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Home Front: Politix
Air Force Plans Shift to Obtain High-Tech Weapon Systems
2014-07-31
In an acknowledgment that the military may be pricing itself out of business, the Air Force on Wednesday called for a shift away from big-ticket weapon systems that take decades to develop and a move toward high-technology armaments that can be quickly adapted to meet a range of emerging threats.
You mean like US policy before WWII?
An Air Force strategic forecast, looking 20 years into the future and spurred in part by looming budget constraints, also calls for a faster pace, with lower price tags, in developing both airmen and the technology they use, warning that the current way of acquiring warplanes and weapons is too plodding.

The report, described as a "call to action" by Secretary Deborah Lee James of the Air Force, limits itself to how the country's most tech-heavy military service can adapt to looming threats and budget constraints. But it is also a warning to and an admission from the entire Defense Department that with military compensation and retirement costs rising sharply, the country may soon be unable to afford the military it has without making significant changes to the way it does business.

"To boil this down, we have to buy things very differently and develop and employ our people differently," said Maj. Gen. David W. Allvin, one of the authors of the report. "We have to behave more like an innovative 21st-century company."

From 1998 to 2014, annual compensation costs per active-duty service member increased by 76 percent, to $123,000, while the overall defense budget increased by 42 percent -- yet, since 2010, the base Defense Department budget, not including spending on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, has been declining, according to the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. So far, the military has dealt with the sharp increase in personnel costs by cutting the number of service members, and has managed to keep expensive weapons acquisition and technology at the same percentage of the overall budget -- around 30 percent -- as personnel and maintenance and training.

But with the Army, the largest branch in the military, now headed to its lowest personnel numbers since before the World War II buildup, Defense Department officials, particularly in the Army, warn that more cuts could bring increased risks to deployed service members. While the Air Force and Navy, with historic reliance on technology, are widely viewed as more willing to make personnel cuts than their Marine and Army counterparts, even officials in those services say there is a limit to how much more they are willing to reduce personnel.

But a potential gap between good intentions and spending reality remains, and it is unclear how serious the Air Force is about its call to move away from its focus on big, expensive weaponry, in particular advanced fighters and bombers. After all, the report is a long-range forecast that looks to change the culture of weapons development two decades or more down the road, so expensive weapons already in the pipeline remain relatively safe.

Over past decades, similar talk of streamlining the military has crashed into opposition from members of Congress, defense contractors and the military itself, which often work to protect bases, weapons systems and other budget pets. And calls for saving money by adopting new technologies are not new; Donald H. Rumsfeld, a former defense secretary, announced a goal of imposing "transformation" on the military to create a smaller, lighter, more agile -- and cheaper -- force, but his ideas were forced aside by the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

For example, nowhere in the report is there mention of scaling back on the trouble-plagued F-35 jet fighter -- in development for 14 years so far -- which was temporarily grounded last month after another in a series of problems. Nor is there talk of getting rid the next generation long-range bomber, which the Air Force is working on for around $550 million per plane and which is expected to debut somewhere around the mid-2020s.

"They're still going to buy the Joint Strike Fighter," said Todd Harrison, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, referring to the F-35 warplane. "They're getting squeezed, but they're still going to buy the next generation bomber and the KC-46 tanker" for aerial refueling.

In fact, introducing the report on Wednesday, both Secretary James and Gen. Mark A. Welsh III, the service's chief of staff, made a point of saying that the F-35, the next-generation long-range bomber and the KC-46 refueling tanker are all high-priority items for purchase. General Welsh offered a vigorous defense of the F-35, the world's most expensive weapons project, and called the recent failure of an F-35 engine at a Florida air base a fixable problem.

"The F-35 is the answer, the only answer, that ensures that future fights won't be fair fights," he said. "I'm confident that the program will remain on track."

Officials said Air Force weapons systems that could be targeted in the new shift -- the Air Force is calling it "strategic agility" -- is the next-generation replacement for the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System, or J-Stars, a surveillance airplane that provides information on ground forces to commanders in the air and on the ground, as well as the replacement training aircraft -- called TX -- used to train pilots.

Space and information programs could also see their spending cut in this new approach, military analysts said, with a view to building them in a more piecemeal way that would allow for quick adaptation as new technology emerges.

"The notion is, we can't afford the big bang programs anymore, so what if we approached it differently, looking at adding capability in smaller chunks?" said Beth McGrath, a director at Deloitte Consulting and former deputy chief management officer for the Defense Department. "We say, 'This is the big thing we want,' and then we go buy the big thing. But there's a better way to do this."

Air Force officials said they also believed they could incorporate this new system into some existing programs -- the service has been retrofitting its aging B-52 bomber fleet for decades to meet changing needs. A senior Air Force official said Wednesday that engineers were looking into whether they could integrate some of the newest advances in aircraft engines, including the latest in propulsion technology for fuel savings, and put them into existing systems, instead of simply starting from scratch all over again with new planes.

General Allvin, who worked on the report, said in an interview that the service also must look for how to make airmen more adaptable to new technology, and seek ways to harness advances underway at American tech giants like Google. He suggested that the Air Force might restructure pension and retirement programs so airmen could still qualify for military retirement benefits even if they spend their careers switching back and forth between the service and high-tech firms in the private sector.

