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Hassan Ghul	Hassan Ghul	al-Qaeda	Iraq				20040124
	Hasan Ghul	al-Qaeda	Iraq				20040124
	Hassan Gul	al-Qaeda	Iraq				20040123

-Election 2012

UN Warns Americans: Do Not Elect Mitt Romney

2012-10-21

The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights has warned Americans not to elect Republican Mitt Romney in next month's presidential election, saying that doing so would be "a democratic mandate for torture." Thanks Sparky. Now off to Zimbabwe wit yez... The UN's Ben Emmerson was referring to Romney's refusal to rule out the use of waterboarding in interrogating terror detainees, a practice that President Barack Obama has ended. A practice President Obama says he has ended...or perhaps pledged to end. Obama promises all have an expiration date. Colin Perkel of The Canadian Press reported Emmerson's remarks from a symposium in Toronto on the impact of 9/11 on human rights: "The re-introduction of torture under a Romney administration would significantly increase the threat levels to (Americans) at home and abroad," Emmerson said. "Such a policy, if adopted, would expose the American people to risks the Obama administration is not currently exposing them to." As in, our ambassadors would be at increased risk? U.S. intelligence services were able to pinpoint Osama bin Laden's location and carry out the successful mission to kill him in May 2011 based on information yielded during waterboarding of 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and information from Al Qaeda operative Hassan Ghul, who was captured in Iraq in 2004. Obama opposed both waterboarding and the Iraq War, without which bin Laden would not have been found. Emmerson warned that Romney could reinstate waterboarding if he took office. He also criticized the Obama administration's drone program--an initiative begun by the Bush administration but accelerated by President Obama, partly because of his reluctance to capture, detain or interrogate terror suspects. Emmerson sounds like the kind of guy who relies on words, promises and emotions, as opposed to understanding how 80% of the world really works...

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Terror Networks

Paks Spring Big Turban, but Bush Not Blamed

2011-06-15

The terrorist described as the linchpin in the hunt for Osama bin Laden has rejoined al-Qaida after the Bush administration released him from a secret CIA secret prison Boy! There's a missed opportunity! under pressure from Pakistan, according to former and current U.S. intelligence officials. Who asked not to be named, because then their story might be checked. Shortly after the CIA decided to close the hundreds of secret prisons, the U.S. intelligence agency returned al-Qaida operative Hassan Ghul in 2006 to his native Pakistan, which had been demanding his release since his capture about two years earlier. No doubt, the media cheered on the demands from his native Pakistan, but we don't need to bring that up! Pakistan held Ghul for at least a year before he was released, eventually making his way back to al-Qaida as fast as his curley-toed slippers could carry him to help with operations against the U.S., the nameless, secretive officials said. Pakistan's decision to free Ghul, a midlevel al-Qaida operative, is yet another troubling revelation in a time when the U.S. is rethinking its relationship with the Pakistan and whether it can be a trusted ally in the war on terror. Wow. Somebody must've really cheesed the media. They could've easily blamed Bush for springing him for Gitmo. Of course, they could've blamed all the whiners who wanted Gitmo closed, 'cuz all the plain folks Cheney locked up there were all innocent. Maybe this is part of Soros's plan? Whip up a war frenzy with Pakistain to distract attention from Zero's "bumps in the road to recovery." Incumbents love wartime economic gains!

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International-UN-NGOs

AI wants us to know: 39 Secretly Imprisoned by U.S.

2007-06-07

A coalition of human rights groups has drawn up a list of 39 terror suspects it believes are being secretly imprisoned by U.S. authorities and published their names in a report released Thursday. Information about the so-called "ghost detainees" was gleaned from interviews with former prisoners and officials in the U.S., Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Yemen, according to Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and four other groups. Information on the purported missing detainees was, in some cases, incomplete, the report acknowledged. Some detainees had been added to the list because Marwan Jabour, an Islamic militant who claims to have spent two years in CIA custody, remembered being shown photos of them during interrogations, it said. Others were identified only by their first or last names, like "al-Rubaia," who was added to the list after a fellow inmate reported seeing the name scribbled onto the wall of his cell. But information for at least 21 of the detainees had been confirmed by two or more independent sources, said Anne Fitzgerald, a senior adviser for Amnesty International. President Bush acknowledged the existence of secret detention centers in September 2006, but said that the prisons were then empty. Bush said 14 terrorism suspects that the CIA had been holding, including a mastermind of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, had been transferred to military custody at Guantanamo Bay for trials. Detainees on the list include Hassan Ghul and Ali Abd al-Rahman al-Faqasi al-Ghamdi, who were both named in the 9-11 Commission report as al-Qaida operatives. Another is Mustafa Setmarian Nasar, a jihadist ideologue named as one of the FBI's "Most Wanted Terrorists." U.S. officials have confirmed that Nasar was seized in the southwestern Pakistani city of Quetta in November 2005, and the activists' report said that he was taken into U.S. custody after his arrest, citing unnamed Pakistani officials. His current location is unknown. Also missing is Mohammed Omar Abdel-Rahman, the son of the Omar Abdel-Rahman, the "Blind Sheik" behind the first plot against the World Trade Center in New York, the report said. Most of the 35 other detainees mentioned in the report have been previously identified, with the exception of four Libyans, alleged members of the al-Qaida-linked Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. The report says they were handed to U.S. authorities and have not been heard from since. The four other groups involved in drafting the report were the Center for Constitutional Rights in New York, the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice at New York University's School of Law, and Reprieve and Cageprisoners - both London-based rights groups.

