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Right on Cue: Desperate Democrats want probe of tape destruction |
2007-12-08 |
Nancy: "OK everyone, it's showtime! I want to see plenty of seething and righteous indignation. We have a mountain to make out of a molehill tonight! Ted, Dick, Carl! Get up front and start gnashing your teeth. I want to see red faces, insane comparisons, skewed importance, and plenty of spittle all around like usual! I want deceptive logic all around but try not to draw attention to the ignorance of their assumptions as you take advantage of them. Harry, take off the collar and stand up, it wouldn't look good. No, someone's already used 'Oh the humanity' before I think. Now remember: Nothing is below us - err, I mean No detail is too insignificant. Pay attention back there already! Jack's drooling out of the left side of his mouth again! Joe, make yourself useful for once and straighten him up. No, the other way! OK, places everyone!" [The curtain raises and Act 1 begins] ![]() The Senate's No. 2 Democrat, Dick Durbin of Illinois, called on Attorney General Michael Mukasey to find out "whether CIA officials who destroyed these videotapes and withheld information about their existence from official proceedings violated the law." Sen. Edward Kennedy, D-Mass., accused the CIA of a cover-up. "We haven't seen anything like this since the 18 1/2-minute gap in the tapes of President Richard Nixon," he said in a Senate floor speech. And Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin, D-Mich., told reporters the CIA's explanation that the tapes were destroyed to protect agents' identities is "a pathetic excuse," adding: "You'd have to burn every document at the CIA that has the identity of an agent on it under that theory." Democrats on the House Judiciary Committee sent letters to CIA Director Gen. Michael Hayden and Mukasey asking whether the Justice Department gave legal advice to the CIA on the destruction of the tapes, and whether it was planning an obstruction-of-justice investigation. White House press secretary Dana Perino said Friday that President Bush did not recall being told about the tapes or their destruction. But she could not rule out White House involvement in the decision to destroy the tapes, saying she had only asked the president about it, not others. Perino refused to say whether the destruction could have been an obstruction of justice or a threat to cases against terrorism suspects. If the attorney general decides to investigate, "of course the White House would support that," she said. In a daily press briefing dedicated almost solely to the topic of the CIA tapes, Perino responded 19 times that she didn't know or couldn't comment. At least one White House official, then-White House Counsel Harriet Miers, knew about the CIA's planned destruction of videotapes in 2005 that documented the interrogation of two al-Qaida operatives, ABC news reported Friday. Three officials told ABC News that Miers urged the CIA not to destroy the tapes. White House officials declined to comment on the report. The spy agency destroyed the tapes in November 2005, at a time when human rights groups and lawyers for detainees were clamoring for information about the agency's secret detention and interrogation program, and Congress and U.S. courts were debating where "enhanced interrogation" crossed the line into torture. Also at that time, the Senate Intelligence Committee was asking whether the videotapes showed CIA interrogators were complying with interrogation guidelines. The CIA refused twice in 2005 to provide the committee with its general counsel's report on the tapes, according to Committee Chairman Sen. Jay Rockefeller, D-W.Va. Hayden told agency employees Thursday that the recordings were destroyed out of fear the tapes would leak and reveal the identities of interrogators. He said the sessions were videotaped to provide an added layer of legal protection for interrogators using new, harsh methods. President Bush had just authorized those methods as a way to break down the defenses of recalcitrant prisoners. Destruction of the tapes came in the midst of an intense national debate about how forcefully prisoners could be grilled to get them to talk. Not long after the tapes were destroyed, Congress adopted the Detainee Treatment Act, championed by Republican Sen. John McCain of Arizona, who was tortured while a prisoner of war in Vietnam. The law prohibits not only torture, but cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment of all U.S. detainees, including those in CIA custody. Also in the fall of 2005, the Supreme Court heard a case involving the legal rights of detainees held at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. It decided in June 2006 that al-Qaida prisoners are protected by the Geneva Conventions' prohibitions on torture and cruel treatment. At the time, the CIA also was concerned that its operatives involved in prisoner interrogation might be subject to legal charges over the treatment of detainees. Some agency employees have bought liability insurance as a hedge against that possibility. The decision to destroy the tapes was made by Jose Rodriguez, then the head of the CIA's clandestine directorate of operations under CIA Director Porter Goss. Hayden said congressional intelligence committee members were made aware in February 2003 both of the tapes and the CIA's ultimate plan to destroy them. That claim was denied by several members of the panels, including Republican Peter Hoekstra of Michigan, who was then chairman of the House Intelligence Committee. The Senate Intelligence Committee did not learn of the tapes' destruction until November 2006, and Rockefeller said he was not told in 2003 of the plan to destroy them. The House Intelligence Committee learned of the tapes' destruction in March 2007. Republicans were mostly mum about the CIA disclosure. McCain, a presidential candidate, said while campaigning in New Hampshire on Friday that he would not side with Democrats' calls for an investigation because he believed the CIA's actions were legal. "That doesn't mean I like it," McCain added. "Of course I object to it," he said of the tapes being destroyed. "Right now, our intelligence agencies need credibility and this is not helpful to that." At least one of the tapes showed the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah, the first high-value detainee taken by the CIA in 2002. Zubaydah, under harsh questioning, told CIA interrogators about alleged 9/11 accomplice Ramzi Binalshibh, Bush said publicly in 2006. The two men's confessions also led to the capture of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, whom the U.S. government said was the mastermind behind the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. Hayden told agency employees the interrogations were legal, and said the tapes were not relevant to "any internal, legislative, or judicial inquiries." Lawyers for U.S. detainees believe otherwise. The Center for Constitutional Rights, which