Recent Appearances...

Hello !
Recent Appearances... Rantburg

Africa Subsaharan

Nigeria: Dozens of terrorists killed as Boko Haram, ISWAP fighters clash in Sambisa Forest

2026-09-05

EXCLUSIVE: Dozens of terrorists killed as Boko Haram, ISWAP fighters clash in Sambisa Forest

By Zagazola Makama

More than 23 terrorists have reportedly been killed in renewed deadly clashes between rival Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) factions in the… pic.twitter.com/Rjobm4bzIe
— Zagazola (@ZagazOlaMakama) September 4, 2026

Text:

EXCLUSIVE: Dozens of terrorists killed as Boko Haram, ISWAP fighters clash in Sambisa Forest

By Zagazola Makama

More than 23 terrorists have reportedly been killed in renewed deadly clashes between rival Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) factions in the Sambisa Forest area of Borno State.

The latest confrontation reportedly occurred around the Chingolo axis of Bama Local Government Area, where Boko Haram fighters attacked ISWAP members who were advancing into the area.

Security sources told Zagazola Makama that the latest fighting is part of a renewed wave of hostilities between the two rival terrorist groups that began about two days ago.

A Video obtained by Zagazola indicated that the clashes reportedly involved sustained exchanges of fire as both factions sought to consolidate their positions and prevent the other from expanding its influence within the forest.

Preliminary intelligence indicates that more than 23 terrorists have been killed on both sides since the latest round of fighting began, although the exact casualty figures for each faction could not immediately be independently verified.

The development is believed to reflect the continuing rivalry between Boko Haram and ISWAP over territory, access routes, resources and control of fighters operating in the Sambisa Forest and surrounding areas.

The latest fighting around Chingolo reportedly began after ISWAP elements moved into the area, prompting Boko Haram fighters to launch an attack against the advancing group.

The confrontation further weakened the terrorist groups and disrupted their activities in an area that has historically served as a major operating environment for insurgents in Borno.

More at the link

Link

Africa North

Imported From Egypt: The extremist ideology that inspired Boko Haram

2026-09-01

by Aliyu Dahiru
31 Aug 2026

[HumAngleMedia] This is the story of how modern Islamist extremism emerged from the edge of an African prison and moved into Nigeria, escalating into an unending fire of insurgency.

In August 2016, Mamman Nur, one of Boko Haram’s foremost commanders, dramatically sat before a camera on the shore of the Sambisa Forest, a vast terrorist hideout in North East Nigeria. He publicly accused the group’s supreme leader, Abubakar Shekau, of doctrinal deviance and transgressions. He said Abubakar had become power-drunk, killing his own commanders over minor disagreements and spilling the blood of fellow Muslims.

And it is an article of faith that no good Moslem would ever harm a fellow Moslem. Not validated by experience, but nonetheless often trumpeted.

He named several terrorist figures Shekau had killed, including Mustapha Chad, Abu Amr Falluja, Kaka Allai and Mallam Ba’ana Banki.

He titled the recording Exposé, deliberately weaponising the same word Shekau had used to attack his critics. He also invoked the words of the former Islamic State spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, saying: “Whoever changes, we will also change him.” His message was not only a threat; it was also a campaign to depose Shekau as the leader of the terror group. Within months, Mamman’s faction formally broke away to become the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), as Shekau led the Jama’atu Ahlussunnah Lidda’awati wal Jihad (JAS). This movement had existed before Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the Islamic State.

Behind the sudden division lay an unfolding theological debate within the global Salafi-jihadi movements for decades. It revolved around one question that has repeatedly divided jihadist organisations from the Middle East to the Lake Chad Basin: How far can the practice of takfir – declaring other Muslims as non-believers – go before this doctrine, which is meant to validate jihad, starts to undermine the very concept of jihad itself?

The other question, in the years following the American response to 9/11, is how much pain and destruction must the Ummah absorb as a result the strong jihad of the sword against the lands of the Unbelievers, Dar al Harb, and is there a point where the high cost is proof that Allah did not approve of that particular effort by that particular group? The conclusion for a while was that Al Qaeda crossed the line by attacking America, but then ISIS came along, and thinking once again fell by the wayside in favour of wielding sharp bits of metal and things that kaboom, though the remaining Shiites aiming at Israel might be starting to ponder the addressing the question.