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Terror Networks

Osama Bin Laden will never surrender, says ex-jihadi

2006-03-09

A Saudi Muslim scholar who spent years with Arab jihadis in Afghanistan said he knows Osama bin Laden well and that the Al Qaeda leader would never surrender, according to a report published Wednesday. “He will never surrender because he seeks death and yearns for it,” said Musa al-Qorni in an interview with Saudi-owned pan-Arab newspaper Al-Hayat. He added that he believed bin Laden, the mastermind of the September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States, is at present under the sway of the “Egyptian jihad group” led by Al Qaeda’s second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri and acts according to its plans. Qorni said he and others tried to convince bin Laden when he was in Sudan in the mid-1990s to come back to Saudi Arabia and “lead a normal life”, but that the Saudi-born militant snubbed them and returned to Afghanistan. I was thinking about this very subject yesterday, and started to write on it. Naturally, with such an interesting idea, I was interrupted and couldn't get back to it. I think we've seen enough ferocious bad guyz by now to have a pretty good statistical feel for their actions when cornered. Some are assisted from the gene pool without being given the opportunity to demonstrate their "yearning for death," notably by being helizapped, so they can be dropped from the equation. Udai and Qusay fought it out to the bitter end. In Soddy Arabia they tend to shoot it out to the bitter end — one wonders, in fact, if they're given a choice in the matter. But Sammy was found cowering in the receiving end of an outhouse and gave up. Abu Zubaydah was wounded and gave up. Khalid Sheikh Mohammad was captured in his underwear. Ramzi bin al-Shibh let the minions do the shooting, then gave up. Abdur Rehman gave up, complaining that his human rights had been violated when RAB turned off the water. Bangla Bhai managed to set fire to himself, but then he gave up. Abu Faraj al-Libbi? Captured. Mustafa Setmarian Nasar, ditto. Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, captured. Hambali, captured. Hassan Ghul, captured. Mohammed Naeem Noor Khan, captured. Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani ("Foopy"), also captured. Louai Sakra, captured. Are we getting the impression that "You'll never take me alive, coppers!" only applies to the lower ranks? I think that when Binny's finally cornered his feet will turn out to be the same fine grade of clay as Sammy's. Same with Zawahiri, and same with Zarqawi. You heard read it here first.

