Europe |
Yes, Le Pen could win in France |
2017-02-28 |
[YAHOO] With the polls narrowing and one of her main rivals embroiled in an expenses scandal, far-right leader Marine Le Pen could feasibly become French president in May, senior politicians and commentators say. At the headquarters of her National Front (FN) party in Nanterre outside Gay Paree, officials believe the same forces that led to the Brexit vote in Britannia and Donald Trump ...New York real estate developer, described by Dems as illiterate, racist, misogynistic, and what ever other unpleasant descriptions they can think of, elected by the rest of us as 45th President of the United States... 's victory in the United States could carry Le Pen to power. Even some of her rivals concede a victory for the far-right firebrand ... firebrandsare noted more for audio volume and the quantity of spittle generated than for any actual logic in their arguments... is possible. "I think Madame Le Pen could be elected," former conservative prime minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin said this month. Another former premier, the Socialist Manuel Valls, has also warned of the "danger" of assuming that Le Pen cannot win. Polls show that support for the 48-year-old anti-immigrant and anti-EU candidate has been consistent for four years now. Since 2013, surveys have shown she will progress through the first round to reach the runoff stage in La Belle France's two-stage presidential election. Pollsters now note that although Le Pen is not currently forecast to win the all-important showdown on May 7, she has whittled down the projected gap between herself and her main challengers. |
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-Election 2012 | ||||
Hollande builds lead as Sarkozy allies despair | ||||
2012-04-19 | ||||
Supporters of the front-running Socialist candidate, François Hollande, could scarcely contain their euphoria when they gathered in Lille for their last big rally on Tuesday night before French electors go to the polls on Sunday. They interrupted the candidate's speech endlessly with chants of "François president, François president". "You are well informed," Mr Hollande quipped. "It is possible we are going to win. It's not certain... but, yes, I feel the hope rising." New polls published yesterday suggested that Mr Hollande, 57, was leading the field of 10 candidates in the first round with up to 29 per cent of the vote. He had extended his lead over Mr Sarkozy to between two and four points. In voting intentions for the two-candidate, second round on 6 May, Mr Hollande now leads the President by a "landslide" margin of 14 to 16 per cent. In a series of damning, private remarks, reported by the Le Canard Enchainé newspaper, senior members of President Sarkozy's government said that defeat now seemed inevitable. "The carrots are cooked," the Prime Minister, François Fillon, was quoted as saying. "[Sarkozy's] strategy of campaigning on hard-right issues was a serious mistake." The former centre-right prime minister, Jean-Pierre Raffarin, was reported to have said privately: "There is no chance of us winning." The President has also suffered a series of desertions. It was reported earlier this week that the former President Jacques Chirac intended to switch sides and vote for Mr Hollande. A clutch of former Sarkozy ministers and supporters, from the right, left and centre of French politics, have also declared they will vote for the socialist. They include Martin Hirsch and Fadéla Amara, two of Mr Sarkozy's ministerial recruits from the Left after his 2007 election and three former centre-right Chirac-era ministers, Azouz Begag, Corinne Lepage and Brigitte Girardin. The President has fought an energetic but erratic campaign. He began by warning that France needed tough medicine to escape recession. But he then switched to a hard-right message to reclaim votes from Marine Le Pen's National Front. In recent weeks, Mr Sarkozy warned that French "identity" was menaced by a tide of illegal immigration, Islamist terrorism and halal meat. Last Sunday, he stole abruptly -- and without acknowledgement -- Mr Hollande's argument that the European Central Bank should be allowed to pump reflationary cash into Eurozone economies (a policy that Mr Sarkozy had opposed with Germany). Mr Sarkozy's sharp right turn propelled him into a narrow lead in first- round opinion polls but that support now appears to have dribbled back to Ms Le Pen. In polls published yesterday, she regained third place with around 17 per cent of the vote. The hard-left candidate, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, whose lurid anti-capitalist rhetoric has illuminated an uninspiring campaign, fell back to fourth place with around 13-14 per cent. Through all these twists and turns, Mr Hollande has held his nerve. At the Lille rally, he said he would bring a three-part approach to the economic crisis: "responsibility" (deficit cuts, mostly through tax rises); "growth" (EU capital investment programmes and the reflationary printing of euros); and "solidarity" (help for poorer people and poorer EU countries).
The Socialist top brass, seated nearby, were, however, two steps ahead of Mr Hollande. Their chatter was not about the first or second rounds but the "third round": who would be "in" and who would be "out" in the first centre-left government for a decade. The favourite to be Mr Hollande's prime minister is the Socialist party leader, Martine Aubry, daughter of former European Commission President Jacques Delors.
The opening round of the presidential election this weekend is the first of four polling days in just over two months. On Sunday, French voters will choose between the 10 candidates. The top two go on to the second round on 6 May, after which the winner will hold office for five years, not seven as used to be the case. He (never yet she) will be the ultimate arbiter of French policy but will not run the government day to day. To do that, the President will choose a Prime Minister. He, or possibly she, will seek to win a parliamentary majority in the lower house of parliament. Then "legislative elections" will be fought, once again over two rounds, on 10 and 17 June. | ||||
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-Lurid Crime Tales- | ||||
French Ex-Minister Quizzed over Child Orgy Allegations | ||||
2011-06-04 | ||||
[An Nahar] ![]()
Ferry has already insisted that he has no specific proof that a sex crime took place, but was merely recounting anecdotally what he had heard during his time in government from other senior French officials. The shock claim came as La Belle France engaged in soul-searching about the behavior of its allegedly chauvinist political elite in the wake of two scandals. On May 14, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, head of the IMF and favorite to lead the Socialist ticket in next year's presidential showdown with incumbent Nicolas Sarkozy, ...23rd and current President of the French Republic and ex officio Co-Prince of Andorra. Sarkozy is married to singer-songwriter Carla Bruni, who has a really nice birthday suit... was jugged in New York on suspicion of attempted rape. Then, earlier this week, junior public service minister Georges Tron was forced to resign after two municipal employees from the town where he is mayor accused him of sexual assault. Both men deny all wrongdoing, but the reporting of their cases has breached the wall of silence surrounding the sexual lives of French leaders and led to a string of allegations of predatory behavior in high office. | ||||
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Olde Tyme Religion |
Daniel Pipes Blog: Islam incompatible with modern medicine |
2007-01-03 |
A number of incidents are showing the deep incompatibility of radical Islam with modern medicine. Here are a trio to get this blog going, with more examples to be listed, in reverse chronological order, as they occur: Muslim visitors refuse anti-bacterial gel: British hospitals offer dispensers with anti-bacterial gel outside wards so that visitors can be sure not to bring in such infections as MRSA and PVL. But the gel contains alcohol, prompting some Muslims to refuse to use the hand cleansers on religious grounds. A National Health Service employee, Theresa Poupa told in December 2006 of her experience visiting a sick relative at the London Chest Hospital: I could not believe it - the signs are large enough and clear enough but they just took no notice and walked straight onto the ward. I was there almost every day for three weeks and I saw it repeated dozens and dozens of times. When I raised the matter with the nursing staff they just shrugged and said that Muslims were refusing to use the gel because it contained alcohol. They said they couldn't force visitors to use the gel and I understand that but I was astonished that anyone who didn't wash their hands was allowed onto a ward. I know the dangers that bugs like MRSA can cause. They kill hundreds of patients a year. Male refused treatment by female doctors: A 17-year-old male shepherd from Konya, Turkey, referred to only as "A.G.," arrived at the Konya Testing Hospital complaining of swollen testicles. He was sent to get ultrasound tests, but two headscarved (i.e., Islamist) female radiology doctors refused him service. Not receiving proper attention, A.G. later had one of his testicles removed by operation. The case has provoked much attention. The hospital's head of urology, Celal Tutuncu, portrayed the case as very "black and white," and said that action would be taken. Members of the opposition CHP party raised the case in parliament in December 2006. A CHP lawyer, Atilla Kart, noted that "This is the destruction wrought by religious references spilling over into public administration." Male relatives preventing female patients from being treated by male doctors: So rampant is the problem in France of Muslim husbands preventing their wives and other female relatives from being treated by male doctors (for example, women in labor have not had epidurals because the anesthetist was a man) that Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin reportedly planned in February 2004 to propose legislation to stop this from happening (how he plans to do this is not explained). |
