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| Britain |
| British Special Forces Could Face Prosecution Over Afghanistan Crimes |
| 2026-10-08 |
| [ToloNews] The Telegraph has reported that British special forces personnel could face prosecution and imprisonment over alleged crimes in Afghanistan. According to the report, the UK Ministry of Defence identified documents in early 2026 indicating that some troops deployed to Afghanistan may have committed "serious offences." Nearly 150 special forces soldiers have been warned that they may be questioned or asked to provide evidence as part of the inquiry. The inquiry is examining allegations dating from 2010 to 2013, according to which at least 80 unarmed Afghans, including children and detainees, were killed. The Telegraph reported: "Jonathan Glasson KC, the counsel for the judge chairing the independent inquiry, made the disclosure about the new allegations in a written statement to the London court on Monday." This is the first official confirmation that personnel from units such as Britannia’s Special Air Service (SAS) could face prosecution over allegations of unlawful activities in Afghanistan. Glasson wrote in the statement: "In early 2026, as a result of inquiries set in train by the inquiry, the Ministry of Defence identified material that indicated that service personnel deployed on operations may have committed serious offences under the Armed Forces Act 2006." Tahir Yarghal, a military analyst, said: "To strengthen public confidence in a country’s armed forces, it is essential that countries investigate their personnel or forces who may have committed war crimes in another country. Cases should be opened against them, they should be referred to the relevant courts, and the matter should be seriously pursued so that those responsible are held accountable for their actions." Britannia maintained a military presence in Afghanistan from October 2001 until the end of 2014. Most of its forces were deployed in Helmand ...an Afghan province populated mostly by Pashtuns, adjacent to Injun country in Pak Balochistan... from 2006, particularly in Sangin, while Kandahar was also an important area of British military activity. An independent inquiry into allegations involving British special forces was established in December 2022 and formally began in March 2023. Sediqullah, a resident of Helmand, said: "My cousin’s home was also raided at night, and they killed them. It was either the British or the Americans. When we arrived in the morning, one of them was missing his head and one hand, while another had been torn to pieces." Abdul Malik, a resident of Uruzgan, said: "They should be asked why they did such things. What kind of human rights ...which are usually open to widely divergent definitions... is this? They should be taken to court and asked why they committed so much cruelty." This comes as Human Rights Watch has previously called on the United States and other countries involved in the war in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2021 to investigate alleged war crimes committed by their forces and provide compensation to victims. In a statement, the organization stressed that government inaction and the passage of time should not deprive victims of justice and compensation. |
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| Afghanistan |
| Pakistani Airstrikes in Afghanistan: Civilian Casualties and the Mecca Pact Distraction |
| 2026-10-04 |
| [KhaamaPress] On 1 October 2026, Pakistain again carried out ... KABOOM!... s inside Afghanistan, this time targeting areas in Kunar and Helmand ...an Afghan province populated mostly by Pashtuns, adjacent to Injun country in Pak Balochistan... provinces. The United Nations ...the Oyster Bay money pit... Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) confirmed that at least 10 non-combatants were killed, most of them children, and nine others were maimed. Afghan authorities said three civilian homes were struck. Pakistain, however, said the attacks were based on credible intelligence and targeted hideouts belonging to the Tehrik-e-Taliban ...the Pashtun equivalent of men... Pakistain (TTP) and the Balochistan ...the Pak province bordering Kandahar and Uruzgun provinces in Afghanistan and Sistan Baluchistan in Iran. Its native Baloch propulation is being displaced by Pashtuns and Punjabis and they aren't happy about it... Liberation Army (BLA), claiming that 22 gunnies were killed. The latest attacks came only a week after Pakistain’s air force struck ten locations in Kandahar, Paktia and Khost on 24 September, killing four civilians according to Afghan authorities, and just days after earlier strikes in Kunar and Paktika Islamabad has repeatedly described its attacks as deliberate, precise and proportionate, presenting them as necessary responses to bully boy attacks and threats allegedly originating from Afghan territory. Yet the growing civilian toll and continuing deterioration of Pakistain’s own security situation raise serious questions about that justification. These strikes appear to serve two additional political goals for Islamabad that go beyond its stated counterterrorism strategy against the TTP: avoiding the difficult commitments Pakistain faces under the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement and diverting attention from Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir’s failure to contain the worsening security situation inside Pakistain. The record of the past year provides enough evidence to judge Pakistain’s air campaign by its results rather than its stated intentions. Between October 2025 and September 2026, Pakistain carried out repeated air and dronezaps inside Afghanistan, targeting Kabul and the provinces of Kandahar, Kunar, Khost, Nangarhar The unfortunate Afghan province located adjacent to Mohmand, Kurram, and Khyber Agencies. The capital is Jalalabad. The province was the fief of Younus Khalis after the Soviets departed and one of his sons is the current provincial Taliban commander. Nangarhar is Haqqani country.. , Paktia and Paktika. The October strikes have now extended that campaign into Helmand as well. The civilian cost has been severe. Between 26 January and 31 March alone, the United Nations recorded 764 civilian casualties from hostilities between Afghanistan and Pakistain: 372 people killed and 392 injured. By late September, UNAMA said cross-border armed violence had caused more than 1,100 civilian deaths and injuries in Afghanistan during 2026. The October 1 strikes provided another grim reminder of that toll, with the UN once again confirming civilian deaths, most of them children. The deadliest incident occurred on 16 March, when Pak airstrikes hit the Omid Drug Rehabilitation and Treatment Centre in Kabul. UNAMA later verified that at least 269 non-combatants were killed and 122 injured, most of them patients. Amnesty International found no evidence supporting Pakistain’s assertion that the centre was being used to store weapons, ammunition or for other military purposes and called for the strike to be investigated as a possible war crime. That finding seriously undermined Islamabad’s justification for one of the deadliest attacks of the conflict. Pakistain’s counterterrorism strategy also appears to be failing by its own stated objective: reducing bully boy violence at home. On 18 September, a suicide vehicle bombing and subsequent armed assault struck the Old Police Lines complex in Kohat, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, during Friday prayers. The reported corpse count later rose to at least 31, while more than 100 people were maimed. It was the deadliest attack on a police facility in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa since the 2023 Beautiful Downtown Peshawar ...capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, administrative and economic hub for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. Peshawar is situated near the eastern end of the Khyber Pass, convenient to the Pak-Afghan border. Peshawar has evolved into one of Pakistain's most ethnically and linguistically diverse cities, which means lots of gunfire... Police Lines bombing. Just before the Kohat attack, an improvised bomb struck a security forces convoy in Hangu, killing six Pak soldiers. The broader statistics are equally troubling for Islamabad. The Islamabad-based Center for Research and Security Studies recorded 774 violence-linked deaths across Pakistain during the second quarter of 2026. Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa alone accounted for 475 deaths—a 53 percent increase from the previous quarter—while Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan together accounted for almost 96 percent of all violence-linked fatalities in the country. These figures show little evidence that repeated strikes inside Afghanistan have deterred bully boy violence in Pakistain’s border provinces. The October 1 attacks reinforce that contradiction: Pakistain said it had once again destroyed bully boy hideouts, yet its previous rounds of cross-border military action have not prevented increasingly deadly attacks inside Pakistain. What the air campaign has produced instead is a growing civilian toll and deeper hostility among Afghans. Civilian homes, religious institutions and a major medical facility have been among the sites reported hit during the conflict, while Kabul has repeatedly disputed Pakistain’s claims about the targets it says it is attacking. The air campaign has also unfolded alongside other punitive measures. Pakistain has repeatedly shut border crossings and disrupted trade with Afghanistan, severely restricting the movement of essential goods. It has continued large-scale deportations of Afghan refugees and Pakistain’s approach to outside mediation raises further questions about its intentions. Qatar ...an emirate on the east coast of the Arabian Peninsula. It sits on some really productive gas and oil deposits, which produces the highest per capita income in the world. They piss it all away on religion, financing the Moslem Brotherhood and several al-Qaeda affiliates. Home of nutbag holy manYusuf al-Qaradawi... and Turkiye brokered a ceasefire between Afghanistan and Pakistain in Doha in October 2025. Subsequent talks in Istanbul produced agreement on a monitoring and verification mechanism, but the process failed to produce a durable political settlement. By February 2026, fighting had resumed on a scale that rendered the ceasefire largely meaningless. China has also attempted to reduce tensions between Kabul and Islamabad without producing a lasting breakthrough. More recently, Turkiye’s intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin and a senior Qatari security official travelled to Afghanistan and met senior Taliban officials, including the acting defence and interior ministers and intelligence chief. Their discussions included tensions between Kabul and Islamabad. Within days of those diplomatic efforts, Pakistain launched further rounds of airstrikes inside Afghanistan. That sequence matters. If mediation succeeds, Pakistain and Afghanistan would both have to accept clearer and more reciprocal commitments. Continued military escalation, by contrast, allows Islamabad to act unilaterally while placing responsibility for failed diplomacy on Kabul. This makes the timing of Pakistain’s latest escalation particularly significant. The wider regional context provides another possible explanation. In August, Pakistain, Saudi Arabia ...a kingdom taking up the bulk of the Arabian peninsula, largely made up of sand and oil rigs. Its primary economic activity involves exporting oil and soaking Islamic rubes on the annual haj pilgrimage. The country supports a large number of princes in whatcha might call princely splendor. Formerly dictatorial and steeped in Olde Tyme Religion, deferring to Salafist holy men on all issues, it has now done a 180 and is making a serious effort to modernize, so as not to be left in the sand by its Gulf Arab neighbors. The holy men have been shoved to the background and the nation is now still dictatorial but somewhat rational. That doesn't make them trustworthy, but it's a start...and Turkiye signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, establishing a collective-defence arrangement under which an attack against one member is to be treated as an attack against all three. The agreement quickly faced its first serious test. On 8 September, Iran's Houthi sock puppets ...a Zaidi Shia insurgent group operating in Yemen. They have also been referred to as the Believing Youth. Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi is said to be the spiritual leader of the group and most of the military leaders are his relatives. The legitimate Yemeni government has accused the them of having ties to the Iranian government. Honest they did. The group has managed to gain control over all of Saada Governorate and parts of Amran, Al Jawf and Hajjah Governorates. Its slogan is God is Great, Death to America™, Death to Israel, a curse on the JewsThey like shooting off... ummm... missiles that they would have us believe they make at home in their basements. On the plus side, they did murder Ali Abdullah Saleh, which was the only way the country was ever going to be rid of him... forces launched a major series of missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia, targeting energy facilities and military sites. The following day, Pak Defence Minister Khawaja Asif said that aggression against Saudi Arabia could make the Mecca agreement operational and stressed that Pakistain was bound by its terms. Pakistain’s rhetoric became even stronger in the following days. Senior Pak military officials pledged to stand with Saudi Arabia against aggression, while Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif told the United Nations General Assembly on 25 September that any threat to Mecca or Medina represented a "red line." The three countries also moved toward consultations among their military chiefs on how to respond to the growing Houthi threat. Yet strong rhetoric is not the same as committing troops or entering another Middle Eastern war. That distinction matters because Pakistain has been here before. In 2015, despite intense pressure from Saudi Arabia, Pakistain’s parliament voted to remain neutral in the Yemen ...an area of the Arabian Peninsula sometimes mistaken for a country. It is populated by more antagonistic tribes and factions than you can keep track of... war. A decade later, Islamabad again faces the difficult task of balancing its strategic dependence on Saudi Arabia against the enormous political and military risks of becoming directly involved in Yemen. Afghan officials have drawn their own conclusion from this timing. Taliban front man Zabihullah Mujahid has accused Pakistain of attacking Afghanistan partly to evade responsibilities under the Mecca pact and to divert attention from its domestic political, economic and security failures. Kabul obviously has its own interests in advancing this argument, and the allegation cannot by itself establish Islamabad’s motives. But it cannot simply be dismissed either. The sequence is striking. As pressure increased on members of the Mecca pact to translate collective-defence promises into action, Pakistain simultaneously intensified military operations on its western frontier. By presenting itself as already engaged in a serious conflict with Afghanistan, Pakistain’s military leadership gains a politically convenient argument against deeper involvement elsewhere while preserving its strategic relationship with Riyadh. The second motive is domestic and centres on Field Marshal Munir’s repeated inability to reverse Pakistain’s deteriorating security situation. Military action across the Afghan border offers something that a difficult domestic political settlement does not: immediate images of retaliation, strength