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Terror Networks

The rise of Zarqawi as bin Laden's protege

2005-12-12

At the time, the meeting hardly seemed notable--let alone the start of the world's deadliest partnership. It was late in 1999, and Osama bin Laden was sheltering in Afghanistan, already deep into his plot to attack the World Trade Center. His visitor was a burly young Jordanian, bruised and furious after spending six years inside his country's worst prisons. Abu Mousab al-Zarqawi had traveled to Afghanistan with a proposal for the al-Qaeda chief: he wanted to rally Islam's "true believers" to rise up against corrupt regimes in the Middle East. Bin Laden was skeptical. While al-Zarqawi advocated a war on all fronts, bin Laden was fixated on attacking the U.S. and Israel. He was unsure whether the abrasive, ambitious al-Zarqawi would make a reliable lieutenant. But al-Zarqawi would not be dissuaded. According to an account of the meeting by Saif al-Adel, a former member of bin Laden's inner circle, that appeared on jihadist websites, al-Zarqawi "doesn't retreat on anything ... He doesn't compromise." So began an odyssey that would transform al-Zarqawi from a brawling thug to the leader of the jihadist insurgency in Iraq, a man deemed so threatening to U.S. security that he commands the same $25 million bounty offered for bin Laden. By turning Iraq into a breeding ground for al-Qaeda foot soldiers, al-Zarqawi has given new shape to an organization that was fractured when the U.S., in retaliation for the 9/11 attacks, ousted the Taliban and sent bin Laden into hiding. And as al-Zarqawi's stature has risen, his relationship with bin Laden has apparently grown more complex and contentious, like that of an apprentice who has eclipsed his master. At stake in their struggle for control, say those who track the two men, is the future of the global Islamic terrorist movement and its war with the U.S. and its allies. In the four years since bin Laden disappeared during the siege of Tora Bora, intelligence agencies around the world have struggled to glean information about the whereabouts and inner workings of al-Qaeda's high command. U.S. intelligence on al-Zarqawi, bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, is not strong. But counterterrorism and intelligence officials tell TIME they believe al-Zarqawi has expanded his reach outside Iraq's borders to the extent that he has become al-Qaeda's most dangerous operative. The U.S. believes al-Zarqawi has contacted about two dozen other terrorist groups in more than 30 countries in Europe, Africa and Asia in an effort to raise funds for his network and coordinate international operations. His network has forged links with jihadist groups in Europe that may be planning attacks similar to the London bombings last July. According to Arab counterterrorism authorities, since his arrival in Iraq, al-Zarqawi has been involved in attacks in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Egypt, Morocco and, most recently, the Nov. 9 triple-suicide bombing in Jordan. And American counterterrorism officials are worried that al-Zarqawi may also be reaching out to extremists hidden in the U.S. "He's certainly trying to assume the mantle of bin Laden," says an American intelligence analyst who has studied al-Zarqawi. "It may be that bin Laden's and al-Zawahiri's time has passed." The two al-Qaeda leaders are certainly under pressure. In a statement said to have been taped in September and aired by al-Jazeera last week, al-Zawahiri claimed that al-Qaeda is "spreading, expanding and strengthening" and that "bin Laden is still leading its jihad" against the West. But intelligence officials say it's striking that bin Laden himself has not issued a videotaped statement for more than a year--a sign, U.S. intelligence believes, that while he is probably still alive, he has been forced to go further underground to avoid detection. So, is bin Laden still in control? By tracing his relationship with al-Zarqawi through a variety of sources--interrogation of captured operatives, encrypted codes on jihadist websites, chains of messages spanning from Iraq to Afghanistan--terrorism experts have assembled a picture of the way bin Laden turned to his former acolyte to revive al-Qaeda after the fall of the Taliban. It also reveals the ways in which al-Zarqawi has steered al-Qaeda in directions his bosses probably never intended or approved of--and why that makes the terrorist threat more unpredictable, and perhaps more dangerous, than it was before Sept. 11. The pair's first purported meeting, in Afghanistan in 1999, provided hints of their future rivalry. A senior Pakistani military officer who once advised the Taliban's inner circle says, "Osama's camp was not open to everyone. People like al-Zarqawi, who were temporary visitors, were never trusted by him." According to the officer, Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar was warned by al-Qaeda not to be swayed by al-Zarqawi's global war cry. The officer says, "Those around Mullah Omar made it clear that the Taliban should avoid fighting in other people's wars"--especially in gulf states where the Taliban and al-Qaeda had plenty of wealthy backers. But according to a biography of al-Zarqawi written by al-Adel (now believed to be under detention in Iran), bin Laden thought it "unwise to lose the chance of mobilizing al-Zarqawi and his companions in those regions"--especially if al-Zarqawi, with his ties to Jordan's militant underground, could help carry out an attack against Israel. According to al-Adel's account, bin Laden instructed al-Zarqawi to set up his own camp, far from bin Laden's activities, in the stony hills behind Herat, near Afghanistan's western border with Iran. By 9/11, al-Zarqawi was training several dozen fighters from Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq at his Herat camp. He and other jihadis brought out their wives and children and formed an armed, Islamic commune, with al-Zarqawi as self-anointed emir, or prince. When U.S. forces attacked in October 2001, al-Zarqawi rallied with al-Qaeda and Taliban commanders in Kandahar, the last bastion of the militants. No match for the laser-guided bombs of U.S. warplanes, al-Zarqawi and a select band of fighters fled westward into Iran and eventually northern Iraq, where he had ties with the radical Islamic group Ansar al-Islam. U.S. intelligence sources say they believe that a few months after the U.S.'s March 2003 invasion of Iraq, bin Laden dispatched a trusted aide, Abdul Hadi al-Iraqi, to see about organizing an al-Qaeda cell there. A former major in Saddam Hussein's army, al-Iraqi seemed the perfect choice. But al-Zarqawi was reportedly enraged that bin Laden had sent someone else as terrorist ringmaster and apparently refused to cooperate with al-Iraqi. U.S. intelligence officials can't confirm that account, but they do say bin Laden's choice later returned to Afghanistan. Today, say the officials, al-Iraqi acts as al-Qaeda's most lethal commander in Afghanistan, employing tactics and bombmaking skills honed in Iraq and shared over the Internet and by returning fighters. By the time of the al-Iraqi mission, the organizational structure of al-Qaeda had been revamped. In the wake of 9/11--according to a classified report detailing elements of the U.S. interrogation of former bin Laden aide Abu Faraj al-Libbi, the contents of which were confirmed to TIME by a senior French counterterrorism official--al-Qaeda leaders delegated day-to-day authority over the group's global network to a "management committee" of five operatives, including al-Libbi. From that point on, only attacks on the U.S. homeland required approval from bin Laden and al-Zawahiri. The high command's decision to devolve authority empowered operatives like al-Zarqawi. In February 2004, U.S. authorities in Baghdad intercepted a letter believed to be from al-Zarqawi to al-Zawahiri in which the Jordanian laid out his plan to provoke Iraq's Shi'ites into a civil war with the Sunnis, one that would draw in Salafi Sunni extremists from across the Islamic world. Arab intelligence sources tell TIME that al-Zarqawi's incendiary aim may have had bin Laden's backing. The sources say that in a letter found in the possession of Hassan Ghul, a Pakistani operative arrested in Iraq in January 2004, bin Laden urged al-Zarqawi to "use the Shi'ite card"--to launch attacks on Shi'ite targets in Iraq--as a way of pressuring Iran to free a number of top al-Qaeda leaders, including bin Laden's son Saad, who fled to Iran from Afghanistan in December 2001. In October 2004, after further meetings with bin Laden's emissary al-Iraqi, al-Zarqawi publicly joined al-Qaeda, becoming the self-proclaimed prince of its operations in the "Land of Mesopotamia." As the jihadist insurgency gained momentum, the open wariness that once characterized al-Zarqawi's dealings with bin Laden dissipated, although counterterrorism officials believe their alliance was rooted more in pragmatism than affection. "Al-Zarqawi needs bin Laden for his credibility," says a U.S. intelligence analyst. "Bin Laden needs al-Zarqawi because he is doing the real work." But the celebrity al-Zarqawi has gained through his reign of terror in Iraq has marginalized bin Laden and shrunk his circle of loyalists. A senior Pakistani intelligence officer says "several hundred" al-Qaeda jihadis, spurred by al-Zarqawi's attacks on U.S. troops, left Afghanistan for Iraq in two waves, one via the gulf and the other across the Iran-Turkmenistan border; scores were killed in Iraq, and many fell in the battle of Fallujah in November 2004. Terrorism experts say bin Laden remains the spiritual leader of global jihad but is no longer calling the shots. "Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri may have turned al-Zarqawi into something bigger than themselves," says French counterterrorism expert Roland Jacquard. "Strategically, they didn't have much choice. They needed to give the Iraq jihad the backing and legitimacy of al-Qaeda's direction. But it's turned out to be a very emancipating development for al-Zarqawi." Evidence suggests,though, that he may have gone too far. In October the U.S. released a letter that it said was sent in July from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi--in which bin Laden's deputy urged the Jordanian to refrain from attacking Shi'ites in Iraq. It has provoked the anger of moderate Muslims around the world. Al-Zawahiri suggests such attacks "be put off until the force of the mujahid movement in Iraq gets stronger." Although some experts speculate that the letter was drawn up by Iranian intelligence to dupe al-Zarqawi, the CIA and Pentagon insist that the 13-page missive is not a forgery and that it reveals differences between the old al-Qaeda leaders and al-Zarqawi over tactics and ideology. At the same time, the letter also indicates an acknowledgment by al-Zawahiri that the al-Qaeda hierarchy has been reordered. "It wasn't the letter of an overall commander pulling the choke chain of a subordinate," says Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism expert with the Rand Corp. think tank in Washington, who believes it is genuine. "It was diplomatic, cajoling, flattering and in essence sucking up to [al-Zarqawi]." What does that mean for the future of al-Qaeda? Intelligence officials generally believe that al-Zarqawi has surpassed bin Laden as an inspirational figure for budding jihadis. "People have forgotten about bin Laden because they don't hear about him anymore," says an Arab intelligence source. Al-Zarqawi's twin challenges will be to survive divisions within the Iraqi insurgency as well as the U.S. military's hunt for him. The Pentagon believes its commandos have come close to capturing him several times. If al-Zarqawi manages to survive, he may try to attain bin Laden's global reach. He has reportedly outlined to his associates a strategy that calls for the overthrow of moderate Arab governments and the establishment of a pure Islamic state in the region in the next decade, with the ultimate goal of launching a world war against nonbelievers. For now, although al-Zarqawi has ties to jihadist groups across Europe, they don't necessarily take orders from him, counterterrorism officials say. But over the long term, his efforts in Iraq position him to become the voice and inspiration for disaffected Muslims around the world. "More and more people are veering into Islamic extremism and embracing the Iraqi cause ... all converging on al-Zarqawi's struggle," says a senior French counterterrorism official. "To our great distress, he's doing just fine without ever turning his attention from Iraq." As long as that's true, al-Zarqawi will be at the forefront of the war against the West that his old boss started.

