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Iraq

'Make Iraq Great Again': Trump Threatens Baghdad With Another Invasion

2026-01-29

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Kirill Semenov

[REGNUM] Another military crisis involving the United States is brewing in Iraq after the Iraqi Coordination Council, a coalition of Shiite parties, nominated Nouri al-Maliki for the post of prime minister.

"I'm hearing that the great country of Iraq may be making a very bad choice by returning Nouri al-Maliki to the post of Prime Minister. The last time Maliki was in power, the country was plunged into poverty and utter chaos... Because of his insane policies... the United States of America will no longer aid Iraq." This statement by Donald Trump on January 27, 2026, at first glance, seems to express concern for the fate of the Middle Eastern country.

Of course, there are some things one cannot disagree with Trump on.

The return of al-Maliki, a figure whose rule (2006–2014) became synonymous with sectarian politics and institutional collapse, indeed carries great risks for the future of Iraq, and perhaps the region.

His current fanatical rhetoric contrasting "the army of Imam Hussein and the army of Yazid" demonstrates the persistence of his confrontational approach towards Iraq's Sunni community.

However, Trump’s hypocritical “concern” for the future of Iraq is only a pretext for a new escalation, the target of which is the Islamic Republic of Iran.

His harsh criticism fails to take into account the United States' own past mistakes, such as the country's collapse in 2003.

This statement is a tactical move within a larger strategy to counter Iran. Its goal is to exploit Iraq's internal weaknesses and problems and deal a decisive blow to Tehran's regional influence.

Trump's advisers are likely now suggesting this scenario as preferable to direct strikes against the Islamic Republic, or perhaps even in addition to limited strikes.

THE DESTRUCTION OF SAHWA OPENED THE DOOR FOR ISIS
But Trump is right that al-Maliki's rule wasn't just unsuccessful—it systematically destroyed the remaining fragile foundations of Iraqi statehood and sectarian balance. His policies transformed de-Baathification (the elimination of the Baath Party's influence) from an instrument of national reconciliation into a weapon of collective punishment for the Sunni population.

State institutions were de facto replaced by a shadowy system of loyalty, where Shiite militias and proxies of the radical Shiite Islamist party Dawa had priority over professional cadres.

An army riven by corruption (the "ghost soldiers" that cost millions of dollars) proved incapable of confronting the ISIS* terrorists who emerged from the desert in 2014, having been driven there by the Sunni militias of the Sahwa (Awakening) movement.

They had previously single-handedly cleared the provinces of al-Qaeda* from Anbar, Salah ad-Din, and Diyala. Around 100,000 Sahwa fighters became human shields protecting their communities and a key factor in reducing violence. Their success was so significant that the word "sahawat" became firmly established in jihadist jargon as a symbol of shameful defeat.

For al-Maliki, however, the autonomy and influence of Sunni fighters became a direct threat to his model of Shiite dominance.

Therefore, after 2008, his government took a series of steps that led to the movement's dismantling. In particular, funding was completely cut off. Payments to fighters promised by the US and Baghdad were delayed or stopped, depriving thousands of families of their livelihoods, and many Sahwa commanders were arrested on trumped-up charges of terrorism and Baathism.

Plans to integrate Sahwa fighters into the army and police were blocked. Persecution and arbitrary arrests of Sunnis became the norm, leading to mass killings, such as the 2013 al-Hawijah massacre, in which 42 Sunnis were killed while peacefully protesting.

The destruction of the Sahwa was one of al-Maliki's most destructive and cynical decisions of that period.

The consequences were catastrophic.

Thousands of dispossessed, embittered, and experienced fighters and their supporters joined the ranks of the nascent ISIS*, which replaced al-Qaeda* in Iraq, bringing with them tactical knowledge, connections, and weapons.

But more importantly, the Sunni population, betrayed by the state and subjected to repression by the Shiite government and pro-government forces, no longer saw Baghdad as a protector. The state was perceived as an occupying force, and the terrorists skillfully positioned themselves as "avengers" and "defenders."

It was precisely this deep chasm between the government and Sunnis that allowed ISIS* to seize vast territories and the country's second-largest city, Mosul, virtually without a fight in June 2014. Therefore, al-Maliki's return today is not simply a change of power; it is the legitimization of a policy that already led to the country's collapse.

FORMAL BRIGADES AND THE REAL IRANIAN NETWORK
But for Trump, al-Maliki's return is a pretext to crack down on pro-Iranian forces in Iraq and drive them out of the "Axis of Resistance."

Today, the key player in Iraq and the main irritant to the United States are the Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilization Forces, PMF). Created in 2014 in response to the ISIS offensive as a collection of various Shiite militias, they are now formally integrated into the Iraqi security forces as "brigades" within the Internal Security Forces.

Their total strength is estimated at approximately 150,000–200,000 fighters. Behind the neutral brigade numbers are well-known, ideologically motivated pro-Iranian groups. Their funding, armament, and ideological training are closely linked to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

The most well-known component of the NMI is the Hezbollah Brigades (Kata'ib Hezbollah), a direct analogue of the Lebanese Hezbollah, created with the active participation of the IRGC. It is included on the US list of terrorist organizations and has been repeatedly accused of launching rocket attacks on US bases in Iraq.

Other major groups include Asaib Ahl al-Haq, a splinter group from Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army, and the Badr Organization, one of the oldest pro-Iranian structures, formed in the 1980s from Iraqi prisoners of war and refugees to fight alongside Iran against Saddam Hussein. It also has close ties to the Iranian leadership. Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, another direct offshoot of the Iranian IRGC, has actively participated in the fighting in Syria on the side of Bashar al-Assad's government.

There are others.

Following al-Maliki's return, these very groups may be presented by the Trump administration as a sign that they have passed the "point of no return," after which Washington will need "urgent intervention." This perception of its urgency is also fueled by statements from leaders of Iraqi groups.

In particular, the leader of the Iraqi group Kataib Hezbollah, Abu Hussein al-Hamidavi, said in a statement released on Sunday that the "enemies" of the Islamic Republic will face "the most terrible deaths."

"You will taste all forms of mortal suffering, nothing will remain of you in our region, and we will sow terror in your hearts," the statement said.

This in turn gives the American carrier force in the Arabian Sea a pretext to bomb the NMS instead of Iran.

US AND ISRAELI STRIKE AGAINST THE "AXIS OF RESISTANCE"
In the context of a likely scenario being developed in the White House, which presupposes not a direct military confrontation with Iran, but its strategic weakening through the defeat of its allies in the “Axis of Resistance,” the political crisis surrounding al-Maliki creates an ideal pretext for the United States to intervene in Iraq.

Under the slogan of “defending Iraq’s sovereignty from pro-Iranian militias” or “preventing a new dictatorship,” Washington could sanction targeted strikes or a full-scale operation against the Hashd al-Shaabi Brigades.

In parallel, as part of a coordinated strategy, Israel could launch a new large-scale operation against Hezbollah in Lebanon, creating a second front.

The IDF's active strikes against targets in Lebanon in January 2026, including the assassination of an Al-Manar satellite channel anchor, indicate a readiness for a serious escalation. Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem has already stated that the group will not stand aside in the event of an attack on Iran.

However, it is unclear whether Iran will become involved in this conflict unless it itself is directly attacked. It is highly likely that Tehran will refrain from overt military intervention amid the complex domestic political situation.

Thus, Iraq and Lebanon risk becoming new battlefields of the "Washington-Tel Aviv Axis" and the "Axis of Resistance".

Nevertheless, the risk of direct military aggression against Iran remains. Perhaps, following limited attacks on the Islamic Republic, which would provoke some members of the "Axis of Resistance" to support Tehran militarily, all forces will be thrown against them.

REPEATING MISTAKES UNDER THE GUISE OF CORRECTING THEM
The historical irony and tragedy of the situation is that the United States itself created Nouri al-Maliki as a political project.

After the 2003 invasion, the American administration actively promoted it, seeing radical Shiite politics as a guarantee of stability and loyalty in opposition to Sunni radicals.

Throughout his sectarian rule (2006–2014), Washington gave him full political and military support, turning a blind eye to all negative trends, the collapse of the army and the repression of Sunnis, since he formally complied with the US status of forces agreement.

For years, American advisers and diplomats ignored warnings about Sunni radicalization, seeing Maliki as an ally in the "war on terror." Furthermore, Washington was once again forced to come to his aid, sending troops and air power when ISIS* emerged from the desert and captured Mosul, threatening to overrun Baghdad.

Therefore, Trump's harsh rhetoric today is not remorse, but a cynical rewriting of history. The US is condemning the very politician it nurtured and whose actions it encouraged.