coordinates the work of all attorneys representing U.S. prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, says the CIA may have destroyed crucial evidence a court said it was entitled to in 2004. The center said Friday it is now "deeply concerned" the CIA may have destroyed evidence relating to Majid Khan, a former CIA detainee now held at Guantanamo. Revelations about the tapes also may affect ongoing terrorism trials. Convicted terrorism conspirator Jose Padilla's lawyers claimed in a Florida federal court that Zubaydah was tortured into saying Padilla was an al-Qaida associate. The Justice Department dismissed Padilla's allegations as "meritless," saying Padilla's legal team could not prove that Zubaydah had been tortured. Padilla and his two co-defendants will be sentenced next month. They face life in prison on three terror-related convictions. Then-U.S. District Judge Mukasey, now attorney general, signed the warrant used by the FBI to arrest Padilla in May 2002. That warrant relied in part on information obtained from Zubaydah, court records show. In a separate case, attorneys for al-Qaida conspirator Zacarias Moussaoui in 2003 began seeking videotapes of interrogations they believed might help their client. In November 2005 a federal judge ordered the government to disclose whether it had video or audio tapes of specific interrogations. Eleven days later, the government denied it had them. Gerald Zerkin, one of Moussaoui's lawyers in the penalty phase of his trial, recalled some of the defense efforts to obtain testimony from video or audio tapes of the interrogations of top al-Qaida detainees. "Obviously the important witnesses included Zubaydah, Binalshibh and KSM (Khalid Sheikh Mohammed)... those are the guys at the head of the witness list," Zerkin said. He could not recall specifically which tapes he requested or the phrasing of his discovery requests, which he said were probably still classified. The tapes also were not provided to the 9/11 Commission, which relied heavily on intelligence reports about Zubaydah and Binalshibh's 2002 interrogations. CIA spokesman Mark Mansfield said the agency did not subvert the 9/11 commission's work. "Because it was thought the commission could ask about tapes at some point," he said, "they were not destroyed while the commission was active." |
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Intel: Can't Keep A Secret |
2007-04-13 |
Can't Keep A Secret By INVESTOR'S BUSINESS DAILY | Posted Friday, April 13, 2007 4:20 PM PT Intelligence: Congress is determined to apply "open government" principles to spying. Most Americans know espionage and secrecy are vital tools in the global war on terror and will reject this political power grab. The White House has indicated that President Bush will veto the intelligence authorization bill set for Senate floor debate this week and backed by both the Senate Intelligence Committee's Democratic chairman, Jay Rockefeller of West Virginia, and the panel's Republican vice chairman, Kit Bond of Missouri. No wonder. Included in its provisions are an array of congressional intrusions that would spill the beans about our espionage activities to our terrorist enemies, and force intelligence agencies to waste valuable time catering to the politically motivated whims of nosy senators and congressmen: Spy agencies would be required to provide within 15 days "any intelligence assessment, report, estimate, legal opinion, or other intelligence information" requested by a congressional intelligence committee, the chairman or vice chairman of those panels, or "any other congressional committee of jurisdiction." The administration could only refuse such requests by declaring an executive prerogative. The White House rightly charges that this "would foster political gamesmanship and elevate routine disagreements to the level of constitutional crises," plus force intelligence agencies "to direct resources from critical missions to comply with broad information requests within an artificial deadline." The required notification to Congress of intelligence information would be extended to all members of the Senate and House intelligence committees, not just to their Democratic chairmen and Republican vice chairman and ranking members, as is now the case. (This means Rep. Alcee Hastings, the Florida Democrat, impeached and ousted as a federal judge by Congress for perjury regarding a $150,000 bribe in a racketeering case, would be receiving ultrasensitive intelligence briefings.) When spy agencies refuse to give notification because special protection of secrets is needed, they would have to give every committee member a classified statement of the reasons for the decision and the "main features" of the intelligence activity in question. As the White House points out, "these reporting requirements themselves may require broader dissemination of the very facts that require limited access." The director of national intelligence would be required to provide Congress with detailed reports on current and former secret prisons for terrorists. Terrorist interrogation is better left to "the normal course between the intelligence committees and the executive branch," the White House maintains. Congress would establish a new inspector general office over all intelligence agencies of the U.S. government including departments and agencies that already have an inspector general. Every year, the president would be required to disclose the total funding request for intelligence activities. The White House responded by stating the obvious fact that "disclosure of changes in funding totals over time could compromise intelligence sources, methods, and activities." Democrats such as Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin of Michigan have been trying to impose this kind of congressional micromanagement of spying for years. But they always seem to use information about intelligence decisions for political purposes during wartime. Earlier this month, Levin was hitting the Bush administration over the head with a declassified Pentagon report on pre-Iraq War intelligence. Unfortunately, Bond, the top Republican on the Senate Intelligence panel, is little better, insisting that Congress, under Democratic control, "reassert our oversight" instead of making sure it stays out of the executive branch's way as it tries to use espionage as a weapon against terrorists. Former CIA Director Porter Goss found it impossible to reform "the agency" away from its bad bureaucratic habits and steer it toward being a more effective force in this new kind of war. How much harder would it be to spy on terrorists with a bunch of politics-minded congressmen and senators looking over our intelligence community's shoulder? |
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The Times Distorts Rep. Hoekstra's Letter on Intelligence |
2006-07-11 |
