| Iraq |
| Cats Out of the Bag: Onwards to Maysan |
| 2008-06-03 |
| This is being discussed as "rumor" on some Milblog sites. H/T Greyhawk via Major John who simply stated, "Very interesting. In the near future, I will probably be able to explain why... I might be out of the loop for a few days, traveling and all that." Saturday, May 24, 2008 Well I guess enough people are openly discussing this now in Baghdad that its okay for me to write about it. Mind you, all the following is classified under the category of gossip: The Iraqi Army and the Marines are preparing for a major campaign against Mahdi Army and Iranian targets in Maysan Province (Amara). Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki may even put the entire elected leadership of Amaramany of whom are Sadristsout of a job, by flexing his authority under emergency powers. There is even talk of air strikes against military targetsweapons depots, transportation vehicles and individualson the Iranian side of the fence; these are targets that are arming and otherwise supporting the Special Groups throughout Iraq. Irans logistics trail goes from Maysan through southern Babil/Hillah Province (al-Hamza) and from there into central Iraq, i.e. Baghdad. Theres another route also going from Maysan into Qurnah and then onto Basra. The southern route has been effectively crippled. And the last stretch of the northern route that used to take weapons from south-western Baghdad all around to Sadr City has also been shut down. Mind you, the information is murky and sometimes contradictory. For example, it seems that Iran has denied entry to several top ranking Special Groups and Mahdi Army commanders that only a few months ago Iran was playing host to. As a consequence, theres been a glut of high-level and mid-level Sadrists bidding their time in Amara. Now, Maysan is a weird place: even after draining the marshes in the early 1990s, Saddam could not claim full control of the province. And ever since the late 1980s, Irans Revolutionary Guards has maintained forward bases deep inside Iraqi territory, such as ones around the town of Al-Mijerr al-Kabir. Iraqi opposition groups were active in these areas right up to the fall of the regime. Furthermore, Iran had a large recruiting pool among Marsh Arab refugees who lived in camps almost right across the border. The talked-about airstrikes would take out forward Iranian border stations that have recently been moved into Iraqi territory, especially around oil fields. Then there are weapons depots of rockets, advanced RPGs and assorted weaponry right near the border ( on the Iranian side, though) that are on the target list, as well as buildings and Iranian individuals involved in facilitating logistics for the SGs, also on the Iranian side. Although this has gone largely unreported, but US airstrikes were busily taking out Iranian trucks smuggling arms through Maysan within the first three weeks after Operation Cavalry Charge. Im not sure, but some Iranian citizens may have been killed as a result. The new target list is a stepped-up extension of this bombing trend. It would also break the taboo over launching bombing runs against nuclear and terrorist facilities deeper into Iranian territory. Of course, this is all still in preparation phase. It is unclear whether the Iraqis and Americans will go through with all or any of it. And given that its all out in the open, it could be US PSY-OPS to scare the Iranians away from backing the SGs. But arrest warrants for Maysan officials are being prepared, and intelligence is being gathered about other Sadrist leaders who have gone into hiding there. I expect the battle for Maysan to be difficult: this would be Irans last stand in Iraq. The fighting would also be occurring on topographical and human terrain that the Iranians have been studying and cultivating for decades. It could start incrementally, and the ante could be raised as the operation faces increased resistance, eventually leading to bombing runs inside Iran. But then again, Sadrist morale is very loweven with all the squeaking and squawking weve been hearing from the pressand the Iranians seem unwilling to confront an outgoing American president itching for a parting shot. It should be noted that the vast majority of Sadrist support in Baghdad and Basra comes from families that trace their roots to Maysan Province. Furthermore, Maysan is home to the largest concentration of Iraqi tribes with unknown Arab ancestrymost likely remnants of pre-Islamic ethnic groups and whatever was left in the wake of rebellions by black slaves and gypsies in Abbasid times. |
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| Iraq |
| What Happened in Basra? The Mahdi Army got their Quag Mired |
| 2008-05-10 |
