Hello !
Recent Appearances... Rantburg

China-Japan-Koreas
Samurai at the Nuclear Club's Doors: Why the US is Attacking Iran but Keeping Silent About Japan
2026-08-26
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Boris Rozhin, expert at the Center for Military-Political Journalism

[TASS] Boris Rozhin on the dark side of double standards and how it influences global restructuring


For years, Iran's nuclear program has served as a pretext for sanctions and preemptive strikes in Washington, while the similar technological capabilities of American allies are ignored. According to Chinese Ambassador to Moscow Zhang Hanhui, Japan has stockpiled over 44 tons of plutonium, enough to produce approximately 5,500 nuclear warheads in the medium term.
Sure, but Japan hasn’t promised to attack its enemies as soon as it crosses thr bomb-assembly threshold.
This situation exposes a policy of double standards: while the US and Israel carry out attacks on Tehran's nuclear facilities, Tokyo – a key American ally in Asia – has a full cycle of nuclear fuel reprocessing, enjoying the full support of Washington and raising no questions from a non-proliferation standpoint.

CLEAR GOAL
Japan has long been considered a "threshold state." Tokyo boasts a developed nuclear energy industry (14 of its 33 reactors are operational, with the rest preparing for restart), its own centrifuge uranium enrichment technologies, and a full cycle of spent fuel reprocessing. Officially, this potential is justified by the country's commitment to a closed fuel cycle. However, the country's financial and technological resources allow it to launch a full-fledged military nuclear project in a relatively short time.

Japan's military and political dependence on the United States, which makes it a limited subject, has long constrained Tokyo's ability to build up offensive weapons, especially weapons of mass destruction. But the situation has changed: the United States is effectively encouraging Japan's remilitarization (to exert pressure on China, Russia, and North Korea). Under these circumstances, the threat of Japan becoming a nuclear power has shifted from a theoretical one to a potential one.

Indeed, deep-rooted pacifism in the country remains an obstacle to nuclearization: according to polls, up to 76% of Japanese citizens still favor strict adherence to the non-nuclear status. Nevertheless, systematic public opinion work is being conducted. Along with the traditional inflated "threats" from Beijing and Pyongyang, particular emphasis is placed on accusations against Moscow. The hypocritical denial of the US role in the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is accompanied at the official level by aggressive statements about an alleged "nuclear threat" emanating from Russia. This "blaming" serves a clear purpose: to artificially create an image of an enemy, against which society will gradually be forced to accept the need to build its own arsenal.

It's important to understand that for some Japanese elites, the current situation has become a historic opportunity to shed the restrictions imposed after World War II. By potentially joining the "nuclear club," Tokyo hopes to regain its status as a full-fledged geopolitical player.

Incidentally, discussions about Germany's remilitarization and its potential access to nuclear weapons are unfolding along a similar pattern. The West's proxy war against Russia in Ukraine serves as a convenient pretext for Berlin to shed post-war taboos and increase its international influence. Thus, the former Axis powers are exploiting the current transformation of the world order for military revenge. By agreeing to serve as Washington's instruments of pressure on its strategic opponents, Tokyo and Berlin hope to convert this loyalty into sovereignty. This role is nothing new for Japan: one only needs to recall the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, when the British Empire actively pumped Tokyo with resources for its own interests.

NUCLEAR HYPOCRISY
Developing this approach, Washington, for example, turns a blind eye to Tokyo's development of long-range strike systems, which could potentially serve as nuclear weapons delivery vehicles. Similarly, the US virtually ignores the nuclear ambitions of Berlin and Warsaw, and, prior to that, Kyiv's official declarations of its desire to achieve nuclear power status (which, incidentally, was one of the reasons for the launch of the special military operation).

On the other hand, where "denuclearization" serves American interests, Washington takes a purely instrumental approach and acts from a position of overt aggression. The strikes on Iranian facilities are proof of this. This is despite the fact that Iran is under the official fatwa of the late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, which explicitly prohibits the development of nuclear weapons. In a similar vein, the United States has been escalating tensions around Pyongyang for decades, constantly harping on the issue of North Korea's arsenal to justify its military presence in the region.

The pinnacle of this legal disparity remains the US position on Israel. Washington not only ignores the existence of an undeclared nuclear arsenal, but completely removes it from international scrutiny, playing into Israel's policy of strategic ambiguity. This is the absurdity of the entire situation: Iran is being asked to curtail even peaceful research, while Israel, whose possession of nuclear weapons is acknowledged by leading global experts, is not being asked for even minimal transparency. And this is happening despite Israeli officials periodically threatening to use such weapons against Iran and the Gaza Strip.

Of course, such a disingenuous position does not lead to real disarmament, but rather, fuels a global arms race. Countries clearly see that a unified approach formalized through international law does not exist, and the United States, in order to maintain its dominance, can attack a subject state to deprive it of even theoretical defense potential, while simultaneously ignoring the nuclear ambitions of its satellites.

What's particularly noteworthy here is that the pretext for the ultimatum to abandon enrichment even for civilian nuclear energy, and for the aggression against Iran, is its accumulated uranium reserves, which, according to Western estimates, could theoretically be enough for 10-15 warheads. And despite Japan's plutonium capacity to assemble thousands of warheads, the US is not demanding that Tokyo limit or curtail industrial enrichment, transfer existing quantities abroad, or establish additional oversight.

Thus, it is the US's hypocritical approach that undermines the authority of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This fundamental international document is designed to prevent the emergence of new nuclear powers, but Washington uses it solely as a tool of political pressure. While ostensibly advocating for limiting the "nuclear club," the US is in fact provoking its expansion.

REACTIONS OF RUSSIA AND CHINA
At diplomatic forums, including the UN, Russia and China regularly point out the destructiveness of this US policy for the entire international security system. The notorious "rules-based world order," operating according to the neocolonialist principle of "everything for us, the law for them," has finally exhausted itself. In an era of the obvious decline of Western dominance, when Washington is no longer able to deter its opponents with its previous economic and military-political methods, it has shifted to "outsourcing nuclear deterrence." The hypocritical encouragement of the nuclear ambitions of Tokyo, Berlin, Warsaw, and Kyiv is not simply double standards, but the deliberate construction of a nuclear cordon around the borders of Russia and China.

This is disrupting the entire global security architecture and forcing countries in the crosshairs to move from verbal condemnation to practical steps to ensure strategic defense. This is precisely the reason for the consistent modernization of Russia's nuclear missile defense. For the same reason, China is actively building nuclear submarines and silo-based nuclear missile systems in its western regions. North Korea is intensifying the production of long-range systems and increasing the number of warheads, while Iran is increasingly coming to the conclusion that its refusal to develop nuclear weapons according to "Western rules" has not protected it from aggression.

A responsible approach by the United States (and the West as a whole) to the NPT could stem this spiral, but the weakening hegemon is unwilling to abandon its instrumental manipulation of strategic stability. In this regard, the issue of Japan's military nuclearization is not a localized problem, but a key marker of the final dismantling of the previous security architecture. The potential emergence of a nuclear arsenal in a remilitarized Tokyo represents a fundamental threat that cannot be ignored.

The editors' opinion may not reflect the author's opinion. Use of this material is permitted subject to the citation rules of the tass.ru website.

Link


Arabia
'This is allowed': The US approved the nuclear program of the Middle Eastern monarchy
2026-07-24
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Leonid Tsukanov

[REGNUM] The United States and Saudi Arabia have agreed to jointly develop the kingdom's nuclear program. The landmark nuclear cooperation agreement, developed over the past several years and repeatedly on the brink of being cancelled, was signed in Washington on July 22 and now awaits congressional approval.

The deal has generated considerable controversy. It leaves numerous loopholes, including the right to independently enrich uranium, which could, in theory, push Riyadh to develop a covert military nuclear program. Although the kingdom, of course, vehemently denies any such plans.

Washington, however, believes there's nothing wrong with the deal. And by compromising its principles, it's supposedly saving the region from more serious problems. This raises doubts.

THE HARD WAY TO A DEAL
Despite strong allied relations and its status as the "US's greatest friend" in the Persian Gulf, Riyadh's path to the 2026 deal has proven thorny and confusing.

The first discussions about cooperation in the nuclear sector began back in 2008, when the United States and Saudi Arabia signed a memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

At the same time, the kingdom announced its intention to rely on the international nuclear fuel market rather than develop its own uranium enrichment.

Before the full launch of the Saudi nuclear program with Washington's support, only one symbolic step remained: the signing of a standard agreement (the "123 Agreement"), which would enshrine the renunciation of independent nuclear fuel production.

These commitments were part of the so-called “gold standard,” which embodied the formula for US nuclear cooperation with its allies: “supplies and technology in exchange for the renunciation of uranium ambitions.”

Nevertheless, the agreement process dragged on for nearly 15 years. The Saudis refused to agree to the "gold standard," even after the UAE signed a similar agreement in 2009, arguing that it would place them in a "colonialist dependence" on Washington and deprive them of the opportunity to independently explore and exploit the kingdom's uranium reserves.

Riyadh even tried to defend its rights by relying on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which recognizes the right of states to develop peaceful nuclear energy (a right consistently supported by Russia), including fuel cycle technologies. However, it was not very successful.

Washington was reluctant to take the statement at its word. After all, the Saudis had previously been caught secretly purchasing technology from Pakistan, developing dual-use infrastructure, and expanding their nuclear-capable delivery systems.

Riyadh also avoided signing an additional protocol with the IAEA that would have provided for stricter inspections of nuclear power plants, which also hinted at its ulterior motives in the nuclear field.

Neither Barack Obama's flexible Middle East policy nor Joe Biden's attempts to restructure Saudi Arabia's nuclear program in exchange for normalizing the kingdom's relations with Israel helped matters.

Even Donald Trump, the leading advocate of rapprochement with the Arabian monarchies, has already received a slap on the wrist for being too active in Saudi Arabia. In 2019, the American corporation IP3 International, through his family, tried to lobby for the accelerated transfer of sensitive technologies to Riyadh. And was quite successful in this regard.

However, the resulting uproar in the expert community attracted the attention of the IAEA, and then the US Congress. The matter was hushed up, but the negative aura from the story haunted Trump for several years. And during his second term, he became suspicious of the Saudis.

So much so that, to be on the safe side, he surrounded himself with people wary of the kingdom. Current Secretary of State Marco Rubio received his portfolio partly because, as a senator, he authored a "step-down bill" that imposed additional bureaucratic restrictions on cooperation between American nuclear companies and Riyadh.

However, two years later, Trump suddenly changed his anger to mercy and gave the go-ahead for the development of Saudi “peaceful nuclear energy.”

On July 22, Saudi and American delegations signed a package of two documents in Washington: a nuclear cooperation agreement and a bilateral safeguards agreement. The agreement was signed by Energy Secretary Chris Wright on the American side, and by Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman Al Saud on the Saudi side.

The agreement envisages the construction of nuclear power plants in the Kingdom based on the American model and using advanced US technology. Furthermore, Washington agreed to the transfer of technology and equipment for peaceful nuclear power generation to Riyadh and established the initial legal framework for the participation of American companies in the development of the Saudi nuclear program. The agreement is for 30 years, with the possibility of extension by mutual agreement.

Behind the dry wording of the document lies a diplomatic somersault that the Republicans prefer not to focus on.

The final deal is based on the same promises made to the Kingdom during Biden's presidency—the only difference being that Washington ultimately decided to abandon the counter-conditions. Trump had previously repeatedly promised to "comprehensively rethink" the provisions to ensure they would serve only the interests of the American people.

However, the head of the White House soon made it clear that he was once again selling the Democrats' legacy, but this time under the guise of his own initiative.

"The Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement between the US Department of Energy and Saudi Arabia, which concerns exclusively the civilian use of nuclear energy... will be approved, but its implementation is entirely dependent on Saudi Arabia joining the respected and successful Abraham Accords," he wrote on the social network Truth Social.

Thus, the US President expects Riyadh to normalize relations with Israel within the framework of agreements to which he already pushed a number of Arab countries, including the UAE and Bahrain, to participate during his first presidential term.

The deal differs from previous versions in that it has already been formally set in motion, but the Saudis will only be able to reap the benefits after they accept Washington's counter-demand.

RECONSIDER YOUR VIEWS
There are several reasons for the sudden change in mood in the White House.

The most obvious is Trump's fear of losing the Persian Gulf's largest market. Despite difficulties in reaching agreements, Riyadh had not squandered its geopolitical ambitions and intended not only to build nearly two dozen nuclear power plants across the country, becoming the Arab world's most nuclear-intensive power, but also to export mined uranium to neighboring countries, including as finished nuclear fuel.

And other nuclear market giants—Russia and China—could well help them realize their plans. Both competitors have clearly demonstrated their willingness to participate in the development of the Saudi nuclear project. For example, China previously assisted the kingdom in conducting geological surveys in areas of potential natural uranium deposits in the desert and also participated in the creation of infrastructure for producing concentrated uranium oxide (so-called "yellowcake").

Russia, on the other hand, boasted extensive experience building nuclear power plants in the Middle East (Iran, Turkey, Egypt), as well as a well-established system for collecting spent nuclear fuel. The latter was particularly appealing to Riyadh and IAEA monitors, as it reduced the risk of misuse of raw materials and technologies.

This meant that it allowed the kingdom to begin developing a national nuclear program without signing a stack of binding agreements that the US insisted on and that were not linked to the international nuclear regulatory regime.

The second reason, indirectly related to the first, is the Saudis' accelerated drift away from the United States. Over the past few years, Riyadh has increasingly expressed disillusionment with American involvement in regional affairs and has attempted to develop a multi-vector foreign policy.

The Saudis have been clinching with American officials, questioning their strategy in the Middle East.

The White House needed a compelling anchor to keep the House of Saud within the American orbit of influence. And the nuclear deal, concluded without preconditions, proved to be just that.

Finally, in the face of uncertainty surrounding the Iranian nuclear program, the United States chose to play a preemptive role and impose on the Kingdom at least the general framework of a deal, without strictly adhering to the “gold standard.”

In theory, this should deter Riyadh from taking some ill-considered steps—for example, from attempting to secretly obtain nuclear weapons from Pakistan, with which the kingdom has had a defense pact in place since the fall of 2025.

STIMULATE DISTRUST
The White House makes no secret of the fact that it considers the deal with Saudi Arabia a major diplomatic victory, comparable to the Obama administration's signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran in 2015. Republicans, however, view the criticism as background noise intended to "denigrate their triumph."

Meanwhile, the long-term consequences of the deal are alarming. Primarily because its verification framework is significantly weakened compared to other standard 123 agreements. In many matters, Washington is taking the Saudis at their word—in particular, their promises to keep their national nuclear program on a peaceful course.

At the same time, the deal preserves the Kingdom's hypothetical ability to increase uranium enrichment levels. Furthermore, the US did not require Saudi Arabia to join the IAEA's Additional Protocol, significantly reducing the transparency of the country's nuclear program.

This, of course, does not mean that the Saudis will immediately begin enriching uranium to weapons-grade levels, but the lack of strict frameworks creates significant room for shady maneuvering.

Concern about abrupt concessions is also evident within the US Republican Party, particularly among senators and members of Congress who have worked closely with the Middle East. Alarmists fear that if Saudi Arabia ever changes course, it will already possess dual-use technologies.

