Iraq |
Christopher Hitchens: WHAM - Iraq's Budget Surplus Scandal |
2008-08-11 |
H/T Gateway Pundit One day I will publish my entire collection of upside-down Iraq headlines, where the true purport of the story is the inverse of the intended one. (Top billing thus far would go to the greatest downer of them all: the tale of Iraq's unemployed gravediggers, their always-insecure standard of living newly imperiled by the falling murder rate. You don't believe me? Wait for the forthcoming anthology.) While you wait, you might consider last week's astonishing report about the Iraqi budget surplus and the way in which the report was reported. Largely attributable to the bonanza in oil prices, to new discoveries of oil since the eviction of Saddam Hussein, and to the increasing success of Iraqi exports via the pipelines to Turkey, this surplus could amount to as much as $79 billion by the end of this year. A good chunk of that money is sitting safely in a bank in New York. I would call this good news by any standard, though of course I understand the annoyance of Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., and others involved in the auditing of Iraq, who complain that all the unspent wealth is a bit much, given the heavy outlay from the U.S. treasury for the rebuilding of Mesopotamia. Sen. Levin, who with Sen. John Warner, R-Va., requested the original report from the Government Accountability Office on Iraq's finances, was the ranking Democrat on the Senate subcommittee investigating the "oil for food" outrage. He knows perfectly well what used to happen to Iraq's oil wealth, which was prostituted through a U.N. program and diverted to such noble causes as the subsidy of suicide bombers in Gaza and the financing of pro-Saddam and "anti-war" politicians in London, Paris, and Moscow. While this criminal enrichment of Iraqi and overseas elites was taking place, the population of the country was living on garbage and drinking tainted water as a result of the U.N.-mandated international sanctions. He ends with this: So, yes, major combat operations appear to be over, and to that extent one can belatedly say, "Mission accomplished." If there is any Iraqi nostalgia for the old party and the old army, it is remarkably well-concealed. Iraq no longer plays deceptive games with weapons of mass destruction or plays host to international terrorist groups. It is no longer subject to sanctions that punish its people and enrich its rulers. Its religious and ethnic minoritiestogether a majorityare no longer treated like disposable trash. Its most bitter internal argument is about the timing of the next provincial and national elections. Surely it is those who opposed every step of this emancipation, rather than those who advocated it, who should be asked to explain and justify themselves. |
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Senate Bill Drops C-17s, Funds F-22s | |||||
2008-05-03 | |||||
![]() The baseline defense authorization legislation was adopted unanimously by the committee, Armed Services Chairman Carl Levin (D-Mich.) said May 1, adding: "We adopted the numbers that were sent over by the administration." Those numbers included funding for an additional 20 F-22 stealth jet fighters. The authorizing committee also approved $497 million either for advanced procurement of F-22s or for shutting the manufacturing line down. "That either/or decision will be made by the next president," Levin said. The Bush administration did not seek any C-17s in its fiscal 2009 budget request "and none were authorized," Levin said. However, the need for additional C-17s tops the U.S. Air Force's Unfunded requirements List. The services placed 15 aircraft worth about $3.9 billion on its FY '09 list.
The bill also fully funds the administration request for the U.S. Army's Future Combat Systems and adds $87 million to increase the access of Defense Department unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to the National Air Space. ![]()
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Home Front: Politix |
Virginia Sen. John Warner Hospitalized With Heart Condition |
2008-02-27 |
Sen. John Warner, R-Va., has been hospitalized for an abnormal heart condition but it is not considered serious, FOX News has confirmed. A statement from his office released Tuesday says Warner, 81, was "pursuing a re-evaluation and readjustment of medications which require regular monitoring and observation within a hospital environment," after a return of the common condition for which he was treated last fall, known as atrial fibrillation, or irregular heartbeat. |
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Home Front: WoT | |
History Will Not Judge General Petraeus Kindly | |
2007-09-30 | |
The opinion of Andrew J. Bacevich, professor of history and international relations at Boston University.
