India-Pakistan |
'ISI a disciplined force under its chief's orders' |
2007-11-10 |
![]() The Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate or ISI, according to an analysis published here, may not exactly be the monster it has been portrayed as. The analysis by Eben Kaplan, associate editor, Council on Foreign Relations, quotes former US ambassador to Pakistan William Milam as saying, I do not accept the thesis that the ISI is a rogue organization. Milam says, Its a disciplined army unit that does what its told, though it may push the envelope sometimes. With a reported staff of 10,000, ISI is hardly monolithic. Like in any secret service, there are rogue elements, says Frederic Grare, a South Asia expert and visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. ISI-Taliban links: He points out that many of the ISIs agents have ethnic and cultural ties with Afghan insurgents, and naturally sympathise with them. Experts generally suspect Pakistan still provides some support to the Taliban, though probably not to the extent it did in the past. If theyre giving them support, veteran AP correspondent Kathy Gannon says, its access back and forth (to Afghanistan) and the ability to find safe haven. The analysis says, quoting experts, that President General Pervez Musharraf exercises firm control over his intelligence agency. His admission that retired ISI agents may be helping Taliban fighters suggests his government knows of at least some unsanctioned Pakistani support for the Afghan insurgency. Experts note Musharrafs acknowledgement also gives him plausible deniability of any sanctioned assistance Pakistan may also be providing. Marvin Weinbaum of the Middle East Institute is of the view that Pakistan has sent retired ISI agents on missions the government could not officially endorse. Though Pakistan has effectively battled Al-Qaeda, Weinbaum says, it has largely ignored Taliban fighters on its soil. There are extremist groups that are beyond the pale with which the ISI has no influence at all, he says. Those are the ones they go after. According to Weinbaum, Pakistan has two policies. One is an official policy of promoting stability in Afghanistan; the other is an unofficial policy of supporting jihadis in order to appease political forces within Pakistan. The second (policy) undermines the first one, he says. |
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India-Pakistan |
Pakistan not 'doing enough' to deal with radical Islamists |
2007-03-04 |
Pakistan is not doing enough to secure its borders, and the border regions are a safe haven for radical Islamists whether aligned with Afghanistans former Taliban regime or Al Qaeda and its affiliates, Kathy Gannon, a veteran Islamabad-based Associated Press correspondent, told a discussion forum run by the Council on Foreign Relations. She wrote, Whats the answer? Roaring in with all guns blazing, killing lots of people in the hopes that you get a few of the leaders? That hasnt worked in Afghanistan and it wont work in the tribal regions. It will make hundreds, maybe thousands more enemies. The problem is that the US put all its eggs in the one basket: the Pakistani military. Why are things so bad? Its not because the military made an agreement in Waziristanin in 2006. Its because the military gave a toehold in Pakistan back in 2002 to the very people who are at the root of the Islamic jihadist movement. Gannon said that every single party that formed MMA was part of the coalition in Balochistan, as well as the official opposition in the federal government, had a jihadist wing. A key component of the ruling religious alliance in the NWFP government, the Jamaat-e-Islami, has sent its followers to Chechnya, Bosnia and northwestern China. Several Al Qaeda men were arrested at the homes of its party workers. In President Pervez Musharrafs eight years in power, he has not found new civilian partners to replace the radical religious right. They remain the militarys only partner working to quiet the Pashtun belt of Pakistan, she added. The AP bureau chief in Islamabad said the US made allies with the wrong people. She said, Think back to what happened the last time the US made allies of the Pakistan military. It got September 11. And on the Afghan side, the US has made allies with the mujahideen leaders whose radical Islamic vision is no different than Al Qaedas and who have links to Al Qaeda and its affiliates, including the likes of Lashkar-e-Tayyaba. These groups were based in northwestern Afghanistan in the early 1990s by the mujahideen government, which offered safe haven when the US was pushing Pakistan to shut down its Kashmiri militant training camps. It just moved them next door to Afghanistan with the support of the mujahideen government there and the same people are back in power today. According to Gannon, the situation in deteriorating because of the political room to manoeuvre given by the Pakistani military when it turned (as it always does) to the religious extremists and sidelined mainline political parties. She said that the solution had to be a political one that put an end to the tribal regions having separate administrations from the state. The tribal area is Pakistani territory and should be subject to Pakistani law. |
