Hello !
| Arabia | ||
| The Iranian Houthi militia has lost more than 39 thousand of its combat elements in just 6 weeks | ||
| 2026-11-04 | ||
Translated Text: 🚨 Urgent | The most dangerous news ever: The Iranian Houthi militia, which has killed the Yemeni people for more than 12 years, is today appealing to each of: - The European Union - The International Security Council - The Arab League - The Organization of Islamic Conference - And human rights and humanitarian organizations To appeal to the entire world, as it has stated, to stop the killing in Yemen, and they say they are ready for a comprehensive national dialogue with all spectrums of the Yemeni people. WHY THE APPEAL NOW The Iranian Houthi militia has lost more than 39 thousand of its combat elements in just 6 weeks — and the Houthi militia is currently suffering from a shortage of human resources and its stockpile of weapons and fighters, since the strikes of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni National Army were more powerful, precise, and devastating in order to liberate the most oppressed Yemeni people.
| ||
| Link |
| Israel-Palestine-Jordan |
| The Real Nakhba: They Knew Why They Lost |
| 2026-09-06 |
| [MelissaBrodsky] Arab leaders warned they weren't ready. After 1948, they explained why they lost. There’s this overly popular version of 1948 that begins with Paleostinian refugees and works backward. By the time it reaches the months before Israel declared independence, the Jews have become this overwhelming military force bearing down on a largely passive, innocent Arab population that never stood a chance against them. Interestingly, that wasn’t how Arab leaders described what was happening. Before Israel existed, Arab military commanders were sending increasingly grim reports to their governments about the balance of forces in Paleostine. After the war, Paleostinian politicians and Arab intellectuals wrote postmortems that heavily blamed the British. But they also pointed fingers at Arab failures: poor preparation, political rivalries, inadequate weapons, competing commands, weak governments and a disastrous underestimation of the Jews. No one had to invent these explanations. Arab leaders were writing them all by themselves. THE WARNING CAME BEFORE ISRAEL EXISTED On March 23, 1948, General Ismail Safwat sent a report to Syrian Prime Minister Jamil Mardam Bey, chairman of the Arab League ...an organization of Arabic-speaking states with 22 member countries and four observers. The League tries to achieve Arab consensus on issues, which usually leaves them doing nothing but a bit of grimacing and mustache cursing... ’s Paleostine Committee. Safwat was an Iraqi general, former Iraqi chief of staff, and head of the vaporous Arab League’s Military Committee for Paleostine. His job was to assess the coming war. His conclusion: "There is no comparison between our forces and the Jewish forces." Safwat estimated Jewish strength at 50,000 men …I suspect a quarter to a third of the fighting men were actually women, and some unknown percentage of the whole were not men but sub-adult teens and children who had survived the Holocaust and had been the sole adults in their own lives for years — Dr. Ruth was one of them, and had volunteered to be trained as a sniper… backed by additional local defense formations. The Arab forces available to oppose them were a fraction of that. Paleostinian guerrillas were poorly equipped, Arab League forces were inadequate, and weapons promised by Arab governments hadn’t arrived in the agreed-upon quantities.The details get way worse for the Arabs. Safwat described trained Jewish personnel, engineers and technicians, organized transportation, armored vehicles, reserves, repair facilities and domestic arms production. Egypt had supplied only part of the rifles it had promised. Saudi Arabia ...a kingdom taking up the bulk of the Arabian peninsula, largely made up of sand and oil rigs. Its primary economic activity involves exporting oil and soaking Islamic rubes on the annual haj pilgrimage. The country supports a large number of princes in whatcha might call princely splendor. Formerly dictatorial and steeped in Olde Tyme Religion, deferring to Salafist holy men on all issues, it has now done a 180 and is making a serious effort to modernize, so as not to be left in the sand by its Gulf Arab neighbors. The holy men have been shoved to the background and the nation is now still dictatorial but somewhat rational. That doesn't make them trustworthy, but it's a start...and Transjordan hadn’t fulfilled their rifle commitments. Arab ammunition was short, artillery was old, and mortars were scarce. Safwat was worried about what happened once equipment broke. The Jews had workshops and facilities capable of repairing weapons and vehicles. The Arabs didn’t. "Our side has nothing of the sort, not even a single small repair shop." And this was only part of his concern. Paleostinian gangs answered to competing politicians and factions. Some, Safwat reported, were accumulating weapons for conflicts with other Arabs rather than for the war against the Jews. "This situation has led to a rise in factionalism and local alliances among Paleostinians and has pitted them against one another." Safwat had been pushing the Arab League since 1947 to recruit and train more men, provide weapons, and create a unified command. It hadn’t happened. Now the war was approaching, and there was still no effective Paleostinian command comparable to the Haganah. And Safwat saw another problem, one that had nothing to do with rifles or ammunition. He wrote about Arab morale remaining relatively strong because: "The Arabs still tend to look down upon and depreciate the Jews." They were completely underestimating the Jews even as their military commander had raised the red flag, warning them how dangerous that was. This report was dated March 23, 1948. Israel wouldn’t exist for another seven weeks. THE TWO SIDES HAD SPENT THE MANDATE VERY DIFFERENTLY Safwat’s description makes a lot more sense when looking at what had been happening the decades before he wrote it. The Yishuv had built the Jewish Agency, Va’ad Leumi, Histadrut, Haganah, schools, hospitals, universities, banks, agricultural organizations and municipal institutions. Thousands of Paleostinian Jews served with Allied forces during World War II ...my father was one of them, though he was the first wave that was taken on as civilians and not permitted weapons training or to fight, though they wanted to. The second wave fought, but only a small number of those who volunteered were accepted, to limit the number with war training afterward. The colonial masters did not account for the number of Jews who had volunteered for the UK, Canadian, Australian, and American armies — not to mention the various underground and Partisan units behind Nazi lines — then chose to make aliyah to Israel to fight as soon as that became an option in 1948… and came home with stronger military training and experience.None of this was top secret information. In 1946, the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry looked at the Jewish community in Paleostine and called it a "virtual Jewish nonterritorial State". |
| Link |
| Israel-Palestine-Jordan | |||
| Netanyahu called Britain the first Islamic country with nuclear weapons | |||
| 2026-08-15 | |||
| He ain't wrong. Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited [Regnum] On August 14, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, speaking on Israel Army Radio, called Britain the "Islamic Republic of Britain" and the first Islamic country with nuclear weapons. This was reported by The Guardian. ![]() Netanyahu stated that Britain's attitude toward Israel has deteriorated significantly in recent decades. He noted that "in today's Britain, in what is called the Islamic Republic of Britain," the support London once provided to Israel is no longer to be found. “Isn’t all of Europe like this?” asked the program’s host. Netanyahu answered in the affirmative. US Vice President J.D. Vance previously called Britain "the first Islamic country with nuclear weapons." In his speech, he drew attention to the risks of the spread of Islamism in several European countries, including Britain. The authors noted that relations between Britain and Israel have worsened since the appointment of Andy Burnham as British Prime Minister. Shortly before his confirmation, Burnham publicly apologized for the Labour Party's previous support for Israel's attacks on Palestine. Burnham took office as British Prime Minister on July 20. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova noted that Moscow does not expect relations with the UK to improve following the resignation of Burnham's predecessor, Keir Starmer. She indicated that London will continue its anti-Russian course, which is determined by the consensus of the British establishment, not by the prime minister's personality. ‘Completely unacceptable’: UK condemns Netanyahu for calling Britain an ‘Islamic republic’ [IsraelTimes] Britain hits back at Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu derisively calling the country an “Islamic republic” in an interview, branding the remarks “completely unacceptable.” “These comments are completely unacceptable and we have raised them with the Israeli government,” a UK government spokesman says.
“He [Netanyahu] was making a quote that someone else had given,” Mencer said, noting United States Vice President JD Vance had “made those comments” previously. “He was quoting what the vice president had said.”