Threats to “cut off aid” are not a concern for the Iraqis, but a tool of blackmail, designed either to install a more convenient figure in power in Baghdad or to create legal and informational cover for direct military intervention.

Al-Maliki's return is truly a bad choice for Iraq. But an even worse choice is believing that the external forces whose past experiments led the country to its current state are now acting in its interests.

Trump's criticism is a call for a new intervention, this time under the pretext of correcting the mistakes that the US itself committed.

Iraq once again finds itself hostage to a great game, where its sovereignty and stability are bargaining chips in the strategy to contain Iran.

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Iraq

Iraq arrests 135 over alleged Baathist ties

2025-10-19

It’s been almost twenty years since Saddam Hussein left the scene, but there are still stubborn revenants.

[Rudaw] Iraq arrested 135 people suspected of having links to the banned Baath party in a nationwide campaign on Thursday, a national security official said.

"In an operation carried out by the National Security Service (INSS) on Thursday, 135 suspects charged with membership or promoting the Baath party were arrested," INSS spokesperson Arshad Hakim told Rudaw.

The operation included raids in 14 provinces and was based on intelligence gathered from interrogations of jugged
Drop the gat, Rocky, or you're a dead 'un!
leaders of the former regime.

Hakim accused Baath-linked networks of seeking to "attract the youth to establish secret groups and make websites on social media platforms. They had tried to make use of crowds and rallies to take group photographs to show they are large in number."

Support for the Baath Party in Iraq was banned in a law that came into force on July 30, 2016 and criminalized membership in, and promotion of, the party, as well as any similar groups or ideologies.

"The operation continues to track down all those involved in this matter, some of whom are run by wanted runaways from outside Iraq, most of whose activities were through social networks, whether for recruitment or propaganda," Hakim said.

The arrests come less than a month before Iraq’s parliamentary elections, which has seen the disqualification of hundreds of candidates on charges linked to the Baath party.

In late July, the INSS arrested another 40 people suspected of spreading Baathist ideology and planning sabotage attacks.

The Arab Socialist Baath Party ruled Iraq from 1968 until it was toppled in 2003 by a United States-led invasion that removed its leader, Saddam Hussein. The party has been banned under the Iraqi constitution, which outlaws adopting, glorifying, or promoting the symbols and propaganda of the former regime.

Hussein’s oppressive regime was responsible for numerous crimes against humanity, including the Anfal genocide against the Kurds. The campaign reached its deadliest point in 1988 with the Halabja chemical attack that killed around 5,000 people and injured 10,000 more.

Hussein was executed in 2006 after he was sentenced to death for the killing of 148 Shiites. His trial on charges related to the Anfal genocide was still ongoing at the time of his execution.

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Syria-Lebanon-Iran

'Dawn of the Tribes': 50,000 Armed Men Could Reshape Syria

2025-07-24

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Kirill Semenov

[REGNUM] The bloody events in the Syrian province of Suwayda, which began on July 13 as a conflict between Druze and Bedouin tribes, have led to the largest population displacement since the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime.

According to the UN, 93,000 residents of the province were forced to leave their homes. However, while the Druze have already begun to return after the ceasefire was declared, the Bedouins and representatives of the Arab-Sunni clans of Suwayda have become refugees who are being placed in temporary camps in the neighboring province of Daraa, which creates the preconditions for the continuation of the conflict in the very near future.

It is clear that the Syrian tribes are extremely unhappy with this outcome, although recently it seemed that they were one step away from entering the city of As-Suwayda, the provincial capital, and dealing with the Druze leader Hikmat al-Hijri.

He is considered not only an Israeli stooge and the organizer of armed resistance to the new Syrian authorities, but also responsible for numerous acts of violence and reprisals against the Bedouins of Suwayda.

Reprisals makes it sound like the Bedouins started it…

But after another intervention by government troops and the Interior Ministry, which this time blocked the arrival of reinforcements from Syrian tribes in Suwayda, the Bedouins were forced to agree to the truce reached between the government and the Druze leaders and began withdrawing their forces.

However, this also led to the exodus of the Sunni Arab population of Suwayda, who feared reprisals and revenge from the Druze fighters. That is, the Bedouins may feel that not only was their victory stolen from them, but they were also forced to leave their homes, and now they are waiting for the moment for revenge.

If the situation is not resolved in the near future and an agreement is not reached between the government and the Druze that takes into account the interests of all parties, then Suwayda will likely face a new invasion of Syrian tribes. The government will not be able to stop it, and perhaps will not want to.

At the first stage of the confrontation, when battles between Arab tribes and the Druze began, the army and the Ministry of Internal Affairs were brought into the province, and instead of separating the opposing sides, they began to support the Bedouins in their attacks on the Druze.

This led to numerous casualties, including among the civilian population. Thus, according to human rights activists, the army and tribal militias participated in reprisals against the civilian population. About 200 Druze were killed then, a tenth of them were women and children.

Then the strikes of the Israeli Air Force, the patron of the Syrian Druze, were able to stop the advance of the Syrian troops and the Interior Ministry and forced them to retreat from the province. But soon Tel Aviv itself was forced to appeal through intermediaries to official Damascus so that it would again intervene in the conflict and stop the advance of the Bedouin tribes.

THE AWAKENING OF THE TRIBES STOPPED ISRAEL
After the army left, the tribal militias refused to leave Suwayda, where, according to their representatives, violence against their fellow tribesmen took place. Instead, they called for a mobilization that affected not only the clans in this province, but also throughout Syria. This demonstrated that the Syrian tribes are an important independent factor that should not be underestimated.

On July 17, the Syrian Tribal Council announced Operation Tribal Dawn, which marked a major Bedouin offensive against Suwayda. The Druze were unable to stop it without Israeli support.

The point is that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) could no longer strike on behalf of the Druze. This would have provoked a more serious regional escalation and the spread of the conflict to neighboring countries, such as Jordan.

After all, the IDF would have to bomb not the “terrorists” and “jihadists,” as the Syrian army is called in Israel, but the Bedouins, with whom their fellow tribesmen from neighboring countries expressed solidarity, promising their assistance in the event of external intervention.

After all, the IDF itself is made up not only of Druze, but also of Bedouins from the Negev desert. The latter could also be displeased that, in appearing as the protector of the Druze, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ignored their interests.

In turn, the Jordanian Tribal Council “clearly and unequivocally” warned that “any direct military intervention by the Zionist entity in Syrian territory, especially in the south, will be met with immediate action by the Jordanian tribes in defense of the dignity of the nation, loyalty to the Arab and Islamic covenant, and rejection of any encroachment on Arab geographic sovereignty and decision-making process.”

Unlike Syria, Netanyahu would not want to destabilize friendly Jordan, whose population is made up of Palestinians and Bedouins. Jordanian Palestinians already largely support Hamas. If Bedouins joined them, it would weaken the ruling Hashemite dynasty.

Thus, the mass movement of Syrian Bedouins in support of the Arab-Sunni clans of Suwayda could get out of control and turn into a serious cross-border threat. However, the risks of such a scenario have not yet been contained, and the chances that a new wave of Bedouin rebellion will engulf not only Suwayda, but also neighboring countries, still remain.

FROM LAWRENCE OF ARABIA TO AS-SAHWA
One can recall the times of Lawrence of Arabia and the awakening of the Arab tribes, which showed that they were a formidable force when united by common interests. Without their support, the British would have found it difficult to break through the Turkish armies in Palestine in 1917-1918.

But even in the more recent past, there are examples of how the Bedouins were on the verge of changing the region.

As Grigory Lukyanov, a research fellow at the Center for Arab and Islamic Studies at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, told Regnum news agency, “even before ISIS appeared, the Americans hired tribes from the Syrian-Iraqi border to fight Al-Qaeda (AQ) terrorists, and then the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)”.

These tribes were quite successful, they managed to eradicate AK and ISI in the terrorists’ stronghold – Anbar province, and the Bedouins of Iraq gained a reputation as hunters of Al-Qaeda. They were the only ones who managed to suppress the activity of its militants and drive them deep into desert refuges.

According to Lukyanov, this led to an increase in power and financial demands from tribal groups, who hoped to consolidate their role and place in governing Iraq and gain access to its resources.

But the American exodus in 2011 and the end of funding for the tribal militias transformed them from a leading counterterrorism force into a base for the same jihadist groups they had so successfully fought so recently.

Of course, the sectarian anti-Sunni policy of the radical Shiite party "Dawa" headed by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, which came to power in Iraq, also played a role here. He saw "As-Sahwa" as a threat to his power and rejected previous agreements on turning the tribal militia into a national guard, trying to disarm them.