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India-Pakistan | ||
Several countries responsible for terrorism: Gannon | ||
2006-05-10 | ||
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Afghanistan |
Debate over whether or not the Taliban are terrorists |
2006-05-03 |
When the US State Department issued its annual Country Reports on Terrorism last Friday, it listed numerous state-sponsors of terrorism, like Iran, and groups it considers foreign terrorist organizations, like Hamas, Al Qaeda, and Hizbullah. Conspiciously absent from the lists, however, was the Taliban. In an article entitled "Terrorism's Dubious 'A' List," the non-partisan Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) reports that the religious extremist organization has never been listed as a terrorist group by the US, Britain, the EU, Canada, Australia, or any of the coalition partners, despite the fact that during its six year rule in Afghanistan, it provided save haven for Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda, and currently is staging terrorist attacks against coalition forces and waging a national campaign of intimidation and fear. The new report did designate the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region as a terrorist "haven," however. In a CFR Q&A on the Taliban, Chistopher Langdon, a defense expert at the Institute for International Strategic Studies, describes the group as "an insurgent organization that will periodically use terrorism to carry out its operations." According to Kathy Gannon, the former Associated Press bureau chief for Pakistan and Afghanistan, these [Taliban] have at times aligned themselves with Al Qaeda fighters and with mujahadeen (holy warriors) led by the anti-government warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. During the Soviet occupation, Hekmatyar received more support from US and Pakistani agents than any other fighter. "The Afghan Taliban is better organized today than it was in 2001," says Gannon, "they have more recruits [and they] have been able to take advantage of the lawlessness, the criminal gangs, and the corruption in the government." Langton says Taliban forces "have largely recovered from their initial defeat," and are proving a savvy enemy for coalition forces. Taliban fighters have become encouraged by the domestic opposition some NATO nations face as they deploy in former Taliban strongholds previously patrolled by US forces, he says. "They are very adept at reading these signals and seeing where the weaknesses lie." Some experts, like Mr. Langdon, say the Taliban aren't terrorists. "You could never say that the Taliban themselves espoused the wholesale use of terror," Langton says. But the CFR article points out that many others, like Amin Tarzi, the Afghanistan analyst for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, say that if the activities that the Taliban are carrying out were happening in any other country, they would be called terrorism. He says a political motive is behind this double standard. In order to gain a broad base of support, Afghan President Karzai has reached out to Pashtuns, many of whom were members of the Taliban. "You can't call them 'terrorists' and at the same time reconcile with them," Tarzi says. In an April 2003 speech, Karzai noted a distinction between "the ordinary Taliban who are real and honest sons of this country [and those] who still use the Taliban cover to disturb peace and security in the country." Steven Simon, CFR's Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, says Tarzi's explanation is plausible, "The designation of 'Foreign Terrorist Organization' has always been highly political," he says. Former National Public Radio reporter Sarah Chayes, who has been living and working in Afghanistan since 2002, wrote in the March/April edition of The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists that one only needs to look at how the traditional Afghan values of hospitality have changed to see how effective the Taliban have been in their campaign of intimidation and terror. In previous years, Ms. Chayes could freely visit local villages to buy produce and goods from local farmers for the organizations she helps run. But now she must ask them to come to her office because if she is seen talking to them publicly, they will probably be killed. In reality, the four years since the Taliban's demise have been characterized by a steady erosion of security in distinct phases. The most recent phase, signaled by the rebuffs I received from the farmers, may represent a point of no return. These rebuffs are the consequence of a highly effective intimidation campaign that has been carried out in tightening circles around Kandahar by, for lack of a better term, resurgent Taliban. Handbills appear in village mosques threatening anyone who dares collaborate with foreigners or the Afghan government. Homes receive armed visitors, demanding provisions or other assistance. One of my farmer friends, afraid even to pronounce their name, refers to them as "fairies who come at night." Chayes also writes that the US military obsession with Al Qaeda and "an Osama bin Laden-style, ideological confrontation" have acted like a set of blinders to the real problem with the Taliban, and that this has greatly disillusioned the average Afghan. The