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Recent Appearances... Rantburg

-Great Cultural Revolution
The World Is on Fire, but Here Is the Defense Department's Highest Priority
2024-02-03
[RedState] You would think that the Department of Defense (DoD) would have their hands full right now. The war between Russia and Ukraine drags on, war between Israel and Hamas continues, and China continues its saber-rattling over "reunification" with Taiwan. The United States might not be directly involved in all of those conflicts, but we will have some role to play. The Defense Department is concerned about terrorism. But before you get excited over the fact that there might be someone at the DoD with their priorities straight, think again. They are not worried about the thousands of potential terrorists sneaking across the southern border. They are worried about home-grown terrorists, you know, the right-wing kind.

The DoD's Office of Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) supervises overseas special operations. Recently, they invited "all" office employees to hear Bruce Hoffman, a professor at Georgetown University and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), and Jacob Ware, a research fellow at CFR, talk about their book entitled "God, Guns, and Terrorism" on...wait for it...domestic right-wing extremism. It gets better. The Chief of Staff for the SO/LIC Office is a woman named Ariane Tabatabai. She was recently investigated for her ties to an Iranian influence network. It gets even better. Tabatabai is also a founding member of something called the Iranian Experts Initiative. They are a group of analysts who allegedly cooperated with Iran's Islamic regime to promote the official position on Iran's nuclear program in the middle of negotiations on a nuclear deal with Iran.

It is unknown whether the invite to all SO/LIC employees was mandatory. Nor did the email explain why the topic of domestic terrorism was relevant to DoD employees, as domestic terrorism does not fall under their purview. Unfortunately for the DoD, the SO/LIC Office, and Hoffman and Ware, the supply of right-wing extremism does not meet their apparent demand. After the Jan. 6 Capitol riot, the DoD called for a review of military personnel to weed out any "extremism" within the ranks. Less than 100 members of the military were found to have engaged in any "extremist" activities. But the DoD wasn't convinced. It spent two years hunting down extremists in the military to no avail. The final report on a study that began in 2021 and was quietly released in December of 2023 “found no evidence that the number of violent extremists in the military is disproportionate” to U.S. society."
Related:
Ariane Tabatabai: 2023-11-23 Meet the Iranian-born Biden military aide reportedly under investigation for major influence campaign: ‘Clear and present danger'
Ariane Tabatabai: 2023-10-25 High-Level Iranian Spy Ring Busted, trail leads from Tehran to D.C. passes directly through the offices of Robert Malley and the International Crisis Group
Ariane Tabatabai: 2023-10-03 High-Level Iranian Spy Ring Busted in Washington


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Britain
Staff Forge St. Andrews
2023-02-02
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.

Commentary based on Telegram posts by Alexander Hoffman

[ColonelCassad] Let's continue to https://t.me/thehegemonist/1916. St. Andrews University - 1st in Scotland, 3rd in seniority Anglo-Saxon. Founded in 1410 by Scots from the Augustinian clergy, expelled first from the Sorbonne after the Western Schism, and then from Oxbridge after the invasion of Bolingbroke. The role of the SEU is important for understanding the actions of the Anglo-Saxon intellectual apparatus after the Cold War, including the fight against international terrorism.

In 1989, Prof. Paul Wilkinson, a student of Crozier, was invited to SEU.

During this period Wilkinson's Research Foundation for the Study of Terrorism, located in the same office as the Targets, merged with the Institute for the Study of Conflict, founded by Crozier, into the Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, registered on December 12, 1989, very soon after the Malta Summit. Wilkinson introduces the understanding of terrorism that he formed over the previous years into the scientific environment of the SEU.

In SEU, Wilkinson introduced two new courses - International Terrorism and Comparison of Intelligence Systems. He led the first one himself, to shape the thinking of future state and corporate managers. The second is “Kremlinologist” Michael Robertson, who prepared the course with the help of retired intelligence officers.

In 1993, SEU, together with the command of the Royal Air Force, introduced a direction in the field of defense studies, including courses in environmental security, diplomacy, political economy and the study of terrorism. The direction was tested on the officers of the Royal Air Force base in Leuchars, at a distance.

In 1994, Wilkinson was appointed head of the School of History and International Relations of the SEU, left RISCT and created the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, the director of which was the Oxfordian Bruce Hoffman, who later worked for the CIA and All Souls, and at that time an analyst RAND. Subsequently, CSTPV was led by Wilkinson himself and other operators of controlled Islamophobia through the legitimization of discourse in the academic environment - the Swede Magnus Ranstorp and the Swiss Alex Schmid.

ST. ANDREWS ALUMNI INCLUDE:
Kevin Abraham - Major General of the British Army, led its reform - the development of the army reserve, senior researcher at the Institute for Statecraft (specialized in social inclusion, youth engagement and institutional reforms), one of the organizers of the terrorist attack on the Crimean bridge and a number of other operations related to Russia and the Ukrainian frontier

John Kuckney - Baron, MI5 officer, Thatcher's chief adviser on the arms trade

Alistair Crook - former MI6 agent, specialized in parallel diplomacy or secret negotiations: Ireland, South Africa, Namibia, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia and Palestine

William Mountbatten-Windsor - Heir to the British Throne

David Knott - surgeon specializing in information campaigns and propaganda in war zones

Craig Oliphant - Integrity Initiative operator

Mark Sedwill - Baron, high-ranking British diplomat and official, now on the boards of BAE Systems, Rothschild & Co, Lloyd's of London

John Sawers - Head of MI6, 2009-2014.

Fiona Hill - US-British expert on the expansion of American influence in Eurasia, focused on Vladimir Putin.

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Terror Networks
Report: How Strong Is Al-Qaeda?
2022-05-23


Sept. 11, 2001, was “The Day the World Changed.” The 2,977 deaths at the hands of al-Qaeda terrorists led to massive policy changes and dominated U.S. politics for years afterward. The United States went to war in Afghanistan to topple the Taliban, and the attacks contributed to the U.S. decision to invade Iraq in 2003. America began an array of aggressive counterterrorism programs, including the use of armed drones to kill suspected terrorists, indefinite detention at the naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and even torture. At home, the U.S. government detained many American Muslims on flimsy pretexts and implemented controversial programs related to surveillance.

