Hello !
| -Land of the Free |
| Judicial Watch founder Larry Klayman: Joe Biden Is Dangerously Close To Facing A Coup d'état |
| 2021-07-07 |
| [FreedomFirstNetwork] Today, the Two Mikes had the pleasure of interviewing Lawrence Klayman, a renowned lawyer, and the founder of Judicial Watch and of his current organization, Freedom Watch. Mr. Klayman cogently and clearly explained that America is broken and that our legal system is a smoking ruin. “Our legal system is gone, it’s been taken away from us. We have corrupt judges and a compromised legal system,” Lawrence explained. If the American republic is to be recovered, only the widespread and targeted activities of common American citizens and their organizations can achieve the goal. Mr. Klayman has formed the “New American Independence Party”, and on 5 and 6 July 2021 will hold the “Third Continental Congress” at the reception center of Independence Hall in Philadelphia, PA. The meeting will discuss and plan ways in which the citizenry can take the fight — in a legal and constitutional manner — to the authoritarians that pack the Biden regime, DoJ, and the FBI. With how out of control our government has gotten recently, Dr Michael Scheuer brought up his concern that peaceful events such as the Third Continental Congress event are not going to be enough to take back our nation. While Mr Klayman made clear that he will never call for violence to take back the White House from Joe Biden, “he is dangerously close to a Coup d’état.” Mr. Klayman also has, for several years, been working on new ways of applying justice in America. Quoting Justice Scalia, Mr. Klayman explained that the grand-jury process actually belongs to the American people as a whole, and not just the three branches of the national government. Given this fact, it is possible for the citizenry to investigate, arrest, try, and convict the offenders, people that the current judicial system ignores or abets, under the parameters of the Constitution and U.S. law. — Mr. Klayman’s website is: http://www.freedomwatchusa.org, and the site contains documents about the organization, content, and goals of next week’s Third Continental Congress. Related: Freedom Watch: 2019-12-05 George Zimmerman SUES Trayvon Martin's family for $100MILLION Freedom Watch: 2019-02-12 Now Radical Blacks Are Even Turning On People of Mixed Race! Freedom Watch: 2018-08-18 Revoking Security Clearances: The Easy Way out - Larry Klayman believes that Brennan et al. ought to be tried and jailed |
| Link |
| -Land of the Free |
| Top CIA official responsible for hunting Osama bin Laden is now a QAnon conspiracy theorist who calls rioting BLM protesters a 'semi-human mob' who need to be 'punished with violence because they are Trump's enemies' |
| 2020-09-17 |
[Daily Mail]
Related: Michael Scheuer: 2017-12-12 The Swamp against the People Michael Scheuer: 2010-04-27 Bin Laden had 'no clue' about Sept. 11 retaliation Michael Scheuer: 2010-02-11 Peace with Pakistan: an idea whose time has passed Related: QAnon: 2020-09-05 Joe Biden's Staff Give First Question to Atlantic Reporter, Who Asks About Trump's 'Soul' QAnon: 2020-08-27 CNN analyst & a lecturer at Yale, @AshaRangappa_, released the personal phone number of a conservative reporter QAnon: 2020-08-21 The QAnon conspiracy: What is it and where did it come from? |
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| Home Front: Politix |
| The Swamp against the People |
| 2017-12-12 |
| [American Thinker] Anybody who still believes that there is no Deep State in America might recall three major Deep State rebellions against constitutionally elected administrations in recent history. 1. The Stalin period, when communists, both overt and covert, had deeply infiltrated the State Department; the White House; and, most dangerously, the Manhattan Project of DOD, which built the first two nuclear bombs. At that time, the Communist Party of the USA was directly controlled by Stalin's Comintern in Moscow, the international center for worldwide infiltration, sabotage, espionage, and agitation-propaganda aiming to destroy the United States and its allies. Stalin's Comintern was especially powerful in Hollywood, in universities and the media. 2. The Watergate period, when historically anti-communist President Richard Nixon was destroyed by a revenge campaign, combining the NYT-WaPo media axis with the FBI's Mark Felt and the Democrats (among them Hillary Clinton) to bring down the duly elected president of the U.S. by unconstitutional means. The extra-constitutional office of the special prosecutor was made up at that time, with no constitutional warrant or standing, and indeed in direct violation of the U.S. Constitution (USC Amendments I-IV). 3. Today, we are seeing a third example of an attempted coup d'état by the Deep State and the left-controlled media, both monsters that were never imagined by the Founders. In 2016, Hillary Clinton was openly endorsed by the Communist Party USA, and Hillary never rejected that endorsement. That fact speaks for itself. In the meantime, the corrupt media keep aiming for conservative scalps. If Roy Moore is elected to the Senate, he will be harassed and scapegoated next. That is 100 percent predictable, because for the left, the swamp, and the corrupt media, there are no credible punishments. Today, we see another politically motivated special counsel in close cahoots with the Democratic Party and three Deep State chiefs who were recently fired by Donald J. Trump: James Comey, George Brennan, and Jim Clapper. These individuals, as well as Mr. Mueller, were appointed by Barack H. Obama, who has