"What if you entered the Air Force knowing you could serve for a few years, then go to work for an innovative tech company, and then return to the Air Force?" he said. "We could enter into partnerships with cutting-edge companies and allow our work force the opportunity of a more flexible retirement system that allows you to do two different jobs and still get to a 20-year retirement. It might take 35 years, but you would get here."

After two costly and exhausting land wars and the fiscal reality of government austerity, the Air Force report could signal similar shifts by the entire military.
Two words of advice:
1) Only buy domestic.
2) Don't put any plans on the internet.
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-Election 2012
Mittens Blasted for Criticizing Champ Too Soon
2012-09-13
In which the Publican nominee is criticized for saying what is both correct and right...
In which the Publican nominee is criticized. Fixed that for ya...
Statements that the Republican presidential nominee made slamming President Obama led to a day of tumult for Romney, with leading voices in his party criticizing him and his top aides scrambling to prevent further damage.
From too soft to waaay too tough. So some say.
"I think it's a terrible course for America to stand in apology for our values, that instead when our grounds are being attacked and being breached, that the first response of the United States must be outrage at the breach of the sovereignty of our nation," Romney told reporters. "An apology for America's values is never the right course."
Whotta right-wing crazy!
"Governor Romney seems to have a tendency to shoot first and aim later," Obama told CBS. "And as president, one of the things I have learned is that you can't do that. You have to make sure that statements you make are backed up by facts and that you have to think through the ramification before you make them."
That's why I use a teleprompter. Don't leave home without it!
Sen. John F. Kerry (D-Mass.), who chairs the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said in an interview that Romney demonstrated "a level of political recklessness and expediency that I think defies America's interest. I think Mitt Romney is very sad," Kerry said, adding, "There ought to be some limits to ambition and trying to exploit every opportunity.""
I know you ALL wanted to know what Big Jawn had to say.
Later in the day, former defense secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld tweeted: "The attacks on our embassies & diplomats are a result of perceived American weakness. Mitt Romney is right to point that out."

Sen. Jim DeMint (R-S.C.) said that "Governor Romney is absolutely right, there is no justification for these deadly attacks and we should never apologize for American freedom."

But others said that regardless of the critique, the timing of it was poor. Rep. Peter T. King (R-N.Y.), chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, said Romney was "right on the larger point," but "I probably would have waited a day or half a day."
I agree with Rummy.
Unlike Obama, Romney does not receive national security briefings, and his aides and advisers watched the news and Twitter to monitor the situations in Egypt and Libya on Tuesday.
Clearly, WaPo writers do not get Rantburg briefings, either.
Romney's initial statement, just two sentences, echoed themes of "No Apology," the candidate's 2010 book. "I'm outraged by the attacks on American diplomatic missions in Libya and Egypt and by the death of an American consulate worker in Benghazi," he said. "It's disgraceful that the Obama Administration's first response was not to condemn attacks on our diplomatic missions, but to sympathize with those who waged the attacks."

At the time, aides said, they did not know that J. Christopher Stevens, the U.S. ambassador to Libya, had been killed in Benghazi.

A statement from the U.S. Embassy in Cairo -- apparently a response to outrage in Egypt over an anti-Muslim film made in California -- said: "The Embassy of the United States in Cairo condemns the continuing efforts by misguided individuals to hurt the religious feelings of Muslims -- as we condemn efforts to offend believers of all religions."
And two hours later, the Ambassador was dead. A few hours after that, other embassies were stormed. But the lesson is Mitt spoke too soon?
Romney also made clear at the news conference that he believes the [Egyptian] embassy speaks for the White House and Hillary, and Big Jawn, and the left-wing in general. "The president takes responsibility not just for the words that come from his mouth, but also the words that come from his ambassadors from his administration for his embassies."
Only if it's convenient, Mitt; I thought you understood that.
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Home Front: Politix
Obama May Opt For New Military Advisers: 4 Generals to Retire
2010-10-19
President Obama, who has clashed with the military top brass over war and gays, will soon have a chance to reshape the Joint Chiefs of Staff as he faces contentious decisions next year on withdrawing troops from Afghanistan and on ending some weapons systems.

The admirals and generals who today make up the six Joint Chiefs were largely nurtured by Bush administration Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, who took a keen interest in finding and promoting officers who impressed him.

Mr. Obama has had differences with some of them. The outgoing Marine Corps commandant, Gen. James Conway, for example, has openly questioned the White House's July 2011 deadline to start a troop withdrawal from Afghanistan. Mr. Obama and his top military adviser clashed privately over Afghanistan troop strength, a new book reveals.

Next year, the president will have the opportunity to replace four of the six, unless he breaks with tradition and extends their tenures. The pending exits include the Joint Chiefs chairman, Navy Adm. Mike Mullen, whose term ends in September, and Marine Corps Gen. James Cartwright, the vice chairman, whose term ends in August.

Also due to retire in 2011 are the heads of the Army, Gen. George Casey in April, and the Navy, Adm. Gary Roughead in September. Mr. Obama made his first appointment to the chiefs this summer when he nominated Gen. James Amos to replace Gen. Conway.
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Afghanistan
Senate report: Bin Laden was 'within our grasp'
2009-11-29
Osama bin Laden was unquestionably within reach of U.S. troops in the mountains of Tora Bora when American military leaders made the crucial and costly decision not to pursue the terrorist leader with massive force, a Senate report says.

