the equivalent of a territorial army in the provinces, then the Ali Battalions of the Basij Command are the equivalent of a gendarmerie aimed at suppressing unrest and counter-revolutionary rebellions. They work closely with the police and security forces.

The IRGC has created a multi-layered presence in Iranian society and has engaged in its activities in one form or another millions of people who are ready to stand up for the Islamic revolution at the first order. At least, this is what is expected of them.

This is the foundation, the basis on which the Iranian regime relies. And even if its supporters are in the minority, their unity and organization will most likely allow them to withstand the challenges and threats of internal destabilization.

Link


Europe
EU Pushes Balkans Towards New War, Dodik Seeks Support from Russia and Israel
2025-04-03
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Bogdan Kish

[REGNUM] Over the past month, Republika Srpska
…the Serbian enclave in Bosnia and Herzegovina…
(RS) President Milorad Dodik has made several international visits despite a Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) court verdict, an Interpol arrest warrant and a travel ban from BiH. Despite everything, the republic continues to regain its powers and move towards independence.

On April 1, Dodik held a meeting in the Kremlin with Russian President Vladimir Putin. It is noteworthy that the head of the RS had already visited Serbia, Hungary and Israel before his visit to Moscow, enjoying the support of a number of countries tired of the “rules-based world.”

UNTENABLE VERDICT
After the BiH court sentenced the leadership of the Republika Srpska, a real hunt began. Due to “disrespect” for the illegitimate “high representative” appointed to oversee Bosnia and Herzegovina after the end of the 1992-1995 war, Dodik was sentenced to one year in prison and banned from political activity for five years.

The Prime Minister of the Republic of Srpska Radovan Višković and the Speaker of the Parliament Nenad Stevandić were also found to be "guilty". Moreover, due to Sarajevo's inability to arrest the RS leadership, the Serbian leaders began to be accused of "attempting to undermine the constitutional order" of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which resulted in an Interpol request and a ban on leaving BiH.

One of Dodik's main allies, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, was the first to react to the verdict, and quite violently:

"The political witch hunt against Republika Srpska President Milorad Dodik is a sad example of how the legal system is being turned into a weapon against a democratically elected leader. If we want to maintain stability in the Western Balkans, this is not our way forward."

However, the verdict itself is hardly legitimate. It is not for nothing that the Republic of Srpska has not recognized the activities of the High Representative Christian Schmidt and the Constitutional Court of BiH for more than two years.

Schmidt does not have a UN Security Council mandate, as Russia and China have vetoed it. Therefore, the decisions and imposed laws of the self-proclaimed high representative in Banja Luka are simply ignored.

The situation is similar with the BiH court. This court is built on the system of "2+2+2+3", it has two representatives of each nation: two Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks, and three foreigners.

It is not difficult to guess that the presence of foreigners provides political Sarajevo with the decisions it needs, so the court has long become an anti-Serb (and even anti-Croatian) political instrument within the process of creating a unitary country.

"BiH has never emerged from crisis. It is an impossible country, in constant crisis. It emerges from one crisis process and enters another," Dodik said recently.

RETURN OF POWERS
The political structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina is an extremely complex system, in which, in theory, there should be two entities - the Republic of Srpska and the Muslim-Croat Federation of BiH. The entities have the broadest rights and, in fact, these are two states in one, which is enshrined in the Dayton Peace Treaty.

However, Sarajevo, the EU and the US are increasingly unhappy with this arrangement, since the Republic of Srpska is blocking accession to NATO, refusing to impose anti-Russian sanctions and not supporting Ukraine. In fact, they began to take away its powers almost immediately after the signing of peace. This is noticeable in a number of decisions - from the creation of the Brcko district to common institutions of power at the level of BiH. But especially strong pressure began with the coming to power of Milorad Dodik.

Under him, the republic began to regain a number of powers, and the sentence to its leadership became the last straw, after which they realized that they had a choice: either to surrender and allow the destruction of statehood, or to fight through legal and diplomatic means.

"We are not fighting against BiH and Bosniaks, but we are fighting for our rights, as enshrined in the Dayton Peace Accords," said Milorad Dodik.

The leadership of the Republic of Srpska promptly passed laws banning the work of the Bosnian prosecutor's office, court and SIPA intelligence service on its territory, as well as laws on foreign agents and the fight against intelligence activities. At the same time, Milorad Dodik called on Serbs working in the general government bodies to leave them, promising to find them all other jobs.

Moreover, the deputies of the National Assembly (parliament) of the Republic of Srpska approved a draft resolution on the beginning of the adoption of a new constitution of the Republic of Srpska, which will give the right to recreate its armed forces, create special services and border guards, form a court and prosecutor's office, and even the right to a confederation with Serbia.

Particular attention is drawn to Articles 115 and 116, which state that Banja Luka will have its own army and can both declare neutrality and enter into military alliances with other states. Given the authority of Milorad Dodik and the political majority in parliament, the adoption of a new Constitution is a matter of time.

One of the main points of the republican leadership's activities will be the restoration of the border police. Two laws have already been developed and are under consideration by the government.

It is worth recalling here that from 1996 to 2000, the border of the Republic of Srpska with Serbia, Croatia and Montenegro was controlled by its own police. The creation of the border service of Bosnia and Herzegovina was initiated by the high representative Wolfgang Petritsch, putting pressure on the then weak Banja Luka.

It is noteworthy that the Serbs who worked in the institutions of BiH were given until March 19 to decide whether to transfer to the institutions of the Republic of Srpska. And from that date, all employees of the SIPA special services and the Bosnian prosecutor's office can be detained for working on the territory of the Republic of Srpska.

"If something can't live up to Dayton, then we have to be a free state," Dodik said.

Despite the constant accusations of "separatism" and "attack on the constitutional order" against the RS leadership, it is Banja Luka that does everything within the framework of the Dayton Accords and the BiH constitution. It does not go beyond what is permitted and uses the broadest possibilities of the internationally recognized documents that were won on the battlefield from 1992 to 1995.