Antisemitism is no mere prejudice. It's a potent political technology, perhaps the most effective negative campaign and coalition-builder in modern politics. Prof. Ruth Wisse, professor emerita of Harvard, now a senior fellow at the Tikvah Fund, joins the podcast to help us trace the “politics of the pointing finger” from Wilhelm Marr’s Antisemitenliga to the Arab League, from the Harvard campus’s grievance coalitions after October 7 to the rising figures on the progressive left and the populist right who find Jews the easiest, least costly villain on which to foist their anxieties and fears. Wisse argues that Jews cannot win this fight by trying argue with the charges being leveled at them; that Israel’s creation remains the great modern resurrection of a people; and that Jewish (and American) self-confidence is the only real answer to this challenge. Related: Benjamin Netanyahu 08/14/2026 Mamdani dodges question on whether NYPD will go ahead with training in Israel Benjamin Netanyahu 08/14/2026 ‘Just like before Oct. 7’: Gaza border surveillance troops say they’re seeing terror activity Benjamin Netanyahu 08/13/2026 Australian police drop charges against Bondi Beach attack hero Ahmed al Ahmed Related: J.D. Vance 08/12/2026 Reuters: US sells seized Russian-flagged tankers for scrap J.D. Vance 08/07/2026 'America First': Tucker Carlson Declares War on Israeli and Kyiv Agents J.D. Vance 08/01/2026 Ukrainian Perspective: Invasion of Ukraine: July 31, 2026 Related: Andy Burnham 08/14/2026 Accused of calling stunt election to avoid scrutiny, UK’s Farage faces joke candidate Andy Burnham 07/29/2026 'Fascist Revolt.' White Britons escaped the ghetto and terrorized London Andy Burnham 07/27/2026 Ukrainian Perspective: Invasion of Ukraine: July 26, 2026 | |||
| Link |
| Arabia | |
| A nearly kidnapped 'thorn.' A spy scandal has caused a rift between Israel and the Emirates | |
| 2026-06-24 | |
| Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited by Leonid Tsukanov [regnum.ru] Former Israeli counterintelligence chief Ronen Bar narrowly escaped being caught in an Iranian trap while on a business visit to the UAE, the Jewish state reported. ![]() The decision to make the story public was made only after they were certain the retired security official was in no danger and Emirati officials were not involved in the incident. However, the Israelis' tactic of terse language, as usual, only fueled interest in the topic. INTERRUPTED BUSINESS TRIP According to Israeli media reports, the former counterintelligence chief recently traveled to the UAE to participate in closed expert meetings on regional security issues. His wife, Dafna Bar-Agassi, a senior executive at the telecommunications company Cellcom, accompanied him to the Emirates. The visit's itinerary was not publicized, but indirect indications suggested that the Bars intended to attend the Sir Bani Yas political forum (last held in December 2025), organized on the island of the same name in the Persian Gulf. The forum is considered one of the largest closed events in the region and traditionally attracts security officials and politicians from the Middle East and neighboring regions. Naturally, Sir Bani Yas is inaccessible from the street. The high-ranking Israeli couple was supposedly scheduled to arrive there at the invitation of Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan, head of the Israeli Foreign Ministry,
However, they never reached their destination. Bar, having barely entered the UAE, received a warning from former colleagues about "high security risks" and a possible assassination attempt by Iranian intelligence, after which he and his wife were evacuated back to their homeland on a special flight. In total, the former counterintelligence officer spent less than an hour in the UAE. FORGET ABOUT HOSTILITY Despite the "political thorn" status that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu bestowed on Bar before his removal from office in the fall of 2025, the Israeli leadership has in fact retained respect for the high-ranking security official. Bar distinguished himself in the diplomatic arena during his time there, working to advance complex deals on Gaza and normalize relations with Arab partners, including the UAE. Moreover, during the acute phase of the confrontation with Iran, the former Shin Bet chief caused considerable trouble for the Persians, exposing dozens of their spy networks. Therefore, Tehran could easily have turned his kidnapping into a political stunt, thereby exerting pressure on the Israeli government and the Prime Minister personally. Any delay in rescuing Bar would have been seen by the public as deliberate abandonment and settling old scores. For this reason, Netanyahu didn't hesitate and ordered the emergency evacuation of his opponent as soon as the intelligence services' suspicions arose. However, he ordered the details to be kept under wraps until an internal investigation was completed. The Israeli government only decided to reveal the general outline of the case six months later, in June 2026. They tactfully kept silent about Bar's exact travels. They also refused to answer the question of why the then-retired counterintelligence chief was suddenly entrusted with such a sensitive matter as resolving disagreements with the Emirates. Bar himself also refrained from any comment. However, you can't hide an awl in a sack. As Israeli journalist Michael Shemesh later reported, citing sources in the security sector, the rapid evacuation of the former head of the Shin Bet from a "friendly Middle Eastern country" was a response to an operation being prepared by Iranian intelligence services. There were fears that Bara and his wife would be kidnapped right from the forum and taken to an unknown location. However, the Israelis' swift intervention prevented these plans from coming to fruition. "WE HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH IT" The disclosure of details of the incident, albeit in a truncated form, was not to the liking of the UAE authorities. The House of Al Nahyan saw the Israelis' actions as damaging to their image. Abu Dhabi felt that allegations that Iranian intelligence services could kidnap someone directly from the venue tarnished the reputation of the Sir Bani Yas Forum, which the UAE had been trying for several years to portray as a competitor to the Munich Security Conference. Similar negative publicity has seriously undermined the sheikhs' long-standing efforts. Tahnoun bin Zayed al-Nahyan, the Emirates' chief strategist and head of intelligence, was also clearly hurt. For him, the allusions to enemy infiltration of the Sir Bani Yas were akin to a personal insult. Although Tahnoun bin Zayed remained cool in public, several angry telegrams were sent to Israel through closed channels, including promises to reconsider his approach to interaction with his newfound intelligence partner. However, the Emirates quickly found a way to strike back gracefully. UAE Foreign Ministry officials orchestrated a controlled leak to the press, including Israeli opposition outlets. It reported that Abu Dhabi had never invited the high-ranking Israeli security official to its headquarters. According to their information, Bar was not invited to the Sir Bani Yas forum either under the quota for active foreign security officials or as a retired expert. He arrived in the UAE as a private citizen, without a business mission. Accusing the UAE authorities of concealing or distorting the facts is problematic. Bar's abrupt departure was followed by no high-profile arrests or exposure of pro-Iranian spy networks. And the Israelis' own desire to freeze information about a successful operation for six months seems very strange. Usually, reports of a successful counterattack reach the top, and from there, reach the press within a matter of weeks. Here, on the contrary, one gets the impression that Israel urgently needed a reason to offend the Arabian monarchy and could not come up with anything better than the story with Bar. Moreover, a week before the Israeli press began trumpeting the “miraculous rescue” of the former Shin Bet chief, Yair Golan, chairman of the Democrats party, was heading to the UAE on a non-public business trip. He met extensively with local security and political leaders, according to some reports, delivering classified messages from the country's leadership. Even considering that he, like Bar, is an opponent of Netanyahu, the Israeli authorities could well have tried to use him to convey signals on Iran issues, assuming that Iranian intelligence agencies wouldn't monitor the current prime minister's opponents as closely as they do his allies. However, Golan's proposals hardly gained support from Abu Dhabi, which only added to the Israeli authorities' nervousness. In this context, the sudden disclosure of details of the December incident appears to be a response to the sheikhs' intransigence and an attempt to paint them in an unfavorable light in front of other Arabian monarchies and Iran. Related: Ronen Bar 04/03/2026 Mossad without a head: Israel can't choose a head of intelligence Ronen Bar 02/19/2026 'Vested Interest': 40 Generals Set a Quiet Professor on Netanyahu Ronen Bar 02/12/2026 The brother of the head of Israel's counterintelligence smuggled cigarettes to the enemy Related: UAE: 2026-06-22 Half the internet goes down as Cloudflare blames major outage on 'fiber cut' in North America UAE: 2026-06-21 Penthouse to outhouse: ‘Poor' Ilhan Omar now claims erstwhile-millionaire hubby made as little as $200 last year UAE: 2026-06-20 Iran’s Revolutionary Guard set up Iraqi cells to attack Gulf neighbors, sources say Related: Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan 11/10/2015 Arab League seeks end to Israel's violent 'escalation' Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan 04/25/2012 Iran Deploys 'Offensive, Defensive Systems' on Disputed Islands Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan 01/12/2012 Arab League Puts Off Sending More Syria Monitors | |
| Link |
| Africa Horn |
| Somaliland, Israel agree to deepen cooperation after presidential talks, Hamas and friends condemn |
| 2026-06-16 |