repeatedly expressed his open contempt for the clearly delimited powers of the U.S. Constitution. During their years as high officials of U.S. national security and justice administration, reliable military sources reported deep infiltration of the U.S. government by Jihad War powers. In the months after the 9/11/01 surprise terror attack by Wahhabi jihadis, which murdered more than 3,000 people in Manhattan, Pennsylvania, and the Pentagon, a CIA official expressed open support for Osama bin Laden in published books. See Michael Scheuer. During the run-up to 9/11/01, Mr. Scheuer served as the official chief of the bin Laden desk of the CIA ‐ throughout the Bill Clinton years and into the early months of the George W. Bush administration. To public knowledge, no one has ever been fired or even punished for blatant failures to "defend and protect the Constitution of the United States" during the Jihad War. The idea of an unaccountable Deep State in open rebellion against the Constitution of the United States and its officers and elected officials is therefore beyond any reasonable doubt. More follows at the link. |
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| Terror Networks |
| Bin Laden had 'no clue' about Sept. 11 retaliation |
| 2010-04-27 |
Osama bin Laden had no idea the U.S. would hit al-Qaida as hard as it has since the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks, a former bin Laden associate tells WTOP in an exclusive interview. "I'm 100 percent sure they had no clue about what was going to happen," says Noman Benotman, who was head of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group in the summer of 2000. "What happened after the 11th of September was beyond their imagination, " says Benotman, who adds that al-Qaida thought the U.S. was a "paper tiger." Sitting on the floor at bin Laden's compound in Kandahar, Afghanistan during a meeting the summer before the attacks, Benotman shocked bin Laden and more than 200 other international jihadist leaders by telling the al-Qaida leader his jihadi strategy was "a total failure." Benotman, a highly regarded associate of bin Laden's at the time, says he surprised him again by rebuffing a plea for help. "He asked for my help. Bin Laden asked me personally, you know. I responded immediately on the spot ...'No. I'm not going to help you.'" Bin Laden was stunned. "Because he used to like to sit next to me, you know. My right hand side," Benotman says. The seating location meant he was someone bin Laden respected. Benotman says he spoke frankly because his reputation allowed him to. "I've spent time in the front line engaging with the enemy more than bin Laden and [Ayman Al-]Zawahiri and the entire group of al-Qaida." Zawahiri laughed when he warned those at the 2000 meeting that the U.S. response would be swift, hard and long, Benotman says. Benotman attributes al-Qaida's overconfident attitude to the United States' response to al-Qaida attacks on its in embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania in 1998. Zawahiri, according to Benotman, expected only a missile attack. "When they attacked the embassies in East Africa, they estimated the U.S. launched 75 cruise missiles and eight people got killed. So they said this time, maybe they will launch 200 and they laughed about this." Benotman's assessment is backed up by a former Central Intelligence Agency officer, who was active in the fight against al-Qaida. The officer, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, says "several captured terrorists have said publicly that al-Qaida never expected the towers to fall. Their goal was to frighten people and impact the U.S. economy, so they really didn't plan for the massive response the U.S. launched." Bin Laden got more than one warning, says Benotman. "I told him several times before the Sept. 11th attacks that if you do this, the U.S. is going to retaliate in a very harsh way. At least twice I reminded him about the serious orders he was given by Mullah Omar, the leader of the Afghan Taliban to stop fighting the U.S., and he disobeyed the order." Now living in London and openly campaigning against organizations like al-Qaida, Benotman - according to some - is simply trying to avoid going to jail in his native Libya. "I would like to believe that bin Laden was shocked and dismayed by what we did after 9/11, but I come hard up against an awful lot of evidence that that's exactly what he wanted," says Michael Scheuer, former head of the CIA's Osama bin Laden unit. Scheuer questions whether Benotman is speaking out freely. "Clearly, Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi is holding a hammer over his head," Scheuer says, noting some of Benotman's ex-LIFG colleagues are in prison and Benotman still has relatives in Libya. Benotman, who still believes in the commitment Jihad requires, laughs at the notion he's afraid of being arrested. "I'm not afraid of the Americans or any other country. My speaking out is a conscious decision and it's based on my entire experience and understanding of jihadism." Not only does Benotman reject al-Qaida's ideology, but he says "killing civilians is a crime. I don't care if it's Jews, Christians, Muslims or anyone. It's a crime and we shouldn't help them (al Qaida)." |
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| India-Pakistan |
| Peace with Pakistan: an idea whose time has passed |
| 2010-02-11 |