By Jack Kelly Sometimes a lede can be buried so deep it barely makes it into the story. On Saturday, the New York Times ran a lengthy article about a sharply critical private letter the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee sent to President Bush May 18. "An important congressional ally charged the administration might have violated the law by failing to inform Congress of some secret intelligence programs and risked losing Republican support on national security matters," wrote Eric Lichtblau and Scott Shane in their lead paragraph. The lede implies that Rep. Peter Hoekstra (R-Mich) thinks "Republican support on national security matters" is jeopardized by the failure to inform Congress of these secret intelligence programs, but his letter indicates this isn't so. Rep. Hoekstra won't say what those intelligence programs are, but the speculation is they are the "special access programs" former National Security Agency official Russell Tice claimed violated the law. Mr. Tice was fired in May of 2005, allegedly because he was psychologically disturbed. Mr. Tice had asked permission to brief the House and Senate Intelligence Committees on the programs he was worried about, which was denied until after Rep. Hoekstra wrote his letter. But mentioned only in the penultimate paragraph of a four page letter, this concern was the least of the three raised by Rep. Hoekstra. A more important concern was what he saw as empire building by the new Director of National Intelligence, John Negroponte. "I am concerned that the current implementation is creating a large, bureaucratic and hierarchial structure that will be less flexible and agile than our adversaries," Rep. Hoekstra wrote. "If we are to be successful we must limit the growth of the office of the DNI -- to force it to be the lean, coordinating function we envisioned." But most of his ire was directed at the appointment of Stephen Kappes to be Deputy Director of the CIA. "Regrettably, the appointment of Mr. Kappes sends a clear signal that the days of collaborative reform between the White House and this committee may be over," Rep. Hoekstra wrote. Rep. Hoekstra is a friend of former CIA Director Porter Goss, his predecessor as chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, and was upset with his brusque dismissal May 5. The appointment of Mr. Kappes to team with Air Force Gen. Michael Hayden poured salt in the wound. Mr. Kappes was deputy director for operations when Mr. Goss took over at Langley in the fall of 2004. He resigned rather than reassign an aide who was insubordinate when told that leaks to reporters from the CIA must stop. Rep. Hoekstra accused Mr. Kappes of being one of the leakers: "I have been long concerned that a strong and well-positioned group within the Agency intentionally undermined the Administration and its policies," he wrote. "This argument is supported by the Ambassador Wilson/Valerie Plame events, as well as by the string of unauthorized disclosures from an organization which prides itself with being able to keep secrets. I have come to this belief that, despite his service to the DO, Mr. Kappes may have been part of this group. "Further, the details surrounding Mr. Kappes' departure from the CIA give me great pause," Rep. Hoekstra wrote. "The fact is, Mr. Kappes and his Deputy, Mr. Sulick, were developing a communications offensive to bypass the Intelligence Committees and the CIA's own Office of Congressional Affairs. One can only speculate on the motives, but it clearly indicates a willingness to promote a personal agenda. Every day we suffer from individuals promoting their personal agendas. This is clearly a place where we do not want or need to be." Neither of these paragraphs made it into the lengthy story Mr. Lichtblau and Mr. Shane wrote. Their only mention of Rep. Hoekstra's concerns about Mr. Kappes was this sentence, deep within the article: "He warned that the choice of Mr. Kappes, who he said was part of the group at CIA that 'intentionally undermined the administration,' sends 'a clear signal that the days of collaborative reform between the White House and this committee may be over.'" Without this sentence, Mr. Lichtblau and Mr. Shane could not have implied, misleadingly, in their lede that the White House risked losing Republican support over its failure to inform Congress of some intelligence programs. The New York Times frequently accuses the Bush administration of "cherry-picking" intelligence on Iraq. I'd say the Times did a fine job of cherry-picking -- not to say distorting -- Rep. Hoekstra's letter. |
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Bolten said to push Goss's exit |
2006-05-10 |
Intelligence insiders say that former CIA Director Porter Goss was given less than a day to pack his bags by new White House Chief of Staff Josh Bolten, who is moving swiftly to put a new and more aggressive face on the administration. Despite Monday's praise by President Bush for Goss, with whom he held an exit ceremony last Friday at the White House, the insiders say that the decision to dump Goss came hard and fast. One says that Goss revealed to his senior staff on Friday that Bolten had called him last Thursday night to ask if he had "thought through an exit strategy." On Friday morning, Bolten made a second call to demand Goss's resignation that day, which he gave. Some insiders view Bush's praise for Goss as part of an effort to offset stories that the director had been fired. Others say it was an attempt by the White House to make Goss look good so that his hiring less than two years ago isn't viewed as a mistake. |
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The CIA's intelligence deficit disorder |
2006-05-10 |
"In the last year-and-a-half, more than 300 years of experience has either been pushed out or walked out the door in frustration. This has left the agency in free-fall. I have visited these brave and committed women and men in nearly every corner of the globe, and urge the new director do so. They deserve maximum support and a clear vision of where their agency is headed." Quite unintentionally, Democratic Representative Jane Harman's press release on the resignation of CIA Director Porter Goss is a decent guide to the debilitating problems afflicting the agency's clandestine service. Although the operations directorate has certainly been in free-fall, this condition has very little to do with Mr. Goss's tenure. The CIA is a dispirited organization. It should be: The end of the Cold War removed a sustaining sense of purpose and the broad indulgence of the agency's unenviable record of clandestine-intelligence collection, counterespionage and analytical forecasting. The nature and exigencies of the Cold War (and the attendant literary fascination with cloak-and-dagger stories that usually bore little resemblance to the truth) successfully camouflaged much of the internal rot. Case officers love to deceive themselves and others about their work. Would you want to admit that the most important espionage achievement of the Cold War was to wait inside U.S. embassies and consulates for Soviet officials to walk in, volunteering their information and services? Or