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Home Front: WoT
Al-Qaida Strengthens Its Presence In America's Heartland
2013-11-26
[InvestorsBusinessDaily] Terrorism: Al-Qaeda's abilities to strike in the U.S. are "more dangerous and more numerous than before 9/11," says House intelligence chief Mike Rogers. Why is his hair on fire? Bigger question: Why isn't our president's?

Al-Qaeda forces of Evil linked to wars in Iraq and Syria -- including several dozen whom Homeland Security mistakenly let into the U.S. as war "refugees" -- have recently been found stockpiling heavy weapons and possibly building cells in Kentucky and North Carolina and other unlikely places in the heart of America.

Rogers, who as head of the intelligence panel is routinely privileged to some of the same super-classified terrorist threat matrixes as ithe president, says the increasing likelihood of forces of Evil who work for, or are inspired by, al-Qaeda carrying out more Boston Marathon-style attacks inside the homeland "keeps guys like me up at night."

We should take his warnings seriously, for the following reasons:

  • A recently unsealed terrorism case in North Carolina reveals a dangerous bridge between American-raised jihadists and al-Qaeda's growing network in Syria. The FBI tossed in the slammer
    Keep yer hands where we can see 'em, if yez please!
    Pakistain-born Basit Javed Sheikh, living here as a legal permanent resident, for providing material support to al-Qaeda.

  • The 29-year-old is just one of a suspected 1,000 or more jihadists with U.S. and other Western passports who are traveling to Syria to train to kill Christians there and possibly return here to kill Americans.

  • They follow al-Qaeda's new strategic criminal mastermind, Abu Musab al-Suri, a red-haired, blue-eyed Syrian who many experts say may be more dangerous than the late Osama bin Laden
    ... who doesn't live anywhere anymore...
    . Al-Suri, who is said to have helped plan the 2004 train bombings in Madrid and the 2005 train bombings in London, has called for a series of similar small-scale attacks in America, culminating in the use of weapons of mass destruction.

  • Several dozen suspected terrorist bombmakers -- including some thought to have killed U.S. troops -- have been given asylum inside the U.S. as refugees from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

  • According to ABC News, the FBI in 2011 busted two Iraqi "refugees" trying to buy Stinger missiles and other heavy arms in Kentucky. Turns out Waad Ramadan Alwan and Mohanad Shareef Hammadi were members of Al-Qaeda in Iraq. They bragged to an informant about killing American troops there.

    Alwan, who built a dozen deadly IEDs in Iraq and used a sniper rifle to kill U.S. soldiers, said he had them "for lunch and dinner." Yet the unvetted terrorists, who also traveled to Syria, were invited to resettle here and even receive welfare. They were allowed to move into public housing near high-security Fort Knox and Fort Campbell, where the Army Nightstalker pilots involved in the raid on bin Laden were based. Alwan spoke of targeting an Army captain in the U.S. and possibly attacking other homeland targets.

  • They are just two of more than 70,000 Iraqi war refugees who have passed through the flawed U.S. refugee screening system. Thousands more have streamed in from Afghanistan, Libya and Somalia.

  • These failed Islamic states, along with Yemen, Tunisia, Algeria and Mali, have become safe havens akin to pre-9/11 Afghanistan. Rogers believes the next attack on America might originate from one of them, most likely from Syria.

  • Al-Qaeda in Syria has already projected violence outside Syria to Beirut, where two al-Qaeda jacket wallahs Tuesday blew up the Iranian embassy to intimidate Shiite Tehran into cutting off support to the Assad regime.

    Despite all these Mohammedan countries harboring new al-Qaeda threats, the B.O. regime is pressing ahead with "piecemeal" reforms to open the U.S. border and relax immigration. Now is not the time.
  • Link


    Terror Networks
    The New Mastermind of Jihad
    2012-04-12
    A taste.
    A recently freed Islamist thinker has long advocated small-scale, independent acts of anti-Western terror