| By Dr Prem Mahadevan A leading indian english language newspaper has chosen to begin 2010 by stirring up controversy. It has run a series of editorials advocating peace initiatives with Pakistan, despite the manifest unwillingness of Islamabad to punish the perpetrators of 26/11. What might have begun as a practical joke by the newspaper's editorial staff has since acquired pretensions to seriousness. The newspaper cites a dubious and unverifiable poll result, suggesting that most people in India and Pakistan strongly desire a resumption of peace talks between the two countries. Going by the reader response posted on the newspaper's website, the poll was either poorly conducted or biased in its sampling. A very large number of Indians are in no hurry to forget Pakistani sponsorship of terrorism. Their reluctance to let bygones be bygones stems not from hostility towards Pakistan per se but rather, a natural instinct towards self-preservation. It is no secret that even now; Pakistani terrorist groups are planning attacks in India on a scale that aims to surpass 26/11. One can be assured that if such an attack were to occur, Pakistani officials would first condemn it and then suggest that resolution of the Kashmir issue would prevent further attacks. There is a word for such double-edged statements: blackmail. The victim of wrongdoing is being made to feel that he is responsible for his own suffering, merely because he has failed to oblige the whims of the wrongdoer. Ever since the 1993 Mumbai blasts, Pakistan has adopted a policy of killing Indian civilians to get what it previously failed to get through negotiations and war. From its perspective, Islamabad is being reasonable. It has offered the Indian government the option of surrender. Should India stand firm, Pakistan cannot be blamed for the hundreds more Indian lives that will be lost in terrorist attacks planned from its territory. The fact that many Pakistanis attempt to rationalize this policy is understandable, if unfortunate. They are after all, captive to the propaganda of a rogue army that claims it is protecting them from an existentialist Indian threat. The same army did not hesitate to butcher three million Bengalis in 1971, conduct aerial bombing of Baluch nationalists in 1973, hang a democratically elected leader in 1979, support Sunni sectarian groups in terrorizing Shias after 1980 and topple civilian governments throughout the 1990s. Furthermore, the selective use of logic permits Pakistani intellectuals to advocate peace with India on one hand, while simultaneously asserting that there can be no compromise on Kashmir. Thus, while the ordinary people of Pakistan may want peace, it still has to be on the terms laid down by their army. Like hostages in a hijack situation, they suffer from the Stockholm Syndrome and believe in the rightness of their tormentors only because they have no choice. The people of Nazi Germany faced the same situation in the 1930s. The Pakistani state today shares more in common with fascist dictatorships of yesteryears than with democratic India, yet Indian peace activists stress the similarity between the two peoples. In doing so, they fall prey to a common analytical failing known as mirror-imaging. Basically, what this means is that rather than make the intellectual effort of seeing the world from your enemy's point of view, you merely assume that the enemy is no different from you. Whatever you would do is what the enemy can be expected to do. Conversely, anything that you would not do, the enemy would not do either. The weakness of this logic became apparent in 1999, when the Pakistan army unilaterally violated the Line of Control in Kargil, destroying the Lahore peace process initiated by India. Self-deception among the top Pakistan army brass had led them to believe that the aggression would be cost-free because Indians have no stomach for a fight'. Hitler made a similar assumption in 1939, when he invaded Poland and triggered off World War II. What are the similarities between India and Pakistan, which Indian peaceniks go on about? Other than ethnicity, food and to a lesser extent language, squat all. The two countries are on different political, cultural and economic trajectories. Since 1971, Pakistan has strived to reinvent itself as an Arab state, in order to draw the wider Islamic world into its fight against India. Wahabbi madrassas funded by Saudi petrodollars have metastasized across the country like a rampaging cancer. These madrassas stress the need for Pakistani society to regress back to the 7th century and the fundamentals of Islam (as interpreted by the Wahabbis only). They advocate medievalism over modernity. Liberal Sufi and Barelvi traditions are being replaced by religious orthodoxy that would be unrecognizable to anyone who lived in pre-partition India, when there was no Pakistani army and no Lashkar-e-Toiba. How can any peace process be durable unless Pakistani civil society first frees itself from these two terrorist groups (one in uniform, the other outside it)? Economically, Pakistan has been a basket case since the mid 1990s. The country is dependent on foreign aid to make up for the financial deficits caused by its ever-expanding public sector i.e., the Pakistan army's business empire. Land-grabbing by army officers is institutionalized in the form of grants awarded by generals to their favourite subordinates. A neo-colonial system of economic predation combined with a population explosion is pushing Pakistan back to the 18th century, while the Indian economy continues to liberalize and grow. Despite having a population seven times larger than its neighbour, India's per capita income grew to exceed that of Pakistan in 2003 and the gap has since widened. From a purely business perspective, the argument for better relations