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Europe |
Media ridicules Chirac |
2006-06-27 |
Jacques Chirac woke up on Tuesday morning to face one of the worst fates that can befall a head of state: widespread ridicule. Frances 73-year-old president had hoped his rare televised interview on Monday night would restore some lost authority and breathe fresh life into his embattled government. Instead, his speech was greeted by resounding boos from the media, reinforcing the atmosphere of fin de règne that has dogged his second term in office. You dont change a losing team, said Libérations front page, a sarcastic reference to Mr Chiracs repeated support for Dominique de Villepin, his enfeebled and unpopular prime minister. Pierre Giacometti, analyst at Ipsos, said Mr Chirac never stood a chance of regaining public confidence with his plea that Mr de Villepin and his government had been judged unfairly. The press mercilessly poked fun at the presidents gaffes, such as his reference to the Airbus A370, which does not exist, and his prediction that France will beat Brazil in the final of the football World Cup, which is impossible as they will meet in the quarter finals, if at all. Cut off from the rest of the world in the Elysée palace, he has created a virtual world that he believes to be more real than reality, mocked Libérations editorial, in an irreverent tone rarely used when discussing the head of state, even by his fiercest critics. Le Figaro, the conservative broadsheet usually supportive of the government, drew an unflattering comparison between Mr Chirac and Zinédine Zidane, the ageing and much-criticised captain of Frances struggling football team. His foot is no longer as sure, his glance no longer as quick: like Zinédine Zidane, Jacques Chirac has won every competition, but that was all long ago, said Le Figaros editorial. Like Zidane, as we all know, he will soon be forced to hang up his boots. The regional press were equally damning. La République des Pyrénées said: Jacques Chirac last night pushed the denial of reality to its limits. Meanwhile, lEst Républicain complained: What is terrible about Jacques Chirac is that he listens to nothing, hears nothing, sees nothing. Le Monde criticised an exercise in self-satisfaction, which was, at the least, surreal. The brickbats have built up after an annus horribilis for Mr Chirac. In May 2005, he lost a referendum on Europes constitutional treaty, forcing him to sack Jean-Pierre Raffarin and appoint Mr de Villepin. Soon afterwards, came the loss of the 2012 Olympic games to London, a spell in hospital after suffering a vascular accident in his eye, several weeks of urban riots across France, a humiliating u-turn on a youth labour law and the embarrassing Clearstream scandal. Mr Chirac on Monday attempted to leave the door open to him running for a third term in next years election. But analysts judged that the president had no choice but to maintain the possibility of running again, or he would have become even more of a lame duck leader. |
Link |
Terror Networks & Islam |
The Chirac Doctrine (on arab policy) |
2005-10-12 |
Excellent, note the notion that french arab policy is said to be very personal, Chirac having many ties with the arab world (notably strong familiy ties with Morocco, cf. his new grand son), and this is also true for other big players. See link for notes. This is possibly to be seen in perspective with the Eurabia Grand project as analyzed by Bat Ye'or and Robert Spencer, or am I too conspiracy-oriented? For a *remarkable* ressource on french arab policy, see the following blog (in french) : http://politiquearabedelafrance.blogspot.com/ by Olivier Guitta With just one-fifth the population of the United States, France boasts the world's second largest contingent of diplomats, and its consulates and embassies number just eight fewer than the State Department's 260.[1] The French investment in its foreign ministry is likewise heavy and demonstrates the importance the French government places on French prestige and grandeur. Under President Jacques Chirac, French foreign policy has become increasingly assertive. Francois Heisbourg, director of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (Foundation for Strategic Research), summed up French foreign policy as "oppose just to exist."[2] Such descriptions are not entirely fair, though. While Chirac inherited a French foreign policy already tilted toward the Arab world, his pursuit of close personal ties to Arab leaders and his outreach to Islamists, rejectionist Arab states, and groups considered terrorists by the U.S. government is part of a broader strategy to increase French influence in the region. Why French Foreign Policy Is Pro-Arab There are a number of domestic and historical factors that contribute to the French government's increasingly skewed Middle East policy. High among them is the changing nature of French demography. At least 10 percent of France's sixty million residents are Muslim. Given the discrepancy between the Muslim and non-Muslim birthrate in France, demographers estimate that by 2030 at least 25 percent of the French population will be Muslim.[3] In the past decade, the Islamist element among French Muslims has grown rapidly, overpowering more moderate Muslim voices. Many young French Muslims are influenced by extremist organizations such as the Union des Organisations Islamiques de France, an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. They hail bin Laden as a hero;[4] during demonstrations in Paris, marchers recently shouted, "Death to America and the Jews."[5] Since 2000, France has experienced its greatest wave of anti-Semitism since the 1930s. According to the Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l'Homme, whose statistics are used by the French government, anti-Semitic incidents jumped from 69 in 1999 to 970 five years later.[6] Demography has changed, and French political figures hesitate to criticize members of their largest religious minority. In January 2004, a French Jewish singer was performing at a gala attended by, among others, First Lady Bernadette Chirac when young French Muslims in the first rows interrupted the performance with shouts of "dirty Jew," "death to the Jews," and "we'll kill you." Rather than condemn the blatant anti-Semitism, Mrs. Chirac remained silent.[7] France's historical legacy is also important. Colonial control of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Syria, and Lebanon has marked the French psyche. France occupied Algeria for more than 130 years, withdrawing only after an eight-year war, which cost at least 300,000 Algerian and 20,000 French lives.[8] Upon Algerian independence in 1962, more than one million French residents of Algeria returned to France; many had been there for generations, and some had intermarried with the Arab and Berber population. As the various French colonies and mandates achieved independence, Parisian politicians had trouble letting go. Today, French officials act as if they never lost their empire. The Quay d'Orsay, where the Foreign Ministry is housed, for example, continues to promote the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (International Francophone Organization), of which fifteen out of forty-nine states are Muslim, as a way to bolster the community and cohesion of former French colonies. Under Chirac, French policy has gone beyond special treatment for the French-speaking Middle East, though, and embraced even the most rejectionist Arab and Islamic regimes while simultaneously working to criticize and isolate Israel, oppose the war on terrorism, and undercut the emphasis on democratization. The Evolution of French Policy The Middle East policy espoused by Chirac and his appointees bears little likeness to that espoused by French decision-makers in decades past.[9] The shift in policy is most clear with respect to Franco-Israeli relations. Paris supported Jerusalem between 1948 and 1967. Until the mid-1950s, France was Israel's chief if not only ally. Shimon Peres maintained an office at the French Ministry of Defense while serving as an aide to David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first prime minister.[10] Israeli and French interests converged. In 1956, the Israeli Defense Force cooperated with the French and British militaries in military operations at Suez. According to Yuval Neeman, a former Israeli minister of science, Paris provided Israel with weapons in exchange for information about Egypt, which was helping the Algerian insurgents.[11] The two states also cooperated on nuclear issues.[12] The French approach to the Middle East changed after the Israeli victory in the 1967 Six-Day war. President Charles de Gaulle began to espouse the decidedly pro-Arab policy that continues to the present. According to the news magazine Le Point, de Gaulle explained, "The Arabs have for themselves their numbers, space, and time."[13] His was a Machiavellian calculation. He pursued what he saw as a long-term strategy: sacrificing good ties with Israel in order to win the good will of the more populous and oil-rich Arab world. Subsequent French leaders, both from the Left and the Right, adopted his policy. As early as 1974, for example, the conservative president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing established relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), despite its involvement in terrorism, including the murder of Israeli athletes at the Olympic Games in Munich in 1972 and the assassination of the U.S. ambassador to Sudan in March 1973.