Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
Text taken from a news article posted on telegra.ph
Text from May 2023.
[ColonelCassad] Colonel (ret.) Pere de Young is the former commander of the 3rd Marine Regiment, aide-de-camp to two French presidents and founder of THEMIIS (an independent French company founded in 2015 that provides services to states and institutions in the fields of security, defense and development). He is also responsible for the course on security and defense service companies (ESSD), taught as part of the Master's program in Geopolitics and International Security at the Institut Catholique de Paris (ICP).
Pere de Young has just published a book, Agir entre les lignes (Acting between the lines), published by Mareuil, and is also the author of Vous n'oublierez rien, colonel (You will not forget anything, Colonel) (Editions Tallandier, 2017). Paul Munier is a Master's student in Geopolitics and International Relations at the Institut Catholique de Paris.
Paul Munier (Interviewer): To begin with, based on your experience, what are the preconceived notions about private military companies at a time when the Wagner Group has found itself in the spotlight worldwide?
Peer de Young (P.J.): Private military companies (SMPs), which are called ESSDs in France (translator's note: this is the French name for companies providing security and defense services, so this abbreviation will be used in the context of French companies in the following text), officially have a relatively recent history, but their activities are much older.
Specifically, we very often equate PMCs with mercenaries, but this has nothing to do with the matter; we are talking about two completely different stories here. Obviously, they have a common basis, since they are related to conflicts and the military sphere. But they are opposed by different modes of action. In addition, mercenaries have been criminalized since 1977 (translator's note: in Russia, Article 359 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation "Mercenarism" was singled out as a separate type of offense only in 1996). This obviously does not apply to the ESSD, whose role is limited by the law of April 2003 banning mercenaries in France. These are two completely different worlds.
PMCs and ESSDs have experienced significant growth, especially since 2003, with the American presence in Iraq. However, it should be noted that Washington has always used subcontracting companies. From the Cold War to conflicts in the Middle East and the Vietnam War, PMCs have operated all over the world. One of the first notable operations was the use of Air America, created in 1946. Owned by the CIA, this company provided air support and transport for Chiang Kai-shek in his war against Mao Zedong. After Mao came to power in 1949, Air America was gradually “recycled” during the Vietnam War. Thus, between 1945 and 1975, the Americans experimented with the possibility of using a form of subcontracting, bringing in the necessary external expertise through Air America.
The Wagner “structure” is a form of development of Russian foreign policy; it is not exactly a PMC. Depending on the Russian state, mercenary groups are used rather as a supplementary form, as in Syria or Libya, or as a first-line force, as in Ukraine.
P.M.: PMCs and ESSDs are not very well known; in your book you describe in detail the various areas of their activity. What is the reason for turning to the services of these companies?
P. de J.: Since the 2000s, the budgets of all armies in the world, and especially in Europe, have been sharply reduced. Sometimes up to 30%, as in France or the USA. Soldiers have become rare and therefore expensive, which has opened up peripheral and “auxiliary” activities for ESSDs and PMCs. This observation was made by Dick Cheney and then Donald G. Rumsfeld, the two subsequent US Secretaries of Defense. This was the beginning of the rise of private structures.
However, each army has its own traditions, its own ways of doing things; there is no predetermined and ideal model. In the ESSD, personnel are very often recruited from among those who have left the army. Therefore, they are well trained. The unemployment observed today among retired military personnel is more a result of the dogma of "spent material" than of a logic based on doubts about their abilities. The skills are definitely there and they can be used.
With the exception of active combat operations, which include the use of weapons, which must remain within the framework of self-defense, PMCs and ESSDs can perform all possible missions, especially everything that is peripheral, namely security, protection, convoy escort, medical care or even what is called maintenance of operational condition (MCO) of equipment (you can read more about this here). Obviously, the capabilities of ESSD employees allow them to conduct all kinds of training. In addition, ESSDs are indispensable both in operations to combat maritime piracy and in matters of cyber defense. The scope of employment is very wide. Thus, these private structures can compensate for the shortcomings of the army, which is in the process of constant restructuring.
PM: After the Cold War, in a security context marked by asymmetrical struggle, to what extent did the war in Iraq open the doors to the world market for companies providing military services?
P. de J.: Since the 1940s, the United States had already integrated the use of private groups into its system, mainly for economic and technical reasons. The fall of the Wall (1989) and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact (1991) led to a sharp reduction in budgets and personnel in many armies around the world. Particularly in the United States, where the American budget was cut by 28%. These cuts lead to shortages and needs.
Dick Cheney, then Secretary of Defense, explained that soldiers had become rare and expensive, and that they had to dedicate themselves to their combat mission. This is how the idea of outsourcing auxiliary or peripheral activities (support, logistics, assistance, etc.) to private companies arose. So Dick Cheney and his successor Donald G. Rumsfeld created a kind of recurring doctrine of supporting the American military. The peak of this period was the Iraq War in 2003.
So when the Americans intervene, the American budget is extremely low, while the needs in Iraq and Afghanistan are enormous. Realizing that the war may drag on, and given the limited budget, they will compensate by encouraging the entry of ESSD into the scene. The Americans develop the principle of outsourcing to such an extent that in Iraq there is one contractor for every fighter (a contractor is simply a person under contract with a company). During this conflict, almost 90% of the PMC missions were support missions assigned to non-combatants, most of whom were foreigners.
PM: You devote a large chapter of your book to Prigozhin and Wagner. How did the Russian Wagner Group become a form of service to the Russian political power?