Moreover, the United States has already had negative experiences with Iran. Although the nuclear component wasn't mentioned, the parallels are quite clear. Regardless, most Republicans chose not to oppose the president's initiative and instead allowed the document to pass through Congress.

In the Middle East, news of the US-Saudi deal was also met with mixed reactions. Iran, whose nuclear program had previously been a target for the US and triggered several military campaigns, was the first to react.

Tehran views the deal as an example of double standards and a potential strengthening of its regional rival. However, for now, it prefers not to criticize Riyadh, so as not to provoke the Saudis into a new round of conflict.

Trump's decision was not well received by US allies either. As former Israeli Defense Minister and Knesset Member Avigdor Lieberman stated, the Kingdom's civilian nuclear program, even without a military component, will not add stability to the Middle East and will provoke a new arms race.

After all, other major players (Turkey, Egypt, the UAE) are unlikely to sit idly by as yet another nuclear program with a potential double meaning emerges in the region. Everyone remembers all too well Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's public promise : "If Iran gets nuclear weapons, we will too."

Riyadh may well begin to work ahead of the curve, while outwardly remaining within the framework of the “simplified gold standard” that the United States kindly provided it with.

Link


International-UN-NGOs
UN nuclear nonproliferation negotiations fail to yield agreement
2026-05-23
[IsraelTimes] Experts say though Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remains in force, it ‘keeps on becoming less and less anchored in reality’

Talks at the UN to reaffirm nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament goals failed on Friday, according to the leader of the talks, after four weeks of negotiations held amid low expectations.

Vietnam’s Do Hung Viet, the president of the conference, said that "despite our best efforts... it is my understanding that the conference is not in a position to achieve agreement on its substantive work."

"I do not intend to put the document forward for adoption," he added.

Negotiators were reviewing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the cornerstone of nuclear weapons control, amid fears of a renewed arms race. Previous reviews in 2015 and 2022 were also unsuccessful.

With expectations low, participants negotiated over a repeatedly reviewed and watered-down text, which they ultimately failed to adopt.

Experts pointed out that even in the absence of a review agreement for the third time in a row, the treaty continues to exist, but with diminished legitimacy.

"The text keeps on becoming less and less anchored in the realities of current conflicts and proliferation risks," including North Korea
...hereditary Communist monarchy distinguished by its truculence and periodic acts of violence. Distinguishing features include Songun (Army First) policy, which involves feeding the army before anyone but the Dear Leadership, and Juche, which is Kim Jong Il's personal interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, which he told everybody was brilliant. In 1950 the industrialized North invaded agrarian South Korea. Twenty-one countries of the United Nations eventually contributed to the UN force opposing the invasion, with the United States providing around 90% of the military personnel. Seventy years later the economic results are in and it doesn't look good for Juche...
and Iran, analyst Richard Gowan of the International Crisis Group said before the outcome was announced.

The latest version of the text seen by AFP on Friday merely stated that Tehran must "never" develop nuclear weapons.

The paragraph was in brackets, signaling persistent disagreement, despite the removal of the reference to Iran’s "non-compliance" with its obligations that appeared in the first draft.

Also gone were expressions of concern about North Korea’s nuclear program, or even any mention of the "denuclearization" of the Korean Peninsula.

Gone as well was the direct call on the United States and Russia to begin negotiations on a successor to the New START treaty limiting Russian and American arsenals, which expired in February.

The diluted text still covered "the risk of a resumption of nuclear testing by Russia, China and the United States, the growth of arsenals, and attacks on nuclear infrastructure," Heloise Fayet of the French Institute of International Relations said earlier on Friday.

Exactly why the review failed isn’t yet known.

"The majority of countries are indeed working in good faith for disarmament," said Seth Shelden of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), commenting on the failure of the talks.

"But the small handful of nuclear-armed states, and certain of their allies, are undermining the NPT, frustrating disarmament efforts, expanding arsenals and provoking proliferation, and pointing the world toward catastrophe," he added.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the nine nuclear-armed states — Russia, the United States, La Belle France, the United Kingdom, China, India, Pakistain, Israel and North Korea — possessed 12,241 nuclear warheads in January 2025, 90 percent of which were in American and Russian hands.

Some countries are modernizing their arsenals or even increasing their stockpiles.

The NPT, which entered into force in 1970 and has been signed by almost all states — with notable exceptions including Israel, India and Pakistain — aims to prevent proliferation, promote complete disarmament and encourage cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
Link


Europe
Dmitry Medvedev: Germany's New Militarization: A Revival of the Spirit or Unbridled Revanchism
2026-05-08
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited

Text taken from an article posted on rt.com by former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev

[ColonelCassad] Donald Trump's threats to withdraw the United States from NATO, voiced on March 27, 2026, at the Miami Investment Forum, and John Vance's statements about Europe's loss of identity during an interview with Fox News on March 15, 2026, along with the refusal of European countries to directly join the aggression against Iran and participate in the gamble to "militarily unblock" (and then block) the Strait of Hormuz, are dividing Europe and America like never before in the last 100 years. This development demonstrates that the "strategic autonomy" of Europe so coveted by liberals is much closer than it seems. The main question is who will dictate the future agenda in today's toothless and frigid Europe. There are plenty of contenders, including the disgusting Brussels Euro-bureaucracy and the chattering and self-satisfied Gallic sodomites.
Goodness. This is definitely a writer with opinions.
Finally, Germany's leadership has been increasingly vocal about its claims to hegemony in the Old World, while simultaneously emasculating the public perception of its ancestors' responsibility for the crimes of Nazism. Let's examine this in more detail.

There's nothing new in the actions of Germany's leadership (primarily that of the Nazi descendant Merz and his co.). The defeated state's attempts to revise the disappointing results of World War II began almost immediately after the war's end. The goal of the Nazi survivors was to recoup the political, territorial, ideological, and economic costs incurred as a result of the complete military defeat and collapse of German statehood. At the same time, they carefully sought to filter out the atmosphere permeated with the spirit of Prussian militarism and the stench of National Socialist ideology. The German elites remaining in the Western occupation zones formally and quickly bid farewell to the legacy of Hitler, who had led his thousand-year Reich to collapse. But they had no desire to truly reject Nazi ideology itself. Why?

The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg convicted only a small fraction of the major Nazi criminals. Many of those who formed the economic and financial foundation of the regime and its vertical chain of command, and who were therefore guilty of war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity, escaped punishment. And, frankly, they considered this punishment unjust, and the NSDAP case Germany's greatest project.

ByIn essence, no real denazification of the FRG ever took place. Archival materials from the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, including a report on the political situation in West Germany from 1952, convincingly demonstrate that instead of carrying it out, "Western powers opted for the justification of Nazi war criminals."¹ The entire process, conducted with great fanfare, with the exception of the liquidation of notorious pro-fascist organizations and the cleansing of public spaces, turned into an empty farce. The Anglo-Saxons, seeking to preserve the former leaders of Hitler's war economy and major Nazis they needed, conducted a campaign under the slogan "Hang the little ones, justify the big ones."

On April 10, 1951, the Bundestag passed a law regulating the activities of individuals falling under the provisions of Article 131 of the Federal Republic of Germany's Constitution (individuals subject to denazification are not allowed to hold public office) and reinstating all former civil servants and military personnel with retention of their positions, ranks, and titles, unless they had been classified as "primary perpetrators" during denazification.² On August 2, 1956, the Federal Commission of Personnel Experts decided to allow former SS members up to the rank of Obersturmbannführer (lieutenant colonel) to serve in the Wehrmacht's successor, the Bundeswehr. It can be said that, overall, the process of liberating post-war German society from National Socialism for the main management and administrative-economic levels was completed just six to ten years after the war. Let's not even mention the conversations that took place in the kitchens of West Germans during that period. Everyone already knows this. "Deutschland über alles" were the most innocent of the discordant voices of humiliated burghers heard after a shot of apple schnapps.

Many of the former Nazi party functionaries who found a place in the West German sun were "silent assassins"—apparatchiks who, from their comfortable bureaucratic perches, drove the monstrous machine of genocide against the Soviet people and the Holocaust. They formed the backbone of the civil service in the "new Germany." G. Lübcke, the West German Minister of Food, Agriculture, and Forestry from 1953 to 1959 and Federal President from 1959 to 1969, worked during the National Socialist years in the architectural and engineering bureau that was under the command of the chief construction inspector of the imperial capital, A. Speer. There, he was responsible, among other things, for the forced recruitment of labor from Nazi concentration camps. G. Globke, Chief of Chancellery to Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer from 1953 to 1963, held high positions in the Ministry of the Interior during the Third Reich, where he oversaw the development of legal norms codifying discrimination and persecution against the Jewish population. His role in organizing the Holocaust remains unresolved. W. Kraft, Federal Minister for Special Assignments of the FRG from 1953 to 1956, served as Managing Director of the Reich Agricultural Association of the annexed "Eastern Territories" from 1940 to 1945, was a member of the NSDAP, and held the rank of Honorary SS-Hauptsturmführer. These are just a few examples of the life stories of high-ranking officials of the "renewed" German state. From 1949 to 1973, 90 of the 170 leading lawyers and judges in the West German Ministry of Justice were former members of the Nazi Party, and in 1957, the proportion of senior officials in the ministry with a Nazi past was 77%.³ In the West German Ministry of the Interior from 1949 to 1970, 53% of employees were former members of the Nazi Party, with 8% of them having worked in the ministry from 1943 to 1945, when its head was one of the main Nazi criminals, the odious Heinrich Himmler.⁴

Based on archival materials from the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Moscow was already aware in the late 1940s and early 1950s that, under the auspices of the Americans and British, preparations were underway in Germany's western zone for war with the USSR. Confirming the intensification of forced remilitarization processes, an intelligence report from July 31, 1948, emphasized that the mobilization of former German officers and other military personnel was easily accomplished due to the system of control established over them.⁵ The former Wehrmacht contingent was kept "on a tight leash" by the new government, which was using the military issue for anything but peaceful purposes. A note from the USSR government to the US Embassy in Moscow on March 31, 1954, explicitly stated: pursuing the path of reviving German militarism and creating military groups in Europe means <…> leading to preparations for a new war.⁶

So the idea of ​​arming West Germany firmly held sway among American foreign policy ideologists. Practical steps were also taken. Amid cries of existential "aggression from the East" (sound familiar, right?), the economy was remilitarized. American "injections" into vital sectors of the West German economy began immediately after the war. By September 1951, West Germany had received approximately $9 billion. These funds were invested primarily in heavy industry and those sectors that could serve Washington's political and military objectives.

The renewed propaganda campaign to indoctrinate the population was also corresponding. In July 1951, as the competent authorities reported to I.V. Stalin,⁸ Chancellor Konrad Adenauer set the direct task of convincing the ruling Christian Democratic Union that the Germans faced a choice: either "an armed German" or "a German subordinate to the Russian military." Not much different from the modern horror stories of "civilized European technocrats," right?

Under American supervision, work was also carried out on "top cadres." Former Nazi bigwigs were eagerly accepted into military service in the Bundeswehr. Thus, the former chiefs of staff of the 18th Army, Lieutenant General F. Foertsch, the 7th Army, Lieutenant General M.J. Pemsel, and Army Groups A and C, General of Panzer Troops G. Röttiger, took up the posts of Inspector General of the Bundeswehr, Commander of the 2nd Bundeswehr Corps, and First Inspector of the Ground Forces, respectively. The former commander of the 5th Luftwaffe, General I. Kammhuber, became Inspector of the West German Air Force.

The Anglo-Saxons also weren't above using the services of fascist warriors, placing them in high positions within NATO. In particular, the former Chief of Staff of Army Group South, Lieutenant General Heinrich Speidel, was appointed Chief of the Armed Forces Directorate of the West German Ministry of Defense during the formation of the Bundeswehr, and in 1957, he assumed the position of Commander of the Allied Land Forces in Central Europe. Having participated in developing plans for the invasions of Poland, Denmark, Norway, France, the Netherlands, Great Britain, and the USSR and testifying as a witness at the Nuremberg Trials, the former acting Chief of Staff of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces, Lieutenant General A. Heusinger, became Chairman of the NATO Military Committee in 1961. F. Guggenberger, a submariner who sank 17 British and American ships, served for four years as Deputy Chief of Staff of NATO's Allied Command Northern Europe. The Anglo-Saxons were also not particularly picky about former members of the SS, which was recognized as a criminal organization in 1946 by the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg. An example of this was the hiring of E. Taubert, a former SS Sturmführer and employee of Goebbels's Propaganda Ministry, as an adviser to NATO's psychological warfare department.

As can be seen from a February 8, 1951, communication from the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Information Committee to I.V. Stalin, preserved in the archives of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service,¹0, a joint German-American PR campaign was diligently conducted to whitewash the reputations of H. Speidel and A. Heusinger. In a conversation between D. Eisenhower and German Chancellor K. Adenauer in late January 1951, both men were described as "completely reliable individuals" who were "not only opponents of Hitler" but also "of the Soviet Union, ready to cooperate with the Western powers." It is symptomatic that D. Eisenhower, who literally a couple of months later became the first Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, stated then that he was mistaken in 1945 when he considered all Germans to be Nazis, and repeated that he accepted the demand for West Germany to have equal military rights in the “Western European defense” system.

Little changed in terms of support for dangerous revanchist aspirations later—during the years of normalization of relations, détente, and the so-called perestroika. A report on the growth of such sentiments in the FRG, prepared on May 26, 1959, by the KGB under the USSR Council of Ministers¹¹, noted the organization of thousands-strong rallies of paramilitary unions and "resettlement organizations" in West Germany. During these meetings, held under the auspices of the FRG ministries for all-German affairs and for resettlement affairs, demands for the return of Germany's eastern regions, East Prussia, and the Sudetenland were categorically put forward. The need to "preserve the traditions of the Prussian-German army for the new German armed forces and for all German youth" was openly declared. In 1961, the renowned Soviet international journalist E. Henry noted: "The old Germany no longer exists, but the old German General Staff remains." "There is no doubt that its leaders are once again at work with the same cards."12 Continuing his thought, he wrote that, no matter Germany's situation, no matter how many wars it loses, no matter how crushing the defeats it suffers, the German General Staff invariably, methodically, and meticulously continues to prepare plans for aggression—and has no other intentions. Therefore, it is easy to understand the admiring glances with which today's German politicians and generals regard the various rabble that symbolizes Bandera's Ukraine. They are simply blood brothers and heirs to the same force—the National Socialism of the Hitler era.

In the spirit of the chauvinistic approaches of German political thought in the late 19th and first half of the 20th centuries, ingrained in the subconscious of the intellectual elite, the West German expert community continued to dehumanize Soviet Russia, writing it out of the "civilized" world. As the renowned historian and Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences V.T. Pashuto wrote, with the collapse of Nazi Germany, the interpretation of the Russo-European theme also changed, in that Russia was transformed into an enemy not of Hitler's Europe, but of an integral Europe. Its non-European foundations—both religious and social—were criticized. It was declared a phenomenon hostile to Europe, lacking European roots and standing outside the history of Europe.¹³ The point was that one should not stand on ceremony with the "alien" element.