[14] The secretary general of the Quai d'Orsay helped set up the PLO office in Paris.[15] The French approach to anti-Western figures and revolutionaries extended to provision of safe-haven to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the most prominent opponent to the Iranian regime of the pro-Western Mohammad Reza Shah. Khomeini used his time in France to engage the Western media and broadcast calls for revolution. The French approach backfired this time, however, for after reaching power, Khomeini sponsored terrorism on French soilâfor example the wave of bombings in Paris in 1986, which killed eleven and wounded 275 and the 1991 assassination of Shahpour Bakhtiar, the last premier under the shah.[16] Beginning in the late 1970s, Lebanon became the focus of the French government's activism in the Middle East. In 1978, the French government made a contingent of troops available to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, created to monitor the Lebanese-Israeli border in the wake of Israel's Litani River operation.[17] The French role in Lebanon increased in 1982 when 800 French troops joined an equal number of U.S. soldiers and 400 Italian troops to supervise the evacuation of the PLO from Lebanon and serve as peacekeepers. However, following the October 1983 bombing of the U.S. and French marine barracks, an attack that killed 241 U.S. and 57 French soldiers, Paris, along with Washington and Rome, withdrew its troops.[18] However, the French government remained engaged. Paris participated in the 1991 liberation of Kuwait, even though its defense minister, Jean-Pierre ChevÚnement, resigned in protest. The French air force also helped enforce the no-fly zone over Iraqi Kurdistan although it later ceased its participation in order to maintain its lucrative trade relationship with Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Throughout this period, the French government maintained cool relations with Israel, joining with the Arab League in condemning Israel while refusing to affix its name to resolutions condemning terrorism against the Jewish state. For instance in 2004, out of eighteen United Nations resolutions condemning Israel and vetoed by the United States, France voted thirteen times in favor and abstained five times.[19] Upon assuming the presidency in 1995, Chirac sought to readjust the status quo in French policy and shift Paris's sympathies further toward the Arab world. Speaking in Cairo in April 1996, Chirac declared, "France's Arab policy must be a dimension of its foreign policy. I wish to give it a new boost."[20] The French government expanded its trade and cultural exchanges with the Arab world. By 2002, France was among the top three trade partners for most Arab countries: first in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Saddam's Iraq, second in Lebanon, and Syria, and third in Egypt. France was also first among foreign investors in Jordan.[21] Ahmed Youssef, author of L'Orient de Jacques Chirac, argues that Chirac's policies have made inroads with the Arab states:[22] As soon as the peace process between the Israelis and Palestinians deteriorated, Chirac appeared, in the eyes of Arab opinion, to be the only Western leader that could counter the unconditional support of the United States to Israel. Chirac then became more popular than certain leaders or kings in the Arab capitals.[23] Many in the Arab world also admire Chirac for his charm, especially when working crowds. On October 22, 1996, Chirac sought to mix with bystanders while walking in a predominantly Arab neighborhood of Jerusalem. When Israeli security would not allow the crowds to approach too closely, he shouted, "This is not security; this is pure provocation, what do you want me to do? Fly back right away to Paris?"[24] His theatrics won him friends among the Palestinians.[25] His comments symbolized resistance to Israel, even as Chirac knew that he had put the Israeli security detail in an impossible situation. His popularity has further grown as he has repeatedly juxtaposed his pro-Arab stance with Washington's support for Israel. When the White House and State Department condemned Palestinian terrorism, Chirac would often exculpate the bombers with talk of root causes.[26] His popularity has become so great in recent years that a number of Palestinian families have named their sons "Chirac."[27] During Ramadan in 2003, merchants in Cairo named the best quality datesâthe traditional food with which Arabs break the sunrise to sunset fastâ"Chiracs" to honor the French president.[28] A May 2004 Zogby survey conducted in six Arab countries, found Chirac at the top of the list of world leaders in Egypt, Lebanon, and Morocco, and third in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.[29] In contrast, the same polls found U.S. president George W. Bush the least favorite world leader after Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon. The basis of Chirac's outreachâand perhaps a cause of itâhas been the development of close personal relationships with a number of Arab leaders, including not only Arafat and the late prime minister of Lebanon, Rafik al-Hariri, but also with the late Syrian president Hafez al-Assad, his son and successor Bashar, as well as former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. These personal relationships have become the backbone of French Middle East policy. Chirac and Saddam Hussein Perhaps Chirac's deepest friendship has been with Saddam Hussein.[30] The two first met in December 1974 when Prime Minister Chirac visited Baghdad to negotiate trade agreements, including the delivery of a nuclear reactor[31] later destroyed by an Israeli air raid in 1981. When Hussein visited France the following Septemberâhis only visit to a Western country[32]âthen-prime minister Chirac said, "I welcome you as my personal friend. I assure you of my esteem, my consideration, and my affection."[33] Resigning from government in 1976, Chirac founded the Rassemblement pour la Republique, which would soon become France's largest political party. There remain persistent rumors that Hussein helped finance the party, supported by allegations by Lebanese arms merchant Sarkis Soghanalian[34] and by various Iraqi politicians. In 1992, Saddam reportedly threatened to expose French leaders who had earlier accepted his largesse. "From Mr. Chirac to Mr. ChevÚnement, politicians and economic leaders were in open competition to spend time with us and flatter us," the Iraqi leader reportedly said. "We have now grasped the reality of the situation [of France's support for the 1991 Gulf War, a betrayal in Saddam's eyes]. If the trickery continues, we will be forced to unmask them, all of them, before the French public."[35] According to an aide, Chirac's friendship with Hussein was such that he would stop for a night in Baghdad whenever he traveled between Paris and Asia.[36] Baghdad rewarded Paris for its loyalty. Throughout the 1980s, Iraq bought US$25 billion worth of arms from French concerns, including Mirage fighters, Super Etendard aircraft, and Exocet missiles.[37] The Iraqi government also picked French companies to build Saddam International Airport in 1982.[38] The relationship between Chirac and Hussein went beyond the norm in Franco-Iraqi relations. When Chirac again became prime minister in 1986 after a decade out of power, the relationship once more blossomed. The following year, reports surfaced that Chirac had offered to rebuild the nuclear reactor destroyed by Israel in 1981. In 1994, French oil companies Total and Elf won contracts worth billions to develop southern Iraqi oil fields upon the lifting of the sanctions regime.[39] When Chirac became president in 1995, his government began lobbying the United Nations to ameliorate if not lift sanctions imposed on Iraq after its 1990 invasion of Kuwait.[40] The United Nation's Oil-for-Food program, inaugurated in 1996, allowed the Iraqi government to sell its oil in order to purchase food, medicine, and other humanitarian supplies.[41] Saddam Hussein rewarded Chirac's government for his support. France quickly became Iraq's chief trade partner, a position it maintained until 2003.[42] Hussein's investment in Chirac proved fruitful for the Iraqi leader. In 1998, when asked how patient he was prepared to be with Saddam Hussein, Chirac responded, "When it comes to humanitarian affairs, France's patience is limitless."[43] In the months preceding the 2003 Iraq war, French resistance to sanctions or military action against Baghdad grew. According to The Sunday Times of London, French officials regularly "kept Saddam abreast of every development in American planning and may have helped him to prepare for war."[44] In January 2003, a French company sold aircraft and helicopter parts to Iraq for its French-made Mirage fighters and Gazelle helicopters.[45] On October 26, 2003, rockets struck the Rashid Hotel in Baghdad during the visit of U.S. deputy secretary of defense Paul Wolfowitz. Subsequent investigation showed these to be French-made Matra SNEB 68-millimeter. The pristine condition of those left behind suggested manufacture after the imposition of sanctions.[46] Several French officials benefited personally from their close ties to Baghdad. Documents unearthed in the wake of the Iraqi regime's collapse suggest that French officials accepted lucrative oil vouchers from the Iraqi government in exchange for diplomatic favors. According to the September 2004 Duelfer report, titled Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction), Iraq's former deputy prime minister, Tariq Aziz, said he "personally awarded several French individuals substantial oil allotments." Aziz told his interrogators that both parties understood that resale of the oil was to be reciprocated through efforts to lift U.N. sanctions or through opposition to U.S. initiatives within the Security Council."