| Ever since the prime minister of Iraq, Nouri al-Maliki, launched Operation Cavalry Charge in Basra on March 25, which has been going on there and elsewhere across Iraq, three important conclusions can be drawn: the Iraqi state and the Iraqi army can function on their own; an influential figure in Iraq, Muqtada al-Sadr, is much weaker than he was deemed to be; and Iran has bet on the wrong horse. As a result of being unable to rely on Mr. Sadrs organization, Iran would lose a menacing avenue for retaliation against America should Irans illicit nuclear program get attacked. Basra had a moment of clarity, illuminating the convergence of several positive trends in Iraq. Whats driving these trends is a sense among regular Iraqis that their state has outlasted its challengers, whether they are Sunni insurgents, organized crime cartels, or hostile regional powers. Basra is Exhibit A for those who argue that Iraqs remaining problems are fixable, that the achievements seen so far are irreversible, and that a sense of patriotic cohesion is salvageable and viable. Consequently, the events in Basra do not sit well with those who have argued otherwise and staked their careers and credibility to the storyline that Iraq is irredeemable, such as the many journalists and pundits who have been covering Iraq over the last five years. This has seemingly induced them to fabricate a negative and false narrative in the hope that their predictions would go unchallenged. Six weeks ago, Iraqi policemen in Basra were dodging RPG projectiles fired by teenagers. These days, though, they keep themselves busy with house-to-house sweeps in search for weapons caches. Moreover, on a daily basis, they issue hundreds of tickets for traffic and parking violations. Indeed, the situation in Basra has changed dramatically. The violence in Basra was not sectarian in nature even though Iraqs southernmost province first in potential wealth with between 60% and 70% of the countrys oil and second, after Baghdad, in its population size boasts a significant Sunni minority, as well as Christian, Mandean, and non-mainstream Shia denominations. Basras chaos resulted from a unique mélange of Iranian meddling, proliferation of organized crime, and Britains unsteady hand in running military and political matters. The Americans had delegated Basras management to their British allies, who ended up ruining things in Iraqs most promising piece of real estate. However, it is not surprising that the British would mismanage a place that they had thoroughly studied a little over 90 years ago, the first time they came to occupy Basra as a result of World War I. Basra was founded by the Arabs who invaded the city 1,400 years ago. They used it as an operating base against the Persian Empire. It became a military base in a land teaming with Jews, Christians, and Manichean peasants, all of various Semitic extractions. In that intensely fertile land, a land open to the influences and trade of the Indian Ocean, many propagandists roamed and many bastard children were left by a passing sailor. Thus, the pure-bred Arabian tribes that were settled south of the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates were instilled with a distinct identity that meant that ones roots in Basra would set one apart from those who originated in Baghdad or Nejd or Isfahan. But something of the original mission against Persia seems to have survived among Basras original Arab tribes, for today it forms the backbone of the tribal elements that have flocked to Mr. Malikis side in his battle against the organized crime cartels criminality that had found political refuge and patronage within the Sadrist movement. This divide is historical in origin too: most of these Sadrists descend from destitute families that escaped the poverty and tribal hierarchies of the nearby Amara Province in the 1930s and 1940s. They were looking for menial work and if that was not available, they turned to a life of crime. Some of their kin also flooded into Baghdad, creating the human overflow in the slums that would become Sadr City. A derogatory name was coined for the boorish newcomer: shroogi or easterner. In the last five years, being a Sadrist was almost synonymous with shroogi ancestry. Various troublemakers in modern Iraq have made up their unruly mobs with these dislocated social misfits. The Iranians are no different as they set about establishing a parallel contingency plan in Iraq that would unleash chaos and terror should America contemplate a war against Tehran. That is supposed to be Irans strategic deterrence. Once Mr. Maliki launched Operation Cavalry Charge, the Iranians and the organized crime cartels that they have been patronizing realized that they were no match for a prime minister who is bent on their destruction. He had enough soldiers with armored vehicles to withstand that first volley of Iranian-supplied RPGs that were unleashed when his troops drove down previously no-go alleyways. Mr. al-Maliki also rallied the silent majority of Basra to reclaim their city after they had receded into the safety of their homes. The Iraqi state had endured the worst, and came back to