Over 20 years later, the effectiveness of these measures, and the threat al-Qaeda poses, remain hotly debated. Leading terrorism experts like Bruce Hoffman have warned that al-Qaeda remains strong, patiently waiting for opportunities to strike while strengthening its global reach. Other leading analysts are skeptical. Barak Mendelsohn and Colin Clarke contend that “al-Qaeda the organization has failed.” In her 2022 threat testimony, Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines struck a middle ground, warning that al-Qaeda still aspires “to conduct attacks in the United States” while also noting that its external attack capabilities are “degraded.” With the al-Qaeda threat perhaps in the rearview mirror, President Biden withdrew troops from Afghanistan in 2021 to end the so-called “forever wars” that sprang up in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.
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Economy
Government Clears Amazon's $13 Billion Purchase Of Whole Foods
2017-08-24
[Daily Caller] The government has cleared the way for Amazon to purchase Whole Foods, Inc., in a deal worth as much as $13.7 billion.

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) said in a Wednesday statement that the deal would not violate antitrust laws or result in creation of an anticompetitive market.

"Based on our investigation we have decided not to pursue this matter further," Bruce Hoffman, the Acting Director of the Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Competition, said in the statement. "Of course, the FTC always has the ability to investigate anticompetitive conduct should such action be warranted."

The board of directors for organic food seller Whole Foods approved the sale earlier Wednesday, CNBC reports.

The deal means that Amazon, owned by Jeff Bezos, will enter the traditional retail food market, in addition to controlling a large percentage of online sales.
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Home Front: WoT
Al Qaeda more dangerous than ever: US experts
2013-12-16
WASHINGTON: More than two and a half years after US commandos shot dead al Qaeda figurehead Osama bin Laden, the global extremist network is more dangerous than ever, American experts and counterterrorism officials warned this week.
Really? That's not what Champ was saying not so long ago...
Thanks notably to a flood of recruits flowing to join al Qaeda-linked forces fighting in Syria’s civil war, the group is back on its feet, and securing territory from which it could once more threaten Europe and the United States. Bin Laden’s former lieutenants in al Qaeda’s historic leadership have been killed by US Special Forces or in drone strikes, or else are isolated and on the run in the tribal badlands on the Afghan-Pakistan border.

But armed groups in Syria, Somalia, Yemen, Libya and West Africa have flocked to his banner and al Qaeda is rebuilding its influence and recruiting fighters across the region. “Their leadership has been hit very hard, but this brand is still growing. And it’s growing from an increased number of safe havens,” said retired US Marine Corps general James Mattis. Between 2010 and earlier this year, Mattis led US Central Command, in charge of prosecuting Washington’s long war against extremists in the Middle East, Southwest Asia and the Horn of Africa.

Now he has hung up his uniform, but admits the war is far from over, warning: “The congratulations that we heard two years ago on the demise of al Qaeda were premature and are now discredited.” Speaking at the Jamestown Foundation’s annual conference on terrorism in Washington, Mattis said: “Al Qaeda is resilient, they adapted. We have to think strategically before we act, not only act tactically.” Bin Laden’s death in May 2011 triggered a wave of optimism that the United States and its allies might have broken the back of the militant threat, but today officials here are under no illusions.

Since the audacious commando strike that took out al Qaeda’s apparently largely symbolic chieftain, the black banner of his movement has been raised more widely than ever. Militants inspired by or linked to bin Laden’s armed struggle have sacked a US consulate in Libya and stormed a shopping mall in Kenya. Attacks are on the rise once again in Iraq, al Qaeda has reportedly begun operating in Egypt’s Sinai Desert and violent groups are now the most powerful elements in the rebel coalition fighting in the Syrian civil war.

Bruce Hoffman, director of the Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University, told the Jamestown conference that collapsing states in the Middle East were opening up space for extremists. “The oxygen that al Qaeda depends on is access to sanctuaries and safe haven. And unfortunately over the past two years it gained greater access to more ungoverned spaces,” he said. “The success of the attack in Nairobi and earlier in Mumbai suggests that this groups have now within their capacity the ability to fulfil one of Bin Laden’s last commands or operational desires, which was to stage Mumbai-style attacks in Europe.”

For the experts gathered in Washington, Syria’s civil war – which has attracted militant volunteers from Muslim communities in Europe as well as Arab countries – has worked greatly to al Qaeda’s advantage. “The al Qaeda-affiliated groups have created an alliance which disposes of 45,000 guerrilla fighters across the country,” said David Kilcullen, a renowned counterinsurgency expert who has advised US forces in the field. “It’s a very significant number, almost twice as many as we see in terms of Taliban fighters in Afghanistan,” he said. “We’re seeing a recovery on all fronts for al Qaeda.”

For Bruce Riedel, a three-decade CIA veteran who now works for the Brookings Institution, al Qaeda’s resurgence is proof that it has managed to ride out and ultimately profit from the revolts that have roiled the Middle East and North Africa. “Al Qaeda’s narrative was challenged in 2011 by the Arab Spring. Peaceful demonstrations succeeded in toppling dictators. Al Qaeda’s narrative was at risk. Terror had not produced change, Twitter had,” Riedel said.

“But today, everything is different. Al Qaeda’s narrative is validated in 2013, most notably in Egypt. The counterrevolution has succeeded, the army has overthrown the elected government. “For those who want to join al Qaeda’s movement, events in Cairo, in Damascus have validated what they long said: Jihad is the only solution to the problem of change in the Muslim world today.”
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Terror Networks
The al Qaeda Franchise Threat
2013-05-02
[WSJ] Reports of the terrorist group's imminent defeat are greatly exaggerated.

Even as the U.S. has "decimated" (the President's word) al Qaeda's senior leadership--killing or capturing 13 of the top 20 most wanted terrorists--it pops up in new locales and forms. In recent months, al Qaeda has revived or started terrorist franchises in Iraq and Syria, across northern Africa and in Nigeria. It lost a haven in Afghanistan but set up bases in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. It has nimbly exploited opportunities and is more active and in more places, points out Rand analyst Bruce Hoffman, than on September 11, 2001.
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India-Pakistan
The Pakistani Perspective: The Meaning Of Osama Bin Laden One Year Later
2012-05-13
FIRST, THERE WAS SPIN

Was he, or wasn't he? Did the SEALs shoot him unarmed, or did he go down fighting? Were the Paks involved, or incompetent, or both. The post-mortem chatter about OBL was confusing, if not confounding.