[47] Also, according to an Iraqi intelligence service memo, a French politician met in May 2002 with an Iraqi official and "assured the Iraqi that France would use its veto in the UNSC [U.N. Security Council] against any American decision to attack Iraq."[48] Among the French officials indicted are several members of Chirac's inner circle, including Charles Pasqua, his former interior minister. A May 17, 2005 report released by the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations concluded, Documents created by the Ministry of Oil during the Hussein regime and interviews of high-ranking Hussein regime officials conducted by the Subcommittee provide substantial evidence that Charles Pasqua was granted oil allocations for 11 million barrels of oil from the Hussein regime under the Oil-for-Food Program in return for his continued support.[49] Documents reveal that the Iraqi government also gave fourteen million barrels of oil to French businessman Patrick Maugein, whom it considered "a conduit to French president Chirac."[50] The French judiciary has begun investigating leads on the Maugein connection.[51] While citizens of many other countries are involved, few are as senior or as well connected to their governments as the Frenchmen involved. The level of oil-for-food contacts reflects both the high-level of Franco-Iraqi ties, as well as Saddam Hussein's belief that the Chirac administration was an easy target for a campaign of influence. Chirac and Arafat Jacques Chirac's relationship with the Iraqi dictator was not an exception but part of a pattern of embracing Middle Eastern rulers hostile to international norms of behavior and in conflict with Western democracies. Soon after assuming the presidency, Chirac sought rapprochement with Palestinian Authority leader Yasir Arafat. On March 13, 1996, for example, Chirac told Arafat, "When you have a problem, call Doctor Chirac."[52] Arafat inculcated the message. Later that year during a joint Ramallah press conference with Chirac, Arafat declared, "We need Doctor Chirac to save the peace process."[53] When French foreign minister Michel Barnier began his first Middle East tour in June 2004, he scheduled a meeting with Arafat, foregoing a meeting with Sharon to do so. Barnier's visit tried to undercut the efforts of Bush, Sharon, and other Western leaders, who were seeking to isolate Arafat because of his support of terrorism. Barnier said that the French government wanted to reaffirm Arafat's indispensable role in the Middle East and said that Israel's isolation of Arafat was disgraceful.[54] Chirac reiterated this criticism during the June 2004 NATO summit in Istanbul saying, Arafat is probably the only person capable of imposing on the Palestinian people compromises, particularly of a territorial nature, which could not be imposed, today at any rate, by anyone else. This is why I believe that wanting to isolate him isn't very prudent or very much in line with a strategy of restoring peace.[55] The French government's outreach to Arafat led it not only to turn a blind eye to his role in terrorism[56] but also to twist the historical record to exculpate him for previous failures to negotiate. Following the collapse of the July 2000 Camp David II summit between Arafat and Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak, President Bill Clinton blamed Arafat for refusing the peace deal arrived at by his negotiators.[57] In a June 2004 interview with right-wing daily Le Figaro, Hubert Vedrine, French foreign affairs minister between 1997 and 2002, suggested that the fault was not Arafat's and that Clinton, as an American politician beholden to the U.S. Jewish lobby, had no choice but to criticize the Palestinian politician.[58] Such suggestions flew in the face of the historical record but nevertheless proved popular with an Arab audience that wanted to admit no responsibility. As Arafat's health deteriorated in his Ramallah compound, Chirac interceded for the Palestinian politician. French taxpayers footed the expense not only for Arafat's transportation but also for that of his entire entourage. Chirac placed several Palestinian officials in a five-star hotel at French government expense.[59] The red carpet treatment ensured French favor among the Palestinian street. French flags and posters thanking Chirac dotted the Ramallah square outside Arafat's headquarters.[60] In a partly handwritten October 28, 2004 note to the ill Arafat, Chirac said, "I wish that you could resume as soon as possible your work at the service of the Palestinian people ... [France] will always stand next to you."[61] Le Figaro commented that Paris had become the capital of Palestine for the thirteen days of Arafat's deathwatch.[62] Upon Arafat's death, the stoic Chirac had tears in his eyes as he eulogized him as "a man of courage and conviction."[63] The embrace of Arafat through his final days got Chirac what he wanted: to be the center of attention of the world and bolster French influence in the Arab world. The Syrian Connection While the French bond with Syria has long been strong, Chirac worked to bolster relations even further. Quoting de Gaulle, Chirac described Franco-Syrian ties as an "indestructible friendship."[64] He was the only Western head of state to attend Hafez al-Assad's funeral in 2000. Bashar al-Assad's first official trip outside the Middle East was to Paris in June 2001 although Chirac had cultivated his relationship with the young Assad, receiving him at Elysée Palace in November 1999 prior to his accession to power.[65] In October 2000, the city of Lyon picked Aleppo, Syria's second largest city, as its sister city. In 2001, the Ãcole Nationale d'Administration, the prestigious Parisian school in which almost the entire French political class, including Chirac, former president Giscard d'Estaing, current prime minister Dominique de Villepin, and former prime minister Lionel Jospin studied, began to train Syrian professors in order to tie together future French and Syrian officials. In 2004, the Ãcole Nationale d'Administration furthered its outreach to Syrian officials by opening a branch in Damascus,[66] adding to branches already operating in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. The Chirac administration's support for the Assad regime is not only limited to public gestures. The French government has reportedly sold weapons systems such as self-propelled howitzers equipped with night vision gear to Syria.[67] As in the case of Iraq, there are lingering questions of Syrian payments to French politicians. Many French politicians join associations and charitable boards both for financial and political gain. The board of the L'Association d'Amitié France-Syrie (France-Syria Friendship Association) boasts among its members former prime minister Raymond Barre, former secretary of state Claude Cheysson, and 2007 presidential hopeful Nicolas Sarkozy.[68] So why did Paris join with Washington on September 2, 2004, to cosponsor U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559, which demanded the withdrawal of Syrian troops occupying Lebanon and the disarmament of militias? The left-of-center daily Libération suggested the temporary unity was because the murder of former prime minister Rafik al-Hariri forced Chirac temporarily to choose between Arab friends.[69] Hariri described Chirac as "my best pal" shortly before his death.[70] Some French papers have reported that the Lebanese billionaire contributed to Chirac's 2002 reelection campaign.[71] Chirac rewarded his friend by helping the Lebanese government avert bankruptcy. For example, in November 2002, he put together the Paris II conference, in which European leaders, Saudi officials, and representatives from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank worked to extend credit to Lebanon. Chirac helped the Lebanese government win $4.4 billion of international credits.[72] But the February 14, 2005 assassination of Hariri forced the French hand. According to one French diplomat, "Before, all we did for Syria was because of Hariri; now everything we do against Syria is because of Hariri, again."[73] Now that the Syrian troop withdrawal is complete, Chirac may again embrace the Syrian president. Quay d'Orsay has not fully accepted U.S. concerns regarding Syrian support for Lebanese Hezbollah, for example. Chirac has long embraced Hezbollah. Former U.S. senator Bob Graham (Democrat, Fla.), relates how, upon arriving in Damascus in July 2002, he saw an Iranian cargo plane on the tarmac. He asked a U.S. diplomat what it might be carrying. The embassy aide replied, "Probably arms and ammunition, other military equipment for Hezbollah. This is the primary point of delivery."[74] Such matter-of-fact concerns regarding Hezbollah's commitment to violence did not factor in Chirac's decision to embrace the group. Prior to the 9-11 terrorist attacks, Hezbollah had killed more Americans than any other terrorist group; it still has the distinction of having killed more Frenchmen than any other terrorist group outside of the Algerian war for independence because of its bombing of the French marine barracks in Beirut and subsequent kidnapping of sixteen French citizens. Nevertheless, in October 2002, Chirac invited Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah secretary general, to attend the Francophone summit in Beirut. Their meeting bestowed legitimacy upon the group, whose raison d'être disappeared upon the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon two years before. The French government has continued to resist calls not only from Washington and Jerusalem but also from some within Europe to label Hezbollah a terrorist organization,[75] preferring instead to categorize the group as a "social" organization.[76] The one concession the French government has made to other Western governments has been to ban Hezbollah's Al-Manar satellite channel in December 2004.