.... David Petraeus is a political general. Yet in presenting his recent assessment of the Iraq War and in describing the "way forward," Petraeus demonstrated that he is a political general of the worst kindone who indulges in the politics of accommodation that is Washingtons bread and butter but has thereby deferred a far more urgent political imperative, namely, bringing our military policies into harmony with our political purposes. .... The general has now made his call, and President Bush has endorsed it: the surge having succeeded (so at least we are assured), it will now be curtailed. The war will continue, albeit on a marginally smaller scale. As events develop, it just might become smaller still. Only time will tell. Petraeus has chosen a middle course, carefully crafted to cause the least amount of consternation among various Washington constituencies he is eager to accommodate. This is the politics of give and take, of horse trading, of putting lipstick on a pig. Ultimately, it is the politics of avoidance. A political general in the mold of Washington or Grant would have taken a different course, using his moment in the spotlight not to minimize consternation but to stir it up to the maximum extent. He would have capitalized on his status as man of the hour to oblige civilian leaders, both in Congress and in the executive branch, to do what they have not done since the Iraq War began - namely, their jobs. He would have insisted upon the president and the Congress making decisions that wartime summons themand not military commandersto make. Instead, Petraeus issued everyone a pass. In testifying before House and Senate committees about the current situation in Iraq, Petraeus told no outright lies. He made no blustery promises about "victory," a word notably absent from his testimony. The tone of the presentation was sober and measured. It contained the requisite references to complexity and challenge. Petraeus acknowledged miscalculation and disappointment. In contrast to his commander in chief, he did not claim that U.S. troops were "kicking ass." Yet the essence of his message was this: after four years of futile blundering, the United States has identified the makings of a successful strategy in Iraq. The new doctrine that Petraeus had devised and implemented - the concept of securing the population and thereby fostering conditions conducive to reconstruction and reconciliation - has produced limited but real progress. This gives Petraeus cause for hope that further efforts along these lines may yet enable the United States to create an Iraq that is stable, unified, and not a haven for terrorists. In so many words, Petraeus told Congress that senior U.S. commanders in Iraq had finally found the right roadmap. The way ahead may be long and difficultindeed, it will be. But Petraeus and his key subordinates know where they are. They know where they need to go. And above all, at long last, they know how to get there. .... The critics make a good case. Yet let us ignore them. Let us assume instead that Petraeus genuinely believes that he has broken the code in Iraq and that things are improving. Lets assume further that he is correct in that assessment. What then should he have recommended to the Congress and the president? That is, if the commitment of a modest increment of additional forces - the 30,000 troops comprising the surge, now employed in accordance with sound counterinsurgency doctrine - has begun to turn things around, then what should the senior field commander be asking for next? A single word suffices to answer that question: more. More time. More money. And above all, more troops. It is one of the oldest principles of generalship: when you find an opportunity, exploit it. Where you gain success, reinforce it. When you have your opponent at a disadvantage, pile on. In a letter to the soldiers serving under his command, released just prior to the congressional hearings, Petraeus asserted that coalition forces had "achieved tactical momentum and wrestled the initiative from our enemies." Does that reflect his actual view of the situation? If so, then surely the imperative of the moment is to redouble the current level of effort so as to preserve that initiative and to deny the enemy the slightest chance to adjust, adapt, or reconstitute. Yet Petraeus has chosen to do just the opposite. Based on two or three months of (ostensibly) positive indicators, he has advised the president to ease the pressure, withdrawing the increment of troops that had (purportedly) enabled the coalition to seize the initiative in the first place. This defies logic. Its as if two weeks into the Wilderness Campaign, Grant had counseled Lincoln to reduce the size of the Army of the Potomac. Or as if once Allied forces had established the beachhead at Normandy, Eisenhower had started rotating divisions back stateside to ease the strain on the U.S. Army. .... If Petraeus actually believes that he can salvage something akin to success in Iraq and if he agrees with President Bush about the consequences of failure - genocidal violence, Iraq becoming a launching pad for terrorist attacks directed against the United States, the Middle East descending into chaos that consumes Israel, the oil-dependent global economy shattered beyond repair, all of this culminating in the emergence of a new Caliphate bent on destroying the West - then surely this moment of (supposed) promise is not a time for scrimping. Rather, now is the time to go all out - to insist upon a maximum effort. There is only one plausible explanation for Petraeuss terminating a surge that has (he says) enabled coalition forces, however tentatively, to gain the upper hand. That explanation is politics - of the wrong kind. .... an incremental reduction in U.S. troop strength makes sense only in one regard: it serves to placate each of the various Washington constituencies that Petraeus has a political interest in pleasing. A modest drawdown responds to the