The report asserts that the failure to kill or capture bin Laden at his most vulnerable in December 2001 has had lasting consequences beyond the fate of one man. Bin Laden's escape laid the foundation for today's reinvigorated Afghan insurgency and inflamed the internal strife now endangering Pakistan, it says.

Staff members for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Democratic majority prepared the report at the request of the chairman, Sen. John Kerry, as President Barack Obama prepares to boost U.S. troops in Afghanistan.

The Massachusetts senator and 2004 Democratic presidential candidate has long argued the Bush administration missed a chance to get the al-Qaida leader and top deputies when they were holed up in the forbidding mountainous area of eastern Afghanistan only three months after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

Although limited to a review of military operations eight years old, the report could also be read as a cautionary note for those resisting an increased troop presence there now.

More pointedly, it seeks to affix a measure of blame for the state of the war today on military leaders under former president George W. Bush, specifically Donald H. Rumsfeld as defense secretary and his top military commander, Tommy Franks.

"Removing the al-Qaida leader from the battlefield eight years ago would not have eliminated the worldwide extremist threat," the report says. "But the decisions that opened the door for his escape to Pakistan allowed bin Laden to emerge as a potent symbolic figure who continues to attract a steady flow of money and inspire fanatics worldwide. The failure to finish the job represents a lost opportunity that forever altered the course of the conflict in Afghanistan and the future of international terrorism."

The report states categorically that bin Laden was hiding in Tora Bora when the U.S. had the means to mount a rapid assault with several thousand troops at least. It says that a review of existing literature, unclassified government records and interviews with central participants "removes any lingering doubts and makes it clear that Osama bin Laden was within our grasp at Tora Bora."

On or about Dec. 16, 2001, bin Laden and bodyguards "walked unmolested out of Tora Bora and disappeared into Pakistan's unregulated tribal area," where he is still believed to be based, the report says.

Instead of a massive attack, fewer than 100 U.S. commandos, working with Afghan militias, tried to capitalize on air strikes and track down their prey.

"The vast array of American military power, from sniper teams to the most mobile divisions of the Marine Corps and the Army, was kept on the sidelines," the report said.

At the time, Rumsfeld expressed concern that a large U.S. troop presence might fuel a backlash and he and some others said the evidence was not conclusive about bin Laden's location.
It's all Bush's fault!
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Home Front: WoT
A General Steps From the Shadows
2009-05-19
Meet the new guy...
WASHINGTON — Lt. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the ascetic who is set to become the new top American commander in Afghanistan, usually eats just one meal a day, in the evening, to avoid sluggishness. He is known for operating on a few hours’ sleep and for running to and from work while listening to audio books on an iPod. In Iraq, where he oversaw secret commando operations for five years, former intelligence officials say that he had an encyclopedic, even obsessive, knowledge about the lives of terrorists, and that he pushed his ranks aggressively to kill as many of them as possible.

But General McChrystal has also moved easily from the dark world to the light. Fellow officers on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, where he is director, and former colleagues at the Council on Foreign Relations describe him as a warrior-scholar, comfortable with diplomats, politicians and the military man who would help promote him to his new job. “He’s lanky, smart, tough, a sneaky stealth soldier,” said Maj. Gen. William Nash, a retired officer. “He’s got all the Special Ops attributes, plus an intellect.”

If General McChrystal is confirmed by the Senate, as expected, he will take over the post held by Gen. David D. McKiernan, who was forced out on Monday. Obama administration officials have described the shakeup as a way to bring a bolder and more creative approach to the faltering war in Afghanistan.

Most of what General McChrystal has done over a 33-year career remains classified, including service between 2003 and 2008 as commander of the Joint Special Operations Command, an elite unit so clandestine that the Pentagon for years refused to acknowledge its existence. But former C.I.A. officials say that General McChrystal was among those who, with the C.I.A., pushed hard for a secret joint operation in the tribal region of Pakistan in 2005 aimed at capturing or killing Ayman al-Zawahri, Osama bin Laden’s deputy. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld canceled the operation at the last minute, saying it was too risky and was based on what he considered questionable intelligence, a move that former intelligence officials say General McChrystal found maddening.

When General McChrystal took over the Joint Special Operations Command in 2003, he inherited an insular, shadowy commando force with a reputation for spurning partnerships with other military and intelligence organizations. But over the next five years he worked hard, his colleagues say, to build close relationships with the C.I.A. and the F.B.I. He won praise from C.I.A. officers, many of whom had stormy relationships with commanders running the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. “He knows intelligence, he knows covert action and he knows the value of partnerships,” said Henry Crumpton, who ran the C.I.A.’s covert war in Afghanistan after the Sept. 11 attacks.

As head of the command, which oversees the elite Delta Force and units of the Navy Seals, General McChrystal was based at Fort Bragg, N.C. But he spent much of his time in Iraq commanding secret missions. Most of his operations were conducted at night, but General McChrystal, described nearly universally as a driven workaholic, was up for most of the day as well. His wife and grown son remained back in the United States.