As Grigory Lukyanov noted, this led to the fact that the authorities of the Sunni tribes of Iraq and their sheikhs were unable to do anything to stop the mass exodus of ordinary members to radical anti-government groups.

Thus, at first, the Sunni tribes of Iraq played a decisive role in the defeat of terrorist groups and allowed the Americans to begin withdrawing troops from Iraq under the pretext of completing their mission to suppress terrorist activity, which was carried out at the hands of the tribes.

But then those same tribes, or rather the youth that emerged from them, turned their weapons against the government and supported the terrorists they had only recently fought, becoming the social base of the ISIS, and then of ISIS.

This allowed the terrorist organization to restore its strength and, two years later, to attack government troops with renewed vigor, who, now deprived of the support of the tribes, could not withstand the onslaught and began to surrender city after city.

AMERICAN "INVESTMENTS"
As for Syria, according to Lukyanov, similar phenomena are currently being observed there: tribes are looking for their new place and new role.

As the expert notes, the absence of a fully functional state, parties, trade unions, and the loss of horizontal connections that existed in the Baath Party led to the launch of processes of forming new forms of socialization, activity, and consolidation that tribal structures can offer.

However, as Lukyanov notes, the consolidation of the Syrian tribes is currently based on a response to threats from their opponents, the Druze. Therefore, it is too early to talk about the long-term nature of such tribal associations. Consequently, according to the orientalist, the potential of the tribes is "situational and limited."

Indeed, despite having a very significant number of “bayonets and sabres,” the Syrian tribes were never able to come up with a common position during the civil war. They created various alliances with the opposition, the Assad regime, and the Kurds, and, depending on the situation, switched from an alliance with one to an alliance with their opponents.

At the same time, the clans often changed places: one supported Assad today, and the opposition tomorrow, and another supported the opposition today, and the government tomorrow.

For example, some clans of the Shaitat tribe, which initially supported the anti-Assad Free Syrian Army, later switched to the government's side, creating the "Lions of the Eastern Province" group led by Abdul Basset Alkhalaf.

Others chose the “third way” and ended up in the ranks of the pro-Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), where, for example, two tribal armies operated: Jaysh al-Sanadid from the largest tribe, Shhammar, and Quwat al-Nuqba.

At the same time, the Assad regime tried to use the tribes to undermine the unity of the Syrian Democratic Forces and turned the tribes against the Kurds, in which Iran helped it.

They partially succeeded in this in the fall of 2023.

Then a tribal uprising broke out, which was able to expel the Kurdish SDF formations from many areas of the Euphrates region after the Kurds arrested one of the tribal leaders who headed the SDF-affiliated military council of Deir ez-Zor.

And only American “investments” were able to stop the spread of the conflict, which threatened the very existence of Kurdish autonomy in the Syrian northeast, and force the tribes to return to the ranks of the SDF.

Therefore, despite the situational and temporary nature of alliances, the ability of the Syrian tribes to create a militia of 50 thousand armed men could threaten the existence of not only the Druze formation in Suwayda, but also the Syrian Democratic Forces, with which Damascus has been unsuccessfully trying to negotiate.

In fact, the SDF alliance, consisting of Kurds and Arab tribes, between whom there has long been undisguised hostility, is held together only by American infusions. But Washington has recently been reconsidering its attitude to maintaining the SDF's autonomy, which its Kurdish leadership continues to insist on, and is pushing it toward integration into the Syrian army.

And the tribal instrument remains a factor of influence in the hands of Washington, among others, as could be seen during the period of the activity of the As-Sahwa movement in Iraq.

If the Druze and Kurds continue to be intractable, it is precisely the money from the Americans, who have suddenly shown interest in Syrian unity, that could become the trigger that will force the tribes to turn their weapons against the Kurds and Druze and “drive” them under the aegis of official Damascus.

CROSS-BORDER THREAT
Even temporary outbreaks of tribal activity in Syria pose a serious threat to neighboring countries.

For example, in Iraq there are still quite a lot of contradictions between Sunnis and Shiites, and, having realized the ability to solve problems on a regional scale, Syrian tribes can come to the aid of their Iraqi brothers.

And brothers in the most literal sense, since many families and clans are divided by the Syrian-Iraqi border and live on both sides of it. The same applies to Jordan.

Therefore, the Syrian tribes are a "samurai sword" that, on the one hand, can be used against enemies, but on the other hand, there is always a risk of inflicting mortal wounds on oneself.

And the flirtation of the weak Damascus regime, which is incapable of establishing order in its own army, with tribal militias in the more distant future may turn against it, just as the Iraqi Sahwa once turned against the Iraqi government.

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Syria-Lebanon-Iran

Daraa Secretary of division of former Al-Baath Party shot dead

2025-02-07

[PUBLISH.TWITTER]

Daraa | Secretary of division of former Al-Baath Party shot de*ad in northern countryside#SOHR https://t.co/OH7mXojC9I
— المرصد السوري لحقوق الإنسان (@syriahr) February 6, 2025

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Syria-Lebanon-Iran

Syrian authorities announce dissolution of parliament and termination of constitution

2025-01-30

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
[Regnum] The new Syrian authorities have announced the termination of the previous constitution and the dissolution of the country's parliament.

Unexpectedly]

This was reported on January 29 by the military operations department (the governing body of the new authorities).

“The 2012 constitution, as well as all laws adopted under emergency procedures, are no longer in effect,” the department noted on its Telegram channel.

For the transitional period, Ahmed al-Sharaa was declared the head of the new administration of the interim government of Syria.

The new authorities also announced the dissolution of the Baath Party, which has ruled Syria for more than 60 years, the country's parliament, all security services and armed groups.

As reported by the Regnum news agency, on December 8, 2024, Bashar al-Assad resigned as president and left Syria, ordering a peaceful transfer of power. He and his family arrived in Russia, where they were granted asylum. On December 10, 2024, Mohammed al-Bashir announced his appointment as head of the Syrian government for a transitional period that will last until March 1, 2025. The de facto leader of Syria was Ahmed al-Sharaa, head of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham group (banned in Russia and recognized as terrorist).

On January 28, the Russian interdepartmental delegation held talks in Damascus with the head of the Syrian administration, Ahmed al-Sharaa. The nearly three-hour meeting was generally constructive, said Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov. The parties discussed a number of issues, including further mutually beneficial cooperation. At the meeting, Russia also called for resolving problematic issues in Syria through dialogue with the participation of all political forces in the country and ethno-confessional groups.

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Syria-Lebanon-Iran

Syria’s long-ruling Baath party on way out after collapse of Assad regime

2024-12-31

[IsraelTimes] New leaders turn Baath headquarters in Damascus into a location for former security officials, soldiers to hand over their weapons; many party members have gone into hiding or fled

A few days after Death Eaters in Syria overthrew President Bashir Pencilneck al-Assad
The Scourge of Hama...
, his ruling Baath party announced it was freezing its activities, marking a stunning change in fortunes for the political group that had ruled for more than six decades.

Many members of the party’s leadership have gone into hiding and some have fled the country. In a symbolic move, Syria’s new rulers have turned the former party headquarters in Damascus into a center where former members of the army and security forces line up to register their names and hand over their weapons.

Calls are on the rise to officially dissolve the Arab Socialist Baath Party that had ruled Syria since 1963.

Many Syrians — including former party members — say its rule damaged relations with other Arab countries and aided in the spread of corruption that brought the war-torn nation to its knees.

"The party should not only be dissolved, it should go to hell," said Mohammed Hussein Ali, 64, who worked for a state oil company and was a party member for decades until he quit at the start of Syria’s anti-government uprising in 2011 that turned into civil war. He never left the country and said he is happy the Baath rule is over.

An official with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, formerly al-Nusra, before that it was called something else

Tahrir al-Sham, formerly al-Nusra, before that it was called something else

...al-Qaeda's Syrian affiliate, from which sprang the Islamic State...
, or HTS, the group that led the Death Eater offensive that overthrew Assad, said no official decision has been made on what to do with the Baath party.

The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak publicly about the matter, noted that HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa has said that officials who committed crimes against the Syrian people over the past decades will be brought to justice and hinted that they include party members.

The Baath party, whose aim was to unify Arab states in one nation, was founded by two Syrian Arab nationalists, Michel Aflaq and Salaheddine Bitar, in 1947 and at one point ruled two Arab countries, Iraq and Syria.

A rivalry developed between the Syrian branch under Assad and his late father, Hafez, and the one in Iraq under Saddam Hussein, who was removed from power by a US-led invasion in 2003.

In Syria, the Baath party became inextricably associated with the Assad family, which took power in 1970. For decades, the family used the party and its pan-Arab ideology to control the country. Many senior military jobs were held by members of the family’s minority Alawite sect, and party membership was used as a cover to give it a nationalist rather than a sectarian nature.

