Afghanistan | |
Taliban Defense Minister Visits Panjshir; We Do Not Allow “disruptors” to Disrupt Security | |
2022-05-22 | |
![]() students... Ministry of Defense said that Mullah Yaqub, the Acting Minister of Defense, has visited Panjshir province to assess the security situation. Mullah Yaqub met security officials and tribal elders in the province, today May 21st, according to Inayatullah Khawarazmi, the front man for the Taliban Ministry of Defense. Khawarazmi added that the Acting Minister of the Taliban’s Defense Ministry had told the residents of Panjshir province that they should not be galvanized by enemy propaganda and should continue living their "normal" lives. The residents of the province were also advised to cooperate with the Taliban to restore "order" in the province. The Acting Minister of Defense also emphasized that the Taliban in the province will not allow anyone, particularly "disruptors" to disrupt security. In recent days, battle between Afghan National Resistance® Front forces led by Ahmad Massoud and Taliban forces in Panjshir province has escalated. Amrullah Saleh and Ahmad Massoud founded the Resistance® Front after the Taliban seized control of Afghanistan in Panjshir. Saleh and Massoud, as well as the Front’s leadership council, are based outside of Afghanistan. In the most recent case, battle started two days ago in the Khanj district of Panjshir province between Taliban and Resistance® Front fighters, and it is said to be still unfolding. The Taliban Air Force Commander, who visited Panjshir earlier this week, told the people of the province "not to kill themselves for the sake of those in Tajikistan and La Belle France." "Do not kill yourself for the benefit of those who live in Tajikistan and La Belle France and raise money from your blood there," said Amanuddin Mansoor, commander of the Taliban Ministry of Defense Air Force, in a message to the people of Panjshir released on May 14, through the ministry. The Taliban official called on the people of Panjshir to stop resisting and join the Taliban. According to him, if the people of Panjshir unite with the Taliban, their "lives, property, honor and reputation" will be protected and no one will "invade" Panjshir. Related: Panjshir: 2022-05-20 Ankara Gathering of Political Figures Forms the Supreme Council of National Resistance for the Salvation of Afghanistan Panjshir: 2022-05-18 MSNBC contributor and retired four-star general Barry McCaffrey deletes tweet showing Russian plane 'getting nailed' by Ukraine that's from a VIDEO GAME Panjshir: 2022-05-15 Politicians Call for Probe into Alleged Torture of Civilians | |
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Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia |
Gen. McCaffrey: Russia Has.... ‘Lost Command And Control' (video) |
2022-03-26 |
Signals intercepts, and why Ukraine communication systems were NOT taken out by invading Russian forces. [YouTube] Retired Four Star General Barry McCaffrey and former consultant to the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division Clint Watts discuss the Russian army struggling with logistics, communication, and resources. Related: Barry McCaffrey: 2018-03-05 'This is not going to end well': Trump's friends and allies are worried he's spiraling out of control ‐ and they say this time is different Barry McCaffrey: 2011-11-23 A war is taking place in Mexico: An interview with Dr. Robert J. Bunker Barry McCaffrey: 2010-07-26 General McCaffrey: Juarez Car Bomb Was Narcoterrorism |
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Home Front: Politix | |
'This is not going to end well': Trump's friends and allies are worried he's spiraling out of control ‐ and they say this time is different | |
2018-03-05 | |
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As Trump becomes ever more focused on perceived attacks against him, constantly obsesses over TV coverage, and lashes out at friends and foes alike in public, many close to him say he is approaching "pure madness," according to the Washington Post. Retired Gen. Barry McCaffrey did not mince his words about Trump's current mental state. "I think the president is starting to wobble in his emotional stability and this is not going to end well," he told the Post. "Trump's judgment is fundamentally flawed, and the more pressure put on him and the more isolated he becomes, I think, his ability to do harm is going to increase." But others say things will likely get worse before they get better. "We haven't bottomed out," one official told the paper. | |
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Caribbean-Latin America | |
A war is taking place in Mexico: An interview with Dr. Robert J. Bunker | |
2011-11-23 | |