Drawing on Boko Haram’s internal correspondence, Arabic treatises, multimedia recordings, and local sermons, HumAngle traces how an ideology born in Egypt travelled through Jordan, Iraq, and Syria before taking root in northeastern Nigeria. What later appeared as a personal power struggle between Shekau and Mamman Nur was, in reality, the culmination of a decades-long ideological dispute over faith, authority, governance, and the limits of violence. The journey that turned the former terrorist allies into bitter enemies began several decades back, in an Egyptian prison cell.

The story begins with Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian author and one of the foremost figures in modern Sunni Islamic revivalism. He’s the author of a popular Islamist book, Ma’alim fi al-Tariq, mostly known as Milestones, which he wrote while in prison under the Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, and published shortly before his execution in 1966. The book was said to have transformed a classical Islamic concept into a revolutionary political doctrine.

The term “jahiliyya” literally referred to the pre-Islamic Arabian era before the Prophet Muhammad’s message, but Sayyid gave it a radically different meaning in his book. He argued that contemporary Muslim societies had fallen back into a new jahiliyya because they accepted political systems that placed human authority above divine law.

More at the link

Link

Africa Subsaharan

Inside ISWAP's Online Propaganda Machine: How Al-Buhaira outlet is waging a war of words across the Lake Chad basin

2026-08-17

When the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) split from its predecessor organization, Abubakar Shekau’s faction of Boko Haram in 2016, it began developing a more systematic media strategy. The founding dispute with Shekau centered in part on the legitimacy of indiscriminate predation against Muslim civilians. ISWAP’s propaganda subsequently became a key tool for communicating with local populations and projecting the group as a governing authority, emphasizing its distinct priorities from Boko Haram and its more selective approach to violence against Muslim communities. It has since become the Islamic State province generating the largest volume of propaganda anywhere in the network, per CSIS’s tracking.

Playing a unique role within that online media infrastructure is Al-Buhaira Media Foundation. Named after the Arabic word for ‘The Lake’, a reference to Lake Chad, the geographic and symbolic heartland of ISWAP’s operational territory, the outlet functions as the group’s primary Hausa-language propaganda arm. As of June 2026, it remains active despite Nigerian Air Force airstrikes in November 2025 and a joint US-Nigerian operation in May 2026 that AFRICOM assessed had killed several senior commanders, among them Abu-Bilal al-Minuki.

More at the link

Link

Africa North

Inside ISWAP's Online Propaganda Machine: How Al-Buhaira Outlet is Waging a War of Words Across the Lake Chad Basin

2026-08-14

by Kiria Borak and Lucas Webber

[MilitantWire] When the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) split from its predecessor organization, Abubakar Shekau’s faction of Boko Haram in 2016, it began developing a more systematic media strategy. The founding dispute with Shekau centered in part on the legitimacy of indiscriminate predation against Muslim civilians. ISWAP’s propaganda subsequently became a key tool for communicating with local populations and projecting the group as a governing authority, emphasizing its distinct priorities from Boko Haram and its more selective approach to violence against Muslim communities. It has since become the Islamic State province generating the largest volume of propaganda anywhere in the network, per CSIS’s tracking.

Interesting. We’re still getting plenty of reports of Boko Haram actions, or actions not defined as one or the other.
Playing a unique role within that online media infrastructure is Al-Buhaira Media Foundation. Named after the Arabic word for ‘The Lake’, a reference to Lake Chad, the geographic and symbolic heartland of ISWAP’s operational territory, the outlet functions as the group’s primary Hausa-language propaganda arm. As of June 2026, it remains active despite Nigerian Air Force airstrikes in November 2025 and a joint US-Nigerian operation in May 2026 that AFRICOM assessed had killed several senior commanders, among them Abu-Bilal al-Minuki.

More at the link

Link

Africa North

Fragmented security allows terrorists’ cross-mobility across Lake Chad and Sahel

2026-07-29

By Taiwo Adebayo
Researcher, Lake Chad Basin, ISS

[ISSAFRICA] As Islamic State affiliates extend their reach, states must find ways to share intelligence and cooperate, despite political fractures.

Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) has resolved to send 100 fighters to reinforce Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) in Ménaka near Mali’s border with Niger, defectors communicating with current fighters told ISS Today. This comes months after ISSP retreated from the area when Malian forces regained control.