and national resolve. Airstrikes can dominate headlines after bully boy attacks and allow the military to demonstrate that it is "responding." But retaliation is not the same as strategy. Pakistain’s security crisis has deep political, social and historical roots, particularly in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and the former tribal areas. Bombing targets across an international border cannot substitute for addressing those grievances, strengthening civilian institutions or pursuing the political compromises required for long-term stability. Nor can repeated airstrikes conceal the basic contradiction in Islamabad’s approach. If nearly a year of military pressure inside Afghanistan has failed to reduce bully boy attacks in Pakistain—and violence in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa is instead increasing—then more of the same cannot credibly be presented as a successful counterterrorism policy. The events of October 1 show that the cycle described here is no longer merely a prediction. Less than a week after the previous round of Pak strikes, Afghan civilians were again killed in cross-border air attacks, even as Islamabad once more declared that bully boy targets had been successfully eliminated. The likely pattern is therefore grim but increasingly familiar: bully boy attacks inside Pakistain, followed by Pak strikes inside Afghanistan, followed by civilian casualties, public anger and another round of escalation. That cycle may provide short-term political cover for Pakistain’s military leadership. It does not provide security for Pakistain, peace for Afghanistan or a path toward resolving the disputes between the two countries. |
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| Afghanistan |
| Pakistan launched airstrikes on drone launch and storage sites in Afghanistan |
| 2026-09-25 |
| Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited [Regnum] Pakistani forces carried out airstrikes on 10 drone launch and storage sites in Afghanistan, according to the country's Information Minister Ataullah Tarar. ![]() Pakistani authorities accused Afghanistan of violating the country's sovereignty by launching drones from Afghan territory on September 23. "Pakistan carried out precision airstrikes and UAV strikes on 10 locations in Afghanistan used to launch and store these drones," Tarar wrote on social media. Tolonews previously reported that Pakistan launched an attack on the city of Kandahar in southern Afghanistan. Afghan authorities stated that the strike hit a deserted area of the city and caused no damage. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan signed the Mecca Mutual Defense Agreement in early August. The document stipulates that armed aggression against one of the parties is considered an attack against all, with assistance provided upon request and potentially including intelligence, logistical support, ammunition, and military units. In September 2025, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif met in Beijing. During the talks, Putin stated that Russia values its relations with Pakistan. Pakistan Drone Shot Down in Afghanistan’s Helmand Province, Report Says [KhaamaPress] A Pak drone was shot down in Afghanistan’s Helmand ...an Afghan province populated mostly by Pashtuns, adjacent to Injun country in Pak Balochistan... province, according to local media reports Taliban ...the once and current oppressors of Afghanistan... -linked media claimed Thursday that the group’s forces shot down an armed Pak drone in Afghanistan’s southern Helmand province, days after Pakistain carried out ...KABOOM!... s in several Afghan provinces amid escalating cross-border tensions. Hariyat Media, a platform affiliated with Taliban intelligence, reported that the drone was intercepted over the Garmsir district of Helmand while flying near a Taliban border brigade position. The outlet cited local sources as saying the unmanned aircraft was carrying explosives and was destroyed during the operation. The report said the incident occurred over an area close to the Afghanistan-Pakistain border, where Taliban border forces have recently increased security deployments following a series of Pak military operations. Neither the Taliban Defense Ministry nor other Taliban officials have independently released evidence confirming the drone’s downing, including photographs or video of the wreckage. Pak authorities have not commented on the claim. The alleged drone interception follows a new round of Pak airstrikes inside Afghanistan. Reports indicated that Pakistain recently targeted areas in Khost, Paktia and Kandahar provinces, while additional strikes earlier hit Kunar and Paktika The United Nations ...a lucrative dumping ground for the relatives of dictators and party hacks... said at least three people were killed in the latest Pak airstrikes, while local residents reported damage to homes and civilian infrastructure. Pakistain has said previous cross-border operations were aimed at hard boy groups that Islamabad accuses of launching attacks from Afghanistan territory. Relations between Pakistain and the Taliban administration have deteriorated over the past year as Islamabad has intensified military operations along the border and repeatedly blamed the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistain (TTP) for attacks originating from Afghanistan. The Taliban administration has denied allowing Afghanistan territory to be used for attacks against Pakistain. Pakistain has increasingly relied on airstrikes and drones against what it describes as hard boy hideouts near the Afghanistan border. Previous operations in Khost, Paktika and Kunar have drawn condemnation from Taliban officials, who accused Pakistain of violating Afghanistan’s illusory sovereignty and killing civilians. Islamabad maintains that the strikes are part of counterterrorism operations targeting gangs threatening Pakistain’s security, while the Taliban insist they do not permit foreign hard boy groups to use Afghanistan territory for attacks. |
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| Afghanistan |
| Six-Year-Old Afghan Girl Married to 60-Year-Old Man for 200,000 Pakistani Rupees |
| 2026-09-05 |
| [KhaamaPress] A six-year-old girl in Afghanistan’s southern Helmand ...an Afghan province populated mostly by Pashtuns, adjacent to Injun country in Pak Balochistan... province has reportedly been married to a 60-year-old man in exchange for 200,000 Pak rupees, according to the provincial media office. The Taliban ...mindless ferocity in a turban...’s media office in Helmand said on Sunday, 30 August, that the girl’s father arranged the marriage and received the money. It said the father was addicted to drugs and was facing financial and personal difficulties. The case was reported in Garmser district, where poverty and economic hardship have increased concerns over child marriage and the vulnerability of children from struggling families. The report follows another case reported by local sources in Helmand’s Nad Ali district, where an 80-year-old man allegedly married an eight-year-old girl. The cases have renewed concerns about child and forced marriage in Afghanistan, particularly among girls. Poverty, displacement, food insecurity and limited access to education can leave children more vulnerable to early marriage and other forms of exploitation. POVERTY DEEPENS RISKS FOR AFGHAN CHILDREN The reported marriage comes amid a wider humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, where millions of people continue to face economic hardship and difficulties meeting basic needs. For families struggling to afford food, housing and healthcare, financial pressure can increase the risk of harmful coping practices, including arranging early marriages in exchange for money. Girls are particularly vulnerable because restrictions on education and employment have sharply limited their opportunities. Rights groups and humanitarian organizations have repeatedly warned that prolonged poverty, combined with restrictions affecting women and girls, can deepen their exposure to forced marriage, exploitation and other abuses. The latest case highlights how economic hardship can intersect with longstanding child-protection concerns in Afghanistan, leaving maiden of tender yearss at heightened risk when families lack access to adequate financial and social support. Related: Helmand: 2026-08-31 Afghanistan's United Front allegedly shot and killed a Taliban member in Jalalabad. Helmand: 2026-08-27 Two Former Afghan Military Personnel Shot Dead in Pakistan’s Quetta Helmand: 2026-08-24 How Taliban's medieval barbarity was exposed by video showing a woman stoned to death for adultery |
