Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Ilya Ropshin
[REGNUM] Exactly ten years ago, on January 22, 2015, after a massive artillery barrage, the Donbass militias launched an offensive on the Debaltseve arc. The battles for the capture of the city of Debaltseve, one of the largest railway hubs of the DPR, became the last episode of the "hot phase" of the Donbass conflict and culminated in the signing of the Second Minsk Agreements.
From the point of view of military strategy, the battles for Debaltseve became the largest battle of the transition period. They were very different from the 2014 campaign, some experts call them almost a manifestation of the "new Makhnovshchina" and semi-guerrilla warfare. And at the same time, they cannot be classified in scale as combat operations of the SVO. At the same time, some of the problems that emerged during the storming of Debaltseve will also emerge during the current special operation of the Russian Armed Forces.
THEATER OF OPERATIONS
The Debaltseve salient on the combat contact line was formed at the end of July 2014. At that time, the Armed Forces of Ukraine managed to completely capture the city, which had been controlled by the Novorossiya militia since April 13. However, the success of the Ukrainian Armed Forces was incomplete. The Ukrainian military managed to cut the Donetsk-Luhansk railway, but they failed to reach the rear of Yenakiyevo and organize an offensive on Gorlovka.
In August, the militia attempted to recapture Debaltseve. However, due to the lack of coordination between the Luhansk and Donetsk militias, as well as threats to the Donbass republics from other directions, this was not possible.
By the fall of 2014, Ukraine controlled the Debaltseve salient, which jutted out to the south, encircled Gorlovka from the east, and cut off the roads between Lugansk and Donetsk. The Ukrainian group located on the salient threatened the same Gorlovka, as well as the cities of Yenakiyeve, Shakhtyorsk, Alchevsk, and Stakhanov. At the same time, the salient itself was under fire from the artillery of the Donbass republics.
It was no secret to anyone that sooner or later the militia would try to cut off the ledge.
BALANCE OF POWER
At that time, the Ukrainian group in the Debaltseve area included: units of the 128th Mountain Infantry, 25th Airborne and 17th Tank brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, territorial defense battalions from the Chernihiv, Kyiv and Kirovograd regions, police and National Guard special forces units.
As well as formations that are not formally part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine: the battalion of the “Volunteer Ukrainian Corps” of the “Right Sector”* and the Chechen battalion named after Dzhokhar Dudayev.
On the side of the DPR and LPR, the Kalmius and Prizrak brigades fought in the battles, as well as battalion tactical groups of the 1st Army Corps of the DPR and the 2nd Army Corps of the LPR. Let us explain: after the first Minsk agreements (signed on September 5, 2014), in October, on the basis of disparate volunteer units, People's Militia corps were created - the 1st Corps of the DPR and the 2nd Corps of the LPR, respectively.
For example, the famous Sparta unit (now named after its first commander Arsen Pavlov - Motorola) became part of the 1st Corps of the DPR People's Militia. Sparta participated in the battles for Debaltsevo, among other things.
The corps of the people's republics were formed, among other things, by contract soldiers - for the men of Donbass, which was experiencing mass unemployment, this was also an opportunity to earn money.
The number of units on the opposing sides was approximately equal - according to various sources, it ranged from 7 thousand to 8-9 thousand people.
Ukraine was quickly turning Debaltseve into a powerful fortified area. The militia was replenishing its equipment reserves, especially artillery. At the same time, there were also problems related to the personnel of the opposing sides.
It would seem that Ukraine had a motivated and seasoned sergeant and junior officer corps. And many privates had already had a taste of gunpowder.
The defenders of Donbass were supposed to have already gained enough experience during the battles of the “Russian Spring” – from the defense of Slavyansk to the battles at Saur-Mogila.
However, in reality, things were not so optimistic - and not only in the aggressor's troops, but also, alas, in the ranks of the defenders of the people's republics.
PROBLEMS OF THE UKRAINIAN ARMED FORCES: FREEDOM, CONFUSION AND SLOWNESS
"The Maidan activists are the worst, many of them are unemployed and have no goals in life. They joined the army but do not want to learn discipline. When I tried to teach them something, they said: who are you to teach us, I threw Molotov cocktails on the Maidan," a British citizen of Ukrainian origin, call sign Shafran, who fought near Debaltseve, complained to BBC correspondents in February 2015. He introduced himself as a "military instructor."
According to his estimates, 6 out of 10 losses among Ukrainian volunteers were the result of friendly fire and inability to properly handle weapons.
"It was clear from the start that Debaltseve would be a disaster for Ukraine, but the military command and political leaders watched it unfold with a sluggish air," the British instructor lamented.