Such decisions by ISWAP’s Shura Council, made at a recent meeting, pose a major challenge to Lake Chad Basin and Sahel counter-terrorism operations – and show an organisation both under pressure and extending its reach.

Anti-insurgency structures in each region are not designed to match ISWAP and ISSP’s cross-regional mobility. ISSP operates mainly across the Mali-Burkina Faso-Niger border area, where the al-Qaeda-linked Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin is also active. Success will depend on cooperation between these governments.

One defector quoted a fighter who attended the Shura Council meeting as saying: ‘They [ISSP] are having problems [in Ménaka]’ – meaning the group needed support. Fifty more fighters were heading to Nasarawa in Nigeria’s North Central, hundreds of kilometres from ISWAP’s Lake Chad stronghold, he said – the second such deployment to Nasarawa since 25 fighters were sent there last year.

More at the link

Link

Africa Subsaharan

Northwest Nigeria’s New Jihadist Front: Trends from the First Half of 2026

2026-07-16

By Chris Dayton

[HSTODAY] Jihadist activity has surged in Nigeria’s North-West and North-Central Regions over the first half of 2026. Groups affiliated with the Islamic State, al-Qaeda, and indigenous Nigerian jihadist groups have expanded their presence in these regions. The emergence of these groups in the North-West and North-Central regions poses a great challenge to the Nigerian military, which is already battling jihadist groups in the Lake Chad region. These developments also challenge governance and state-to-state cooperation, as much of the violence takes place in Nigeria’s borderlands.

JIHADIST ACTORS
Several jihadist organizations now operate in Nigeria’s North-West and North-Central regions. While these groups differ in affiliation and goals, they increasingly operate in the same geographic space, making it increasingly difficult to distinguish among actors.

More at the link

There’s a cute little map at the link that shows the AOs of JASDJ (Sadiku network), ISSP (IS Sahel Province), JNIM, and Mahmuda Group (Darul Salam) for the map lovers among us.

Link

Africa Subsaharan

Who Funds The Fire?

2026-07-07

[X] LAGOS, JOHANNESBURG, STOCKHOLM — Violence on this scale is never free. Someone pays for the Kalashnikovs carried by bandits in Zamfara. Someone pays for the motorcycles that carry Boko Haram fighters across the Sambisa. Someone benefits when unemployed South Africans in Johannesburg turn their rage not on the politicians who looted their country, but on the Nigerian shopkeeper next door.

This report follows the money. Not rumor. Not conjecture. The documented, prosecuted, court-certified money.

## I. THE RANSOM ECONOMY: NIGERIA'S WAR PAYS FOR ITSELF

The most authoritative recent audit of Nigeria's kidnapping industry comes from SBM Intelligence: between July 2024 and June 2025, at least **4,722 people were abducted in 997 incidents**. Of those, **762 were killed**. Kidnappers collected approximately **$1.66 million** in ransom payments in a single year — and the ransom for one abducted judge alone netted a Boko Haram-linked group roughly **$500,000**. SBM's conclusion is chilling in its bureaucratic precision: Islamist groups' participation in the abduction economy is growing, "with proceeds feeding insurgency logistics."

This is the first truth Abuja does not want spoken plainly: **the insurgency is substantially self-financing, and every ransom paid — including those quietly paid by state governments — is a direct subsidy to the next attack.**

## II. THE FOREIGN MONEY THAT IS ACTUALLY PROVEN

There is documented foreign money in this war. It runs through Dubai, not Washington.

In 2020, the Federal Court of Appeals in Abu Dhabi convicted **six Nigerians for transferring $782,000 from Dubai to Boko Haram** — two sentenced to life imprisonment. Nigerian media reporting on the proceedings identified one of the recipients as a **Nigerian government official** who also funneled *government money* to the terrorists. Read that again. A serving official of the Nigerian state, paid by the Nigerian taxpayer, moving money to the men burning Borno.

The Financial Action Task Force and Nigeria's own Financial Intelligence Unit have mapped the rest of the pipeline: hawala networks that escape all oversight, trade-based laundering through dried fish and cattle, cryptocurrency channels — Binance among the platforms identified — through which Boko Haram receives funds from local and international sources undetected, and Point-of-Sale agent networks embedded in the everyday cash economy.