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| India-Pakistan |
| Two Former Afghan Military Personnel Shot Dead in Pakistan’s Quetta |
| 2026-08-27 |
| [KhaamaPress] Two former Afghan military personnel were rubbed out by unidentified button men in Quetta, the capital of Pakistain’s Balochistan ...the Pak province bordering Kandahar and Uruzgun provinces in Afghanistan and Sistan Baluchistan in Iran. Its native Baloch propulation is being displaced by Pashtuns and Punjabis and they aren't happy about it... province, according to police. The shooting took place on Sunday evening near Sheikh Zayed Hospital in Quetta, according to reports. Police confirmed that the attack occurred but have not released the identities of the victims or further details about the investigation. Sources indicated that the two men were associates of Basir Achakzai, a former Afghan military commander who relocated to Balochistan after the regime change in Afghanistan in 2021. According to the sources, the victims were identified as Ahmad and Adib. Their identities and military backgrounds have not been independently confirmed by Pak authorities. Basir Achakzai previously served as a commander in Dand and Zhari districts of Kandahar province and Gereshk district of Helmand ...an Afghan province populated mostly by Pashtuns, adjacent to Injun country in Pak Balochistan... province under Afghanistan’s former government, according to the report. The shooting is the latest in a series of attacks targeting Afghan nationals and former members of Afghanistan’s security forces in Quetta. Earlier this month, local sources reported that Hazratullah Achakzai, the former commander of Police District 2 in Kandahar, was rubbed out by unidentified button men in Quetta. Two days later, unidentified attackers opened fire on a group of Afghan ...a grouping of Dari-speaking people of Sino-Tibetan descent inhabiting Afghanistan and Pakistain. They are predominantly Shia Moslems and not particularly warlike, which makes them favored targets...Ganji area, reportedly killing three Afghan citizens. The incidents have heightened concerns among Afghan refugees and former Afghan security personnel living in Pakistain, many of whom fled to Balochistan following the political changes in Afghanistan in 2021. Two Afghan nationals were shot dead by unknown armed men in the Sariab area of the provincial capital. Police officials said the armed men opened indiscriminate fire when the two Afghans were passing through the area near Sheikh Zayed hospital on Monday night, killing both on the spot. |
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| Afghanistan | ||||
| How Taliban's medieval barbarity was exposed by video showing a woman stoned to death for adultery | ||||
| 2026-08-24 | ||||
[Daily Mail, where America gets its news] Standing in a hole dug into a barren Afghan mountainside, you can just about see Rukhshana's face poking above the surface. Surrounding her is a group of Taliban picking up rocks from the ground and, one by one, hurling them at the terrified young woman. Her agonised cries grow louder and louder as the barrage of rocks strikes her with sickening thuds. In the background, men shout 'Allahu Akbar' as they relentlessly stone their victim. The 19-year-old Afghan girl did not survive the barbaric 2015 stoning, which was captured in a video filmed by an anonymous witness and obtained by Radio Free Afghanistan. The disturbing scenes, capturing for the first time the brutal lengths the Taliban will go to punish defenceless women, spread on social media, shocking the world. The then-governor of Ghor province, Seema Joyenda, called Rukhshana's killing 'inhumane' at the time, while Maryam Muhammadi, an Afghan youth and women's activist, said: 'It is absurd that the government of Afghanistan lets this happen.' What makes the stoning of Rukhshana even more devastating is that she was simply trying to get away from the oppressive shackles of the Taliban's rules. At just 13 years of age, Rukhshana's parents arranged for her to marry an older man. But years later, Rukhshana refused to wed and fled with Mohammad Gul – a boy she had been in love with since childhood. The pair escaped to the Saghar District in Afghanistan's Ghor Province, but after some time, security forces captured Rukhshana and handed her back to her father. Once again, she was forced into marriage, and once again, she escaped. While on their way to Murghab village, Rukhshana and Mohammad were stopped by a local Taliban commander who had previously suggested she marry his brother. The 19-year-old was accused of having premarital sex and arrested. The Taliban demanded five million Afghanis, or £57,000, from her father in exchange for her release. Since her family could not afford the ransom, a Taliban cleric issued an order for Rukhshana to be stoned. But the young woman's tragic end was not a one-off, and instead is just one of the countless examples of the levels of violence women in Afghanistan are confronted with every day. Just months before Rukhshana's killing, a woman named Farkhunda was savagely beaten and set ablaze in central Kabul after being falsely accused of burning a Koran. The mob killing triggered protests around the country and drew global attention to the treatment of Afghan women. That same year, a video from the region appeared to show a woman receiving lashes from a turbaned elder in front of a crowd of male spectators. The flogging came after a local court found her guilty of having sex outside marriage with a man, who was similarly punished. And ever since the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan five years ago, matters for women's rights have only gotten worse. Women and girls are facing widespread discrimination in Afghanistan, with laws dictating how they must dress and behave. They are banned from secondary school and universities, from most jobs, and from nearly all leisure activities, including gyms, beauty salons and even public parks. The rules also stipulate that women can only go out in public when wearing full hijab – which includes a headscarf and long robe covering the entire body – as well as a face covering that leaves only the eyes visible. The regulations are policed by the feared Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, and if women don't comply, they are met with brutal punishment. Earlier this month, the Taliban's morality police rounded up at least nine women in a fresh move to enforce strict Sharia law dress codes. The women were detained in the city of Herat, despite them all wearing hijabs, according to Amu TV – a US-based Afghan broadcaster. The arrests come as the group has been ramping up its psychological abuse of women in Afghanistan. According to a Herat resident, women are becoming increasingly afraid to leave their homes, telling Amu TV: 'They harass women everywhere under the pretext of enforcing morality.''Women are being detained, intimidated and subjected to psychological abuse, yet no one is listening.' Another resident said four women were detained outside the Marble Market last month despite complying with the Taliban's dress requirements. 'They were wearing hijab,' the resident said. 'They were taken simply because they were wearing long coats.'