According to him, the Ukrainian military leadership was then “so incompetent that it puts the lives of personnel at risk”: “Commanders confuse tactics with strategy, they launch offensives without warning each other, and without any strategic necessity.”
The Ukrainian volunteer units lacked coordination of actions at that time. And they had problems with communication: they used ordinary mobile phones.
At the same time, British instructor Shafran noted the high level of training of Ukrainian special forces.
MILITIA PROBLEMS: WEAKNESSES OF COMMANDERS AND FIGHTERS “BY AD”
On the other hand, the DPR and LPR corps had a problem of a different nature: poorly trained personnel.
"One of the main problems has become the individual training of soldiers, whose level of training, especially in infantry units, does not fully meet the modern requirements of combined arms combat. The main reason for this is the acute shortage of trained junior officers and sergeants at the platoon and company level," military correspondent Vladislav Shurygin stated in his blog in March 2015.
In his opinion, on average, a battalion had at best two or three platoon commanders with a military education. The shortfall had to be covered by appointing university graduates and fighters who gained experience in June–September 2014, with their subsequent accelerated training already in the units.
"But this problem was never fully resolved. As a result, during the battles the infantry had to be constantly reinforced by well-trained special forces and reconnaissance units, which were ultimately used for the most part as assault groups," Shurygin noted.
Similar difficulties were observed in tank units. Many crews had only basic driving and shooting experience, but when it was necessary to urgently fix a breakdown of a combat vehicle, problems already began. As a result, equipment was often abandoned during battles "with minimal breakdowns and damage," Shurygin stated.
The armored vehicle crews lacked experience in “team play,” which led to large and unjustified losses of equipment and personnel.
Shurygin also directly pointed out that some of the people accepted into service in September–October 2014 “actually had no other motivation for service other than material incentives.”
Andrey Morozov, the head of communications for the August Battalion of the LPR People's Militia, spoke even more harshly: "Everyone understood perfectly well how recruitment into the army by advertisements would end. It was impossible to establish any filtering or screening of recruits at the level of large units in such a short time."
Ultimately, this led to the desertion of a certain number of fighters from the DPR and LPR Armed Forces.
So, before the fighting began, the sides had enough problems. But the battle for Debaltseve still took place.
FIRST PHASE OF THE OPERATION. STRIKING AT WEAK LINKS
On January 22, Ukraine officially acknowledged the loss of Donetsk airport. On the same day, the offensive operation of the armed forces of the DPR and LPR began to eliminate the Debaltseve salient.
Initially, the plan was to cut off the salient at its "base" - near Svetlodarsk. On January 22, the militia launched artillery strikes on Debaltsevo, Olkhovatka, Redkodub, Popasnaya and Sanzharovka.
The DPR and LPR Armed Forces attempted to close the cauldron near Debaltseve with counterattacks in the direction of Svetlodarsk, but the attack was unsuccessful. In response, Ukrainian formations launched a counterattack in the direction of Troitske and Krasny Pakhar, which the militia had previously managed to recapture.
The armed forces of the Donbass republics tried to achieve success further south. On January 25, in the area of Sanzharovka, the "August" battalion attacked height 307.9. Morozov's text in "Live Journal" was dedicated to the battles for the height :
"Sanzharovka itself was really taken almost without problems. It was a great tank attack through the fog, with infantry on the armor. However, how much infantry was there? Battalion reconnaissance. A platoon, about 20 people. The motorized rifle company assigned to us according to the organization chart was partly in another place on the front at that time, partly scattered along the entire route of advance to the front, guarding rear bases and transit points."
According to the chief of communications of the August battalion, the militia artillery fire in that battle, if it was adjusted, was unsatisfactory. And then the Ukrainian military realized that the militia did not have enough infantrymen.
"There was no infantry there. Neither our own, nor that attached to one of the brigades. And the command knew that it would not be there during the attack. The tanks went to 307.9 "naked", without infantry," Morozov noted.
The militia tanks were burned. Sanzharovka itself continued to be shelled until the end of the battle for Debaltseve.
However, the armed forces of the DPR and LPR managed to drive the Ukrainian Armed Forces out of the settlement of Nikishino. The Ukrainian garrison went north to Redkodub, which was later also liberated.
The Donbass republics' command also concentrated its efforts on Uglegorsk, a weak link in the Ukrainian defense. As a number of experts pointed out, the Ukrainian military prepared the fortifications there poorly, which the militias took advantage of.
The militia's goal was to organize a "small cauldron" along the line of heights that controlled the M-103 highway running northwest from Debaltseve. The highway itself came under heavy artillery fire from the Kalmius Brigade.