By Chris Covert Mexican security forces conducting Laguna Segura counternarcotics operations dismantled a sophisticated telecommunications network on Thursday in the Torreon, Coahuila metropolitan area, colloquially known as La Laguna. The network used a long range radio, as well as networked laptop computers to communicate with aircraft and to control/monitor the movement of ground assets. Other equipment reportedly found included more than 120 separate telecommunications devices. The telecommunication center was operated by Los Zetas criminal drug gang, which used the data from the set up to monitor and evade security forces' movements. The operation appeared to be similar to another one which took place earlier in September when Mexican Naval Infantry troops seized several telecommmunications nodes also operated by Los Zetas, this time in Veracruz, Veracruz on the east coast of Mexico. That network was reportedly sophisticated enough that the transmissions were virtually undetectable. The Laguna Segura counternarcotics operation, which was reinforced late last October, is apparently a more general attempt to gain federal and state government control. This is hoped to be achieved through the increased presence of federal security personnel and by coordinating routine security activities with Coahuila and Durango state police agents, as well as with municipal police agents in the cities of Torreon, Coahuila; Ciudad Lerdo, Durango and Gomez Palacio, Durango. In areas such as these, there patrols with a centralized Mexican Army operations center. These two operations dismantled a telecommunications network, which seems to be indicative of an increasing sophistication Mexican drug cartels are using in their drug processing and shipping operations. The higher level at which cartels now operate places them firmly in the rubric of a narco-insurgency, at least if you ask California professor Dr. Robert J. Bunker. Dr. Robert J. Bunker is a California national security academic whose recent writings place him as one of the top experts in the field as an applied theorist with regard to "non-state threat groups", "counter-threat strategies", "future war/conflict", and other advanced concepts concerning national security. His most recent contribution to the growing national debate on border security and the threat Mexican drug cartels pose to the national security of the United States came last September 13 when he gave testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere. His testimony was about the Merida Initiative, which is the US effort to provide support to Mexico's security apparatus in fighting the drug cartels in Mexico. It is Professor Bunker's belief that the violence and much of the growing sophistication Mexican drug cartels have demonstrated in recent years show that the cartels are slowly evolving from organized crime to something more sinister and harder to deal with, than simple bands of thugs selling drugs to Americans. His belief is bolstered by his contention that cartels are increasingly using warmaking means, such as telecommunications and the use of weapons heavier than small arms. In an interview published in the Mexican leftist weekly Proceso, Dr. Bunker reiterated his contention that cartels are a growing insurgency problem within Mexico which directly threatens the US southern border. This writer wanted to get Dr. Bunker's views on those very issues through an email correspondence. What would you say to critics who say you are trying to conflate normal Mexican organized crime operations to an actual insurgency, that you are trying to make one set of circumstances fit another without any logical nexus? To be candid, I think we have two levels of critics. One is comprised of those at the basic knowledge level-- internet trolls full of malice and readers with just enough knowledge to get themselves in trouble. I basically ignore that group-- I don't want to hear what a Maoist insurgency is and how the cartels do not fit its traditional patterns. The second level of critics is composed of the informed public (with deeper knowledge of the topic), some military/law enforcement readers, and those from the policy and academic communities. The toughest critics come from the last group-- and in fact the debates have already started in the academic/policy circles. Dr. Paul Rexton Kan in the Summer 2011 issue of Parameters put Barry McCaffrey, Hal Brands, Hillary Clinton, Max Manwaring, and yours truly in his theoretical gun sights. His basic argument is that 'high intensity crime' rather than narco-insurgency or narco-terrorism is taking place in Mexico. I've already responded-- in a sense-- with another edited volume of Small Wars & Insurgencies/Routledge book coming out on 'Criminal Insurgencies in Mexico and the Americas'. John Sullivan and I have an important theoretical writeup on new forms of insurgency-- criminal and spiritual as they pertain to the gangs and cartels-- in that work. However, I have recently decided, due to Kan's Parameters essay, that I'm going to have to do a comparative analysis of 'high intensity crime' vs 'criminal insurgencies' now as one response to the critics. To be fair to Dr. Kan, he is part of the El Centro program standing at Small Wars Journal in a few weeks-- we want his differing viewpoint included as we foster open scholarly debate on what is going on in Mexico. This all might sound like splitting hairs but part of the solution-- or in this case mitigation of the threat-- is to accurately define it so that we can properly respond to it. We are back into that "is it crime or war" debate that has been going on for over a decade now. The US Army underwent a similar debate with the emergence of OOTW (Operations Other Than War) back in the mid-1990s. Not to show my age, but I was actively involved in that debate too. Back then, the US Army thinkers just couldn't accept non-state groups were waging war-- only states were allowed to do that. In one of your articles at Small Wars Journal, you write "The cartels then sought in the various towns and cities to suppress and co-opt information produced and distributed by journalists/reporters and their employers." That passage would lead the reader to think that that