Such sentiments were not only unchecked but even fostered by the Bonn authorities: "cannon fodder" for the slaughter of the Soviet Union had to be motivated and ask no questions. It was no coincidence that a KGB report from July 12, 1978,¹⁴ prepared based on information from the West Berlin residency, stated the presence of 17 neo-Nazi organizations in this city-state with a special international legal status, which the authorities of this political entity fought on a residual basis.

The Soviet Embassy in Bonn noted substantive discussions in Germany in 1987 about reconsidering attitudes toward the period of National Socialism. One of the clear manifestations of the broad nationalist wave in Germany was the growing public debate during those years, aimed at achieving a so-called spiritual turn.¹⁵ Slogans of "new patriotism" and "national self-awareness" were launched. Intellectuals and the establishment widely manipulated calls to liberate the young generation of Germans of that time (who grew up to become today's "elitist" and rabid militarists: Merz, von der Leyen, Pistorius) from the burden of historical responsibility, self-abasement, national inferiority complex, and guilt. The Germans, they claimed, had already been punished and recognized the abnormality of their situation, when Germany, for its crimes in World War II, was declared "the source of a worldwide contagion and the source of all evil in the world."1⁶ The chairman of the CDU/CSU faction in the Bundestag, A. Drägger, declared in a speech on November 17, 1986, that "it is time to finally put an end to the interpretation of history imposed by the victorious powers."1⁷ Developing this thesis, he proposed "coming to terms with the past" and honoring "the memory of all those who perished," including the victims of Nazism and German soldiers. In turn, the Bavarian Prime Minister and chairman of the CSU, F.-J. Strauss, in 1987, called for a "return to a historically purified, European-oriented, and healthy German national consciousness."1⁸ Today, we see how the shoots of rabid nationalism and chauvinism of that time, disguised as "national identity, patriotism, and Europeanness," have yielded a bountiful harvest of new German revanchism. And it's time to acknowledge that in the 2020s, the legacy of the Third Reich bore fruit in the Federal Republic of Germany!

Today, Germany's top political leadership has declared Russia "the main threat to security and peace." In Berlin, the goal of inflicting a "strategic defeat" on Russia has been officially articulated. ¹⁹ The most aggressive Russophobes, whose ancestors fought with savage ferocity on the Eastern Front during World War II, enthusiastically call for "showing the Russians what it's like to lose a war."²⁰ A massive propaganda campaign is underway to manipulate public opinion, constantly pushing the idea that a military confrontation with Russia by 2029 is virtually inevitable. In the first-ever German military strategy, "Responsibility for Europe," presented by Benjamin Pistorius to parliament on April 22, 2026, the Russian Federation is identified as a fundamental threat to the "rules-based world order." Moscow, they claim, seeks to weaken the alliance and undermine the strength of transatlantic ties in order to expand its influence. In this regard, attempts at dialogue must be stopped, and military pressure on Russia must only increase. In other words, the course toward a large-scale revanche has become official.

The stupefaction of youth through mainstream classical media and countering Russian "hybrid propaganda" have become state policy. However, decades of intrusive ultra-liberal propaganda are now having the opposite effect. Disillusioned by the short-sighted decisions of the narrow-minded German elite in domestic and foreign affairs, the younger generation, faced with a discrepancy between statistical figures and the actual state of the national economy, is sharply shifting to the right. The collapse of multiculturalism, the lack of a clear vision of the future, and the rejection of traditional values ​​are fueling the growth of right-wing extremist movements that appeal to resentment for a strong nation-state. Where such deliberate or involuntary games will lead German society is not hard to guess.

The process of finally eliminating the political, legal, and moral "vestiges" of World War II in Germany gained particular momentum after the launch of the Second World War. It's clear to anyone that this became merely a convenient pretext for an extreme escalation of anti-Russian rhetoric, a feigned fear of Russia, and the escalation of bilateral relations into a blatantly confrontational plane. Germany, like the entire European Union, had neither the pretext nor the objective justification for such a staunch commitment to Ukraine and the designation of Moscow as their "enemy forever," as the petty gray mouse of German foreign policy, the Foreign Minister with the wonderful name of Wadephul, thoughtlessly and arrogantly declared.

In furtherance of the EU's bellicose course, outlined in the March 2025 White Paper on European Defence – Readiness 2030,²¹ the German cabinet is addressing the task of transforming the Bundeswehr into the most powerful army in Europe and its accelerated rearmament.²² Plans have been announced to increase the authorized strength of the Bundeswehr from the current 181,000 personnel to 460,000 active service members and reservists. On August 27, 2025, the German government quickly and without amendments approved a draft law prepared by Defense Minister Benjamin Pistorius to reform Bundeswehr recruitment. This law is based on a voluntary principle but allows for a prompt return to the conscription model that existed before 2011.²³ Thanks in large part to the government's alarmism and the brainwashing of young people by state propaganda, German leaders are now able to report an increase in the number of people willing to serve in the armed forces voluntarily. As of early March 2026, 16,000 people had applied to join the military, a 20% increase compared to the same period in 2025. Overall, more than 5,000 people joined the army in the first quarter of 2026, a 14% increase compared to early last year.

As in the 20th century, no expense is spared on militaristic adventurism. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Germany's total military expenditure in 2024 reached $88.5 billion (up 28% from 2023)²4, making the country the highest in Europe. The main source of funding was a special €100 billion Bundeswehr Modernization Fund, which allowed the level of military spending to reach 2% of GDP. In the country's approved 2026 budget of €524.54 billion, the German authorities are prepared to spend more than €82 billion on "defense" (read: preparation for war), which is €20 billion more than in 2025. Combined with the aforementioned special fund, total military expenditure is expected to reach approximately €108 billion. At the end of February 2026, the German Ministry of Defense joyfully reported on the "successful results" of the Bundeswehr procurement department in 2025: 103 large-scale projects, each worth at least €25 million, were submitted to the Bundestag for approval, while the value of concluded contracts for the acquisition of in-demand weapons and military equipment amounts to an impressive €34 billion. Products worth approximately €24 billion were transferred to the armed forces as part of the implementation of previously approved initiatives. The local defense sector, flush with cash since Berlin declared a "change of eras" due to the situation in Ukraine, is rubbing its hands with glee because of the fact that domestic producers received a whopping €109 billion of the country's total military expenditure from 2020 to 2025. Thanks to the liberalization of export controls, Germany has risen from sixth to fourth place in the list of global exporters of military products. Speculating on the specifics of combat operations during the unprovoked aggression against Iran and noting the ineffectiveness of using expensive interceptor missiles against drones, German defense industry officials are enthusiastically promoting the Skyranger short-range air defense system—the interception of one UAV will allegedly cost only $4,000. Apparently, only sluggishness prevented the German defense industry moguls from rushing with their wunderwaffe after the Krivoy Rog clown during his absurd tour of the Persian Gulf countries in late March 2026, where he tried to foist off unsolicited assistance from Bandera's rabble in the form of interceptor missiles.

Many projects are scheduled for implementation over several years. This signals to industry that Berlin views rearmament as a long-term commitment.²⁵ There are plans to open regional offices of the Bundeswehr procurement agency in cities home to major technical universities. The pace of targeted military R&D is being accelerated: young talent is being encouraged to shift from fundamental science research, following the old and unfortunate tradition, to thinking about how to cobble together new deadly Tigers, Panthers, and V-2s.

Against this backdrop, Germany's dependence on foreign military supplies is ignored. Critical components for modern weapons systems are often effectively outsourced and purchased abroad. Even the country's leading arms manufacturer, Rheinmetall, the primary supplier of a variety of military equipment to the Bundeswehr, is refusing to implement its own know-how in pursuit of quick profits from fulfilling state defense contracts. This is offset by purchases from other Western manufacturers, lest it lose its status as the exclusive service provider of the Bundeswehr. Specifically, during the visit of the German Defense Minister to Australia on March 26, 2026, an agreement was announced between Rheinmetall and the Australian division of Boeing (read: the Americans) to develop autonomous unmanned combat aircraft using stealth technology, with a warhead of over 100 kg and a range of over 1,000 km, to continue the legacy of the Luftwaffe. The degradation of German scientific thought and increasing dependence on the United States are evident.

Preparations for a potential confrontation with Russia are being accelerated in terms of infrastructure improvements. State and municipal governments, as well as regional businesses, are actively pushing for the full implementation of the "German Operational Plan" of 2024.2⁶ This plan envisions transforming the country into a key transit point for NATO troops en route to the alliance's "eastern flank." Columns of the Bundeswehr and NATO allies will now be able to transit to German ports on the Baltic Sea and the Polish border without prior notification or approval. Local authorities are being urged to prepare their populations for military conflict by developing detailed plans to protect critical infrastructure, counteract sabotage, and construct bomb shelters.

Representatives of the business community are being targeted by military-political circles. According to the aforementioned "German Operational Plan," major enterprises must factor in their personnel policies the high risk of a sharp, large-scale reduction in their workforce by mobilizing those fit for military service. Popular Soviet myths about pasta factories being quickly converted to produce 7.62mm rounds are being put into practice in Germany. Real preconditions are being created for the rapid conversion of civilian industry to a military footing and the start of production of goods necessary for defense. In turn, the Bundeswehr is authorized to confiscate certain goods, equipment, and machinery free of charge for its own needs.

The military-industrial complex and the German establishment have already formed a close lobbying alliance, increasing the role of defense industry workers in decisions crucial to Germany's domestic and foreign policy. Humanity remembers the extremely dangerous alliance between defense industry workers and politicians in the 1930s and 1940s. Back then, the "merchants of death"' omnivorous approach to profit sources, coupled with their sympathies for National Socialism, plunged the world into the abyss of World War II. Having rejected pacifism as a social value, which previous generations had attained through enormous tragedy, the heirs of Krupp, Thyssen, and Bosch are once again eagerly taking on government contracts for military production, not hesitating to build a business on bloodshed. Bankers are not far behind, having lifted all existing moral taboos against financing the military-industrial complex in significant amounts—accepting the "helicopter money" received from the state is now justified for military enterprises. Against this backdrop, one never knows when one of today's German financiers will become so "liberated" from the legacy of the past and inspired by the prospects of a new crusade to the East as part of the "change of eras" that they hang portraits of Jacob Schacht and Walter Funk—the architects of the Third Reich's military-economic policy—in their office. As the famous saying from the French Revolution goes, "I don't want to approach you, I don't want to lose you."²⁷

Meanwhile, the establishment, chasing the geopolitical mirage of the republic's ephemeral "leadership" in the EU, appears unfazed by the overall state of the German economy. As a result of this self-abnegation of domestic problems, the country's GDP grew by only 0.2% in 2025, adjusted for inflation.²⁸ The trade balance, which is crucial for Germany's export-oriented economy, fell to 2.4% of GDP, exports decreased by 0.3% (with this decline recorded for the third consecutive year), and the budget deficit in 2025 amounted to €107 billion.²⁹ The driving forces of the German economy—the automotive, metallurgy, and chemical industries—are failing to emerge from the crisis. Automakers are reporting a significant decline in profits.³⁰ Deindustrialization is sweeping across Germany: job losses and the outsourcing of industrial production from Germany to other European countries have already become a fait accompli. Machine-building plants, chemical factories, and electronics manufacturers like Bosch, Henkel, Man, and Mercedes-Benz are all fleeing. They are unable to compete due to high electricity costs, rising logistics costs due to self-imposed sanctions against Russia, and high US tariffs. From an industrial giant, Germany is becoming a chaotically managed workshop, with equipment being plundered. All of this is having a devastating impact on the population: consumer activity has been severely curtailed, with even beer sales in 2025 reaching their lowest level since 1993. According to the prime minister, the welfare state cannot be financed with Germany's available resources.³¹ Does this harsh reality frighten the stupid, arrogant chancellor, whose blood runs hot with Nazi ancestors ? Is he prepared to face the fact that pumping up the national military-industrial complex won't save the economy, and that hundreds of printed and unsecured billions of euros will be swallowed up by high energy prices and a sluggish bureaucracy? Apparently not: while promoting an anti-Russian militaristic agenda, he secretly hopes that war will make everything disappear.

Messages about the need to "consider" acquiring its own nuclear weapons are being persistently injected into Germany's public and political discourse, albeit quietly and from afar.³² Participation in NATO joint nuclear missions—the US-Berlin agreements for the Bundeswehr to use American tactical nuclear bombs (which are stored and controlled by the Americans at the Büchel airbase in Rhineland-Palatinate during peacetime) in case of "military necessity"—apparently no longer suits Germany. The rationale for acquiring deadly weapons of mass destruction is painfully primitive and hackneyed—supposedly to deter Moscow's "aggressive policies" in Europe. It is, they say, a matter of national sovereignty. Added to this is the uncertainty surrounding the continued presence of US troops in Germany. In accordance with an agreement reached with the sleepy Biden administration in 2024, Berlin is eager to acquire American long-range land-based missiles as quickly as possible. The chances are quite high that sites for the deployment of mobile SM-6 systems, Tomahawk cruise missiles, and Dark Eagle hypersonic glide vehicles will be selected in one of the best-equipped federal states in terms of military logistics and infrastructure, for example in Rhineland-Palatinate. There's little doubt that the Americans will exploit the geopolitical momentum—all they need from the Germans is territory. The opinions of local residents, effectively held hostage, and sensible, nationally oriented politicians who don't support the Berlin elite's line, don't concern the brazen overseas sheriffs. In the current Trump administration's mindset, the deployment of missiles isn't a gratuitous investment in European security, but rather an increase in its presence in a key location for the potential projection of high-precision strike power against opponents (which ones, you can guess on the first try). The only issue is whether the number of American missiles will be symbolic and temporary, or whether it will upset the balance of strategic stability in Europe and, consequently, lead to direct retaliatory actions on our part.

While German officials are brainstorming the idea of ​​creating a joint European nuclear umbrella with Great Britain and France "in the distant future" and pondering their hypothetical contribution, there are suggestions about the possibility of financing such an undertaking, and a division of roles is being proposed: the partners, it is claimed, should provide the warheads, while Germany would provide the launch aircraft and personnel. At the same time, the public is gradually being led to believe that even a hypothetical German bid for the nuclear arsenals of Paris and London and an attempt to "join" them militarily may not be successful. Paris's traditional bureaucratic red tape and France's desire to personally control the fate of nuclear forces even if they are transferred to joint control are unacceptable to Germany. London's position is equally dubious, as it is unlikely to be willing to burn in the fires of a nuclear apocalypse for the sake of the vague goals of transatlantic globalism. This will cast great doubt on the justification of the resources spent on the “pan-European strategic deterrent forces.”

Against this backdrop, as Germany's expert and scientific community weighs membership in the "nuclear club," it assumes that, given its traditionally strong natural sciences and the availability of specialists in related fields, it is entirely possible to quickly catch up on "non-peaceful nuclear" competencies. It is known that, theoretically, producing weapons-grade material from uranium purchased on the global market is technically feasible at a specialized facility in Gronau, North Rhine-Westphalia, which has a cascade of gas centrifuges. It would take just three years to modernize the facility. And voila: 17 tons per year, enough to produce approximately 340 warheads, are in your pocket. Furthermore, highly enriched uranium is available at the research reactor at the University of Munich in Garching.