concerns of Petraeuss fellow four stars, especially the Joint Chiefs, who view the stress being imposed on U.S. forces as intolerable. Ending the surge provides the Army and the Marine Corps with a modicum of relief. A modest drawdown also comes as welcome news for moderate Republicans in Congress. Nervously eyeing the forthcoming elections, they have wanted to go before the electorate with something to offer other than being identified with Bushs disastrous war. Now they can point to signs of change - indeed, Petraeuss proposed withdrawal of one brigade before Christmas coincides precisely with a suggestion made just weeks ago by Sen. John Warner, the influential Republican from Virginia. Although they wont say so openly, a modest drawdown comes as good news to Democrats as well. Accused with considerable justification of having done nothing to end the war since taking control of the Congress in January, they can now point to the drawdown as evidence that they are making headway. As Newsweeks Michael Hirsch observed, Petraeus "delivered an early Christmas present" to congressional Democrats. Above all, a modest drawdown pleases President Bush. It gives him breathing room to continue the conflict in which he has so much invested. It all but guarantees that Iraq will be the principal gift that Bush bestows upon his successor when he leaves office in January 2009. Bushs war will outlive Bush: for reasons difficult to fathom, this has become an important goal for the president and his dwindling band of loyalists. Granted, no one is completely happy. Yet neither does anyone go away empty-handed. The Petraeus plan offers a little something for everyone, not least of all for Petraeus himself, who takes back to Baghdad a smidgen of additional time (his next report is not due for another six months), lots more money (at least $3 billion per week), and assurances that his tenure in command has been extended. This outcome reflects the handiwork of someone skilled in the ways of Washington. Yet the ultimate result is to allow the contradiction between our military efforts in Iraq and our professed political purposes there to persist. .... The president has made no serious effort to mobilize the wherewithal that his wars in Iraq and Afghanistan require. The Congress, liberal Democrats voting aye, has made itself complicit in this shameful policy by obligingly appropriating whatever sums of money the president has requested, all, of course, in the name of "supporting the troops." Petraeus has now given this charade a further lease on life. In effect, he is allowing the president and the Congress to continue dodging the main issue, which comes down to this: if the civilian leadership wants to wage a global war on terror and if that war entails pacifying Iraq, then lets get serious about providing whats needed to complete the mission - starting with lots more soldiers. Rather than curtailing the ostensibly successful surge, Petraeus should broaden and deepen it. That means sending more troops to Iraq, not bringing them home. And that probably implies doubling or tripling the size of the United States Army on a crash basis. ... Of course, if he had done otherwise - if he had asked, say, to expand the surge by adding yet another 50,000 troops - he would have distressed just about everyone back in Washington. He might have paid a considerable price career-wise. Certainly, he would have angered the JCS, antiwar Democrats, and waffling Republicans who want the war to go away. Even the president, Petraeuss number-one fan, would have been surprised and embarrassed by such a request. Yet the anger and embarrassment would have been salutary. A great political general doesnt tell his masters what they want to hear. He tells them what they need to hear, thereby nudging them to make decisions that must be made if the nations interests are to be served. In this instance, Petraeus provided cover for them to evade their responsibilities. Politically, it qualifies as a brilliant maneuver. The generals relationships with official Washington remain intact. Yet he has broken faith with the soldiers he commands and the Army to which he has devoted his life. He has failed his country. History will not judge him kindly. | |
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Senate blocks bill on Iraq combat tours | |
2007-09-20 | |
WASHINGTON - Democrats' efforts to challenge President Bush's Iraq policies were dealt a demoralizing blow Wednesday in the Senate after they failed to scrape together enough support to guarantee troops more time at home. The 56-44 vote four short of reaching the 60 needed to advance all but assured that Democrats would be unable to muster the support needed to pass tough anti-war legislation by year's end. The legislation, sponsored by Sen. Jim Webb, D-Va., was seen as the Democrats' best shot because of its pro-military premise. "The idea of winning the war in Iraq is beginning to get a second look," said Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., who led opposition to the bill alongside Sen. John McCain. Webb's legislation would have required that troops spend as much time at home training with their units as they spend deployed in Iraq or Afghanistan. Members of the National Guard or Reserve would be guaranteed three years at home before being sent back. Most Army soldiers now spend about 15 months in combat with 12 months home. "In blocking this bipartisan bill, Republicans have once again demonstrated that they are more committed to protecting the president than protecting our troops," said Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid. Wednesday's vote was the second time in as many months that Webb's bill was sidetracked. In July, a similar measure also fell four votes short of advancing. Democrats said they were hopeful additional Republicans, wary of the politically unpopular war, would agree this time around to break party ranks. It had already attracted three dozen co-sponsors