General McChrystal was born Aug. 14, 1954, into a military family. His father, Maj. Gen. Herbert J. McChrystal Jr., served in Germany during the American occupation after World War II and later at the Pentagon. General Stanley McChrystal was the fourth child in a family of five boys and one girl; all of them grew up to serve in the military or marry into it. “They’re all pretty intense,” said Judy McChrystal, one of General McChrystal’s sisters-in-law, who is married to the eldest child, Herbert J. McChrystal III, a former chaplain at the United States Military Academy at West Point.

General McChrystal graduated from West Point in 1976 and spent the next three decades ascending through conventional and Special Operations command positions as well as taking postings at Harvard and the Council on Foreign Relations. He was a commander of a Green Beret team in 1979 and 1980, and he did several tours in the Army Rangers as a staff officer and a battalion commander, including service in the Persian Gulf war of 1991.

One blot on his otherwise impressive military record occurred in 2007, when a Pentagon investigation into the accidental shooting death in 2004 of Cpl. Pat Tillman by fellow Army Rangers in Afghanistan held General McChrystal accountable for inaccurate information provided by Corporal Tillman’s unit in recommending him for a Silver Star. The information wrongly suggested that Corporal Tillman had been killed by enemy fire.

At the Joint Staff at the Pentagon, where General McChrystal directs the 1,200-member group, he has instituted a daily 6:30 a.m. classified meeting among 25 top officers and, by video, military commanders around the world. In half an hour, the group races through military developments and problems over the past 24 hours.

Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, brought General McChrystal back to Washington to be his director last August, and the physical proximity served General McChrystal well, Defense officials said. In recent weeks, Admiral Mullen recommended General McChrystal to Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates as a replacement for General McKiernan.

One other thing to know about General McChrystal: when he was a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in 2000, he ran a dozen miles each morning to the council’s offices from his quarters at Fort Hamilton on the southwestern tip of Brooklyn.“If you asked me the first thing that comes to mind about General McChrystal,” said Leslie H. Gelb, the president emeritus of the council, “I think of no body fat.”
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Home Front: WoT
The End of the Global War on Terror
2009-03-24
The end of the Global War on Terror -- or at least the use of that phrase -- has been codified at the Pentagon. Reports that the phrase was being retired have been circulating for some time amongst senior administration officials, and this morning speechwriters and other staff were notified via this e-mail to use "Overseas Contingency Operation" instead.

"Recently, in a LtGen [John] Bergman, USMC, statement for the 25 March [congressional] hearing, OMB required that the following change be made before going to the Hill," Dave Riedel, of the Office of Security Review, wrote in an e-mail.

"OMB says: 'This Administration prefers to avoid using the term "Long War" or "Global War on Terror" [GWOT]. Please use "Overseas Contingency Operation.'"

Riedel asked recipients to "Please pass on to your speech writers and try to catch this change before the statements make it to OMB."

By way of history, senior Bush administration officials several years ago wanted to stop using the phrase and switch to something many felt might better reflect the realities of the fight against international terrorism.

One leading option was to change the name to GSAVE, or Global Struggle Against Violent Extremism. This was not as catchy an acronym as GWOT, but officials felt it more accurately described the battle.Then-Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld even used the GSAVE abbreviation publicly.

But, in a White House meeting, President Bush ruled that it was still a war for him, and Rumsfeld and everyone else went back to GWOT.
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Home Front: WoT
Frustrated Special Forces: Finding Bin Ladin
2008-07-10
H/T Drudge

Policy dispute by Bill Gertz

Defense officials are criticizing what they say is the failure to capture or kill top al Qaeda leaders because of timidity on the part of policy officials in the Pentagon, diplomats at the State Department and risk-averse bureaucrats within the intelligence community.

Military special operations forces (SOF) commandos are frustrated by the lack of aggressiveness on the part of several policy and intelligence leaders in pursuing al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and his top henchmen, who are thought to have hidden inside the tribal areas of Pakistan for the past 6œ years.

The focus of the commandos' ire, the officials say, is the failure to set up bases inside Pakistan's tribal region, where al Qaeda has regrouped in recent months, setting up training camps where among those being trained are Western-looking terrorists who can pass more easily through security systems. The lawless border region inside Pakistan along the Afghan border remains off-limits to U.S. troops.

The officials say that was not always the case. For a short time, U.S. special operations forces went into the area in 2002 and 2003, when secret Army Delta Force and Navy SEALs worked with Pakistani security forces.

That effort was halted under Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage, who recently blamed Pakistan for opposing the joint operations.
Mr. Armitage just keeps popping up like a bad penny, and McCain has him onboard.
Mr. Armitage, however, also disclosed his diplomatic opposition to the commando operations. Mr. Armitage, an adviser to Republican presidential contender Sen. John McCain, told the New York Times last month that the United States feared pressuring Pakistani leaders for commando access and that the Delta Force and SEALs in the tribal region were "pushing them almost to the breaking point."

However, the officials said that without the training and expertise of the U.S. commandos, Pakistani forces took heavy casualties in the region, with about 1,000 troops killed by terrorists and their supporters.

Another major setback for aggressive special operations activities occurred recently with a decision to downgrade the U.S. Special Operations Command. Under Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, the command in 2004 began to shift its focus from support and training to becoming a front-line command in the covert war to capture and kill terrorists. In May, SOCOM, as the command is called, reverted to its previous coordination and training role, a change that also frustrated many SOF commandos.