The Basic Booboo from D.C.:

The day after bin Laden was killed, White House officials gleefully pointed out that we was living in comfort with his family in a walled, fortress-like house far from the rugged war zones of Pakistain's triba; areas or southern Afghanistan. "Here is bin Laden, who has been calling for these attacks, living in this million-dollar plus compound, living in an area that is far removed from the front, hiding behind women who were put in front of him as a shield," Brennan told news hounds. "I think it really just speaks to just how false his narrative has been over the years."

But there were several mistakes in Brennan's statements, which underscored the continued weakness of the American counter-messaging strategy. Within twenty-four hours, the White House was forced to correct the fact there were no women shielding bin Laden when he was shot and killed. A further correction, about whether bin Laden was armed and participated in a firefight with the Navy SEALS (he wasn't and he didn't), also had to be made. First accounts of complicated military missions are almost always incomplete or inaccurate. But in his haste to trumpet the mission's operational success, Brenna heralded details about bin Laden that turned out to be wrong, undermining the credibility of the rest of this message in the Moslem world and elsewhere in the world.
- Counter Strike: The Untold Story of America's Secret Campagin Against Al Qaeda - Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker

CIA's Black Beard Vanity Fair

The CIA's release of five videos of bin Laden on May 7th, just days after they were recovered from his hideout, illustrated the B.O. regime's efforts to minimize the al Qaeda leader's mystique, even among mainstream Moslems who admired him for standing up to the West. The selected outtakes from bin Laden's recorded messages to his followers appeared to be part of an American effort to underscore bin Laden's vanity. In one video, bin Laden is shown watching himself on television in his house, and his beard is mostly white. In the other four videos, in which bin Laden addresses the Moslem world, his beard is black. US intelligence officials openly speculated that the al Qaeda leader had dyed his beard black in these videos in order to appear younger.
- Counter Strike: The Untold Story of America's Secret Campagin Against Al Qaeda - Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker

THE OSAMA PAPERS

The 175-page cache posted online by the US Military Academy's Combating Terrorism Center - in the week marking a year since Bin Laden's death provides a flurry of insights about the man and his machine, Al Qaeda. Here's how it was analyzed:

Fearing Nature, Not Pakistain?

Perhaps the most notable communication, however, is one dated Aug. 27, 2010. In it, bin Laden fears for the safety of his fighters and followers in Pakistain-not because they might be tossed in the clink
Youse'll never take me alive coppers!... [BANG!]... Ow!... I quit!
or incarcerated
Into the paddy wagon wit' yez!
by the authorities, but because torrential rains and flooding were then afflicting that country...This is astonishing. Bin Laden was more fearful that his men might be affected by the weather than by any effort of the Pak government to apprehend them. This assertion alone speaks volumes about how comfortable he and his minions found their refuge there.
- Bruce Hoffman, director of Georgetown University's Center for Security Studies and a senior fellow at the U.S. Military Academy's Combating Terrorism Center in The Wall Street Journal Op-Ed, May 8, 2012

No Pak Smoking Gun

There is no explicit reference to any institutional support from Pakistain, where the al-Qaeda leader lived for nine years...The papers make mention of "trusted Pak brothers", but one reference suggests Bin Laden was wary of Pak intelligence

- BBC backgrounder, "the late Osama bin Laden
... who no longer has to waste time and energy breathing...
's document's released", May 3, 2012

Rebranding Al Qaeda:

His concerns in fact centered on his belief that Western media and al Qaeda's enemies were misportraying the movement by focusing only on its violent side and ignoring its political aims and aspirations. Bin Laden thus sought a new name for the movement that would more accurately reflect its ideological pretensions and self-appointed role as defender of Moslems everywhere.

- Bruce Hoffman, director of Georgetown University's Center for Security Studies and a senior fellow at the U.S. Military Academy's Combating Terrorism Center in The Wall Street Journal Op-Ed, May 8, 2012

Fifteen Seconds of Fear: How OBL/Al Qaeda rated the western press

Fox News "falls into the abyss as you know, and lacks neutrality too."

CNN "seems to be in cooperation with the government more than others."

And "ABC channel is all right; actually it could be one of the best channels, as far as we are concerned."

HOW HE LIVED

OBL's "million dollar mansion" was recently razed, prior to his first death anniversary, by a government wary of it becoming an icon and thus a mecca for terror-tourists, gawkers and wannabe jihadists. But a new book takes us inside the "Pacer's" (the pre-Geronimo code-name for OBL) compound:

A Manhunt Revealed

We learn, for example, that Bin Laden's two older wives, both academics, taught the children Arabic and read from the Qur'an in a bedroom on the second floor. Almost every day, apparently, the al-Qaeda leader, a strict disciplinarian, lectured his family about how the children should be brought up.
That sounds like fun. Or not...
Nor were Bin Laden's living conditions particularly salubrious. A tiny bathroom off the bedroom he shared with his Yemeni third wife had green tiles on the walls but none on the floor, a rudimentary squat toilet and a cheap plastic shower. In this bathroom, Bergen tells us, Bin Laden (54 when he died) regularly applied Just for Men dye to his hair and beard. Next to the bedroom was a kitchen the size of a large closet, and across the hall was Bin Laden's study, where he kept his books on crude wooden shelves and tapped away on his computer. There was no air-conditioning.
- Jason Burke of The Guardian, reviewing Peter Bergen's newly released "Manhunt"

FRIENDS OR THERAPISTS?

There was a lot of flak after Neptune Spear, and post-mortem OBL, most of it hit Pakistain. When Pervez Perv Musharraf
... former dictator of Pakistain, who was less dictatorial and corrupt than any Pak civilian government to date ...
stated so to CBS's 60 Minutes on September 25, 2005 that
"One thing is very sure, let me assure you, that we are not going to hide him for a rainy day and then release him to take advantage,"
that categorical denial, though punctured by OBL being found in killed in Abbottabad
... A pleasant city located only 30 convenient miles from Islamabad. The city is noted for its nice weather and good schools. It is the site of Pakistain's military academy, which was within comfortable walking distance of the residence of the late Osama bin Laden....
, still continues to hold mostly true.

Allegations on Pakistain, Spun & Counterspun

"It was decided that any effort to work with the Paks could jeopardize the mission. They might alert the targets."

- Leon Panetta
...current SecDef, previously Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Panetta served as President Bill Clinton's White House Chief of Staff from 1994 to 1997 and was a member of the United States House of Representatives from 1977 to 1993....
to Time Magazine, May 3, 2011

Both countries "cooperated in making sure" that the operation leading to bin Laden's death was "successful".