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Terror Networks

Human Rights Watch's list of "ghost prisoners"

2005-12-02

Take a good, long look at the people on this list and you can decide for yourself whether or not you have any problems with this. I sure don't. 1. Ibn Al-Shaykh al-Libi Reportedly arrested on November 11, 2001, Pakistan. Libyan, suspected commander at al-Qaeda training camp. 2. Abu Faisal Reportedly arrested on December 12, 2001 3. Abdul Aziz Reportedly arrested on December 14, 2001 Nationality unknown. In early January 2002, Kenton Keith, a spokesman at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, produced a chart with the names of senior al-Qaeda members listed as killed in action, detained, or on the run. Faisal and Aziz were listed as detained on Dec. 12 and 14, 2001. 4. Abu Zubaydah (also known as Zain al-Abidin Muhahhad Husain) Reportedly arrested in March 2002, Faisalabad, Pakistan. Palestinian (born in Saudi Arabia), suspected senior al-Qaeda operational planner. 5. Abdul Rahim al-Sharqawi (aka Riyadh the facilitator) Reportedly arrested in January 2002 Possibly Yemeni, suspected al-Qaeda member (possibly transferred to Guantanamo). 6. Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi Reportedly arrested in January 2002 Nationality unknown, presumably Iraqi, suspected commander of al-Qaeda training camp. U.S. officials told Associated Press on January 8, 2002 and March 30, 2002, of al-Iraqi's capture. This is a different Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi who was placed in command of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan yesterday (who had previously been in command of Brigade 055 rather than a training camp), for those keeping score. 7. Muhammed al-Darbi Reportedly arrested in August 2002 Yemeni, suspected al-Qaeda member. The Washington Post reported on October 18, 2002: "U.S. officials learned from interviews with Muhammad Darbi, an al Qaeda member captured in Yemen in August, that a Yemen cell was planning an attack on a Western oil tanker, sources said." On December 26, 2002, citing "U.S. intelligence and national security officials," the Washington Post reports that al-Darbi, as well as Ramzi Binalshibh [see below], Omar al-Faruq [reportedly escaped from U.S. custody in July 2005], and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri [see below] all "remain under CIA control." 8. Ramzi bin al-Shibh Reportedly arrested on September 13, 2002 Yemeni, suspected al-Qaeda conspirator in Sept. 11 attacks (former roommate of one of the hijackers). 9. Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (or Abdulrahim Mohammad Abda al-Nasheri, aka Abu Bilal al-Makki or Mullah Ahmad Belal) Reportedly arrested in November 2002, United Arab Emirates. Saudi or Yemeni, suspected al-Qaeda chief of operations in the Persian Gulf, and suspected planner of the USS Cole bombing, and attack on the French oil tanker, Limburg. 10. Mohammed Omar Abdel-Rahman (aka Asadullah) Reportedly arrested in February 2003, Quetta, Pakistan. Egyptian, son of the Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, who was convicted in the United States of involvement in terrorist plots in New York. See Agence France Presse, March 4, 2003: "Pakistani and US agents captured the son of blind Egyptian cleric Omar Abdel Rahman. . . a US official said Tuesday. Muhamad Abdel Rahman was arrested in Quetta, Pakistan, the official said, speaking on condition of anonymity." David Johnston, New York Times, March 4, 2003: "On Feb. 13, when Pakistani authorities raided an apartment in Quetta, they got the break they needed. They had hoped to find Mr. [Khalid Sheikh] Mohammed, but he had fled the apartment, eluding the authorities, as he had on numerous occasions. Instead, they found and arrested Muhammad Abdel Rahman, a son of Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, the blind Egyptian cleric. . ." 11. Mustafa al-Hawsawi (aka al-Hisawi) Reportedly arrested on March 1, 2003 (together with Khalid Sheikh Mohammad), Pakistan. Saudi, suspected al-Qaeda financier. 12. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed Reportedly arrested on March 1, 2003, Rawalpindi, Pakistan. Kuwaiti (Pakistani parents), suspected al-Qaeda, alleged to have "masterminded" Sept. 11 attacks, killing of Daniel Pearl, and USS Cole attack in 2000. 13. Majid Khan Reportedly arrested on March-April 2003, Pakistan. Pakistani, alleged link to Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, alleged involvement in plot to blow up gas stations in the United States. Details about Khan's arrest were revealed in several media reports, especially in Newsweek: Evan Thomas, "Al Qaeda in America: The Enemy Within," Newsweek, June 23, 2003. U.S. prosecutors provided evidence that Majid Khan was in U.S. custody during the trial of 24-year-old Uzair Paracha, who was convicted in November 2005 of conspiracy charges, and of providing material support to terrorist organizations. 14. Yassir al-Jazeeri (aka al-Jaziri) Reportedly arrested on March 15, 2003, Pakistan. Possibly Moroccan, Algerian, or Palestinian, suspected al-Qaeda member, linked to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. 15. Ali Abdul Aziz Ali (aka Ammar al Baluchi) Reportedly arrested on April 29, 2003, Karachi, Pakistan. A Pakistani, he is alleged to have funneled money to September 11 hijackers, and alleged to have been involved with the Jakarta Marriot bombing and in handling Jose Padilla's travel to the United States. U.S. Judge Sidney Stein ruled that defense attorneys for Uzair Paracha could introduce statements Baluchi made to U.S. interrogators, proving that he was in U.S. custody. Former Deputy Attorney General James Comey also mentioned Baluchi during remarks to the media about the case of Jose Padilla on June 1, 2004 16. Waleed Mohammed bin Attash (aka Tawfiq bin Attash or Tawfiq Attash Khallad) Reportedly arrested on April 29, 2003, Karachi, Pakistan. Saudi (of Yemeni descent), suspected of involvement in the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000, and the Sept. 11 attacks. See Afzal Nadeem, "Pakistan Arrests Six Terror Suspects, including Planner of Sept. 11 and USS Cole Bombing," Associated Press, April 30, 2003. His brother, Hassan Bin Attash, is currently held in Guantanamo. 17. Adil al-Jazeeri Reportedly arrested on June 17, 2003 outside Peshawar, Pakistan. Algerian, suspected al-Qaeda and longtime resident of Afghanistan, alleged "leading member" and "longtime aide to bin Laden." (Possibly transferred to Guantanamo.) 18. Hambali (aka Riduan Isamuddin) Reportedly arrested on August 11, 2003, Thailand. Indonesian, involved in Jemaah Islamiyah and al-Qaeda, alleged involvement in organizing and financing the Bali nightclub bombings, the Jakarta Marriot Hotel bombing, and preparations for the September 11 attacks. 19. Mohamad Nazir bin Lep (aka Lillie, or Li-Li) Reportedly arrested in August 2003, Bangkok, Thailand. Malaysian, alleged link to Hambali. 20. Mohamad Farik Amin (aka Zubair) Reportedly arrested in June 2003, Thailand. Malaysian, alleged link to Hambali. 21. Tariq Mahmood Reportedly arrested in October 2003, Islamabad, Pakistan. Dual British and Pakistani nationality, alleged to have ties to al-Qaeda. 22. Hassan Ghul Reportedly arrested on January 23, 2004, in Kurdish highlands, Iraq. Pakistani, alleged to be Zarqawi's courier to bin Laden; alleged ties to Khalid Sheikh Mohammad. 23. Musaad Aruchi (aka Musab al-Baluchi, al-Balochi, al-Baloshi) Reportedly arrested in Karachi on June 12, 2004, in a "CIA-supervised operation." Presumably Pakistani. Pakistani intelligence officials told journalists Aruchi was held by Pakistani authorities at an airbase for three days, before being handed over to the U.S., and then flown in an unmarked CIA plane to an undisclosed location. 24. Mohammed Naeem Noor Khan (aka Abu Talaha) Reportedly arrested on July 13, 2004, Pakistan. Pakistani, computer engineer, was held by Pakistani authorities, and likely transferred to U.S. custody. (Possibly in joint U.S.-Pakistani custody.) 25. Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani Reportedly arrested on July 24, 2004, Pakistan Tanzanian, reportedly indicted in the United States for 1998 embassy bombings. U.S. and Pakistani intelligence officials told UPI that Ghailani was transferred to "CIA custody" in early August. 26. Abu Faraj al-Libi Reportedly arrested on May 4, 2005, North Western Frontier Province, Pakistan. Libyan, suspected al-Qaeda leader of operations, alleged mastermind of two assassination attempts on Musharraf. Col. James Yonts, a U.S. military spokesman in Afghanistan, "said in an email to The Associated Press that al-Libbi was taken directly from Pakistan to the U.S. and was not brought to Afghanistan."