Critics in the Pentagon of the failure to more aggressively use the 50,000-strong SOF force say it also is the result of a bias by intelligence officials against special forces, including Pentagon policy-makers such as former CIA officer Michael Vickers, currently assistant defense secretary for special operations; former CIA officer Mary Beth Long, assistant defense secretary for international security affairs; and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, a former CIA director.

The officials said the bias among intelligence officials against aggressive military special operations is long-standing. As evidence, they note that one of the very few recommendations of the 9/11 commission ignored by President Bush was the panel's call for giving the Pentagon the lead role in paramilitary operations.

The commission report stated that "lead responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary operations, whether clandestine or covert, should shift to the Defense Department." That has not occurred, and the officials said one result is that bin Laden and his deputies remain at large.

Said one Pentagon official: "The reason some Pentagon leaders appear to be so indecisive about President Bush's order to catch Osama bin Laden dead or alive is that they have not unleashed the dogs of war. Too many bureaucrats have blocked ideas from the aggressive U.S. commandos in Afghanistan and at SOCOM headquarters who just want to carry out the president's orders to stop al Qaeda from rebuilding."

Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell declined to address any specifics of special operations policies but said he thinks senior commanders do not share the critics' views.

On the hunt for bin Laden, Mr. Morrell said: "No one should question our commitment to bringing Osama bin Laden and the rest of his cowardly lieutenants to justice, one way or another. It will happen. it's just a question of when."
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Home Front: Politix
Congress Investigates Harsh Interrogation
2008-06-17
A Senate investigation has concluded that top Pentagon officials began assembling lists of harsh interrogation techniques in the summer of 2002 for use on detainees at Guantanamo Bay and that those officials later cited memos from field commanders to suggest that the proposals originated far down the chain of command, according to nameless congressional sources briefed on the findings.

The sources said that memos and other evidence obtained during the inquiry show that officials in the office of then-Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld started to research the use of waterboarding, stress positions, sensory deprivation and other practices in July 2002, months before memos from commanders at the detention facility in Cuba requested permission to use those measures on suspected terrorists.

The reported evidence -- some of which is expected to be made public at a Senate hearing today -- also shows that military lawyers raised strong concerns about the legality of the practices as early as November 2002, a month before Rumsfeld approved them. The findings contradict previous accounts by unspecified top Bush administration appointees, setting the stage for new clashes between the White House and Congress over the origins of interrogation methods that many lawmakers regard as torture and possibly illegal.
Cover for the issues of gas prices and the sucess of the Iraq war.
"Some have suggested that detainee abuses committed by U.S. personnel at Abu Ghraib in Iraq and at Guantanamo were the result of a 'few bad apples' acting on their own. It would be a lot easier to accept if that were true," Sen. Carl M. Levin (D-Mich.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, wrote in a statement for delivery at a committee hearing this morning. "Senior officials in the United States government sought out information on aggressive techniques, twisted the law to create the appearance of their legality, and authorized their use against detainees."
Bad apples used panties, Carl, Senior Officals didn't authorize the use of women's undergarments. But you're probably too old to remember that.
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Iraq
Pentagon institute calls Iraq war `a major debacle'
2008-04-18
I haven't read the report(not more than the first 4 pages) nor do I know the reputation of the author. I assume this report will be front page of the Tehran Times tomorrow though. Could someone with more knowledge please make some relevant comments to shed some light on this report and what it means? Is it relevant at all?

I'm curious to know to if and to what extent Cheney and Rumsfeld's involvement in day to day war operations have influenced our desired outcomes and eventual victories in the larger WoT. But first things first who is Joseph Collins?

WASHINGTON | The war in Iraq has become ``a major debacle'' and the outcome ``is in doubt'' despite improvements in security from the buildup in U.S. forces, according to a highly critical study published Thursday by the Pentagon's premier military educational institute. The report released by the National Defense University raises fresh doubts about President Bush's projections of a U.S. victory in Iraq just a week after Bush announced that he was suspending U.S. troop reductions.

The report carries considerable weight because it was written by Joseph Collins, a former senior Pentagon official, and was based in part on interviews with other former senior defense and intelligence officials who played roles in prewar preparations. It was published by the university's National Institute for Strategic Studies, a Defense Department research center.

``Measured in blood and treasure, the war in Iraq has achieved the status of a major war and a major debacle,'' says the report's opening line.

At the time the report was written last fall, more than 4,000 U.S. and foreign troops, more than 7,500 Iraqi security forces and as many as 82,000 Iraqi civilians had been killed and tens of thousands of others wounded, while the cost of the war since March 2003 was estimated at $450 billion.

``No one as yet has calculated the costs of long-term veterans' benefits or the total impact on service personnel and materiel,'' wrote Collins, who was involved in planning post-invasion humanitarian operations.

The report said that the United States has suffered serious political costs, with its standing in the world seriously diminished. Moreover, operations in Iraq have diverted ``manpower, materiel and the attention of decision-makers'' from ``all other efforts in the war on terror'' and severely strained the U.S. armed forces.

``Compounding all of these problems, our efforts there [in Iraq] were designed to enhance U.S. national security, but they have become, at least temporarily, an incubator for terrorism and have emboldened Iran to expand its influence throughout the Middle East,'' the report continued.