would you want to admit today that CIA officers who wait for Pakistani, Jordanian and Egyptian security officers to give them information are the "front-line" operatives in the war on terror? Another myth is on the verge of being born. To wit: Porter Goss, the conservative ideologue, greatly politicized the CIA, and encouraged or forced several critically important senior officers to leave the agency, thus dispiriting the entire organization. Implicit in Ms. Harman's commentary -- made more explicit elsewhere by her, by other Democrats in Congress, and by sympathetic members of the press -- is the assumption that the Bush administration is waging a vendetta against Langley's upper echelons for their hostility to the administration and their embarrassing leaks to the press, especially before the 2004 elections. The current version of this theme, best articulated by Howard Dean of the Democratic National Committee, posits a completely apolitical, professional CIA -- correctly analyzing Iraq (weapons of mass destruction excepted, of course) -- being pounded by a partisan, bellicose, mendacious Republican administration, punishing those who speak truth to power. One has the sneaking suspicion that Mr. Dean, like others in politics and the press, really has no idea at all what CIA case officers, working-level analysts and their few Iraqi reporting assets (overwhelmingly expatriate cliques of former Baathist Sunni military officers) were writing about Iraq from 2001 until the invasion. I'll take a bet that not a single analyst or Iraq task-force case officer foresaw, in a written report, the all-important role of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani and the senior Shiite clergy; the power of the Salafi fundamentalist movement among the Sunnis; or the speed and nature of the Sunni insurgency before the insurgency actually developed. But a remote understanding of the CIA has not prevented Mr. Dean, and others, from speaking with certainty about how astute Langley was in Iraq. Few seem to suggest that some in the senior management of the CIA might possibly want to rewrite history to make themselves look better, or that agency officers, like senior State Department officials, can occasionally misbehave and forget that they are apolitical executive-branch officers. So what do we actually know about the state of the CIA -- especially the clandestine service, which has always defined the agency? And what can we say about Porter Goss's brief tenure? The one thing we know for sure is that Mr. Goss certainly didn't degrade the capabilities of Langley, given how poor the espionage capacity already was. And the agency's covert-action (CA) capabilities -- against targets that really mattered (for example, Iran) -- were for most purposes nonexistent when Mr. Goss arrived and remain so today (the brain and muscle for these things take years to develop). A working-level CIA officer familiar with the operations directorate's Iran assets described Langley's CA abilities inside Iran from 2000 through 2004 as "unchanged: they're zero." Unknowingly, Ms. Harman also reveals how stubbornly the CIA has refused to alter the method, and thus the effectiveness, of deploying its case officers overseas. According to the congresswoman, "I just saw those people in the field in the Middle East, in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan and Israel last week. I saw the new recruits and I saw the chiefs of station in these states . . . [and] they're doing a lot better." With all due respect to Ms. Harman, in all probability, they are not. No chief of station or case officer would ever discuss active operational cases or files in sufficient detail or historical depth to allow her or her staff to make any judgment whatsoever on the quality of any foreign-intelligence assets being run in any of these countries. Chiefs of station and case officers will, however, do dog-and-pony shows for congressmen, which have been, over the years, remarkably effective in playing on the patriotic chords of our elected officials. (I must confess that I once did one for senior congressmen visiting "the farm," the CIA's espionage training facility located in the Virginia swamp lands. I came away believing that Lincoln's dictum about fooling all of the people some of the time might need to be revised in the case of congressional intelligence-oversight committee members.) The CIA has stubbornly refused to move away from stations and bases within official facilities overseas, where most American operatives pose as fake diplomats. Such officers were undoubtedly most of the folks Ms. Harman met. This official-cover deployment, combined with a promotion system premised overwhelmingly on a "head-count" of "recruited" agents, had atrociously poor results during the Cold War, producing hundreds of assets on the books with no real intelligence value, except as means for case-officer advancement and cash performance awards. Foreign intelligence services, if minimally competent, can identify and track these officers when they choose to focus their surveillance resources, which has happened much more frequently since the end of the Cold War. It is simply absurd to believe that these officially covered operatives, who still represent a preponderant majority of case officers stationed overseas, have much value against an Islamic terrorist target or any hard target protected by a competent counterespionage service (for example, a Pakistani military officer with access to Pakistan's nuclear-weapons program). The upper mid-level and senior case officers who have left the agency since Mr. Goss's appointment are operatives who prospered in a thoroughly corrupt service. This is not the type of "experience" that you would want to preserve. If one used Ms. Harman's idea of lost collective experience and soberly assessed the number of operatives now serving in the CIA who offer no real value against any hard target -- they either lack the skill; are permanently compromised by overseas postings with bad cover; are too old to work against young-man targets (which is emphatically the case with the Islamic militant target); or are too encumbered with family to be deployed sensibly as nonofficial cover officers against this threat -- the Bush administration and Congress should want to shed about 15,000 years of "experience" (multiplying the number of years in service by the number of irretrievably mediocre case officers). If this number seems shockingly large, then that only underscores how surreal the discussion has been in Washington about the depth of Langley's systemic problems. Regrettably, reform at the CIA is now dead. The only real chance opened immediately after 9/11 and closed when President Bush decided to retain the services of George Tenet, who always remained close and sympathetic to the operations directorate. Ms. Harman, many other prominent Democrats, and the anti-Bush press have put another nail into the clandestine service's coffin by rallying around an organization that desperately needs to be radically deconstructed. However tepidly or lazily Mr. Goss approached his work, he and his abrasive minions ought to be complimented for at least firing somebody. Given the history of the CIA, this is not an insignificant achievement. In the 1980s, it was the Republican Party which was hopelessly lost concerning the supposed value and achievements of the CIA. Today, it's the Democrats who've lost it. This is a pity. The first-rate young men and women at the CIA, who have been quitting Langley quietly in large numbers for decades, deserve better. Mr. Gerecht, a Middle Eastern specialist with the Central Intelligence Agency from 1985 to 1994, is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. |