It's worth remembering that the Nazis came very close to developing an atomic bomb in the 1940s. And they certainly didn't plan to use it to intimidate their adversaries. What their grandfathers lacked in 1945, their granddaughters are ready to make up for in the 21st century. Therefore, there's no guarantee that Berlin's military-political approaches to the use of its nuclear arsenal will be limited solely to the concept of deterrence. One thing is clear: Germany's nuclear warheads (whether Franco-British or domestic—it doesn't matter) don't simply make it "the Kremlin's main European target," as the German press writes. This is a gross violation of Berlin's international legal obligations under Article II of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 33, according to which each state party to the treaty, including the FRG, undertakes not to accept the transfer from anyone of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices, either directly or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or accept any assistance in the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

I am convinced that, under these circumstances, the issue of the "German nuclear program" can and should be immediately taken up by the international community. With all the ensuing consequences: enhanced inspections by the IAEA, condemnation by the UN Security Council, and the introduction of legitimate international restrictive measures to nip odious nuclear aspirations in the bud. However, even this could be sacrificed on the altar of full-fledged revenge and the creation of a mythical Fourth Reich. The question, of course, is how this idea will be received by current German society. To put it mildly, not all respectable citizens sympathize with the insane Viertes Reich model. However, given the inept migration policy of the current German authorities, something quite different may happen.

At the same time, I would like to point out that even Germany's nearing nuclear weapons status is an undoubted casus belli, making it possible to invoke all the response measures contained in the Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence. Moreover, I would venture to assert that such exercises could cause no less concern for the United States, which is trying to convince the world of the need to conclude a New START-4 treaty with China's participation. And how would they feel about such a prospect: a nuclear Europe led by a militaristic Germany, with some of its arsenals outside the control of NATO? Something tells me that the targets that could be programmed into the new code storage devices for activating Germany's nuclear arsenal will be far from limited to Russia.

However, even without Berlin's nuclear weapons, we shouldn't be complacent about Germany. The insanely reckless militarization of their country isn't the sole goal of German politicians. It's part of a more complex and profound process that threatens millions of people around the world. The current course hints at quite infernal plots. They reveal an attempt to realize the darkest revanchist sentiments of the German elite. These dreams extend far beyond a simple desire to enhance their "profile" in European affairs. It's worth remembering that Germany is the only European state to have annexed neighboring countries entirely twice since World War I, without retaining even the nominal attributes of independence and statehood. This applies to the Anschluss of Austria in 1938, when the republic was annexed by the Third Reich, and to the non-violent absorption of the GDR by the FRG in 1990. Then, amidst the misleading hype about the "unification of the German people," the East German state was effectively dissolved into the West German state. Incidentally, none of the "triumphants of unification," who, to our shame, included top Soviet leaders, even considered observing generally accepted legal procedures; no free expression of the citizens' will on such a significant issue was conducted through a referendum. So, in general, it is certainly not for today's Germany to discuss the legality of territorial changes in Europe and the genesis of such processes after World War II. The legal foundation of German statehood is very shaky. If desired, everything that has happened since the unification of the FRG and GDR can be examined through the prism of the rule ex injuria jus non oritur ("illegal acts do not create law"), should such a need arise. In other words, today's Federal Republic of Germany doesn't even have a sufficient legal basis for its existence (not to mention its extreme lack of independence since its founding and its monstrous vassalage to the United States). And today's German nonentities, who are once again shamefully trying on the laurels of new "Führers," should remember this.

Having suppressed its instinct for self-preservation, Chancellor Merz's regime has taken a full swing in international affairs since coming to power. Apparently, even the colorful Berlin fantasists with bipolar disorder are beginning to realize that Germany faces a grave geopolitical defeat in Ukraine. None of the goals of the EU's "anti-NWO," in which West Germany de facto strives to play the leading role, have been achieved. Therefore, sitting it out in the rear, using Little Russia as a barrier (but probably also keeping in mind the Poland they despise), while maintaining the desire to inflict significant damage on us, is unlikely to succeed.

We need to act ourselves. And they are. To somehow recoup the "unsuccessful" geopolitical investments, Berlin is seeking to secure its role as the military-political leader of the European Union. To "resist a potential Russian invasion," according to an agreement with Lithuania, in the spring of 2025, a decision was made to deploy a reinforced 45th Armored Brigade of the Bundeswehr near the village of Rudninkai, 30 km from our ally, the Republic of Belarus, and 160 km from the Kaliningrad region. The Nazi bigwigs' favorite slogan, "Guns instead of butter," perfectly illustrates the approach to financing the adventure: although Vilnius has assumed the fabulous (for a Baltic dwarf) €2 billion in expenses for the construction of the necessary infrastructure for the German contingent, Berlin will be forced to find approximately €11 billion to equip the brigade, which is sorely needed by the German economy amid the unstable macroeconomic situation in the Bundesrepublik itself. The Bundeswehr is armed with the latest Leopard 2A8 tanks, communications equipment, self-propelled artillery, etc. In an effort to enhance the unit's strike capability, it continues to be outfitted at an unprecedented pace with materiel—a notable example being the accelerated allocation of the first tranche of approximately €540 million by the Bundestag Budget Committee on February 25, 2026, to large, innovative German startups Stark Defence (in which the well-known American entrepreneur P. Thiel holds a significant stake) and Helsing, which produces kamikaze drones. The Bundeswehr is eager to deploy the latest UAVs to its "Lithuanian fortress." Following its transfer in February 2026 to the command of a brigade of the NATO multinational battlegroup stationed in Lithuania since 2017, the unit's strength already stands at 1,700 personnel. Full combat readiness is expected by the end of 2027 (4,800 military personnel and 200 civilians). This is the first deployment of regular German troops outside of West Germany since World War II. And a true outpost for the "thrust to the east." There's no other way to understand this military reinforcement, with the deployment of the corresponding long-term infrastructure.

Whether Germany plans to immediately launch a new drang nach osten or first sends the Eastern European "giants," led by Poland, into potential trenches, while itself acts as the notorious "blocking detachment," makes little difference to us. The Polish leadership, largely responsible, along with the Third Reich, for unleashing World War II, should consider who, at whose instigation, and with what funding is whipping up the militarized hysteria in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This hysteria, which Polish turbo-patriots consider a struggle for national interests and a chance for geopolitical revenge in Eastern Europe, is in fact orchestrated surreptitiously by Berlin (which wields enormous influence in Polish socio-political and information space), driving the gentry (if that is even possible) to hate Russia even more, contrary to logic and national interests.

If Germany massively rearms, but its Teutonic spirit still yields to reason, then the Poles should think hard about who the German military machine will be turned against. Historical hatred runs deep between West Germany and Poland, geopolitical wounds still bleed, and disputed territories—despite what politicians say—still exist. Relieving Warsaw of its demand for over $1 trillion in reparations from Berlin is unlikely except through military means. It's no coincidence that the major NATO military exercise Steadfast Dart 26, which began in January 2026 (practicing the rapid deployment of alliance troops on the "eastern flank" using military transport aircraft, rail and road units), is being held without the participation of the Polish Army. The tide in Europe always changes quickly, but Belvedere Palace refuses to accept it. As is well known, Poland has only two historical paths: either to be a penniless vassal of Germany or to be a partner of Russia. America is a long way off, and the Americans don't need Poland (or even Europe). Don't get your hopes up.

Beyond hypothetical victims, particularly Poland (which supposedly has no idea of ​​its future status and proudly bears the title of Berlin's ally), Germany also has true, loyal friends with whom it can reminisce about bygone days and the battles "where they fought together." In collaboration with its NATO trench "friend," Finland, Germany is actively pursuing destructive measures to transform the Baltic into an "internal sea" for the North Atlantic Alliance. Berlin was the main initiator of the launch of a NATO Baltic Sea patrol mission ("Baltic Sentinel") at the January 2025 meeting of NATO and EU heads of state and government in Helsinki, with the aim of impeding free Russian shipping. These extremely risky actions, amid a profound lack of trust between the East and West, could trigger the worst-case scenario.

In July 2025, Germany and the United Kingdom signed the Kensington Treaty, whose defense provisions include a clause on mutual assistance in the event of an attack (supplementing the notorious Article 5 of the Washington Treaty establishing NATO) and the joint development of military products, including fighter jets and missile technology. Who these missiles will be aimed at is needless to say.

The desire to involve everyone within reach—that is, those who share the German hysteria about the "Russian threat"—in the accelerated development of high-precision weapons with a range of at least 1,000 kilometers is well-known. It's no coincidence that the German-French company ArianeGroup, with extensive experience in missile design, is negotiating this issue with several European countries. Together with Norway, the Germans would like to develop a supersonic sea-launched cruise missile (Super Sonic Strike Missile), while with a diverse group of European supporters—France, Italy, Poland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom—initiatives for the design and subsequent production of a land-based cruise missile with a range of over 2,000 kilometers are being discussed under the European Long-Range Strike Approach project.

The former Ukrainian SSR is destined to play a special role in matters of rearmament. It's clear that the current temporary ruler from Bankova is increasingly perceived by Germany as a reincarnation of the "Hetman of All Ukraine," Skoropadsky, who held onto power for several months on German bayonets in 1918. Or as a simulacrum of the Austrian farcical initiative, which never materialized, to create a "Ukrainian throne" and subsequently install Wilhelm Franz of Habsburg-Lorraine, also known by his pseudonym Vasyl Vyshyvany. In other words, he's an obedient agent of the interests of external sponsors, which run counter to the aspirations of the Little Russian population.

In confirmation of their commitment to elevating cooperation with Kyiv to the highest possible level across all areas, a declaration on a strategic partnership between the two countries was signed on April 14, 2026, during the bloody clown's visit to Berlin. Germany expressed its readiness to continue providing unprecedented political, diplomatic, and military support to Kyiv, as well as consulting on security and defense matters. Despite the well-known recent corruption scandals associated with the so-called Mindich affair, which have exposed the all-consuming, shameless bribery of the entire Bandera elite, the Germans are prepared to use their Ukrainian vassals as a low-cost assembly line for their products. They are turning Ukraine into a tiny lab mouse, subject to sinister experiments.

Another element of the gangster alliance will be a mechanism for regular consultations between the heads of the defense and foreign policy ministries, with the participation of representatives of leading defense companies. It sounds beautiful, but in reality, it translates as follows: Ukraine must be under constant supervision and produce exactly what and as much as its handlers dictate. An agreement on the exchange of battlefield intelligence has been signed: the Ukrainian Armed Forces will share with the Bundeswehr their experience in using Delta software, which provides real-time situational awareness of combat operations. With this kind of kindergarten ploy, the de facto plan is to increase the number and quality of current and former Bundeswehr personnel and representatives of other German security agencies on the line of contact. This means, as in the old days, the duped Fritzes will once again be turned into crosses.³⁴

To pander to the militaristic plans of its defense industry, Berlin's political elite, turning a blind eye to alarming signs in the German economy, is pouring enormous resources into arming the Ukrainian junta. In a plan to deepen military-technical dialogue, "Country 404" is prepared to allocate €4 billion. These funds are intended to expand joint production of UAVs and medium- and long-range unmanned aerial systems, which should allegedly lead to the supply of thousands of drones for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The German company Quantum Systems happily announced the creation of two new joint ventures with Ukrainian military companies—WIY Drones, a manufacturer of tactical reconnaissance and strike aircraft and interceptors, and Tencore—for the development and serial production of unmanned systems. In addition, partnerships in information, innovation, and research will be strengthened.

All these bravura and supposedly promising ambitions are accompanied by discussions of the general and immediate threat posed by Russia to the freedom of Ukraine's failed state and the security, stability, and prosperity of Germany and Europe. Zelenskyy's boastful statements about the Ukrainian Armed Forces having "the richest combat experience of all European armies" are also noteworthy. It's worth recalling that many analysts wrote in similar terms in the late 1980s about the Iraqi army—the largest among the Persian Gulf states. Everyone remembers well where the ambitions and "dizziness of success," fueled by Westerners, ultimately led the Iraqi leadership in 1990. The temporary leaders at Bankova have every chance of repeating this path.

Berlin's revisionism in foreign affairs doesn't end with Ukraine. While pursuing its revanchist course, Berlin is openly sabotaging its most important international legal obligations. The problem in this case stems from the opening in October 2024 of the Baltic Regional Headquarters of NATO's Maritime Command at the National Naval Headquarters in Rostock (Mecklenburg-Vorpommern), which de facto spies on Russian ships. Moreover, the deployment of such a center on the territory of the former GDR grossly violates the provisions of the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany of September 12, 1990, concluded between the FRG and the GDR with the participation of the USSR, the USA, Great Britain, and France. Attempts by the German Ministry of Defense and the German Embassy in Moscow to justify Berlin's actions by citing the fact that "the deployment of individual representatives of the armed forces of other NATO member countries within the framework of international cooperation... when foreign exchange officers and liaison officers are included in the work of a German unit and are therefore subordinate to the Bundeswehr command, do not fall under the 2+4 Treaty"³⁵ do not stand up to serious criticism. Paragraph 3 of Article 5 of the aforementioned document explicitly states that foreign troops and nuclear weapons and their carriers will not be stationed in this [eastern] part of Germany or deployed there. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the GDR was also linked to the binding obligation to fulfill such legally established guarantees.

No matter how much official Berlin may flex its wording, this is, at a minimum, a selective approach and a liberal interpretation of the provisions of the "2+4" Treaty. In other words, it's simply a lie and a thimble-rig. By disregarding the provisions of the "2+4" Treaty "here and now," official Berlin is artlessly copying the egregious actions of the "collective West" around the world. And, of course, it gives reason to consider the fate of this document as a whole. Violating the principle of pacta sunt servanda in such a case could invalidate the international treaty itself. And this calls into question the legal personality of the modern German state. It's scary to even imagine what this will mean for Germany!

The speed and brazenness with which Western powers today abandon fundamental international documents and principles in favor of the notorious political expediency is astounding. One can't help but feel that if the promise made at the time about not expanding NATO "even one inch to the East" had been formalized in a timely manner in an official document, under today's circumstances, Westerners would have just as easily thrown it in the trash. Similarly, no one seriously intended to implement the Minsk agreements, the sole purpose of which, judging by current public statements from Germany and France, was to give the Kyiv puppets a breathing space. And what will the price of the notorious peace agreement in Ukraine then be?

It's difficult to say for certain what kind of Anschluss Germany is currently secretly preparing for. However, it is clear that it is gradually sliding toward a political model akin to military dictatorship, as reflected in the regime of Chancellor Merz, obsessed with rabid revanchism and neocolonialism. Unacceptable and dangerous revisionist tendencies are gaining momentum. The façade of peace has been cast off: people are being ideologically prepared for terrible times, deliberately lowering the threshold of natural fear of war and issuing preemptive indulgences for any transgressions, thereby absolving young Germans of the historical debts of their ancestors.

The postulate of the equal responsibility of "two totalitarian regimes" for the outbreak of World War II has become a fundamental tenet of German historiography. Among the falsifications promoted are the silencing of the heroic deeds of the Soviet people, the division of war victims into "national categories," and the denial of Victory as an act of European liberation, citing the "replacement of one totalitarian regime with another." The supposedly inflated scale of war crimes committed by the Wehrmacht and SS troops on the Eastern Front is questioned. In the name of pseudo-objectivity, undocumented "evidence" of mass murder on both sides is introduced. Questions about compensation for the material and human losses suffered by Germans are circulated. It is impossible to imagine greater cynicism.