[ShabelleMedia] Somaliland ...Republic of Somaliland is an unrecognised sovereign state in the Horn of Africa, recognised internationally as a de jure part of Somalia. It is located in the southern coast of the Gulf of Aden with approximately 5.7 million residents as of 2021. The capital and largest city is Hargeisa. The government regards itself as the successor state to British Somaliland, which united from 1960 to 1991 with the Trust Territory of Somaliland (the former Italian Somaliland) to form the Somali Republic. Under the Siad Barre regime, Somaliadestroyed ninety percent of Hargeisa Per international law, once you're in, you gotta stay in, no matter how bad it smells....President Abdirahman Mohammed Abdullahi (Irro) and Israeli President Isaac Herzog on Sunday pledged to strengthen cooperation between their two sides following talks at the Israeli presidential residence, where they jointly addressed the media. The two leaders said their discussions focused on expanding bilateral engagement and building what they described as a forward-looking partnership based on shared interests. President Cirro said the talks reflected the growing relationship between Somaliland and Israel, adding that both sides would work together to build a future based on cooperation, mutual benefit and shared opportunities aimed at advancing the development of their peoples. He expressed appreciation for the hospitality extended to him during a state lunch hosted by the Israeli president, thanking Herzog for the warm reception. For his part, President Isaac Herzog said the time had come to move beyond declarations of relations toward "real and substantive cooperation" between the two sides. He said Somaliland and Israel shared similar strategic interests and challenges, particularly in combating bad boy groups, ensuring regional security and safeguarding maritime routes. The meeting marks a further step in Somaliland’s efforts to expand international engagement, particularly with partners in the Middle East, amid broader geopolitical shifts in the region. Hamas condemns Somaliland plan to open embassy in occupied Jerusalem [HodhodYemenNews] The Islamic Resistance Movement ( Hamas) condemned Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi’s announcement that the breakaway region plans to open an embassy in occupied Jerusalem, calling the move a “political mistake” and a violation of international law and the longstanding Arab and Islamic position on the city. In a statement on Sunday, Hamas said opening an embassy in occupied Jerusalem would show disregard for the city’s religious, political and legal status. It warned of the serious consequences of the move and urged Somaliland’s authorities to reverse it. The Movement also condemned Abdullahi’s visit to Israel and his meetings with Israeli officials, saying the steps were part of efforts to strengthen relations with a government accused of committing violations and crimes against Palestinians. Hamas called on the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and other relevant bodies to act against attempts to break the consensus supporting Palestinian rights and to prevent further normalization with Israel while its attacks on Palestinians continue. The statement came as the Somaliland president arrived in “Israel” to take part in the opening of the planned embassy in occupied Jerusalem, a step that has drawn widespread criticism across the Arab and Muslim worlds. Israeli media reported that the visit includes meetings with senior Israeli officials, including the president, foreign minister and prime minister, as well as economic officials, amid accelerating ties between the two sides in recent months. Several countries, including Türkiye, Egypt, Qatar, Jordan and Pakistan, have rejected Somaliland’s decision to open an embassy in occupied Jerusalem, reaffirming their opposition to measures that alter the city’s legal and historical status. Related: Somaliland: 2026-06-13 Talks to Free Egyptian Sailors Held by Somali Pirates Collapse Over Ransom Dispute Somaliland: 2026-06-06 Report: Israel Deployed Elite Forces to Azerbaijan as Part of Secret Regional Iran War Network Somaliland: 2026-06-03 Yale Lab Identifies Advanced Chinese-Made Drone in Nyala Linked to UAE Defence Distributor |
| Link |
| Arabia | ||
| A landing of Iranian colonels: the frightened emirate bowed to Macron | ||
| 2026-05-26 | ||
| Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited by Leonid Tsukanov [REGNUM] Tensions are rising between Kuwait and Iran. The al-Sabah family accuses Tehran of attempting to land a sabotage team on the strategically important Bubiyan Island in the northern Persian Gulf. Iran denies this and demands that the Kuwaiti authorities cease their "witch hunt" and incitement to hatred against the Islamic Republic. ![]() But the Kuwaitis have no intention of resting. They see new ominous omens in Tehran's actions and are seeking ways to shield a key area from the upcoming landing operation by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which they are certain will begin soon. FAILED LANDING The incident occurred on May 11, but Kuwaiti authorities released its details later, after they were certain the threat had passed. According to the Interior Ministry, a group of six Iranians on a rented boat, the Meroj Keshtezri Darya, disguised as a fishing vessel, approached Bubiyan Island in the early morning hours and attempted to board it to commit "certain hostile acts." The intruders resisted the arrest, resulting in one Kuwaiti serviceman being wounded. However, the garrison's superior numbers and firepower allowed them to quickly overcome the resistance and neutralize the attackers. Following a brief battle, four saboteurs were captured; the rest managed to weigh anchor and escape to the open sea. A coast guard boat sent in pursuit returned empty-handed. Kuwaiti authorities later released the names of the detained Iranians. According to police, the sabotage team that landed on the island included Colonel Abd al-Samad Yadallah Kanawati, Captain Ahmad Jamshid Gholam Reza Zolaghari, and Senior Lieutenant Muhammad Hossein Sohrab Foroughi Rad. The group was led by Colonel Amir Hossein Abd Muhammad Zara'i, in whose name the vessel was chartered. Although the captives cooperated with the investigation, providing their real names and ranks, and indicating their affiliation with the IRGC Navy, they refused to comment on the purpose of their arrival at Bubiyan. There was also no answer to questions about the cargo on board or why their comrades chose to flee at sea. The omission further angered Kuwait. The very next day, Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Totonji was summoned to the Foreign Ministry and strongly protested his country's "hostile actions." At the same time, Kuwait appealed to the UN, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab League, and even NATO (of which it is a non-aligned partner), calling on the international community to "pay attention to Tehran's act of aggression" and its "obvious preparations for a major war." MANY VERSIONS Iran strongly denied the accusations of an attempted landing on a Kuwaiti island. A statement released by the Iranian Foreign Ministry emphasized that the maritime incident was the result of a failure of navigational equipment during a "routine patrol" in the Strait of Hormuz. Further deterioration in weather conditions caused the vessel to stray off course and end up in Kuwaiti territorial waters. The Iranians were allegedly convinced they were still in their own waters, and mistook Bubiyan, which appeared on the horizon, for Iran's Kharg Island, which resembles Kuwaiti island in terms of topography and coastal area. The Foreign Ministry also stated that Kuwaiti shore guards, whom the crew of the Meroj Keshtezri Darya mistakenly identified as smugglers, opened fire first on the sailors, who were forced to fire back in self-defense. Moreover, the first shot fired by Kuwaiti security personnel nearly wounded Zarai, who was on the bridge. Tehran refused to explain the specific missions assigned to the naval group or why a civilian vessel was chartered for the patrol. This gave Kuwait ample scope for accusations against the Islamic Republic and allowed it to inflate the theory of planned sabotage. Opinion leaders loyal to Kuwait went even further and began vying with each other to concoct their own versions of events, which they eagerly shared on social media. Overnight, the "fishing vessel" swelled into a "sabotage flotilla" of several vessels, and the crew of the Meroj Keshtezri Darya was "joined" by combat divers, minelayers, and drone operators. The latter allegedly attempted to deploy a drone battery on the island to strike deep into Kuwait's rear. Remarkably, some of these stories, at the time of widespread publicity, seemed so plausible that they even made it into the Qatari news agency Al Jazeera's operational reports, although they were quickly scrubbed. Be that as it may, behind the apparent widespread publicity lies Kuwait's genuine concerns. Although Bubiyan lacks any significant infrastructure, with the exception of the Mubarak al-Kabeer port complex being built with Chinese funding, it offers easy access to Kuwait's key oil fields and military installations. Furthermore, the island is located close to Iraq's major maritime arteries, and control over it allows, among other things, the port of Umm Qasr to be targeted, affecting local shipping. This makes the island a tempting target for the Iranian military. And given the constant rumors about the impending seizure of Kharg by American forces to "force peace," Tehran is quite capable of retaliating and seizing control of the local islands. Including in advance. Needless to say, given this combination of factors, Kuwait is finally no longer perceiving the recent crisis as a fluke. A DEFENDER IS NEEDED Following the incident on the island, relations between Kuwait and Iran, already tense, have become even colder. The al-Sabah royal family continues to believe that Tehran was preparing a major combined operation in the Persian Gulf and that further landing attempts are only a matter of time. Kuwait's overall response to the incident was largely predictable. The country increased coastguard patrols and declared several areas around the island closed to navigation until further notice. However, the country's authorities understand that it will be difficult to compete with Tehran on their own. Kuwait's total naval strength is no more than 2,500 (10 times smaller than that of the IRGC Navy), and if Tehran were to make any real plans, it would not be difficult for it to capture and hold Bubiyan. For this reason, the monarchy's authorities are looking for champions among the heavyweights. And their first choice fell on France.