reclaim its turf. Mr. Maliki can draw upon a war chest of $60 billion from this years budget. He has enough bags of money to entice the bulk of the shroogis away from life on the margins and into the benevolence of the state. He offered them a newer sense of belonging within the ranks of the government-employed lower middle-classes. Over the last five weeks, the Iraqi army has smashed through many myths that have been internalized by Iraq-watchers about the weakness of the Iraqi state, the strength of the Sadrists, and the omnipresence of the Iranians. Last year, many had speculated that Mr. Malikis government would collapse as a result of a boycott by the Sadrists. Periodically since then, some have been holding their breath every time a confrontation between Messrs. Sadr and Maliki seemed imminent. Yet no lessons were drawn about who has the upper hand even though Mr. Sadr has been the one to back down at every juncture. If some worry that the Iranians may unleash a Sadrist deluge against the Green Zone should America conduct a bombing run against Irans nuclear facilities this summer, then those worries should be downgraded. It seems now, as the Iraqi state keeps pressing on, that the Sadrists will fold easily. |
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| Iraq |
| There's a New Sheriff in Basra |
| 2008-04-02 |
| An article by Nibras Kazimi, Visiting Scholar at the Hudson Institute .... The United Alliance List delegation ... evidently made al-Sadr an offer he couldnt refuse when they sat down for a friendly chat in Tehran two days ago: the Iraqi state was willing to go all the way in smashing the Sadrist movement arresting all the leaders and shutting down all the offices if he didnt play along with Operation Cavalry Charge and hand over those operatives whose names appear on the wanted lists. See, Maliki went to Basra with a long-ish list of names comprising all those involved in oil smuggling, drug dealing and the various other crimes that have wracked Basra. It just so happens that many of them claim to be Mahdi Army commanders. The Mahdi Army in Basra is only an army in the sense that soldiers and cappos are rankings in the Cosa Nostra. .... Maliki made the calculation that he can take on these cartels and withstand the wrath of the other affiliated Mafiosi familias that got unleashed in other parts of Iraq. The criminal syndicate knows that once Operation Cavalry Charge squashes their sweet set-up in Basra, then other pockets of criminality are going to be next, so thats why they are going to the mattresses. Well, so far several dozen of these Most Wanted folks have been killed, while tens of others are wounded or in hiding. At least 50 of them are under arrest. The outbreak of violence in places other than Basra was an occasion for the Iraqi Army and police to act on arrest warrants that have been outstanding since 2004, for example, several such dangerous outlaws were taken into custody in Karbala and Hillah. ..... .... today he [Maliki] is perceived as a statesman commanding a strong and motivated army that can impose law and order on once-powerful forces that have run amuck. If thats not a benchmark of success, then what is? .... Operation Cavalry Charge was a reality warp for all those whove internalized the rhetoric that Iraq is a failed state. Instead of being dismissed as a Green Zone politician, Maliki took his war cabinet to Basra and went all Untouchables on the Al Capones of Iraqs oil-rich south; plenty of journalists and experts simply could not grasp these dramatic changes to the political topography of Iraq. Maliki won, pure and simple. The western media invented the narrative that Maliki was at war with the Sadrist movement, even though no such declaration was ever made. .... Malikis approach is piece-meal: hes taken out the intimidation factor that kept much of the Sadrist sway in place and hes done that by showing them that they are no armed match for a better-disciplined, better-supplied Iraqi Army with plenty of stamina. The Sadrists are left with some political gains that theyve accrued from joining the political process, such as government posts and lucrative contracts that theyd be loathe to part with and thats their collateral for good behavior from now on. .... Now the Sadrist will have to sway voters their way with words and entreaties, rather than threats and drills. Most of the crime cartels are also on notice that the days of the Wild, Wild South are over and theres a new sheriff in town. .... Maliki has promised to keep arresting the names on his list, and he has demonstrated that hes a man who means what he says. .... The regular folks Ive been speaking to are so admiring of Maliki. The political elite in Baghdad is freaked out by Malikis newfound stature and they must all go back to the drawing boards to recalculate this new dynamic in the political equation. ..... Today, Basra is calm and Iraqs national army is in charge, not the Mahdis. Well done, Mr. Maliki. |