The addition of 30,000 U.S. troops to Iraq last year to halt the country's descent into all-out civil war has improved security, but not enough to ensure that the country emerges as a stable democracy at peace with its neighbors, the report said.

``Despite impressive progress in security, the outcome of the war is in doubt,'' said the report. ``Strong majorities of both Iraqis and Americans favor some sort of U.S. withdrawal. Intelligence analysts, however, remind us that the only thing worse than an Iraq with an American army may be an Iraq after a rapid withdrawal of that army.''

``For many analysts (including this one), Iraq remains a `must win,' but for many others, despite obvious progress under General David Petraeus and the surge, it now looks like a `can't win.'''

The report lays much of the blame for what went wrong in Iraq after the initial U.S. victory at the feet of then-Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld. It says that in November 2001, before the war in Afghanistan was over, President Bush asked Rumsfeld ``to begin planning in secret for potential military operations against Iraq.''

Rumsfeld, who was closely allied with Vice President Dick Cheney, bypassed the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the report says, and became ``the direct supervisor of the combatant commanders.''

''The aggressive, hands-on Rumsfeld,'' it continues, ``cajoled and pushed his way toward a small force and a lightning fast operation.'' Later, he shut down the military's computerized deployment system, ``questioning, delaying or deleting units on the numerous deployment orders that came across his desk.''

In part because ``long, costly, manpower-intensive post-combat operations were anathema to Rumsfeld,'' the report says, the U.S. was unprepared to fight what Collins calls ``War B,'' the battle against insurgents and sectarian violence that began in mid-2003, shortly after ``War A,'' the fight against Saddam Hussein's forces, ended.

Compounding the problem was a series of faulty assumptions made by Bush's top aides, among them an expectation fed by Iraqi exiles that Iraqis would be grateful to America for liberating them from Saddam's dictatorship. The administration also expected that ``Iraq without Saddam could manage and fund its own reconstruction.''

The report also singles out the Bush administration's national security apparatus and implicitly President Bush and both of his national security advisers, Condoleezza Rice and Stephen Hadley, saying that ``senior national security officials exhibited in many instances an imperious attitude, exerting power and pressure where diplomacy and bargaining might have had a better effect.''

Collins ends his report by quoting Winston Churchill, who said: ``Let us learn our lessons. Never, never believe any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who embarks on the strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter. ... Always remember, however sure you are that you can easily win, that there would not be a war if the other man did not think that he also had a chance.''
Obtain the report here.
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Afghanistan
U.S. Army Chief In Europe To Run NATO Afghan Unit
2008-01-15
WASHINGTON — Gen. David D. McKiernan is expected to be appointed as the next commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan, American military officials said Monday. General McKiernan oversaw the allied ground attack that toppled Saddam Hussein in 2003. He has held a variety of senior posts and is the commander of American Army forces in Europe. He is likely to assume his new command in June and is to replace Gen. Dan K. McNeill.

By all accounts, it will be a challenging assignment. United States and allied forces face a resilient Taliban, as well as Qaeda militants, who have been operating from sanctuaries in northwestern Pakistan. But NATO nations have had to carry out their mission short of combat troops and trainers.

General McNeill recently requested that some 3,200 additional troops be sent, according to Defense Department officials. The Pentagon is expected to announce a decision on the request on Tuesday.

The NATO force in Afghanistan numbers about 40,000, of which 14,000 are Americans. Separately, the United States has 12,000 troops who are carrying out a counterterrorism mission in Afghanistan.

General McKiernan entered the Army in 1972. In the months before the Iraq war, he pressed to begin the war with a greater number of troops than authorized in the plan he had inherited.

General McKiernan was never a favorite of former Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, and after the invasion he was made the deputy head of the Army’s Forces Command, which oversees the training of American troops in the United States. In 2005, he was awarded a fourth star and made the head of American Army troops in Europe. His European experience will be a plus in dealing with NATO’s disparate forces in Afghanistan. During the 1990s, he was a senior officer with allied forces in Bosnia and later was deputy chief of staff of American Army operations in Europe.

Among his other posts, he has been commander of the First Cavalry Division and the Army’s chief of operations.
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Home Front: Politix
The Next War
2007-09-16
Testifying before Congress last week, Gen. David H. Petraeus appeared commanding, smart and alive to the challenges that his soldiers face in Iraq. But he also embodied what the Iraq conflict has come to represent: an embattled, able, courageous military at war, struggling to maintain its authority and credibility after 4 1/2 years of a "cakewalk" gone wrong.

Petraeus will not be the last general to find himself explaining how a military intervention has misfired and urging skeptical lawmakers to believe that the mission can still be accomplished. For the next war is always looming, and so is the urgent question of whether the U.S. military can adapt in time to win it.

Today, the most likely next conflict will be with Iran, a radical state that America has tried to isolate for almost 30 years and that now threatens to further destabilize the Middle East through its expansionist aims, backing of terrorist proxies such as the Lebanese group Hezbollah and Hamas in Gaza and the West Bank, and far-reaching support for radical Shiite militias in Iraq. As Iran seems to draw closer to acquiring nuclear weapons, almost every U.S. leader -- and would-be president -- has said that it simply won't be permitted to reach that goal.

Think another war can't happen? Think again. Unchastened by the Iraq fiasco, hawks in Vice President Cheney's office have been pushing the use of force. It isn't hard to foresee the range of military options that policymakers face.