with Pakistan simply does not make sense. Even the European Union is facing problems due to income disparities among its constituent states. Why then, are some Indian journalists so keen to jump on the peace-making bandwagon, especially when Mumbai has eclipsed Kashmir as the unresolved issue' in Indo-Pak relations? Are they genuinely unable to differentiate between the tasks of reporting facts, formulating policy and providing light amusement? The Aman ki Asha' initiative by the Times of India and Jang media groups fails miserably on the first count, with its lack of empirical evidence and logical argument and resort to clichés like turning swords into ploughshares'. As regards influencing policy, flowery language is insufficient to dissuade Pakistan from supporting terrorist groups, as successive Indian prime ministers have learnt. All that the proposed peace initiative does is provide an example of the wordplay that appeasers engage in when they run out of arguments and have to keep talking. Were it not for the insult which the authors of this initiative deliver to the memory of 70,000 Indians killed by Pak-sponsored terrorism in Punjab, Kashmir and elsewhere, their delusions would be laughable. Not only have they allowed themselves to be wined and dined into serving as ISI mouthpieces, but they also perniciously suggest that their views are shared by a majority of people. In the process, they forget that with each successive terrorist attack in India, a growing number of people have legitimate cause to hate Pakistan and all that it stands for. From the Akshardham Temple siege in 2002 to Mumbai in 2008, victims of the dead and injured lost any reason to support peace initiatives with a terrorist state. The same holds true for families of soldiers who died reclaiming the heights of Kargil. While harping about Pakistani hospitality, Indian peace activists could pause to consider the hospitality shown to Lt Saurav Kalia and his men for fifteen days in May 1999. Lest anyone argue that the actions of a few crazed jihadis do not represent the majority of Pakistanis, it must not be forgotten that their savagely mutilated bodies were returned to India by the Pakistan army, not Lashkar-e-Toiba. There is a concerted effort on by interested third parties to create an impression that resumption of the peace process is inevitable'. It is not. Even the most pacifist of Indian prime ministers have demonstrated a steely resolve on national security issues, such as V.P Singh in 1990 when he threatened to go to war if Pakistan intervened overtly in Kashmir. Similarly, in 1997 IK Gujral did not allow his dovish image to stop him from publicly shooting down a British attempt to mediate on Kashmir. Those who believe that New Delhi can be flattered or badgered into negotiating with a terrorist state only risk damaging their own relations with India. During the first few weeks of the Kargil war, there were the usual calls for restraint from Washington and London. These transformed into pressure on Pakistan only after India made clear that it would not negotiate under threat. Today, a similar message of firmness needs to be sent out. Failure to do so would encourage the belief currently prevailing within the Pakistan army that its use of terrorists is a viable strategy. India has already made the biggest confidence building measure possible, by not retaliating to a single act of terrorism originating from Pakistan. ISI officials continue to plan terrorist attacks in India, knowing that they will not be targeted for assassination. Until November 2008, New Delhi remained on cordial terms with Islamabad, despite the urban bombing campaign by the so-called Indian Mujahiddin' (actually Lashkar-e-Toiba by another name). The Mumbai attacks broke this dynamic because Pakistan instead of reciprocating Indian goodwill, chose to ratchet up its proxy war. By sending Pakistani mercenaries to kill Indians under the cover of a non-existent terrorist group called Deccan Mujahiddin', the ISI overplayed its hand. The fortuitous capture of Ajmal Kasab was a huge embarrassment for Pakistan. It initially attempted to bluff its way out by denying Kasab's nationality, just as it had previously done with its soldiers in Kargil. In the first few hours after the attack, Indian media coverage only mentioned that the attackers had Pakistani links, without suggesting that they were state-sponsored. Islamabad responded to this restraint by claiming it was being made a scapegoat for India's homegrown terrorist problem. Pakistani blame-shifting and obfuscation was what led to a hardening of Indian public opinion, not inflammatory media coverage. For some Indian journalists to now believe that their role in reporting the truth amounted to war-mongering, suggests a lack of professional integrity. They condemn jingoism while forgetting that excessive sentimentalism is equally dangerous. Rather than preaching about the need for Indians and Pakistanis not to be held hostage by history, peace activists could first study that history in order to explain how it differs in any meaningful way from the present. Specifically, are they in any position to provide an assurance to their readers, on whose behalf they claim to speak, that Pakistan will convict those responsible for the Mumbai attacks? Instead of setting overly ambitious goals of freeing two countries from hatred, the Indian and Pakistani media could first combine forces to free 54 Indian Prisoners of War, being illegally held captive by Pakistan. If, as the initiators of the Aman ki Asha' farce claim, they are motivated by humanitarian considerations, they