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| Iraq | ||
| Operation Calvary Charge (New Info) | ||
| 2008-03-28 | ||
| An article by Nibras Kazimi, Visiting Scholar at the Hudson Institute Operation Cavalry Charge in Basra is going much better than anticipated; solid leadership coupled with a much-diminished enemy is harvesting very quick results. Here are the key points on Day 2 of the operation: * The word from Hayyania, one of Basras most populated and poorest neighborhoods, is that the situation is calm and under control. The Iraqi Army has taken up positions in the main thoroughfare while the criminal gangs and the Sadrists seem to be sitting this one outtheyre not engaging the government troops and are instead keeping a low profile. * Both the Army commander of Operation Cavalry Charge, Lt. Gen. Mohan Hafidh al-Freiji, and the police commander, Maj. Gen. Jalil Khalaf al-Muhammadawi, are very able commanders and brave men, with al-Muhammadawi, an ex-tank officer in the Iraqi Army, tending towards brutality. Hes also helped by the fact that he can draw upon important tribal relations in the all-important Albu-Muhammed tribe of nearby Amara Province. * The Iraqi Army is operating with the utmost restraint which reflects their good training and new ethos; this in not the Saddam-era Army whose first instinct is to level rebellious neighborhoods to dust. Maliki has given the criminal cartels 72 hours to come out with their hands over their headsthis is not a battle, its rather a law-enforcement stand-off.
* Many parts of Baghdad where one would assume the Sadrists could potentially be troublesome such as Husseiniya, Bunook, Shia Ghazaliyya, and Washash experienced no acts of violence. The places where there was limited violence and tension were Sadr City, Bayaa, and very sporadically in al-Shula. In fact, most of the people who Ive spoken to throughout the day, many of whom were out and about travelling across wide swaths of Baghdad, seemed surprised that the situation was that calm.
* The Sadrists can only keep the shops and schools closed through intimidation, including spraying some shop owners with gunfire in the Bab al-Shargi neighborhood. But it is also interesting that one form of intimidation taken by Sadrist activists has been to take photographs of shops that have remained open despite the call for a strike. This sort of behavior indicates that although the Sadrists may not be able to anything about this defiance now, theyll remember these scabs and settle these accounts later. This shows weakness. * The radically Sunni al-Sharqiyya TV (owned by Saad al-Bazzaz, who in recent years has financed his media conglomerate with monies from the dethroned ex-ruler of Qatar, the Barzanis and the U.S. Department of State) is curiously propagating and amplifying Sadrist ( maybe Iranian) psyops. Whats even funnier is that al-Sharqiyyas bogus reporting is looping back into western reporting on the situation in southern Iraq. It seems that news of the situation in the provinces of Diwaniyya, Kut and Hillah have been widely exaggerated by al-Sharqiyya and consequently by certain western media outlets that are pretending to be covering the story when what theyre really doing is taking questionable reporting by an openly hostile TV station and passing it on to the western news consumer as original and objective reporting. * Ahmad Chalabi is trying to reconcile the Sadrists with Maliki. No word on whether Maliki is receptive to this overture. | ||
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| Iraq |
| Operation Cavalry Charge |
| 2008-03-26 |
| An article by Nibras Kazimi, Visiting Scholar at the Hudson Institute .... Today [March 25], the Iraqi Army launched its first major military operation to fully control Basra, the second largest city in Iraq, without any - ANY - Coalition assistance. One source tells me that during the preparation phase of this campaign the Americans offered to position some U.S. Special Forces and air-cover near the Basra battle theater to act as back-up if needed but their Iraqi counterparts planning this operation politely turned down the offer. This is Operation Cavalry Charge.... Its chief objective is to flush out the organized crime cartels that control the port of Basra and the oil pipelines of the province. One major criminal force in the Basrawi scene are groups that affiliate themselves with the Sadrist movement and its Mahdi Army. Many of these criminal rings are also associated with certain factions of Irans Revolutionary Guard that operate in Basra both for intelligence/sabotage purposes as well as enriching themselves. By knocking out these egregious manifestations of lawlessness, Operation Cavalry Charge will have the accrued benefit of mashing up the more subtle patterns of Irans malignant influence in Iraqi Shiisms foremost economic prize, the oil fields and port of Basra. |
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