The contents of the letter were not disclosed, but it also most likely concerned the aforementioned incident, as the very next day Kuwait and France agreed to hold a series of bilateral security consultations, tentatively scheduled for the second half of May. Kuwait's calculations in this case are clear and extremely simple. The Élysée Palace is seeking ways to demonstrate its involvement in resolving the crisis in the Persian Gulf, but at the same time, it is reluctant to engage in direct military clashes with Iran. A flag display near Bubiyan Island, even if very limited, would not only allow Paris to signal its presence in the region but also deter Tehran from further military action. At least, this is the idea being promoted by Kuwaiti experts close to the court. However, Kuwait clearly doesn't plan to focus solely on Paris. Kuwaiti diplomats have at least several more tours scheduled—both in Europe and the Middle East—and in all cases, maritime security is high on the agenda. Among other things, Kuwait is trying to expedite the implementation of existing agreements to upgrade its coast guard capabilities: for example, by reducing the delivery time of the upgraded Falaj 3 combat boats previously ordered from Italy and preventing a repeat of the incident involving the escape of some of the saboteurs. Kuwait, however, apparently isn't counting on immediate US intervention. Washington's priority for now is protecting larger bases in the UAE and Saudi Arabia, which Tehran periodically targets for harassing fire.
However, for now, the opposite is true: Kuwait is nervously reacting to any political moves by Iran—for example, its intention to finally legitimize its control over shipping through the Strait of Hormuz—and is applying them to the recent situation with Bubiyan. And over time, it is increasingly inclined to strengthen its military presence on the troubled island. Related: Kuwait: 2026-05-23 Iran moves to broaden its control over Hormuz, infuriating its Gulf neighbors and the US Kuwait: 2026-05-23 Navy preparing to sink two prominent and retired San Diego warships off Hawaii Kuwait: 2026-05-21 Trump says Netanyahu will ‘do whatever I want’ on Iran after pair said to hold tense call, Jordon shoots down drone Related: Bubiyan Island: 2026-05-13 Kuwait says it stopped armed Iranian team from attacking one of its islands Bubiyan Island: 2026-04-07 IDF Strikes Tehran Airports, Destroying Dozens Of Iranian Aircraft, also 2 petrochemical plants, more key people killed Bubiyan Island: 2012-02-02 Iraq to Try 6 Accused of Plotting Attack on Kuwaiti Port Project | ||
| Link |
| Arabia |
| UAE chooses to deepen ties with Israel amid war with Iran, risking rift with Saudis |
| 2026-05-16 |
| [IsraelTimes] Experts say UAE taking pragmatic view that Israel is ‘like any other country,’ sees it as partner for security, while Riyadh and other Gulf capitals view Jerusalem as a rogue actor After facing barrages of Iranian missiles that threatened its economic future, the UAE has moved closer to Israel, widening a split with ally-turned-rival Saudi Arabia ...a kingdom taking up the bulk of the Arabian peninsula, largely made up of sand and oil rigs. Its primary economic activity involves exporting oil and soaking Islamic rubes on the annual haj pilgrimage. The country supports a large number of princes in whatcha might call princely splendor. Formerly dictatorial and steeped in Olde Tyme Religion, deferring to Salafist holy men on all issues, it has now done a 180 and is making a serious effort to modernize, so as not to be left in the sand by its Gulf Arab neighbors. The holy men have been shoved to the background and the nation is now still dictatorial but somewhat rational. That doesn't make them trustworthy, but it's a start...and placing it in defiant opposition to Tehran. This gamble granted the UAE, a tourism hub where 90 percent of the population is foreign, access to Israeli air defense systems to help fend off more than 2,800 drones and missiles — effectively placing protection above all else to preserve a model based on stability, analysts said. But its closer cooperation with Israel risks further antagonizing Iran, which the UAE views as its biggest threat, and puts Abu Dhabi at even greater odds with Saudi Arabia, which, along with much of the Gulf, has come to see Israel as the region’s main rogue actor. SECURITY COOPERATION "The UAE is thinking about the future and sees Israel as the best security partner that can provide cover for its economic recovery," said Sanam Vakil, director of the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House. Their bet appears to have paid off in terms of security and defense. On Tuesday, US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee confirmed Israel had sent its Iron Dome air defense batteries and personnel to the UAE during the war. The UAE became the first Gulf country, alongside Bahrain, to recognize Israel in 2020 under the US-mediated Abraham Accords. Throughout the war, Emirati officials have lambasted unnamed Arab countries for showcasing hollow solidarity as attacks rained. "There wasn’t enough of a sense of urgency, while this is the most existential threat that we have dealt with since the inception of the country," said Nadim Koteich, a Lebanese-Emirati media executive and policy adviser close to the UAE government. "But in this war, the Israelis showed up for the UAE when they had to show up." Israel launched its campaign against Iran, alongside the US, to degrade the Iranian regime’s military capabilities, distance threats posed by Iran ...a theocratic Shiite state divided among the Medes, the Persians, and the (Arab) Elamites. Formerly a fairly civilized nation ruled by a Shah, it became a victim of Islamic revolution in 1979. The nation is today noted for spontaneouslytaking over other countries' embassies, maintaining whorehouses run by clergymen, involvement in international drug trafficking, and financing sock puppet militiasto extend the regime's influence. The word Iranis a cognate form of Aryan.The abbreviation IRGCis the same idea as Stürmabteilung (or SA).The term Supreme Guideis a the modern version form of either Duceor Führeror maybe both. They hate — including its nuclear and ballistic missile programs — and "create the conditions" for the Iranian people to topple the regime, the military and other Israeli leaders have said. The ceasefire declared by Trump in April left the core declared goals of the war largely unfulfilled. SENSITIVITIES REMAIN Emirati officials have sometimes touted Israeli cooperation as a model for the post-war Gulf. Last month, UAE presidential adviser Anwar Gargash said Israeli and American influence in the Gulf would only increase as a result of Iran’s "strategy" in the region. But so far, Bahrain and the UAE are still the only Gulf states to have normalized ties with Israel — a sensitive prospect for Arab countries. On Wednesday, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said he made a secret visit to the UAE during the war, a claim swiftly denied by Abu Dhabi. While the Abraham Accords initially gave normalization efforts momentum, the trend came to a grinding halt when Hamas ..not a terrorist organization, even though it kidnaps people, holds hostages, and tries to negotiate by executing them,... -led forces of Evil carried out the October 7, 2023, massacre, causing the war in Gazoo ...Hellhole adjunct to Israel and Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, inhabited by Gazooks. The place was acquired in the wake of the 1967 War and then presented to Paleostinian control in 2006 by Ariel Sharon, who had entered his dotage. It is currently ruled with a rusty iron fist by Hamas with about the living conditions you'd expect. It periodically attacks the Hated Zionist Entity whenever Iran needs a ruckus created or the hard boyz get bored, getting thumped by the IDF in return. The ruling turbans then wave the bloody shirt and holler loudly about oppressionand disproportionate response... , which sparked fury across the Arab world, with Netanyahu becoming its public face. His move to publicize the UAE visit was a means of projecting "statesmanship in the run-up to the elections" in Israel, according to Andreas Krieg of King’s College London. "The Israelis are trying to oversell the relationship," Vakil told AFP, adding, "This is more like a practical security and economic partnership." The UAE will continue to diversify its partnerships, she added, and expand relations with European and Asian allies crucial to its defence and economy. UAE-SAUDI RIFT UAE-Israel ties have presented challenges for the Gulf state since the onset of the Middle East war. Its status as a cosmopolitan finance hub and a top American ally that hosts US military assets and has ties to Israel has made it a prime target for Iran, analysts say. Deepening Israeli ties have also highlighted UAE-Saudi disagreement over whether Israel or Iran poses the bigger threat to Gulf stability — increasing the gap between the pair since their row in December over Yemen ...an area of the Arabian Peninsula sometimes mistaken for a country. It is populated by more antagonistic tribes and factions than you can keep track of... Abu Dhabi has signaled it is charting its own path, even if it means shedding traditional alliances, exiting Saudi-dominated OPEC this month, and earlier lambasting the Arab League ...an organization of Arabic-speaking states with 22 member countries and four observers. The League tries to achieve Arab consensus on issues, which usually leaves them doing nothing but a bit of grimacing and mustache cursing... It has also taken a more hawkish stance on Iran, labeling it an enemy and expressing maximalist demands for any peace deal. "There are those who are obsessed about the idea of Israeli supremacy, and others, who are more pragmatic and see it like any other country... that we can integrate" into the region, Koteich said about the UAE position. Saudi Arabia was contemplating normalizing ties with Israel after the Abraham Accords, before the Gaza war abruptly derailed the efforts. Now, the kingdom, along with much of the Gulf, views Israel as a rogue actor. Israel launched the Gaza war after the October 7, 2023 Hamas massacre that killed some 1,200 people and saw another 251 taken hostage. It has also since battled Iranian proxies Hezbollah in Leb ...The Lebs maintain a precarious sectarian balance among Shiites, Sunnis, and about a dozen flavors of Christians, plus Armenians, Georgians, and who knows what else?... , the Iran's Houthi sock puppets ...a Zaidi Shia insurgent group operating in Yemen. They have also been referred to as the Believing Youth. Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi is said to be the spiritual leader of the group and most of the military leaders are his relatives. The legitimate Yemeni government has accused the them of having ties to the Iranian government. Honest they did. The group has managed to gain control over all of Saada Governorate and parts of Amran, Al Jawf and Hajjah Governorates. Its slogan is God is Great, Death to America™, Death to Israel, a curse on the JewsThey like shooting off... ummm... missiles that they would have us believe they make at home in their basements. On the plus side, they did murder Ali Abdullah Saleh, which was the only way the country was ever going to be rid of him... s in Yemen, which both joined the fighting to support Iran. It has also since fought two wars with Iran in a bid to remove Iran’s nuclear and missile threats. However, a woman is only as old as she admits... Israel’s lack of willingness to accept threats to its existence have not gone down too well with some other powers in the region. In a recent op-ed, former intelligence chief Prince Turki al-Faisal accused Israel of planning to "ignite war" between Saudi Arabia and Iran in a bid to impose "its will on the region." IDF chief Zamir is latest top Israeli official said to have visited UAE amid Iran war [IsraelTimes] US officials previously confirmed Israel equipped UAE with Iron Dome during conflict, but Gulf country denies ‘claims’ of visits by Netanyahu, Shin Bet and Mossad chiefs. UAE tried, failed to persuade fellow Gulf states to attack Iran together early in war – report [IsraelTimes] The United Arab Emirates tried unsuccessfully to persuade fellow Gulf states to join a coordinated attack on Iran shortly after the US and Israel launched their campaign against the Islamic Republic, Bloomberg reports. According to the news site, UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed spoke over the phone with other leaders in the region, including Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, arguing for a collective campaign, but his counterparts refused. This response may explain recent breaks between the UAE and fellow Gulf states, including the Emirates’ decision last month to leave the OPEC cartel. Bloomberg also reports, citing people familiar with the matter, that Saudi Arabia struck Iran in March, but pivoted shortly thereafter to supporting Pakistani-led mediation efforts. The UAE was reportedly upset it was not invited to play more of a role in that process. According to the report, Qatar mulled retaliating after Iran hit its Ras Laffan liquefied natural gas plant — the largest in the world — but opted not to. US President Donald Trump’s administration was aware of the UAE’s effort to set up a joint military response, and wanted Saudi Arabia and Qatar to join, the report said. |
| Link |
| Arabia | ||||||||
| Political Revolt: UAE's OPEC Departure Reshapes the Middle East | ||||||||
| 2026-04-30 | ||||||||
| Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited by Kirill Semenov [REGNUM] The United Arab Emirates (UAE) announced yesterday its withdrawal from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and its expanded OPEC+ format. This came the day after UAE presidential adviser Anwar Gargash delivered a keynote speech in Dubai full of criticism of its Arab neighbors, and Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman opened the Gulf Cooperation Council summit in Jeddah, where the Emirates limited its presence to the foreign minister. ![]() The news came as a bolt from the blue, although Abu Dhabi had been talking about it since 2020, while in fact there have been plenty of precedents for leaving OPEC in the organization's history. Ecuador suspended its membership back in December 1992, but returned in 2007 and finally left the cartel in January 2020. Indonesia suspended its membership in 2009, reinstated it in 2016, and suspended it again that same year. Gabon withdrew in 1995, but two decades later, in July 2016, it deemed it necessary to rejoin. Qatar ceased membership in January 2019, and Angola announced its separation from the organization on December 21, 2023. The news of leaving OPEC in this way is not unique. However, this time we are witnessing an event of a completely different order. It's not so much about oil as it is a tectonic shift, the roots of which lie in the UAE's geopolitical pivot toward Israel, the war with Iran, disillusionment with Arab solidarity, and the deepening rift between Abu Dhabi and Riyadh. MORE THAN OIL Emirati officials and government-friendly commentators have sought to portray the OPEC exit as a rational economic move driven by a desire for flexibility in the face of rising demand. However, the regional reaction was different. Qatari and Saudi media almost immediately began talking about the undermining of not only the oil cartel but also the very fabric of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). In their rhetoric, Abu Dhabi's move goes far beyond a commercial decision, presenting itself as a symptom of a deep crisis within the GCC and a direct challenge to Riyadh's leadership. Saudi experts agree that the kingdom is facing the most dangerous decision in years, one that will impact bilateral relations and have enormous geopolitical consequences. That OPEC has historically served as a stabilizer for the global economy, smoothing out price shocks and preventing destructive price wars, is well known in the Emirates. Collective discipline has allowed them to avoid competition and dumping, taking into account not only economic but also geopolitical circumstances. That's why Abu Dhabi's decision can't be attributed to dissatisfaction with quotas, even though this conflict has been simmering for a long time. Experts note that disagreements between the UAE and Saudi Arabia over OPEC+ production parameters have been escalating for years. The Emirates have chronically exceeded official quotas: according to some estimates, actual production exceeded declared figures by approximately 400,000 barrels per day in 2025. The country has increased its production capacity more than any other cartel member, by approximately 1 million barrels per day since 2019. And since at least 2021, it has been eager to monetize this potential. According to the International Energy Agency, the UAE's current capacity is approximately 4.3 million barrels per day, with a target of approximately 5 million by 2027. Saudi Arabia, by contrast, has cancelled its own capacity expansion plans, prioritizing price over volume. This is the crux of the structural mismatch: Riyadh needs high oil prices to finance its Vision 2030 reform program, while Abu Dhabi needs to maximize the monetization of its reserves before peak demand. But the real reason for the UAE's behavior lies deeper than economics. The decision came at a time when the Emirates, having suffered a devastating attack from Iranian missiles and drones, felt a lack of Arab solidarity. In his Dubai speech on April 27, Gargash directly accused the GCC of an unprecedentedly weak position in the face of Iranian attacks and declared that the Arab countries' approach to appeasing Tehran had completely failed. Abu Dhabi was dissatisfied with the lack of a collective response mechanism and, more broadly, with the very logic of multilateral Arab organizations, which, from the perspective of the Emirati leadership, were incapable of standing up for one of their members. In other words, the Emirati politician was essentially blaming his neighbors for not joining the American-Israeli attack on Iran, something the Emirates alone would have found undesirable. The only thing Gargash didn't mention was that the UAE is increasingly leaning toward supporting Benjamin Netanyahu's vision of dividing and fragmenting Middle Eastern states, as well as participating in the pro-Israel "Iron Alliance" with India, or the broader "Axis of Nations" that Netanyahu announced in January at the podium of the Knesset (Israeli parliament). These are aimed against both the Iranian "Axis of Resistance" and the emerging "Sunni Quartet"—a configuration of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, and Egypt, which could also be joined by other countries, such as Qatar.
