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India-Pakistan

Omar Saeed Sheikh not dead yet

2008-11-14

Despite being sentenced to death six years ago by an Anti Terrorism Court for the gruesome murder of American journalist Daniel Pearl, Sheikh Ahmed Omar Saeed is lucky enough to have dodged the gallows. The Sindh High Court is yet to decide his appeal against the sentence even though the case hearing has been adjourned for over 100 times since 2002.The 38-year-old American journalist travelled to Pakistan in the aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks to work on an investigative story about the alleged intelligence links of some Pakistani militant leaders. He was abducted from Karachi on January 23, 2002, before being beheaded by militants. The killers of Pearl, including Sheikh Omar Saeed, a London School of Economics graduate-turned-Jihadi, and three of his accomplices -- Fahad Naseem, Salman Saqib and Sheikh Adeel -- were put on trial on April 22, 2002. Almost three months later, the Karachi court handed down capital punishment to Omar Saeed Sheikh while his three accomplices were sentenced to life in prison. The accused had instantly approached the Sindh High Court by lodging appeals against the Anti Terrorism Court verdict. But their appeals have not yet been decided for inexplicable reasons despite a lapse of 75 months and over 100 adjournments. Currently languishing in a Hyderabad jail, the accused had instantly approached the Sindh High Court by lodging appeals against the Anti Terrorism Court verdict. But their appeals have not yet been decided for inexplicable reasons despite a lapse of 75 months and over 100 adjournments. However, Omar Sheikh's defence lawyer sees nothing unusual, saying that appeals in murder cases usually last for years. Rai Bashir maintains that the Pearl case had already taken a new twist. He plans to use the confession by the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, Khaled Sheikh Mohammad, that he was the one who had beheaded Pearl. Khaled Sheikh Mohammad had made this confession in the FBI custody, the transcript of which has already been made public by the authorities. Rai Bashir says he would use Khaled's testimony as evidence that his client did not kill Pearl. "What we had been saying for so many years in the appeal is that Omar was innocent and he had not committed that murder. We are happy that this version has been verified by none other than the Americans after the arrest of Khaled Sheikh Mohammed," maintained Rai. He also plans to use Musharraf's published memoirs in defence of Omar Sheikh. "President Pervez Musharraf's book 'In the Line of Fire' will be mustered for an appeal against my client's conviction because it indicated that alleged September 11 mastermind Khaled Sheikh Mohammed and another man had killed Pearl," the lawyer further maintained. However, contrary to his lawyer's contention, the hard fact remains that at his initial court appearance in April 2002, Sheikh Omar had almost confessed to his crime by stating before the court: "I don't want to defend myself. I did this. Rightly or wrongly, I had my reasons. I think our country shouldn't be catering to American needs." Sheikh Omar is a British citizen of Pakistani descent who had first served five years in prison in New Delhi in the 1990s in connection with the 1994 kidnapping of three British travellers. However, he was released from captivity in 1999 along with the defunct Jaish-e-Mohammad chief Maulana Masood Azhar, and eventually provided a safe passage to Pakistan by the Taliban regime, after the Indian government was forced to accept the demands of the hijackers of the Indian Airliner IC-814. Two years later, on February 12, 2002, he was arrested in Lahore on the charge of Pearl's kidnapping. He was not arrested but had actually surrendered to Brig (retd) Ejaz Shah, a former chief of the Punjab chapter of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). He, however, told the court that he was not arrested but had actually surrendered to Brig (retd) Ejaz Shah, a former chief of the Punjab chapter of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). Subsequent Western media reports blamed Sheikh Omar for working for Pakistani agencies under the name of Mustafa Mohamed Ahmad, who had wired $100,000 to the official ringleader of the 9/11 terror attack, Mohammad Atta, from a Saudi Arabian account of the Standard Chartered Bank. On October 6, 2001, a senior US government official told the CNN that American investigators had discovered that Omar, while using the alias Mustafa Muhammad Ahmad had sent about $100,000 from the United Arab Emirates to Mohammed Atta. Hardly a month after the money transfer was discovered, the then director general of the ISI, General Mahmood Ahmad, was sacked. It was later reported by the American media that the FBI was further investigating General Mahmood Ahmad's role.