can set up forums for common people in both countries to denounce Lashkar-e-Toiba and its supporters. Only then will they command any credibility as representatives of popular opinion. Other initiatives could include asking the Pakistani government to shut down terrorist training camps, extradite Dawood Ibrahim, prosecute Hafeez Saeed, stop blocking Indian attempts to join the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) and stop ganging up with China to thwart India's bid for a UN Security Council seat. Forward movement by Islamabad in even one of these areas would constitute a solid foundation for re-starting peace talks and would be more than reciprocated by India. Absence of any progress on the other hand, would demonstrate that the Pakistani desire for good relations extends only to cultivating Indian opinion-makers through fine food and paid holidays. Evidence of such intellectual subversion already exists, in the form of arguments that a 'stable and prosperous Pakistan is in India's interest'. Which Pakistan are these people talking about? The one that colonized Afghanistan in the 1990s while ostensibly seeking strategic depth and then further trying to extend its influence into Central Asia or the one that regularly diverts foreign aid money towards building up its India-centric war machine, or the one that survives on a narco-trafficking industry whose annual turnover equals 25 percent of the nation's own GDP? Anyone who believes that a strong Pakistan would be a responsible state needs to read Michael Scheuer's book Imperial Hubris. Scheuer, a former CIA analyst, describes the period 2000-2001 as representing a golden moment' for the Pakistani military elite. India was on the defensive in Kashmir and Afghanistan was firmly under the control of the Taliban. A quick review of Indian Home Ministry statistics for these years would reveal how many Indians died in terrorist attacks by Pakistan-based groups during the golden moment'. Rather than emulate the condescending arrogance of Western writers, who insist on bracketing India with Pakistan, would-be peaceniks should first come to terms with reality. They equate India with Pakistan as a victim of terrorism, without regard for the fact that Pakistan is a victim of its own terrorist-sponsoring policy, while India is a victim of proxy warfare. The two situations are not comparable on any level. Making any further peace overtures to Pakistan, without meaningful progress on the Mumbai investigations, would be tantamount to political suicide for whichever party tried it. Subversive propaganda such as Aman ki Asha' would not change the facts of the situation, only the way policymakers perceive them, to their own detriment. Prem Mahadevan is a strategic affairs analyst at a leading think-tank, based in Western Europe. |
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| Afghanistan | |||
| Suicide attack on CIA agents 'was planned by bin Laden inner circle' | |||
| 2010-01-07 | |||
US intelligence officials believe that the suicide bomb attack that killed seven CIA officers in Afghanistan last month was planned with the help of Osama bin Laden's close allies, raising fears that the al-Qaeda leader is enjoying a lethal resurgence. They think that the attack could not have taken place without the prior knowledge and assistance of the Haqqanis, the powerful Taleban group thought to be shielding bin Laden.The attack was carried out by a Jordanian doctor whom the CIA believed was about to divulge the whereabouts of bin Laden's deputy, Ayman al- Zawahiri. It is one of the deadliest blows against the CIA and has increased tensions between the US and Pakistan because of Islamabad's repeated failure to target the Haqqanis. The Haqqanis control a large block of territory on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border near the Afghan town of Khost, a Taleban hotbed near where the CIA officials were killed on December 30. It is also where the US believes bin Laden is hiding. One former CIA officer, who did not wish to be named, told The Times that the agency had taped evidence of a Pakistani army officer tipping the Haqqanis off about a raid and a member of Pakistan's intelligence service boasting that the Haqqanis are our guys'. Pakistan has ignored US demands to target the strongholds of the Haqqanis' leader, Sirajuddin Haqqani, whose father, Jalaluddin, founded the network and was a Mujahidin commander and ally of the US during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. The network is said to be behind several audacious attacks, including the bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul in July 2008. Michael Scheuer, the former head of the CIA unit tracking bin Laden, said: There is no way this operation would have occurred in Khost without the knowledge and active support of Jalaluddin Haqqani and/or his son. They and their organisation own the area and nothing occurs that would impact their tribe or its allies without their knowledge or OK. Both men, moreover, would be delighted to help bin Laden in any way they can.' Mahmood Shah, who served as security chief of Pakistan's lawless tribal region, agreed: The attack may have been planned by al-Qaeda, but it could not have been possible without the help of the Haqqani group.' What has alarmed the US is the fact that al-Qaeda and the Taleban managed, despite an intense US bombing campaign, to mount an operation that wiped out the top CIA experts involved in the hunt for bin Laden. It's a huge blow,' a former CIA officer said. If you are Osama bin Laden, your biggest enemy is the CIA. This is a big hit.'