steadily worsening situation in southern Afghanistan is not the work of some ineffable Al Qaeda nebula. It is the result of the real depredations of the corrupt and predatory government officials whom the United States ushered into power in 2001, supposedly to help fight Al Qaeda, and has assiduously maintained in power since, along with an "insurgency" manufactured whole cloth across the border in Pakistan a US ally. The evidence of this connection is abundant: Taliban leaders strut openly around Quetta, Pakistan, where they are provided with offices and government-issued weapons authorization cards; Pakistani army officers are detailed to Taliban training camps; and Pakistani border guards constantly wave self-proclaimed Taliban through checkpoints into Afghanistan. Chayes says the result is that people in Kandahar, where she lives, "have reached an astonishing conclusion: The United States must be in league with the Taliban ... In other words, in a stunning irony, much of this city, the Taliban's former stronghold, is disgusted with the Americans not because of their Western culture, but because of their apparent complicity with Islamist extremists." The Globe and Mail of Toronto reported Tuesday how Afghanistan's new parliament is having troubles learning to function correctly, but it is still moving ahead. The new parliament is "odd mixture of Muslim fundamentalists, former Taliban commanders, ex-Communist politicians, Western-educated women and even a former United Airlines pilot." The parliament is a baby, its members say, but they are hoping to "build and institution that lasts" longer than they do. Finally, the Associated Press reports that, in a study being released Tuesday, Afghanistan and Iraq are listed as two of the world's ten most vulnerable states. Foreign Policy magazine, in its second annual "failed states index," ranked Sudan as the country under the most severe stress. The magazine goes on to say that the situation in Iraq (No. 4) and Afghanistan (No. 10) has deteriorated since 2005, the first year the survey was taken. |
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India-Pakistan |
US does not consider Taliban terrorists |
2006-05-02 |
Even as the Taliban attacks US, Canadian, and British forces, organization is left off terrorist list in 'political' decision. By Tom Regan | csmonitor.com When the US State Department issued its annual Country Reports on Terrorism last Friday, it listed numerous state-sponsors of terrorism, like Iran, and groups it considers foreign terrorist organizations, like Hamas, Al Qaeda, and Hizbullah. Conspiciously absent from the lists, however, was the Taliban. In an article entitled "Terrorism's Dubious 'A' List," the non-partisan Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) reports that the religious extremist organization has never been listed as a terrorist group by the US, Britain, the EU, Canada, Australia, or any of the coalition partners, despite the fact that during its six year rule in Afghanistan, it provided save haven for Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda, and currently is staging terrorist attacks against coalition forces and waging a national campaign of intimidation and fear. The new report did designate the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region as a terrorist "haven," however. In a CFR Q&A on the Taliban, Chistopher Langdon, a defense expert at the Institute for International Strategic Studies, describes the group as "an insurgent organization that will periodically use terrorism to carry out its operations." According to Kathy Gannon, the former Associated Press bureau chief for Pakistan and Afghanistan, these [Taliban] have at times aligned themselves with Al Qaeda fighters and with mujahadeen (holy warriors) led by the anti-government warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. During the Soviet occupation, Hekmatyar received more support from US and Pakistani agents than any other fighter. "The Afghan Taliban is better organized today than it was in 2001," says Gannon, "they have more recruits [and they] have been able to take advantage of the lawlessness, the criminal gangs, and the corruption in the government." Langton says Taliban forces "have largely recovered from their initial defeat," and are proving a savvy enemy for coalition forces. Taliban fighters have become encouraged by the domestic opposition some NATO nations face as they deploy in former Taliban strongholds previously patrolled by US forces, he says. "They are very adept at reading these signals and seeing where the weaknesses lie." Some experts, like Mr. Langdon, say the Taliban aren't terrorists. "You could never say that the Taliban themselves espoused the wholesale use of terror," Langton says. But the CFR article points out that many others, like Amin Tarzi, the Afghanistan analyst for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, say that if the activities that the Taliban are carrying out were happening in any other country, they would be called terrorism. He says a political motive is behind this double standard. In order to gain a broad base of support, Afghan President Karzai has reached out to Pashtuns, many of whom were members of the Taliban. "You can't call them 'terrorists' and at the same time