It is obvious that the strong position of the republic does not suit either Sarajevo or the US and the EU, so they not only interpret the agreements as they want, but also directly contradict them - the appointment of an illegitimate high representative alone is worth something.

ISOLATION HAS FAILED
The persecution of Milorad Dodik is just part of a larger EU campaign to combat dissent.

Brussels today represents the "war party" and is the main supporter of the continuation of the conflict in Ukraine to the last Ukrainian. However, a number of political leaders in Europe "sabotage" the EU plan, as a result of which the Union openly spat on all democratic processes and moved to a real dictatorship even beyond its borders.

The arrest of a presidential candidate in Romania, the detention of the head of Gagauzia, attempts to overthrow the Prime Minister of Hungary, an attempt to assassinate the Prime Minister of Slovakia, unrest in Georgia, the arrest of Marine Le Pen in France and the attempt to detain Milorad Dodik are all links in the same chain.

At the same time, arresting the president of the RS turned out to be not so easy. Firstly, the republic has its own police and special forces that report exclusively to it.

Secondly, the Bosnian Interior Ministry does not enter the republic. SIPA officially refused to participate in Dodik's arrest, and the head of the special services, Darko Čulum, even moved to Dodik's Interior Ministry.

Thirdly, even the EUFOR peacekeeping contingent refused Sarajevo, citing the fact that they do not have the authority to do so.

That is why Milorad Dodik feels at ease in Banja Luka and is not planning to run anywhere.

Foreign visits, of course, became more difficult after the Sarajevo branch of Interpol issued an international arrest warrant for him. However, even this did not stop Dodik from making four foreign trips in a little over a month.

In mid-February, he flew to Hungary on an official visit together with Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic. After discussing a number of economic issues, the country's President Tamas Sujok presented Vucic with the Grand Cross of the Hungarian Order of Merit with a chain and a gold star.

Then Milorad Dodik calmly visited Serbia on March 24, the anniversary of the start of the bombing of Yugoslavia, and returned to Bosnia. Sarajevo was, of course, indignant, but there was nothing they could do about it.

And even though his own border police is still in the process of being created, there are Serbs working on the border with Serbia, and they will not detain their president.

The situation with travel to distant foreign countries has become even more interesting.

Milorad Dodik, as before, left BiH unhindered and traveled from Serbia to Israel. He took part in an international conference on combating anti-Semitism, organized by the Israeli Diaspora Ministry, and also held talks with the country's top leadership.

The details, unfortunately, are not disclosed, but it can be assumed that Dodik has secured the support of Tel Aviv.

It is noteworthy that Banja Luka, unlike Sarajevo, has good relations with it. The Republic of Srpska has long cooperated with Israel on a number of issues, especially in the area of ​​security (due to the threat of Wahhabism) and the study of suffering in World War II (more than 20 years of intensive joint work with the International Institute for the Study of the Holocaust Yad Vashem, cooperation with the Simon Wiesenthal Center, etc.).

Israel also rejected all UN resolutions directed against Republika Srpska, and the republic responded by blocking BiH's vote in the UN against Israel.

The icing on the cake of Milorad Dodik’s international voyage was a visit to Moscow.

It is worth noting that he announced his visits to Israel and Russia long ago. The only question was whether he would be able to leave Bosnia. As we can see, he did.

The meeting with Vladimir Putin was already Dodik's 26th. On the Russian side, the president's aide Yuri Ushakov also took part.

"Russia is a very important country for the Republic of Srpska, including in the UN Security Council. And it has always been objective. Russia is the guarantor of the peace agreement, and Putin said this at the meeting. Within this framework, Russia will advocate for the cessation and abolition of the work of international institutions, especially the fake high representative or, as he says, the illegitimate representative. He was interested in the details of what we do and how we work," Dodik said.

Earlier, the issue of the activities of the EUFOR "peacekeepers" was also raised, as Milorad Dodik wanted to ask Vladimir Putin to veto their activities in the UN Security Council. It is unknown whether this topic was also touched upon. Sarajevo began spreading rumors that Dodik had received Russian citizenship, but this news was quickly denied.

It is not yet known when the President of the Republic of Srpska will return to Banja Luka. However, it is certain that Sarajevo, with the assistance of the EU, will do everything to remove him from political activity.

Any means will be used: arrest, attempt at a “color revolution,” increased sanctions, pressure through Belgrade, and so on.

However, the situation in BiH is such that the potential detention of Dodik threatens a referendum on the secession of the republic he leads from the federation, and this, in turn, could provoke a new war. Do they understand this in Sarajevo and the EU? There are serious doubts about this.

But there is absolutely no doubt that the isolation of Milorad Dodik has failed.

Banja Luka has excellent relations with Hungary, Russia, Israel, China and, with a little help from them, with the entire “global south”. And the common border with Serbia, which is obliged to help and protect Banja Luka, plays a key role in this.
Related:
Milorad Dodik 03/28/2025 Right-wing politics take center stage at Israel’s controversial antisemitism confab
Milorad Dodik 10/14/2024 'True Friend': Erdogan Visits Serbs, But Gives Drones to Kosovo
Milorad Dodik 05/24/2024 UN General Assembly approves a draft resolution on the 'genocide in Srebrenica'

Link


Africa Horn
President @HassanSMohamud, in his televised Ramadan address, urged Somalis to unite in support of the government’s efforts to liberate the country from Kharijites, who have occupied parts of Somalia for 18 years
2025-03-02
[PUBLISH.TWITTER]

…khawarij (Kharijites) are heretics, often used to describe Wahhabis and hence Al Qaeda and ISIS-linked jihadis…
Related:
Kharijites 01/28/2025 Al-Shabaab outwitted in Somalia
Kharijites 12/29/2024 Khawarij-Afghan Taliban ''joint infiltration attempt'' on border foiled
Kharijites 12/12/2024 Media reports Taliban government minister killed in Kabul blast

Link


Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia
'Half an Hour's Respite - and Again the Attack.' How 90 'Greenhorns' Turned the Tide of the 2nd Chechen War
2025-03-02
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Daniil Pelymov

[REGNUM] "The battalion was carrying out a blocking mission. Intelligence discovered the caravan. The battalion commander moved to the battlefield and commanded the unit. The soldiers fulfilled their duty with honor. I am proud of my people." These few words of Colonel Sergei Melentyev, commander of the 104th regiment of the 76th Pskov Airborne Division, at a briefing on March 5, 2000, became the first official testimony of the bloody battle that took place several days earlier in the Argun Gorge of Chechnya.