Former CIA officials told The Times that the high number of CIA officers travelling from Kabul to meet al-Balawi reflected how desperate the agency was for information on bin Laden. That al-Balawi came via Jordanian intelligence has proved deeply embarrassing for Jordan, exposing how closely the country works with the US in sharing intelligence and operatives on the front line in the war against extremists. The Jordanian intelligence official killed in the blast was buried in Jordan on Tuesday but the Jordanian Government refused to acknowledge his role with the CIA in Afghanistan. Anti-US sentiment is high in Jordan. | |||
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| Afghanistan | |
| Get Nasty or Go Home | |
| 2009-10-16 | |
| By Michael Scheuer. Take with a grain of salt. Rather than popular support for the Taliban being based on intimidation and money, what we are seeing in Afghanistan is popular opinion catching up with Islamist determination. Until roughly late 2006, the war against the U.S.-NATO coalition was largely fought by the Taliban, other Islamists groups like that led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and al Qaeda. Since then, however, the Islamists have been joined by Afghans who simply do not want Muslim Afghanistan occupied by all sorts of infidels from all sorts of Christian and polytheist countries. In short, an Islamist insurgency has evolved into an Islamist-nationalist freedom struggle not unlike that which beat the Red Army. The best way to see the growth of the Afghan enemy facing the United States and NATO is to track the proliferating number of insurgent attacks in the heretofore quiet and supposedly "friendly" arc of provinces from Herat in the west clockwise to Badakhshan in the far northeast. . . . . . . [L]et us hope . . . that Washington's focus is refixed on the hard but simple Afghan choice it faces: Because the U.S.-NATO occupation powers the Afghan insurgency and international Muslim support for it, we must either destroy it root and branch or leave. . . . . [O]nly the all-out use of large, conventional U.S. military forces can be expected to have a shot at winning in Afghanistan. Since 1996, the United States has definitively proven that clandestine operations, covert action, Special Forces actions, and aerial drone attacks cannot defeat al Qaeda. It has likewise proven beyond doubt that nation-building in Afghanistan is a fool's errand. That said, military victory would require 400,000 to 500,000 additional troops, the wide use of land mines (even if Princess Diana spins in her grave), and the killing of the enemy and its civilian supporters in the numbers needed to make them admit the game is not worth the candle. This clearly is not a viable option. . . .
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| Terror Networks |
| Little-Known Egyptian is Key Al-Qaeda Figure |
| 2009-10-16 |
| He's a heavyweight in al-Qaeda but little known outside jihadi and intelligence circles even though he runs the terrorist movement's operations in a key front -- Afghanistan -- and may be linked to a plot in New York. Mustafa al-Yazid makes no secret of his contempt for the United States, once calling it "the evil empire leading crusades against the Muslims." "We have reached the point where we see no difference between the state and the American people," al-Yazid told Pakistan's Geo TV in a June 2008 interview. "The United States is a non-Muslim state bent on the destruction of Muslims." Al-Yazid may also have links to Afghan immigrant Najibullah Zazi, whom U.S. authorities have arrested in an alleged plot to use homemade backpack bombs, perhaps on New York City's mass transit system. Two U.S. intelligence officials, speaking on condition of anonymity because the case remains under investigation, told The Associated Press that the bespectacled, Egyptian-born al-Yazid used a middleman to contact Zazi, indicating that the al-Qaeda leadership took a keen interest in what U.S. officials call one of the most serious terrorism threats crafted on U.S. soil since the 9/11 attacks. Despite his relative obscurity in the West, the shadowy, 55-year-old al-Yazid, who barely stands 5-foot-5 inches tall, has been involved with Islamic extremist movements for nearly 30 years since he joined radical student groups led by fellow Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahri, now the No. 2 figure in al-Qaeda after Osama bin Laden. In the early 1980s, al-Yazid served three years in an Egyptian prison for purported links to the group responsible for the 1981 assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. After his release, al-Yazid, also known as Sheik Said and Abu Saeed al-Masri, turned up in Afghanistan, where, according to al-Qaeda's propaganda wing Al-Sabah, he became a founding member of the terrorist group. He later followed bin Laden to Sudan and back to Afghanistan, where he served as al-Qaeda's chief financial officer, managing secret bank accounts in the Persian Gulf that were used to help finance the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks in New York and Washington. After the U.S. and its allies invaded Afghanistan in 2001, al-Yazid went into hiding for years. He surfaced in May 2007 during a 45-minute interview posted on the Web by Al-Sabah, in which he was introduced as the "official in charge" of the terrorist movement's operations in Afghanistan. Some security analysts believe the choice of al-Yazid as the Afghan chief may have signaled a new approach for al-Qaeda in the country where it once reigned supreme. Michael Scheuer, former head of the CIA unit that tracked bin Laden, believes that bin Laden and al-Zawahri wanted a trusted figure to handle Afghanistan "while they turn to other aspects of the jihad outside" the country. Al-Yazid had little background in leading combat operations. But terrorism experts say his advantage was that he was close to Taliban leader Mullah Omar. As a fluent Pashto speaker known for impeccable manners, al-Yazid enjoyed better