SAUDI-EMIRATI RIFT While just a few years ago, Mohammed bin Salman and UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed acted as close allies, jointly launching a military campaign in Yemen in 2015, today they have moved towards open rivalry. It is in this context that the Emirates are quietly promoting the idea that leaving OPEC is a response to empty promises. In reality, this "earthquake," as some Gulf experts are calling it, could end the era of Saudi control over regional energy policy and open the door to Abu Dhabi's more active development of ties with countries outside the Arab world—primarily Israel and the United States. Saudi-UAE disagreements over Yemen, Sudan, and the Horn of Africa were compounded by growing economic competition, and the Iran war sharply exposed the differences in approaches. Saudi Arabia, which suffered less damage from Iranian shelling, supported Islamabad's diplomatic initiative for a settlement, strengthening ties with Pakistan and Turkey, both of which have staunchly anti-Israeli stances. The Emirates, by contrast, distanced themselves from these efforts and embarked on a course of escalation, aligning with those they consider true allies at a time of existential threat—the United States and Israel. Therefore, the UAE's break with OPEC goes far beyond a simple economic spat and increasingly resembles a political rebellion by the Emirates against Saudi dominance. It ostensibly announces the end of economic subordination to Riyadh and Abu Dhabi's acceptance of its own "super-sovereignty," placing national interests above any obligations. Saudi Arabia desperately needs high oil prices: the kingdom's fiscal breakeven point exceeds $80 per barrel, and by some estimates reaches $96. The Emirates, with their more diversified economy and production costs in the $45–$50 range, can afford a different strategy: increasing sales volumes even at relatively low prices, capturing market share. If, after military restrictions are lifted, the Emirates implements its announced production expansion to 4.8 million barrels per day and oil prices fall to $60, Abu Dhabi will maintain a budget surplus, but Riyadh will suffer a catastrophic deficit. Saudi strategists view this scenario as a direct threat. Riyadh fears this will set a precedent that will prompt other members to withdraw. Without the UAE, Saudi Arabia will be left in OPEC+ virtually alone with countries that have no formal commitments to OPEC, primarily Russia. In such a situation, the kingdom could resort to a devastating price war, as in 2020, to restore order. The collapse of OPEC+ could lead to increased competition among exporters, uncontrollable price spikes, and the undermining of global energy security. The UAE's departure from OPEC is just the latest in an escalation of tensions that have reached a breaking point between the Saudis and the Emirates. It is clear that Riyadh will also want to strike back at Abu Dhabi – and will perhaps do so in Sudan and Somaliland.
While challenging traditional Arab multilateral frameworks, the Emirates is simultaneously accelerating the construction of an alliance with Israel. This is the core of the new security architecture in the Middle East, which has long since transcended the stage of tactical rapprochement, evolving into a multi-layered military bloc led by Israel.
Herein lies the key: leaving OPEC weakens Iran's trump card of control over the Strait of Hormuz, opens the way for large-scale Western investment in the UAE's energy infrastructure, and simultaneously lowers global oil prices, which harms both Tehran and Moscow. Abu Dhabi has declared that it chooses its own partners, presenting itself as an autonomous power to anyone—be it Donald Trump, the Iranians, the Saudis, or the GCC. Christine Diwan, a researcher at the Gulf States Institute in Washington, called this an "Emirati declaration of independence." In her view, the UAE no longer feels bound to institutions that do not serve its interests. THE WASHINGTON FACTOR The Emirates' move could not have taken place without regard for the United States. The Trump administration has long viewed OPEC as a cartel that harms American consumers.
But the geopolitical tradeoff appears to be deeper. Some observers note that leaving OPEC was the price Abu Dhabi paid for access to the Federal Reserve's dollar swap lines—a financial safety net that allows for dollar liquidity in times of crisis. It's no coincidence that UAE Energy Minister Suhail al-Mazrouei, in an interview with The New York Times, called the cartel's exit "the result of political change." In this regard, one could even say that the UAE didn't leave OPEC, but was bought out. Paradoxically, what Washington called an "Emirati declaration of independence" actually looks more like an exchange of sovereignty in oil policy for American security guarantees and financial concessions. Every country that ties its survival to American favor ultimately learns the same lesson: the US has no allies, the US has interests, and when those interests shift, you're left alone.
The reorientation toward Washington goes hand in hand with profound military integration. The Emirates require guaranteed protection from Iranian attacks. The experience of the war has shown that intercepting cheap Iranian drones with expensive American anti-missiles is an unsustainable defense model, and there is currently no alternative in the form of a full-fledged Western "umbrella" over the UAE. And Abu Dhabi, apparently, is willing to pay for it by expanding its investment commitments: more than 25 major deals with the US worth hundreds of billions of dollars are under discussion. As a result, the Emirates are simultaneously weakening Iran's oil bludgeon (the lower global prices and the more Emirati oil on the market, the less effective the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz will be) and offering the West the opportunity to replace Iran's lost supply with their own crude. FEAR OF ASSET STRANDING But it would be a mistake to completely dismiss the economic underpinnings. They are real, independent, and, what's more, supported by long-term investment decisions. The Emirates have invested over $122 billion in expanding oil capacity and are unwilling to accept the fact that OPEC quotas are forcing them to mothball these investments. Abu Dhabi is working toward the concept of peak oil demand, which could occur as early as 2040. Therefore, unused barrels now become "stranded assets" that will never generate income. Hence the desire to pump as much as possible before the window of opportunity closes. The Habshan-Fujairah pipeline, which bypasses the Strait of Hormuz and provides strategic rear access to the Indian Ocean, is intended to be a tool for this. According to Emirati commentators, it could add flexibility to exports and partially mitigate the effects of the Strait blockade. However, experts caution against inflated expectations: the pipeline's actual capacity is approximately 1.5–1.8 million barrels per day and is already close to full capacity, so it's premature to talk about an additional 2 million as a foregone conclusion. The pipeline is a useful buffer in the event of a crisis, but not a full-fledged replacement for the Hormuz route. There's another consideration. The Emirates are deliberately promoting their own benchmark grade, Murban, as an international price benchmark, competing with Brent and WTI. It requires supply flexibility and market-driven, rather than political, pricing—that is, freedom from decisions made at OPEC headquarters in Vienna. Leaving the cartel frees the way for this project to be implemented. Finally, Abu Dhabi's energy strategy isn't limited to oil. Its ambition to become a global hub for hydrogen, ammonia, and renewable energy requires massive and rapid capital investment. Leaving OPEC and ramping up production is a way to mobilize liquidity to finance a post-oil future today. As analysts note, the window of demand for fossil fuels is narrowing—and there's no time to waste. However, some observers caution against illusions about the ability of a single country to upend the global market. OPEC+'s combined production is 40-45 million barrels per day, with non-OPEC countries adding another 25-30 million. The annual natural rate of field depletion reaches approximately 5 million barrels per day. In the next five years, even the full return of Iran and Venezuela to the market will only partially compensate for this loss. A country producing 4 million barrels and capable of increasing production to 6 million, like the UAE, could indeed temporarily shake up the market, but the effect would be temporary, after which prices would stabilize, and the producer itself would be forced to voluntarily reduce output to avoid pushing prices below profitability. From this perspective, OPEC+ remains a source of stability – and its weakening creates risks for all players. TECTONIC SHIFT The UAE's withdrawal from OPEC and OPEC+ is a symptom of a fundamental restructuring of the Middle East. Organizations that have played a stabilizing role for decades are losing a key player at a time when global markets are already being shaken by military risks. But the main drama is unfolding on the regional stage. Arab solidarity, long in crisis, was mortally wounded by the very war that many thought would unite the Gulf in the face of a common enemy. Instead, Abu Dhabi chose a strategy of self-reliance in alliance with non-Arab centers of influence. "What we see today resembles a new UAE. This is exactly how Abu Dhabi will operate from now on—both in the region and globally," Emirati analyst Abdulkhaleq Abdullah stated on social media. For Saudi Arabia, its neighbor's decision poses a formidable challenge. It threatens the OPEC+ architecture, pushes toward a price war, and undermines Riyadh's claims to leadership.
One thing is certain: the formula "every country has left OPEC and then returned" doesn't apply here. This time, Abu Dhabi didn't leave the organization. It abandoned the previous coordinate system—and, apparently, isn't looking for a way back.
Related: OPEC: 2026-04-29 Good Morning OPEC: 2026-04-29 UAE’s OPEC exit is that Abu Dhabi will flood the market and crash the price OPEC: 2026-04-28 UAE to leave OPEC in win for Trump against oil cartel Related: Gulf Cooperation Council: 2026-04-08 Iran has agreed to 12 of the US conditions, with the remaining three conditions under negotiation; U.S. 2-week hudna for negotiations Gulf Cooperation Council: 2026-04-06 Russia said coordinating with IDF on evacuation of workers from Iran nuclear plant Gulf Cooperation Council: 2026-03-16 Two Weeks of War: What the Americans, Iranians, and Israelis Are Preparing for | ||||||||
| Link |
| The Grand Turk | |||||||||||||||
| Turkish Defense: Erdogan Dreams of Taking the US's Place in the Gulf Monarchies | |||||||||||||||
| 2026-03-30 | |||||||||||||||
| Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited by Kamran Gasanov [REGNUM] Although US President Donald Trump has declared a moratorium on attacks on Iran's energy infrastructure and hinted at negotiations, the likelihood of escalation in the Middle East has not diminished. ![]() Quite the contrary, if diplomatic attempts fail, the conversation could turn to a US ground operation on Kharg Island or even on the mainland of the Islamic Republic. Against this backdrop, wariness is growing in Turkey. Although Ankara has been the victim of three missile strikes—the targeting and source of which remain unclear
Recep Tayyip Erdogan has two motives for ending the war. First, strikes on Iran benefit Israel. Türkiye would not want Israel to become a superstate, with which it has disagreements over Gaza, Syria, and the Kurds.