including Republicans Chuck Hagel of Nebraska, Olympia Snowe of Maine and Gordon Smith of Oregon. But momentum behind the bill stalled Wednesday after Sen. John Warner, R-Va., announced he decided the consequences would be disastrous. Warner, a former longtime chairman of the Armed Services Committee, had voted in favor of the measure in July but said he changed his mind after talking to senior military officials. Webb later told reporters there was no doubt Warner's opposition threw cold water on the bill. Hagel, R-Neb., said the White House also "has been very effective at making this a loyalty test for the Republican Party." Of the 56 senators voting to advance the measure were 49 Democrats, six Republicans and Vermont Independent Bernard Sanders. Voting against it were 43 Republicans and Connecticut Independent Joseph Lieberman. The vote "means Congress will not intervene in the foreseeable future" in the war's execution, Lieberman told reporters. In coming days, the Senate plans to vote on legislation by Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., that would order combat troops home in nine months. Levin, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, said his bill would allow some troops to remain behind to conduct such missions as counterterrorism and training the Iraqis; he estimated the legislation, if enacted, would cut troop levels in Iraq by more than half. The Senate also planned to vote on legislation by Sen. Russ Feingold, D-Wis., and Reid, D-Nev., that would cut off funding for combat next year. The firm deadlines reflect a shift in strategy for Democrats, who had been pursuing a bipartisan compromise on war legislation. But after last week's testimony by Gen. David Petraeus, the top military commander in Iraq, Democrats calculated not enough Republicans were willing to break party ranks and support more tempered legislation calling for combat to end next summer. McCain, R-Ariz., the top Republican on the Armed Services Committee and a Vietnam veteran, said Webb's bill was a "backdoor method" by Democrats to force troop withdrawals. "We have a new strategy. We have success on the ground," said McCain. Pulling out troops would spark "chaos and genocide in the region, and we will be back," he said. McCain offered an alternative resolution that would identify equal deployment and training times as a goal, but would not mandate deployment restrictions. The resolution was aimed at peeling off Republican support and lessening the prospects of passage for Webb's bill. That resolution fell five votes shy of advancing, in a 55-45 vote. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said he would have recommended that President Bush veto Webb's legislation if it is passed. The bill could force the military to extend tours, rely more heavily on reservists, or not replace units right away, even if they are needed, Gates said. Webb and his supporters say the bill provides flexibility to avoid those pitfalls, including a presidential waiver if Bush can certify to Congress that ignoring the limitation was necessary to national security.
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Home Front: Politix |
Putting Politics Aside to Save Iraq |
2007-09-16 |
WaPo titled it "The Disaster of a Hasty Withdrawal", and it was not easy to find the web-version! By Henry A. Kissinger Two realities define the range of a meaningful debate on Iraq policy: The war cannot be ended by military means alone. But neither is it possible to "end" the war by ceding the battlefield, for the radical jihadist challenge knows no frontiers. American decisions in the next few months will not be able to end the crises in Iraq and the Middle East before the change of American administrations; they may drive them out of control. Even while the political cycle tempts a debate geared to focus groups, a bipartisan foreign policy is imperative. The experience of Vietnam is often cited as the example for the potential debacle that awaits us in Iraq. But we will never learn from history if we keep telling ourselves myths about it. The passengers on American helicopters fleeing Saigon were not American troops but Vietnamese civilians. American forces had left two years earlier. What collapsed Vietnam was the congressional decision to reduce aid to Vietnam by two-thirds and to cut if off altogether for Cambodia in the face of a massive North Vietnamese invasion that violated every provision of the Paris Peace Accords. Should America repeat a self-inflicted wound? An abrupt withdrawal from Iraq will not end the war; it will only redirect it. Within Iraq, the sectarian conflict could assume genocidal proportions; terrorist base areas could re-emerge. Under the impact of American abdication, Lebanon may slip into domination by Iran's ally, Hezbollah; a Syria-Israel war or an Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities may become more likely as Israel attempts to break the radical encirclement; Turkey and Iran will probably squeeze Kurdish autonomy; and the Taliban in Afghanistan will gain new impetus. Countries where the radical threat is as yet incipient, as India, will face a mounting domestic challenge. Pakistan, in the process of a delicate political transformation, will encounter more radical pressures and may even turn into a radical challenge itself. That is what is meant by "precipitate" withdrawal - a withdrawal in which the U.S. loses the ability to shape events, either within Iraq, on the anti-jihadist battlefield or in the world at large. The proper troop level in Iraq will not be discovered by political compromise at home. To be sure, no forces should be retained in Iraq that are dispensable. The definition of "dispensable" must be based on strategic and political criteria, however. If reducing troop levels turns into the litmus test of American politics, each withdrawal will generate demands for additional ones until the political, military and psychological framework collapses. An appropriate