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CIA's Foggo Expected to Resign Soon | |
2006-05-08 | |
Brian Ross and Richard Esposito Report: Dusty Foggo, the executive director of the CIA linked to a bribery investigation, is expected to resign soon, according to CIA officials and his associates. Outgoing CIA Director Porter Goss had refused to remove Foggo from his powerful post after Foggo came under investigation by the FBI and the CIA Inspector General. A CIA official said Foggo's resignation would be "pretty normal" following the resignation of Goss as Director. The choice of Foggo to run the agency's day-to-day activities has been cited as an example of Goss' mismanagement of the spy agency. Before being handpicked by Goss, Foggo had been written up for insubordination by his supervisor, the highest ranking African American woman in the CIA. A CIA official confirmed the incident but said the insubordination report was never formally filed. The supervisor, Jeanette Moore, resigned shortly after Foggo was promoted by Goss. Foggo recently admitted that he attended Washington, D.C. poker parties that figure in a widening corruption scandal involving a defense contractor, Brent Wilkes, who is a longtime friend of Foggo. Federal officials are investigating whether Wilkes also provided prostitutes at the parties. Foggo has denied seeing any prostitutes at the parties he attended.
The FBI and the CIA Inspector General are both investigating whether any of the CIA contracts awarded to Wilkes were handled improperly. Foggo has strongly denied any impropriety involving CIA contracts. | |
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#3 at CIA under investigation for Contractor Bribery |
2006-05-02 |
The CIA inspector general has opened an investigation into the spy agency's executive director, Kyle "Dusty" Foggo, and his connections to two defense contractors accused of bribing a member of Congress and Pentagon officials. The CIA released an official statement on the matter to ABC News, saying: "It is standard practice for CIA's Office of Inspector General -- an aggressive, independent watchdog -- to look into assertions that mention agency officers. That should in no way be seen as lending credibility to any allegation. "Mr. Foggo has overseen many contracts in his decades of public service. He reaffirms that they were properly awarded and administered." The CIA said Foggo, the No. 3 official at the CIA, would have no further comment. He will remain in his post at the CIA during the investigation, according to officials. Two former CIA officials told ABC News that Foggo oversaw contracts involving at least one of the companies accused of paying bribes to Congressman Randall "Duke" Cunningham. The story was first reported by Newsweek magazine. As executive director of the CIA, Foggo oversees the administration of the giant spy agency. He was appointed to the post by CIA Director Porter Goss after working as a midlevel procurement supervisor, according to former CIA officials. While based in Frankfurt, Germany, he oversaw and approved contracts for CIA operations in Iraq. Foggo is a longtime friend of Brent Wilkes, referred to as co-conspirator No. 1 in government documents filed in the Cunningham investigation. The two played high school football and were in each other's weddings. According to government documents, Wilkes gave Cunningham $630,000 in cash and gifts in exchange for help in getting government contracts. Wilkes was the founder of ADSC Inc, in 1995. Under Wilkes, the company obtained more than $95 million in government contracts. Officials say they could not describe the CIA contracts in question because some of them were classified secret. EFL |
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Battle lines drawn over McCarthy |
2006-04-26 |
In a city that lives for the whispered nugget of information, fired CIA analyst Mary McCarthy is viewed as both hero and villain. Ask CIA Director Porter Goss, and he will tell you an officer he fired committed a grave offense damaging national security by talking to reporters and knowingly disclosing classified information. Not so, argue McCarthy's defenders, who contend that she had a stellar government career and is merely the victim of a Bush administration witch hunt for leakers. Associates, who spoke only on condition of anonymity because of her sensitive legal situation, say the CIA authorized McCarthy on a number of occasions to talk with reporters. However, the details and timing remain unclear, including whether that was ever true after Goss took over in September 2004. It is not yet clear precisely what McCarthy did that led to the firing. In a statement to CIA employees, Goss said that a CIA officer has acknowledged having unauthorized discussions with the media, in which the officer knowingly and willfully shared classified intelligence, including operational information. Last week, government officials indicated McCarthy was involved in providing information to reporters that included material used in The Washington Post's award-winning report on a covert network of CIA prisons. Allegations of a Soviet-style gulag in Eastern Europe and other facilities sparked international condemnation and investigations. Goss and others have said leaks have done dramatic damage to U.S. relationships with allies. He told Congress in February that his counterparts ask: Mr. Goss, can't you Americans keep a secret? But McCarthy's attorney, Ty Cobb, defends her actions and says she was not the source for the Post story. She did not leak any classified information, and she did not have access to the information apparently attributed to her by some government officials, Cobb said. CIA spokesman Paul Gimigliano reaffirmed the agency's position Tuesday, saying an officer was fired for unauthorized contact with the media and the improper disclosure of classified information. The agency has not named that officer. McCarthy, 61, got her start at the CIA in its Directorate of Intelligence the analysis division focusing on Africa and Latin America. By 1988, she landed her first management job as the Central American branch chief. Former CIA officer Larry Johnson said he had trouble with her management style when he worked for her in 1988 and 1989. Part of his job was to collect cables of importance for