cartel information offensive was planned from the start. How do you convince a reader that is the case? And how significant is it that cartels have planned information operations from the start. If the readers looked at background analytical documents, such as Lisa Campbell's operational assessment of Los Zetas-- specifically the operations and intelligence composition figures [See Narcos Over the Border, pp. 58-59] when they were allied to the Gulf Cartel-- they will see counterintelligence and deception (psychological warfare) organizational components identified. The other cartels may have taken a more haphazard approach, though, as the La Familia and splinter Los Caballeros Templarios groups have proven adept at winning the 'hearts and minds' of indigenous populations in Michoacan via their own propaganda efforts. The free press in Mexico has long been suppressed when reporting on the drug trade due to past PRI (and elite) complicity, profit taking, and collaboration with the initial cartels. Los Zetas, and later the Guatemalan Kaibiles, coming into this has made it even worse. They initially ushered in special operations planning into the decision making process for the Gulf Cartel-- info ops thus became a planning component. This required the other cartels to acquire their own capabilities just as we have seen with the 'arms race' that has been taking place with the deployment of cartel enforcers increasingly found to have military grade weaponry. I think cartel info ops have evolved over time along with the Mexican cartels, which are about two-and-a-half decades old, they definitely did not have them day one with some sort of grand plan. Information operations is also a broad concept-- what is possibly even more significant is that different levels of these operations exist and the various Mexican cartels seem adept at different levels. It could be argued that the Sinaloa cartel focuses on strategic level info ops issues while some of the other cartels do not. This was evident as early as the 1990s-- but very little has been written on it-- when car bombs were being directed against the Sinaloa cartel by the Arellano F"lix (Tijuana) cartel and the Sinaloa cartel did not retaliate in kind. Blog del Narco has had technical problems with Google in the past that wound up being attributed to sloppiness by Google. If Blog del Narco's problems are not under that category, does their current travails suggest Los Zetas have some influence with unidentified individuals in Google? I'm going to have to go with the sloppiness/too much network traffic explanation unless Google does not want Blog del Narco associated with it and therefore the technical service provided might not be considered a priority. Google is a business and the controversy generated by hosting Blog del Narco might represent a minor headache via the bad press it provides. Blog del Narco also gets the service it pays for and has been doing things on the cheap. This is all only speculation however-- but Blog del Narco has since migrated to another web site now and mirrored sites are causing some confusion. I don't see Los Zetas having any influence on unidentified individuals or embedding 'agent provocateurs' at Google. Google has its own unique corporate culture that is pretty alien to outside groups-- especially Los Zetas. Would it surprise you to learn that Blog del Narco has in the past been frequented by Mexican narcotraffickers? And that the identity of the bloggers are an open secret in one of the cities in Nuevo Leon? Not your first statement. The site is open and anonymous media content (pictures/video links/text) is sent in all the time. No doubt the Mexican narcotraffickers are providing some of the content directly to the site to settle old scores, set up competitors and others who stand in their way, further their own agendas, and facilitate components of their info ops plans. I'm sure many of the traffickers are also viewing the site to see how so and so was killed and to hear 'shop talk' about current incidents of interest. The second statement did surprise me. If accurate, it would mean those bloggers are either protected or allied to one of the competing cartels. I have trouble with the cartels viewing the bloggers as benign and just leaving them alone in a city like that once they have been identified-- that would appear to be an anomaly. Part II to be continued tomorrow. Click here to read part II | |
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Caribbean-Latin America |
General McCaffrey: Juarez Car Bomb Was Narcoterrorism |
2010-07-26 |
Rinse the article through Google Translate or Babelfish to get a taste. The gist of the article is that the government of Mexican president Felipe Calderon refuses to call narcoterrorist attack so. Sometimes, I guess, it takes an American general to call it like it is. "There is no doubt that what happened in Ciudad Juärez was an act of narco-terrorism to a very high level," he says in an interview with Proceso Barry McCaffrey, retired U.S. general. "The incident reflected the violence in Mexico has reached another level and clearly intended to terrorize the Mexican state with the specific objective to disable it," emphasizes McCaffrey, who was head of Southern Command of the U.S. Armed Forces 1994 1996, request that during this time trained in narco-terrorism operations against the Army and National Police of Colombia. |
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Home Front: WoT |