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Afghanistan/South Asia

Hunt for Binny heating up

2004-03-11

EFL, getting at the new information. The hunt for bin Laden is an unprecedented confrontation between 21st-century technology and age-old guerrilla tactics. While the elusive terror chieftain hides in mountain caves and scurries along mule trails, Task Force 121 "bytes" away at him and his chief deputy, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, with the best the Information Age has to offer. Using powerful software called Analyst’s Notebook, which helps to piece together data on criminal and terror networks—Special Forces command just ordered up more copies—military and intelligence officials are increasingly confident they are narrowing bin Laden’s whereabouts. It’s a classic cat-and-mouse game in which tactics abruptly shift on both sides. In years past, U.S. officials listened in on bin Laden’s cell-phone conversations. But he apparently no longer dares to use electronic means of communication. So McRaven and his hunters are now trying to snare his couriers in transit. They scored a major victory two months ago with the capture of Hassan Ghul, a Qaeda operative who was carrying what U.S. officials say was a strategic memo from Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi, the mysterious terror leader allegedly behind the bombings of Shiites in Iraq. Ghul also yielded intel on bin Laden’s position. Key to the search is "accumulated humint," or human intelligence, says one insider. Other officials tell NEWSWEEK that an increasing number of "data points"—reports of sightings—have created an ever-clearer picture of bin Laden’s area of operation as he appears to shuttle between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Now they’ve focused that picture to the point where they have been able to send in Predator unmanned aerial vehicles to search for him. If the hunters are getting closer to their prey, it’s also thanks to a renewed effort by Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf to infiltrate the border regions sympathetic to Al Qaeda. On Saturday, the BBC reported that bin Laden narrowly escaped one such Pakistani raid, and NEWSWEEK confirmed that such an incident occurred. Within the past few weeks, some intelligence sources say, a U.S. Predator also spotted a suspect believed to be Al-Zawahiri somewhere in the border area. Some Afghan and Pakistani sources, however, insist that bin Laden is several steps ahead—and that he will continue to outsmart his pursuers. A Taliban official in Pakistan, contacted by NEWSWEEK, says he’s heard that both top Qaeda leaders moved to more secure and separate locations in January, before the spate of publicity about an American "spring offensive." The Taliban official learned that, he said, from a ranking Qaeda operative, a Yemeni who told him that other Qaeda and Taliban fighters had moved into Afghan provinces more than 100 miles from the Pakistani border. "We decided to leave the dangerous zone for safer areas," the Arab told the Taliban official, who goes by the nom de guerre Zabihullah. "The sheik is now in the most secure area he has ever been in," the Arab said, referring to bin Laden. "We were all laughing at all these recent reports that the Americans had our sheik cornered." Zabihullah also said he received an encrypted e-mail last Thursday from a senior Qaeda source in Saudi Arabia. The Qaeda operative told him not to be taken in by the American "psychological warfare" campaign about bin Laden’s imminent capture. He assured Zabihullah in the e-mail that "the sheik is in a safer place than ever and is more healthy than he’s ever been." I hate to be the pessimist here, but we might do well to recall that the Mansoor Ijaz account later backed up by the Financial Times said that Binny and Ayman had body doubles running around the Afghan-Pakistan border while they were in Iran. McRaven could be using psyop to flush bin Laden and others out of their hiding places. But the real key to success, the Task Force 121 commander knows, may be the "hammer and anvil" of converging U.S. Special Forces teams in Afghanistan and some 70,000 Pakistani forces in the border areas. In one recent operation in Waziristan, Pakistani security forces arrested several women married to foreign fighters, hoping for a lead on bin Laden. Similarly, they have destroyed the houses of tribesmen suspected of sheltering Qaeda fugitives. Pakistani officials said the tactic has worked, providing valuable information while apparently helping to drive Qaeda and Taliban fighters back across the Afghan border—into the hands, they hope, of Task Force 121. The standing U.S. offer of $25 million for bin Laden’s head provides an extra incentive. "We now have all the ingredients in place for more effective operations in the days to come," says a senior Pakistani official. The man who’s been tasked with blending those ingredients together, Bill McRaven, is betting on it.