And the names are now public. In April 2026, the Nigeria Sanctions Committee **froze the assets of 48 terror-financing suspects**, including **Tukur Mamu** — the self-styled "negotiator" of the Kaduna train hostages — and **Simon Ekpa**, alongside a string of Bureau De Change operators, for financing Boko Haram, ISWAP, IPOB and Ansaru. Historical financiers already on the record include the late **Alhaji Buji Foi**, a former Borno State Commissioner of Religious Affairs — a government man — who supplied the group money, motorcycles and logistics. Al-Qaeda's early seed money to the sect is documented in the academic literature; AQIM's support likewise.

**The pattern is unmistakable: the financiers of Nigeria's terror are disproportionately Nigerian officials, Nigerian "big men," and Gulf-routed networks — protected for years by the same state that claims to be fighting them.** The weapons, as the Council on Foreign Relations dryly noted, often come from government armories "because the back gate was left unlocked."

## III. JOHANNESBURG: WHO PROFITS FROM THE POGROM?

Now to South Africa, where in April–June 2026 the vigilante movements **Operation Dudula** and **March and March** set a June 30 "deadline" for foreigners to leave, marched in their thousands through Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town, and left at least **four dead** in the campaign's final weeks — after **five Ethiopian migrants were murdered in Johannesburg on a single day, May 3**. Two Nigerians died in April alone: **Amaramiro Emmanuel**, beaten by SANDF soldiers, and **Ekpenyong Andrew**, arrested in Pretoria and later found in a mortuary. Human Rights Watch documented the attacks and the police response: little to none.

President Tinubu was forced to order emergency evacuations — **603 Nigerians airlifted home in three flights by early July 2026**, over 1,000 more screened and waiting — scenes that recall wartime, not relations between the continent's two largest economies. Ghana, Malawi, Kenya and Mozambique ran their own evacuations. Nigeria now demands formal legal compensation.

So who funds Dudula? Here the money trail is domestic and political, and that is the scandal. These movements are cheap to run — marches, taxi networks, WhatsApp mobilization — and they are *sponsored in effect* by every South African politician who profits from the deflection. As South African analysts themselves concede, xenophobia is **manufactured by elites who benefit when the poor fight each other instead of demanding accountability from their rulers**. A Zulu king deploying the slur "kwerekwere." Politicians who face no cost for incendiary speech in a country with 30-plus percent unemployment. The South Gauteng High Court had to *injunct* Dudula in November 2025 just to stop its members blocking sick migrants from hospitals. That is state failure operating as silent sponsorship.

The 2008 pogroms killed over 60 and displaced 100,000. The 2015 wave required military intervention. 2026 is not an aberration. It is a business model.

## IV. THE FOREIGN HAND: WHAT HISTORY PROVES, AND WHAT 2026 MUST ANSWER

Is there precedent for foreign intelligence services financing African destabilization? The declassified record answers emphatically yes.

JFK-era files declassified in 2025 confirm the CIA ran operational stations in **Lagos, Johannesburg and Pretoria**, surveilled the ANC, and — by agent Donald Rickard's own admission — helped deliver **Nelson Mandela** to his captors in 1962. The Congo operation consumed the equivalent of **$80 million** in today's money on regime change, propaganda and paramilitary action. More than **225 front organizations** worldwide were exposed as CIA funding conduits — including one that staged a music festival in Lagos in 1961 whose own performers did not know who paid them. Israel, for its part, armed apartheid Pretoria, helped it evade the 1977 UN arms embargo, trained alongside its forces against the ANC, and partnered on its nuclear bomb — an alliance a former Israeli ambassador described as a "love affair" between the two security establishments.

That history earns Africa the right — the obligation — to ask hard questions about foreign interests today. But an honest investigator must state what the 2026 record shows: **no declassified document, court judgment, sanctions designation or financial-intelligence report currently in the public domain ties American or Israeli funding to Boko Haram, the Northwest bandits, or Operation Dudula.** The proven financiers are named above, and they are closer to home.