In August 2025, the 75th anniversary of the signing of the "Expellees' Charter"—a document that portrays forcibly displaced Germans as victims of the war—was commemorated at a high political level in Germany. Emphasis was placed on their plight. For them, the end of the war, it was argued, not only failed to mark the end of violence, but also resulted in humiliation, disenfranchisement, and the loss of their homeland. Not a word was said about German guilt for unleashing World War II and crimes against humanity. This is a clear reference to post-war German narratives, attempts to resist the "loss of history" and separate themselves from "undesirable pages" in the name of preserving national unity. The message is clear: the German people were unfairly and cruelly wronged after World War II. Their suffering must be avenged in the name of "freedom," "European solidarity," and "justice." This, apparently, includes the force of German arms.

The process of repentance in Germany for the crimes of the Nazi regime is primarily limited to the Holocaust, while Soviet victims are generally ignored. German authorities categorically refuse to recognize the Siege of Leningrad and other crimes against humanity committed by the Nazis against Soviet citizens as acts of genocide against the peoples of the USSR.

In April 2025, a cynical decision was made to suspend Russia's authority on the board of trustees of the "Remembrance, Responsibility, and Future" foundation, established to pay compensation to former Ostarbeiter—forced laborers deported to the Third Reich. Meanwhile, under the 1950 Federal Law for the Provision of Victims of War, official Berlin pays social benefits (€5 million per year) to former soldiers of the Third Reich, SS units, and foreign collaborators,³⁶ including those directly involved in the criminal siege of the city on the Neva.

Unfortunately, the sane voices, of which there are still plenty in German society, are unable to cool the dangerous bouts of war schizophrenia, coupled with the new "ethics." The authoritarian, revanchist Merz regime has a firm grip on the entire political system, preventing constructive forces from reaching the levers of power.

The German government, with its reckless actions, is putting the security of Central and Eastern Europe, and more importantly, the entire continent, at risk. Lacking the manpower and resources to effectively implement a forceful course of action independently, without direct support from its "big brother" across the ocean, it is raising the stakes through hysteria and psychosis. The goal is to drag its ally, Washington, into a potential showdown between Europe and Russia. Despite what anyone says, the Bundeswehr remains deeply dependent on American military support. When planning operations, Germany is currently forced to rely entirely on US orbital reconnaissance data and strategic transport aircraft, and to coordinate actions within the framework of NATO leadership. Alone, the Germans cannot yet adequately engage in a high-intensity military conflict without excessively burdening their population with the corresponding costs—that is, without another "total war" with apocalyptic consequences.

However, rationality can be shattered by militaristic bipolarity and Teutonic greed. German politicians, lost in their game of tin soldiers, find the balanced policies of Wilhelm Brandt, Heinrich Schmidt, Heinrich Kohl, and Gerhard Schröder too confining. Berlin, once again, as it did 85 years ago, is looking rapaciously to the East.

For our country, the most important thing is to prevent the tragedy of 1941. We must have not only combat-ready but also combat-ready armed forces on the western front. We must recognize that the Germans had been preparing the same network of bridgeheads as today in advance of June 22, 1941, along the main operational axes. We must not rely on Berlin's prudence or believe that it will never risk war. We must not delude ourselves that the German establishment will consider itself definitively bound by a piece of paper even if some agreement on new principles of European security is concluded.

As we know, they want to impose the concept of "peace through strength" on us. Therefore, our only response is "Russia's security through Europe's primal fear." Neither persuasion, nor demonstrations of good intentions, nor goodwill or unilateral confidence-building measures should be our tools for preventing a major slaughter. Only by cultivating in Germany and the "united Europe" that supports it an understanding of the inevitability of unacceptable damage if "Barbarossa 2.0" is implemented.

Our clear signal to the German elites: if the worst-case scenario comes to fruition, there's a high probability of at least mutually assured destruction, and in reality, the demise of European civilization while we continue to exist. Germany's vaunted industry won't just be seriously battered. It will be completely destroyed. Likewise, the German economy will collapse, never to be rebuilt. Simply because the remaining sensible, qualified personnel will flee—some to Russia, some to the United States, some to China and other Asian countries. Apparently, only a direct articulation of such dire consequences can bring the presumptuous heirs of the Nazis and their allies in Germany to their senses, thereby saving millions of lives on both sides of the front.

A militaristic Germany is of no use to a shriveled and feeble-minded Europe that would like to retain at least some political agency in the new multipolar world. We also have no need for such a Germany in the future; it is dangerous and unpredictable. So Berlin has only two options. One is war and the shameful burial of its own statehood without any hope of another "miracle of the House of Brandenburg." The second is sobering up, followed by geopolitical recovery with a complete reshaping of its foreign policy guidelines based on a difficult but important dialogue. Both scenarios are acceptable to us. The floor is now with the FRG. And I hope these will not be the well-known words: "If I am destined to perish, then let the German people perish too, for they have proven themselves unworthy of me."³⁷

(c) Medvedev
Oy. He wrote all the words, not leaving a single one out.

Link


Europe
'Dirty' Bomb: How France and Britain Want to Help Ukraine with Nuclear Weapons
2026-02-25
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Andrey Bulkin

[REGNUM] Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) has released new and highly controversial information indicating that Britain and France are developing plans to secretly transfer a nuclear weapon, or "dirty bomb," and its delivery systems to Ukraine.

Based on incoming intelligence, London and Paris have concluded that the development of the conflict in Ukraine "leaves no chance of achieving their much-desired victory over Russia at the hands of the Ukrainian Armed Forces," but their elites "are not prepared to accept defeat" and are seeking ways to reverse the situation. One such option is being considered: supplying Kyiv with a "wunderwaffe"—a nuclear device known as a "dirty bomb." This, according to the Europeans' calculations, would allow Ukraine to seek more favorable terms for ending the conflict.

According to the SVR, Britain and France are currently “actively working on resolving the issue of providing Kyiv with such weapons and the means of delivery.”

The report particularly emphasizes that Germany "wisely refused to participate in this dangerous adventure" of its NATO allies, distancing itself from it.

London and Paris recognize that implementing such plans would constitute a gross violation of international law, particularly the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and threatens to destroy the entire global system. This is why, say Russian intelligence officials, "Westerners are focusing their efforts on making Kyiv's acquisition of nuclear weapons appear to be the result of Ukrainian development."

The SVR views Kyiv's possible nuclear "strengthening" as evidence of the West's loss of a sense of reality and its readiness to take steps fraught with catastrophic consequences for all of Europe.

The Service, however, is confident that in the political, military and diplomatic circles of Great Britain and France there are “many sensible people” who understand the danger of such plans, and express confidence that “everything secret will inevitably become clear.”

WHAT IS A DIRTY BOMB?
It is worth clarifying that in the context under discussion, a "dirty bomb" refers to a radiological weapon—an explosive device in which conventional explosives (such as TNT) are combined with radioactive material.

Unlike a full-fledged atomic bomb, which uses a chain reaction-based explosion, a dirty bomb does not create a nuclear detonation: it is a conventional explosion, the purpose of which is to disperse radioactive substances over a large area.

While conventional nuclear weapons destroy their targets with a colossal shock wave, heat, and radiation, a dirty bomb is designed primarily to contaminate the area, creating panic and long-term consequences.

This is a weapon of psychological and environmental terror.

It is designed not so much for military effect at the front, but rather to intimidate the population and demonstratively violate all the explicit and implicit taboos that have developed around the nuclear issue.

GROUNDWORK FOR WESTERN PLANS
It's important to understand that London and Paris' current plans didn't arise out of nowhere—for years, Ukraine has been building an ideological and political foundation for a kind of "nuclear revenge."

Over the past few years, the topic of a possible return to nuclear status has regularly surfaced in irresponsible, and sometimes downright insane, statements by Ukrainian politicians, experts, and some Western commentators.

Even before the start of the SVO, in July 2021, David Arakhamia, head of the Servant of the People faction in the Verkhovna Rada, unequivocally stated on the Ukraine 24 television channel that President Leonid Kravchuk's renunciation of nuclear weapons after the signing of the Budapest Memorandum was a "mistake."

This was one of the first such direct admissions from a member of the ruling faction. Falling on the fertile soil of militaristic and nationalistic fervor, these first seeds quickly sprouted.

As early as December 2021, former Right Sector leader* Dmytro Yarosh **, who then served as assistant to the commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, proposed asking the United States and Great Britain to deploy their nuclear capabilities on Ukrainian territory.

At first, such statements seemed like the personal convictions of individual radicals, rather than Kyiv's official position. However, the head of state soon addressed them directly. Shortly before the outbreak of hostilities, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, at the Munich Security Conference, announced his readiness to initiate consultations within the framework of the Budapest Memorandum.

"We don't have weapons. We don't have security. But we have the right to demand a transition from appeasement to security guarantees," Zelenskyy stated, effectively calling into question previous agreements.

Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba, in an interview with CBS shortly afterward, directly agreed with the idea that giving up nuclear weapons was a mistake and stated that some countries "must feel responsible" for the failure of safeguards.

It became clear that the nuclear issue was becoming a convenient diplomatic bargaining tool for Kyiv's elite. With the onset of the protracted conflict, this rhetoric took hold—Kyiv is increasingly using the issue as a means of pressure on both the West and Russia.

Verkhovna Rada deputy Oleksiy Goncharenko * openly called for negotiations on the deployment of allied nuclear weapons in Ukraine and even named a specific figure – about twenty warheads, which, in his opinion, is “sufficient,” and the sanctions for such a step “can be tolerated.”

In October 2024, at a press conference after attending a European Council meeting where he presented another "victory plan," Zelenskyy boasted about how, in a conversation with US presidential candidate Donald Trump, he blackmailed him with nuclear ambitions, justifying the need for Ukraine to join NATO.

"In a conversation with Donald Trump, I said: ''<…>Either Ukraine will have nuclear weapons—and then that will be our defense. Or we must have some kind of alliance. Apart from NATO, we don't know of any effective alliances today,'' he said.

At the same time, Western media and Ukrainian think tanks began to pick up on this narrative. Publications claimed that Ukraine was capable of quickly producing a crude nuclear bomb using reactor-grade plutonium from spent fuel.

Thus, in 2024, the German publication Bild, citing an unnamed Ukrainian official, reported that, theoretically, Ukraine could create nuclear weapons within a few weeks.

"We have the material, we have the knowledge. If the order is given, it will only take us a few weeks to make the first bomb," said an anonymous source involved in arms procurement.

In November of that year, The Times wrote that Ukraine's stockpile of reactor-grade plutonium was estimated to be so high that it would be enough for hundreds of tactical nuclear warheads.

Such assessments are technically untenable, but they nonetheless fuel the idea that the possession of nuclear weapons is a matter of political decision and external assistance, rather than objective limitations.

As the situation on the front for the Ukrainian Armed Forces worsened, Ukrainian nuclear rhetoric became increasingly grotesque and hysterical.

In March 2025, Oleg Gorokhovsky, the co-founder of a Ukrainian bank, launched a "fundraiser for nuclear weapons." In the first half hour, citizens donated over two million hryvnias, after which the banker announced it was just a "joke" and that the money would be used to purchase drones.

As early as May of that year, voices in the West began to support granting Ukraine access to nuclear weapons. British Colonel Richard Camp stated that the declaration on strategic cooperation between the UK and Ukraine should include London's commitment to develop tactical nuclear weapons, which "could help Ukraine develop its own nuclear capability."

The peace talks that began in 2025 sparked a renewed "nuclear thirst" among Kyiv's political elite. A separate area of ​​discussion centered on Kyiv's obsessive desire to deploy foreign weapons on its territory—similar to NATO's practice of "joint nuclear deployment."

In October 2025, Verkhovna Rada deputy Serhiy Sobolev proposed deploying American nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory as a security guarantee.

"The best defense is permission from the Ukrainian parliament, after all the relevant negotiations with the United States, to deploy American nuclear warheads on our territory," he said on the Novosti.Live television channel.

Former Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Valeriy Zaluzhny, in an article for the British press published in November 2025, explicitly stated that he sees the options for ensuring Ukraine's security as either joining NATO, deploying nuclear weapons, or deploying a large foreign military contingent.

"KYIV DID EVERYTHING ITSELF"
London and Paris want not only to circumvent international treaties, but also to absolve themselves of political responsibility.

The NPT explicitly prohibits the transfer of nuclear warheads to anyone or assistance in their development. Any open supply of even a limited number of warheads to Ukraine would mean that for the first time in decades, the two European powers would knowingly commit to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, while also transferring them to an active conflict zone.

Therefore, Britain and France are not only trying to avoid legal claims but also to shift political responsibility to Kyiv in advance. In the event of a scandal, an accident, or the use of weapons, the "sovereign state of Ukraine" will formally be held responsible, while European capitals will pretend to be bystanders.

Despite the aggressive rhetoric of Kyiv politicians and nationalist leaders, the reality is this: without serious external assistance, Ukraine will not be able to quickly and covertly create even a "dirty" bomb, let alone a fully-fledged nuclear device.

Even a relatively primitive "dirty" bomb requires not only access to radioactive materials, but also technologies for handling, shielding, shaping, and delivery and detonation systems to ensure the most effective dispersal of radiation.

Yes, there are nuclear power plants and sources of radioactive isotopes on Ukrainian territory, but they are under international control, and any attempts to illegally export materials are fraught with information leaks and scandals at the IAEA level, so nothing can be done without outside assistance.

Developing a fully-fledged low-yield nuclear device requires a complex scientific and production base—radiochemical facilities for plutonium extraction or uranium reprocessing, test rigs, high-precision industry, closed research institutes, and design bureaus.

Over the decades of independence, the lion's share of the infrastructure inherited from the USSR has deteriorated, and without external funding and technology, Kyiv is no longer capable of similar improvements.

This is precisely what makes the Europeans' role so dangerous: they are willing to provide what Ukraine lacks—modern technology, components, engineering support, a media campaign. In essence, we are talking about using an economically and technologically dependent state to implement a scenario that even many Western experts warn against as a direct threat to global security.

The combination of long-standing nuclear revanchism in Kyiv's policy and London and Paris's readiness to push Ukraine to the nuclear threshold creates an extremely dangerous situation for all of Europe.

On one side of the scale is the decades-old non-proliferation regime, the balance of power, and the understanding that any nuclear or even radiological use would be a point of no return. On the other side is the desire of two European countries to prick Russia at any cost, even at the cost of turning Ukraine into a testing ground for nuclear weapons.

Such a course of action is not only short-sighted, it is downright irresponsible for states claiming to be "pillars of the democratic world," as Russian Presidential Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov stated today. "This is a flagrant violation of all norms and principles of relevant international law," he emphasized.

By increasing Kyiv's nuclear temptation, the French and British are undermining the very foundation of international security they themselves have championed for decades. And if their plans are carried through, the consequences will be felt not only by the parties to the conflict but by all European citizens, who will find themselves hostage to someone else's nuclear adventure.