Meanwhile, in the Panjshir province, the Taliban recently told female doctors working at a local hospital that they would not be allowed to work unless they wore a burqa. The latest detention of Afghan women comes just weeks after a protest against the Taliban's morality police left one person dead and several more wounded. Officials opened fire on demonstrators during a protest back in June after dozens took to the streets to denounce the detention of women and girls arrested for violating the country's dress code. Footage obtained by Amu TV showed residents running in fear down a street in the Jibrail township, north-west of Herat City, amid the sound of multiple gunshots. Protesters can be heard screaming as others were beaten to the ground by officials wielding long sticks. Meanwhile, armed men can be seen breaking up the demonstration, including fully veiled women among the protesters. Sayed Masoud Hosseini, spokesman for Herat police, told the state-run Bakhtar News Agency that the gathering had 'created tensions' and disturbed public order under the pretext of opposing the Islamic hijab, which he described as a religious obligation. The demonstration followed days of growing outrage over the detention of women and girls in Herat, for allegedly failing to comply with the Taliban’s strict interpretation of Islamic dress requirements. Dozens of women, including at least 21 whose detentions were independently confirmed, had been taken into custody by officials from the Taliban’s Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, Amu TV claimed. The human rights arm of the UN delivered a damning assessment of conditions in Afghanistan in a report released in March, warning that life for ordinary Afghans, especially women and girls, has severely worsened under the Taliban.
Women remain excluded from all education above primary school age, following a ban from higher education since December 2022. In November 2025, medical graduation examinations were held without the participation of women for the second consecutive year, after having been banned from medical institutes since December 2024. Women deemed not to be complying with the chador requirement – the traditional Islamic full-body cloak – have been removed from public transport and denied access to public markets and services.Meanwhile, a new law demands that girls wait until puberty before seeking to get out of a marriage, and also requires mediation for women seeking to escape an abusive husband. 'The authorities have, in effect, criminalised the presence of women and girls in public life,' Mr Türk said. 'Discrimination affects their healthcare, their access to civic space, and their freedom of movement and expression.' 'Afghanistan is a graveyard for human rights,' he concluded.
Related: Rukhshana 02/14/2017 Top Taliban leader involved in stoning of a girl surrenders in Ghor Rukhshana 12/24/2015 Helmand Asks For Probe As Province Struggles Against Insurgents Rukhshana 12/12/2015 Security Incidents Drop 23 Percent In November: Report Related: Herat: 2026-08-14 HRW Calls for Release of 8 UN and Aid Workers Detained in Afghanistan Herat: 2026-08-08 Afghanistan Freedom Front allegedly carried out a rocket strike targeting military airport in Kabul Herat: 2026-06-26 Afghanistan Freedom Front targeted a Taliban base in Qolak village, Noorlam Baba Valley | ||||
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| Syria-Lebanon-Iran | |
| VDH on Iran: ‘ignore the periodic 24-hour schizophrenia of the Left and the media...examine...its likely long-term effects’ | |
| 2026-04-15 | |
The prognosis of the Iran War is now so couched in politics and so warped by the American Left that the public has grown tired and wants it all to go away. But in truth, the situation is so fluid that any accurate prediction is impossible. Yet there is good reason to believe in an eventual outcome quite favorable to the U.S. and one far better than the status quo ante bellum. THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ Prior to President Trump’s most recent announcement that the United States would first blockade and then reopen and control traffic through the Strait, only a few ships were going through, mostly those aligned with Iran, opposed to the United States, or neutral. Thus, the Strait was disrupted to a far greater degree than during Iran’s earlier efforts at closure during the “Tanker War” phase of the Iran–Iraq War, as well as its chronic harassment of shipping in 2018–19. And now? If Trump quickly clears and secures control of the Strait, and if allowable traffic reaches, say, 60–70 percent of prewar levels and if the U.S. avoids a full-scale war, instead responding disproportionately to any renewed Iranian attempts to close it—then, within one to two months, oil prices will begin to taper off. The American challenge with the war is not military but political. This time, the U.S. is not sending Marines to fight house to house in Fallujah or to scour villages on the ground in Helmand Province—losing hundreds in casualties and fighting in circumstances favorable to jihadists and terrorists. Instead, the administration is restrained in its use of force only by concerns about the war’s effects on the U.S. economy, global oil prices, domestic gas prices, the midterm elections, and the political fortunes of vulnerable Republican members of Congress. Militarily, the U.S. has choices. The Navy can continue demining the Strait, rotate patrols of U.S. and allied warships through it, allow allied and neutral shipping to pass while blocking Iranian-bound ships, and periodically strike Iran whenever it attempts to disrupt shipping—including clearing its coasts of missiles and drones. In other words, Trump can flip the Iranian strategy of selective entrance to the Strait, with the key difference that he has the wherewithal to carry out such a calibrated blockade, and Iran does not. World opinion will be with him, for economic reasons and, should Iran seek to stop him, for its breaking the ceasefire and thus justifying the rain of retaliatory bombs that will descend upon it. Or if Iran restarts missile and drone attacks on U.S. military and allies in the region, the administration can warn Iran that it will lose its oil facilities on Kharg Island as well as dual-use generation plants—until it relents. But in the long term, no one will forget Iran’s third—and most egregious—effort to hijack the Strait, despite its failure to do so completely and for any sustained period. The Gulf exporters will double down on their Red Sea and Gulf of Oman pipelines, which bypass the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi Arabia and others will explore more routes, perhaps even through Jordan to Israel and Haifa on the Mediterranean. In the end, Iran will be left with an inert asset—if not a liability—since the United States can ensure that no oil flows from Kharg Island through the patrolled Strait, which the West may ultimately render irrelevant anyway. Importers will quietly begin shifting toward increased output from Venezuela, the United States, and perhaps a soon-to-be unsanctioned Russia. Iran’s attacks on 11 Muslim nations in the Middle East will not be lost on the people of the region. Many of the sheikdoms will continue to press Israel and the U.S. to ensure Iran does not rearm. A sane Gulf would not give any more money to Hamas, given its hostile and hated lunatic patron. REGIME CHANGE Iran lost most of its 47-year-old, multibillion-dollar investment in weapons as well as its military-industrial complex. To