P. de J.: To be specific, Yevgeny Prigozhin is a businessman with an entrepreneurial mindset. Wagner is only one third of the "tripod" of Prigozhin's structures. In fact, this Russian businessman has a holding company called Concord, based in St. Petersburg. This historical parent company generates significant amounts of money in the catering sector, and therefore in everything related to food. So he understands the need for new problems.
Like the Americans, Vladimir Putin is considering the possibility of building structures that can take up minimal space on the ground, American "light springs". V. Putin, a former Russian intelligence officer, understands the logic of American intervention, especially in Iraq. He believes that outsourcing peripheral operations is a good idea.
Prigozhin responded to Putin’s questions about this minimal intervention by creating the Wagner Group, which became a tool for “dirty work”. In 2014, the Wagner Group entered the fight in Donbas and Crimea, reinforcing the Russian intelligence forces of the FSB and GRU. They become a supporting force, and the Wagner experiment is successful. It immediately…
This experience was subsequently reinforced in 2015, 2016 and 2017 during the fighting in Syria, where the same sequence of actions was repeated with the Russian Air Force. They captured the Syrian cities of Palmyra and Deir ez-Zor.
Prigozhin’s architecture rests on two other pillars: information warfare and “seizing the legacy”, that is, access to natural resources. Thus, Prigozhin attracted a number of companies that were supposed to strengthen and finance the role of Wagner. These civil companies negotiate with states for remuneration and carry out technical activities related to the extraction of natural resources (minerals, gas, oil, etc.).
Prigozhin’s entrepreneurial activity at Concord is noteworthy. After all, Wagner is only the visible part and flagship of the “Prigozhin project”, a kind of “loss leader” …
PM: France lags significantly behind other national competitors in this market. In your experience, what difficulties have French security and defense companies (ESSD) encountered in their development, despite the skills acquired in our national institutions?
P. de Y.: Firstly, it is a question of culture and history. In France, all external actions and influence operations are based on two pillars: diplomatic and military, which has always worked.
In 2003, the Americans introduced a new player to the national team – a PMC (translator’s note: Colonel De Jong is being a bit disingenuous here: the Americans had been actively using their PMCs in the Yugoslav War since 1991, especially since De Jong himself was “working off” his service in Bosnia at that time). France did not do this for various reasons.
Firstly, given the asymmetrical nature of the operations in which France participated, this nature did not require a fundamental need for external personnel. Today, the situation is changing due to two parameters: firstly, the weakening of French influence in Africa, while our army was an instrument intended for this region, and, secondly, the war in Ukraine. The latter is forcing our army to become more compact. We have entered a transition period, which must necessarily take these two new parameters into account.
However, the ESSD faced the state, namely those structures that I call the "deep state", characterized by the reluctance of the armed forces, "exhausted" since the 2000s by successive reforms, and which did not welcome the emergence of any form of competition. The political power is relatively indifferent. He believes that there is an opportunity to develop new small and medium-sized enterprises, which has a very positive impact on employment. In any case, if the positions are not filled by French people, they will obviously be foreign quasi-PMCs, as is already happening in the air transport sector.
PM: President Macron's speech in Toulon on November 9, 2022 is considered a turning point in French policy in Africa. What developments can be foreseen for our ESSD in this region, where French influence is harshly criticized? What role could they play?
P. de Y.: In Africa, to be specific, we are being shown the way out, our military system in Africa will be reduced, especially in terms of numbers. We already know that in Gabon, Ivory Coast and Senegal these numbers will be halved. African states are demanding a transformation of the French presence and want, in the name of their sovereignty, a minimal French presence.
Secondly, in connection with the events in Ukraine, part of our army will be sent to resolve the issues of the "Greater East". Therefore, I recommend that the PMCs and the ESSD support these consolidation movements in Eastern Europe, as well as in Africa, where they can obviously meet the specifications. This is a modest impact...
In my experience, the ESSD can very well be compensatory structures with a minimal presence, in civilian clothes and without ranks. The ESSD does not represent France; if the customer state is not satisfied, it terminates the contract; this will not affect the bilateral relations between France and this African state. So, there are many advantages to having ESSD in combat, especially since these companies are 95% ex-military, like Themiis.
PM: What limitations do you see for PMCs and ESSD, given their unique capabilities and versatility in terms of missions and theaters of operations?
The first is an administrative limitation – carrying weapons. This is a very important concept, because in special forces or small patrols there are those who need to carry weapons and those who do not. For example, to conduct training or provide advice, there is no need to carry weapons. The number of missions that require carrying weapons is limited. This is a central issue for ESSD-SMP. There are very strict rules governing the carrying of weapons.
The second point concerns the issue of combat. If we take Wagner, this group is an exception, and the creation of a "French Wagner" is unthinkable. PMCs are a very little-known topic, and we return to the topic of the "mercenary myth" mentioned at the beginning. There is one limitation that cannot be crossed: the fact that PMCs or ESSDs participate in combat.
PMCs are not frontline forces, but peripheral combat support forces... That is the difference between Wagner and everything else. The use of force is allowed only to civil servants. There should be no debate on this matter. All over the world, PMCs are an instrument of influence, not an instrument of struggle.
|
...the land mass occupying the space between the English Channel and the Urals, also known as Moslem Lebensraum....jpg)
...the land mass occupying the space between the English Channel and the Urals, also known as Moslem Lebensraum...
[Breitbart]