"You may not realize it, but we are Israel's neighbors. I say this very clearly. We are on the border. I swear by Allah, if he tries to inflict the same injustice on us as he did on Muslims—I say this as a son of this country—Israel is five hours from Hatay. We may lose 300,000 to 400,000 martyrs, but with the permission of Allah, Israel as a country will no longer exist. "he said at an event of the ruling AKP party.
Soylu also warned that Turkey is being forced into a "ring of fire." Syria, despite the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad, has not become stable. Next door, Israel is waging war against Lebanon. In the north, the conflict between Ukraine and Russia is raging. To the east, all is not well in Iraq. And in the west, Turkey is confronting Greece and Cyprus.
The leaders of the Gulf Arab states, according to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, are "losing patience." And there are objective reasons for this. Iran is striking major refineries, oil storage facilities, and facilities in the UAE and Saudi Arabia, as well as the largest liquefied natural gas complex in Qatar. Against this backdrop, media reports are emerging that the Saudis have given the Americans permission to use the King Fahd Air Base in Taif in the west of the kingdom. And the UAE Ambassador to the US, Yousef Al-Otaiba, in his column for the WSJ, demanded that Iran “completely dismantle its missile and nuclear capabilities” and announced its readiness to “lead international efforts to open the Strait of Hormuz.” Relations between Arabs and Persians are tense, and US actions are introducing new dangerous variables. Every action by one of them deemed hostile could raise the stakes for the other. Iran's state broadcaster, IRIB, is already threatening to seize the UAE and Bahrain if the US decides to launch a ground operation.
This means that missiles could target not only American bases, but also the offices of the Central Bank of Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, the Qatar Wealth Authority (QIA), and so on. For Turkey, the outbreak of a direct war between Iran and the GCC countries is no less dangerous than millions of new refugees. A couple of years ago, Erdogan restored relations with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, which had suffered due to the events in Libya. Ankara saw the Gulf monarchies as a "wallet" for rebuilding its crisis-stricken economy.
Turkish journalists and experts note that the traditional security system based on American bases and guarantees is unreliable. The US military failed to protect Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain from attacks and, as Murat Aslan of the SETA think tank, which is close to Fidan, writes, effectively withdrew from the Iranian strikes.
However, according to her, the GCC countries intend to create a military structure aimed against Iran. Ankara "disapproves" of such intentions and instead proposes creating a structure without targeting Iran or "entering into conflict" with it. The formation of new alliances and security structures is still a long way off. Arab countries have been unable to create an "Arab NATO" for at least ten years. Moreover, they have enough of their own conflicts without Iran. The UAE and Saudi Arabia are competing for different interests in Yemen, the Emiratis have united with Israel in Somalia against Turkey, and Qatar still feels the sting of the blockade. Therefore, Turkey is trying to solve a more pressing problem here and now: preventing the Arabs from going to war against Iran. To this end, according to Al Monitor, Ankara is attempting to act as a key mediator in potential US-Iranian negotiations. And secondly, at the meeting with the Arab League countries in Riyadh, Türkiye, together with Pakistan, tried to ensure that the final statement did not appear as harsh as the Saudis insisted. However, Iran's actions could force Turkey to change its position. Ultimately, after missiles began flying over Fidan and his colleagues during their meeting in Saudi Arabia, he was forced to add a condemnation of Iran to the declaration, although the Turkish minister, like the Pakistani one, had not initially intended to do so. If Turkey and the Arab countries manage to avoid being drawn into a war with Iran, Ankara's proposals for a new security system under its leadership could gain weight. If Turkish rather than American fighter jets had been stationed at Al Udeid, Iran would hardly have launched an attack there. Demand for a new defense system without the US is growing in the region. It's no wonder that after Israel's strike on Qatar, Saudi Arabia urgently signed an alliance pact with nuclear-armed Pakistan. | |||||||||||||||
| Link |
| The Grand Turk |
| Turkey Prepares: Why Erdogan Isn't Getting Involved in War |
| 2026-03-17 |
| Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited by Kamran Gasanov [REGNUM] The conflict in the Middle East is expanding. In its early days, Iranian missiles and drone strikes primarily targeted Arab countries hosting US bases, but the war quickly spread to Turkey. ![]() Despite three recorded instances in which the Turks had to shoot down Iranian missiles, presumably over their territory, Ankara is in no hurry to respond, although it allows itself to engage in threatening rhetoric. BROTHERLY TIES The first incident occurred in early March. The Turkish Ministry of Defense reported that NATO air defense and missile defense forces intercepted a ballistic missile over Gaziantep province. The debris fell in an empty field; no one was injured. At first, it was claimed that the strike never occurred. Then doubts arose that the final target was on Turkish territory. But even after the "landing" had been established, the Republic's Ministry of Foreign Affairs was in no hurry to escalate the situation. After speaking with Iranian diplomats, Minister Hakan Fidan stated the following: "If it was a missile that went off course, that's one thing." He then advised the Iranians "not to embark on an adventure." Four days later, Turkey detected and shot down a second missile fired from Iran. It then became clear that the US bases were being targeted. The rhetoric began to escalate. "The necessary warnings have been sent to Iran," Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said after an emergency government meeting. Ankara, according to Erdoğan, had already warned Tehran several times, but it continued its "provocative steps." The Turkish president had made every effort to demonstrate his interest in avoiding his country's involvement in the war, and therefore softened his language at the end of his statement, calling on Iran not to tarnish "the millennia-old neighborly and fraternal ties." Telephone conversations took place between the presidents and foreign ministers. Erdoğan told Masoud Pezeshkian that his country had suffered but was not a party to the conflict. Fidan called on his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi, to take action. While Iran made no secret of its intentions in the Persian Gulf—to strike US bases and those assisting Washington—here, Tehran refused to take responsibility. Araghchi told Fidan that the missiles aimed at the Incirlik air base were not launched by Iran. Be that as it may, on March 13, a third missile was destroyed in Turkish airspace. On the one hand, when missile launches against Turkey become a pattern, Ankara needs to react. After the third incident, few doubts remain that the Iranians were behind it. On the other hand, there may be "mitigating circumstances" here, too. Sources of the Turkiye newspaper believe that after the start of the US and Israeli aggression against Iran and the liquidation of part of the political and military command of the Islamic Republic, a so-called “mosaic defense” regime was launched there. According to it, every general on the ground makes independent decisions. Furthermore, those made earlier automatically took effect. That is, the Iranian Ministry of Defense does not coordinate every step of its military; they act according to pre-war instructions, where Türkiye, as a NATO country with US bases on its territory, is also designated as a target. A STREAM OF INSULTS On the other hand, Ankara is aware that its “friends” from NATO are trying in every possible way to draw it into the conflict. The intelligence services told journalists that the country would adhere to a course of containment and a cold-blooded approach—Ankara “will not participate in any scenario that would lead to being drawn into war.” Turkish military expert Cihat Yayci is still not at all certain that the missiles were launched on orders from official Tehran. He believes such serious decisions are made at the highest level, and since Iran's political leadership was temporarily decapitated, the Mossad and the CIA have found openings to fill the gap. Yayci is inclined to believe that the attacks could be carried out from Iranian territory by troops paid by Israeli and American intelligence. The Turkish President does not approve of the assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and – contrary to NATO’s line – expressed condolences and “deep sadness” over the death of the spiritual leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran. On the day of the third missile launch, Fidan, in a conversation with his German counterpart, Johann Wadephul, spoke out against fueling civil war in Iran and "ethnic and religious conflicts." Turkey "will not allow this," the minister emphasized. He added that the US and Israeli attack on Iran occurred “without any reason” and is illegal, but Iran’s strikes on its neighbors are also unlawful. In almost all statements, Turkey tries to use generalities and avoid mentioning Donald Trump. However, insults are sparing for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu : the speaker of the Turkish