[77] The move came under tremendous pressure from French politicians and public alike, outraged at the station's flouting of French laws banning anti-Semitism. Chirac's consistent support for Hezbollah has won him the group's favor. In April 2005, Nasrallah published a commentary in the Beirut daily As-Safir in which he welcomed a French role in Lebanese reconciliation and declared that the "Lebanese do not like to see France held hostage to the savage and aggressive American hegemony."[78] Does the Chirac Doctrine Work? Chirac may have several reasons for extending French embrace beyond mere sympathy with the Arab world to uncritical support of rogues regardless of their rejectionism or support for terror. Part of his embrace of Saddam Hussein, Yasir Arafat, Bashar al-Assad, and Hassan Nasrallah may be due to a desire to undercut U.S. objectives in the Middle East and thereby bolster French prestige at U.S. expense. His personal antipathy toward Israel and desire to please his Muslim constituency may also contribute. When terrorists killed French Jews in Israel, French officials often failed to express condolences. French diplomacy continues to show total disdain for the Jewish state. The French ambassador to the United Kingdom, for example, called Israel "that little shitty country" at a dinner party hosted by Daily Telegraph columnist Barbara Amiel.[79] The new French ambassador to Israel labeled Sharon a "rogue."[80] From Chirac's perspective, though, his policies have bolstered French prestige. A close friend of Chirac explained, "For 1.2 billion [Muslim] people, France exists."[81] The importance of Paris may have declined within Europe, in the trans-Atlantic relationship, and even among many of her former colonies, but within the Islamic world, France retains some of her former stature. Yet, preservation of such prestige may come at a high cost. In December 2003, a blue-ribbon panel reported that increasing Islamism within the French Muslim community threatened French secularism.[82] The 1905 law on the separation of church and state constitutes a pillar of the French republic. Chirac supported a March 2004 law banning head coverings, including scarves and hijab from public schools. In doing so, he incurred the wrath of Islamist radicals in France and abroad.[83] Iranian foreign ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Assefi warned that Chirac's "extremist decision is against the citizens' rights and will tarnish France's image in the Islamic world."[84] On January 2, 2004, Iranians chanting "Death to France" interrupted a sermon critical of the French decision by Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, a close associate of Iranian supreme leader âAli Khameneâi.[85] Sheikh Mohammed Qabbani, mufti of the Lebanese republic, accused the French government of showing "a hatred of Islam."[86] It remains unclear whether Chirac's pro-Arab policy has translated into real influence among the most radical segments of Arab society. When the Iraqi Islamic army insurgent group seized two French journalists just outside of Baghdad in August 2004, French foreign minister Barnier appeared on Al-Jazeera to reiterate Chirac's pro-Arab policy and to thank the Arabic satellite channel for support.[87] The kidnappers demanded that the French government lift its ban on headscarves. Protestors marched in support of their demands in Lebanon and Bahrain. Several months later, the group released the journalists unharmed after 124 days. Their captors declared that their "liberation occurred because of the numerous calls of Muslim organizations along with the appreciation of the French government's position on Iraq and that of the two journalists regarding the Palestinian cause."[88] The French Left nevertheless criticized Chirac for not having succeeded earlier in freeing the hostages.[89] Former prime minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin said that France had not paid a ransom although a high official in the Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure, France's secret service, contradicted this statement.[90] It is unclear whether the hostages' release can be credited to the success of Chirac's policy or rather was the result of a ransom payment. Roger Auque, a French journalist and former hostage in Lebanon, speculated that the French government also made political concessions, perhaps promising not to send troops to Iraq and offering to review the law banning headscarves and hijab in public schools.[91] Serge July, editor of left-leaning Libération questioned whether the cost of Chirac's political gestures was too high.[92] The deaths of Hafez al-Assad, Arafat, and Hariri, as well as the ouster of Saddam Hussein suggest that the political benefits of the Chirac doctrine may be fleeting. Developing relationships takes time. The new Iraqi government resents the French embrace of Saddam Hussein. If other Middle Eastern dictatorships succumb to the tentative wave of democratization, there is no guarantee they will embrace Paris or honor commercial accords made under dictatorship. But growing Islamist pressure inside France may, nevertheless, push Chirac and his successors to pursue an even more pro-Arab policy. The legacy of the Chirac doctrine, though, may not be the French grandeur that Chirac and his allies seek, but rather a reputation for cynicism, hostility to democracy and reform, and association with the worst excesses of Middle Eastern society. Olivier Guitta is a Washington, D.C. freelance writer specializing in the Middle East and Europe. |
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It's Chirac, stupid |
2005-06-07 |
Nothing really new here, but why pass a little Chirac-bashing?! France's president has wasted ten years, devoted mainly to a search for scapegoats UNDER France's fifth republic, prime ministers have come to serve a useful purpose for presidents: when the going gets tough, they get both the blame and the boot. Georges Pompidou got rid of Jacques Chaban-Delmas; François Mitterrand kicked out Pierre Mauroy, Michel Rocard and Edith Cresson. Sure enough, after the crushing French rejection of the European Union constitution in a referendum on May 29th, President Jacques Chirac turfed out Jean-Pierre Raffarin and appointed Dominique de Villepin, one-time foreign minister and unelected former diplomat, promising a "new impetus" from his government (see article). Having heard France's message, he said in a television broadcast, "I intend to respond." The trouble is that the selection of an elite technocrat is not a meaningful response to that message. For the ultimate responsibility for the political upset this week belongs not to the hapless Mr Raffarin, but to Mr Chirac himself. The French had many reasons to reject the constitution, but underlying their defiance was a simple point: times are hard, jobs are scarce, nothing changes, promises go unkept, we are fed up, and youthe political classrefuse to listen. After ten years as president, Mr Chirac has received this message more than once. He received it in 1997, when he called an early parliamentary election on the wise suggestion of Villepin, among others and lost, landing himself with a Socialist government. He received it in 2002, when the far-right Jean-Marie Le Pen made it into the presidential run-off. He received it in 2004, when the left swept the board at regional and European elections. Now, he has received it once again. Leaders can respond to such discontent in two ways. One is to pretend that the French social model is still valid, that no trade-off exists between social protection and economic growth, that France can close the shutters and shelter from global capitalism, that all the blame belongs with outside forceswhether globalisation, America or Brussels. The other is to admit that France cannot isolate itself from the world economy, to explain that new markets are an opportunity for French companies, that job losses in manufacturing can be balanced by job creation in services and that inflexible social protection deters the creation of new jobs. At almost every turn, Mr Chirac has chosen the first response. His one bold attempt at economic reform, under Alain Juppé in 1995, ended in failure when he backed down after the country was paralysed by strikes. Since then, rather than confronting the populist arguments of the anti-globalisation lobby, Mr Chirac has drifted to the left with public opinion. During the referendum campaign, he was at it again, promising that the constitution would entrench the French social model and protect it from "Anglo-Saxon liberalism". His choice of Mr de Villepin, the aristocratic product of elite technocratic training and the embodiment of everything the French have just rejected, runs true to form. Mr Chirac was first elected president in 1995, pledging that "jobs will be my preoccupation at all times". Since then, unemployment has barely moved: from 11.3% then to 10.2% today. At this time of morosité, it is easy to forget that France has so much going for it. Government policy may stop its top companies from creating many jobs, but they know how to make and sell the world such products as lipstick, rubber tyres, cars, handbags and insurance. There is no reason why the country should not halve its unemployment rate by deregulating the labour marketif the political will existed to take on the unions. Yet Mr de Villepin, who has never held an economic portfolio and recently called for a more socially minded programme, is unlikely to be any bolder than his predecessors. You have delighted us long enough The source of France's troubles is not Europe, nor global capitalism, nor rebellious socialists, nor the far-right, nor the far-left. It is Mr Chirac. His failure to be straight with the French about the need for reform has come back to haunt him. That is why a better response would have been for Mr Chirac to follow the example set by Charles de Gaulle after he lost a referendum in 1969: to accept his responsibility and resign. |