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India-Pakistan

The True Face of Jehadis: Inside Pakistan's Network of Terror

2006-08-25

BOOK REVIEW Deadly double game The True Face of Jehadis: Inside Pakistan's Network of Terror by Amir Mir Reviewed by Sreeram Chaulia Pakistan's status as the frontline state for worldwide jihad is central to its governmental institutions and their absolute command over society. The role of the establishment in injecting religious fanaticism and hatred is a classic case of ideological mobilization of society in the name of God. Journalist Amir Mir's new book uncovers the overt and covert roots of Pakistan's descent into intolerance and terrorism and its deadly impact on South Asia and beyond. In the Foreword, Khaled Ahmed of The Friday Times describes how the jihad in Kashmir had a deleterious effect on Pakistani society. Massive state-sponsored public indoctrination in favor of holy war against India produced "a society deeply influenced by the rhetoric of jihad". The denial mode and "fantasy for jihad" among ordinary Pakistanis today is the result of decades of brainwashing and deficit of objective information about terrorism. After the Afghan war, Kashmir's "liberation" became the sole agenda of thousands of Pakistani terrorists. By 1995, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) collaborated with the Jamaat-e-Islami to raise a Taliban-type force of young Pakistani students to fight Indian forces in Kashmir. Since September 11, 2001, Islamabad has been "struggling hard to control the jihadi monster it created". (p 6) With the state's active connivance, Pakistani support structures continue to breed more jihadis. The leaders of Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) "enjoy full freedom of movement and speech despite an official ban". (p 8) Terrorist training camps flourish with renewed vigor on both the Indian and Afghan borders of the country. The suicide bombers who tried to assassinate Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf in December 2003 belonged to JeM and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI). They colluded with Pakistani air force, army and military intelligence personnel, an indication that "jihadi tentacles have spread far and wide" and boomeranged on their own masters. (p 21) Since the soldiery hails from the ranks of the urban and rural poor, it is practically impossible for it not to be infected by the virus of Islamist bigotry being propagated by thousands of deeni madrassas (religious seminaries). Musharraf's half-hearted attempts to give the army a liberal outlook acceptable to the West barely ruffle the deeply ingrained zealotry that runs in its veins. Pro-jihad officers occupy the top echelons of the military, making a mockery of the so-called "purges" in favor of moderation. The murder of journalist Daniel Pearl in Karachi in 2002 was masterminded by Sheikh Omar Saeed, a double agent of the ISI and JeM who was previously involved in terrorist attacks on high-profile targets in India. Musharraf himself admitted that Pearl had been "over-intrusive" in his investigations. Saeed had foreknowledge of the September 11 terrorist strikes and immediately informed Lieutenant-General Ehsanul Haq, then ISI director and corps commander for Peshawar. Saeed's capture spurred ISI higher-ups to intervene and obstruct his interrogation findings from being made public. Holding him in an isolated cell "helps Musharraf keep a key witness out of American, British and Indian hands". (p 43) Since the end of 2003, JeM seems to have lost the favor of ISI because Washington is convinced of its links to al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Abdul Jabbar, the former right-hand man of JeM chief Maulana Masood Azhar, was released by security agencies in 2004 to set him up in open conflict with his mentor. LeT founder Hafiz Muhammad Saeed is now in the good books of the establishment since he is "agreeable to waging a controlled jihad in Indian Kashmir whenever asked to do so". (p 66) The government cooperates fully with LeT fundraising, public rallies, recruitment