A former soldier and decades-long Baath party member who came to party headquarters to cut his military ties, Abdul-Rahman Ali, said he had no idea it was founded by Aflaq and Bitar. He had always thought that Hafez Assad was the founder.

"I am happy. We have been liberated from fear," said Ali, 43. "Even the walls had ears. We didn’t dare express opinions with anyone." He was referring to the dreaded security and intelligence agencies that detained and tortured people who expressed criticism of Assad or government officials.

Many Syrians were required to join the Baath Vanguards, the party’s youth branch, while in elementary school, where Arab nationalist and socialist ideology was emphasized.

It was difficult for people who were not party members to get government jobs or join the army or the security and intelligence services.

In 2012, a year after Syria’s uprising began, a paragraph of the constitution stating that the Baath party was the leader of the nation and society was abolished, in a move aimed at appeasing the public’s demand for political reforms. In practice, however, the party remained in control, with members holding majority seats in parliament and government.

Another former soldier, who gave only his first name, Ghadir, out of fear of reprisals as a member of the Alawite sect, said he came from a poor family and joined the party so he could enter the military for a stable income.

"You could not take any job if you were not a Baathist," he said.

While few are mourning the party’s fall in Syria, some are concerned that the Sunni majority that now controls the country could carry out a purge similar to the one in Iraq after Saddam’s fall.

A de-Baathification committee was formed in Iraq and its main job was purging Saddam loyalists from government and military institutions. The Sunni minority considered it a means of sectarian score-settling by Iraq’s Shiite majority. The Sunni resentment and disenfranchisement that followed helped to drive the rise of bad boy groups in the country including al-Qaeda and the Islamic State
...formerly ISIS or ISIL, depending on your preference. Before that they were al-Qaeda in Iraq, as shaped by Abu Musab Zarqawi. They're really very devout, committing every atrocity they can find in the Koran and inventing a few more. They fling Allah around with every other sentence, but to hear western pols talk they're not really Moslems....
in Iraq.

In Syria, a Baath party statement issued three days after Assad’s fall called on all members to hand their weapons and public cars to the new authorities.

On December 24, party member and former army colonel Mohammed Merhi was among hundreds who lined up at the former party headquarters and handed over weapons.

Merhi said the Baath party should be given another opportunity because its principles are good but were exploited over decades. But he said he might want to join another party if Syria becomes a multiparty democracy in the future.

He handed over his Soviet Makarov pistol and received a document saying he can now move freely in the country after reconciling with the new authorities.

"I want to become again a normal Syrian citizen and work to build a new Syria," he said.

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Syria-Lebanon-Iran

As Turkey moves in following Assad’s fall, Syria’s Kurds are on the defensive

2024-12-23

[IsraelTimes] After rebels sweep to power in Damascus, Syrian Kurdish leader asks Trump to prevent northern incursion by Ankara — which views Kurdish factions as a national security threat

With hostile Ottoman Turkish-backed groups mobilizing against them in Syria’s north, and Damascus ruled by a group friendly to Ankara, Syria’s main Kurdish factions are on the back foot as they seek to preserve political gains carved out during 13 years of war.

Part of a stateless ethnic group straddling Iraq, Iran, ~~The Sick Man of Europe~~ Turkey
...a NATO
...the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A collection of multinational and multilingual and multicultural armed forces, all of differing capabilities, working toward a common goal by pulling in different directions...
member, but not the most reliable...
, Armenia and Syria, Kurds have so far been among the few winners of the Syrian conflict, controlling nearly a quarter of the country and leading a powerful gang that is a key US ally in countering the Islamic State
...formerly ISIS or ISIL, depending on your preference. Before that they were al-Qaeda in Iraq, as shaped by Abu Musab Zarqawi. They're really very devout, committing every atrocity they can find in the Koran and inventing a few more. They fling Allah around with every other sentence, but to hear western pols talk they're not really Moslems....
But the power balance has tilted against them since the Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, formerly al-Nusra, before that it was called something else
...al-Qaeda's Syrian affiliate, from which sprang the Islamic State...
(HTS) swept into Damascus this month, toppling president Bashir Pencilneck al-Assad
Supressor of the Damascenes...
, two analysts and a senior Western diplomat told Rooters.

The seismic change in Syria is expected to yield deeper Ottoman Turkish sway just as a change of US administration is raising questions over how long Washington will keep backing the country’s Kurdish-led forces.

For Turkey, the Kurdish factions represent a national security threat. Ankara views them as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which has been waging an insurgency against the Ottoman Turkish state since 1984 and is deemed a terrorist group by Turkey, the United States and other powers.

The Syrian Kurdish groups "are in deep, deep trouble," said Aron Lund, a fellow at Century International, a US-based think tank. "The balance has shifted fundamentally in Syria to the advantage of Turkey-backed or Turkey-aligned factions, and Turkey seems determined to exploit this to the fullest."

The shift has been reflected in renewed fighting for control of the north, where Turkey-backed gangs known as the Syrian National Army (SNA) have made military advances against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

Fanar al-Kait, a bigwig in the Kurdish-led regional administration, told Rooters that the ouster of Assad, whose Arab nationalist Baath Party oppressed Kurds for decades, presented a chance to stitch the fragmented country back together.

He said the administration is ready for dialogue with Turkey, but the conflict in the north showed Ankara had "very bad intentions."

"This will certainly push the region towards... a new conflict," he added.

Ottoman Turkish President His Enormity, Sultan Recep Tayyip Erdogan the First
...Turkey's version of Mohammed Morsi but they voted him back in so they deserve him. It's a sin, a shame, and a felony to insult the president of Turkey. In Anatolia did Recep Bey a stately Presidential Palace decree, that has 1100 rooms. That's 968 more than in the White House, 400 more than in Versailles, and 325 more than Buckingham Palace, so you know who's really more important...
said Friday he expected foreign states would withdraw support for Kurdish fighters following Assad’s toppling, as Ankara seeks to isolate the People’s Protection Units (YPG), the Kurdish militia that spearheaded the SDF alliance.

Responding to questions from Rooters, a Ottoman Turkish official said the root cause of the conflict is "not Turkey’s view towards the region; it is that the PKK/YPG is a terrorist organization."

"The PKK/YPG elements must lay down their arms and leave Syria," the official said.

SDF commander Mazloum Abdi, in a Rooters interview on Thursday, acknowledged the presence of PKK fighters in Syria for the first time, saying they had helped battle Islamic State and would return home in the event a total ceasefire was agreed with Turkey. He denied any organizational ties with the PKK.

Meanwhile,
...back at the abandoned silver mine, a triangular dorsal fin appeared in the water. Then another...
in Damascus, the new leadership is showing warmth towards Ankara and indicating it wants to bring all Syria back under central authority — a potential challenge to the decentralization Kurds favor.

While Turkey provides direct backing to the SNA, it along with other states deems HTS a terrorist group because of its al Qaeda past.

Despite this, Ankara is believed to have significant sway over the group. A senior Western diplomat said: "The Turks can clearly influence them more than anyone else."

HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa told a Ottoman Turkish newspaper that Assad’s ouster was "not only the victory of the Syrian people, but also the Ottoman Turkish people."

The Ottoman Turkish official said HTS was not and never had been under Ankara’s control, calling it a structure "we were communicating with due to circumstances," and adding many Western states were also doing so.

Syrian Kurdish groups led by the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the affiliated YPG militia took control of much of the north after the uprising against Assad began in 2011. They established their own administration, while insisting their aim was autonomy, not independence.

Their politics, emphasizing socialism and feminism, differ starkly from HTS’s Islamism. Their area grew as US-led forces partnered with the SDF in the campaign against Islamic State, capturing Arab-majority areas.

The Turkey-backed SNA groups stepped up their campaign against the SDF as Assad was being toppled, seizing the city of Manbij on Dec. 9

Washington brokered a ceasefire, but the SDF has said Turkey and its allies have not abided by it, and a Ottoman Turkish defense ministry official said there was no such deal.

US support for the SDF has been a point of tension with its NATO ally, Turkey. Washington views the SDF as a key partner in countering Islamic State, which US Secretary of State Antony Blinken

...71st United States secretary of state and a leading light of the corrupt and inept Biden administration. He previously served as deputy national security advisor from 2013 to 2015 and deputy secretary of state from 2015 to 2017 under the corrupt and inept Obama administration. He advocated for the 2003 invasion of Iraq while serving as the Democratic staff director of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 2002 to 2008. He was a foreign policy advisor for the Biden 2008 presidential campaign. During his tenure in the Obama administration, Blinken helped craft B.O.'s policy on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the nuclear program of Iran. We all saw how well each of those worked. After leaving government service, Blinken moved into the private sector, co-founding WestExec Advisors, a lobbying firm...
has warned will try to use this period to re-establish capabilities in Syria. The SDF is still guarding tens of thousands of detainees linked to the hard boy group.