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Zarqawi’s profile is worrying the US

2004-03-03

It’s by Walter Pincus, so it’s time to break out a jolly can of fisk ... The Jordanian-born jihadist who quickly became a suspect in yesterday’s bombings in Iraq also wants to assume a leading, independent role in future terrorist operations in other countries, according to senior intelligence officials. I think he's already done that: Jordan, Europe, Afghanistan, probably a few others as well... Abu Musab Zarqawi has claimed responsibility for two dozen bombings in recent months and was on record threatening new attacks against Iraqi Shiites before yesterday’s attacks. But U.S. officials are also increasingly concerned about Zarqawi’s ambitions beyond Iraq. Although Zarqawi has worked with al Qaeda in the past, officials say it is increasingly clear he operates independently of Osama bin Laden’s organization and has developed his own network of operatives. Except that he gets his marching orders from Saif al-Adel and praises Binny and Ayman in his love letters. As for running his own mob, al-Qaeda’s a decentralized beast. Hambali ran his own outfit down in Southeast Asia too, we call it JI. "He is a thinker" and "a good organizer" who "sees Iraq as a springboard into broader and more jihadist actions in the region," said one senior intelligence official. The focus on Zarqawi, his network and his longer-term plans had intensified before yesterday’s attacks. It comes as U.S. intelligence officials recalibrate their tactics in the fight against terrorists, paying particular attention to the emergence of such smaller, largely autonomous groups. CIA Director George J. Tenet told a Senate panel Feb. 24 that the battering of al Qaeda’s leadership has "transformed the organization into a loose collection of regional networks" that pursue shared, though not always identical, goals. The groups "pick their own targets, they plan their own attacks," he said. That's what we're seeing here, too, but somehow we're seeing it differently. What're we missing? Or is the press missing something? Is Tenet? (I doubt it. I also doubt he's spilling everything...) Although al Qaeda may have been wounded, one senior intelligence analyst said, "there has been no comparable weakening in the wider Islamic jihadist movement." U.S. intelligence officials consider Zarqawi’s most immediate threat to be in Iraq, "which he is using as a recruitment poster," said the senior analyst. Bin Laden and his top al Qaeda deputy, Ayman Zawahiri, are believed to be on the run somewhere along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, leaving Zarqawi to become what one U.S. official described as the unofficial "umbrella leader" of Islamic resistance groups in Iraq. Zarqawi has used foreign fighters and former members of Saddam Hussein’s Baathist Party, and claims to have carried out a series of bombings there. Thank God we know that Baathists would never ally themselves with religious fundamentalists! In early January, Zarqawi met with Hassan Ghul, a trusted bin Laden emissary, to discuss whether al Qaeda would participate in future Iraq operations, according to the senior intelligence officials. Ghul’s mission was to determine whether the tide was already turning against the jihadists in Iraq, or whether al Qaeda should join the fight as an opportunity to reassert its leadership role in the region, officials said. Yet they’ve been sending Euro jihadis to Iraq for months now. That’s pretty much the limit of the actual news in this story, the rest just rehashes the tired old meme that Zarqawi isn’t really an al-Qaeda leader that we’ve seen floating around for the last several months. But then, it’s Pincus so this is to be expected.

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Al-Qaeda turns down Zarqawi’s request to kill Shi’ites