and training. The terror outfit's sprawling 80-hectare headquarters in Muridke has been transformed into a "mini-Islamic state" where uninterrupted jihad is planned. Hafiz Saeed's confidants are convinced that Musharraf will abandon neither terrorism nor the military option on Kashmir. The military regime is avoiding any action against LeT on the pretext that it has no links with Jamaat-ul-Dawa, the powerful political patron whose hand has been revealed in terror as far afield as Indonesia and Iraq. Mir notes that as LeT focuses on "global jihad outside Pakistan, it has a free hand to operate within the country". (p 72) HuM's al-Qaeda connections are second to none. The naib ameer (commander) of the group, Muhammad Imran, announced openly in a courtroom that it was a brainchild of the Pakistani rangers and intelligence agencies. When HuM supremo Maulana Fazlur Rahman was taken into custody in 2002, Pakistan refused to oblige US demands for a debriefing. As soon as international pressure eased off, he was set free. Unlike Qari Saifullah Akhtar's HuJI, Rahman is still allowed to call the shots on jihadist foreign policy. Notwithstanding splits and desertions in HM, its leader Syed Salahuddin remains fully in control because of the ISI's backing. At present, he operates from Rawalpindi with "instructions to wait and see". (p 91) He has received clearances from Jamaat-e-Islami to assume a new role as a politician in Indian Kashmir. The Jamaat's own cadres and office bearers are aiding al-Qaeda's surviving members and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-e-Islami across Pakistan and Afghanistan. Tableeghi Jamaat, supposedly a preaching organization, is clandestinely assisting jihadist forces with the blessings of Pakistan's elite bureaucracy, military, scientists and intelligence agencies. HuM, LeT and HuJI recruit through Tableegh in the guise of spreading Islamic theology. US intelligence believes that Tableegh is the fountainhead of the Pakistan-based jihad infrastructure. Dawood Ibrahim, a billionaire gangster and Islamic extremist, lived with Pakistani government protection in Karachi for several years. Islamabad's claim that he is no longer around is discounted by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as "a face-saving exercise because it is in its interest not to give the don up". (p 109) Mir discloses that Ibrahim may have moved to Islamabad after the September 11 attacks. On the monster of sectarian violence, Mir comments that "fundamentalist Islam remains at the heart of the Musharraf establishment's strategy of national political mobilization and consolidation" (p 114) The former head of the anti-Shi'ite Sipah-e-Sahiba (SSP), Maulana Azim Tariq, maintained a cozy working relationship with the ISI for more than a decade before being mysteriously killed in 2003. The SSP not only ran amok against minorities in Pakistan but also sent thousands of jihadis to fight in Indian Kashmir. The Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a spinoff of the SSP with highly vicious killers, might be working as al-Qaeda's "Delta Force" in Karachi. The surprise rise of the religious right in the 2002 elections in Pakistan was attributable to the encouragement of the Musharraf regime. The Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) has a special relationship with the military by sustaining the latter's Afghan and Kashmir policies. The MMA provides Islamabad an alibi to argue that it cannot moderate its policies in Kashmir to the degree that Washington desires. The 10,000-odd deeni madrassas of Pakistan continue to churn out radical terrorists by the dozens every day. The government is unwilling to act against the madrassas for fear of unsettling its religious allies. The army sees in the large number of madrassa-trained jihadis a valuable asset for its proxy war against India. Mir asserts that "the Pakistani military dictator's priority has never been eradication of Islamic extremism". (p 147) Sectarianism and virulence are not limited to madrassas alone. Public schools in Pakistan instruct students on jihad and martyrdom to