Only later, from the words of the survivors, it became clear that this was an event that would forever enter the history of the Russian army.

Exactly twenty-five years ago, 90 young fighters of the 6th company of the 104th regiment found themselves in the path of militants who were many times superior in force – and at the cost of their lives, they thwarted the breakthrough through the mountains of a large group of Shamil Basayev and the international terrorist Khattab. At the same time, the feat of the “Spartans from the Airborne Forces” revealed the systemic problems of the Russian army of that time, which had to be solved already in the new century.

ENEMY BREAKTHROUGH IN TWO DIRECTIONS
The last year of the 20th century, 2000, was a leap year, so the last battle of the 6th company of the Pskov landing force fell on a rare date - February 29.

Leap years are considered difficult years – and in this case it was not just a matter of popular superstition. It was the last war that Russia had waged this century – the Second Chechen War.

Since September 1999, the army, at the cost of heavy losses, but steadily corrected the mistake made in 1996 - when the First Chechen War was ended by the Khasavyurt Peace. The conflict was supposedly stopped, but the "deal" only extended the life of the criminal-terrorist enclave that called itself the "Chechen Republic of Ichkeria". The regime that captured Chechnya quickly drifted from separatism to Islamism and could not help but begin "exporting jihad" - the invasion of Khattab and Basayev's gangs into Dagestan without the knowledge of the "President of Ichkeria" Aslan Maskhadov was inevitable.

By the end of 1999, the militants' attack was repelled by the regular army and Dagestani militias, and the war continued on enemy territory. The cities of Gudermes, Achkhoy-Martan, Argun, Shali, and the village and airfield of Khankala had already been liberated, and the battle for Grozny was underway (November 1999 - February 2000).

During the retreat from the Chechen capital, the "Ichkerians" lost many fighters who were blown up in their own minefields. Unable to confront the regular army in open combat, the enemy retreated to the mountains of the Shatoi and Itum-Kalinsky districts, where they felt more confident.

The absence of problems with food, the support and training of Arab professional terrorists (who were supervised by the “Black Arab” Khattab and the main “specialist” in airborne and subversive operations Abu al-Walid ), knowledge of the terrain - all this contributed to the effective operations of the Wahhabis and the difficulties of the advancement of the “federalists”.

The gang of "division general" Ruslan Gelayev moved towards the village of Komsomolskoye (Urus-Martanovsky district), trying to gain a foothold in this strategically important point of mountainous Chechnya. Gelayev hoped for the effectiveness of the tactics of the first war, when Salman Raduyev's terrorists successfully held Pervomayskoye together with the hostages. The battles for Komsomolskoye (March 5-20, 2000) became the last major battle of the Second Chechen War and require a separate story. We will turn our attention to another group.

The formation under the dual command of Basayev and Khattab concentrated in the area of ​​the village of Ulus-Kert in the Shatoi district and the adjacent mountains along the Argun gorge. From here, the enemy planned to wage a sabotage war and wait for spring to begin full-scale guerrilla operations. Ulus-Kert became a "stronghold" for the separatists.

The goal of our army was to encircle and eliminate the remaining large groups in the Argun Gorge. The enemy hoped to break out of the encirclement being formed and, possibly, break through the mountains into Dagestan again.

YOUNG, INEXPERIENCED
In this difficult situation, the 6th Company of the 2nd Battalion of the 104th Regiment, consisting mainly of young, “green” soldiers (many were only 19 years old), was ordered to occupy the dominant height 776 in the Argun Gorge.

The problems began even before the operation. The better prepared and equipped 4th company was originally planned to be assigned to fortify the heights, but due to problems with transport, the "green" 6th company was sent on the mission.

It is worth adding that right before being sent to the combat zone, the company was staffed from different units, which affected its coherence and combat training. The commanders were able to get to know the fighters only at the front. This is exactly the situation that Guards Major Sergei Molodov, appointed as the group leader, found himself in. Together with him, the battalion commander, Guards Lieutenant Colonel Mark Yevtyukhin, took command.

The concept of the operation was quite simple. By this time, the 3rd company of the same 104th regiment, already occupying a fortified height, successfully held off the onslaught of superior enemy forces, using machine gun fire and artillery support with a smaller staff. Therefore, the "youngsters" from the 6th company were given a similar task.

A major problem in planning the operation was the lack of proper information about the enemy's forces and movements. There was a lack of technical equipment and scale of reconnaissance operations, and Basayev's men themselves skillfully camouflaged themselves in the mountain forests and carried out large-scale regroupings only at night.

"NO, THEY'RE GOBLINS."
On the afternoon of February 29, the paratroopers encountered a small enemy reconnaissance group. After a short firefight, the militants retreated, and then Major Molodov was tragically killed by a sniper shot, which was a blow to the morale of the personnel.

It was an alarming signal, but no one realized the scale of the impending threat. They thought everything was all right. The separatists, noting that the detachment was small, had a lot of cargo, and was poorly trained in moving in the mountains (the company was scattered in a long chain along the mountains), decided to break through the chain right here, sensing what they thought was a weak bleeding spot.

Khattab was confident of success, but Basayev still initially doubted the success of the fight even with such an advantage.

A recording of their radio communications from February 29, intercepted by our intelligence, has been preserved.

Basayev: If there are dogs in front (in militant jargon - soldiers of the internal troops), we can come to an agreement.

Khattab : No, they are goblins (paratroopers)

Basayev: Listen, maybe we should go around? They won't let us in, as soon as we reveal ourselves...

Khattab: No. We will cut them down.