USJFC Warns Pakistan And Mexico Could Destabilize And Collapse |
2009-01-14 |
Mexico is one of two countries that "bear consideration for a rapid and sudden collapse," according to a report by the U.S. Joint Forces Command on worldwide security threats. The command's "Joint Operating Environment (JOE 2008)" report, which contains projections of global threats and potential next wars, puts Pakistan on the same level as Mexico. "In terms of worse-case scenarios for the Joint Force and indeed the world, two large and important states bear consideration for a rapid and sudden collapse: Pakistan and Mexico. "The Mexican possibility may seem less likely, but the government, its politicians, police and judicial infrastructure are all under sustained assault and pressure by criminal gangs and drug cartels. How that internal conflict turns out over the next several years will have a major impact on the stability of the Mexican state. Any descent by Mexico into chaos would demand an American response based on the serious implications for homeland security alone." The Joint Forces Command in Norfolk, Va., is a Defense Department combat command that includes different military service branches, active and reserves. One of its roles is to transform the military's capabilities. In the report's foreword, Marine Gen. J.N. Mattis, the Joint Forces commander, said "Predictions about the future are always risky. ... Regardless, if we do not try to forecast the future, there is no doubt that we will be caught off guard as we strive to protect this experiment in democracy that we call America." The report offers "a Polaroid snapshot," and conditions in Mexico and elsewhere are in a state of flux, said Brig. Gen. José Riojas, executive director of the National Center for Border Security and Immigration at the University of Texas at El Paso. "I'm not sure Mexico looks today like it did nine months ago," Riojas said. The report is the latest focusing on Mexico's security problems, which stem mostly from drug violence and corruption. Recently, the Department of Homeland Security and former U.S. drug czar Barry McCaffrey issued similar assessments. Despite such reports, El Pasoan Veronica Callaghan, a border business leader, said she keeps running into people who "are in denial about what is happening in Mexico." Last week, Mexican President Felipe Calderón Hinojosa instructed his embassy and consular officials to promote a positive image of Mexico. He's also vowed to continue the crackdown on drug cartels. |
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Afghanistan |
Bush study favors bigger Afghan army |
2008-11-07 |
The Bush administration, in the midst of a wide review of its war strategy in Afghanistan, is likely to recommend soon to the incoming Obama administration that the U.S. push for further expansion of the Afghan army as the surest path to an eventual U.S. withdrawal, The Associated Press has learned. ... Under a plan adopted by the U.S. and Afghan governments in September, the Afghan army is to grow to 134,000 soldiers by 2014. The previous goal was 80,000, and the actual number in uniform now is about 67,000, according to Lt. Col. Christian Kubik, spokesman for the Combined Security Transition Command in Afghanistan, which is responsible for training and equipping Afghan forces. The price tag for getting to the new target of 134,000 by 2014 is an estimated $17 billion, Kubik said. Gates noted there is broad support for getting to the 134,000 goal quickly. "It may well not stop there," he added, noting that the size of the Afghan security forces is vastly smaller than Iraq's. A rapid increase in the size of Iraqi security forces over the past two years was a key element along with an altered U.S. counterinsurgency strategy in drastically reducing the level of violence and opening the door to American troop withdrawals this year. Barry McCaffrey, a retired four-star Army general, wrote recently after a July visit to Afghanistan that one of the keys to winning in Afghanistan is expanding the Afghan army to 200,000 soldiers. "Afghanistan will not be solved by the addition of two or three more U.S. combat brigades from our rapidly unraveling Army," McCaffrey wrote in a paper for the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y. Gates said he does not expect NATO allies or others to contribute significant additional troops in Afghanistan, even though he and other U.S. officials have pleaded for many months for more help. In his remarks last week, Gates alluded to a behind-the-scenes debate about the wisdom of deepening U.S. involvement, beyond the extra brigades McKiernan already has requested. "I think it remains to be seen whether there is a need or value to significantly more troops than that," the defense secretary said. |
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Afghanistan |
A top general says more troops aren't the answer in Afghanistan |
2008-07-31 |
There's military slang that seemingly applies to the situation on the ground in Afghanistan today. The operative acronym is FUBAR - Fouled Up Beyond All Recognition. That first letter doesn't really stand for "Fouled," and the R sometimes stands for Repair. One of the sharper military analysts I know has just returned from a tour of that sorrowful nation, which has been at war continuously since the Soviet Army invaded it in late 1979. Gen. Barry McCaffrey, who retired from the U.S. Army with four stars and a chest full of combat medals including two Distinguished Service Crosses, says we can't shoot our way out of Afghanistan, and the two or three or more American combat brigades proposed by the two putative nominees for president are irrelevant. |