- CNN quoting Hussain Haqqani, May 2, 2011

"We assisted only in terms of authorization of the helicopter flights in our airspace" and that "we did not want anything to do with such an operation in case something went wrong."

- Anonymous Pak official confirming to CNN's Nick Paton Walsh that there was Pak cooperation into the operation, May 2, 2011

Bin Laden hiding "deep inside" Pakistain was a matter of grave concern for India, and showed that "many of the perpetrators of the Mumbai terror attacks, including the controllers and the handlers of the snuffies who actually carried out the attack, continue to be sheltered in Pakistain".

- Wall Street Journal quoting P. Chidambram, the Indian Home Minister, May 2, 2011

"Clearly to be able to be there he must have had some support mechanisms - absolutely."

- China's Xinhua news agency quoting Prime Minister Julia Gillard on May 3, 2011

"We would have destroyed them long ago" Nazarov said, if other countries didn't manipulate terrorist groups for "geopolitical goals." For instance, in Pakistain Osama bin Laden wasn't an invisible man, and many knew his whereabouts in North Wazoo, but whenever security forces attempted a raid on his hideouts, the enemy received warning of their approach from sources in the security forces.
- Point 7(C) of Wikileaks Cable 09DUSHANBE1433, quoting State Committee for National Security (GKNB) Deputy Chairman for Counterterrorism General Abdullo Sadulloevich Nazarov of Tajikistan (dated Dec 16, 2009)

The fact that Bin Laden was living in a large house in a populated area suggests that he must have had a support network in Pakistain.

- UK Prime Minister David Cameron
... has stated that he is certainly a big Thatcher fan, but I don't know whether that makes me a Thatcherite, which means he's not. Since he is not deeply ideological he lacks core principles and is easily led. He has been described as certainly not a Pitt, Elder or Younger, but he does wear a nice suit so maybe he's Beau Brummel ...
to the House of Commons, May 5, 2011

HOW IT HAPPENED

Navy SEAL Team Six? DEVGRU? JSOC? SOCOM? The world came to know much about the units and formations involved in the operation. But Vice Admiral McRaven's operational module have been well explained in few places:

Who Did Him In?

Their names may never be known, their faces may remain unsees, but the strike package that flew by helicopters out of Jalalabad, Afghanistan, for the bin Laden compound numbered seventy-nine" Navy SEALS, intelligence specialists, medical corpsmen, translators, and the bomb-sniffing dog. Little is known of the strike team commander, other than that he had scores of successful raids under his belt and that McRaven described him to White House officials as "absolutely the single guy I would choose for this mission"

- Counter Strike: The Untold Story of America's Secret Campagin Against Al Qaeda - Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker

Inside the Assault Team

For the operation, bin Laden was assigned the code name Geronimo. Inside the White House Situation Room, the president and his war council followed the mission via video link narrated by Leon Panetta at CIA headquarters. Soon after Panetta announced, "They've reached the target". One of the four helicopters carrying the assault team lost lift and descended faster than anticipated owing to unexpectedly warm temperatures. Its tail snapped off against a wall, but there were no injuries. The SEAL team commander adjusted his plans, and the unit executed its well-trained art of improvisation. A second helicopter which had been tasked to hover over the main building while the commandos fast-roped onto the roof, instead landed on the ground inside the compound. A third flew in from reserve. The SEALS set explosive charges to blow open a door to the main house and brick wall behind it, which some said was a false door disguised as ruse. Abu Ahmed al-Kawaiti, the courier whose SUV had led American intelligence to the compound, began shooting at the strike team, which returned fire, killing him and his wife. A second man - al-Kuwaiti's brother, was spotted and believed readying to shoot; he too was killed. As the commandos made their way up a stairwell,l bin Laden's son Khalid rushed toward them and he was killed as well. Smashing into the third-floor rooms atop the guesthouse, the commandos came face to face with bin Laden himself. "We have a visual on Geronimo," Panetta told the officials gathered in the Situation Room. An AK-47 and Russian-made Makarov 9-mm automatic pistol were said to be within the Al Qaeda leader's reach. One of bin Laden's wives charged at the strike team; she was shot in the leg but not killed. A few minutes later came the message, "Geronimo EKIA" - Enemy Killed in Action - with the trademark close-quarters sharpshooting of the American Special Operations forces, the deadly efficient "double-tap". One bullet to the head and one to the chest.
THE FOLLOW UP BEGINS

"We want to disable Al-Qaeda...There are several significant leaders still on the run. Al-Zawahiri
... Formerly second in command of al-Qaeda, now the head cheese, occasionally described as the real brains of the outfit. Formerly the Mister Big of Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Bumped off Abdullah Azzam with a car boom in the course of one of their little disputes. Is thought to have composed bin Laden's fatwa entitled World Islamic Front Against Jews and Crusaders. Currently residing in the North Wazoo area. That is not a horn growing from the middle of his forehead, but a prayer bump, attesting to how devout he is...
, who inherited the leadership from Osama, is somewhere, we believe, in Pakistain. So we are intent on going after those who are keen on keeping Al-Qaeda operational and inspirational."

Thus spoke US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton
... sometimes described as the Smartest Woman in the World and at other times as Mrs. Bill, never as Another Jeremiah S. Black ...
, on an NDTV moderated interactive session in India. A year after, the timing of Clinton's visit, as well her coupling of the 2008 Mumbai attacks (which Pakistain is deemed largely responsible by more than a few forums and governments), should be an ominous sign of the post-OBL shadow that continues to lurk over Islamabad.

"We are well aware that there have not yet been steps taken by the Pak government to do what both India and the U.S. have repeatedly requested that they do and we are going to keep pushing that point," Ms. Clinton said, adding that she had recently authorised a $1-million reward for information leading to the capture of Hafiz Muhammad Saeed
...who would be wearing a canvas jacket with very long sleeves anyplace but Pakistain...
(The Hindu)
The Post OBL Treasure Hunt

There has been some mondo bizarro showmanship from strange quarters of late. One stream is from Bill Warren, a US Congressional hopeful turn treasure hunter, who claimed that he has located where OBL's body was thrown. "I'm the only one with this information. It's 200 miles to the west of the Indian city of Surat."