relations with the Afghans than many of the al-Qaeda Arabs, whom the Afghans found arrogant and abrasive. That suggested a conscious decision by al-Qaeda to embed within the Taliban organization, helping the Afghan allies with expertise and training while at the same time putting an Afghan face on the war. Al-Yazid himself alluded to such an approach in an interview this year with Al-Jazeera television's Islamabad correspondent Ahmad Zaidan. Al-Yazid said al-Qaeda fighters were involved at every level with the Taliban. "We participate with our brothers in the Islamic Emirate in all fields," al-Yazid said. "This had a big positive effect on the (Taliban) self-esteem in Afghanistan." A September 2007 al-Qaida video sought to promote the notion of close Taliban-al-Qaeda ties at a time when the Afghan insurgents were launching their comeback six years after their ouster from power in Kabul. The video showed al-Yazid sitting with a senior Taliban commander in a field surrounded by trees as a jihad anthem played -- rather than in a bleak desert hideout. The Taliban commander vowed to "target the infidels in Afghanistan and outside Afghanistan" and to "focus our attacks, Allah willing, on the coalition forces in Afghanistan." There is also evidence that al-Yazid has promoted ties with Islamic extremist groups in Central Asia and Pakistan, where other top al-Qaeda figures are believed to be hiding. "He definitely seems to have significant influence among the Pakistani Taliban and the Central Asian groups," terrorism expert Evan Kohlman said. "They regularly post and share his videos on the Web, just as they would with bin Laden or al-Zawahri." In August 2008, Pakistani military officials claimed al-Yazid had been killed in fighting in the Bajaur tribal area along the Afghan border. However, he turned up in subsequent al-Qaeda videos, all of which had clearly been made after the Bajaur fighting. Al-Yazid appeared on an al-Qaeda video posted this month, vowing to avenge the death of Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud, who was killed in a CIA missile strike Aug, 6. "I say to the Islamic nation that even if we have lost Baitullah Mehsud, there are thousands of tribesmen who are like him and who will take revenge on the Americans and their allies," al-Yazid said. |
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| Terror Networks |
| Al-Qaeda laid to rest? Not just yet |
| 2008-06-12 |
| By Michael Scheuer Whether said about the aging process or the implacable approach of writing deadlines, the old saw about "time flying" is certainly true. But seldom has it been truer than in the past three weeks. At dawn on May 29, the 2007 US National Intelligence Estimate that said al-Qaeda was a major and gradually increasing threat to the United State was still valid; by late that afternoon, the secretary of the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had announced that the Lebanese Hezbollah was now the " 'A' team of terrorism" and that it made "al-Qaeda look like a minor league team". |
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| Terror Networks |
| Al Qaeda on the Run - Hold them by the nose, kick em in the ass! G. Patton |
| 2008-05-31 |
Hold them by the nose, kick em in the ass! G. S. PattonA year ago in July, a National Intelligence Estimate warned that al Qaeda had "protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability," meaning it could be poised to strike America again. The political reaction was instantaneous and damning. "This clearly says al Qaeda is not beaten," said Michael Scheuer, the former CIA spook turned antiterror scold. What a difference 10 months and a surge make. CIA Director Michael Hayden painted a far more optimistic picture in an interview yesterday in the Washington Post. "On balance, we are doing pretty well," he said. "Near strategic defeat of al Qaeda in Iraq. Near strategic defeat for al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia. Significant setbacks for al Qaeda globally and here I'm going to use the word 'ideologically' as a lot of the Islamic world pushes back on their form of Islam." What happened? To certain sophisticates, this is all al Qaeda's doing: By launching suicide attacks on Shiite and even Sunni targets, and ruling barbarically wherever they took control, the group has worn out its welcome in the Muslim world. There's some truth in this. The Sunni Awakening in Iraq was in part a reaction by local clan leaders against al Qaeda's efforts to subjugate and brutalize them. The Arab world took note when Abu Musab al-Zarqawi ordered the November 2005 bombing of three hotels in Amman, Jordan, in which nearly all of the victims were Sunni Arabs. Extremist Islamic parties took an electoral drubbing in Pakistan's elections earlier this year following a wave of suicide bombings, one of which murdered Benazir Bhutto. It's also true that al Qaeda finds itself on the ideological backfoot, even in radical circles. As our Bret Stephens reported in March, Sayyed Imam, a founder of Egyptian Islamic Jihad and once a mentor to Ayman al Zawahiri, has written an influential manifesto sternly denouncing his former comrades for their methods and theology. This was enough to prompt a 215-page rebuttal from Zawahiri, who seems to have time on his hands. Lawrence Wright in the New Yorker and Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank in the New Republic have recently written about similar jihadist defections. But the U.S. offensives in Afghanistan and especially Iraq deserve most of the credit. The destruction of the Taliban denied al Qaeda one sanctuary, and the U.S. seems to have picked up the pace of Predator strikes in Pakistan or at least their success rate. This has damaged al Qaeda's freedom of movement and command-and-control. As for Iraq, Zawahiri himself last month repeated his claim that the country "is now the most important arena in which our Muslim nation is waging the battle against the forces of the Crusader-Zionist campaign." So it's all the more significant