The separatists were counting on success, as they outnumbered the paratroopers, outsold them in experience and mobility. As veteran of the 104th regiment Andrei Lobanov noted, the field commanders were far from being "schoolchildren", they were experienced, trained people with disciplined fighters. Also, unlike the "federals", who carried all their belongings, including potbelly stoves, the militants could leave most of their equipment and provisions in Ulus-Kert and actively used pack animals.

TWO DAYS IN HELL
During the day, the jihadists secretly approached the army positions and began to dig in. In the evening, a fierce battle began. The exact number of attackers is unknown, but according to various estimates, up to 2,500 people. Only the first waves of attacks involved 300-400 militants armed with mortars, machine guns, and sniper rifles.

“They were simply coming at us like a wall, their eyes bulging, shouting: ‘Allahu Akbar!’” Guards Sergeant Andrei Porshnev, one of the six who survived the battle at Height 776,told Rossiyskaya Gazeta in 2014.

“We’d shoot one wave, have a half-hour break, and then attack again... There were a lot of them,” the soldier recalled.

The battle flared up with incredible force. The paratroopers, despite the enemy's numerical superiority, put up a desperate resistance. Every meter on the approach to the dominant height was drenched in blood.

By midnight on March 1, the shooting had died down. The unit, previously stretched out along the heights, began to regroup, help the wounded and remove the dead. Artillery support was ineffective due to inaccurate calculations, poor intelligence and the stressed state of the gunners. Nevertheless, according to enemy information, at least 30 "mujahideen" were killed by artillery fire.

On the night of March 1, the 1st company of Guard Major Sergei Baran tried to break through to help: only they had the opportunity to cover the distance to the heights in the shortest time and help their comrades. But, probably, the fighters encountered a blocking detachment of militants while crossing the Abazulgol River and were forced to retreat.

At the same time, the paratroopers, tired and having lost a third of their number, were unable to dig trenches in the frozen ground, despair gripped everyone, and the only hope was for dawn, which would dispel the darkness for artillery and reinforcements. Around 6 a.m., the enemy made a final attempt to break through.

The wounded paratroopers continued to fight, covering the retreat of their comrades. When their ammunition ran out, not wanting to surrender, they blew themselves up with grenades, taking their enemies with them to the grave. By order of Captain Viktor Romanov, who took command after Yevtyukhin's death, the heights were covered with artillery fire.

By morning, the 6th company had practically ceased to exist. Only six remained alive. The enemy's loss figures vary. Colonel General Gennady Troshev, who commanded the united federal forces during the Second Chechen War, wrote in his memoirs about 400 "Ichkerians" killed, while the newspaper " Krasnaya Zvezda " wrote about half a thousand fighters in an article for the first anniversary of the battle.

LESSONS OF TRAGEDY AND HEROISM
In any case, at the cost of its life (and at the cost of tragic mistakes), the 6th Company greatly influenced the outcome of the war. The active combat phase of the Second Chechen War - with the capture of cities and large-scale battles "in the field" - ended by April 2000.

On the other hand, the tragedy at the 776th height stirred up all of Russia. A mass of legal proceedings followed, connected with the death of soldiers, in every corner of the country they knew about the battle for the 776th height.

The unit was able to delay the advance of the militants, but in the future the shortcomings of the old military system (understaffing, sending "green" conscripts to the front lines, the quality of planning operations and coordination between units) will lead to tragic episodes and a number of military failures. It is enough to recall the destruction of a column of Perm OMON near the village of Dzhani-Vedeno in March 2000. And some of Basayev's and Khattab's men managed to break through from the Argun Gorge in other areas. The "Black Arab" himself was liquidated in 2002, Basayev was "gotten" only in 2006.

But, be that as it may, the experience of mistakes, successes and exploits of the Second Chechen Campaign - completed successfully, but at a high price - was laid as the basis for the military reform of 2001-2004 and, in general, became the beginning of the revival of the Russian Armed Forces, which distinguished themselves during the five-day war in South Ossetia, and in the Syrian operation, and on the fields of the North Caucasus Military District.

The special operation added new pages to the annals of the Airborne Forces' history (it is enough to recall the defense of the airport in Gostomel in February 2022), but the paratroopers do not forget the feat of the generation of fathers and older brothers. The whole of Russia remembers them, which is especially important now, when, on the initiative of the president, 2025 has been declared the Year of the Defender of the Fatherland.

Link


India-Pakistan
Khawarij-Afghan Taliban ''joint infiltration attempt'' on border foiled
2024-12-29
[GEO.TV] Security forces successfully thwarted an attempted infiltration and retaliated decisively against a cross-border attack by snuffies in the Kurram and North Wazoo regions, security sources told Geo News on Saturday.

According to security sources, a group of 20 to 25 khawarij,
…khawarij (Kharijites ) are heretics, often used to describe Wahhabis and hence Al Qaeda and ISIS-linked jihadis…
in coordination with the Afghan Taliban
...the once and current oppressors of Afghanistan...
, launched an unprovoked attack on Pak posts using heavy weaponry this morning.

In a swift and effective response, Pak forces not only neutralised the infiltration attempt but also delivered a strong counterattack.

Reports claim that over 15 holy warriors, including Afghan Taliban members, were killed, with many others injured. The operation forced the Afghan Taliban to abandon six posts along the border, incurring heavy losses on their side.

Initial reports suggest significant damage on the Afghan side, with further casualties likely. Despite the intensity of the exchange, Pakistain's security forces reported no fatalities and only three injuries.

The development comes against the backdrop of increased terrorist attacks inside Pakistain since the interim Afghan Taliban-led administration came to the helm in Kabul.

Terrorist attacks have been rampant in the provinces of KP and Balochistan
...the Pak province bordering Kandahar and Uruzgun provinces in Afghanistan and Sistan Baluchistan in Iran. Its native Baloch propulation is being displaced by Pashtuns and Punjabis and they aren't happy about it...
— which abut Afghanistan — targeting especially the law enforcers and security forces.

Islamabad has time again urged Kabul to not allow its territory to be used by terrorist groups to carry out attacks against Pakistain.