Warren's being making claims for several months now, but he is showing more confidence than another, very different probe: The four-member Abbottabad Raid Commission, headed for retired justice Javed Iqbal, which is months overdue to publish its findings and which, at the time this paper was going to print, had leaked to the Pak press that the President's Asif Ali President Ten Percent Zardari
... sticky-fingered husband of the late Benazir Bhutto ...
's response, or the lack of it, was causing delays in the publication of the report. Insiders state that everyone, from the Abbottabad traffic police to the Prime Minister, will be blamed for the 'intelligence failure'.
Link


India-Pakistan
CIA ups drone strikes over Europe attacks plot: report
2010-09-29
[Pak Daily Times] In an effort to foil a suspected terrorist plot against European targets, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has ramped up missile strikes against forces of Evil in Pakistain's tribal regions, current and former agency officials were quoted as saying by the Wall Street Journal on Tuesday.

In July 8, Pak paramilitary troops took position on a hilltop post in Khajore Kut, an area of South Wazoo.

The terror plot, which officials have been tracking for weeks, is believed to target multiple countries, including the UK, France, and Germany, the officials said.

The exact nature of the plot or plots could not be learned immediately, and counter-terrorism officials in the US, Pakistain and Europe are continuing to investigate. There have, however, been multiple terror warnings in recent days in France, Germany and the UK.

Notable threats: "There are some pretty notable threat streams," said one US military official, who added that the significance of these threats is still being discussed among counter-terrorism officials but that threats of this height were unusual.

US Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano plans to discuss the current European terrorism intelligence with her European counterparts at a UN aviation security meeting this week in Montreal. "We are in constant contact with our colleagues abroad," she told a Senate panel last week. "We are all seeing increased activity by a more diverse set of groups and a more diverse set of threats. That activity, much of which is Islamist in nature, is directed at the West generally."

Not all of the drone strikes in the latest wave are connected to the suspected European plot. But many have targeted forces of Evil who are part of the Haqqani network. Last week, France stepped up its level of vigilance over what was thought could be an imminent al Qaeda threat. Authorities said that they had uncovered a suicide kaboom plot to attack the Paris subway linked to al Qaeda's North African affiliate. They said the threat might be connected to France's recent vote to ban the wearing of burqas.

"There have been some actionable targets, including Haqqani targets, that have presented themselves," said one US military official. If the Haqqani network were involved in a European terror plot, it would be the first known instance where it sought to launch attacks outside of South Asia, said Bruce Hoffman, a professor at Georgetown University, who has written extensively on terrorism.
Link


India-Pakistan
Today's Fizzle Bomber Round-up
2010-05-06
NY bomb suspect 'met Taliban explosives expert'
(AKI) - Pakistani investigators believe Faisal Shahzad learned about explosives from a senior Taliban expert at a training camp in Pakistan. Mohammad Rehan, one of eight people arrested in Pakistan late Tuesday, is accused of introducing Shahzad to militants gave him lessons in handling explosives.

According to security sources Rehan was arrested in the Pakistani southern port city of Karachi. He is suspected of taking Shahzad to the northern city of Peshawar and then to North Waziristan, which is now a Taliban stronghold.

Officials believe Shahzad, a Karachi-born Pushtun, had no relationship with any militant organisation until Rehan put him in contact with Qari Hussain Mehsud, the chief of the Pakistani Taliban's suicide squad and explosives expert. Mehsud is believed to have provided training to Shahzad on improvised explosives on a recent visit to Pakistan.

Officials from Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence have detained Tauseef Ahmed, a friend with whom Shahzad stayed on his last trip to Karachi, and Shahzad's father-in-law Iftikhar Mian.

Father of fizzle bomber questioned
(AKI) - US and Pakistani investigators are reported to have interviewed the father of Times Square car bombing suspect and four others linked to a notorious Pakistani militant group, intelligence officials told the American cable network, CNN, on Thursday.

Bahar Ulhaq, a retired senior Pakistani air force officer, was questioned by senior investigators in the northwestern Pakistani city of Peshawar. He is the father of Faisal Shahzad, the 30-year-old Pakistani-American suspect, in the failed car bomb attack in Times Square on Saturday. Ulhaq, who lives in the Peshawar suburb of Hayatabad, was not detained or arrested, a source told CNN.

Another official said the team was questioning four men suspected of having links to the banned militant group Jaish-e-Mohammed.

Fizzle Bomber's Ties to Pakistan Taliban Probed
The article has a nice slideshow of Mr. Shahzad's home village. From the comment next to one of the photos: The respected conservative family belongs to Pakistan's elite..his brother is a mechanical engineer in Canada; his sister works in a hospital; another sister used to work as an educator..
U.S. and Pakistani investigators are giving increased credence to links between Times Square bombing suspect Faisal Shahzad and the Pakistan Taliban, with one senior Pakistani official saying Mr. Shahzad received instruction from the Islamist group's suicide-bomb trainer.

If the links are verified, it would mark a stark shift in how the Pakistan Taliban—an affiliate of the Taliban in Afghanistan—and related jihadist groups in Pakistan pursue their goals. Until now, they have focused on attacks within Pakistan and in India, not the U.S.
True. The pantibomber and Major Hasan were both connected to Al Qaeda in Yemen.
For the past several months, Pakistan's military has waged a battle against the Pakistan Taliban and a related group, Jaish-e-Mohammed, in the Pakistani tribal region of South Waziristan, which borders Afghanistan. The Pakistan Taliban's leadership has been heavily targeted by missile strikes from Central Intelligence Agency pilotless drones.

Pakistani investigators also are probing Mr. Shahzad's possible connections with Jaish-e-Muhammad, an outlawed Islamist militant group, after the arrest Tuesday of Tohaid Ahmed and Mohammed Rehan in Karachi. A senior Pakistani government official said the two men were believed to have links to Jaish. Mr. Ahmed had been in email contact with Mr. Shahzad; Mr. Rehan took Mr. Shahzad to South Waziristan, the official said.

There, Mr. Shahzad received training in explosives in a camp run by Qari Hussain, the official said. Mr. Hussain is a senior commander with Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, the Pakistan Taliban's formal name, and trains suicide bombers, the official said. Mr. Hussain is also a cousin of Hakimullah Mehsud, the Pakistan Taliban's chief. Mr. Shahzad has admitted to investigators that he received training from militants in Waziristan, U.S. officials said.