Ottoman Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Guler said last weekend that Turkey saw no sign of an Islamic State resurgence in Syria. On Friday, Turkey’s foreign minister, Hakan Fidan, told his German counterpart during talks in Ankara that alternatives needed to be found for the management of camps and prisons where the detainees are being held.

Separately, US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf said on Friday that Washington was working with Ankara and the SDF to find "a managed transition in terms of SDF’s role in that part of the country."

US President Joe The Big Guy Biden
...46th president of the U.S. I'm not working for you. Don't be such a horse's ass....
’s administration has said that US troops will stay on in Syria, but President-elect Donald Trump
...Oh, noze! Not him!...
could remove them when he takes office on Jan. 20.

During his first administration, Trump attempted to pull out of Syria but faced pressure at home and from US allies.

In a Dec. 17 letter to Trump, reviewed by Rooters, top Syrian Kurdish official Ilham Ahmed said Turkey was preparing to invade the northeast before he takes office.

Turkey’s plan "threatens to undo years of progress in securing stability and fighting terrorism," she wrote. "We believe you have the power to prevent this catastrophe."

Asked for comment, Trump-Vance transition front man Brian Hughes said: "We continue to monitor the situation in Syria. President Trump is committed to diminishing threats to peace and stability in the Middle East and to protecting Americans here at home."

Trump said on Dec. 16 that Turkey will "hold the key" to what happens in Syria but has not announced his plans for US forces stationed there.

"The Kurds are in an unenviable position," said Joshua Landis, a Syria expert at the University of Oklahoma. "Once Damascus consolidates its power, it will move on the region. The US can’t remain there forever."

HTS leader Sharaa told British broadcaster the BBC that Kurds were "part of our people" and "there should be no division of Syria," adding arms should be entirely in the state’s hands.

Sharaa acknowledged one of Turkey’s main concerns — the presence of non-Syrian Kurdish fighters in Syria — and said: "We do not accept that Syrian lands threaten and destabilize Turkey or other places."

He pledged to work through dialogue and negotiations to find "a peaceful formula to solve the problem," saying he believed initial contacts had been established "between the Kurds in northeastern Syria or the SDF organization."

Kait, the Kurdish official, said his administration wanted "a democratic Syria, a decentralized Syria, a Syria that represents all Syrians of all sects, religions and ethnicities," describing these as red lines. The SDF would be "a nucleus of the coming Syrian army," he added.

SDF commander Abdi, in his Rooters interview, confirmed that contact had been established with HTS to avoid festivities between their forces but said Ankara would try to drive a wedge between Damascus and the Kurdish-led administration.

Still, he said there was strong support from international parties, including the U.S.-led coalition, for the SDF joining "the new political phase" in Damascus, calling it "a great opportunity."

"We are preparing, after a total ceasefire between us and between Turkey and the affiliated factions, to join this phase," he said.

Link

Good Morning

2024-12-12

Trump's border czar reveals
scheme for 1,400 acres of Texas land

Thursday 12/12/2024

Syria's former ruling Baath Party has suspended work 'until further notice.'

ziegfeld follies claudia dell

-Lurid Crime Tales- Cali Weed Bust: $100m In Trash Bags Stacked To The Ceiling		Europe In Berlin, a mostly foreign crowd chants, 'F*ck you, Germany.'
Syria-Lebanon-Iran Syria: Russian forces attempted to destroy the Rastan Bridge to halt revolutionary advances, but failed		Syria-Lebanon-Iran Syrian people are destroying the Captagon drugs they found in the factories and warehouses of Maher Assad
Europe At Amsterdam attack trial, prosecutor claims violence %u2018not motivated by antisemitism%u2019		Olde Tyme Religion Vatican nativity scene showing baby Jesus on a keffiyeh removed after backlash

Australia Fires U.S. Tomahawk Missile at Sea for First Time

Link

Syria-Lebanon-Iran

Syria's former ruling Baath Party has suspended work 'until further notice.'

2024-12-12

[X]

Syria's former ruling Baath Party has suspended work 'until further notice.'

Baath Party ruled Syria from 1963 to 2024. pic.twitter.com/KjXfQUql6k
— Clash Report (@clashreport) December 11, 2024

Link

Syria-Lebanon-Iran

Syria after the collapse. What next?

2024-12-12

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.

Text taken from the website of Elijah J. Magnier. The rest of the text is in Russian and behind a paywall.
[ColonelCassad] Rapid military developments in Syria, without resistance from the Syrian army, led to the fall of President Bashar al-Assad and his unopposed departure from Damascus. This transition was the result of high-level negotiations between key players, including Turkey, Russia and Iran. However, the surprises in the Middle East are far from over; they are only just beginning with this transition of power and the attempt to create a new state with very different standards.

One of the key reasons for the rapid fall of the Assad regime was the strategy employed by the advancing forces in the towns and villages they captured, especially in the countryside of Idlib, Aleppo and its surroundings (apart from isolated extremist actions), but also in Hama, Homs, Damascus and southern Syria.

The attackers deliberately distanced themselves from the brutal tactics that had united the world against the forces fighting the Syrian army since 2011.

This shift in approach allowed the regime to collapse like a snowball rolling down a mountain, with minimal resistance as one city after another surrendered. The orderly surrender occurred without significant bloodshed after protracted negotiations led by the main mediators: Turkey, Iran, and Russia.

Russia and Iran lost a staunch ally and a strong base in the Middle East, leaving Turkey as the dominant power. Istanbul provided military support to the advancing forces, coordinated their operations, and carefully directed their actions through a joint operations room. Under Turkish leadership, these forces achieved all of their objectives in areas previously controlled by the Syrian army. However, they did not extend their success to areas controlled by U.S.-backed Kurdish forces in the northeast, where power extended to Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa.

Syria remains deeply divided, with the northeast under Kurdish control, Israel expanding its occupation of new Syrian territory in the south, and no unified factions that could form a cohesive ruling authority. Instead, Prime Minister Mohammed Ghazi al-Jallali has been appointed to lead an interim administration running the country. What events have brought Syria to this point, and what does the future hold?

As head of the interim administration, Prime Minister al-Jallali will likely be responsible for the day-to-day functions of the state while preparing it for a longer-term transition. This includes maintaining basic governance, preventing a complete collapse of institutions, and overseeing negotiations to achieve a more permanent political settlement. Al-Jallali will have to navigate deep divisions as he works with opposition groups, external actors, and the remnants of the Assad-era bureaucracy. His ability to manage these relationships will determine whether Syria can move toward stability. His appointment signals to the international community that Syria is attempting to rebuild itself within a framework that combines continuity and change. However, it also raises questions about whether genuine reform is possible with a figure associated with the previous regime. Al-Jallali’s leadership during the transition will set the tone for Syria’s transition. Whether he can maintain stability and steer the country toward a new political structure will depend on his ability to build consensus among internal and external actors.

His tenure will likely determine whether Syria moves toward unity or remains divided and uncertain.

Many factions in Syria have united under the leadership of the Repel Aggression Coalition, forming a single alliance that includes groups such as Jaysh al-Izza, Jaysh al-Ahrar, Faylaq al-Sham, Al-Quwat al-Mushtaraka, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zinki, the Sultan Murad Brigade, Ansar al-Tawhid, Suqour al-Sham, Ahrar al-Sham, the Sulayman Shah Brigade, the Al-Hamza Division, and the Turkistan Islamic Party Brigades. Among them, Ahrar al-Sham and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham stand out as the largest and most influential.

A call has been announced for a “National Transitional Council” (NTC) to unite all elements of the revolution. This comes after Abu Muhammad al-Julani said that existing institutions would remain under the current prime minister in order to maintain stability following the unexpectedly rapid collapse of the Syrian government’s control over major cities.

However, the path forward remains uncertain. It is not yet clear how the state will be governed in the coming weeks or who will lead the effort to draft a new constitution and prepare for parliamentary elections. The main challenge will be creating a coherent governance structure and reconciling the diverse and often conflicting ideologies of the combined factions.

As these factions, with their different backgrounds and agendas, try to forge a unified vision for Syria’s future, questions remain about who will wield ultimate authority and how they will navigate the complexities of building a functioning state.

The success of this fragile alliance will likely determine whether Syria can move toward stability or remain divided and uncertain.

The creation of the National Transitional Council highlights the enormous challenges of uniting disparate factions into a coherent governing structure. While the Repel Aggression coalition suggests a temporary convergence of interests, the long-term sustainability of such an alliance remains questionable.