"We desire good ties with them (Kabul) but TTP should be stopped from killing our innocent people [....] This is our red line," Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif said in a cabinet address on Friday.

The diplomatic effort is coupled with ongoing kinetic action against hard boyz by security forces who eliminated 13 hard boyz in three KP operations earlier this week.

A day before that, forces had bumped off 13 hard boyz during an intelligence-based operation in South Waziristan.

The third quarter of 2024 (July-September) witnessed a sharp uptick in fatalities in terrorist violence and counter-terrorism campaigns with a 90% surge in violence, according to a report issued by the Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS).

A total of 722 people were killed, including civilians, security personnel, and outlaws, while 615 others were maimed in as many as 328 incidents recorded during the period under review.

Nearly 97% of these fatalities occurred in KP and Balochistan — marking the highest percentage in a decade, and over 92% of these incidents of terror attacks and security forces' operations were recorded in the same provinces.

In 2024 alone, the military has reported 383 soldiers and 925 snuffies killed in various festivities.
Related:
Khawarij 10/20/2024 5 terrorists arrested during intelligence-based operation in Pishin: ISPR
Khawarij 08/17/2024 Security forces kill three terrorists in KP's North Waziristan: ISPR
Khawarij 10/01/2023 Pak: Forces of evil will continue to face full might of state, COAS says

Related:
Kurram: 2024-12-28 Pakistan reports death of senior officer and 13 TTP militants
Kurram: 2024-12-28 TTP fighters kill 11 Pakistani Security Personnel
Kurram: 2024-12-28 AFGHANISTAN — Massive deployment of Taliban who have declared war on Pakistan
Related:
Wazoo: 2024-12-28 Pakistan reports death of senior officer and 13 TTP militants
Wazoo: 2024-12-28 TTP fighters kill 11 Pakistani Security Personnel
Wazoo: 2024-12-28 AFGHANISTAN — Massive deployment of Taliban who have declared war on Pakistan
Link


Afghanistan
Media reports Taliban government minister killed in Kabul blast
2024-12-12
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
[Regnum] Khalil Haqqani, the Minister of Refugees in the Taliban-led government of Afghanistan (the organization is under UN sanctions for terrorist activities), was killed in an explosion in the building of the department he heads in Kabul. This was reported on December 12 by the Afghan news portal Tolo news, citing sources.
How exciting! Who dunnit?
“Sources close to the Taliban have confirmed the killing of the Minister of Refugees, Khalil Haqqani,” the portal’s Telegram channel says.

It is noted that several more people died as a result of the explosion.

As reported by Regnum News Agency, in April 2023, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said that the Afghan authorities are pursuing a policy that helps strengthen security not only in the country but also in the region. According to him, there are no threats to Central Asian countries from Afghanistan.
What about from the jihadi groups they eagerly host, like Al Qaeda and Taliban Tehrik-i Pakistan (TTP)?
Russian President Vladimir Putin said on November 28 that Russia expects to develop relations with Afghanistan and the current Afghan leadership. The head of state added that complex processes are currently taking place in that country.
Russia has been saying so since shortly after the American-led Coalition pulled out. They haven’t yet done so, though, for some reason.
Local questions:
Who was behind the assassination of Khalil-ur-Rahman Haqqani?

[KhaamaPress] Khalil-ur-Rehman Haqqani’s assassination occurred in one of his most secure locations, with trusted Zadran tribesmen guarding him.

The attack raises suspicions of possible internal involvement or security breaches within his circle.

However, Zabihullah Mujahid, the spokesperson for the Taliban government, stated in a message that Khalil ur-Rahman Haqqani, the Taliban Refugees Minister, was killed in an attack by “Khawarij” (referred to ISIS).
Khawarij (Kharijites) is an ancient Arabic Moslem term for heretics, often used to describe Wahhabis and hence Al Qaeda and ISIS-linked jihadis.
The ISIS-Khorasan branch, as an active terrorist group in Afghanistan, has repeatedly claimed responsibility for attacks against high-ranking Taliban figures. The assassination of Mullah Dawood Muzammil, the Taliban governor of Balkh, and the killing of Nisar Ahmad Ahmadi, the Taliban deputy governor of Badakhshan, are examples of such actions.

Regarding Khalil ur-Rahman Haqqani, although it is said that the Haqqani network maintains good relations with ISIS members, it is not unlikely that ISIS could have carried out this attack.

Mujahid, referring to the U.S. offer of a $5 million reward for Haqqani’s capture, mentioned that Haqqani was a prominent member of a large jihadist family, and the enemies of Islam had placed a bounty on his head.

He further remarked, “Today, he was martyred by the Khawarij, who claim to be Muslims while declaring other Muslims as apostates.”

The Taliban spokesperson emphasized that such cowardly acts would not weaken the resolve of Muslims nor help the conspirators achieve their evil goals against their Islamic system. Instead, he argued, such actions only darken the faces of the enemies of Islam and expose their malicious intentions.

At present, no group has claimed responsibility for Haqqani’s assassination, although the Taliban often refers to the terrorist group ISIS as the “Khawarij.”

However, it can be speculated that the assassination of Khalil-ur-Rehman Haqqani took place in one of the most secure locations under his supervision. His security detail consisted of trusted Zadran tribesmen, including all of his personal guards.

The high security measures at the ministry suggest that the attack was likely carried out by someone from his inner circle or with their cooperation, as breaching such security would be difficult otherwise.


This attack underscores the ongoing violence and instability in Afghanistan, despite the Taliban’s claims of controlling the country. The continued targeting of key figures within the Taliban government reflects the ongoing internal and external challenges the regime faces, particularly from extremist factions that reject its authority.


Related:
Khalil Haqqani 09/21/2021 China to provide unconditional aid to Afghanistan by winter
Khalil Haqqani 09/09/2021 Farooq Abdullah backs new Taliban 'govt' in Afghanistan; urges talks with other nations
Khalil Haqqani 08/31/2021 Wait – the Taliban Offered Control of Kabul to US Forces...And We Turned Them Down?