After several trips to Pakistan, Mr. Shahzad came back to the U.S. with significant amounts of declared cash, law enforcement officials said. "That's not that unusual, for immigrants to move with lots of cash," he said. "There just wasn't anything in his [immigration file] that raised any red flags."

U.S. and British intelligence officials estimate that about 100 Westerners have in recent years taken advantage of lengthy trips to the region to complete training at jihadi camps in Pakistan and returned to their home countries, according to Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism expert at Georgetown University. That figure includes Najibullah Zazi and David Headley, who recently pleaded guilty in the U.S. in terror cases, and numerous British terror plotters. It also includes Mr. Shahzad, who told border officials in February 2010, upon returning to New York City, that he had been visiting his ailing father in Pakistan.

The size of American and British populations of Pakistani descent is so large that it makes detailed scrutiny of travel overseas difficult. There are more than 200,000 Pakistani-Americans, and more than 400,000 Britons of Pakistani heritage.

Other countries with smaller diasporas in the U.S. do draw close attention. Americans traveling to Yemen, a hotbed of al Qaeda activities, receive close scrutiny upon return. Last year, the Federal Bureau of Investigation launched a program out of its Minneapolis field office to keep an eye on American Somalis traveling to their homeland.

Before Mr. Shahzad's capture, U.S. officials gave little credence to the claims of Taliban involvement, but investigators are now probing the possible connection. "Pakistani Taliban links to the Times Square incident are entirely plausible," said one U.S. counterterrorism official.

Family relative Kifayat Ali Khan, a lawyer, said Mr. Shahzad had spent little time in the village, because he studied in various educational institutions, including a Pakistan Air Force college in Peshawar, the main city in northwestern Pakistan.
We had been wondering if Mr. Shahzad was another military son who'd gone to military school before heading to America.
More than a dozen people have so far been picked up in Karachi, Faisalabad and Khyber-Pakhtunkhawa (formerly known as the North West Frontier Province). According to one senior Pakistani official, most of the people arrested in the sweep belonged to Jaish and a Sunni sectarian offshoot, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.

One thing that puzzles U.S. terrorism experts: the lack of sophistication in the planned attack, considering Mr. Hussain's reputed expertise and emphasis on suicide bombs. One theory is that Mr. Shahzad may not have been fully embraced or fully trained by the Pakistan Taliban, who may have been suspicious of a U.S. citizen seeking training. "They may not have shown him all their tricks, but just set him loose. If he pulls off an attack, great, they got a 'freebie,' and if not, no harm done," said Brian Fishman, a terrorism analyst at the New America Foundation in Washington, a think tank that focuses on security issues.

Others speculated that the attempted attack might have been a personal play by Mr. Mehsud, the Taliban leader, to avenge U.S. drone strikes, bolster his own embattled leadership credentials and regain popular support for a terrorist group that has angered many Pakistanis with its urban attacks. "The one thing that does get you support in Pakistan is action against America and American policies—that would be a boost for his standing," said Richard Barrett, coordinator of the United Nations al Qaeda/Taliban Monitoring Team.
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India-Pakistan
Drone attacks target important Pakistan militants
2009-09-17
The U.S. believes Central Intelligence Agency drone attacks have killed two prominent Islamic militant figures in Pakistan affiliated with al Qaeda, one of whom was on the U.S.'s list of top 20 targets, according to officials briefed on the matter.

Drone attacks targeting Baitullah Mehsud and his supporters destroyed houses in a Pakistani village in August. One drone attack Monday is believed to have killed the leader of the Islamic Jihad Union, Najmiddin Kamolitdinovich Jalolov, an Uzbek native implicated in terrorist plots and attacks in Germany and Uzbekistan. Officials said they are almost certain he was killed, though a DNA test hasn't yet been performed.

A drone attack on Sept. 7 appeared to have killed another prominent Islamic militant, Ilyas Kashmiri, who had been briefly detained in Pakistan for alleged involvement in a 2003 assassination attempt against then-Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. There is less certainty about his death, however.

The two men are "solid midlevel commanders," said Bruce Hoffman, a Georgetown University professor who specializes in terrorism. Targeting middle-level officers is important, he said, because "when you do kill the senior commanders, there's no one to fill their shoes."

CIA drone attacks intensified in the early months of the Obama administration. A drone last month claimed Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud, who was believed to have been responsible for the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.

This most recent campaign targeted militants in three attacks over the course of a week. The U.S. has launched 74 drone-missile attacks since August 2008, and 38 of those strikes were launched this year, according to the Long War Journal, which tracks CIA drone strikes.

U.S. officials don't openly acknowledge the CIA drone attacks, but as recently as Tuesday, the top U.S. intelligence director touted the success of intelligence operations against al Qaeda. "What has really made all the nations safer has been the accumulation of knowledge about al Qaeda and its affiliate groups, which enables us to be more aggressive in expanding that knowledge and stopping things before they happen," said Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair.

The Treasury Department last year designated Mr. Jalolov's group as an al Qaeda-affiliated organization with the goal of overthrowing the Uzbek government. Treasury officials froze his assets and prohibited Americans from conducting financial transactions with him. The U.N. also placed sanctions on him that included freezing assets and an arms embargo.

Mr. Jalolov, 37 years old, the man on the CIA's top target list, was considered a potential ringleader in a September 2007 plot to attack several venues in Germany, according to the Treasury Department. In 2006, he directed the casing of terrorist targets, particularly hotels catering to Western visitors, in Central Asia. U.S. officials alleged he was an organizer of the 2004 terrorist attacks in Uzbekistan that killed at least 47 people.

Mr. Kashmiri, an al Qaeda operational commander, is reported to be among Pakistan's top 10 most-wanted terrorists. He was arrested in December 2003 in connection with an attempted suicide bombing targeting Mr. Musharraf, and was released a month later. Mr. Kashmiri then moved his operations to Pakistan's tribal Waziristan region and linked up with Mr. Mehsud.
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Terror Networks
Ideological clash of two jihadi titans shakes Al Qaeda
2008-12-15
A bitter, year-long feud that has shaken Al Qaeda's ideological pillars grew even sharper last month. A former associate of Ayman al-Zawahiri accused him of working for Sudanese intelligence, wearing "women's garments" to flee Afghanistan, and spreading an incorrect Islamic theory of jihad.

Mr. Zawahiri "is only good at fleeing, inciting, collecting donations, and talking to the media," wrote Sayyed Imam al-Sharif in his latest attack on Al Qaeda's No. 2.