rearm will cost the regime dearly—and that vast expense will be unpopular with a restive populace short of food and fuel. It will be hard for whoever is running the country to reestablish its military arsenals and multibillion-dollar subsidies to Arab terrorists. Indeed, Iran’s subsidized proxies—Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis—may be left orphaned, despised by the Iranian people, and perhaps even more hated by some of their former Gulf co-sponsors. The odd myth of Iranian military invulnerability is shattered. And that loss of face, too, will have consequences soon at home and abroad. The Iranian people will further grow angry that the one nationalist argument made by the Iranian mullahs—that at least its half-century, half-trillion-dollar military buildup sent shivers throughout the Middle East, terrified the West, and gave global cred to Iran—has now also imploded. It is one thing for the people to be ruled by globally feared autocrats armed to the teeth, but quite another to be governed by humiliated, now-impotent incompetents and buffoons. Once the Berlin Wall fell, it took weeks and sometimes months for Eastern Europeans to overthrow their communist oppressors. And it required more than two years after the wall went down for its full effects to ripple out and dissolve the Soviet Union. On that basis, then, no one should expect regime change merely days after the cessation of the war. The West has little real idea who is currently running Iran or who or even what they represent. All that is known is that second- or third-tier theocrats, military officers, politicos, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps thugs are vying for power. Each cadre has likely become terrified that it will either be seen as too accommodating and attacked by the hard-liners—or that rivals will defect and cut a deal with the Iranian people to serve as transitional figures, thereby avoiding the noose. The worst of the worst know that if they are not killed by drones or missiles in any renewed hostilities, they may instead be killed by the Iranian people if and when the regime collapses. WINNERS AND LOSERS The eventual beneficiaries and casualties of the war will become clear over the next three or four weeks, hinging on whether the U.S. concludes that those in charge are worthless negotiators who, if Iran persists in attacks, will have to be persuaded by further force. But on the larger map, the once anti-Western bloc—Russia’s Assad regime in Syria, China’s Iran satellite, and Iran’s own proxies, Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis—is either gone, tottering, humiliated, or increasingly isolated. Russia’s brief advantage from higher oil prices will end soon. It will remain stuck in a Somme-like quagmire in Ukraine, and its weapons corridor to and from Iran will be hard to restore to prewar levels. If Putin were smart, he would cut a deal with Ukraine, seek relief from sanctions on Russian oil, and then pump like crazy. China has lost its exclusive oil concessions with Venezuela and may have forfeited a similar sweetheart deal with Iran, now or in the near future. If the regime falls, Beijing will likely be hated by any subsequent transitional government. It may instead seek to come to some arrangement with the U.S. to send its tankers through the Strait—if Iran does not provoke the U.S. and lose Kharg Island. | |
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| Fifth Column |
| 180A identifies 'Familiar Pattern:' - Spotters, cutouts, dead drops, disciplined coms. |
| 2026-01-26 |
| [Eric Schwalm on X] As a former Special Forces Warrant Officer with multiple rotations running counterinsurgency ops—both hunting insurgents and trying to separate them from sympathetic populations—I’ve seen organized resistance up close. From Anbar to Helmand, the pattern is familiar: spotters, cutouts, dead drops (or modern equivalents), disciplined comms, role specialization, and a willingness to absorb casualties while bleeding the stronger force slowly. What’s unfolding in Minneapolis right now isn’t "protest." It’s low-level insurgency infrastructure, built by people who’ve clearly studied the playbook. Signal groups at 1,000-member cap per zone. Dedicated roles: mobile chasers, plate checkers logging vehicle data into shared databases, 24/7 dispatch nodes vectoring assets, SALUTE-style reporting (Size, Activity, Location, Unit, Time, Equipment) on suspected federal vehicles. Daily chat rotations and timed deletions to frustrate forensic recovery. Vetting processes for new joiners. Mutual aid from sympathetic locals (teachers providing cover, possible PD tip-offs on license plate lookups). Home-base coordination points. Rapid escalation from observation to physical obstruction—or worse. This isn’t spontaneous outrage. This is C2 (command and control) with redundancy, OPSEC hygiene, and task organization that would make a SF team sergeant nod in recognition. Replace "ICE agents" with "occupying coalition forces" and the structure maps almost 1:1 to early-stage urban cells we hunted in the mid-2000s. The most sobering part? It’s domestic. Funded, trained (somewhere), and directed by people who live in the same country they’re trying to paralyze law enforcement in. When your own citizens build and operate this level of parallel intelligence and rapid-response network against federal officers—complete with doxxing, vehicle pursuits, and harassment that’s already turned lethal—you’re no longer dealing with civil disobedience. You’re facing a distributed resistance that’s learned the lessons of successful insurgencies: stay below the kinetic threshold most of the time, force over-reaction when possible, maintain popular support through narrative, and never present a single center of gravity. I spent years training partner forces to dismantle exactly this kind of apparatus. Now pieces of it are standing up in American cities, enabled by elements of local government and civil society. That should keep every thinking American awake at night. Not because I want escalation. But because history shows these things don’t de-escalate on their own once the infrastructure exists and the cadre believe they’re winning the information war. We either recognize what we’re actually looking at—or we pretend it’s still just "activism" until the structures harden and spread. Your call, America. But from where I sit, this isn’t January 2026 politics anymore. It’s phase one of something we’ve spent decades trying to keep off our own soil. |
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| Afghanistan |
| Briefly on the 'war' between Afghanistan and Pakistan |
| 2025-10-12 |
| Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. Commentary by Russian military journalist Boris Rozhin [ColonelCassad] 1. The Pakistani Taliban has been fighting on the territory of Pakistan for a long time and relatively successfully. The structure operates mostly autonomously from the Afghan Taliban, but they maintain contacts. It is important to remember that the Taliban as such is a child of Pakistani military intelligence. ![]() 2. The Pakistani Taliban is waging war on the territory of Pakistan, striving for territorial control. He will attack the military and security forces, but he does not disdain the practice of terror. His tactics in general are similar to the tactics of the Afghan Taliban during the war against foreign intervention and the puppet government. Of course, after the victory of the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani comrades cheered up, although the chances of one person toppling the regime of the Pakistani military are not very great. 3. For rest and replenishment, they periodically go across the border to Afghanistan, the Kabul Taliban certainly do not intend to expel their Pakistani brothers, but they do not officially participate in the war on the territory of Pakistan. Actually, during the Taliban occupation, the Afghan Taliban also went to Pakistan for rest and replenishment. With the knowledge of Pakistani military intelligence. Even under Obama, the USA bombed Taliban camps directly on the territory of Pakistan. Nuclear-armed Pakistan pretended to be very unhappy when its territory was bombarded by American drones, killing, including the civilian population of Pakistan. 4. After the recent successful attacks of the Pakistani Taliban on the military, Pakistan decided to respond and attacked Kabul, where one of the leaders of the Pakistani Taliban was hanging out. So to speak in the spirit of Israel. Like Israel's attack on Qatar, Pakistan's attack on Kabul only worsened the situation. And the leader of the Pakistani Taliban was not killed, and local battles on the border with the Afghan Taliban began. As you can easily guess, fighting the Afghan Taliban with the help of airstrikes is quite a pointless venture. And so Pakistan runs the risk of getting another additional front on the border, in addition to the internal attacks of the Pakistani Taliban and the periodically hot front in Kashmir. 5. Taking into account the fact that China has a serious influence on both the Taliban and Pakistan, I will assume that Beijing will try to curtail this escalation in the next week, since both Afghanistan and Pakistan play an important role in China's economic expansion plans in Central Asia. There is no need for war and instability on the border of China. 6. On the other hand, India may well fuel the ambitions of the Pakistani Taliban with the aim of weakening its old enemy with an additional front. Therefore, a clash of interests is possible here, although India is also interested in participating in new trade corridors, some of which will go through Afghanistan to India. The USA itself also benefits from chaos in the region, as it will hit China's positions and give the opportunity to continue pressuring the Taliban to give the Bagram Air Base to the USA. So, in these conditions, I will not be surprised if the USA begins to show diplomatic or other support for Pakistan's actions. In general, they will fight, let off steam, and then, under the pressure of external players, conclude a cold peace until the next time. As recently as the war between India and Pakistan. Incidentally, for Trump, there is another reason for cheap PR - let the Taliban and Pakistan be at peace. Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. More from regnum.ru Afghan Air Force attacks Pakistan's Lahore Kabul, October 11, 2025, 10:20 PM. Afghan air forces attacked the Pakistani city of Lahore following armed clashes on the border between the two countries. This was reported on October 11 by the news portal Tolo News. "This evening, Taliban Air Force (the Taliban is under UN sanctions for terrorist activities) Super Tucano fighter jets struck positions in the Pakistani city of Lahore," the journalists clarified. The airstrike was reportedly a response to armed clashes in the border area. No casualties or damage in Lahore were reported. On the night of March 23, Pakistani forces killed 16 Islamist militants attempting to breach the border from Afghanistan. The incident occurred while Pakistan's Special Representative for Afghanistan, Sadiq Khan, was on a two-day official visit to Kabul. The Pakistani politician traveled to Afghanistan to discuss bilateral relations and economic issues. Even more from regnum.ru Heavy fighting has begun on the Afghan-Pakistani border. Kabul, October 11, 2025, 11:01 PM. Heavy fighting has begun along the entire Durand Line on the Afghan-Pakistani border, Tolo News reported. "Local sources report large-scale clashes between Taliban forces (the Taliban is under UN sanctions for terrorist activities) and the Pakistani army along the Durand Line," the authors wrote. Five Pakistani soldiers are known to have been killed in the clashes. Heavy fighting is ongoing in the provinces of Kunar, Nangarhar, and Helmand. Pakistani border positions are being attacked from several positions simultaneously. In some areas, Pakistani troops have been forced to abandon their positions and retreat. |
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| Afghanistan | |
| US military didn't plan for Taliban's ISIS-K jailbreak, forced a rush to close Bagram Air Base | |
| 2025-09-04 | |
The speed with which the U.S. military abandoned Afghanistan in 2021 — including the timing of the abandonment of the Bagram Air Base — was driven not just by President Joe Biden, but also by military commanders who adopted a “speed is safety” mantra while failing to plan for the Taliban’s jailbreak of ISIS-K terrorists. Then-CENTCOM Commander General Frank McKenzie told Congress last year that “we believed that speed brought safety” when explaining why the U.S. military conducted its retreat so quickly in 2021. Politico reported that Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff both insisted in May 2021 that “speed equals safety.” Although the transcript of the press conference has been deleted, a web archive shows that Biden publicly endorsed the U.S. military’s “speed is safety” argument in early July 2021, just after the U.S. had quietly left Bagram at the start of the month. An ISIS-K suicide bomber named Abdul Rahman al-Logari — who had been freed by the Taliban from a prison at Bagram in mid-August 2021 — has been identified by CENTCOM as having carried out the suicide attack at Abbey Gate, killing 13 U.S. service members and an estimated 170 Afghan civilians on August 26, 2021. Military had no plan to secure terrorist prisoners as Afghanistan crumbled Two books and multiple news articles have reported that Biden national security adviser Jake Sullivan asked the U.S. military leaders in June 2021 to consider pausing or delaying the closure of Bagram, but that Austin and Milley pushed back against this and insisted on closing Bagram quickly — which Biden approved. General Austin “Scottie” Miller, the final U.S. commander of NATO’s Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan, admitted last year in congressional testimony that he did not know of any plan to secure the terrorists held at Bagram in the possible scenario that the Taliban marched on the base. Command Sergeant Major Jacob Smith, who served as the Bagram senior enlisted advisor in 2021, also said he was not aware of any plan to handle the terrorist prisoners at Bagram if the prison fell to the Taliban or if the terrorists were sprung from jail there. The House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC), led at the time by then Chairman Michael McCaul, R-Texas, released a report on the Afghan withdrawal last year titled, “Willful Blindness: An Assessment of the Biden-Harris Administration’s Withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Chaos that Followed.” The HFAC report attributed Milley’s rush to close Bagram to Miller, despite citing the two books which attributed the pushback to Milley. The report also did not include the revelatory admissions from Miller and Smith about the lack of U.S. military planning for the exact scenario that occurred, with the Taliban freeing ISIS-K terrorists from Bagram after the U.S. left