Related:
Khawarij 12/02/2024 Captain among two soldiers martyred, eight terrorists killed in separate KP operations
Khawarij 11/19/2024 Deadly explosion near Mosque in Pakistan’s Waziristan
Khawarij 10/20/2024 5 terrorists arrested during intelligence-based operation in Pishin: ISPR

Link


India-Pakistan
Deadly explosion near Mosque in Pakistan’s Waziristan
2024-11-19
[KhaamaPress] Pak police reported that a blast near a mosque in Azam Warsak, South Wazoo, resulted in the death of one person and injuries to six others. Among the injured was Maulana Shahzada Khan Turabi, the mosque’s imam and a big shot of Jamaat Ulema-e-Islam
...the political wing of the Pak Taliban...
Earlier, a military intelligence-related account on the social media platform X shared a video of the earth-shattering kaboom near the mosque, identifying it as a deliberate attack by "Khawarij"
… Khawarij (Kharijites ) are heretics, often used to describe Wahhabis and hence Al Qaeda and ISIS-linked jihadis. Given that Al Qaeda is a long-term partner of the Afghan Talibs, at least, the military intelligence-related social media account probably means ISIS-K…
targeting the mosque in South Waziristan.

According to the note shared alongside the video, Maulana Shahzada Khan, a big shot of Jamaat Ulema-e-Islam and the mosque’s preacher, was the intended target of the attack.

The account also confirmed the death of at least one person and reported injuries to three others, including Maulana Turabi.

Hospital officials stated that the condition of the injured is critical, with an urgent need for blood donations.

So far, no group has grabbed credit for the incident. Various hard boy factions, including ISIS and Tehrik-e-Taliban
...mindless ferocity in a turban...
Pakistain (TTP), operate in the area.

The escalation of insecurity and hard boy attacks in Pakistain has raised alarm, particularly in regions like South Waziristan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, where hard boy factions have intensified their operations.

The resurgence of hard boy activities has not only endangered lives but also disrupted social and political stability, especially in border areas.
Related:
Azam Warsak: 2023-04-12 Arms looted by militants from Wana police station recovered: South Waziristan DPO
Azam Warsak: 2023-01-06 11 ‘militants’ killed, five cops injured in KP terror spate
Azam Warsak: 2022-03-27 Militant commander gunned down in South Waziristan
Related:
Wazoo: 2024-11-16 Pakistani Police report suicide attack in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Wazoo: 2024-11-02 Pakistani airstrike in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa kills civilians
Wazoo: 2024-10-28 Four terrorists eliminated in separate KP operations: ISPR
Related:
Khawarij 10/20/2024 5 terrorists arrested during intelligence-based operation in Pishin: ISPR
Khawarij 09/28/2024 Somali Army Conducts Major Operation Against Al-Shabaab in Lower Shabelle Region
Khawarij 09/12/2024 U.S. Special Operations Commander makes frontline visit in Somalia

Link


Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia
Islamologist calls for banning the Council of Muftis and the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the Russian Federation
2024-09-18
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
[Regnum] Islamic scholar Roman Silantyev asked the Chairman of the Investigative Committee Alexander Bastrykin to initiate a ban on the Council of Muftis of Russia (CMR) and the Spiritual Administration of Muslims (SAM) of the Russian Federation. This was reported on September 17 by the Telegram channel "Tsennosti.RF".

It is noted that in his address, Silantyev called these structures controlled by Mufti Ravil Gainutdin and the most criminalized religious organizations in the country.

According to him, the RMC and the DUM appear in scandals and crime reports more often than other Muslim organizations, although they control no more than 9% of registered and no more than 7% of actually operating Muslim communities in Russia.

Silantyev added that Gainutdin had repeatedly spoken out in support of Wahhabism and protested against the ban on this movement, and then lobbied for the activities of the leaders of the Turkish extremist movement Nurcular (an extremist organization whose activities are banned in the Russian Federation).
...a movement with millions of followers around the globe, especially in Turkey, banned in Russia since 2008. It was founded by Turkish Sufi theologian-politician Said Nursi (d. 1960), with the goal of forming a Turkic caliphate comprising those regions of the Middle East, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Russia's North Caucasus and Volga regions, so of course the Russian authorities object.
The Islamologist stated that Gainutdin's people are now trying to register communities in Dagestan in order to create an alternative muftiate on their basis and gather into it all opponents of the historically existing Dagestan muftiate.

“Considering the religious beliefs of these opponents – and they are predominantly Wahhabis – such an initiative could radically destabilize the already difficult situation in this republic,” Silantyev noted.

According to his calculations, at present 41 spiritual leaders of the RMC and the DUM have joined the ranks of extremists and terrorists, which is an absolute record among Muslim organizations.

"As a forensic expert, working including on requests from the Investigative Committee of Russia, I can note that the most common approach to recognizing organizations or movements as extremist is an analysis of the activities of their adherents. If adherents are regularly convicted of inciting hatred, justifying and financing terrorism, as well as for more serious crimes, then this is the main argument for banning the entire organization," Silantyev wrote.

According to him, the mass participation of ordinary members and spiritual leaders of the RMC and the DUM in crimes of an extremist and terrorist nature is sufficient grounds for recognizing these organizations as extremist.

As reported by the Regnum news agency, on July 3, the Muftiate of Dagestan temporarily banned the wearing of niqabs in the region. The decision was made taking into account the conclusion issued by the fatwa department. According to the organization, the ban will remain in effect until the identified threats are eliminated and a new theological conclusion is issued.

The Coordination Center of Muslims of the North Caucasus concluded that in Russia, under current conditions, wearing the niqab, burqa and other head coverings that conceal the face is harmful to Muslims and also threatens discord in interreligious and interethnic relations.