strategy for Iraq requires political direction. But the political dimension must be the ally of military strategy, not a resignation from it. Symbolic withdrawals, urged by such wise elder statesmen as Sens. John Warner, R-Va., and Richard Lugar, R-Ind., might indeed assuage the immediate public concerns. They should be understood, however, as palliatives; their utility depends on a balance between their capacity to reassure the U.S. public and their propensity to encourage America's adversaries to believe that they are the forerunners of complete retreat. The argument that the mission of U.S. forces should be confined to defeating terrorism, protecting the frontiers, preventing the emergence of Taliban-like structures and staying out of the civil-war aspects is also tempting. In practice, it will be very difficult to distinguish among the various aspects of the conflict with any precision. Some answer that the best political result is most likely to be achieved by total withdrawal. The option of basing policies on the most favorable assumptions about the future is, of course, always available. Yet, in the end, political leaders will be held responsible - often by their publics, surely by history - not only for the best imaginable outcome but for the most probable one, not only for what they hoped but for what they should have feared. Nothing in Middle East history suggests that abdication confers influence. Those who urge this course of action need to put forward what they recommend if the dire consequences of an abrupt withdrawal foreseen by the majority of experts and diplomats occur. The missing ingredient has not been a withdrawal schedule but a political and diplomatic design connected to a military strategy. Much time has been lost in attempting to repeat the experience of the occupations of Germany and Japan. Those examples, in my view, are not applicable. The issue is not whether Arab or Muslim societies can ever become democratic; it is whether they can become so under American military guidance in a timeframe for which the U.S. political process will stand. Western democracy and that of Japan developed in largely homogeneous societies. Iraq is multiethnic and multisectarian. The Sunni sect has dominated the majority Shia and subjugated the Kurdish minority for all of Iraq's history of less than a hundred years. In homogeneous societies - even in societies where divisions exist without being rigid - a minority can aspire to become a majority as a result of elections. That outcome is improbable in societies where historic grievances follow existing ethnic or sectarian lines and are then enshrined in the political structure through premature elections. American exhortations for national reconciliation are based on constitutional principles drawn from the Western experience. But it is impossible to achieve this in a six-month period defined by the American troop surge in an artificially created state wracked by the legacy of a thousand years of ethnic and sectarian conflicts. Experience should teach us that trying to manipulate a fragile political structure - particularly one resulting from American-sponsored elections - is likely to play into radical hands. Nor are the present frustrations with Baghdad's performance a sufficient excuse to impose a strategic disaster on ourselves. However much Americans may disagree about the decision to intervene or about the policy afterward, the U.S. is now in Iraq in large part to serve the American commitment to global order and not as a favor to the Baghdad government. It is possible that the present structure in Baghdad is incapable of national reconciliation because its elected constituents were elected on a sectarian basis. A wiser course would be to concentrate on the three principal regions and promote technocratic, efficient and humane administration in each. The provision of services and personal security coupled with emphasis on economic, scientific and intellectual development may represent the best hope for fostering a sense of community. More efficient regional government leading to substantial decrease in the level of violence, to progress toward the rule of law and to functioning markets could then, over a period of time, give the Iraqi people an opportunity for national reconciliation - especially if no region is strong enough to impose its will on the others by force. Failing that, the country may well drift into de facto partition under the label of autonomy, such as already exists in the Kurdish region. That very prospect might encourage the Baghdad political forces to move toward reconciliation. Much depends on whether it is possible to create a genuine national army rather than an agglomeration of competing militias. The second and ultimately decisive route to overcoming the Iraqi crisis is through international diplomacy. Today the United States is bearing the major burden for regional security militarily, politically and economically while countries that will also suffer the consequences remain passive. Yet many other nations know that their internal security and, in some cases, their survival will be affected by the outcome in Iraq and are bound to be concerned that they may all face unpredictable risks if the situation gets out of control. That passivity cannot last. The best way for other countries to give effect to their concerns is to participate in the construction of a civil society. The best way for us to foster it is to turn reconstruction step-by-step into a cooperative international effort under multilateral management. It will not be possible to achieve these objectives in a single, dramatic move. The military outcome in Iraq will ultimately have to be reflected in some international recognition and some international enforcement of its provisions. The international conference of Iraq's neighbors, including the permanent members of the Security Council, has established a possible forum for this. A U.N. role in fostering