Factions within the NTC span a wide range of ideologies. Groups such as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Ansar al-Tawhid advocate sharia-based governance of Syria. Their extremist vision risks alienating moderate factions and potential international supporters. Large groups such as HTS and Ahrar al-Sham may claim disproportionate influence, risking the marginalization of smaller factions and internal disunity. At the same time, Ahrar al-Sham and Faylaq al-Sham combine Islamic principles with nationalist aspirations, seeking a pluralistic model of governance that includes diverse Syrian groups.

On the other hand, factions such as the Sultan Murad Brigade and the Turkistan Islamic Party Brigades include foreign fighters and minorities, and they pursue unique goals, complicating the prospect of national unity. Smaller factions often support democratic or technocratic governance, which can conflict with the dominant Islamist forces in the coalition. These differences highlight the difficulty of creating a common vision of governance and policy.

Israel has formally abandoned the 1974 disengagement agreement with Syria, declaring its intention to renegotiate the dynamics on the border. In a bold move, Israel captured Mount Hermon and several villages in Quneitra, declaring Syria an open battlefield and signaling its intention to advance further into Syrian territory with blatant disregard for international norms. The Israeli Air Force conducted a sustained campaign, systematically attacking and destroying more than 100 strategic targets, including Syrian air defense systems, ammunition depots in Damascus, and key installations at several airports across the country, further weakening Syria’s already depleted defenses.

On the other hand, Russian forces, deployed on the Syrian-Israeli border primarily for stabilization following the Syrian civil war, acted as a buffer between Israeli and Syrian forces, preventing escalation. They were stationed primarily in the Quneitra and Golan Heights areas and served as intermediaries, restraining both sides from aggressive actions that could lead to a wider conflict. However, their presence was also a symbol of Russia’s influence in the region and its role as a security guarantor for the Assad regime.

Recent events have forced Moscow to abandon these positions due to the security risks to its soldiers, creating a vacuum that has allowed Israel to expand its operations and consolidate its control in southern Syria.

No international power has stepped up to defend Syrian sovereignty or oppose Israel’s annexation of additional Syrian territory. For Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the occupation of parts of Syria represents a major achievement in Israel’s strategic ambitions. Not only does the move strengthen his political position at home, it also reinforces Israel’s territorial and military dominance at a key moment in the evolution of the Middle East’s geopolitical situation.

Moscow, which has provided refuge to Bashar al-Assad and his family, has announced that it remains in touch with all parties involved in Syria, maintaining a pragmatic approach toward the new authorities. However, uncertainty hangs over Russia’s strategic presence in the region. The possible loss of the Khmeimim and Tartus military bases would be a significant loss, as these facilities provide the only access to the warm waters of the Mediterranean, a critical geopolitical asset for projecting influence in the region.

Since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2012, Turkey under Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has taken a firm stance against President Bashar al-Assad. Erdogan has repeatedly stated that his goal is to visit Damascus and pray at the Umayyad Mosque. Today, with the fall of Assad, this goal seems achievable, cementing Turkey’s status as the “godfather” of the new Syrian leadership.

Turkey has long-term goals in Syria: securing its borders, countering Kurdish autonomy, and strengthening its influence in northern Syria. To this end, Ankara has used military action, economic integration, and support for opposition groups and jihadists. However, achieving these goals depends on Turkey’s ability to balance domestic political objectives, regional rivalries, and international interests.

Turkey has established zones of influence in regions such as Afrin, Jarablus, and al-Bab, where it exerts significant administrative, economic, and military influence. Turkish currency and goods dominate local markets, and the establishment of schools and cultural institutions has helped spread the Turkish language and culture.

These actions also help Turkey address its domestic challenges. It hosts more than 3.5 million Syrian refugees, and anti-refugee sentiment has become a significant political issue. By creating “safe zones” in northern Syria, Ankara aims to repatriate significant numbers of refugees, reducing domestic tensions and demonstrating its role as a stabilizing force in the region. However, such ambitions have drawn opposition from Russia and Iran, especially in light of Turkey’s resettlement of opposition-supporting Syrians in areas cleared of Kurdish forces. This process of demographic engineering is aimed at weakening Kurdish influence and strengthening Turkey’s position.

Turkey’s military campaigns and support for offensive forces are also aimed at undermining U.S.-backed Kurdish militias in northeastern Syria. Although the United States relies on Kurdish militias such as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to fight ISIS, Ankara views the alliance as a threat to its security. Turkey’s operations demonstrate to Washington that it will not tolerate a prolonged Kurdish presence on its borders, even if it means disrupting American plans to stabilize the region.

Despite the fall of the Assad regime, the fighting in Syria is far from over. Fighting continues in northeastern Aleppo between Turkish-backed forces and U.S.-backed Kurdish militias. Turkey views these Kurdish forces not as Syrian militias but as affiliates of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is designated a terrorist organization in Turkey and internationally. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan recently underscored this position, saying that these forces are “foreign fighters who have gathered in Syria and they must all be eliminated.” The Kurdish forces remain determined to defend their autonomy and continue to receive U.S. support, creating a protracted conflict that limits Ankara’s ability to achieve its goals.

The United States, however, takes a different stance. While Washington also considers Ahmed al-Shaar (Abu Muhammad al-Julani), the leader of the task force, a terrorist, it continues to support Kurdish groups, including militias linked to the PKK, which it also officially recognizes as terrorist organizations. Yet these same Kurdish forces play a key role in protecting the American presence in Syria. U.S. forces also provide them with air cover and prevent attacks on them, creating a paradoxical dynamic. The U.S. will only recognize new leaders in Syria if there is a smooth transition.

In recent days, Kurdish forces have advanced and taken control of Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa, adding these territories to the already-held regions of Hasakah and Qamishli, which are critical to Syria’s economy and resources. The new Syrian leadership is unlikely to accept this development, as it exacerbates tensions in the northeastern region, which contains the country’s grain basket as well as oil and gas resources. This Kurdish control presents an ongoing dilemma and raises the question of federalization, especially given the different identities of the Kurds, Alawites, and Druze in Syria.

However, Turkey’s staunch opposition to Kurdish autonomy will make the creation of a Kurdish state similar to Iraqi Kurdistan much more difficult. Ankara is unlikely to tolerate even the hint of a Kurdish enclave in northeastern Syria, ensuring that the issue remains a contentious and unresolved point in the country’s fragmented landscape.

Read the rest at the link

Syria. The last 75 years
Text taken from the Telegram channel of alter_vij

Commentary by Russian military journalist is in italics.
[ColonelCassad] In Syria over the past 75 years, not counting external wars:

1949 – three military coups, the supreme power changes as many as three times in one year

1951 – military coup

1954 – general rebellion and coup

1961 – military coup

1962 – as many as two military coups in one year

1963 – military coup, the Baath Party comes to power (one of the leaders is Assad Sr.)

1966 – military coup, where Assad Sr. is one of the main participants

1968-69 – riots in the main cities of the country, suppressed by the army

1970 – military coup, Assad Sr. comes to power

1976-82 – civil war between the Assad government and the Islamists. Mass killings in Aleppo. The city of Hama, mentioned more than once in December 2024, was completely destroyed during the fighting in 1982...

1984 - President Assad's younger brother unsuccessfully tries to overthrow his brother and seize power.

Since 1985, 20 years of relative stability begin under the harsh dictatorship of the Assad clan

2000 - Assad Sr. dies, power passes to his son

2005 - Vice President Khaddam, a close associate of his late father, unsuccessfully attempts to overthrow Assad Jr.

Since 2011 - as we all know, an ongoing war.

So 2024 and even 2025 will not be the last years of the eternal Syrian turmoil...

P.S. And what beauty was happening there throughout the 19th century! Emperor Nicholas I first thought about introducing Russian troops into Syria in 1840, when the "Egyptians" and "Turks" were once again fighting for Damascus and Aleppo during the civil strife within the Ottoman Empire.

Russian military intelligence began systematic work on the lands of modern Syria while Pushkin was still alive...

For five years, from 1834 to 1839, Russian officers worked continuously in Palestine and Syria. The first to survey the region for the possibility of military operations was Colonel of the General Staff Alexander Duhamel, who was listed as consul in Egypt. Then Lieutenant Colonel Pyotr Lvov worked in Syria. This native of the Tver province, a veteran of wars with the Turks and Polish rebels, compiled the first military map and topographic description of Syria in the style: "... here a road cut into the rock winds, and Beilan in a military sense would deserve special note."

Beilan is now the Turkish Belan in Hatay, where there are still more Arabs than Turks, and the line of the Syrian-Turkish border was recognized by Damascus only in 2011 and almost immediately "unrecognized" after Erdogan supported the internal Syrian rebellion.