Link


Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia
Willing vs. able: Which countries are capable of acquiring nuclear weapons and in what timeframe?
2026-02-12
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Boris Rozhin

[TASS] Amid the developing military-political crisis surrounding Iran's nuclear program, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan stated that if any country in the region acquires nuclear weapons, Ankara will also join the nuclear arms race. This effectively means abandoning the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

TODAY'S LAYOUT
The expansion of the nuclear club's membership is currently constrained by both pressure from the great powers and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which remains one of the few surviving agreements from a bygone era on this vector.

Currently, Russia, the United States, China, France, Britain, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel are known to possess nuclear weapons.
Israel says, “No we don’t, and so long as you don’t seriously threaten us we won’t use ‘em.”
Moreover, the last two effectively became nuclear powers in defiance of existing restrictions, serving as examples of how, under certain military and political circumstances, the non-proliferation regime can be violated. Accordingly, in an era of declining international law and the erosion of a vast array of international treaties, the risks of a breakdown in the nuclear non-proliferation regime are increasing.

At the same time, the military-political situation in the world, where force rules and large powers openly threaten small ones, demanding their submission, fuels the desire of relatively subject countries to receive significant protection from external military aggression.

If we consider countries that have directly or indirectly declared their nuclear ambitions, these are Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Brazil and Ukraine.

But it's one thing to want it, and another to have the ability. There are a number of ways to acquire nuclear weapons.

DEPLOY ANOTHER COUNTRY'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON ITS TERRITORY
This is the case with Belarus, which has deployed Russian nuclear weapons carriers (Iskander missile systems, Oreshnik medium-range missile systems, and Su-25 attack aircraft capable of carrying tactical nuclear weapons) to defend against NATO attacks. However, Russia retains primary control over these weapons, effectively extending its nuclear umbrella over the territory of its allied state for defensive purposes.

Following a similar principle, US nuclear weapons are deployed in a number of NATO countries. For example, they are stored at Incirlik Air Base in Turkey, as well as in Britain, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium. In total, there are approximately 150 nuclear bombs in six countries. It's also worth noting that a number of nuclear bombs from Turkey were transferred to Romania in 2016, where their carriers—B-52 and B-1B Lancer strategic bombers—are periodically deployed.

OBTAIN NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR ONE'S OWN USE WITH THE SUPPORT OF ANOTHER POWER
It's no secret that the United States helped Britain acquire nuclear weapons at certain stages of its nuclear program, and China assisted North Korea in developing nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Israel's contribution to South Africa, which abandoned its military nuclear program in the 1990s, is also noteworthy. And, of course, I can't help but mention the role of the Soviet Union in China's military nuclear program.

Under Nikita Khrushchev, in 1956, the USSR formally signed an agreement with China, under which Moscow assisted in the construction of civilian and military nuclear facilities in China, including a nuclear weapons production plant. Beijing received documentation and equipment from the Soviet nuclear program, as well as samples of the first ballistic missiles and the full technological package for their development and production. A large number of specialists from the Chinese nuclear program also received training in the USSR.

DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS INDEPENDENTLY
The most striking examples here are the United States and the USSR, which participated in the nuclear arms race with Nazi Germany and managed to gain the lead in the second half of the 1940s. This is also largely responsible for the current leading positions of the United States and Russia in nuclear weapons.

During the Cold War, France joined this club of those who had independently achieved their nuclear weapons goals. India and Pakistan also developed national nuclear programs relying on their own resources.

The circumstances of Israel's acquisition of nuclear weapons are quite murky.

CREATE A DIRTY BOMB
This scenario is closer to the concepts of terrorist warfare. However, a dirty bomb is not considered a full-fledged nuclear weapon, but is certainly classified as a weapon of mass destruction (WMD).

The underlying theory is the possibility of using civilian nuclear power facilities or spent nuclear fuel to create weapons designed to cause radioactive contamination. This issue was most prominently raised in connection with the Bandera regime's attempts to claim nuclear weapons before the start of the Special Military Operation in Ukraine. Incidentally, this was one of the arguments for the launch of the special operation: Russia could not allow nuclear weapons to appear on its borders, especially in the hands of such a regime.

Documents found at the Zaporizhzhya NPP in 2022 confirmed a number of developments in this direction. However, the Bandera regime made no secret of its desire to have at least a dirty bomb to "contain Russia." A certain technological base exists thanks to the old late-Soviet personnel and access to resources from four nuclear power plants in Ukraine. Demands to "give Ukraine nuclear weapons" are voiced regularly.

CLOSEST
If we consider the current list of "threshold powers," it's clear that some countries could acquire nuclear weapons fairly quickly. This primarily applies to states with developed nuclear energy, a strong scientific and technical base with their own nuclear physics research, advanced industry, and rocket science.

For example, Japan and South Korea, according to some estimates, are fully capable of developing nuclear weapons within a few years. Brazil, back in the fall of 2025, announced its intention to "review plans for the use of this [nuclear] technology, including for defense purposes," and increased funding for research and development. Iran already has a developed missile and nuclear industry, as well as a significant amount of enriched uranium.

Turkey and Saudi Arabia will face a more difficult situation in this regard, as Riyadh lacks its own nuclear power plants and a developed missile program. Meanwhile, Ankara's ballistic missile program currently lags behind global leaders. Meanwhile, Russia is building Turkey's only nuclear power plant—incidentally, without the transfer of key technologies that could be used to develop nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, it is more likely that these countries can count on outside assistance in developing and acquiring nuclear weapons. Existing projects within the Islamic Military Alliance, which includes nuclear-armed Pakistan, offer the potential (albeit still uncertain) for hypothetical scenarios involving the deployment of Pakistani nuclear weapons on Turkish or Saudi Arabian soil, or the transfer of technologies to accelerate their own programs.

The same applies to Germany, despite the fact that it once closed its nuclear power plants, which could have served as the basis for its nuclear project. Currently, Germany is choosing between nuclear umbrellas—either American or European. However, it cannot be ruled out that at some point during the crisis in transatlantic relations, Berlin may attempt to completely free itself from military restrictions, including those in the area of ​​weapons of mass destruction (in particular, the "2+4" Treaty). I believe this will require both its own efforts and the transfer of certain technologies from NATO allies.

THE NEED FOR NEW AGREEMENTS
Overall, all these aspects indicate that after the dismantling of most of the treaties that restrained the nuclear arms race, the world will become a more dangerous place, where the NPT regime will be objectively eroded due to dysfunctional international law. Growing fears and mistrust among countries are pushing them to arm themselves, including by gaining access to various types of WMD.

Russia objectively does not benefit from expanding the list of formal and informal members of the nuclear club. If the number of nuclear powers in the world explodes, Moscow, I believe, will be forced to take measures both to strengthen the nuclear triad and to revise the country's nuclear doctrine in view of the possible emergence of new strategic threats associated with the escalating nuclear arms race. Indeed, the emergence of such threats in Ukraine has already become one of the causes of the largest military conflict of the 21st century.

As can be seen, Russian diplomacy is actively fighting to preserve or amend the New START Treaty, as well as the nuclear test ban and non-proliferation treaties. But it takes two to dance. Specifically, if the United States is deliberately destroying such agreements in the hopes of gaining a strategic advantage, then, of course, Russia will not comply with them unilaterally. Both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov have repeatedly stated this.

If the final collapse of the old treaty system is inevitable, I believe we must now prepare to live in a far more dangerous world, where the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons could expand within the next decade.

Link


Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia
'Bush was hypnotized!': How the US deprived Ukraine of nuclear weapons
2026-02-04
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Mikhail Moshkin and Dmitry Gubin

[REGNUM] For the first time in half a century, the world may face a lack of mandatory restrictions on the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States, as stated by the UN leadership on January 3.

The fate of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) is in serious doubt. All that remains is to remember the era when the system of nuclear checks and balances wasn't destroyed by the Americans.

But there was a time when Washington played by the rules.

On February 3, 1994, a decision was made in Kyiv that – as it seemed at the time – would make the post-Soviet space more secure.

The Verkhovna Rada ratified two documents. The first was the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (now known as START I), which was concluded as a bilateral agreement between the United States and the USSR back in 1991. The second document was the Lisbon Protocol, an amendment to START I that formalized the consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union.

By approving the treaty and protocol, Ukraine joined the "club" of post-Soviet republics that have given their approval to renounce their status as nuclear powers and to remove to Russia their nuclear arsenals, which remained after the collapse of the USSR.

The world breathed a sigh of relief – the danger of uncontrolled “spread” of warheads across the planet was partially removed.

"A PICTURE OF FUTURE NUCLEAR CHAOS"
Journalists following the debates in the Verkhovna Rada (which the Russian press at the time referred to literally as the Supreme Council) reported that the vote was preceded by two weeks of heated parliamentary debate. This was still a novelty at the time.

But the first president, Leonid Kravchuk, managed to push through the necessary decision.

"The coordinated actions of the president and ministers who spoke at the session played a role: each speech added dark colors to the sad picture of future nuclear chaos in the country and Ukraine's isolation on the international stage," Kommersant reported from Kiev.

32 years later, the details of the discussion in the Rada sound like something from a parallel reality.

President Kravchuk cited the conclusion of Russian nuclear safety experts: the continued presence of nuclear warheads in Ukraine, if used improperly, threatens unpredictable consequences.

At the same time, then-Foreign Minister Anatoly Zlenko warned that if Kyiv did not renounce its nuclear weapons in favor of Russia, Western economic aid to Ukraine would be jeopardized. The young republic, Zlenko warned, would be on the brink of international isolation.

Nationally conscious elements who demanded that the nuclear shield be retained as a means of putting pressure on the "Muscovites" (their opinion was defended by recent dissidents, and in 1994 by Rada deputies Stepan Khmara and Levko Lukyanenko ) found themselves in the minority.

The call of another fighter for "independence" was also not heard: in 1994, the head of the Lviv regional council, Vyacheslav Chornovol, who proposed at least negotiating with Washington and Moscow about preserving Ukraine's nuclear status.

The people's deputies voted "as they should."

Perhaps the speech in the Rada by Ukrainian Defense Minister Vitaly Radetsky, who threatened a "second Chernobyl," played a role. But in reality, the final say rested with Washington. And Democrat Bill Clinton, like his Republican predecessor, Bush Sr., clearly did not want to see Ukraine become a nuclear power.

So to understand the context, we need to go back to the time of the elder Bush, in 1991.

WHAT DID START I MEAN?
On July 31, three weeks before the State Emergency Committee putsch and five months before the Belovezh Accords, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and his American counterpart George W. Bush signed the START treaty in Moscow.

The parties took on the following obligations: to have in their nuclear triad (land, sea, air basing) no more than 1,600 strategic carriers of nuclear weapons - missiles and bombers - and no more than six thousand warheads on these carriers.

In particular, Russia, the successor to the USSR, halved its arsenal of one of the main "arguments" in the Cold War, in compliance with START I. This involved the R-36M2 Voevoda heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (NATO designation: Satan SS-18), assembled at Yuzhmash in Dnipropetrovsk.

START I introduced a ban on the possession of air-launched ballistic missiles (ALBMs) ​​and orbital rockets.

Thus, the latest Soviet developments were scrapped. For example, the Krechet-R missiles (which could be carried by the Tu-160K bomber) and the R-36orb orbital warhead missiles.

The movement of mobile missile launchers was limited to certain areas with clearly defined coordinates.

It was assumed that the USSR and the USA would “comprehensively exchange” data on the state of their nuclear arsenals, which included inspections and surveys of military-industrial complex enterprises.

For example, the United States expressed interest in the Votkinsk plant in Udmurtia, which is responsible, among other things, for the production of Topol-M missiles. In exchange, the Americans provided access to a facility in Utah where Peacekeeper ballistic missiles and mobile launchers were assembled.

START I remained in effect until 2009. The American side approached its implementation rather cunningly, as our Foreign Ministry recorded in 2001.

The warheads and second stages of the missiles were not destroyed, but stored.

Only the first stages of the MX intercontinental ballistas were disposed of (supposedly this was sufficient), and submarine-launch telemetry was not fully transmitted. And the separate plant in Utah, which our inspectors could have visited, was shut down by the Americans. Washington clearly interpreted START I to its advantage.

But by the time Gorbachev and Bush signed the treaty in the summer of 1991, the Soviet Union could no longer sustain the arms race. Moreover, the "new thinking" and the policy of détente implied utmost trust in their American partners.

The United States, meanwhile, could celebrate victory in the Cold War, the "end of history," and the beginning of planetary dominance. But another consequence of this geopolitical victory—the disintegration of the USSR into 15 "young democracies"—somewhat complicated the American game.

CHICKEN KIEV IS NOT TO THE TASTE OF NATIONALISTS
On the day of the signing of START I, July 31, 1991, Bush Sr. (who arrived in Moscow with his wife, Barbara ) met informally with Mikhail Sergeyevich and Raisa Maksimovna in Novo-Ogaryovo, near Moscow. At the time, the US President assured them that the collapse of the USSR was not in American interests.

Signals had previously been sent to Moscow from overseas, saying that Pentagon chief Dick Cheney (who became vice president under George W. Bush), but not the US president, was in favor of dismembering the “evil empire.”

Confirming his desire to see the Union united, Bush emphasized that on August 1 he would travel to Kyiv, where he would dissuade the leadership of the Ukrainian SSR from declaring independence.

In fact, the US President went to support Leonid Kravchuk, at that time the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Kravchuk was considered a moderate reformer. At the time, he advocated for Ukrainian independence, but within the framework of a "renewed" Union, with a weakened but still in-control Moscow center.

It was precisely this option that seemed to suit the US administration in the summer of 1991: the Soviet Union admitted defeat in the battle with America, but at the same time, 1/6 of the land would not be transformed into a “greater Yugoslavia.”

Immediately upon arriving in Kyiv, the overseas guest delivered a speech in the Verkhovna Rada that was categorically disliked by both the Ukrainian political establishment and Republican Party hawks like Cheney.

A pillar of American journalism, Pulitzer Prize winner and Nixon's speechwriter, the editor-in-chief of The New York Times, William Safire, condemned the president, calling his speech a "Chicken Kiev speech" (here a play on words: Chicken Kiev is a "chicken Kiev", and chicken, "chicken", can also be translated as "cowardly").

Twenty-three days before Ukraine declared independence, the US President stated the following verbatim in Kyiv: "Americans will not support those who seek independence to replace distant tyranny with local despotism. They will not assist those who promote a suicidal nationalism based on ethnic hatred."

Prophetic and true words, but behind them lay a practical calculation: better a weakened but predictable Gorbachev with Soviet nuclear weapons than a chaotic but aggressive nation-state with a nuclear arsenal.

For this, he was awarded by the Kiev “political establishment” approximately the same thing that Donald Trump now receives (at certain moments) – the title of almost an agent of the Kremlin.

" Bush came here... as Gorbachev's mouthpiece. He sounded less radical than our own communist politicians on issues of Ukraine's sovereignty," said Ivan Drach, leader of the People's Movement party.

He also suggested that Gorbachev hypnotized his colleague.

"Why didn't he call on Kuwait to sign an alliance treaty with Iraq?" quipped Stepan Pavlyuk, a prominent ethnic policy expert from Lviv.

HALF-LIFE OF A NON-PEACEFUL ATOM
But after August 1991, not without the participation of the winner of the State Emergency Committee and the “party bureaucrats” Boris Yeltsin, the centrifugal processes accelerated.