That is not exoneration. It is a demand. This report therefore calls for:

1. **Full disclosure** by the United States of all post-2010 intelligence activity, funding and liaison relationships in Nigeria and South Africa — the Cold War files took sixty years to surface; Africa should not wait sixty more.
2. **A UN-mandated forensic audit** of terror-financing flows through Dubai, hawala corridors and crypto exchanges feeding the Lake Chad insurgency.
3. **Prosecution of the Nigerian officials** identified in the UAE proceedings and on the April 2026 sanctions list — with names published, not shielded.
4. **ICC-referable accountability** for South African political figures whose incitement demonstrably preceded the killings of April–June 2026, and reparations for evacuated Nigerians, as Abuja now demands.

Africans are not killing Africans out of ancient hatred. They are killing each other inside systems of profit — ransom economies, protection rackets, deflection politics — built and maintained by men with names, bank accounts and, too often, government titles. The fire has financiers. Name them all.

Link

Africa Subsaharan

Nigeria: Troops repel ISWAP ambush after twin IED attacks on humanitarian convoy in Borno

2026-07-02

Troops Repel ISWAP Ambush After Twin IED Attacks on Humanitarian Convoy in Borno

By: Zagazola Makama

Troops of the 149 Battalion have repelled an ambush by suspected ISWAP terrorists after two command-detonated improvised explosive device (IED) attacks targeted a military… pic.twitter.com/WYgUlUuxMx
— Zagazola (@ZagazOlaMakama) July 1, 2026

Text:

Troops Repel ISWAP Ambush After Twin IED Attacks on Humanitarian Convoy in Borno

By Zagazola Makama

Troops of the 149 Battalion have repelled an ambush by suspected ISWAP terrorists after two command-detonated improvised explosive device (IED) attacks targeted a military escort convoy in Mobbar Local Government Area of Borno State.

Security sources said the first incident occurred at about 2:15 p.m. on June 29 when troops escorting a convoy to Kareto encountered a command-detonated IED planted by suspected terrorists at Grema Kauri Village.

The sources said the explosion left the Commanding Officer of the 149 Battalion, Lt.-Col. E.P. Isah, with minor injuries.

According to the sources, at about 2:55 p.m. on the same day, while escorting 16 empty humanitarian logistics trucks on the return journey, the convoy struck another command-detonated IED at Gambo Kurumuri Village in the same local government area.

The second explosion was immediately followed by an ambush mounted by the terrorists.

More at the link

Link

Africa Subsaharan

Nigeria: The Making and Unmaking of Abubakar Shekau

2026-06-22

[HumangleMedia] Abubakar Shekau’s fanaticism thrived like wildfire in the Sambisa Forest Reserve. His dramatic reign ended abruptly, but the scars of his terror still linger. This is how he lived.

Summary
In May 2021, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) targeted Abubakar Shekau, the leader of Boko Haram, in Nigeria's Sambisa forest.

Faced with surrender, Shekau committed suicide, ending his reign of terror characterized by mass abductions and executions across northern Nigeria and the Lake Chad region.

From humble beginnings, Shekau rose to infamous leader, heavily influenced by Mohammed Yusuf and radical Islamic teachings.

His leadership saw Boko Haram engage in severe violence, including bombings and kidnappings, drawing global condemnation. Despite his death, Shekau's legacy endures in ongoing regional instability and the ideologies he propagated continue to influence insurgent groups in Nigeria and beyond.

Jumping down to this key bit:

According to an internal message released by ISWAP, Abubakar Shekau died in the hours between the 18th and 19th of May 2021. Rather than surrender, he reportedly triggered his suicide vest, killing himself and several others present. The man who had used death as a symbol of his sermons chose suicide as his final supplication.

It wasn’t the first time Shekau had died — his death had been rumoured and reported half a dozen times in the preceding years, by the military or competing insurgency groups — but it was the final, definitive time, with confirmation coming just a few days after the blast. His death ended his reign of terror, but his legacy endures across the Lake Chad region, and more broadly in the geopolitical alarm his insurgency helped ignite. It is the legacy of Shekau’s long war of mass abductions, executions, and persecution of Christians that has reverberated so far as to cause figures like Donald Trump to designate Nigeria as a land of Christian genocide requiring urgent U.S. military intervention.

More at the link

Link

Africa Subsaharan

The War Over Who Is Muslim

2026-06-19

[HumangleMedia] Boko Haram and ISWAP doctrines condemn Nigeria, reject Saudi Arabia, downgrade Hajj, and turn ordinary Muslims and citizens into targets.