such a political outcome could be helpful. Such a strategy is the best road to reduce America's military presence in the long run; an abrupt reduction of American forces will impede diplomacy and set the stage for more intense military crises further down the road. Pursuing diplomacy inevitably raises the question of how to deal with Iran. Cooperation is possible and should be encouraged with an Iran that pursues stability and cooperation. Such an Iran has legitimate aspirations that need to be respected. But an Iran that practices subversion and seeks hegemony in the region - which appears to be the current trend - must be faced with red lines it will not be permitted to cross. The industrial nations cannot accept radical forces dominating a region on which their economies depend, and the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran is incompatible with international security. These truisms need to be translated into effective policies, preferably common policies with allies and friends. None of these objectives can be realized, however, unless two conditions are met: The United States needs to maintain a presence in the region on which its supporters can count and which its adversaries have to take seriously. Above all, the country must recognize that bipartisanship has become a necessity, not a tactic. |
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Iraq |
Political Clash Over War Plan Analyzed |
2007-09-05 |
April may become the new September when it comes to deciding whether to bring U.S. troops home from Iraq, if President Bush's senior advisers have their way. But Congress might not stand for it.![]() Now, administration officials are recommending Bush stand by his war strategy until the spring, and Bush is considered unlikely to order more than a symbolic cut in troops before the end of the year. Officials familiar with the assessment spoke on condition of anonymity to describe decisions not yet publicly released. Read that last sentence again. The suggestion is a bold one, considering Republicans lost control of Congress last year because of voter dissatisfaction on the war and polls show Americans overwhelmingly oppose the war. There could be a revolt. On the other hand, we might win the war. Also, in recent months, Yeah. Like we proved it to the Germans, Japanese, and Koreans, right? "I've been searching - is there another way to kind of hammer the point? I think the message has to be sent," he told reporters Tuesday. Speaking to reporters Wednesday during a trip to Australia, Bush restated his view that decisions about troop levels should be based on recommendations from military commanders. He noted that Gen. David Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, and Ambassador Ryan Crocker would be delivering progress reports soon enough. "Whether or not that's part of the policy I announce to the nation ... why don't we see what they say and then I'll let you know," Bush said. Republican support likely will hinge on Petraeus' testimony next week. If he can convince lawmakers that the security gains won in recent months are substantial and point toward a bigger trend - and a promise of major troop reductions soon - GOP members might be willing to hold out until spring. They also might be persuaded to wait until April if Bush agrees to a small, symbolic drawdown of troops by the end of the year, as is suggested to the White House by Coleman and Sen. John Warner, an influential Republican on security matters. But that would be the best case scenario Page 2 of the prognostications at link. |
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Home Front: Politix |
Warner Decides Not to Seek Sixth Term |
2007-09-01 |
CHARLOTTESVILLE, Va. (AP) - Republican Sen. John Warner of Virginia, one of the most authoritative voices in Congress on the military and a key figure in the debate over Iraq, said Friday he will not seek a sixth term in 2008. Warner, 80, has held the seat since 1979, when the dashing former Navy secretary campaigned alongside his wife at the time, Elizabeth Taylor. "Public service is a privilege and I urge all to try to find time some time in their lifetime to serve the needs of others," Warner said at a news conference. "I have tried to be not only true to myself, but true to the people of this great commonwealth I've served for 29 years now." Warner, who chaired the Armed Services Committee when the GOP controlled the Senate, thanked those who had helped give him "a magnificent and very rewarding career" in the Senate. Warner, a courtly senator with chiseled features and a full shock of gray hair, chose a sentimental setting for his announcement: the steps of the University of Virginia's signature structure, the Rotunda, designed by school founder Thomas Jefferson. The most likely Democratic contender is former Gov. Mark R. Warner, a wealthy Alexandria businessman who left office in early 2006 with unprecedented job-approval ratings. Mark Warner, who is not related to the senator, unsuccessfully challenged him in the 1996 Senate race. The nomination battle among Republicans probably will include former Gov. Jim Gilmore and U.S. Rep. Thomas M. Davis. |
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Allawi Challenges Iraqi PM | |||
2007-08-27 | |||
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Visions of a triumphant return for Allawi are far-fetched. Allawi, who now spends most of his time outside Iraq, has hired the D.C.-based Republican lobbying firm Barbour Griffith & Rogers to put the best face on things. Some of his new advisers are former members of the Bush Administration including Robert Blackwill, a former deputy national security adviser who was involved in putting together the interim government that Allawi headed in 2004. But the notion of Allawi's return isn't a doomed gambit by President Bush. It's symptomatic of the bipartisan consensus in the U.S. that Iraq's problems could be solved if the Iraqis would simply do as they're told.