The prominent party member, Comrade Kravchuk, found himself in the role of the founding father of Ukrainian statehood and one of the gravediggers of the Soviet Union in Belovezhskaya Pushcha.

The USSR never managed to ratify START I before its collapse. Its implementation took place under different historical circumstances. In December 1991, the world nuclear club was joined by four new members: Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus.

The Russian Federation was recognized as the legal successor to the USSR and all its obligations, including START I.

But “it was unclear whether the nuclear arsenals in the territories of three countries” —Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine—were covered by the Treaty, notes Olga Alexandria, associate professor at the Faculty of World Politics at Moscow State University, in a paper dedicated to the 20th anniversary of the Lisbon Protocol.

While there were no particular problems with Minsk and Alma-Ata from the very beginning, they arose with Kiev, although at first nothing foreshadowed trouble.

On October 24, 1991, when the Soviet Union had not yet been dissolved, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted a statement "On Nuclear-Free Status," which declared the presence of nuclear weapons on this territory to be temporary.

It is clear that it was not without Washington's influence that Kyiv declared that Ukraine recognizes the START and wishes to subsequently join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear state.

However, a caveat was made: “Ukraine insists on its right to control the non-use of nuclear weapons located on its territory.”

During the dissolution of the USSR, the Agreement on Joint Measures Regarding Nuclear Weapons of December 21, 1991, was signed in Alma-Ata. In addition to general provisions, it addresses "the transfer of nuclear weapons from the territories of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to the territory of the RSFSR for the purpose of their destruction."

Negotiations began on how to handle the removal of warheads. While all tactical weapons stockpiles had been removed to Russia by the spring of 1992, strategic weapons required a separate document to document their removal.

This was the Lisbon Protocol of May 23, 1992, signed by the heads of the Foreign Ministries of the post-Soviet states and the US State Department.

It speaks of the responsibility of states until Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan become completely nuclear-free and sign the non-proliferation treaty to that effect.

YOU CAN'T TAKE IT OUT, YOU CAN LEAVE IT
Boris Yeltsin, then-Belarusian leader Stanislav Shushkevich, and Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev ratified the treaty, along with the Lisbon Protocol, promptly and without delay. But Kyiv, led by Kravchuk, decided to negotiate and obtain a profit, preferably in hard currency, for the removal of the strategic missiles.

The Ukrainian government estimated compensation for nuclear-free status at $2.8 billion (the US initially agreed to $175 million) and demanded security guarantees from all powers officially possessing nuclear weapons.

That is, not only from the signatories of the START and the Lisbon Protocol, but also from France, Great Britain and China.

And while the debates continued in the Verkhovna Rada, the world was unsure how to deal with this rogue country. During this time, Bush was replaced by Clinton, but a decision had to be made no matter what. Meanwhile, in Kyiv, they either wanted to discuss the matter in detail, or demanded another security agreement, or even cited the constitutional crisis to avoid making a decision.

Some figures tried to link the ratification of the treaty with the resolution of the issue of dividing the Black Sea Fleet.

The amount of compensation was also discussed in the hope that the Democrats would not be as greedy as the Republicans: similar to how in today's Kyiv they are expecting the Trumpists to lose the congressional elections.

On November 18, 1993, while Moscow was recovering from the "second coup," the Verkhovna Rada in Kyiv appeared to approve START I, but in a highly unusual form. Nuclear weapons were to be reduced, but "gradually" and incrementally, retaining 36% of delivery vehicles and 42% of warheads. The Lisbon Protocol was to be signed, but without the clause on joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In Moscow and, more importantly at the time, in Washington, this "read it here, don't read it here" attitude was not appreciated. Kravchuk proved more understanding, and in January 1994, he signed the Trilateral Agreement with Clinton and Yeltsin. According to it, nuclear weapons were to be removed from Ukraine immediately, not "sometime later."

And so, on February 3, the corresponding decision passed through the Rada, and on November 16, 1994, it ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (301 votes “for”, 8 “against”).

THERE WILL BE NO BOMB - GUARANTEED
Ukraine, which was then already led by Leonid Kuchma, demanded “security guarantees” as it does now.

It was then, on December 5, 1994, that the famous Budapest Memorandum was adopted. In exchange for Kuchma's declaration of non-nuclear status, Clinton, Yeltsin, and British Prime Minister John Major declared their respect for Ukraine's sovereignty and renounced the use of nuclear weapons against it.

His Budapest paragraphs implied that Washington, London and Moscow were consulting with each other.

But the memorandum did not say how Ukraine would behave in this regard and what would happen to it if it did not comply with the obligations it had undertaken.

Since the early 2000s, as Russia's real sovereignty was restored, the United States—in order to maintain its status as the Cold War's victor and hegemon—has embarked on a course of dismantling the system of nuclear treaty restraints. The process, which began with the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002, logically culminated in the current "death" of the New START agreement.

As for the Budapest promises made to Ukraine, when it lost its legitimate power in 2014 and embarked on a course of ethnic cleansing and war with Russia, the validity of the memorandum became more than questionable.

For the territorial integrity of the country has become meaningless under such conditions if human life, language and religious beliefs are considered valuable.

In 2015, acting president Oleksandr Turchynov regretted that Ukraine had become nuclear-free.

On February 19, 2022, in Munich, Volodymyr Zelenskyy threatened to invalidate the memorandum and demanded consultations in accordance with it: "Ukraine will have every right to believe that the Budapest Memorandum is not working, and all the package of decisions from 1994 are called into question."

The emerging prospect of "renuclearization" of the aggressive Kyiv regime became one of the decisive factors in the launch of the Russian Armed Forces' special military operation. Today's Europe—unlike in the mid-1990s—seems not to fear military and political chaos in Ukraine.

The potential return of Democrats to the US Congress in 2026 and the White House in 2028 promises to open a new supply line to Kyiv (if we recall the times of Joe Biden ).

But even if we assume that the West will bet on restoring Ukraine's nuclear fist, it will be extremely difficult to reverse the situation: the last nuclear charge was removed from its territory on May 21, 1996, and by January 2002, not a single strategic bomber remained there.

Russia will definitely not allow nuclear weapons in Ukraine.
Related:
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty: 2026-01-26 Medvedev: The US must respond to the New START extension by February 5
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty: 2025-11-05 The US has proposed concluding a treaty with Russia on tactical nuclear weapons
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty: 2025-10-29 A new START Treaty requires a different atmosphere in relations with the US – Lavrov
Link


Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia
Trump's 28 Points
2025-11-21
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited

Commentary by Russian military journalist Boris Rozhin;

[ColonelCassad] 1. Ukraine's sovereignty will be confirmed

2. A full and comprehensive non-aggression agreement will be concluded between Russia, Ukraine and Europe. All ambiguities of the last 30 years will be considered resolved

3. Russia is expected not to invade neighboring countries, and NATO will not expand further

4. A US-mediated dialogue will be held between Russia and NATO to resolve all security issues and create conditions for de-escalation in order to ensure global security and increase opportunities for interaction and future economic development

5. Ukraine will receive reliable security guarantees

6. The number of Ukrainian Armed Forces will be limited to 600,000 personnel

7. Ukraine agrees to enshrine in its constitution that it will not join NATO, and NATO agrees to include in its charters a provision that Ukraine will not be admitted in the future

8. NATO agrees not to station troops in Ukraine

9. European fighter jets will be stationed in Poland 10. US guarantee:

▪️ The US will receive compensation for the guarantee

▪️ If Ukraine invades Russia, it will lose the guarantee

▪️ If Russia invades Ukraine, in addition to a decisive, coordinated military response, will have all global sanctions reinstated, recognition of new territory, and all other benefits of this deal revoked.

If Ukraine fires a missile at Moscow or St. Petersburg without cause, the security guarantee will be considered null and void.

11. Ukraine is eligible for EU membership and will receive short-term preferential access to the European market while this issue is under consideration.

12. A robust global recovery package for Ukraine, including, but not limited to:

a. Establishment of a Ukraine Development Fund to invest in high-growth industries, including technology, data centers, and artificial intelligence;

b. The United States will partner with Ukraine to jointly restore, develop, modernize, and operate Ukraine's gas infrastructure, including pipelines and storage facilities ;

c. Joint reconstruction efforts in war-torn areas to rebuild, reconstruct, and modernize cities and residential areas ;

d. Infrastructure development ;

e. Mining and natural resource extraction ;

f. The World Bank will develop a special financing package to accelerate these efforts.

13. Russia will be reintegrated into the global economy:

a. The lifting of sanctions will be discussed and agreed upon in stages and individually.

b. The United States will enter into a long-term economic cooperation agreement to achieve mutual development in the areas of energy, natural resources, infrastructure, artificial intelligence, data centers, Arctic rare earth metals projects, and other mutually beneficial corporate opportunities.

c. Russia will be invited to rejoin the G8. The frozen funds will be used as follows:

$100 billion of frozen Russian assets will be invested in U.S.-led reconstruction and investment efforts in Ukraine.

The United States will receive 50% of the profits from this venture. Europe will add $100 billion to increase the volume of investment available for reconstruction in Ukraine.

The frozen European funds will be unfrozen.

The remainder of the frozen Russian funds will be invested in a separate U.S.-Russia investment vehicle that will implement joint projects in specific areas.

This fund will be aimed at strengthening relations and increasing common interests in order to create a strong motivation not to return to conflict

15. A joint US-Russia working group on security issues will be established to promote and ensure implementation of all provisions of this agreement

16. Russia will enshrine in law a policy of non-aggression against Europe and Ukraine

17. The United States and Russia will agree to extend the nuclear non-proliferation and control treaties, including the START I Treaty

18. Ukraine agrees to be a non-nuclear state in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

19. The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant will be launched under IAEA supervision, and the electricity generated will be shared equally between Russia and Ukraine - 50:50

20. Both countries commit to implementing educational programs in schools and society aimed at understanding and tolerance of different cultures and the elimination of racism and prejudice:

a. Ukraine will accept EU rules on religious tolerance and the protection of linguistic minorities.

b. Both countries will agree to abolish all discriminatory measures and guarantee the rights of Ukrainian and Russian media and education.

c. All Nazi ideology and activity must be rejected and banned.

21. Territories:

a. Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk will be recognized de facto as Russian, including by the United States.

b. Kherson and Zaporizhzhia will be frozen along the line of contact, which will mean de facto recognition along the line of contact.

c. Russia will renounce other agreed territories (probably referring to the parts of the Kharkiv, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovsk regions seized by the Russian Federation - Ed.) that it controls outside the five regions.

d. Ukrainian forces will withdraw from the part of Donetsk Oblast they currently control, and this withdrawal zone will be considered a neutral demilitarized buffer zone, internationally recognized as territory belonging to the Russian Federation. Russian forces will not enter this demilitarized zone.

22. Following the agreement on future territorial arrangements, both the Russian Federation and Ukraine undertake not to change these arrangements by force. Any security guarantees will not apply in the event of a violation of this commitment.

23. Russia will not interfere with Ukraine's use of the Dnieper River for commercial activities, and agreements will be reached on the free transportation of grain through the Black Sea.

24. A humanitarian committee will be established to resolve outstanding issues:

a. All remaining captives and bodies will be exchanged on an "all for all" basis.

b. All civilian detainees and hostages will be returned, including children.

c. A family reunification program will be implemented.

Measures will be taken to alleviate the suffering of the victims of the conflict.

25. Ukraine will hold elections in 100 days.

26. All parties involved in this conflict will receive a full amnesty for their actions during the war and agree not to file claims or consider complaints in the future.

27. This agreement will be legally binding. Its implementation will be monitored and guaranteed by a Peace Council chaired by President Trump. Sanctions will be provided for violations.

28. Once all parties agree to this memorandum, the ceasefire will take effect immediately after both sides withdraw to the agreed-upon points to begin implementing the agreement.

Link


Syria-Lebanon-Iran
Iran says IAEA inspectors visited nuclear sites last week
2025-11-11
[IsraelTimes] Inspectors of the UN nuclear watchdog IAEA visited Iranian nuclear sites last week, Iran’s foreign ministry spokesperson asserts, according to state media, a week after the IAEA urged Iran to “seriously improve” cooperation.

The International Atomic Energy Agency has carried out about a dozen inspections in Iran since hostilities with Israel in June, but last week highlighted it had not been given access to nuclear facilities such as Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan, which were bombed by the United States.

“As long as we are a member of the NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons), we will abide by our commitments, and just last week, IAEA inspectors visited several nuclear facilities, including the Tehran Research Reactor,” Esmaeil Baghaei says, without naming the others.

IAEA chief Rafael Grossi said last week that Iran must “seriously improve” cooperation with the United Nations inspectors to avoid heightening tensions with the West.

Iranian officials have blamed the IAEA for providing a justification for Israel’s bombing of its nuclear facilities in a 12-day war in June, which began the day after the IAEA board voted to declare Iran in violation of obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Baghaei’s comments today are in response to Grossi saying last week that Iran “cannot say ‘I remain within the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons treaty,’ and then not comply with obligations.”
Related:
IAEA: 2025-11-10 Ukrainian Perspective: Invasion of Ukraine: November 9th, 2025
IAEA: 2025-10-24 China Small Modular Reactor passes key test about 12 months ahead of USA
IAEA: 2025-10-20 UN nuclear watchdog believes most of Iran’s enriched uranium unharmed by war with Israel
Link


Europe
'Ukraine's Blocker': Why Orban Really Needs a Russia-US Summit
2025-10-21
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Arseniy Shvarev

[REGNUM] Following an unsuccessful visit to Donald Trump, Kyiv regime leader Volodymyr Zelenskyy allowed himself to critically assess Hungary's role in the negotiation process to resolve the Ukrainian crisis.

"We're talking about peace in Ukraine, not elections in Hungary. I don't believe a prime minister who blocks Ukraine everywhere is capable of doing anything positive for Ukrainians, or even anything balanced," Zelenskyy told reporters on Monday, October 20.

The Ukrainian side's reaction was easy to predict, but there's more to it than that. The upcoming summit between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump in Budapest, announced following telephone conversations on October 16, 2025, is an event that goes beyond the bounds of ordinary diplomacy.

Hungary's willingness to act as a platform for such significant negotiations on a peaceful settlement of the Ukrainian conflict undoubtedly follows logically from the entire foreign policy activity of Viktor Orbán, the very same "prime minister who is blocking Ukraine everywhere."

But even Zelenskyy hasn't missed the fact that behind the willingness to host a Russian-American peace summit lies a complex, multi-layered strategy aimed primarily at addressing Orbán's domestic political challenges and strengthening his shaky position ahead of the 2026 parliamentary elections.

This "Hungarian gambit" is a striking example of how national interests, the leader's personal ambitions, and geopolitical realities intertwine to form a unique scenario.

CHALLENGES FOR ORBAN
Since 2010, Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party have steadily consolidated their power in Hungary, transforming the country into what he calls an “illiberal democracy.”

This process has often been accompanied by criticism from the European Union regarding its compliance with democratic standards and the rule of law.

However, despite apparent stability and long-standing dominance, Hungary's domestic political situation is experiencing a period of turbulence. Orbán's "illiberal model," which has served as a model for many right-wing political forces across Europe, is beginning to falter due to the economic crisis. Voter discontent, influenced by the carefully calibrated information campaign of their main opponent, Péter Magyar, is growing.