But let's go back to the 19th century.

Emperor Nicholas I personally familiarized himself with the map of Syria and other documents of Lieutenant Colonel Lvov, leaving his own notes on them. As a result of this acquaintance, the lieutenant colonel became a colonel and received a lifelong pension of 2,000 rubles per year.

Following Pyotr Lvov in Syria and Palestine in 1838-39, Captain of the Life Guards Pavlovsky Regiment Joseph Dainese, assistant to the quartermaster general of the Active Army, worked. This Italian, who transferred to Russian service, compiled a "military survey map" and a detailed "Memoire sur la Syrie en 1838" (written in French, "Report on Syria in 1838").

Based on the work of Duhamel, Lvov and Dainese in St. Petersburg, the Department of the General Staff of the Ministry of War compiled the following summary in 1840: "The conquest of Syria, given the disposition of the inhabitants to the advancing army, is possible by acting from Anatolia during one 7- or 8-month campaign, but given the hostility of the steppe and mountain tribes, offensive actions, even from Anatolia, will be extremely difficult, will require a strong army and can be successful only with the slowest course of the war, special caution and inevitable sacrifices."

https://t.me/alter_vij/3365 - zinc

PS. Find Bashar al-Assad in the picture, who has recently become a Muscovite. Perhaps he will vote for Sobyanin in the elections.
The Sobyanin reference refers to Sergey Sobyanin, current mayor of Moskva who is apparently running for reelection.

Link

Syria-Lebanon-Iran

What Syria is made of. How a bomb planted by the French exploded 80 years later

2024-12-11

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Artemy Sharapov

[REGNUM] The flags flying over the Syrian embassies in Istanbul, Stockholm, Yerevan, and Moscow are being changed — a visible symbol of the fact that “power has changed.” The flag of the armed opposition that took control of the country was already the state flag — until 1958.

In a sense, time has turned back in Syria to the times before the rise to power of the secular Arab socialists, from whose ranks emerged the Assad “dynasty” that ruled the country from 1970 to 2024.

In order to understand the rapidly unfolding events now (after all, after 13 long years of civil war, the situation has changed dramatically in just 12 days), it is necessary to at least briefly glance at the recent history of Syria.

FOUR IN ONE
The word "Syria" ("Suriyya" in Arabic) is ancient, but the state with this name is only 78 years old. Until the end of World War I, this part of the Levant, that is, the Eastern Mediterranean, belonged to the Ottoman Empire. The Turks drew the borders of the provinces (vilayets) based on the convenience of governance, without regard for the diversity of ethnic groups and religions. Present-day Syria, Lebanon and the southern part of Turkey proper were divided between the vilayets of Damascus, Aleppo, Beirut and Deir ez-Zor.

When the Entente defeated Germany and its allies (including the Ottoman Empire) in 1918, the victorious powers divided up the Turkish Sultan's possessions. France — formally, under a League of Nations mandate — got the territories of modern Syria, Lebanon, and the Turkish province of Hatay. All of this was called Greater Syria.

Syrian centenarians – there are almost a quarter of a million of them in the country – can remember the times when the French assembled the country and drew its borders as they saw fit. Initially, the Mandatory authorities divided their possessions into six “states” along ethnic lines.

Thus, in the north, the state of Aleppo was allocated to the Kurds, Sunni Arabs, Turks and their relatives, the Turkomans. On the Mediterranean coast (in the present-day province of Latakia, where the Russian Khmeimim base and the Tartus base are now located) there was the Alawite state. It was intended for the compactly living Alawite religious community, whose religion is so different from orthodox Islam that many Sunnis and Shiites do not consider them to be true believers, as well as for Shiites and Christians.

Another unorthodox community, the Druze, living in southern Syria, was given the state of Jabal Druze. The Sunnis and Shiites of the southwest were given the state of Damascus. Finally, Greater Syria included what is now Lebanon.

But in 1926, the French separated Lebanon (which was distinguished by its high ethno-religious diversity, even by Middle Eastern standards) into a separate mandated territory. The Hatay region, after long interethnic clashes and complaints to the League of Nations, was given to the Turks (Syria, however, did not recognize Turkey's sovereignty over this territory until 2005).

And from the remaining lands, the French authorities, for the sake of convenience of governance, cobbled together a country that had never existed before. In one territory there were Sunni Arabs, Shiite Arabs, Alawites, Ismailis, Christian Arabs, Armenians, Druze, Kurds, Turkomans and Assyrians.

There is nothing special about this, however: the British authorities created the never-existent state of Iraq on the same principle. When leaving, the Europeans sought to ensure that their former colonies would always have ethnic and confessional tensions that would periodically “explode” into wars. And, it must be admitted, they succeeded.

ONE COUNTRY, TWO STARS, MANY REVOLUTIONS
Since gaining independence in 1947, Syria (like Iraq) has experienced a series of military coups, uprisings and has intervened in several wars with Israel.

The optimal way to keep ethnic groups, confessions, clans and influence groups in line (and to keep the interests of these warring groups in balance) was an army dictatorship. However, this type of government was traditionally unstable for the Middle East. Between 1946 and 1956, the country saw 20 governments and 4 constitutions.

In 1958–1961, the country lost its independence, becoming part of the United Arab Republic (UAR) for a time, the brainchild of the ambitious Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser. At that time, instead of the previous green-white-black flag, Syria adopted the black-white-red pan-Arab flag of the UAR with two green stars (the two stars originally symbolized the two "union republics", Egypt and Syria). In 1961, another coup took place in Syria, this time against Nasser. The country left the UAR, but the flag remained.

In 1963, the military changed power again. Now the country is "ruled" by the regional branch of the Baath Party - the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party (in the same year, Baath comes to power in Iraq). The word "Arab" was added to the name "Syrian Republic", which is unlikely to be to the taste of non-Arab ethnic groups, primarily the Kurds inhabiting the northeast of the country.

Three years later, in 1970, another coup takes place, this time within the Baathist leadership, and the leader of the country is the former commander of the Air Force, a native of the influential Alawite clan, Hafez al-Assad.

LIONS ON THE THRONE
The father and grandfather of the presidents of Syria, Ali Suleiman, the leader of a mountain clan in Latakia, changed his former nickname al-Wahsh (the savage) to a more harmonious one and one corresponding to his social status back in the 1920s: al-Assad (the lion).

Hafez al-Assad, who held the presidency from 1971 until his death in 2000, was called "the Sacred One" ("al-Muqaddas") and "the Immortal Leader." His son and successor, Bashar al-Assad, was titled a little more modestly upon ascending to the "throne" - "the Hope of the People."

It is hardly possible to reproach the Assads for a cult of personality: this was typical of Middle Eastern secular regimes - Baathist Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Egypt from Nasser to Hosni Mubarak, the Libyan Jamahiriya of Muammar Gaddafi, etc.

There is an opinion that the years of the Assad family in power were a dictatorship of the Alawite religious community, to which Hafez and his son Bashar belonged. According to a slightly more complex version, the Assads relied on a coalition of ethno-religious minorities: Alawites, Shiites, Druze, Christians, etc.

In fact, a regime was created in the country that was in many ways similar to Saddam's government: a group of authoritative military men in power, united by common interests with a division of spheres of influence.

ON THE BRINK OF SPRING
And it was this system that largely allowed the Syrian government to successfully repel the first onslaught of Islamists – the Muslim Brotherhood* uprising of 1976–1982. The storming of the city of Hama, which was commanded by the president’s younger brother Rifaat al-Assad, was considered a model for restoring order (it was this battle that pacified the radical jihadists for a long time).

Syria's loss of the Yom Kippur War with Israel did not shake the regime's position. Especially since the Assads waged a successful proxy war with the same Israel in Lebanon.

Compared to Saddam Hussein’s regime, which essentially fell victim to its own foreign policy adventures, the Assad “dynasty” demonstrated stability. But Soviet specialists who worked in the country in the 1970s and 1980s recalled that the situation was consistently unsettled. Explosions and shootouts “somewhere on the outskirts” were commonplace, and even family members of civilian specialists were trained in case of a terrorist attack.

The stability gained at such a high price allowed the country's economy to develop until the crisis caused by the US invasion of neighboring Iraq in 2001 erupted. The constant influx of refugees and the growth of radical sentiments in the region could not help but affect Syria.

At the same time, discontent grew among a part of Syrian society and the army, who had been removed from key positions. The political opposition demanded democratic reforms (essentially, a redistribution of power and property), while the Islamists demanded the introduction of Sharia law.