Sayyed Imam, serving a life sentence in Egypt, is an esteemed theoretician of jihad whose ideas helped shape Al Qaeda's ideology. But now he's decrying its stock in trade -- mass murder -- in a clash that is an example of how some once-fierce zealots of violent jihad are having second thoughts. "It is really an argument about ... what means are militarily effective and Islamically legitimate," says William McCants, a Washington area-based analyst of militant Islamism. Imam, he adds, is saying that only "a guerrilla war conducted against enemy soldiers" is permitted.

Imam's prison writings were preceded by a series of books and commentaries from imprisoned members of Islamic Group, a group that waged a guerrilla war against the Egyptian government in the 1990s. Their so-called "revisions" renounced violence and some put forward ideas on how to peacefully create an Islamic society.

Terrorism experts disagree on the impact that Imam's scathing critiques of Zawahiri and Al Qaeda will have on the global jihadi movement, particularly since he writes from prison where he is believed subject to influence from Egyptian and US intelligence agencies.

But his writings have put Zawahiri on the defensive. And they come amid other pressures, including the disabling of several Al Qaeda-linked online forums -- presumably by Western and Middle Eastern intelligence agencies -- and an intensification of US military activity in Pakistan's tribal areas, where Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden are believed to be hiding.

"One shouldn't overestimate the impact of this [ideological feud] in the overall war on terror, but it is definitely going to divert some of Zawahiri's creative energy away from operations," says Thomas Hegghammer, a fellow in Harvard Kennedy School's international security program. "Zawahiri's support among jihadis is still strong, but he is losing the media battle to convince the public that Al Qaeda is winning," adds Mr. McCants, who monitors Al Qaeda Web activity at jihadica.com. "That, coupled with the US Predators attacks in Pakistan, put him under tremendous pressure."

Bruce Hoffman, a professor of security studies at Georgetown University and author of "Inside Terrorism," says he does not believe that Imam's writings are going to have a huge adverse impact on Al Qaeda's hard-core followers. If you are a hard-line militant, "are you going to listen to an elderly, geriatric guy in an Egyptian prison?" Mr. Hoffman asks. "It's not as if Zawahiri himself changed his mind."

Far more problematic for Al Qaeda, Hoffman says, is the sabotage of its online forums, some of which have not been working since September. As the principle means of communicating with followers and potential recruits, their loss "has been a serious blow," Hoffman says.

Imam, also known as Dr. Fadl, was a close ally of Zawahiri when Imam led Egypt's Islamic Jihad in the 1980s. His reputation as a top jihadi ideologue rested on his books, particularly his 1994 "A Compendium for the Pursuit of Divine Knowledge." But Imam and Zawahiri disagreed about many things and grew estranged. When Imam stepped down as Islamic Jihad leader in 1993, Zawahiri took his place. Though Al Qaeda cited Imam's writings, he never joined the group.

In Nov. 2007, Imam released "Rationalizing Jihad in Egypt and the World," a book that refuted Al Qaeda's terrorist tactics and ideology and was especially critical of Zawahiri.
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Home Front: WoT
A Not Very Private Feud Over Terrorism
2008-06-09
Every once in a while the NYT brings home an interesting analysis piece. This is one of those.
WASHINGTON — A bitter personal struggle between two powerful figures in the world of terrorism has broken out, forcing their followers to choose sides. This battle is not being fought in the rugged no man’s land on the Pakistan-Afghan border. It is a contest reverberating inside the Beltway between two of America’s leading theorists on terrorism and how to fight it, two men who hold opposing views on the very nature of the threat.

On one side is Bruce Hoffman, a cerebral 53-year-old Georgetown University historian and author of the highly respected 1998 book “Inside Terrorism.” He argues that Al Qaeda is alive, well, resurgent and more dangerous than it has been in several years. In his corner, he said, is a battalion of mainstream academics and a National Intelligence Estimate issued last summer warning that Al Qaeda had reconstituted in Pakistan.

On the other side is Marc Sageman, an iconoclastic 55-year-old Polish-born psychiatrist, sociologist, former C.I.A. case officer and scholar-in-residence with the New York Police Department. His new book, “Leaderless Jihad,” argues that the main threat no longer comes from the organization called Al Qaeda, but from the bottom up — from radicalized individuals and groups who meet and plot in their neighborhoods and on the Internet. In his camp, he said, are agents and analysts in highly classified positions at the Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation.

If Dr. Hoffman gets inside organizations — focusing on command structures — Dr. Sageman gets inside heads, analyzing the terrorist mind-set. But this is more important than just a battle of ideas. It is the latest twist in the contest for influence and resources in Washington that has been a central feature of the struggle against terrorism since Sept. 11, 2001.

Officials from the White House to the C.I.A. acknowledge the importance of the debate of the two men as the government assesses the nature of the threat. Looking forward, it is certain to be used to win bureaucratic turf wars over what programs will be emphasized in the next administration.

If there is no looming main Qaeda threat — just “bunches of guys,” as Dr. Sageman calls them — then it would be easier for a new president to think he could save money or redirect efforts within the huge counterterrorism machine, which costs the United States billions of dollars and has created armies of independent security consultants and counterterrorism experts in the last seven years.

Preventing attacks planned by small bands of zealots in the garages and basements just off Main Street or the alleys behind Islamic madrasas is more a job for the local police and the F.B.I., working with undercover informants and with authorities abroad. “If it’s a ‘leaderless jihad,’ then I can find something else to do because the threat is over,” said Peter Bergen, a senior fellow at the nonpartisan New America Foundation, who puts himself in Dr. Hoffman’s camp. “Leaderless things don’t produce big outcomes.”
But it doesn't take very much to provide leadership, as Osama bin Laden demonstrated. A charismatic man, or small group of men, with some kind of funding can bring together a fair number of leaderless men seeking jihad and provide the direction required to create a 9/11, a 3/11, or a Bali. One of the major lessons of modern terrorism is that it can be surprisingly low tech and remain off the radar screens of local and national police. It's what you can do with a small cadre of committed people. Given the bureauocratic, officious nature of police and the inability of many analysts to find dots, let alone connect them, the complacency Mr. Bergen advocates seems fatally misplaced.
On the other hand, if the main task can be seen as thwarting plots or smiting Al Qaeda’s leaders abroad, then attention and resources should continue to flow to the C.I.A., the State Department, the military and terror-financing sleuths.
The NYT presents this as an 'either/or' scenario, when what is needed is, of course, both, but without the hidebound structures that spend more time in empire-building than they do in rooting out problems.
“One way to enhance your budget is to frame it in terms of terrorism,” said Steven Simon, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “But the problem is that ‘Al Qaedatry’ is more art than science — and people project onto the subject a lot of their own preconceptions.”