The next war would begin with an intense air and naval campaign. Let's say you're planning the conflict as part of the staff of the Joint Chiefs. Your list of targets isn't that long -- only a few dozen nuclear sites -- but you can't risk retaliation from Tehran. So you allow 21 days for the bombardment, to be safe; you'd aim to strike every command-and-control facility, radar site, missile site, storage site, airfield, ship and base in Iran. To prevent world oil prices from soaring, you'd have to try to protect every oil and gas rig, and the big ports and load points. You'd need to use B-2s and lots of missiles up front, plus many small amphibious task forces to take out particularly tough targets along the coast, with manned and unmanned air reconnaissance. And don't forget the Special Forces, to penetrate deep inside Iran, call in airstrikes and drag the evidence of Tehran's nuclear ambitions out into the open for a world that's understandably skeptical of U.S. assertions that yet another Gulf rogue is on the brink of getting the bomb.

But if it's clear how a war with Iran would start, it's far less clear how it would end. How might Iran strike back? Would it unleash Hezbollah cells across Europe and the Middle East, or perhaps even inside the United States? Would Tehran goad Iraq's Shiites to rise up against their U.S. occupiers? And what would we do with Iran after the bombs stopped falling? We certainly could not occupy the nation with the limited ground forces we have left. So what would it be: Iran as a chastened, more tractable government? As a chaotic failed state? Or as a hardened and embittered foe?

Iran is not the only country where the next war with the United States might erupt. Consider the emergence of a new superpower (or at least a close competitor with the United States). China's shoot-down of an old Chinese satellite in January was a wake-up call about the risks inherent in America's reliance on space. The next war could also come from somewhere unexpected; if you'd told most Americans in August 2001 that the United States would be invading Afghanistan within weeks, they'd have called you crazy.

Any future U.S. wars will undoubtedly be shaped by the experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, however painful that might be. Every military refights the last war, but good militaries learn lessons from the past. We'd better get them right, and soon. Here, the lesson from Iraq and Afghanistan couldn't be more clear: Don't ever, ever go to war unless you can describe and create a more desirable end state. And doing so takes a whole lot more than just the use of force.

The lessons from past conflicts aren't always obvious. After the demoralizing loss in Vietnam, the United States went high-tech, developing whole classes of new tanks, ships and fighter planes and new operational techniques to defeat then-enemy no. 1 -- the Soviets. We also junked the doctrine of counterinsurgency warfare, which we're trying to relearn in Iraq.

After the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the U.S. military embarked upon another wave of high-tech modernization -- and paid for it by cutting ground forces, which were being repeatedly deployed to peacekeeping operations in places such as Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo. Instead of preparing for more likely, low-intensity conflicts, we were still spoiling for the "big fight," focusing on such large conventional targets as Kim Jong Il's North Korea and Saddam Hussein's Iraq -- and now we lack adequate ground forces. Bulking up these forces, perhaps by as many as 100,000 more active troops, and refitting and recovering from Iraq could cost $70 billion to $100 billion.

Somehow, in the past decade or two, we began to think of ourselves as "warriors." There was an elemental purity to this mindset, a kill-or-be-killed simplicity that drove U.S. commanders to create a leaner force based on more basic skills -- the kind that some generals thought were lacking in Vietnam and in the early years of the all-volunteer military. Now, in an age when losing hearts and minds can mean losing a war, we find ourselves struggling in Iraq and Afghanistan to impart the sort of cultural sensitivities that were second nature to an earlier generation of troops trained to eat nuoc m?m with everything and sit on the floor during their tours in Vietnam.

One of the most important lessons from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan -- and Vietnam, for that matter -- is that we need to safeguard our troops. The U.S. public is more likely to sour on a conflict when it sees the military losing blood, not treasure. So to keep up our staying power, our skill in hunting and killing our foes has to be matched by our care in concealing and protecting our troops. Three particularly obvious requirements are body armor, mine-resistant vehicles, and telescopic and night sights for every weapon. But these things are expensive for a military that has historically been enamored of big-ticket items such as fighter planes, ships and missiles. Many of us career officers understood these requirements after Vietnam, but we couldn't shift the Pentagon's priorities enough to save the lives of forces sent to Iraq years later.

That brings us to the military's leaders. We need generals who are well-educated, flexible and culturally adept men and women -- not just warriors, not just technicians. Why aren't more military leaders sent to top schools such as Princeton, the way Petraeus was, or given opportunities to earn PhDs, as did Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates's military assistant, Lt. Gen. Peter Chiarelli? For years, Congress has whacked away at military-education budgets, thereby driving gifted officers from the top-flight graduate schools where they could have honed their analytical skills and cultural awareness.

Still, let's not be too hard on ourselves. As an institution, the U.S. Armed Forces stands head and shoulders above any other military in skill, equipment and compassion, and its leaders are able, conscientious and loyal.

But shame on political leaders who would hide behind their top generals. It was hard not to catch a whiff of that during last week's hearings. The Constitution, however, is not ambivalent about where the responsibility for command lies -- the president is the commander in chief.