construct "a national chauvinistic mindset". (p 152) Jihadist journalism committed to pan-Islamic discourses receives state subsidies and jihadist publications thrive on government advertisements. Thanks to this propaganda barrage, al-Qaeda enjoys in Pakistan a virtually bottomless pool of ad hoc members, donors and harborers, particularly in Karachi. Many within the Pakistani security apparatus bear direct responsibility for the resurgence of the Taliban, which masses in the Waziristan, Chaman and Kurram Agency areas to cause mayhem across the Afghan border and then retreat to the safety of Pakistani territory. Mullah Omar himself is said to be hiding in the tribal areas close to Quetta. In April 2004, the Pakistani army made peace with Taliban commander Nek Mohammad in an amnesty agreement mediated by two MMA parliamentarians. Abdullah Mahsud, the most wanted commander of the Taliban in South Waziristan has a brother and four cousins in the Pakistani army. According to the US 9-11 Commission Report, Pakistan benefits from the Taliban-al-Qaeda relationship as Osama bin Laden's camps trained and equipped fighters for the insurgency in Kashmir. Mir remarks that the United States' "reluctance to act against Pakistan and make it pay a prohibitive price for helping jihadi terrorists encouraged the Musharraf regime to keep the jihadis alive and active". (p 186) Al-Qaeda's Abu Zubaydah, captured in 2002, claimed that the late head of the Pakistani air force, Mushaf Ali Mir, had prior knowledge of the September 11 terrorist plot. Mir had allegedly struck a deal with al-Qaeda in 1996 to supply arms and offer protection, a pledge that was renewed in 1998 in the presence of Saudi intelligence boss Prince Turki. Mir's plane crashed in 2003 without explanation and it is speculated that the US forces carrying out anti-Taliban operations had shot it down near Kohat because of his links with al-Qaeda. Investigations into the September 11 plot revealed that ISI's then-head, hardliner pro-Taliban Lieutenant-General Mahmood Ahmad, ordered Sheikh Omar Saeed to wire US$100,000 to Mohammad Atta, the chief hijacker. In October 2001, Musharraf forced Ahmad into retirement after the FBI displayed credible evidence of his involvement in the terror attacks and knowledge that he was playing a "double game". So frustrated was the FBI with the calculated blockading of counter-terrorist operations by the ISI that it formed its own secret Spider Group of former Pakistani army and intelligence operatives to monitor fundamentalist activities through the length and breadth of Pakistan. For all of Musharraf's denials, his government "clearly seems guilty of exporting terror to different parts of the world". (p 257) British and Indian intelligence have nailed down proof of the ISI's jihadist mafia imprint in several terrorist attacks of the past two years. The "real problem is sympathy for Islamic extremism in Pakistan's military and intelligence establishments". (p 261) Banned Islamic charities such as Al-Rashid Trust, Al-Akhtar Trust and Ummah Tameer-e-Nau took full advantage of the October 2005 earthquake in Pakistani Kashmir and resumed their so-called welfare activities, with deadly consequences. Confident about their future as covers for jihadist funding and nuclear trading, they freely admit that "despite the US action, the Pakistani government has not imposed any restriction on our working". (p 275) Musharraf does not want to hack at his own feet and deny himself the force multipliers from jihadist ranks by genuinely ending their stranglehold over Pakistan's resources. The evidence compiled by Mir in this book throws light on the real reasons Musharraf manages to stay in power in spite of ostensibly reversing Pakistan's Taliban and Kashmir policies after September 11, 2001. But for his great "double game" of cooperation with the US and simultaneous obstructionism to help jihadis, a political typhoon would have long swept him out of the top seat. The True Face of Jehadis: Inside Pakistan's Network of Terror by Amir Mir. Roli Books, New Delhi, 2006. ISBN: 81-7436-430-7. Price: US$8.75, 310 pages.