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never-elected-to-office de Villepin is new French PM |
2005-05-31 |
![]() Mr Raffarin, who had served as prime minister since 2002, saw his approval rating plummet to just 21 per cent as the economy slowed and unemployment rose above 10 per cent again this year. Although he did introduce limited reforms of the pensions system and the social security sector, Mr Raffarin's critics accused him of not being bold enough. Mr de Villepin, 51, who previously served as interior minister, is one of France's most high-profile politicians even though he has never held elected office. A classic French technocrat, who studied at the elite Ecole Nationale d'Administration (Ena), Mr de Villepin shot up the ranks of the civil service before emerging as President Jacques Chirac's private secretary in 1995. He is best known internationally for his passionate opposition the US-led war in Iraq in 2003 while serving as foreign minister. Mr de Villepin's top priority will be tackle the country's unemployment crisis. In the past, he has called on the government to pursue more socially oriented reforms but his precise views about economic policy are not widely known. As one of Mr Chirac's closest confidantes, Mr de Villepin will receive strong backing as a possible presidential candidate in 2007. But Mr de Villepin will first have to prove himself in the highly demanding job of prime minister. |
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Raffarin faces the axe |
2005-05-31 |
Chirac will on Tuesday unveil decisions concerning his government, AP reported quoting Elysee Palace on Monday. An aide to Raffarin said he was expected to present his resignation to Chirac on Monday. Earlier on Monday, Chirac spent 30 minutes with Raffarin, who has been in office since May 2002. Other important figures called to the presidential palace included Nicolas Sarkozy, the ambitious head of the governing party, the Union for a Popular Movement, with his eye on the 2007 presidency. A chief rival of Chirac, he is among a handful of possible choices to replace Raffarin. |
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French 'oui' campaigners now admitting defeat |
2005-05-25 |
![]() Nicolas Sarkozy, head of the ruling Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) party, told an ill-tempered cabinet meeting on Tuesday that he no longer believed the "yes" would win, a colleague told AFP. "I keep on telling you that the thing is lost," Sarkozy was quoted as saying in an angry outburst. Valery Giscard d'Estaing, the former French president who led the drafting of the text, said the failures of the "yes" campaign were partly the result of a lack of European enthusiasm on the part of the country's leaders. "Our current rulers are of course believers in the idea of Europe, but in their heart of hearts they are not men and women who are inspired by a European feeling," he told Les Echos newspaper. "When we encounter difficulties, they are too ready to blame Europe. So it is hardly a surprise that the French have a bad idea of the European Union," the 79-year-old former president said. But speaking on the LCI television news channel, Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin said that with 20 percent of the electorate telling pollsters they were undecided it was foolish to give up hope. "It's not over yet. It's not over until the people have spoken. It's always the case that many people leave it till the last minute to make up their minds," said Raffarin, who is widely expected to leave office after Sunday whatever the outcome of the referendum. Supporters of the constitution were banking on last-minute televised interventions by President Jacques Chirac and the former Socialist prime minister Lionel Jospin to shore up their vote. Speaking on the main television evening news programme Tuesday, Jospin - a widely respected figure on the French left - said that a "no" vote would leave France isolated and its European partners bewildered. Listing the political leaders who back the "no" - including far-right leader Jean-Marie Le Pen, Communist and Trotskyite party chiefs and the dissident Socialist Laurent Fabius - he said they could have no coherent alternative to the constitution. "All these 'no's are incompatible and absolutely unrealistic ... What are we going to do with them - put them in a cocktail shaker, mix them up, then ask the president to present this shaker to our astonished European partners? "I think such an attitude will not just isolate France but leave us incomprehensible to the other Europeans," Jospin said. HehChirac was due to appear on national television on Thursday evening. Drawn up after four years of laborious negotiations, the EU's constitution is meant to streamline decision-making in the expanding bloc but must first be ratified by all 25 member states. In France approval was initially seen as a foregone conclusion, but over two months of campaigning the opposition has surged in polls - buoyed by widespread public discontent, fear of unemployment and falling real wages, and anxiety about new competition from the low-cost economies of eastern Europe. A "no" vote in so important a country as France would trigger a period of paralysis inside the European Union, and have huge repercussions on the domestic political scene. |
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France now at the brink of rejecting EU constitution | |
2005-05-23 | |
PARIS, May 22 (AFP) - France entered a frenetic last week of campaigning Sunday ahead of next weekend's referendum on the EU's constitutional treaty, with polls continuing to point to a stunning defeat for President Jacques Chirac and other supporters of the text. Two new opinion polls Sunday gave the "no" camp 52 percent against 48 percent for supporters of the treaty, bringing to seven the number of surveys in the last week to predict a victory for the opposition. None has found for the "yes" camp. With the odds shortening for a major electoral upheaval on May 29, both sides were geared for an intensive week of rallies and media appearances in order to win over wavering voters - estimated at between a fifth and a third of the public - and ensure a high turnout by the faithful. Chirac's office announced that the president will make another personal intervention during the days ahead, though it did not specify when or in what form. The campaign for the referendum has turned into one of the most hard-fought political battles of recent years in France, with both camps sensing that it is a moment to define the country's identity and relationship with the rest of the world. While supporters of the European Union constitution say it is a chance to entrench French influence in a bloc that now encompasses the countries of the former Soviet east, for opponents it is a sell-out to "liberal" economic forces that spells the end of France's generous social model. The arguments have dominated public life for weeks, with many people acquiring an in-depth knowledge of the constitution's four sections and 448 articles. Pro- and anti posters plaster city walls, newspapers print daily commentaries on key issues, radio talk shows feature often angry rows between the two sides, while editions of the constitution and books of explanatory notes dominate the best-seller lists. The constitution was thrashed out over four years by a committee headed by former French president Valery Giscard d'Estaing, and is meant to simplify decision-making in a body that will soon contain 27 members. When France helped launch the predecessor European Economic Community in 1957, there were six. The text must be approved by all states, either by parliamentary vote or popular referendum, before coming into effect. Even though he was not obliged to, Chirac chose to put it to the country - but he has been taken by surprise by a surge in support for the "no" camp. The rejectionists in France stretch from the far-right National Front of Jean-Marie Le Pen to the Trotskyist far-left. There are also nationalist Eurosceptics led by the European deputy Philippe de Villiers and Gaullist dissidents inside Chirac's ruling Union for a Popular Movement. But the hinge group of electors is on the mainstream pro-European left, where the opposition Socialist party is divided by a poisonous internal row. A leadership in favour of the constitution is defied by former prime minister Laurent Fabius who has more than half of party supporters behind him. In an interview with Le Journal du Dimanche, Fabius said that without a rewriting of the constitution the expansion of the EU can only lead to the "delocalisation" of more jobs and businesses from high-regulation countries like France to low-cost economies like Poland and Hungary. "We cannot put all the workers of Europe and the world in open competition and say 'Let the cheapest win!" ... A 'no' vote will not magically resolve all our problems but it will be an important step to a Europe that serves Europeans," he said. The rejectionist camp has been reinforced by a widespread mood of discontent in France, fed by 10.2 percent unemployment and stalling economic growth. The unpopularity of Chirac and his prime minister, Jean-Pierre Raffarin, is also a factor, with a survey Sunday revealing that the president's approval ratings plunged five points to 39 percent over the last month while Raffarin's fell to just 24 percent. Another poll showed that 69 percent of the French public believes the constitution can be redrafted - even though European leaders all say the text is a finely-balanced compromise which cannot be changed to take account of one nation's objections. Over the weekend Chirac issued an appeal for a "yes" vote to residents of France's overseas departments and territories - including Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guyana and French Polynesia - whose 1.4 million voters provide crucial support if the result is tight.