that on this crucial battleground, al Qaeda has been decimated by the surge of U.S. forces into Baghdad. The surge, in turn, gave confidence to the Sunni tribes that this was a fight they could win. For Zawahiri, losing the battles you say you need to win is not a way to collect new recruits. General Hayden was careful to say the threat continues, and he warned specifically about those in Congress and the media who "[focus] less on the threat and more on the tactics the nation has chosen to deal with the threat." This refers to the political campaign to restrict wiretapping and aggressive interrogation, both of which the CIA director says have been crucial to gathering intelligence that has blocked further terrorist spectaculars that would have burnished al Qaeda's prestige. One irony here is that Barack Obama is promising a rapid withdrawal from Iraq on grounds that we can't defeat al Qaeda unless we focus on Afghanistan. He opposed the Iraq surge on similar grounds. Yet it is the surge, and the destruction of al Qaeda in Iraq, that has helped to demoralize al Qaeda around the world. Nothing would more embolden Zawahiri now than a U.S. retreat from Iraq, which al Qaeda would see as the U.S. version of the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan. It is far too soon to declare victory over al Qaeda. Still, Mr. Hayden's upbeat assessment is encouraging, and it suggests that President Bush's strategy of taking the battle to the terrorists is making America safer. |
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| Terror Networks |
| 'Zawahiri replaces Bin Laden as Al Qaeda chief' |
| 2007-09-17 |
Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Ladens deputy, has seized control of Al Qaeda and rebuilt the terror network into an organisation capable of launching complex terror attacks in Britain and America, the Sunday Telegraph reported on Sunday.Osama has not chaired an Al Qaeda meeting in two years: The weekly quoted intelligence officials as saying that bin Laden has not chaired a meeting of Al Qaedas ruling shura, or council, in more than two years. Instead, Zawahiri, bin Ladens nominal number two, is credited with rebuilding the terror network since the Afghan war in 2001. Intelligence sources in Washington have revealed that Western spy chiefs were recently forced to revise dramatically their view that Al Qaeda was so depleted that it was little more than a cheerleader for extremists. Instead, British and American intelligence agencies believe that a network of terrorist cells, funded, controlled and supported by Al Qaedas central command, based in the lawless tribal areas of Pakistan, is in place again. Zawahiris task has been made easier because not a single prominent Al Qaeda leader has been captured since March 2006, nearly 18 months ago. Osama brandname, Zawahiri grand strategist: Bruce Hoffman, a member of the US Military Academys Combating Terrorism Centre, said, Bin Laden is the brand name but al-Zawahiri is the grand strategist. He has taken control of Al Qaeda. Despite the new video [released this month], bin Laden has ceased to be a major force in decision-making and propaganda effort. A window on the changing outlook on Al Qaeda came in July when a US government National Intelligence Estimate concluded that the organisation had regrouped. Prof Hoffman said: The idea that they were just a franchise for ideology was simply not true. While we were saying that Al Qaeda had been diminished and degraded, it was just wishful thinking. What forced the re-evaluation was the plot last August to blow up 10 aircraft en route from Britain to the US. That sent shock waves through the intelligence agencies of both countries, said Prof Hoffman. It was incontrovertible evidence that Al Qaeda was back, and that it was prepared to go after hard targets. Zawahiri promoting new generation of leaders: A former British intelligence officer said that Al Qaeda under Zawahiris direction had promoted a new generation of leaders to the highest echelons of the shura, a group of about 20 to 30 leaders who govern operations, finance and religious fatwahs. The guys on the subs bench are now in the first XI, he said. They have stopped using mobile phones to talk to each other, which has made it more difficult to find them. Zawahiri quadruples number of propaganda videos: The daily says that Zawahiri - who has quadrupled the number of videos produced each year to more than 60 - is credited with stepping up the propaganda effort. Adam Raisman, an analyst with the Search for International Terrorist Entities institute, which intercepts jihadi broadcasts, said: The releases are getting more elaborate both in content and delivery. The old grainy video has been replaced by high-definition, near DVD-quality video. They are now issuing them in formats for cell phones. Michael Scheuer, the head of the CIAs bin Laden unit between 1996 and 1999, warned that officials who have concluded that there is no overt threat in bin Ladens new message may be making a dangerous miscalculation. |
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| Terror Networks | ||
| bin Laden looks for an exit strategy | ||
| 2007-09-11 | ||
| Steve Schwartz. Excerpt: These snippets in the OBL tape were obviously trolled from the internet and thrown together with "clever" gimmicks like the call for Americans to embrace Islam, plus jabs about taxes and the inefficacy of the Democrats. The old and aggressive Islamic idiom found in Bin Laden's discourse is missing. So is the fire. The tone is that of exhaustion, not exhilaration in jihad. I believe, six years after 9/11, that Al-Qaida is losing badly in Iraq, and while George W. Bush perseveres with the promise he made to fulfill America's democratic legacy, Bin Laden is looking for an exit strategy. The Western mainstream media has it backwards; we are winning, the enemy is losing, the war was inevitable and honorable. And the innocents killed on 9/11 will be fully redeemed.
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