reconcile with them," Tarzi says. In an April 2003 speech, Karzai noted a distinction between "the ordinary Taliban who are real and honest sons of this country [and those] who still use the Taliban cover to disturb peace and security in the country." Steven Simon, CFR's Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, says Tarzi's explanation is plausible, "The designation of 'Foreign Terrorist Organization' has always been highly political," he says. Former National Public Radio reporter Sarah Chayes, who has been living and working in Afghanistan since 2002, wrote in the March/April edition of The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists that one only needs to look at how the traditional Afghan values of hospitality have changed to see how effective the Taliban have been in their campaign of intimidation and terror. In previous years, Ms. Chayes could freely visit local villages to buy produce and goods from local farmers for the organizations she helps run. But now she must ask them to come to her office because if she is seen talking to them publicly, they will probably be killed. In reality, the four years since the Taliban's demise have been characterized by a steady erosion of security in distinct phases. The most recent phase, signaled by the rebuffs I received from the farmers, may represent a point of no return. These rebuffs are the consequence of a highly effective intimidation campaign that has been carried out in tightening circles around Kandahar by, for lack of a better term, resurgent Taliban. Handbills appear in village mosques threatening anyone who dares collaborate with foreigners or the Afghan government. Homes receive armed visitors, demanding provisions or other assistance. One of my farmer friends, afraid even to pronounce their name, refers to them as "fairies who come at night." Chayes also writes that the US military obsession with Al Qaeda and "an Osama bin Laden-style, ideological confrontation" have acted like a set of blinders to the real problem with the Taliban, and that this has greatly disillusioned the average Afghan. The steadily worsening situation in southern Afghanistan is not the work of some ineffable Al Qaeda nebula. It is the result of the real depredations of the corrupt and predatory government officials whom the United States ushered into power in 2001, supposedly to help fight Al Qaeda, and has assiduously maintained in power since, along with an "insurgency" manufactured whole cloth across the border in Pakistan a US ally. The evidence of this connection is abundant: Taliban leaders strut openly around Quetta, Pakistan, where they are provided with offices and government-issued weapons authorization cards; Pakistani army officers are detailed to Taliban training camps; and Pakistani border guards constantly wave self-proclaimed Taliban through checkpoints into Afghanistan. Chayes says the result is that people in Kandahar, where she lives, "have reached an astonishing conclusion: The United States must be in league with the Taliban ... In other words, in a stunning irony, much of this city, the Taliban's former stronghold, is disgusted with the Americans not because of their Western culture, but because of their apparent complicity with Islamist extremists." The Globe and Mail of Toronto reported Tuesday how Afghanistan's new parliament is having troubles learning to function correctly, but it is still moving ahead. The new parliament is "odd mixture of Muslim fundamentalists, former Taliban commanders, ex-Communist politicians, Western-educated women and even a former United Airlines pilot." The parliament is a baby, its members say, but they are hoping to "build and institution that lasts" longer than they do. Finally, the Associated Press reports that, in a study being released Tuesday, Afghanistan and Iraq are listed as two of the world's ten most vulnerable states. Foreign Policy magazine, in its second annual "failed states index," ranked Sudan as the country under the most severe stress. The magazine goes on to say that the situation in Iraq (No. 4) and Afghanistan (No. 10) has deteriorated since 2005, the first year the survey was taken. |
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Afghanistan/South Asia |
Book claims Pakistan hid Osama in â98 |
2005-07-04 |
Pakistan hid Osama Bin Laden from the United States in one of its military camps in 1998 after a US missile strike failed to kill the militant leader, according to a new book. The cruise missile barrage hit Bin Ladenâs mountainous camp just hours after he had left. In days after the strike, it was unclear whether Bin Laden had survived. During that time, Pakistan spirited him across the rugged border to one of its military camps, Kathy Gannon writes in âI Is for Infidel,â due out next month. |
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India-Pakistan |
Karachi as Loon Central... |
2002-09-16 |
AP's Kathy Gannon has a piece on Karachi and why the Bad Guys love it.Karachi is Pakistan's main port and premier metropolis, a sophisticated center of international business and commerce that served as Pakistan's first capital until it was moved to Islamabad in 1962.It's not much more than filler, but it's worth a read as background... |
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