the front office of the Middle America-Caribbean division. But she would assemble her own package, undermining his analysis, he said. Yet Johnson, a critic of the Bush administration, defends McCarthy today. This administration thinks just because you make a political contribution to some campaign, you are tainted, he said. This administration is trying to conduct a political purge. McCarthy has given $7,700 to Democratic campaigns in the past three election cycles; her husband has donated $2,500, according to public records. While CIA employees face restrictions on political activity under the Hatch Act, they are allowed to donate to candidates. Johnson said McCarthy never suggested to him that she had a political view or shaped intelligence to conform to an ideology. McCarthy went on to the National Intelligence Council, the government's most senior analysis office, and then the Clinton White House, where she served as a senior intelligence adviser on the National Security Council staff. McCarthy was not afraid to go against the grain. As the White House was considering al-Qaeda targets to strike in retaliation for the 1998 African embassy bombings, McCarthy questioned the strength of the intelligence about a pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, Sudan. According to the Sept. 11 Commission, some officials believed al-Shifa was manufacturing a precursor to a nerve agent, with Osama bin Laden's financial support. We will need much better intelligence on this facility before we seriously consider any options, McCarthy said in a memo to National Security Adviser Sandy Berger outlining her concerns. Berger told the commission he was worried about a possible chemical attack, if al-Shifa wasn't attacked. With the Monica Lewinsky scandal consuming front pages, President Clinton decided to attack with cruise missiles there and in Afghanistan. He was accused of trying to distract from the scandal. As House Intelligence chairman, Goss said in a March 2004 interview that he thought there had been a lousy choice of targets. McCarthy left the National Security Council shortly after Bush took office in 2001. She then went to law school at Georgetown University and was a visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Cobb said she announced her retirement from the CIA and hoped to practice public service law, working on adoptions. The accusation of media contacts, however, has tainted a career that ended in the CIA inspector general's office, where her work included investigations into allegations of agency involvement in torture at Iraqi prisons. The National Whistleblower Center says McCarthy could have a strong case to contest her firing. House Intelligence Chairman Peter Hoekstra, R-Mich., sees her actions differently. This person in the CIA thought that they were above the law, he said on Fox News Sunday. They have put America at risk. They have put our troops on the front lines at risk. |
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McCarthy fired for 'pattern of behavior' |
2006-04-24 |
A U.S. official told CNN on Monday that the CIA officer fired for leaking classified information was accused of a "pattern of behavior," including multiple contacts with more than one reporter. Sources also confirmed to CNN that the officer fired last Thursday is Mary O. McCarthy, who last worked in the CIA inspector general's office. "It's not just about one story, it's a pattern of activity," the official said. Can you say co-conspirators? Officials said the investigation into leaking to Dana Priest of The Washington Post, and other journalists, is ongoing. "It is not over yet," said one. We haven't subpoenaed Dana. McCarthy admitted to multiple unauthorized contacts with journalists Ooooh. I hope Katie Couric was one. And Mary Mapes. after failing a polygraph test, one of "dozens" conducted at the CIA since January of personnel knowledgeable about compromised programs, sources said. Those who took polygraph tests included CIA Director Porter Goss and the agency's inspector general, John Helgerson, according to U.S. intelligence officials. I'll bet Right Guard sales are up in Northern Virginia this week. A congressional aide said that prior to the public revelation that a CIA employee had been fired, the intelligence committees were only told the person was a 61-year-old female in the inspector general's office. That narrowed it down. Two congressional aides -- one Democratic, one Republican -- both told CNN they knew of no attempt by McCarthy to speak to intelligence committee members about any concerns about CIA activities. Riiiight Last week, spokeswoman Michelle Neff said the officer admitted to "unauthorized discussions with the media in which the officer knowingly and willfully shared classified intelligence including operational information." Neff declined to divulge the officer's name or position, or what specifically was leaked. A U.S. official said the person's name has been turned over to the Justice Department, where a determination will be made on whether to file criminal charges. Looks like they got all the data on weekend communicaitons traffic. A senior government official said the dismissal was related to a story in The Washington Post about the United States holding terror suspects in Priest spearheaded the reporting on the "black site" prisons and was awarded a But not as persistent or painstaking as this story will be. A Justice Department investigation is ongoing regarding the story. It is one of several investigations into leaks of classified information, including revelations about the National Security Agency's domestic spying program, which was first reported by The New York Times. I hope they go after Rockefeller also. Former acting CIA Director John McLaughlin, a CNN contributor, has said any CIA employee who wants to raise complaints should address the agency inspector general or the appropriate intelligence committees, not the media. "It is illegal to leak information. That's what you sign up to when you join an intelligence service," McLaughlin said. |
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Science & Technology |
Internet blows CIA cover |
2006-03-11 |