2004-02-21

I suspect the identity of their current hosts could play a role in this ... The most active terrorist network inside Iraq appears to be operating mostly apart from Al Qaeda, senior American officials say. Most significantly, the officials said, American intelligence had picked up signs that Qaeda members outside Iraq had refused a request from the group, Ansar al-Islam, for help in attacking Shiite Muslims in Iraq. The request was made by Ansar’s leader, a Jordanian, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and intercepted by the United States last month. The apparent refusal is being described by some American intelligence analysts as an indication of a significant divide between the groups. It’s a difference of tactics, hardly the sign that they’re ready to go separate ways ... The officials declined this week to say how American intelligence agencies had learned that members of Al Qaeda had rebuffed Mr. Zarqawi’s proposal. One of his top lieutenants, Hassan Ghul, has been in American custody for several weeks. In an interview today, one official cautioned that it would be a mistake to see the two groups as having diverged, and that it was too soon to say whether Al Qaeda might support Mr. Zarqawi. This official described the fact that Mr. Zarqawi had appealed for help as a sign of "emerging links" between the two groups. Zarqawi takes his orders from Saif al-Adel. How is any of this even remotely unclear? It's almost as if they're being purposely obtuse... "Maybe someone did say no, but that doesn’t mean they’ll say no tomorrow," the official said. But, officials said, there are growing indications that the two groups are distinct and independent, and are embracing different tactics and agendas. A recent report by the State Department’s intelligence branch emphasizes those differences, according to American officials who have read the classified document. "Even among Sunni Muslim extremists and committed terrorists, including Zarqawi and Al Qaeda, there can be extreme discrepancies about strategy and tactics," one senior official said. "This is not a world of homogeneous bad guys." It's the Azzam-bin Laden difference in approaches. It's nothing new... Even if Mr. Zarqawi and Ansar are not working closely with Al Qaeda, they appear to be getting logistical support from outside Iraq, the American officials said. Somebody re-read the Milan wiretaps and tell me with a straight face that Zarqawi’s al-Tawhid Euromob isn’t working for al-Qaeda. A recent report by one intelligence agency shows lines of support, including supplies, money and recruiting, that extend to Mr. Zarqawi’s group from neighboring countries, including Iran, Turkey, Syria and Saudi Arabia. Mr. Zarqawi himself has traveled in and out of Iraq from Iran, where he took refuge after the American invasion last March, and from Syria, two military officials said. In public reports and private statements, American intelligence officials have been careful to portray Mr. Zarqawi as an associate of Al Qaeda rather than as a member. By contrast, the evidence since the war began of operations inside Iraq by Al Qaeda has been limited and generally inconclusive, American officials say. American intelligence officers believe Qaeda leaders to be in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is mostly an NYT hit piece against the administration’s linking of al-Qaeda disguised as a news story. About the only complete info here aside from this latest quibbling about who Ansar and Zarqawi work for is that al-Qaeda has turned down Zarqawi’s request, likely in deferrence to their current hosts in Tehran.

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Iraq-Jordan

Syria and Iran aiding Iraqi insurgents

2004-02-20

Senior Iraqi intelligence officers believe an Islamic militant group which has claimed responsibility for two suicide bombings in Irbil and a spate of deadly attacks in Baghdad, Falluja and Mosul is receiving significant help from Syria and Iran. The officers, who have been tracking the activities of domestic and foreign jihadists in northern Iraq, claim that members of Jaish Ansar al-Sunna (the army of the supporters of the sayings of the prophet) have been "given shelter by Syrian and Iranian security agencies and have been able to enter Iraq with ease". The group is suspected of training suicide bombers and deploying them against US forces in Iraq and Iraqis considered to be collaborating with the US-led authorities. Jaish Ansar al-Sunna was one of a dozen Islamic militant organisations which issued a joint statement two weeks ago in Ramadi and Falluja warning Iraqis against cooperating with the occupation. It distributed CDs carrying video footage of some of its operations, which included roadside bomb attacks on US military convoys. US officials believe that since Saddam Hussein was captured in December the insurgency is being increasingly fought by Islamic guerrillas rather than former regime loyalists. While the Iraqi authorities are struggling to establish an effective intelligence operation in the centre and south of the country, in the north they have been able to build on the existing intelligence network in the Kurdish ruled area. Then why not expand the Kurdish network to cover the whole country? An intelligence officer in the northern city of Kirkuk said: "We have arrested a number of foreign Arabs that we believe may be connected to the global terror network. They all seemed to have Iranian or Syrian visas in their passports. A number of them told us they had received assistance in those countries." He said Hassan Ghul, a suspected al-Qaida operative found to be carrying a document urging the fomenting of civil war in Iraq, had been arrested by Kurdish forces on the Iraqi side of the Iranian border near the town of Kalar. Jaish Ansar al-Sunna is suspected of coordinating the infiltration of foreign militants - experienced terrorists and young footsoldiers - from Europe through Syria, the intelligence officer said. "We are not talking huge numbers, perhaps 100 since the war, but that is too much," he said. "We believe that there is a safe house for them near Damsacus. They are crossing the border west of Mosul, then heading for Mosul before dispersing to other cities." He said Iran and Syria wanted to use the militant issue as a bargaining point in their relations with the US. Hoshyar Zebari, the Iraqi foreign minister, said: "There are incidents of infiltration from the outside. "I do not want to accuse anyone, but we are not getting sufficient cooperation from our neighbours. If they believe they can play with the security of Iraq, they are playing with fire. It’s very dangerous." Iraq-Syria war? Damascus and Tehran reject the allegation they are harbouring or facilitating jihadists and point to their increased cooperation with George Bush’s global war on terror. The Iraqi intelligence officers, speaking on condition of anonymity, said Jaish Ansar al-Sunna was believed to be a splinter group of Ansar al-Islam (supporters of Islam), an extreme Kurdish group with suspected links to al-Qaida. The group’s leader is identified on its website as Abu Abdullah al-Hassan bin Mahmoud, thought to be the brother of a leading Ansar al-Islam fighter. Ansar al-Islam was ousted from its stronghold at the beginning of the war by a joint operation involving PUK peshmerga forces and US air power. About 200 fighters fled to Iran, the intelligence official said. They had now had time to reorganise and had been filtering back into Iraq, where they had joined Sunni Arab extremists to form the new group.

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Hassan Ghul was Zarqawi’s delivery man