At the same time, political scientist Ilya Ukhov noted on July 10 that the only ones who have not yet spoken openly and unequivocally about wearing niqabs are the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Tatarstan and the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of the Russian Federation, headed by Ravil Gainutdin.
Related:
Spiritual Administration of Muslims: 2024-09-03 Ukrainian Perspective: Invasion of Ukraine: September 2, 2024
Spiritual Administration of Muslims: 2024-08-01 Chechen leader Kadyrov speaks out against wearing burqa
Spiritual Administration of Muslims: 2024-07-29 Muftiate of Kabardino-Balkaria publishes a sermon on the rules of wearing the niqab
Related:
Ravil Gainutdin 03/24/2024 Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations: has updated list of those killed in the terrorist attack at Crocus
Ravil Gainutdin 09/28/2019 Muslim leaders call for polygamy to be legalised in Russia
Ravil Gainutdin 03/30/2014 Tatar minority to vote for autonomy in Crimea

Related:
Nurcular: 2022-12-07 Resident of Dagestan sentenced on probation for inciting extremism on social media
Nurcular: 2022-08-13 Two Makhachkala residents accused of participating in extremist organizations
Nurcular: 2022-04-22 Resident of Dagestan is suspected of involvement in extremists
Link


Africa Horn
U.S. Special Operations Commander makes frontline visit in Somalia
2024-09-12
[Garowe] The United States has yet again reaffirmed Somalia its support in the fight against al-Shabaab
... an Islamic infestation centering on Somalia attempting to metastasize into Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and similar places, all of which have enough problems without them...
, a group that has terrorized locals for almost two decades, inflicting pain and suffering on innocent civilians and members of the army.
[that would be Shabaab, not US Army]
For the last two decades, the US Africa Command
[comfortably headquartered at Kelley Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany...]
has worked closely in assisting the Somali National Army (SNA) in unleashing against al-Shabaab, securing many strategic locations in the process while dismembering the turbans.

Colonel David Haskell, Special Operations Commander of the US Army, said the US shall not relent in the fight against al-Shabaab, adding that the group’s influence is waning due to strategic cooperation between local forces and friendly partners.

"US government officials expressed strong support for the operation, reaffirming their commitment to assist Somali forces in their efforts to eliminate anti-Khawarij groups," the state media reports.
Could he have misspoken there? Because it’s my understanding that Khawarij (Kharijites ) are heretics, often used to describe Wahhabis and hence Al Qaeda and ISIS-linked jihadis.
The high-ranking delegation led by Major General Ibrahim Sheikh Muhuddin, Commander of the Somali National Army, and Colonel David Haskell, Special Operations Commander of the US Army, spoke while visiting the Middle Shabelle region.

The delegation engaged in strategic discussions with local army officers, focusing on plans to eradicate Khawarij forces of Evil from the region. Major General Muhuddin emphasized the importance of preparedness and collaboration with local communities in the fight against terrorism, state media notes.

The United States Army trains the elite Danab commandos who are critical in the fight against al-Shabaab turbans. The group still controls large swathes of rural central and southern regions of the country, but the army has managed to liberate several strategic areas.
Related:
US Africa Command: 2024-06-17 US reports a strike on one of the leaders of ISIS in Somalia
US Africa Command: 2024-05-15 Somalia: SNA extends offensive against Al-Shabaab in rural areas
US Africa Command: 2024-05-15 US fails to compensate victims of drone strikes in Somalia
Related:
Khawarij 08/30/2024 On Quetta visit, PM Shehbaz vows to rid Balochistan of terrorism ''at all costs''
Khawarij 08/20/2024 Three soldiers martyred in gun battle with terrorists along Pak-Afghan border
Khawarij 08/17/2024 Security forces kill three terrorists in KP's North Waziristan: ISPR

Related:
Danab commandos: 2024-04-29 Somalia Defence Minister admits US-trained Danab officers sold food rations
Danab commandos: 2024-04-09 The elite Danab Special Forces killed a senior Al-Shabaab commander in Somalia
Danab commandos: 2023-07-17 At least 18 Al-Shabaab members killed in Danab force operation
Link


Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia
Mother-in-law danced, husband prayed. Wedding in Dagestan exposed social rift
2024-08-27
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Maria Orlova

[REGNUM] A wedding in the Dagestani village of Nizhneye Kazanishche. The newlyweds are about to go outside, but suddenly the young wife's mother starts circling around her daughter, calling her to dance. The music thunders, and the aunts' round dance carries the young woman along. The husband is shocked by what is happening: he tries to stop the dancing, and when he fails, he rips the wires of the music equipment out of the sockets.

The video from the wedding in Nizhny Kazanishche appeared the day before in Dagestani Telegram channels, and then in VKontakte communities. In the public group “Voice of Dagestan”, the video collected more than a thousand likes and almost two thousand comments in a couple of days. In addition to expressing support for the groom — “handsome!”, “that’s how it should be!” — and mass condemnation of the bride’s mother, commentators discussed how the young people found each other and decided to get married with such different families?

"Where was the groom looking when he was wooing a girl from a non-observant family? He saw what kind of parents and relatives the girl had. And what were the girl's parents and the girl herself thinking when she married a guy who observed religion?" - one of the most "liked" comments under the video.

In response, one user suggested that the families might not have come to a compromise on how the wedding would go. And if they did, the "social" mother-in-law only formally agreed to be left alone, and then at the celebration she did things her way. "You need to initially take someone from your circle as a partner," the author of the comment concludes.

The male commentator immediately explained that in modern Dagestan, "the imam concludes the marriage before the banquet halls, the young couple are already husband and wife. The husband has all rights to his wife as soon as he takes her to his home from her parents' house." In general, "according to religion," music and dancing are prohibited at weddings.

In any case, a compromise could have been found, one of the commentators is sure, describing his own story from two years ago. Then, according to the man, "they gave away a niece in marriage to a groom of a different nationality."

“Seeing the groom with a beard, I made a remark: “Wearing a beard is not prohibited, I cannot forbid it, but the size of the beard is not a criterion for assessing a person’s faith in the Almighty, it should be in the soul of every person.”

Then I informed the guests that from our side there would be a full wedding, the bride's exit from the house would definitely be with music. The groom's side agreed with us. Moreover, at their request, the wedding was held together, in one hall," the man wrote.

Another story was shared by a girl “whose parents were communists and her husband was religious.”