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Stratfor: France and the EU Vote |
2005-05-22 |
Posted in full since no link available. France and the EU Vote: Oui or Non? Dream On Summary French voters decide May 29 whether to approve the proposed EU Constitution. Public opinion has favored a no vote over the past four weeks. But regardless of how the vote turns out, the French dream of using a united Europe to magnify Paris' influence globally will remain just that: a dream. Analysis The French vote May 29 on whether to approve the European Union's new constitution. Far from the easy victory the government -- and France's fellow Europeans -- expected, however, the constitution's naysayers have consistently led in opinion polls over the past four weeks. In a union of 25 states, there is little that everyone can agree on. But one thing our sources across the Continent seem to be in agreement on is this: if the French reject the constitution, the charter dies. Unlike previous treaties, this one will not be renegotiated. Not only is the text as integrationist as Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, etc., would allow, the constitution is the best that Paris could possibly hope for -- after all, a Frenchman wrote it. Valery Giscard d'Estaing, the document's author, has campaigned for the constitution in a bit of a fog, stunned that any sane Frenchman might suggest that he could have eked more out of the marathon negotiations. So a French "non" leaves only one route for the constitution to be salvaged: resubmission in hopes of receiving the "correct" result. Hardly the vote of confidence that France, a founding member of a united Europe, was expected to provide. Many pundits have attributed the lack of French enthusiasm for the constitution to the love deficit they feel toward the current government. Similar perceptions nearly defeated France's approval of previous EU treaty law and have led many to call the constitution vote a "Raffarindum" on the popularity of Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin, which a survey published May 20 puts at 21 percent. That is an easy explanation, but it represents a cop out. It also does not explain why French politicians on the left and right -- some even from within the ruling party -- are both campaigning for the "non" forces. In fact, French agonizing is so acute that Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker, currently wearing the mantle of the EU presidency, resorted April 19 to saying that the French should vote for the constitution if for no other reason than because the Americans want them to vote no. What all this misses is that this referendum is fundamentally different from previous EU votes. France stands at a crossroads and quite literally has no idea which path to follow. France and "Europe" When the French government first jumped into the European experiment in the early days after World War II, the idea of a "united" Europe was simple: make another European war unthinkable. After France's initial postwar political stability issues were sorted out with the ascendance of Charles de Gaulle, however, the focus quickly changed. Under Gaullism, the French sense of centrality, extant since the pre-1871 period, returned. Formerly, Paris was for all practical purposes the capital of Europe, even while the British were far more active in global affairs. The reascendance in French political thought of the importance of French power left Paris -- and in particular, de Gaulle -- outraged at the political balance of the Cold War. Far from calling the shots -- or even having a say -- in Europe, France found itself relegated to the sidelines as just another European state undergoing massive American-funded and -directed reconstruction. Washington created the Bretton Woods system to manage European economic affairs. Washington created NATO to manage European security affairs. Politics were left to the Europeans so long as they did not clash with either Bretton Woods or NATO. For a Gaullist, such an arrangement was intolerable. De Gaulle's reaction was twofold. First, France needed to take command of its own security affairs, so in 1966, Paris withdrew from the NATO Military Committee, ordering NATO forces off French soil. Second, it needed a potential counterweight to the United States. Something that could in time ultimately challenge the West's superpower. That something became "Europe." At first, everything went blissfully according to plan. France's original five European partners -- Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands -- perhaps represented the perfect match for France's geopolitical ambitions. The Low Countries -- ravaged in both world wars -- were in no mood to rock the boat and demand much of anything. And given their diminutive size, France had little problem overshadowing them politically. As for the other two, Western attitudes toward German behavior during the Second World War ensured that Bonn would spend at least a generation apologizing for its actions, allowing Paris to slip into Germany's shoes and speak for Bonn, too. Finally, there was Italy which was, well, Italy. And so in this little Europe, the French had their first soapbox. Paris wasted no time in working to establish a middle ground between Washington and Moscow. A key policy of the time were efforts to convince their European partners that American security guarantees were meaningless, and that Europe should seek an accommodation with the Soviets under a French-led security partnership. In retrospect, Americans may find this almost farcical, but one must remember the context and the times. While pitching itself as the ultimate guarantor of European security, the United States suffered from an unavoidable and equally inconvenient fact: it was on the wrong side of the Atlantic. Any conventional NATO-Russian conflict was destined to end with the Soviets overrunning Western Europe, as the Americans simply could not relocate forces in time. That meant that the core pillar of the American security guarantee was the nuclear option -- which would, of course, result in a Soviet counterstrike annihilating the United States. Why, the French would ask, should we believe that the Americans would be willing to guarantee their country's destruction to protect us? Countering that argument forced the United States to fight any fight the Soviet Union chose, at the time and place of the Soviet Union's choosing. As such, the United States found itself sucked into conflicts in places such as Korea, Vietnam and Cambodia. But in time, France's ability to speak for Europe rapidly degraded. The core logic behind Gaullism and French foreign policy in the post-World War II era was that Paris had to matter. Countries should need to come to France for guidance and arbitration. French troops should be needed in strategic locations. For that to happen, France needed a core group of states willing to let France speak and act on the group's behalf. In a Europe of six, that was possible. But not as Europe expanded. The key year when France's dream of a French-led Europe began to falter was 1973, the year Denmark, Ireland, and most of all, the United Kingdom, joined the European Community, the forbearer of today's European Union. Unlike France's existing partners, London would neither admit to French centrality nor submit to French authority. The United Kingdom -- a country with a vested interest in being part of Europe so it could prevent the development of a Europe strong enough to threaten its independence -- became Europe's poison pill. It should be no surprise that Paris did not cease vetoing the United Kingdom's membership application until after de Gaulle left office. Every state that the European Community -- which morphed into the European Union in 1993 -- accepted as a member for the next 22 years complicated France's vision. Greece was in effect a European island with security concerns far from France's; Spain and Portugal enjoyed strong relations with Latin America and ultimately the United States; Austria, Finland and Sweden -- all officially neutral states -- made the idea of a French-led common European security force problematic at best. Russia and a "Greater Europe" But what is often missed is the centrality that Moscow played in French plans, and how efforts to broaden and deepen the European Union -- a prerequisite for a stronger Europe capable of countering the United States -- made it impossible for Russia to participate in realizing French ambitions. Paris fully understands that the United States' overwhelming economic heft -- at the beginning of 2005 the U.S. economy stood at more than $11 trillion versus the European Union's $7 trillion -- means that successfully challenging the United States requires some flavor of a "greater Europe." Considering the dearth of options available, such an entity by default required a close