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India-Pakistan

Pakistan Spy Chief in Difficult Talks with CIA

2003-05-07

Pakistan’s chief spy, head of the famous Inter Services Intelligence Agency (ISI), General Ehsan ul Haq, will be spending the next 3-4 days with his counterparts in the American CIA, discussing issues crucial to the future of Pak-US and Indo-Pakistan relations. His visit, at the invitation of the CIA Chief, will be his first but will be following a pattern of similar visit by previous ISI chiefs. At least two of them, Lt. General Khwaja Ziauddin and Lt. General Mahmood Ahmed, were removed from ISI shortly after they returned to Pakistan. Ziauddin was first named army chief by then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, but was not allowed by General Musharraf to take over and was arrested. Mahmood was retired shortly before the US launched its attacks on Afghanistan in October because of his suspected links with Taliban and Al-Qaeda leadership. He was said to be under house arrest for some days, a fact which he did not deny when he presented himself before Islamabad journalists at a rare dinner he hosted for them last week. General Ehsan’s visit comes at a time when Washington is pressing Pakistan hard to stop what the Indians call cross-border terrorism and Pakistanis describe as indigenous freedom struggle of the Kashmiris. Pakistan has also climbed down from its position of “No talks” before the “Core Issue” of Kashmir was on the table. Islamabad has also offered to resume trade and many other ‘confidence building measures”, CBMs as they are called, to ease tensions in the region and start a dialogue on Kashmir with Prime Minister Vajpayee’s government who says he is giving Pakistan the last chance of a peaceful solution. But General Ehsan will have a hard time first explaining and then assuring his hosts that his organization would not repeat what many US and western intelligence experts allege was a “double game” played by ISI, with US and with India. Under the new scenario, ISI will have to ensure that the outlawed terrorist outfits active in Indian held Kashmir do not get support from Pakistan in any form or shape, something which will be very hard for General Ehsan to guarantee. The State Department recently declared Sipah e-Sahaba and more importantly Hizbul Mujahideen, the militant wing of now politically powerful Jamaat e-Islami, as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), besides others. This means it will now be ISI’s duty to ensure that these outfits do not operate inside Pakistan, do not raise funds or manpower, do not supply the Kashmiri fighters with weapons and money and do not cross the Line of Control. Coupled with these tough demands on Kashmir, the US side would also seek assurances and guarantees that ISI was not playing a double game on the western border with Afghanistan where General Pervez Musharraf last week claimed Osama bin Laden may still be alive and hiding. The biggest challenge to General Ehsan would be the demand, in some form or shape, to purge the ISI of fanatics and radicals at the middle and lower ranks. Or if that has already been done, provide evidence that the purge was real and effective. General Ehsan would also be making a lot of explanations as researchers and academics have been making serious allegations against his organization and its role, in both pre and post 9/11 periods. One such research, done by Michel Chossudovsky, a Professor of Economics, University of Ottawa for the Center for Research on Globalization (CRG), Montréal, Canada, accused the ISI and General Mahmood of being in direct link with Mohammed Atta, the main 9/11 hijacker. I don't neccesarily believe it, but Ahmed Omar Sheikh's allegedly claimed that he had been informed of the 9/11 attacks before they happened, and that as an ISI asset he passed his information on to his superiors. Writing about General Mahmood’s visit shortly before 9/11, Chossudovsky said Pakistan's chief spy Lt. General Mahmood Ahmad "was in the US when the attacks occurred." He arrived in the US on the 4th of September, a full week before the attacks. He had meetings at the State Department "after" the attacks on the WTC. But he also had "a regular visit of consultations" with his US counterparts at the CIA and the Pentagon during the week prior to September 11. That seems pretty tenuous “What was the nature of these routine 'pre-September 11 consultations'? Were they in any way related to the subsequent 'post-September 11 consultations' pertaining to Pakistan's decision to cooperate with Washington. Was the planning of war being discussed between Pakistani and US officials? On the 9th of September while General Ahmad was in the US, the leader of the Northern Alliance Commander Ahmad Shah Masood was assassinated. The Northern Alliance had informed the Bush Administration that the ISI was allegedly implicated in the assassination.” However that is more than likely, Masood had been a thorn in the side of the Pakisanis ever since the 80's when the ISI favoured Hekmatyar over him. “The Bush Administration consciously took the decision in "the post September 11 consultations" with Lt. General Mahmood Ahmad to directly "cooperate" with Pakistan's military intelligence (ISI) despite its links to Osama bin Laden and the Taliban and its alleged role in the assassination of Commander Masood, which coincidentally occurred two days before the terrorist attacks,” the Canadian Professor wrote, noting that on the Sunday prior to Oct 7 bombing on Afghanistan, Lt. General Mahmood Ahmad was sacked from his position as head of the ISI in what was described as a routine "reshuffling." He also quoted a report published in the Times of India, allegedly revealing the links between Pakistan's Chief spy Lt. General Mahmood Ahmad and the presumed "ring leader" of the WTC attacks Mohamed Atta. The ToI article was based on an official intelligence report of the Delhi government that had been transmitted through official channels to Washington. AFP then reported: "The evidence we [the Government of India] have supplied to the US is of a much wider range and depth than just one piece of paper linking a rogue general to some misplaced act of terrorism." According to the Canadian Professor in assessing the alleged links between the terrorists and the ISI, “it should be understood that Lt. General Ahmad as head of the ISI was a "US approved appointee". As head of the ISI since 1999, he was in liaison with his US counterparts in the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Pentagon. Also bear in mind that Pakistan's ISI remained throughout the entire post Cold War era until the present, the launch-pad for CIA covert operations in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Balkans. “The existence of an "ISI-Osama-Taliban axis" was a matter of public record. The links between the ISI and agencies of the US government including the CIA are also a matter of public record. The Bush Administration was fully cognizant of Lt. General Ahmad's role. In other words, rather than waging a campaign against international terrorism, the evidence would suggest that it is indirectly abetting international terrorism, using the Pakistani ISI as a "go-between". These charges, wild they may seem in the present context, have been circulating in Washington for some time and General Ehsan would have to answer many of the questions raised by his hosts in this context. But what would be of utmost importance and concern to the US is the latest “rehabilitation” of General Mahmood, in the form of a cushy corporate position as head of Fauji Fertilizer, the multi-billion rupees business corporation run by ex-army men.