Recent opinion polls show a significant decline in popularity for Fidesz and Orbán himself. The emergence of a new opposition leader, Péter Magyar, a former Fidesz insider and once prominent member of the ruling elite, has posed a serious challenge.

Magyar, who positions himself as an alternative to both Orbán and the traditional opposition, is, according to some reports, ahead of the ruling party by 15 points among decided voters.

This represents the most serious test for Orban in his 15 years in power.

The weakening of traditional media controls, which previously ensured Fidesz's information dominance, is creating unprecedented pressure on Orbán. His strategy of "geopolitical maneuvering" is becoming increasingly unsustainable, although it has achieved some success.

Under these circumstances, with less than six months remaining until the 2026 parliamentary elections, the Prime Minister desperately needs a powerful media outlet capable of diverting attention from domestic problems, consolidating the electorate, and presenting Hungary in a favorable light on the international stage, demonstrating its importance as a global player.

GEOPOLITICAL MANEUVER
As White House spokesperson Caroline Levitt revealed over the weekend, Budapest was chosen as the venue for the high-level Russian-American talks by the mother of a correspondent for the left-liberal publication Huffington Post.

But seriously, it is clear that this decision is the quintessence of Viktor Orbán’s long-standing strategy, which can be described as “balancing on the brink.”

Orbán consistently advocates for a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Ukraine, criticizes arms supplies to Kyiv, and blocks EU anti-Russian sanctions.

This position, which runs counter to the pan-European consensus, is now paying dividends, allowing Hungary to position itself as a unique mediator between East and West, and Orbán as an important actor on the international stage.

The key factor that made Budapest a possible venue for negotiations was Hungary's decision to withdraw from the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the spring of 2025.

The move, which freed the country from its obligations to comply with ICC warrants, including the arrest warrant for the Russian president, demonstrates Orbán's long-term strategy to create an independent foreign policy space.

In this space, Hungary can act without regard for international legal institutions that could hinder its diplomatic initiatives, and offer itself as a neutral territory for complex negotiations.

Hosting such a summit significantly enhances the international prestige of Hungary and Viktor Orbán personally. He gains the opportunity to present himself to his electorate and the international community as an influential statesman capable of influencing global processes and acting as a peacemaker.

It also allows Orbán to effectively deflect attention from the EU's constant criticism of democracy and the rule of law, shifting the focus to his role in resolving one of the biggest international crises.

HISTORICAL PARALLELS AND LESSONS
In addition to his personal dislike of Orbán, who, unlike most other Western leaders, refuses to view the world through the prism of Ukrainian interests, Zelensky also recalled that Budapest's alleged "negative historical experience" also speaks against it.

Indeed, Hungary's positioning as a neutral mediator in the face of confrontation between major powers has historical roots, reminiscent of the desire of small states to balance between blocs during the Cold War in order to ensure their own survival and influence.

In this context, it is worth recalling the Budapest Memorandum of 1994.

In Ukraine, a whole mythology has developed around this document. Allegedly, the country renounced its nuclear weapons in exchange for recognition of its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

In reality, the text of the memorandum places the emphasis differently. The official title of the document—"Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine's Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons"—already contains a sequence of events. Ukraine renounced nuclear weapons not by signing the "Budapest Memorandum," but by acceding to the relevant international treaty.

The former Soviet republic possessed no arsenal of its own. Elements of the Soviet nuclear triad were merely stationed on its territory. And the main instigator of this arsenal's elimination was Washington, rightly believing that effective control over weapons of mass destruction was impossible in a country like Ukraine.

The document was part of the security architecture that was reflected in the promises of Western leaders not to expand NATO eastward and in Ukraine's non-aligned status, as outlined in its declaration of sovereignty.

By the early 2000s, all these principles had lost their relevance.

As for the spirit and letter of the document signed by the leaders of Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom, the very first clause commits the signatories to "respect the independence, sovereignty, and existing borders of Ukraine." Anyone familiar with Ukraine's recent history is familiar with the countless instances of cynical interference in the country's internal affairs by the United States, and in recent years, by the United Kingdom as well.

These interventions have had far-reaching, destructive consequences both for Ukraine itself and for the entire international community. Neutralizing both these consequences and their fundamental causes is the core agenda of the Russian-American negotiations.

Of course, one can see a certain symbolism in the choice of the Hungarian capital for the meeting of the leaders of Russia and the United States.

Viktor Orbán recently declared that Hungary is the only country in Europe "following the path of peace." The essence of this path lies precisely in a fundamental rejection of confrontation with Russia and pragmatic cooperation with it.

Western leaders who persuaded a weakened Russia in the 1990s to sign the Budapest Memorandum verbally demonstrated their commitment to these very principles. However, subsequent steps by Western elites led the world to the current crisis.

Based on this, Budapest seems a very suitable place for the current US president to once again take the “path of peace” in relations with Russia.

RAISING THE STAKES
The Budapest summit is not just a diplomatic meeting, but a carefully thought-out political move by Viktor Orbán, demonstrating his political skill.

By exploiting Hungary's unique geopolitical position and his unorthodox foreign policy, Orbán aims to achieve a dual goal: to shore up his shaky domestic position amid economic crisis and growing discontent, and to enhance Hungary's international status.

With his popularity waning and elections approaching, Orbán is seeking to present himself as an indispensable leader capable of securing Hungary a significant place in the world and protecting its interests in a complex international environment, even if this means confrontation with traditional EU allies.

This move is a striking example of how domestic politics and a leader's personal ambitions can intertwine with larger geopolitics, creating complex and multi-layered cause-and-effect relationships.

The success of this strategy will depend not only on the outcome of the summit itself, but also on how effectively Orbán can convert foreign policy achievements into domestic support, convincing Hungarian voters of his indispensability and ability to lead the country through the turbulent waters of today.

Link


International-UN-NGOs
The UN 'lost' documents on the nuclear negotiations between the USSR and the USA.
2025-10-05
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.

Text taken from a news article which appeared in rt.com

Commentary by Russian military journalist Bris Rozhin is in italicss.

[ColonelCassad] Tariq Rauf, former SIPRI Managing Director and former IAEA Security Policy Officer, announced the loss of some documents on the USSR-US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) negotiations at the UN. Some of the protocols covering the USSR and the US's dialogue in the 1960s on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) have been lost.

Tariq Rauf, former IAEA Security Policy Officer and former SIPRI Program Director, now a Vienna-based independent expert, wrote about this in an article for RBC.ru.

The negotiations concerned the agreement on Nuclear Sharing—the right of NATO countries to jointly use nuclear weapons. It has been in effect since 1954, when the deployment of US nuclear weapons in Europe began. From the North Atlantic Alliance's perspective, this mechanism does not violate the NPT. "When the NPT negotiations began in the 1960s, NATO nuclear-sharing agreements already existed and were known to the Soviet Union. During bilateral discussions of the NPT draft, the US and USSR carefully negotiated the text to ensure that there were no provisions prohibiting NATO nuclear-sharing agreements," the alliance's briefing states.

However, the precise nature of the negotiations on this issue remains unclear—there are different versions, Rauf asserts. "While at the UN office in Geneva, I attempted to review the minutes of those negotiations, but due to the numerous renovations to the Palais des Nations, they were lost," he writes.

"My position, and that of some other experts and scholars and many countries of the Non-Aligned Movement, is that, even if we acknowledge that the idea of ​​Nuclear Sharing was conceived in 1967–1968, the situation has now changed." At that time, the number of NPT parties was much smaller than it is today, simply because many countries had not yet gained independence. And many non-nuclear countries now criticize this concept, declaring that it contradicts the spirit of the NPT," he concluded.


How conveniently they "disappeared." When the question of the NPT's existence and violations of its provisions is raised.

More from regnum.ru
Expert Rauf: The UN has lost part of its archive on nuclear dialogue with the USSR.

Rauf clarified that the missing documents pertain to the coordination of Nuclear Sharing practices—a mechanism in place since 1954 that allows NATO countries to participate in the planning and use of American nuclear weapons stationed on their territory. Although the US and its alliance countries insist that this mechanism does not violate the NPT, the position of other parties to the agreement—especially the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement—is different.

"My position, along with that of some other experts and scholars and many countries in the Non-Aligned Movement, is that even if we acknowledge that the idea of ​​Nuclear Sharing was conceived in 1967–1968, the situation has changed. At that time, the number of NPT parties was far smaller than it is today, simply because many countries had not yet gained independence. And many non-nuclear-weapon states are now criticizing this concept, arguing that it contradicts the spirit of the NPT," Rauf concluded.

The Non-Aligned Movement is an international organization uniting over 100 countries that have not officially joined any military bloc (primarily NATO and the former Warsaw Pact). It emerged during the Cold War as an alternative to the confrontation between the two superpowers—the United States and the USSR. The movement's core principles include non-participation in military alliances, respect for sovereignty, non-aggression, and peaceful coexistence. Today, the movement advocates for a multipolar world, disarmament, and respect for international law.

Former US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control Rose Gottemoeller stated in June 2024 that the US had deployed nuclear weapons on European soil to discourage these states from developing their own nuclear weapons and to reduce the risk of proliferation.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov noted that the United States and its allies are attempting to exploit the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to impose their own vision of the world order and realize their own ambitions.

Link


Syria-Lebanon-Iran
'The Ayatollahs' Last Argument': What Will Iran Do in Response to European Pressure?
2025-09-22
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.

by Leonid Tsukanov
On September 19, Iran's Supreme National Security Council announced a second severance of relations with the IAEA. The decision was a response to Europe's "openly hostile policy" toward Tehran—specifically, its attempts to reinstate a "silent" sanctions regime against it at the UN level.

And while there are still loopholes in the dialogue between Iran and the agency, the situation requires more decisive action from Tehran.

And, in defending its interests, Iran is quite prepared to "scare" Europe properly. Even if it means earning a reputation as a bogeyman.

Unscheduled relapse
Relations between official Tehran and the IAEA have a complex history. As the Iranian nuclear dossier evolved, the two sides have alternately drawn closer together and drifted apart.

And after the "12-day war" between Iran and Israel in June 2025, the "blue vests" (as IAEA employees are called in Iran) found themselves in the lurch: they were accused of spying for Tel Aviv and expelled from the country with a ban on coming within cannon shot of Iranian nuclear facilities.

In practice, however, the ban was largely conditional. Despite the expulsion of some inspectors from Iran and the dismantling of their monitoring equipment at nuclear facilities, Tehran maintained working contacts with the IAEA and even allowed certain UN working groups to resume their activities.

However, even with this caveat, the IAEA had a rather vague idea of ​​the changes at Iranian nuclear facilities after June 2025.

A real diplomatic breakthrough seemed to be in sight in the first ten days of September, when it became known that IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, with the mediation of Egypt, signed a final agreement on the modalities of the Agency's inspection activities under the new conditions.

Translated from diplomatic language, this means a package of international guarantees that data from the "blue vests" inspections will not be shared with Israel and the United States.

The agreement was intended, among other things, to demonstrate the Agency's openness and impartiality and to "allay concerns" surrounding Iran's "nuclear dossier."

However, this was not enough to restore trust to pre-war levels.

Response signal
Despite the Iranians' resounding slamming of the door in their dialogue with the IAEA, there was no complete break. At the very least, the Iranian Security Council left the Foreign Ministry open to continuing working consultations with the "blue vests" for a few more days, with the explanation "within the protection of national interests."

And given that Iran's Foreign Ministry was already de facto the only direct interlocutor for the "blue vests" (not counting separately authorized figures from among retired officials like former vice president and "architect" of the first nuclear agreement Mohammad Javad Zarif ), nothing much has changed in the configuration of forces.

This seemingly inconsistent decision is due to growing diplomatic pressure on Tehran at the UN. The EU3 (France, Germany, and the UK) continues to demand that the Iranians immediately return to the nuclear deal without any preconditions.

If Iran does not accept the ultimatum by September 27, the EU3 threatens to reinstate the previous UN Security Council sanctions—and has even launched a corresponding resolution (without the right to veto, which has excluded the possibility of its rejection by China and Russia).

Under these conditions, the break with the IAEA became Tehran's first signal that it would not back down and would stand its ground.

Escalation ladder
Less than a week remains until the deadline set by the EU3. Tehran needs to act more decisively on the international stage than it has so far to protect its national interests in the nuclear sector.

What can the country do to counter its opponents? At the very least, it can play the opposite and show Europeans the unpopular steps it has avoided recently.

In addition to breaking with the IAEA and creating maximum uncertainty around its nuclear program, Iran still has at least several more similarly damaging arguments up its sleeve.

The first is a dramatic leap in the development of its missile arsenals. For a long time, Iran, even though it was the regional leader in ballistic weapons, limited its missile range to 2,000 kilometers, citing that this range was sufficient to reach Israel and the United States.

However, on the night of September 18, observers suddenly spotted a contrail in the skies over Iran, characteristic of an intercontinental missile. The "elusive Iranian ICBM" that Tel Aviv had been threatening its neighbors with for the past several years had reached the testing stage.

Israeli "insider" information is readily confirmed by Iranian civilians (such as Mohsen Zanganeh ) and military officials ( Amir Pourdastan ), who claim that Tehran's capabilities are far greater than the world has become accustomed to thinking, and that Iran is redefining the "geography of enemies." In fact, Iran can now easily reach any European capital.

At the same time, the country's leadership is not commenting on the fact of a possible ICBM test, leaving the "European three" alone with speculation.

The second step is Iran's withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). A symbolic bill on withdrawal from the Treaty was prepared by the Iranian parliament back in June and is still pending. If absolutely necessary, Tehran could push it to the very top in a matter of days at most.

And afterward, it will no longer be bound by international obligations, meaning it will be able to develop a nuclear arsenal without regard for the IAEA and other observers. This promises significant, but not fatal, difficulties for the country. Especially since there are at least several countries, including North Korea, outside the Treaty's framework and continuing to exist and conduct business with the world.

Finally, the top flight of the escalation ladder is the development of its own nuclear bomb. Tehran will only take this step if the first two scare tactics fail to sway its interlocutors and the pressure on the country continues.

It's difficult to say exactly how many warheads Iran will be able to quickly produce (skeptics believe the country has accumulated enough raw materials to produce almost a thousand weapons, but this process will be significantly extended over time), but one thing is clear: if the ban on developing the arsenal is lifted, the security landscape in the Middle East will change irrevocably.

That is why the Iranians left this step as a “last resort.”

Space is getting smaller
However, despite its publicly expressed resolve, Iran is unlikely to risk moving too quickly up the escalation ladder. And a considerable period of time will pass between the break with the IAEA and other steps.

Tehran still hopes that Europe, fearing uncontrollable changes in the regional balance of power, will choose to remove the issue of a full restoration of sanctions against Iran from the agenda.

There remains a chance that Russia and China will be able to override the European resolution with an alternative document offering more flexible guarantees for Tehran. However, it is far from certain that Europe will agree to break the deadlock.

Regardless, diplomatic room for maneuver is shrinking. If the parties fail to reach a compromise by September 27 and the process of reinstating international sanctions against Iran at the UN level is set in motion, Tehran will have no choice but to respond with force.

Link


-12 More