Much has already been written about Maliki's shortcomings and failures. But the job of Iraqi prime minister at least as outlined by American officials is probably impossible. There is no one who can reconcile with Sunni nationalists while simultaneously disarming militias tied to Shi'ite Iran. There is no one who can assert control over militia-dominated government ministries while simultaneously asserting control over Sunni communities that remain antagonistic towards the central government. As a senior Western diplomat observed earlier this month, there is no knight in shining armor waiting in the wings to solve the country's problems if and when Maliki finally succumbs. And yet, that's just how Allawi would like to be considered. He follows in the tradition of pre-war Iraqi exiles like Ahmad Chalabi whose outlook and politicking play better in Washington than in Baghdad. Allawi is admirable in some respects. In 2004 he supported offensives against both Sunni insurgents and Shi'ite militia the kind of even-handed approach that impresses Washington and, in a perfect world, would unify Iraqis. But Iraq is far from perfect, and so is Allawi. He was not popular, and even before elections in early 2005, no one thought he had a chance of maintaining his influence. Even in 2004, as Allawi offered support to U.S. forces fighting in Fallujah, Baghdad, and southern Iraq, that support was mostly rhetorical. Very few Iraqis actually showed up to fight and die alongside American soldiers and Marines; more were inspired to take up arms and fight as insurgents and militiamen. In many important respects that dynamic has not changed. Any politician seeking to break the power of Shi'ite militias is faced with a dilemma: you cannot survive in Iraqi politics, much less take on the militias, unless you have armed men of your own. So if Allawi was being literal when he promised on Sunday to "fight for [his] country," chances are he'll eventually want to outsource the actual combat to Americans. Allawi's bid for renewed influence, while far-fetched, raises an important question: does America want to leave Iraq, or does it want Iraqis to do what America tells them to do? As long as American politicians insist that Iraqis do things the American way, American soldiers will have to remain in Iraq and provide the muscle. | |||
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Iraq |
Offensive in Iraq just beginning: Bush |
2007-08-26 |
![]() Warner, a former secretary of the Navy and a widely respected authority on military affairs, suggested Thursday the president bring home up to 5,000 US troops as the first step in a withdrawal of armed forces in order to send a sharp and clear message to the Iraqi government that the US commitment was not open-ended. Bush has not formally responded to the appeal. But in his address, he expressed satisfaction with offensive operations launched in the wake of a nearly 30,000-troop surge he announced at the beginning of the year - and said they were just beginning. We are still in the early stages of our new operations, the president said. But the success of the past couple of months have shown that conditions on the ground can change - and they are changing. He argued that every month since January, US forces have killed or captured on average more than 1,500 Al Qaeda fighters and other insurgents in Iraq. Young Iraqi men are signing up for the army, Bush went on to say, police are patrolling the streets, and neighbourhood watch groups are being formed in Iraqi cities. Bush said Iraqis were now volunteering important information about insurgents and other extremists hiding in their midst more frequently, which had led to a marked reduction in sectarian murders. We cannot expect the new strategy we are carrying out to bring success overnight, the president concluded. But by standing with the Iraqi people as they build their democracy, we will deliver a devastating blow to Al Qaeda, we will help provide new hope for millions of people throughout the Middle East, we will gain a friend and ally in the war on terror, and we will make the American people safer. |
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Iraq |
US Military Looks to Reduce Role in Iraq |
2007-08-21 |
U.S. military officials are narrowing the range of Iraq strategy options and appear to be focusing on reducing the U.S. combat role in 2008 while increasing training of Iraqi forces, a senior military official told The Associated Press on Monday. The military has not yet developed a plan for a substantial withdrawal of forces next year. But officials are laying the groundwork for possible overtures to Turkey and Jordan on using their territory to move some troops and equipment out of Iraq, the official said. The main exit would remain Kuwait, but additional routes would make it easier and more secure for U.S. troops leaving western and northern Iraq. The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because internal deliberations are ongoing, emphasized that the discussions do not prejudge decisions yet to be made by President Bush. Those decisions include how long to maintain the current U.S. troop buildup and when to make the transition to a larger Iraqi combat role. It is widely anticipated that the five extra Army brigades that were sent to the Baghdad area this year will be withdrawn by late next summer. But it is far less clear whether the Bush administration will follow that immediately with additional drawdowns, as many Democrats in Congress are advocating. Bush has mentioned publicly that he likes the idea, first proposed late last year by the Iraq Study Group, of switching the emphasis of U.S. military efforts from mainly combat to mainly support roles. But he also has said that this should not happen until Baghdad in particular is stable enough to enable Iraqi political leaders to make hard choices about reconciling rival interests among Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds. There are now 162,000 U.S. troops in Iraq, of which 30,000 have arrived since February as part of Bush's revised strategy to stabilize Baghdad and to push Iraqi leaders to build a government of national unity. Military efforts to stabilize the country effort have made strides in recent months, but political progress has lagged. In a joint statement Monday, Sens. John Warner, R-Va., and Carl Levin, D-Mich., said that while the military buildup has "produced some credible and positive results," the political outlook is darker. The senators said that during their visit to Iraq last week they told Iraqi leaders of American impatience with the lack of political progress, and "impressed upon them that time has run out in that regard." In a separate telephone interview with reporters, Levin urged the Iraqi assembly to oust Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and replace his government with one that is less sectarian and more unifying. Speaking to reporters in Washington by phone from Tel Aviv, Levin acknowledged that while there is broad frustration with the lack of action by the al-Maliki