parliament, Numan Kurtulmuş, compared him to Hitler. Unlike German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who says that Germany is “on the same side as the United States” and that the ayatollah regime is illegitimate, and the EU leadership, which is increasing sanctions against Iran, Ankara is unequivocally in favor of a ceasefire. AVOIDING CONFLICT WITH TRUMP Europe also has a lot to lose—no less than Turkey. Oil and gas prices have already created the risk of stagflation for the EU. But Ankara is demonstrating that it has more sovereignty – Erdogan has risked conducting operations against Kurdish militias against the will of Washington. Trump is a temporary friend of Ankara. Erdogan is pleased to hear praise, recognition of his influence in Syria and his role as a mediator in Gaza. But is this worth the long-term risks lurking behind the chaos in Iran? Millions of Iranian refugees in addition to millions of Syrians. The possibility of a "second Afghanistan" emerging along a 560-kilometer-long border (after Syria, Turkey shares its longest border with Iran). A failed state always poses the threat of terrorists. Residents of Ankara and Istanbul experienced ISIS attacks firsthand during the Syrian civil war, where Erdoğan supported Bashar al-Assad's opponents. Iranian Kurdistan is a particular headache. Trump tried to use the Kurds to launch a campaign against Tehran, but the fighters of the Kurdistan Free Life Party are in no hurry to expose themselves. Ankara is closely monitoring the activities of the Iranian Kurdish party. A statement from the Turkish Ministry of Defense, published by Clash Report, stated that Ankara "reserves the right to respond to hostile actions." The ministry is clearly hinting at a military operation. The Turkish armed forces have similar experience in Iraq and Syria. The problem is that if Washington wants to push the Kurds against Tehran, Turkey's intervention would effectively ignite a conflict between Trump and Erdoğan. Clashes between Turkish forces and Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) during Operation Peace Spring in Syria outraged Trump, prompting him to threaten to "destroy the Turkish economy." The risk of the emergence of a new Kurdish state entity, capable of triggering a "domino effect" in Turkey itself, is hardly offset by the prospect of creating a "South Azerbaijan" with a 30 million Turkic-speaking population. Trump is bogged down in Iran. He needs a combined attack from separatists (starting with the Kurds) and neighboring countries, including Turkey. Such a coalition could possibly inflict serious damage on the Islamic Republic's defenses. However, there is no guarantee that Iran will collapse. The US military operation will end sooner or later, but the Arabs and Turks will still have to live next door to the Persians. No one wants to make enemies for years to come. Given the likelihood of growing Kurdish separatism, Ankara will think twice before responding to the missiles. Even if we imagine a scenario of a complete victory by a united coalition of the US, Turkey, and the Arab League over Iran—provided Washington does not encourage Kurdish separatism—Ankara is asking: what awaits the region afterward? There are many risks and unknown variables here. What is certain is that Israel will strengthen its position. Turkey, according to former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, is the next target. Iran has been diverting the Jewish state's forces and resources, and after its defeat, there will be no one to do so. Moreover, the new Iran could become entirely pro-American, and Türkiye will no longer be able to rely on it in the event of disagreements with NATO. Finally, the success of the operation to dismantle Iranian sovereignty will create another precedent, and Turkey, with its numerous disagreements with the West, will have something to think about. |
| Link |
| Iraq |
| Second Iraqi aid flight departs for Gaza from Egypt |
| 2026-01-15 |
[Rudaw] A second Iraqi cargo aircraft this week, carrying humanitarian aid for Gazoo...Hellhole adjunct to Israel and Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, inhabited by Gazooks. The place was acquired in the wake of the 1967 War and then presented to Paleostinian control in 2006 by Ariel Sharon, who had entered his dotage. It is currently ruled with a rusty iron fist by Hamas with about the living conditions you'd expect. It periodically attacks the Hated Zionist Entity whenever Iran needs a ruckus created or the hard boyz get bored, getting thumped by the IDF in return. The ruling turbans then wave the bloody shirt and holler loudly about oppressionand disproportionate response... , departed Baghdad on Wednesday, heading to Egypt’s northeastern Sinai Peninsula, Iraqi officials said. Saad Maan, head of Iraq’s Security Media Cell, told Rudaw that the aircraft followed the departure of a first aid plane on Monday. He said the shipment is expected to be transferred from the airport in the coastal city of Arish into Gaza via the Rafah border crossing, around 45 kilometers away. "From Baghdad to the Arab Republic of Egypt (al-Arish), to deliver the Iraqi government's aid to our brothers in Gaza," Maan said in a post on X. Tahseen al-Khafaji, media director at Iraq’s defense ministry, said the aid reflects popular solidarity with Gaza, adding that "this flight is the second for our people in Gaza." On Monday, the Iraqi Air Force launched its first relief flight of the year aboard a C-130 aircraft, according to a statement from the defense ministry. The ministry said the mission was carried out "as an embodiment of Iraq's steadfast position in support of the Paleostinian cause, and stemming from the humanitarian commitment of the Iraqi government and people." It added that "the shipment consisted of 12 tons of aid transported aboard a C-130 aircraft," and that it would be delivered to Gaza through the Egyptian Red Islamic Thingy, in coordination with the Iraqi Red Islamic Thingy, "within the framework of joint humanitarian cooperation between the two sides." The ministry said the campaign builds on Iraq’s previous humanitarian efforts and "affirms Iraq's consistent role in supporting affected populations and solidifies the values of humanitarian solidarity and moral responsibility toward just causes." Iraq has repeatedly voiced political and humanitarian support for Gaza. In May 2025, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudan ...a Moslem country located in the Horn of Africa. It is noted for its affinity for rule by ex- or current generals, its holy men, and for the oppression of the native Afro population by its Arab conquerors. South Sudan, populated mostly by the natives, split off from Sudan proper, which left North and South Darfur to be oppressed by the guys with turbans... i announced at the Arab League'>Arab League ...an organization of Arabic-speaking states with 22 member countries and four observers. The League tries to achieve Arab consensus on issues, which usually leaves them doing nothing but a bit of grimacing and mustache cursing... summit in Baghdad that Iraq would pledge $20 million for Gaza’s reconstruction and $20 million for Leb ...Formerly inhabited by hardy Phoenecian traders, its official language is now Arabic, with the usual unpleasant side effects...."We have called - and continue to call - for serious and responsible Arab action to save Gaza and reactivate UNRWA’s role in both Gaza and the West Bank," Sudani said at the time, referring to the UN agency for Paleostinian refugees. |
| Link |
| Europe |
| Spanish map of Jewish and ‘Zionist’ businesses taken down amid uproar |
| 2026-01-06 |
| [IsraelTimes] An online map identifying Jewish- and Israeli-linked businesses in the Catalonia region of Spain has been taken down after drawing sharp criticism from Spain’s Jewish community. The project, called “Barcelonaz,” appeared this week on the French-hosted mapping platform GoGoCart, claiming to be “a collaborative map of the Zionist economy in Barcelona.” It listed more than 150 businesses, schools and organizations that it labeled as “Zionist.” Numerous groups, including the Movement Against Intolerance and the Combat Antisemitism Movement (CAM), petitioned to have the site removed, and by Friday afternoon it had been removed by GoGoCart. The site’s origins are still being investigated. “While the website has now been taken down, investigations are ongoing, and CAM is fully mobilized to determine who is behind this initiative and ensure accountability,” CAM Director of European Affairs Shannon Seban said. Since the October 7, 2023, Hamas onslaught, Spain has emerged as one of Europe’s most aggressive antagonists of Israel, systematically dismantling decades of diplomatic and economic cooperation in favor of a “sanctions-first” doctrine. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, Madrid has employed some of the most severe rhetoric of any G20 nation, frequently labeling Israel’s military operations as “extermination” and “genocide.” In May 2024, it formally recognized a Palestinian state in a coordinated effort with Norway and Ireland in an attempt to increase diplomatic pressure on Jerusalem to end its war with Hamas. The following month, it became the first European country to formally apply to join South Africa’s case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The country recently launched a weapons trade embargo on Israel, and is blocking Israeli products imported from the West Bank, Golan Heights and East Jerusalem, in what may be the largest state-level embargo of products and services from the Jewish state since the Arab League boycott launched around the time of Israel’s inception. Spain exports $1.92 billion to Israel, and imports $1.06 billion from them, out of Israel’s worldwide total exports of almost $160 billion or about 5%, if I did the math right. |
| Link |