2004-02-16

The Kurds had laid out bait for their prey. In early January, Kurdish security officials spread word in the villages along Iraq’s border with Iran that one stretch of the mountainous frontier was lightly guarded and thus safe for travelers who had reason to slip unnoticed in or out of the country. Then the Kurds waited. "It was like dropping seeds for a chicken, saying ’Come, come,’ and then catching it," a Kurdish official involved in the sting told TIME. It was a crisp morning in mid-January when the chicken fell into the trap. The tall man in an open-neck shirt, jacket and trousers looked like any of the traveling merchants who frequent the area. When he was stopped at a Kurdish checkpoint near Kalar, officials made an intriguing discovery in his travel bag: two CDs and a computer flash disc the size of a cigarette lighter. With a hunch who their catch was—the CIA had given them a heads-up that he might be in the area—the Kurdish officials snapped a digital mug shot of the traveler and e-mailed it to their American intelligence contacts. The confirmation came back quickly: the Kurds had nabbed Hassan Ghul, one of the key al-Qaeda operatives still on the run. "When Washington heard we had him," said a Kurdish official in Baghdad, "they were doing cartwheels." The satchel was at least as important as the suspect. On one of Ghul’s discs was a 17-page progress report and future plan of action in Iraq written to "You, noble brothers, leaders of Jihad." The letter’s author claims to have overseen 25 suicide attacks against various targets in Iraq, which would constitute almost all such assaults since the U.S. rolled into Iraq. The report and other files captured with Ghul suggest a long-term strategy by an international terrorism organization to turn occupied Iraq into the front line of the global jihad. Apart from the documents in Ghul’s satchel, U.S. military officials say they have other evidence that the resistance in Iraq is increasingly being fought and led by jihadists rather than Baathists. Since the capture of Saddam Hussein in December, officials say, supporters of the former regime have largely given up the fight. Their role as financiers and organizers of the diverse insurgency has been taken up by religiously motivated groups that are recruiting young foot soldiers to come to Iraq. It’s unclear, says a U.S. intelligence official in Washington, "how many are, quote-unquote, al-Qaeda." But it’s plain, says a U.S. intelligence official in Iraq, "this is the battleground. It is easy to get here and easy to get weapons." Al-Zarqawi is a central figure in all this. French terrorism expert Roland Jacquard notes that last month an audio recording of al-Zarqawi turned up in extremist circles, in which he urged holy fighters from around the world to join the fight in Iraq under his leadership. Jacquard says Western intelligence agencies believe al-Zarqawi has called for 1,500 to 2,000 jihadists to leave Chechnya for Iraq. Um, according to the Russians, that’s all of them ... Al-Zarqawi is the focus of a manhunt nearly on the scale of the searches for Saddam and his two sons. U.S. officials say they have no firm idea where he is, but they suspect that he is in the Sunni triangle. Al-Zarqawi operates so inconspicuously that U.S. intelligence is having trouble "tracking him through the traditional ways," says an official. The information yielded by the capture of Ghul, whom the Kurds turned over to the Americans, may help al-Zarqawi’s hunters. "The discs [Ghul carried] were jammed," says a Kurdish security official. "You could not fit one more single word on them." In a small, weathered blue notebook in Ghul’s satchel were names and telephone numbers from around the world, including a few in Western countries, the source adds. Says a U.S. intelligence official in Iraq: "We’ve been busy."

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Iraq-Jordan

Zarqawi is al-Qaeda’s man in Iraq

2004-02-10

Oh, gee golly. NYT finally notices... Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian suspected of ties to Al Qaeda, is now thought likely to have played a role in at least three major car-bomb attacks in Iraq that have killed well over 100 people in the last six months, according to senior American officials. Intelligence information, including some gathered in recent weeks, has provided "mounting evidence" to suggest that Mr. Zarqawi was involved in the bombings, including the attacks in August on a Shiite mosque in Najaf and the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad, and the attack in November on an Italian police headquarters. I think we called all those here... One official cautioned that the evidence stopped short of firm proof about involvement by Mr. Zarqawi. But the official said the intelligence had added significantly to concern about Mr. Zarqawi, who one official said was now "really viewed as the most adept terrorist operative in Iraq, in terms of foreigners planning terrorist activities." He's got lots of experience. I wonder if he's still running the European operation, or if there's a new guy? The indication that Mr. Zarqawi played a role in the attacks adds evidence that he has been active in Iraq since the American invasion in March. An American official said Mr. Zarqawi had been "in and out" of Iraq since March, but "at last report" was operating inside Iraq. One of Mr. Zarqawi’s top lieutenants, Hassan Ghul, a Pakistani, was arrested by Americans near the Iranian border last month, and has been interrogated by American military and intelligence officials. If he's known to be inside Iraq, they're probably working him pretty hard. He'll have to either get out of the country or eventually be caught... The American officials who described Mr. Zarqawi’s suspected role declined to discuss the nature of the information pointing to a role by Mr. Zarqawi in the bombings. But the officials included some who have been skeptical in the past of the idea that foreign militants were playing a major role in the violence in Iraq. "The fact that we got Hassan Ghul is new intelligence information," one senior American official said. "The fact that Zarqawi is a bad guy is something we’ve been saying for a long time, but we’re learning more about him." Learning where he hangs out is the most important thing... The raid on the safe house in Baghdad used by associates of Mr. Zarqawi was said by one American official to have provided valuable new evidence. The items seized included a compact disc that contained the 17-page proposal to senior leaders of Al Qaeda as well as a seven-pound block of cyanide salt, which the officials said could have spread cyanide gas within an enclosed area. "It’s likely that he was involved in at least the three bombings," an American official said of Mr. Zarqawi. The car bomb attacks were three of the most deadly in Iraq since the American invasion last March. Besides the Najaf attack, they included the Aug. 19 bombing of the United Nations headquarters, which killed 23 people, including Sergio Vieira de Mello, the top United Nations envoy in Iraq; and the Nov. 12 attack on the headquarters of Italy’s paramilitary police in Nasiriya, which killed more than 30 people, including 19 Italians. You said that in the first paragraph. Say! Is this filler? Last fall, American military, intelligence and law enforcement officials said they did not know whether the August bombings were part of a coordinated campaign. At the time, they said they were wrestling with several competing theories about who might be behind them, including the possibility that they were carried out by former members of the Iraqi military or paramilitary forces. Investigators said at the time that they had not seen a common signature in the bombings, but that the attack at the United Nations headquarters and another on the Jordanian Embassy had used vehicles packed with explosives drawn from old Iraqi military stocks. American officials have not said publicly what kinds of explosives were used in the attacks in Najaf and Nasiriya. The car booms themselves are almost a signature... On Monday, senior American officials were careful to describe Mr. Zarqawi as "an associate" of Al Qaeda rather than a member. American military officials say that at least 90 percent of the attacks on United States troops are thought to have been carried out by Iraqi Sunnis opposed to the occupation.

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