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India-Pakistan

Musharraf tightens his grip

2003-03-13

The deteriorating situation in Afghanistan combined with a possible United States-led attack on Iraq and growing anti-US sentiments in Pakistan are creating a groundswell of dissent from hawkish elements within the Pakistan army — dissent that President General Pervez Musharraf is attempting to quell through new plans to reshuffle the army leadership. Well-placed sources told this correspondent that the reshuffle, which could take place within weeks, is expected to involve all crucial positions — including the important army corps based in Rawalpindi, Mangla, Karachi, Peshawar and Quetta. Changes are also expected in the first and second tiers of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), including the replacement of the present ISI director-general, Lieutenant-General Ehsan ul Haq, with the present Corps Commander of Mangla, Lieutenant-General Javed Alam Khan. At the same time, the heads of the ISI's internal and external wings are also likely to be changed. The last head of the ISI, General Mahmood Ahmad along with the previous corps commander, Lt General Aziz, were both Islamists who oversaw the running of the Taliban and the Kashmiri Jihadis. General Ahmed was the guy who was sent to see Mullah Omar with the message that he must hand over Bin Ladin, but instead told him the exact opposite. He apparently became a 'born again' Jihadi during Pakistan's undeclared Kargil war with India in 1999. His replacement, Ehsan El Haq, was somewhat loyal to Musharaff, but he was also a Pashtun who most likely turned a blind eye to the former members of the ISI's 'Afghanistan Desk' continued support of their old proxies the Taliban and Hekmatyr. General Aziz was formerly in overall command of the ISI's Joint Intelligence North, which oversaw the terrorist training camps in both Afghanistan and Pakistan which turned out Jihadis to be used against the Indian army in Kashmir. The impending changes come against a background of Pakistan's failure over the past year to maintain influence over important factions currently vying for power in Afghanistan. After the Taliban retreated from Afghanistan in early 2002, Pakistan's strategic interests suffered due to its relations with its neighbor to the west, where the new president, Hamid Karzai, although a Pashtun, is perceived as a US puppet. After former Afghan prime minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was expelled from Iran last year, he took over command of the shattered network of Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan militants and emerged as a leading resistance leader in Afghanistan against US forces. Asia Times Online pointed out last year (The new Afghan jihad is born) that Pakistan, desperate to maintain influence in Afghanistan, had revived its former contacts with Afghan commanders affiliated with the Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan. As part of these efforts, the ISI offered support to several commanders allied with the Hezb-e-Islami in areas near the Pakistani borders, including Gazni, Jalalabad, Kunhar and Kandahar. The purpose was not to support the US opposition in Afghanistan, but to safeguard Pakistani interests along the Pak-Afghan border. They're still doing the "sphere of influence" thing... However, these areas have since become hotbeds of resistance to US forces. According to sources in the South Waziristan Agency, rebels based in Gazni, about 110 miles from Wana (the district headquarters of the agency), fire mortar shells and missiles on US positions almost every night and then flee. When US forces chase them, they silently cross the border back into Pakistan. If they couldn't do that, they wouldn't be firing the mortars and missiles, which also, I'd guess, come from Pakland. It doesn't appear we have an Afghan jihad, but a Pak jihad — just like in Kashmir... The situation is very obvious to US authorities, who have silently conveyed complaints to the Pakistani foreign office. As a result, Foreign Secretary Riaz Khokhar forwarded the protest to Musharraf, adding his own insistence that Pakistan could not afford to play a double game. If it continued, it would simply mean that the country would lose whatever US goodwill it had gained after September 11, 2001. Sources said that after these reactions, Musharraf personally took on the concerned officials and asked them not to play around with the national interest and not to take decisions on their own. After these developments, another division of government was formed, headed by serving Lieutenant-General Khalid Qidwai, to coordinate matters between the foreign office and the ISI. But the jihadis continue playing their games, with ISI backing...