strategic partnership with Russia. In many ways a Franco-Russian partnership is a match made in heaven. The two are far enough removed from each other that they have few points of contact, and therefore few points of friction. That became even more the case with the implosion of Russian influence globally during the 1990s. Both are resentful of what they perceive as the intrusion of American power into their backyard -- and front yard. Both feel, with considerable justification, that they would be far more powerful both at home and abroad if the United States were taken down a peg or 30. During the Cold War, European security arrangements with the United States made any broad Franco-Russian alliance impractical. With the end of the Cold War, however, the European security dynamic changed sufficiently enough that it was possible to consider not just a Franco-Russian partnership, but perhaps even a European-Russian grouping. Despite the problems of brokering agreements among a Europe of 12, and as of 1995, 15 members, suddenly the building blocks for a larger "Europe" came tantalizingly within reach. But two unrelated events directly linked to French efforts to strengthen Europe soon fully killed the French dream to create a rival superpower -- and both had to do with Russia. The first occurred Jan. 2, 2002, when the European Union formally adopted the euro as the Continent's common currency. Although since that time the financial strictures undergirding the euro have been watered down and creatively interpreted, one thing that all EU states readily agree on is that post-Soviet collapse Russia is incapable of meeting the financial rigors necessary to qualify for euro membership within a human lifetime. Since meeting those requirements is embedded within EU membership requirements, Russia is barred from EU membership because of technical reasons. In other words, assuming both Paris and Moscow were interested in solidifying an alliance under the aegis of the European Union -- which would constitute the ideal scenario for Paris given its assumption that it would lead an EU with Russia as a member -- the implementation of the common currency regime essentially rendered this economically impossible. The second discriminating event occurred on May 1, 2004 when the EU expanded to bring in 10 Central European and Mediterranean states. Seven of the 10 states the European Union absorbed in 2004 had been directly occupied by the Russians since World War II, and none of them trust Moscow. The problem introduced by U.K. membership was suddenly magnified tenfold, and a common Russian-French foreign policy, determined by Paris of course, is now a political impossibility. Without the population, geographic heft and resources of Russia, Europe remains dependent on the United States for security, markets and -- via American global military commitments -- also on U.S. military force to guarantee European access to global resources and markets alike. For all practical purposes, from the French viewpoint, the idea of a greater Europe realistically capable of challenging the United States is dead. Of Constitutions and Betrayal Which brings us back to the issue at hand: the French Constitution. While Paris continued to attempt to use Europe to further its geopolitical goals, it knew full well that Europe would lack the size and strength to challenge the United States in its current form without Russia's help. The question then became: How does France make due with the building blocks it has on hand? The constitution was supposed to answer that question. As French thinking went, having a common European constitution would bind the member states into a firm alliance that paid heed to French wisdom, expertise and goals. As such, Paris pulled every string it had to put a Frenchman in charge of putting the critical document together. While that process was under way, however, the world threw France a curveball in the form of the 2003 Iraq war. Paris recognized straightaway that a world in which the United States could launch Iraq-style operations without consent or consequence would be a world in which France neither mattered nor was respected. Paris, feeling secure in its position as the leader of "Europe," worked with the Germans and various EU bureaucrats nominally responsible for EU foreign policy and publicly challenged the United States' motives and methods on all things Iraqi. The result was that nearly all of the rest of Europe broke ranks with the Franco-German (and to a lesser degree, Russian) axis. In January 2003, almost a year after France took it upon itself to represent Europe as a power facing off against the United States, a host of other European countries -- Denmark, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom -- issued an open letter in the world's newspapers applauding the United States' role in Europe. The letter also opposed French efforts regarding Iraq and mocked the idea of a common European foreign policy. Within days, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia indicated that they also would have signed the letter if asked. The Netherlands chimed in that it had wanted to sign but was concerned that it would create an appearance of European disunity. Paris perceived the statements as betrayals of European (read: French) values and a (successful) challenge to the idea of French leadership. Suddenly, the entire European experiment had been turned on its head, and instead of Europe meekly allowing France to wax philosophic about the wonders of Parisian culture and statesmanship, a very different "Europe" began to take shape. That Europe became codified into the document the French will consider May 29. In this Europe, foreign policy would be largely relegated to the hands of each member state. Common European positions could be crafted, but they would first have to receive unanimous support from the 25 EU members. Estonia or Hungary could counter French efforts to ally with Russia. Cyprus or Greece could block French efforts to court Turkey. Bulgaria or the United Kingdom could halt French efforts to isolate the United States. Suddenly, instead of an enabler, the European Union had become a cage. And the cage has a mind of its own. The French statist/socialist model (still highly popular among the French) always has clashed with Anglo-style capitalism, which more closely resembles American economic practices. Nearly all of the states that joined in 2004, as well as Bulgaria and Romania who will join in 2007, fall on the side of the United Kingdom in thinking. Combined with a European Commission that took office in late 2004, Paris finds its entire economic model under constant criticism. And unlike the realm of foreign policy, EU economic initiatives do not require a unanimous vote -- except in issues of taxation, a category where high French taxes put French business at a permanent disadvantage. As such, the constitution put before the French populace in the May 29 referendum represents the worst of all worlds for France. It constitutionally isolates France within a union of broadly pro-American states, it gives other states the potential to impose on France what the French perceive as a hostile economic structure and it essentially destroys any hope France once had for forming a French-led union. No wonder then that the French are hesitant about voting for the constitution. Doing so not only would put them on the defensive within Europe, it would consign dreams of global influence to history's proverbial dustbin. Making matters even worse (yes, it can get worse), rejecting the constitution would not help. Should any single state -- say, France -- vote no, the constitution will not take effect. This would mean that existing EU treaty law, which the constitution would have superceded, would remain intact. The voting provisions laid out by the Nice Treaty represent the most important provisions a no vote would preserve. To be approved, the constitution demands that decisions be approved by 55 percent of the European Union's states representing at least 65 percent of the European Union's population. Under such an arrangement, France and Germany voting together could be overruled, but it would take near EU unanimity to do so. Under Nice, however, the smaller states have far more power in proportion to their populations. Spain, for example, has 27 votes to France's 29, despite only having 41 million people to France's 59 million. As the states get smaller, the distortion grows. The three Baltic states and the Czech Republic -- with a combined population of less than 20 million -- voting together wield as many votes as the proud Fifth Republic. The European Union has now become too large to be safely controlled, and too hostile to French aspirations to be trusted. The French truly are damned whether they do or do not. *sniff* |
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