She is 52 years old, married, grew up in the Kansas City suburbs and now lives in Virginia, in a new three-bedroom house. Anyone who can qualify for a subscription to one of the online services that compile public information also can learn that she is a CIA employee who, over the past decade, has been assigned to several American embassies in Europe. The CIA asked the Tribune not to publish her name because she is a covert operative, and the newspaper agreed. But unbeknown to the CIA, her affiliation and those of hundreds of men and women like her have somehow become a matter of public record, thanks to the Internet. When the Tribune searched a commercial online data service, the result was a virtual directory of more than 2,600 CIA employees, 50 internal agency telephone numbers and the locations of some two dozen secret CIA facilities around the United States. Only recently has the CIA recognized that in the Internet age its traditional system of providing cover for clandestine employees working overseas is fraught with holes, a discovery that is said to have "horrified" CIA Director Porter Goss. "Cover is a complex issue that is more complex in the Internet age," said the CIA's chief spokeswoman, Jennifer Dyck. "There are things that worked previously that no longer work. Director Goss is committed to modernizing the way the agency does cover in order to protect our officers who are doing dangerous work." Dyck declined to detail the remedies "since we don't want the bad guys to know what we're fixing." Several "front companies" set up to provide cover for CIA operatives and its small fleet of aircraft recently began disappearing from the Internet, following the Tribune's disclosures that some of the planes were used to transport suspected terrorists to countries where they claimed to have been tortured. Although finding and repairing the vulnerabilities in the CIA's cover system was not a priority under Goss' predecessor, George Tenet, one senior U.S. official observed that "the Internet age didn't get here in 2004," the year Goss took over at the CIA. CIA names not disclosed The Tribune is not disclosing the identities of any of the CIA employees uncovered in its database searches, the searching techniques used or other details that might put agency employees or operatives at risk. The CIA apparently was unaware of the extent to which its employees were in the public domain until being provided with a partial list of names by the Tribune.' At a minimum, the CIA's seeming inability to keep its own secrets invites questions about whether the Bush administration is doing enough to shield its covert CIA operations from public scrutiny, even as the Justice Department focuses resources on a two-year investigation into whether someone in the administration broke the law by disclosing to reporters the identity of clandestine CIA operative Valerie Plame. Not all of the 2,653 employees whose names were produced by the Tribune search are supposed to be working under cover. More than 160 are intelligence analysts, an occupation that is not considered a covert position, and senior CIA executives such as Tenet are included on the list. Covert employees discovered But an undisclosed number of those on the list--the CIA would not say how many--are covert employees, and some are known to hold jobs that could make them terrorist targets. Other potential targets include at least some of the two dozen CIA facilities uncovered by the Tribune search. Most are in northern Virginia, within a few miles of the agency's headquarters. Several are in Florida, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Utah and Washington state. There is one in Chicago. Some are heavily guarded. Others appear to be unguarded private residences that bear no outward indication of any affiliation with the CIA. A senior U.S. official, reacting to the computer searches that produced the names and addresses, said, "I don't know whether Al Qaeda could do this, but the Chinese could." Down on "The Farm" For decades the CIA's training facility at Camp Peary, Va., near historic Williamsburg, remained the deepest of secrets. Even after former CIA personnel confirmed its existence in the 1980s the agency never acknowledged the facility publicly, and CIA personnel persisted in referring to it in conversation only as "The Farm." But an online search for the term "Camp Peary" produced the names and other details of 26 individuals who according to the data are employed there. Searching aviation databases for flights landing or taking off from Camp Peary's small airstrip revealed 17 aircraft whose ownership and flight histories could also be traced. Although the Tribune's initial search for "Central Intelligence Agency" employees turned up only work-related addresses and phone numbers, other Internet-based services provide, usually for a fee but sometimes for free, the home addresses and telephone numbers of U.S. residents, as well as satellite photographs of the locations where they live and work. Asked how so many personal details of CIA employees had found their way into the public domain, the senior U.S. intelligence official replied that "I don't have a great explanation, quite frankly." The official noted, however, that the CIA's credo has always been that "individuals are the first person responsible for their cover. If they can't keep their cover, then it's hard for anyone else to keep it. If someone filled out a credit report and put that down, that's just stupid." One senior U.S. official used a barnyard epithet to describe the agency's traditional system of providing many of its foreign operatives with easily decipherable covers that include little more than a post office box for an address and a non-existent company as an employer. Coverts especially important And yet, experts say, covert operatives who pose as something other than diplomats are becoming increasingly important in the global war on terror. "In certain areas you just can't collect the kind of information you need in the 21st Century by working out of the embassy. They're just not going to meet the kind of people they need to meet," said Melvin Goodman, who was a senior Soviet affairs analyst at the CIA for more than 20 years before he retired. The problem, Goodman said, is that transforming a CIA officer who has worked under "diplomatic cover" into a "non-official cover" operator, or NOC--as was attempted with Valerie Plame--creates vulnerabilities that are not difficult to spot later on. The CIA's challenge, in Goodman's view, is, "How do you establish a cover for them in a day and age when you can Google a name ... and find out all sorts of holes?" In Plame's case, online computer searches would have turned up her tenure as a junior diplomat in the U.S. Embassy in Athens even after she began passing herself off as a privately employed "energy consultant." The solution, Goodman suggested, is to create NOCs at the very outset of their careers, "taking risks with younger people, worrying about the reputation of people before they have one. Or create one." Shortage of `mentors' But that approach also has a downside, in that "you're getting into the problem of very junior, inexperienced people, which a lot of veteran CIA people feel now is part of the problem. Porter Goss has to double the number of operational people in an environment where there are no mentors. Who's going to train these people?" In addition to stepping up recruiting, Goss has ordered a "top-down" review of the agency's "tradecraft" following the disclosure that several supposedly covert operatives involved in the 2003 abduction of a radical Muslim preacher in Milan had registered at hotels under their true names and committed other amateurish procedural violations that made it relatively easy for the Italian police to identify them and for Italian prosecutors to charge them with kidnapping. It's also interesting that for years now, some of our top public operatives have had flexible Internet biographies, their backgrounds changing on an annual basis. I suspect the only covert operatives who have been "compromised" are those hang out at Langley for six months of the year, and often host CIA cocktail parties. |