THE FALL OF UGLEGORSK AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE ARC INTO A CAULDRON
On January 26, the head of the DPR, Alexander Zakharchenko, announced the encirclement of Ukrainian units in the Debaltseve area, calling on Ukrainian soldiers to lay down their arms in exchange for their lives.
In Debaltsevo and Uglegorsk, as well as Dzerzhinsk, a catastrophic humanitarian situation has developed: due to military action, the main water pipelines were damaged.
On January 31, the militia entered Uglegorsk. Street fighting began. On February 3, an attack began on the village of Logvinovo on the M-103 highway.
The next day, on February 4, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon called on the parties to a ceasefire to evacuate residents of Debaltseve and other settlements. A ceasefire was declared, and more than 5,000 civilians were evacuated from Debaltseve and other settlements.
The next day, the fighting resumed. That same day, February 5, the militia established full control over Uglegorsk. It is noteworthy that at the height of the fighting for this settlement, the head of the DPR Zakharchenko visited it, which demoralized those Ukrainians who believed the official media information that the attacks on Uglegorsk were "repulsed."
Two days later, on February 7, Redkodub was liberated, and on February 9, Logvinovo. Ukrainian paratroopers tried to recapture the latter, but they failed. After that, the DPR and LPR announced that the M-103 highway was blocked.
Thus, the cauldron near Debaltseve was formed. However, the Ukrainian side did not admit this. On February 11, the Minister of Defense of Ukraine Stepan Poltorak stated that "the units located in Debaltseve are receiving weapons and ammunition, there is communication and interaction with the command." But in fact, even in Ukraine itself, they did not believe in this.
FIGHTS AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF MINSK
The next morning, February 12, the Ukrainian Armed Forces attempted to break out of Debaltseve. Logvinovo was attacked. Moreover, the attack was carried out both from within the cauldron and from outside.
By that time, negotiations had taken place in Minsk between Russian President Vladimir Putin, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President François Hollande and Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko. On February 12, the heads of the DPR and LPR, Aleksandr Zakharchenko and Igor Plotnitsky, also arrived in Minsk.
Militiamen of the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) on the road to Debaltseve.
As a result of the Minsk agreements signed that day, the troops of both sides were to cease fire from 00:00 Eastern European Time on February 15. Zakharchenko and Plotnitsky announced their readiness to allow the Ukrainian formations to leave the cauldron if they left behind their weapons and equipment.
In reality, the fighting did not stop. OSCE representatives who arrived to record the ceasefire were unable to get to Debaltseve. DPR leader Zakharchenko was wounded during the fighting for Debaltseve on February 17.
FEBRUARY FINALE
On the night of February 18, the Ukrainian command decided to withdraw all the blocked units from Debaltseve. Their backbone was made up of units of the 128th Mountain Assault Brigade. The Ukrainians went for a breakthrough. In total, more than 2,500 people tried to leave the cauldron. The majority of them succeeded. Although three roads leading out of the city were mined and were under close fire control of the militia, the enemy had the opportunity to retreat along paths and rough terrain. But there were also prisoners and dead.
Later that day, the DPR Ministry of Defense announced that Debaltseve was under full control. And the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, in turn, announced the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from Debaltseve. At the same time, Poroshenko tried to claim that the withdrawal of Ukrainian units was organized, which caused criticism both in the DPR and in Ukraine itself, since it was a case of flight at random, with personal weapons, but without heavy weapons and equipment.
According to various sources, Ukraine's losses amounted to 250 people killed and 110 captured. Some authors also estimate the militia's losses at almost 240 people killed. The armed forces of the Donbass republics took quite a lot of trophies, primarily equipment and weapons. But militia officers were rather skeptical about the battles for Debaltseve.
"The offensive on Debaltseve began on the 22nd. I would call it "disgustingly planned", but I seriously doubt that anyone planned it at all. Tanks without infantry, infantry without cover, no communication between units... In general, everything ended as it should have. A week later, everyone sent their superiors to a well-known address and began coordinating actions among themselves at the grassroots level. But there were no reserves left," noted Alexey Markov, commander of the Luhansk Prizrak brigade, on February 1, 2015.
According to him, the liberation of Debaltseve, the neutralization of the Ukrainian group threatening Gorlovka, and the straightening of the front line were a victory achieved in spite of the circumstances and at a rather heavy price.
Later, in 2019, the "Coordination Center for Assistance to Novorossiya", of which Markov was a member, prepared a report "How Russia is Losing the War in Donbass". The report covered in detail the problematic aspects of the battles for Debaltseve. In particular, it discussed the personnel, their training, as well as problems with communication and coordination of the units of the Armed Forces of the Donbass republics.
Some of the problems later "surfaced" at the initial stage of the SVO. But that's a completely different story.
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