the base. Just the News previously reported that, less than two weeks before the Abbey Gate bombing, McKenzie held a mid-August 2021 meeting with Taliban leader Mullah Baradar in Doha, Qatar which would end with the Taliban taking control of Kabul and the U.S. relying upon the goodwill of Taliban fighters to provide security at the Kabul airport during the evacuation. McKenzie is currently listed as the Executive Director for the Global and National Security Institute at the University of Southern Florida. The general did not immediately respond to a request for comment sent to him through his email at the school. Nor did he respond to prior Just the News reporting about him. Milley did not respond to requests for comment sent to him through Princeton University, where he was named a visiting professor last year, and through JPMorgan Chase, where he has been a senior adviser since 2024. He did not respond to previous Just the News reporting on him. Austin did not respond to a request sent to him through the Clarion Strategies firm which he co-founded. As for critiques of the HFAC report, "Chairman McCaul stands by his comprehensive report, the culmination of 18 transcribed interviews, seven public hearings, and 20,000 pages of documents obtained under subpoena from the State Department,” Emily Cassil, a spokesperson for former HFAC Chairman Michael McCaul, told Just the News. Then-Rep. Mike Waltz, R-Fla., said he went on a congressional delegation to Kabul prior to Biden’s April 2021 withdrawal decision, where he met with McKenzie, who told him that “if we get the green light to withdraw, I'm going to do it as fast as possible, because we will be vulnerable.” Waltz, who went on to be Trump’s national security adviser and is currently Trump’s nominee to be U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, said he told McKenzie that that strategy would be like “looking at the issue with a soda straw on just the military operation.” Waltz asked the general how that took into account NATO partners, ongoing support for the Afghan military, U.S. contractors, the U.S. embassy presence, and all of the languishing Special Immigrant Visa applicants, but he said McKenzie didn’t have much of an answer except to repeat that “if I get the green light, I’m putting my foot on the gas to get the heck out of there and limit our exposure.” McKenzie appeared before the House Armed Services Committee on April 20, 2021 where he was pressed on the withdrawal. During the hearing, Waltz asked McKenzie: “Would Bagram Air Base be valuable to you, being where it's located geographically, west of China, south of Russia, east of Iran?” McKenzie replied that “Bagram is key terrain.” Bagram was abandoned by the U.S. in early July of that year. After finding out about the withdrawal order, one U.S. Special Forces operator said that after getting off the phone with Miller that he had been told that Austin “made the decision to pull everybody out starting immediately.” The retreat from the base in Helmand province lasted just ten days. | |
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| Syria-Lebanon-Iran | |
| Iran's water crisis at tipping point in threat to Islamic regime's stability | |
| 2025-03-31 | |
| [Jpost] Iran expert Dr. Sharona Mazalian Levi says prolonged water outages, empty reservoirs, and crop failures may be a recipe for social unrest. "Iran is drying up," Dr. Sharona Mazalian Levi from The Alliance Center for Iranian Studies at Tel Aviv University affirmed, painting a grim picture of what she described as one of the most pressing environmental challenges facing the Islamic Republic today. "Iran is facing an unprecedented water crisis that threatens the nation’s stability," Mazalian Levi said. She explained that multiple factors have converged to create this critical situation, with several major provinces now reaching what she deemed "a tipping point." According to Mazalian Levi, the Iranian Energy Ministry declared last week that the provinces of Tehran, Isfahan, Razavi Khorasan, and Yazd are facing a severe water crisis. She highlighted the alarming state of the Karaj Dam, which supplies water to millions in Tehran and the surrounding areas. "The Karaj Dam is now at only 6% of its capacity," she noted, referencing reports from Tasnim news agency that 94% of the reservoir is empty. "This isn’t just an environmental issue; it’s a potential catalyst for civil unrest and disorder that could lead to national instability." Two of the main catalysts for the crisis are what Mazalian Levi named "poor management of the water sector," as well as a population growth of more than 250% in only 50 years. "This includes over-extraction from natural water sources and aquifers to the point of depletion," she added. However, Mazalian Levi traced the origins of the crisis further back in history. According to the researcher, following the 1979 revolution, Iran found itself internationally isolated and was forced to develop an autarkic economic system. Religious leaders, including then-supreme leader Ruhollah Khomeini, encouraged citizens to embrace farming and agriculture as a way of life, drawing from texts regarding the Prophet Muhammad himself. "This agricultural push significantly increased water usage at a time when the country was still relying on outdated and inefficient irrigation technologies," she explained. "Simultaneously, Iran experienced tremendous population growth, from approximately 37 million on the eve of the revolution to around 90 million today." Mazalian Levi also pointed out that the influx of millions of undocumented Afghani migrants has further strained resources, creating an exponential rise in demand for water. Urban migration has compounded the problem, with rural residents moving to major cities like Tehran, Mashhad, and Karaj, placing even greater pressure on urban water supplies. "The most important river in Afghanistan, the Helmand, flows into Iran," Mazalian Levi explained. "According to a 1973 agreement, the Afghans pledged to transfer around 820 million cubic meters of water to neighboring Iran yearly (with an option to lower the quantities in case of water scarcity). However, recently, the Afghan government violated the agreement and blocked the flow to the Islamic Republic, which intensified the already tense relations between the Shi’ite and Sunni neighbors," the Iran expert added.
"People are left with murky water and even mud coming out of their taps," she said, citing video evidence from the city of Ahvaz. "Water tankers are being dispatched across the country, medical teams find themselves preparing for surgery without water, and household activities are disrupted without warning." ...The agricultural sector has been hit particularly hard. Farmers are being forced to abandon water-intensive crops like wheat and rice in favor of varieties more suited to drought conditions. Many are giving up farming altogether and migrating to cities in search of alternative employment. "Crop variety is shrinking, and the country’s food security is being undermined," Mazalian Levi warned. "There are real shortages of fruits, vegetables, legumes, grains, and oils, leading to rising food prices and increased dependence on imported food." This dependence is especially problematic given the hyperinflation Iran has experienced in recent years, making imported food prices increasingly volatile and unaffordable for many Iranians. In short. Iran's rulers are desperate - which makes them very dangerous. | |
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