The divide over the nature of the threat turned nasty, even by the rough standards of academia, when Dr. Hoffman reviewed Dr. Sageman’s book this spring for Foreign Affairs in an essay, “The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism: Why Osama bin Laden Still Matters.” He accused Dr. Sageman of “a fundamental misreading of the Al Qaeda threat,” adding that his “historical ignorance is surpassed only by his cursory treatment of social-networking theory.”

In the forthcoming issue of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Sageman returns fire, accusing Dr. Hoffman of “gross misrepresentation.” In an interview, Dr. Sageman said he was at a loss to explain his rival’s critique: “Maybe he’s mad that I’m the go-to guy now.”

Some terrorism experts find the argument silly — and dangerous. “Sometimes it seems like this entire field is stepping into a boys-with-toys conversation,” said Karen J. Greenberg, executive director of New York University’s Center on Law and Security. “Here are two guys, both of them respected, saying that there is only one truth and only one occupant of the sandbox. That’s ridiculous. Both of them are valuable.”
And both would spend more time at each other's throats than they would dealing with the major problem at hand.
Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, a former director of central intelligence, sees merit in both sides, too; he said in Singapore last week that Al Qaeda is training European, and possibly American, recruits. But, he added, “You also have the development of violent, extremist networks.”

One argument for playing down Al Qaeda’s importance — Dr. Sageman’s point — has been the public declarations of some prominent Sunni clerics who have criticized Al Qaeda for its indiscriminate killing of Muslim civilians.

A leading Syrian-born militant theorist believed to be in American custody, known by the nom de guerre Abu Musab al-Suri, also has argued in favor of leaderless jihad. In his 1,600-page life work, he advises jihadists to create decentralized networks of individuals and local cells bound by belief, instead of hierarchical structures that could be targets of attack. He has referred to Mr. bin Laden as a “pharaoh.”

Dr. Hoffman’s principal argument relies on the re-emergence of Al Qaeda, starting in 2005 and 2006, along the Afghan-Pakistan border. There is empirical evidence, he says, that from that base, Al Qaeda has been “again actively directing and initiating international terrorist operations on a grand scale.”
The al-Qaeda model has been to find a faraway place that can be used for a base of operations, so that young men can be trained for terrorist or paramilitary operations. It's what Binny did in Afghanistan in the late 90s and what he was seeking to do in the Sudan and in Somalia before that. In turn that came from his experiences during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Binny wants a hierarchy with himself as director; that hierarchy needs a physical location. The other type of model, what al-Suri advocates, is a decentralized network that needs little if any physical plant. A look at al-Suri's life demonstrates why he favors this model; he's never had the opportunity to slip a leash and build a terrorist structure for himself.
But it has been easy for intelligence agencies to get the analysis wrong when faced with piecemeal and contradictory evidence.

One example is the 2004 train bombings in Madrid that killed 191 people. Declarations by several Spanish officials and experts of such a link were undermined by evidence that the group was self-motivated, self-trained and self-financed, and that the explosives were bought locally.

Other examples are provided by the 2004 plot to attack the London area with fertilizer bombs, and the July 7, 2005, transit bombings in London. At first, both were thought to support the home-grown terrorist thesis: British citizens, most of Pakistani descent, had carried out attacks with homemade bombs. Only later did evidence surface that in both cases, at least some had trained in Pakistan at military camps suspected of links to Qaeda operatives.

So a question remains: Was Mohammad Sidique Khan, one of the suicide bombers in the 2005 attacks, a local kid gone wrong, a full-fledged Qaeda operative, or both?

“You can argue that if you subtract his travel to Pakistan, there’s no 7/7,” said Samuel J. Rascoff, an assistant professor of law at New York University and a former intelligence official with the New York City police. “You can also argue that if you subtract his radicalization in Northern England, there’s no 7/7.”

Dr. Sageman’s critics argue that his more local focus plays to a weak point in gauging threats: People tend to feel the threat nearest to home is the most urgent. In April, for example, the Kansas City office of the F.B.I. met with state and local authorities from Kansas and Missouri to analyze “agroterrorism,” a big issue in America’s heartland. The discussion was about the possibility of terrorists causing an outbreak of diseases that could poison cattle or crops, crippling the economies of farm states.

Terrorism-weary prosecuting judges and police investigators in Europe listen to the debate on the other side of the Atlantic and tend to find it empty. They say it is hard to know where radicalization starts — among groups of friends, in an imam’s sermon in Europe or at home on the Internet — and when operational training by Al Qaeda is a factor. They prefer a blended approach.

France, Spain and Italy, for example, pour resources and manpower into investigations at home — from studying radicalization and wiretapping suspicious individuals to infiltrating mosques and community centers. These countries also track movements of suspicious individuals abroad and networks with both local and foreign connections. Terrorist-related cases fall under the authority of special investigative superjudges who have access to all classified intelligence, and can use much of the information in trials.

The Europeans say that for them, the argument is not theoretical. Somewhere in Europe, just about every week, a terrorist plot is uncovered and arrests are made.
We at the Burg sometimes forget that the Euro anti-terror organizations are very, very good at what they do, even if their courts and their politicans don't back them up.
“The danger of this ‘either-or’ argument could lead us to the mistakes of the past,” said Baltasar Garzón, Spain’s leading antiterror investigatory magistrate. “In the ’90s, we saw atomized cells as everything, and then Al Qaeda came along. And now we look at Al Qaeda and say it’s no longer the threat. We’re making the same mistake again.”
So for America, a suggested perscription is 1) vigorous prosecution of home-grown threats 2) continued surveillance at home without stomping on our civil liberties, as bureaucracies tend to do over time 3) cooperation with competent anti-terror units around the world 4) revising our national and international legal structures to be more effective against terrorism and, important, to prevent terrorists from using those legal structures against us 5) treating countries that harbor terrorists, or who can't police their own countries, as pariahs subject to removal (with or without UN blessing) and 6) treating regions of the world that lack sovereign governments as free-fire zones.
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