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The Alliance

Musharraf in the middle...

2001-09-15

Sydney Morning Herald The man under the most pressure was Pervez Musharraf, the bland army general who seized power in Pakistan in October 1999 and named himself president earlier this year. General Musharraf now faces the stark choice of dropping the Taliban, the prized creation of his own country's military-intelligence cabal, or having Pakistan's own military and economic lifelines severed. The powerful head of Pakistan's Interservices Intelligence (ISI), General Mahmood Ahmad, was in Washington to argue the case with CIA chief George Tenet when the terror attacks occurred this week. Mahmood and officials in Islamabad were told bluntly that Washington expected Pakistan's "full and practical co-operation" in pursuing those suspected of the assaults. On Thursday the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, called General Musharraf directly with a "specific list of things" that included, Pakistani officials said, Pakistan closing its border with Afghanistan, cutting off funding to groups allied with Osama bin Laden, turning over any intelligence information it has on his whereabouts, pressuring the Taliban to turn him over and allowing US aircraft to fly over Pakistan if the US decided to attack. "Islamabad has constantly been apprehensive about the US joining a proxy game against the Talibs involving the Uzbeks, Russians and Indians," says Husain Haqqani, a leading commentator in Karachi who has held positions with prevous democratic governments. "The US message seems to have been that we'd rather work with old ally Islamabad so please fall in line," Huqqani said. "Islamabad has no intention of bending, by all accounts. So now the US might have to carry out the threats it has held out until now without action. This could include serious economic screws, which will have to include the IMF." "Islamabad has no intention of bending, by all accounts. So now the US might have to carry out the threats it has held out until now without action. This could include serious economic screws, which will have to include the IMF. This is clearly a moment of truth for General Musharraf's military regime. He has to now prove that his pronouncements about being vehemently opposed to militant Islam and terrorism are not mere words." . He thinks the heavy American pressure will force Pakistan to review its links towards Islamic militant groups in general. "Until now these groups have been treated as allies in the struggle against Indian occupation of Kashmir." There is hardly a more bitter pill for the ISI to swallow. It was livid when the former Benazir Bhutto government helped the US in arresting the main suspect in the earlier 1993 attack on the World Trade Centre, arguing this would shatter morale among the "Jihadis" (holy warriors) it is supporting in Kashmir. Another expert on the Taliban, author Ahmed Rashid, also sees little room for half-measures if the Americans are to be satisfied. Allowing strikes from Pakistan means the end of the relationship, he said from Lahore. In addition, Pakistan will have to end the covert but well-known supply of money, arms and fuel to the Taliban. Rashid also sees the ISI having to accept a crackdown on "the whole madrasah culture" - the medium through which the radical Taliban message has been spreading through Central Asia countries and into Malaysia and Indonesia. "It all has to be done in one go," Rashid said. "It's a huge thing." Adding to the pressure on Musharraf, President Bush himself referred on Thursday to the Pakistani leader's pledge of "unstinting" support for America's search for the terrorist masterminds. "Now we'll just find out what that means, won't we?" Bush said.

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