Surely here is where some of the most salient lessons from recent wars lie: in forcing civilian leaders to shoulder their burdens of ultimate responsibility and in demanding that generals unflinchingly offer their toughest, most seasoned, advice. Gen. Tommy R. Franks embarked on the 2001 Afghanistan operation without a clear road map for success, or even a definition of what victory would look like. Somehow, that was good enough for him and his bosses. So Osama bin Laden slunk away, the Taliban was allowed to regroup, and Afghanistan is now mired deep in trouble and sinking fast.

In Iraq, President Bush approved war-fighting plans that hadn't incorporated any of the vital 1990s lessons from Haiti, Bosnia or Kosovo; worse, then-Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld fought doing so. Nation-building, however ideologically repulsive some may find it, is a capability that a superpower sometimes needs.

At the same time, the United States' top generals must understand that their duty is to win, not just to get along. They must have the insight and character to demand the resources necessary to succeed -- and have the guts to either obtain what they need or to resign. If they get their way and still don't emerge victorious, they must be replaced. That is the lot they accepted when they pinned on those four shiny silver stars.

Above all else, we Americans must understand that the goal of war is to achieve a specific purpose for the nation. In this respect, the military is simply a tool of statecraft, one that must work in tandem with diplomacy, economic suasion, intelligence and other instruments of U.S. power. How tragic it is to see old men who are unwilling to talk to potential adversaries but seem so ready to dispatch young people to fight and die.

So, steady as we go. We need to tweak our force structure, hone our leadership and learn everything we can about how to do everything better. But the big lesson is simply this: War is the last, last, last resort. It always brings tragedy and rarely brings glory. Take it from a general who won: The best war is the one that doesn't have to be fought, and the best military is the one capable and versatile enough to deter the next war in the first place.
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Home Front: Culture Wars
Colin Powell is sorry, Donald Rumsfeld isn't
2007-09-10
GQ interviews former Secretary of State General Colin Powell, ret'd (exactly what one would expect) and former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (swoon!). Excerpts:
Powell: Isn’t the new global threat we face even more dangerous?
What is the greatest threat facing us now? People will say it’s terrorism. But are there any terrorists in the world who can change the American way of life or our political system? No. Can they knock down a building? Yes. Can they kill somebody? Yes. But can they change us? No. Only we can change ourselves. So what is the great threat we are facing?

I would approach this differently, in almost Marshall-like terms. What are the great opportunities out there—ones that we can take advantage of? It should not be just about creating alliances to deal with a guy in a cave in Pakistan. It should be about how do we create institutions that keep the world moving down a path of wealth creation, of increasing respect for human rights, creating democratic institutions, and increasing the efficiency and power of market economies? This is perhaps the most effective way to go after terrorists.

So you think we are getting too hunkered down and scared?
Yes! We are taking too much counsel of our fears.

This doesn’t mean there isn’t a terrorist threat. There is a threat. And we should send in military forces when we have a target to deal with. We should also secure our airports, if that makes us safer. But let’s welcome every foreign student we can get our hands on. Let’s make sure that foreigners come to the Mayo Clinic here, and not the Mayo facility in Dubai or somewhere else. Let’s make sure people come to Disney World and not throw them up against the wall in Orlando simply because they have a Muslim name. Let’s also remember that this country was created by immigrants and thrives as a result of immigration, and we need a sound immigration policy.

Let’s show the world a face of openness and what a democratic system can do. That’s why I want to see Guantánamo closed. It’s so harmful to what we stand for. We literally bang ourselves in the head by having that place. What are we doing this to ourselves for? Because we’re worried about the 380 guys there? Bring them here! Give them lawyers and habeas corpus. We can deal with them. We are paying a price when the rest of the world sees an America that seems to be afraid and is not the America they remember.

Rumsfeld: If you're expecting Don Rumsfeld—out of government now, on his farm, in a moment of repose—to play the bitter, angry, reflective, tragic fallen hero…ain't gonna happen. If he feels any of those things, he's not showing it. (And if he did, he probably wouldn't be Donald H. Rumsfeld.) The man does not do regret. Over the course of the next few hours, he will answer every question asked of him, and even when the answer is "I'm not gonna talk about that," there's never a flash of anger. Impatience, yes, but never anger.

So do you ever feel like you've been made the fall guy with Iraq?

"No. I think anyone who's involved in a war—eh, wars are difficult things, they're messy things, they're dangerous things, people die, people get wounded. And anyone who's involved, someone's not gonna like it, someone's gonna be critical of it. So I—if you're in the business I was in, uh, that goes with the territory."

It's hard to argue with this logic. But it does have the added benefit of deflecting any sort of criticism. It is also the kind of mindset that lets you sleep at night.

He goes on. "If you do anything, somebody's not gonna like it, that's inevitable. Therefore, if you want to be liked—as Tony Blair said, popular, which is a terrible word—if you don't do anything, then everyone's gonna like you. And if you do do something, somebody's not gonna like it. And when you cancel weapons systems, you're gonna get a bunch of generals unhappy about it. Because that's what they spent their whole life on, working on those things, getting ready for it. That doesn't bother me. I've been changing things for decades. I went into companies and changed them. And I—I'm comfortable with that, I accept that, that there's gonna be opposition to things. I was asked to come into the department, by the president, to transform it. I could have gone in and not done that. And everyone would have been smiling. And the defense contractors that were doing what they were doing would be happy, the congressmen who had things going on in their districts would be happy…
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