government, U.S. officials cannot dictate a change in leadership there. He said he and Warner did not meet with al-Maliki when they were in Iraq this time. In response to Levin's remarks about dumping al-Maliki, Gordon Johndroe, spokesman for the National Security Council, noted that Iraqi leaders have been holding talks in recent days on ways to move toward a unified government. "We urge them to come together, reach agreements and show the Iraqi people and the rest of the world their determination to create a stable and prosperous Iraq," Johndroe told reporters, adding that the administration believes al-Maliki is capable of moving the talks to a successful conclusion. Under pressure even from members of his own party to change direction in Iraq, Bush is expected to decide his next steps after hearing in September from Gen. David Petraeus, the top commander in Iraq, and U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker, on what the U.S. troop buildup has accomplished. Petraeus and Crocker are likely to present their views to Congress on Sept. 11 or 12, said Johndroe, the National Security Council spokesman. Johndroe said White House officials are consulting with congressional leaders this week on setting a date for the testimony. Bush also will receive advice and recommendations from Defense Secretary Robert Gates as well as the Joint Chiefs and Adm. William Fallon, the top commander for American forces in the Middle East. Bush's options are limited, politically and practically. The Army and Marine Corps do not have the capacity to increase troop levels, or even to maintain the current number beyond next spring. With the 2008 presidential election approaching, it's not so much a question of whether troop levels will be cut but when and how much. U.S. commanders in Iraq believe they are making substantial progress toward stabilizing Baghdad and other contested parts of the countryincluding in Anbar province in western Iraq where the insurgency has weakened noticeably this year. But they are dubious about the ability of Iraq's political leaders to take advantage of the improved security in ways that promote political reconciliation. Petraeus and other senior commanders have said in recent weeks that the U.S. troop buildup will end in 2008, but Petraeus has not yet recommended a follow-on strategy to Bush. Much depends on judgments about how soon Iraqi security forces will be ready to assume a bigger role, as well as the likelihood of political progress. |
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Sens. Warner and Levin Travel to Iraq, Praise Surge Results - Whatsup??? | |
2007-08-21 | |
![]() "The Maliki government is non-functional," Levin, D-Mich., said in a conference call with reporters.
"We have seen indications that the surge of additional brigades to Baghdad and its immediate vicinity and the revitalized counter-insurgency strategy being employed have produced tangible results in making several areas of the capital more secure. We are also encouraged by continuing positive results in al-Anbar Province, from the recent decisions of some of the Sunni tribes to turn against Al Qaeda and cooperate with coalition force efforts to kill or capture its adherents," the two said in a statement issued after leaving the country. Speaking with reporters, Levin said he hopes when the Parliament reconvenes in the next few weeks, it will dissolve the government, which he said "cannot produce a political settlement because it is too beholden to sectarian leaders." Levin said "broad frustration" exists across Iraq and within the Bush administration with al-Maliki, and he noted that the Iraqi constitution provides that 25 members of Parliament can sign a petition to hold this vote. In a separate event, Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, an on-again, off-again supporter of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki told a British newspaper on Monday that the Iraqi government is on the brink of collapse. "Al-Maliki's government will not survive because he has proven that he will not work with important elements of the Iraqi people," the cleric was quoted by The Independent as saying. "The prime minister is a tool for the Americans, and people see that clearly. It will probably be the Americans who decide to change him when they realize he has failed. We don't have a democracy here, we have a foreign occupation." The trip, which included an excursion to Jordan, gave the lawmakers a chance to see progress on the ground. The two met with a host of American and Iraqi officials, including Gen. David Petraeus, commander of Multi-National Forces-Iraq, Gen. Ray Odierno, the commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq, U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker and Stuart Bowen, special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction. The senators also met with Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, Deputy Presidents Adil Abd Al-Mahdi and Tariq Al-Hashimi and Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih. The visit comes ahead of an expected September report from Petraeus that is to outline the 18 benchmarks laid out by Congress to measure progress in Iraq. The White House said Monday that report should be provided in open hearings on Capitol Hill on Sept. 11 or 12. Levin and Warner said that during their meetings they had few reassurances that the Iraqi government will be able to cooperate in any meaningful way. "In many meetings with Iraqi political leaders, of all different backgrounds, we told them of the deep impatience of the American people and the Congress with the lack of political progress, impressed upon them that time has run out in that regard, and told them of the urgent need to make the essential compromises," the lawmakers said. "In all of our meetings we witnessed a great deal of apprehension regarding the capabilities of the current Iraqi government to shed its sectarian biases and act in a unifying manner." Levin said the Iraqi government is "stronger and more capable" than 10 months ago when Levin was last in Iraq. The Iraqis have trained 10 of 12 divisions 163,000 troops. But he said that until U.S. troops pull out of Iraq, the country's army won't take the lead. Levin is still pushing for the U.S. to begin drawing down to well below pre-surge levels in the next four months. Despite progress being made on the military side of the surge, Sen Levin said that without political progress the military successes won't add up to much. "There is consensus: there is no military solution to the conflict," Levin said. While many of the military goals have been met, opponents of the Iraq war are using the failure for reconciliation on several key political goals as ammunition to call for a withdrawal. Without a political compromise, a lasting calm seems unlikely. However, an additional 20,000 troops are expected to rotate in by December. This is not associated with the surge but would briefly increase the numbers of U.S. soldiers in the country. | |
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