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Home Front: WoT |
Roles, Missions, and Equipment: Military Lessons from Experience in this Decade |
2008-07-09 |
The pendulum has swung too far in denigrating the value of technology in war. Anything that smacks of high-tech warfighting is ridiculed as legacy or Cold War thinking. Today, however, we are at risk of over-correcting and dangerously undervaluing high-technology. Historians Ronald Haycock and Keith Neilson make an important point: Technology has permitted the division of mankind into ruler and ruled.[18] Technology is part of our culture; it is, in fact, our asymmetric advantage. Recently, strategic theorist Colin Gray noted: [H]igh technology is the American way in warfare. It has to be. A high technology society cannot possibly prepare for, or attempt to fight, its wars in any other than a technology-led manner.[19] Some underrate technology because they are drawing the wrong lessons from history. For example, in writing the new counterinsurgency manual the drafters relied heavily upon lessons learned from insurgencies of the 1950s-70s. These were eras when, significantly, high-technology in general, and airpower in specific, had little to offer. Hence, it is no surprise that the discussion of airpower in the 2006 counterinsurgency manual is limited to a five-page annex, and that short discussion is leery of airpower out of fear of collateral damage. Ironically, todays precision air weaponry, especially the new Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, have produced what retired Army General Barry McCaffrey insists is a a 100-year war-fighting leap-ahead that has fundamentally changed the nature of warfare.[20] The result? Human Rights Watch activist Marc Garlasoc recently conceded that he thinks airstrikes probably are the most discriminating weapon that exists.[21] Equally important, todays insurgent is not low-tech. In a recent article, retired Army officer John Sutherland invented the word iGuerrilla for what he describes as the the New Model Techno-Insurgent who exploits technology in a wide variety of ways.[22] Sutherland argues that the iGuerrilla cannot be swayed by logic or argument and insists this kind of insurgent is markedly different from those of the twentieth century who, he contends, are relegated to the dustbin of history. Yet much of our doctrine today is premised on twentieth-century insurgents. To me, this risks missing the opportunity to exploit technological opportunities. We may be reaching the tipping point where the research and development capabilities of the nation-state can significantly exceed the abilities of an adversary dependant upon improvising from off-the-shelf technologies. |
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Fifth Column | ||||||||||||||||||
Petraeus' 'ribbon creep' | ||||||||||||||||||
2008-04-10 | ||||||||||||||||||
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By Matthew DeBord Gen. David H. Petraeus may be as impressive a military professional as the United States has developed in recent years, ...
Memo to Petraeus: When you're making the case for more patriotic gore, go easy on the glitter.
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Home Front: WoT | |
U.S. Army Isn't Broken After All, Military Experts Say | |
2008-03-19 | |
Charts at site One year ago, as President Bush decided to send more troops to Iraq, the conventional wisdom in Washington among opponents of the war was that the U.S. Army was on the verge of breaking. In December 2006 former Secretary of State and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell warned, "The active Army is about broken." Ret. Gen. Barry McCaffrey, in a much-cited memo to West Point colleagues, wrote: "My bottom line is that the Army is unraveling, and if we dont expend significant national energy to reverse that trend, sometime in the next two years we will break the Army just like we did during Vietnam." Army Maj. Gen. Bob Scales, the former head of the Army War College, agreed. He wrote in an editorial in the Washington Times on March 30: "If you haven't heard the news, I'm afraid your Army is broken, a victim of too many missions for too few soldiers for too long. ... Today, anecdotal evidence of collapse is all around." But now, one year later, Scales has done an about-face. He says that he was wrong. Despite all the predictions of imminent collapse, the U.S. Army and the combat brigades have proven to be surprisingly resilient. According to Army statistics obtained exclusively by FOX News, 70 percent of soldiers eligible to re-enlist in 2006 did so a re-enlistment rate higher than before Sept. 11, 2001. For the past 10 years, the enlisted retention rates of the Army have exceeded 100 percent. As of last Nov. 13, Army re-enlistment was 137 percent of its stated goal. Scales, a FOX News contributor, said he based his assessment last year "on the statistics that showed a high attrition among enlisted soldiers, officers who were leaving the service early, and a decline in the quality of enlistments," a reference to the rising number of waivers given for "moral defects" such as drug use and lowered educational requirements. "In fact, what we've seen over the last year is that the Army retention rates are