"When he came to my parents' house, my father immediately made it clear that the wedding would be with music and alcohol - at most, he would not put alcohol on his table - out of respect, that he was against the hijab, and a few other things. My husband agreed. We got married, after some time I covered myself. And my husband conveyed the religion to my parents so beautifully that they began to study it themselves," the girl wrote.

According to another version, the conflict at the wedding could have been programmed from the start - if both the bride and the groom had “non-observant” families.

"Most people in Dagestan have secular families since the communist era, but the youth are more religious. That is, the adults have agreed on something, but the young people have not," wrote one user.

However, the reason for the dispute may be much more prosaic: the bride’s mother could simply be trying to recoup the costs of the celebration.

"We had a case. The groom's parents, without the newlyweds, had a secular wedding the next day to cover their expenses. Perhaps the mother decided to do this at the expense of her daughter's dance," wrote a resident of Dagestan.

There is a tradition at weddings: guests can dance with the bride, after giving her a banknote. In this way, a decent amount can be collected.

At the same time, as explained in the comments, usually the groom's side bears most of the costs of organizing the wedding. And this time, the "musicians and other fun" were obviously ordered by the wife's family.

In any case, as one commentator wrote aphoristically, for the young family “the honeymoon was icy.”

In turn, a resident of Makhachkala offered a recipe for how to prevent similar situations in the future. According to her, conflicts will stop "when both the bride's side and the groom's side understand one simple truth: their children are building their own family. Parents need to understand long ago that they should not interfere in the relationship of two people who are getting married. There will be less pulling back and forth, there will be fewer divorces and broken lives."

The incident in the Dagestani village really illustrates the split in local society, 60-year-old Dagestani Rizvan A., chairman of a collective farm in the Tver region, told Regnum. The man visits his homeland every year and sees how the mood in the region changes.

According to Rizvan, the young wife found herself between two fires: on the one hand, the duty of a Dagestani girl is to honor her parents and obey her mother, on the other hand, to obey her husband.

"We, the older generation, grew up in the Soviet Union. It is customary for us to work hard and have a good rest. How can we not drink excellent Dagestani cognac at a wedding, how can we not dance? I don't understand!

And some of the youth in Makhachkala are now completely different. They are interested in mosques, gyms and barbershops. They want to live like the sheikhs in Saudi Arabia, so they try to become more righteous than Mohammed himself. Our girls have never worn niqabs, the Dagestani women's dress is very beautiful. And now women wrap themselves in black, like in Iran," says the interlocutor of IA Regnum.

He is sure that this is a conflict not only between generations, but also between Soviet modernism and religious archaism.

Dagestan is a boiling cauldron of nations. Only officially, 14 nationalities live side by side here, speaking different languages, but connected by a common history and centuries-old neighborhood.

A Dagestani wedding is one of the main events in the life of a new family. Several hundred guests are usually invited to the celebration. But if earlier a wedding in Dagestan was a celebration of good neighborliness, now different worldviews can clash, which will not only spoil the holiday, but also threaten to create a much wider conflict than a quarrel between two families.

In Dagestan today, there are two types of weddings. The first is the "regular" one, where they dance to loud music and drink to the health of the newlyweds. The second is a Muslim wedding, where alcohol is strictly prohibited, and the ceremony is accompanied by the quiet singing of nasheeds - traditional singers who sing without the accompaniment of musical instruments. Dancing is not prohibited in Islam, but it is believed that men and women should dance separately from each other, in different rooms.

"Most of the peoples of Dagestan profess Islam. But historically, Dagestani Islam absorbed the traditions of the mountain peoples, it was very different from the harsh Islam of the Arabian Desert.

95% of the population of Dagestan are Sunni Muslims, 5% are Shiites. In short, Shiites, who believe in the infallibility of Muslim teachers-imams, are the main current of Islam in Iran. And in more moderate Muslim countries, Sunnis predominate, believing that vital issues should be decided by the Muslim community,” religious scholar Farit Batyrgareev tells IA Regnum.

Recently, he continues, Wahhabism has been considered a separate branch - a movement whose followers believe that Islam must be cleansed of all innovations that appeared after the Prophet Muhammad and his descendants. At the same time, the radicalization of Islam in the post-Soviet space coincided with the global trend.

"Most likely, the growth of Islamist sentiments among Dagestani youth is based on the demand for social justice, so clearly expressed in the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad. Faced with corruption, bureaucracy and other vices of the secular regional system, young people are leaving for mosques," Batyrgareev said.

But radicalism and misunderstood principles of Islam manifest themselves in horrific excesses. In June, terrorists in Dagestan attacked synagogues and a church, where Russian Orthodox priest Nikolai Kotelnikov was brutally murdered. The attackers included the son and nephew of the former head of the Sergokalinsky district, Magomed Omarov.

At the end of October 2023, about 1,200 people rioted at Makhachkala's Uytash airport, breaking into the building and then onto the airfield. The radical youth were waiting for a plane from Tel Aviv to arrive.

On August 23, the Armavir City Court issued the first verdict to the participants in the pogrom: five defendants in the criminal case were sentenced to prison terms of six to nine years. However, they did not admit their guilt.

The main problem is that radical Islamists are ready to do anything. Not so much because of their hatred of Russia, but because of their rejection of the entire modern world as such. In addition, the seething energy of radicals can be used for their own purposes by Russia's enemies, trying to split society and incite interethnic strife.

And the young family from Nizhny Kazanishche can only wish that everything works out for them. If the young people love each other, they will understand and forgive their other half. And if not, maybe it’s good that everything ended, essentially, before it began?

Link


Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia
'The situation requires the army's intervention.' Lessons from the second Chechen war
2024-08-08
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Andrey Zvorykin

[REGNUM] "The situation has already outgrown the scope of the district police department and required the intervention of the army. <…> Troops from the Stavropol and Krasnodar regions and North Ossetia are being transferred to Buinaksk and Makhachkala, and from there by military transport planes to the Tsumadinsky and Botlikhsky districts on the border with Chechnya, where fighting with several groups of Wahhabis has been going on for several days now…".
Link



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