Summary
The conflict involving Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) in Nigeria, and the Lake Chad Basin, revolves around the radical interpretation of Islam through strict doctrines like takfir, where Muslims deemed to live outside their authority are labeled as unbelievers.

These groups weaponize religious concepts and historical grievances, declaring the Nigerian state illegitimate and urging migration to their territories. The struggle is as much about religious authority, as it is about political power, pitting extremist interpretations against communities that historically integrate Islamic faith into secular frameworks.

Boko Haram’s extremist ideology arises from historical tensions over Islamic authority during and post-colonial rule, with leaders like Abubakar Shekau encouraging extremism and violent acts against perceived unbelievers, both within and outside their religious fold. Although ISWAP contrasts by accommodating some Muslims outside their control, they still adhere to radical jihadism against the Nigerian state, leading to internal conflicts and divergent tactics between the factions.

Kassim’s research highlights a generational shift in the conflict driven more by economic survival than theological conviction, with orphans of war inheriting an insurgent economy rather than religious impetus. While the international Islamic communities, including Saudi Arabia, face condemnation by jihadists, the quest for control over religious definition and legitimacy persists, drawing on real and perceived failures of governance in Nigeria to stoke dissent and recruit followers.

Resolving the crisis entails exposing extremist misinterpretations, demonstrating faith's compatibility with a secular state, and addressing governance failures to undermine insurgent propaganda. Only by improving citizens' lives and confronting extremist ideologies can Nigeria hope to quell this enduring conflict rooted in religious and territorial authority.

More at the link

Link

Africa Subsaharan

The politics of Jihadist expansion: Sadiku and 'Boko Haram' In northwestern Nigeria

2026-06-13

James Barnett,Vincent Foucher &M urtala Ahmed Rufa’i

[TANDFONLINE] ABSTRACT
Formed in 2020–2021, the Sadiku group is the extension to northwestern Nigeria of the jihad waged in the country’s northeast by Jama’at Ahl al-Sunna li-Da’wa wal-Jihad (JASDJ), the outfit created by the late Abubakar Shekau and commonly known as Boko Haram. Sadiku’s operation appears to be the most successful attempt at expansion outside the northeast by a Nigerian jihadist to date. Drawing on original interviews with his former associates, this study analyses Sadiku’s relative success.

A stranger in the northwest, a region dominated by bandits uninterested in jihadism, Sadiku showed remarkable flexibility in coopting local components: Darul Salam (a Salafi rejectionist group), the local—and mostly Christian—population, and bandits. Sadiku’s experience confirms that all jihad is necessarily local: even with a portable ideology like Salafi-jihadism, insurgents require local associates and deals. Sadiku’s “navigation” has been difficult, however, resulting in internal contradictions and tensions with the JASDJ core in the northeast as well as erstwhile bandit allies. Here we see the complexities of expansion: even in brutal sectarian organizations like JASDJ, the demands of local context can result in a degree of flexibility, but this, in turn, creates its own problems, undermining jihadists’ religious self-perceptions and expectations.

More at the link

Link

Africa Subsaharan

Nigeria: Boko Haram recently released a video threatening ISWAP

2026-03-31

Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād (JASDJ), mostly known as Boko Haram, recently released a video threatening ISWAP. The group in the video appears to be based in the Lake Chad area under the authority of the JAS overall leader Bakura Doro, aka Abu Umaymah.

The… https://t.co/9X2wVizLsa pic.twitter.com/hqc0abkPP3
— Brant (@BrantPhilip_) March 30, 2026

Text:

Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād (JASDJ), mostly known as Boko Haram, recently released a video threatening ISWAP. The group in the video appears to be based in the Lake Chad area under the authority of the JAS overall leader Bakura Doro, aka Abu Umaymah.

The speaker begins by calling ISWAP apostates and deviants, and tells them not to rejoice over the death of Abu Bakr al-Shekawi (Shekau). As a reminder, Shekau blew himself up in 2021 when he was cornered by ISWAP in the Sambisa Forest. ISWAP had called upon him with loudspeakers to surrender, but he refused.

He adds that after Shekau there are many other Shekaus who don’t die and don’t change, and who follow his ways and teachings, and will remain until the Day of Judgement.

More at the link

Link

-12 More