Therefore, the wave of unrest throughout the Arab world (the so-called Arab Spring) and the fall of governments in Yemen, Egypt and Tunisia in 2011–2012 and the outbreak of war in Libya could not but lead to similar events in Syria.

BEGINNING OF HALF-LIFE
In 2011, protests began across the country, quickly escalating into fighting. Some of the armed forces broke away from government control, forming the Free Syrian Army (FSA). They were joined by local Islamist militias known as the Islamic Front and a number of other groups.

The country, first assembled by the French and then by the Damascus military regimes, began to fall apart at the seams. A number of regions in the north, near the border with Turkey (where the Turkmen tribes live), and in the south, in the regions adjacent to Jordan and Israel, where the Druze live, have left the government's control.

At the same time, in the northwest, in areas of ethnic Kurdish residence, a local administration and armed structures were created that were equally hostile to the government in Damascus and the opposition.

By the beginning of 2012, the revolution and “democratization” were forgotten – a full-scale civil war broke out in the country.

WAR OF THE ENCLAVES
Unlike traditional wars, where the sides are divided by a front line and strive to break through it, the map of the war in Syria quickly took shape into a bizarre mosaic of several colors.

After the authorities managed to suppress the opposition and Islamists in most major cities, they were pushed out to the outskirts, where they strengthened their positions. For example, in Aleppo, the armed opposition retained part of the central districts of the city and the northwestern outskirts, in Homs – the northern districts of the city and the suburb of al-Rastan, in the vicinity of Damascus – entire oases of dozens of settlements, closely adjacent to the city quarters. In one of these enclaves – Eastern Ghouta, there were up to ten thousand armed people.

On the other hand, the successful opposition offensive led to the capture of large territories in the provinces of Raqqa, Idlib and Hama. But even here there remained enclaves that remained loyal to the government. First of all, areas inhabited by religious minorities.

For example, the cities of Fua and Kafariya in Idlib province; Nubl and Zahraa in Aleppo province have been fighting in complete encirclement for several years. The reason is simple: Shiites live here, “heretics” from the point of view of the militants who consider themselves devout Sunnis.

The history of the city of Deir ez-Zor stands apart, its garrison, together with local militia units, was able to withstand several years of siege and wait for help to arrive. Several airbases also remained completely surrounded, the garrison of which did not surrender and continued to resist. The Tabqa, Abu Duhur and Menang airfields were eventually taken by storm, and their garrison was killed.

However, the garrison of the Kweires air base, consisting mainly of cadet pilots, was able to repel attacks for several years and eventually received outside help. Such tenacity and sometimes, without exaggeration, heroism seem even more incredible against the backdrop of the events of 2024, when the army simply refused to participate in military operations.

In other words, military operations were conducted on dozens of fronts at once, and the decisive role was often played not by regular armed formations, but by local forces.

DIVERSITY VS. GENOCIDE
The semi-collapse of the Syrian state after 2011 went hand in hand with the internationalization of the conflict. Since 2013, Al-Qaeda* and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant* (ISIS, later the Islamic State*) have been actively involved in the war.

The Wahhabi IS*, which by definition does not recognize existing state borders, included part of the territory of Syria with the cities of Idlib and Raqqa into its “caliphate,” which continued further to the east, capturing part of Iraq.

It is noteworthy that even in a state of simultaneous war on ten fronts throughout the country, the Damascus government of Bashar al-Assad has not lost control of the situation.

Over the course of several years of military action, the troops managed to fully or partially hold all major settlements. This was partly possible due to the actions of the armed opposition itself, in whose leadership former politicians and military personnel were often replaced by radicals. Those groups that swore allegiance to the terrorist international directly stated that they were bringing death to representatives of other religious communities: Christians, Shiite Muslims, Alawites and Ismailis. For example, in March 2014, Islamist units stormed the Armenian city of Kessab, carrying out ethnic cleansing in it.

And in this case, the thesis about the “coalition of minorities” opposing the Islamists and situationally supporting Bashar al-Assad is correct.

Thus, a pro-government Druze militia was formed in the province of Suwayda, a Christian militia in the city of Maharda in the province of Hama (later one of the most combat-ready formations of the government forces), and an Ismaili militia from Salamiyah and Masyaf. These formations were created primarily for the survival of their communities. They waged war on the side of the Assad government as long as they considered this government capable of protecting the interests of communities and ethnic groups.

Also on the government's side were representatives of local businesses and/or criminals, who simply did not want to give up their positions to new people and created militia units with their own money. The most famous example of such formations is the "Desert Falcons", financed by the Jaber clan from the Latakia province.

One should also not forget about the loyalty of some army commanders who refused to go over to the opposition for one reason or another. Among them are the commander of the defense of the encircled Deir ez-Zor, General Issam Zahreddine, and the hero of the defense of Aleppo, Suheil Hassan. Therefore, Bashar al-Assad managed to avoid the fate of Gaddafi and retain power, albeit having lost control over part of the country's territories.

But this could not go on forever.

START FROM SCRATCH
With access to almost inexhaustible human, financial and military resources from abroad, the Islamists have organized a series of successful military operations.

Government forces, on the contrary, began to gradually “run out of steam” and give up their positions by the mid-2010s. In the circumstances, the Syrian government turned to foreign military assistance.

Russia's involvement in ending the Syrian conflict since 2015, including support for the government army and other anti-ISIS forces "on the ground" and in the air, has radically changed the course of the long-standing war. Russia's peacekeeping efforts require a separate description. For now, several important points should be noted

The Russian leadership has always supported the Assad government in its fight against terrorism, while emphasizing that intra-Syrian reconciliation, the restoration of the balance of interests of the various communities, faiths and ethnic groups living here is the business of the Syrian people themselves. As President Vladimir Putin noted back in 2015, “we are not going to be more Syrian than the Syrians themselves.”

Moscow has always advocated for the normalization of dialogue between Syria’s political and religious forces and organizations, speaking about the need to conduct the most fruitful negotiations under the auspices of the UN.

Now that the government has collapsed, the danger of the conflict becoming "Somalizatsi" is growing, with a complete collapse of statehood and intercommunal wars. Therefore, now more than ever, dialogue is needed between the constituent parts of Syria, from the Kurds to the Druze and from the Alawites to the Sunnis.

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Africa Horn

Tagadum, SPLM-N forge committee ahead of Hamdok-Hilu talks

2024-02-26

[SUDANTRIBUNE] On Saturday, Nur El-Din Babiker, a leading member of the Coordination of Civil Democratic Forces “Tagadum” chaired by former Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok announced the formation of a joint committee with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), led by Abdel Aziz Al-Hilu.

This committee has to agree on a common ground between Tagadum and the SPLA-N before the meeting between the leadership of the two parties in the coming days.

In statements to Sudan Tribune, Babiker confirmed the possibility of bridging the gap between Tagadum and the SPLM-N, despite the movement’s previously expressed reservations.

He further emphasized that the current situation requires all parties to be responsible and make concessions to prevent Sudan’s collapse.

Since January, the Alliance of Civil Forces to Stop the War has invited various Sudanese groups to hold meetings, including the SPLM-N, the Sudanese Communist Party, the Baath Party, and the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) led by Abdel Wahid Nour. These efforts aim to mobilize political support for ending the ongoing war between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces.

The SPLM welcomed the proposed meeting for unifying anti-war forces. However, they advocated for forming a joint committee to address other crucial issues before pursuing joint action. They suggested discussions on national identity and voluntary unity, the state-religion relationship, democratic transformation, the government system, economic challenges, historical accountability, and security arrangements.

Babiker who is also the Sudanese Congress Party Spokesman outlined a roadmap for further communication with all political and social entities in Sudan, including the Sudan Liberation Movement (led by Minni Minawi) and the Justice and Equality Movement (led by Gibril Ibrahim). However, communication with Minawi and Jibril will be conditional upon their shifting from supporting the war to rejecting it, as the Taqadum coalition’s position firmly opposes the war and seeks its cessation.

He further stated, “If any political forces or armed movements currently supporting the war are willing to join and denounce it, they are welcome in the Tagadum Alliance.”

The anti-war official acknowledged the unsuccessful attempt to organize a meeting with the Communist Party but emphasized ongoing efforts to hold separate meetings by Tagadum components, considering the party’s reservations towards alliances.

He underscored that the Communist and Baath Parties are not required to be part of the Tagadum Alliance’s leadership or structure. However, he did not rule out future coordination with them regarding positions on rejecting the war, constitution-making, political negotiations, and other future issues in Sudan.

Finally, Babiker stated that Tagadum held intensive meetings with African leaders and international officials during the recent African Union summit in Addis Ababa to call for more pressure on the Sudanese belligerents to end the war and provide humanitarian assistance.

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