pretty high, that re-enlistments, for instance, particularly re-enlistments in Iraq and Afghanistan, remain very high," Scales said. He noted that re-enlistments were high even among troops who have served multiple tours. A year ago, some military experts were comparing the Army of 2007 with the army of a generation ago, at the end of the Vietnam War, when it was considered "broken" due to morale problems and an exodus of the "best and the brightest" soldiers from service. Scales said he didnt take into account that, unlike Vietnam, this Army is sending soldiers to fight as a unit not as individuals. He also neglected the "Band of Brothers" phenomenon the feeling of responsibility to fellow soldiers that prompts members of service to re-enlist. "The soldiers go back to the theater of war as units," Scales said. "They are bonded together, they know each other, they don't have to fight as an army of strangers. "I was wrong a year ago when I forecast the imminent collapse of the Army. I relied a little bit too much on the data and not enough on the intangibles." Not all the military analysts who made similar predictions last year agree. Lawrence Korb, who worked on personnel issues during the Reagan administration, testified to Congress last July: "As Gen. Barry McCaffrey pointed out when we testified together before the Senate Armed Services Committee in April, the ground combat capability of the U.S. armed forces is shot.'" Korb, a resident scholar at the left-leaning Center for American Progress, told FOX News the Army is worse off than it was a year ago. He suggested that the Army is not being honest with its re-enlistment and retention numbers, an accusation echoed by House Armed Services Committee Chairman Ike Skelton, D-Mo.
He also said that while the numbers of captains leaving the military may not be alarming, the number of captains educated at West Point is. According to Korb, half of the eligible captains from West Points class of 2002 have left the service. And then there are the re-enlistment bonuses, which rose from $50 million in 1998 to $562 million per year in 2007. The amount of re-enlistment bonuses paid is now five times what it was at the start of the Iraq war, according to U.S. Army figures. But Scales says the desertion by mid-grade officers captains and majors just hasnt occurred as predicted. "The Army's collapse after Vietnam was presaged by a desertion of mid-grade officers (captains) and non-commissioned officers," Scales wrote a year ago. "Many were killed or wounded. Most left because they and their families were tired and didn't want to serve in units unprepared for war.... "If we lose our sergeants and captains, the Army breaks again. It's just that simple. That's why these soldiers are still the canaries in the readiness coal-mine. And, again, if you look closely, you will see that these canaries are fleeing their cages in frightening numbers." But an internal Army document prepared at the request of Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Casey and obtained by FOX News suggests that the comparison to the "hollow Army" of 1972 near the end of the Vietnam War is inappropriate. The main reason: Today's Army is an all-volunteer force, and the Army in Vietnam largely was composed of draftees. Captain losses have remained steady at about 11 percent since 1990, and the loss of majors has been unchanged at about 6 percent. "To date, the data do not show heightened levels of junior officer departures that can be tied directly to multiple rotations in Afghanistan or Iraq," the internal Army memo concludes. The key difference between now and Vietnam, Scales explains, is: "this idea that soldiers fight as part of a team. Its the Band of Brothers approach to combat that makes armies effective in wartime, and the Army has been wise enough over the past five years to work very hard to keep soldiers together in units and not to treat soldiers as sort of replacement parts, but to keep them together as cohesive units. ... I believe, is the glue that has really served to hold this army together. | |
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Britain | ||||||||||
One more round on Diego Garcia prison claims | ||||||||||
2007-10-19 | ||||||||||
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Lawyers from Reprieve, a Clive Stafford Smith, the charity's legal director, said he was "absolutely and categorically certain" that prisoners have been held on the island. "If the foreign affairs committee approaches this thoroughly, they will get to the bottom of it," he said.
UK officials are known to have questioned their American counterparts about the allegation several times over a period of more than three years, most recently last month. Whenever MPs have attempted to press ministers in the Commons, they have met with the same response: that the US authorities "have repeatedly given us assurances" that no terrorism suspects have been held there.
Barry McCaffrey, a retired four-star US general who is professor of international security studies at the West Point military academy, has twice spoken publicly about the use of Diego Garcia to detain suspects. In May 2004 he said: "We're probably holding around 3,000 people, you know, Bagram air field, Diego Garcia, Guantánamo, 16 camps throughout Iraq." In December last year he repeated the claim: "They're behind bars...we've got them on Diego Garcia, in Bagram air field, in Guantánamo."
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