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Home Front: Politix |
Rockefeller angry over Bush revealing al-Qaeda's LA plot |
2006-02-24 |
President George W. Bush's disclosure of detailed intelligence about a thwarted al Qaeda plot to attack Los Angeles could prove damaging for U.S. national security, the top Democrat on the Senate intelligence committee said in a letter released on Thursday. In a Feb. 17 letter to U.S. intelligence chief John Negroponte, Sen. John Rockefeller of West Virginia echoed a warning from CIA Director Porter Goss that revelations about intelligence successes or failures against al Qaeda can aid America's militant enemies. "Why then did the president and the assistant to the president for homeland security and counterterrorism describe in great detail the information about this plot contained in a highly classified October 2004 CIA document?" Rockefeller wrote. White House officials were not immediately available for comment. The Senate Democrat was referring to a Feb. 9 presidential speech in which Bush disclosed new details of a 2002 al Qaeda plot to use shoe bombs to hijack a plane and fly it into the 1,017-foot-(310-metre) high US Bank Tower in Los Angeles. The Bush administration cited the same plan to attack West Coast targets using hijacked planes last October as being among 10 disrupted al Qaeda plots. But Bush, while facing criticism over his decision to authorize warrantless eavesdropping inside the United States, provided the public with a more detailed account in his Feb. 9 speech. He said Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, al Qaeda's operational mastermind behind the Sept. 11 attacks, planned to use four Southeast Asian men in a second-wave attack on Los Angeles and trained the cell's leader on how to use a shoebomb. Frances Townsend, Bush's homeland security and counterterrorism adviser, also disclosed intelligence details about the plot. Rockefeller said Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney and other senior officials have disclosed sensitive information for political purposes on a range of issues from prewar Iraq to National Security Agency eavesdropping. The disclosures have all been potentially damaging to U.S. interests, Rockefeller said. At the same time, the administration has sought to blame lower-level officials for damage caused by unauthorized leaks. "Given the administration's continuing abuse of intelligence information for political purposes, its criticism of leaks is extraordinarily hypocritical," Rockefeller wrote. "The president and other senior members must set an example for others to follow," he added. A spokesman for Negroponte's office would confirm only that the director for national intelligence had received the letter. Rockefeller spokeswoman Wendy Morigi said the senator has not yet received a response from Negroponte. |
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Terror Networks |
Binny and Ayman elusive post-Afghanistan |
2006-02-15 |
"Bush, do you know where I am?" With these words, Ayman al-Zawahri, al Qaeda's No. 2 after Osama bin Laden, taunted U.S. President George W. Bush last month after a U.S. airstrike in Pakistan failed to kill him. CIA Director Porter Goss said last year he had an excellent idea of where bin Laden was, but more than four years after the September 11 attacks and despite military operations and high-level arrests, bin Laden and Zawahri are still eluding capture. U.S. officials say only that they are thought to be somewhere in the rugged tribal areas that run for more than 500 miles (800 km) along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. "We think they're in the border region, but cannot disclose more than that for obvious reasons," a U.S. counterterrorism official said, adding the two men were probably always on the move. Bin Laden was last heard from on January 19 in an audio tape and Zawahri appeared in a video on January 30. Officials hope both messages may shed some light on their location. Several officials said Zawahri's use of a relative high quality video while bin Laden only made a mediocre-quality audio tape supported a belief that the two men had unequal access to hi-tech recording devices. Some experts have wondered whether bin Laden was ill and did not want a video to highlight any apparent weakness. "The fact that bin Laden did an audio tape would suggest he's in a more isolated remote environment and Zawahri's video would suggest that he's in closer contact with al Qaeda's propaganda apparatus," said a U.S. counterterrorism official, who declined to say whether this meant Zawahri was probably near or in an urban environment. Strategic Forecasting, a private intelligence firm, questioned the theory of bin Laden's isolation, saying his taped references to detailed current events make it unlikely he is "stuck in a cave." "Unless there are platoons of couriers bringing reports to him ... it would appear that bin Laden is able to access satellite television and possibly the Internet. Wherever he is, there is electricity and some degree of connectivity to the world," the group said in a recent report. Pakistani intelligence officials say Zawahri, at least, is almost certainly still in the Pashtun tribal lands that straddle the long, porous border between the two countries. The terrain ranges from arid dust-blown plains marked by dry gullies and covered in low scrub, to jagged mountain ranges, some barren, others heavily forested. There are few proper roads, and militants can be alerted to any ground movement of security forces long before the troops arrive. While bin Laden and Zawahri have managed to get more than a dozen video and audiotapes to Arab television stations in the Gulf since the 2001 attacks, authorities have been unable to trace them back and locate the world's most wanted men. Several intelligence officials in the United States, Europe and Pakistan said bin Laden and his deputy were probably hiding in separate locations. All of the officials declined to be named because of the sensitivity of the topic. "It seems unlikely that they'd hide in the same place all the time, because then the two of them would be hit with one missile or with one raid," a European counterterrorism official said. He said bin Laden's choice of an audio tape could simply mean he is avoiding the additional risk of making and smuggling videotapes. It could also be part of a deliberate strategy to operate from the shadows where "you hear his voice but don't see his face." "I don't see the cave (as a hide-out for bin Laden). I rather see some backrooms in a large house in a densely populated suburb or something like that," he said. |
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