    Mohamed Merah, the 23-year-old Islamist gunman who hunted down three Jewish children and a rabbi after murdering three French paratroopers in Toulouse last month, didn't act alone. In his journey from the slums of Toulouse, to the local mosques, to the terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan that he described to French police, to filming his murder of the terrified children in order to post video clips on the web, Mr. Merah was following a path marked out years earlier by the coldblooded jihadist theoretician Abu Musab al-Suri.
    According to the baby naming sites, Musab is an uncommon name in Islamic communities. It is a masculine name of Arabic origin and is said to mean 'Undefeatable'. In Islamic belief Musab was the name of a 'Sahabah', a disciple of the prophet Mohammed. Perhaps that last is why al Zarqawi's full nom de guerre was Abu Musab al Zarqawi.
    Once called "the most dangerous terrorist you've never heard of" by CNN, Mr. al-Suri, whose real name is Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, served in the days before 9/11 as the facilitator who took Western reporters to meet with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. Photographs of him from those trips show a well-built man with pale white skin, a red beard and blue eyes who--Afghan garb aside--would not look out of place in an Irish pub or a cafe in Brussels.

    Mr. al-Suri's plans for a wave of "individual jihad" in the West are contained in "A Call to a Global Islamic Resistance," a 1,600-page book that he published on the Web in 2005, shortly before he was apprehended in Pakistan with a $5 million CIA bounty on his head. The manifesto combines strikingly clearheaded historical analysis with trenchant commentary on what he saw as two decades of strategic and operational failures by jihadists. The destruction of the World Trade Center was a short-term public-relations success for al Qaeda, Mr. al-Suri conceded, but American cruise missiles had made short work of the group's havens in Afghanistan, and Western special forces and intelligence agencies had decimated the ranks of its fighters and crippled the global jihadist movement.

    What Mr. al-Suri learned from the Afghan debacle and from al Qaeda's subsequent defeat in Iraq was that jihadists were all but helpless in battle against modern Western armies. In place of old-fashioned hierarchical terror organizations, which had failed, he called for a global struggle in which shadowy motivators and facilitators would prompt jihadists to train and arm themselves in independent, self-generating terror cells that would target Western civilians. His goal: a relentless campaign of exemplary acts of violence under a single ideological banner, culminating in the use of weapons of mass destruction.
    Read the whole thing. Also click on each name to see more articles on the gentleman in the Rantburg archives -- we've been following his exploits for quite some time. And for the really curious, Mr. al-Suri has a nice write-up in Wikipedia.
    Link


    Syria-Lebanon-Iran
    Syria releases the 7/7 'mastermind'
    2012-02-05
    The alleged terrorist mastermind behind the July 7 London bombings is reported to have been freed from a Syrian jail by President Bashar Assad's regime.
    Anyone surprised by this? Anyone? Bueller?
    Abu Musab al-Suri had been held in Syria for six years after being captured by the CIA in 2005 and transported to the country of his birth under its controversial extraordinary rendition programme.

    But he is now said to have been released as a warning to the US and Britain about the consequences of turning their backs on President al-Assad's regime as it tries to contain the uprising in the country.
    Time for the SAS and MI6 to conduct a small joint 'operation'...
    Al-Suri, also known as Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, was al-Qaeda's operations chief in Europe and has been accused of planning the London bombings, in which four British-born terrorists detonated three bombs on the Underground and another on a bus, killing 52 people and injuring more than 700 others in 2005.

    In a statement released after the attacks, al-Suri said: "[In my teachings] I have mentioned vital and legitimate targets to be hit in the enemy's countries ... Among those targets that I specifically mentioned as examples was the London Underground. [Targeting this] was and still is the aim."

    A mechanical engineer, he is also wanted in Spain in connection with the Madrid train bombings in 2004, which left 191 dead, and for links to an attack on the Paris Metro in 1995.
    Link


    Home Front: WoT
    A Not Very Private Feud Over Terrorism
    2008-06-09
    Every once in a while the NYT brings home an interesting analysis piece. This is one of those.
    WASHINGTON — A bitter personal struggle between two powerful figures in the world of terrorism has broken out, forcing their followers to choose sides. This battle is not being fought in the rugged no man’s land on the Pakistan-Afghan border. It is a contest reverberating inside the Beltway between two of America’s leading theorists on terrorism and how to fight it, two men who hold opposing views on the very nature of the threat.

    On one side is Bruce Hoffman, a cerebral 53-year-old Georgetown University historian and author of the highly respected 1998 book “Inside Terrorism.” He argues that Al Qaeda is alive, well, resurgent and more dangerous than it has been in several years. In his corner, he said, is a battalion of mainstream academics and a National Intelligence Estimate issued last summer warning that Al Qaeda had reconstituted in Pakistan.

    On the other side is Marc Sageman, an iconoclastic 55-year-old Polish-born psychiatrist, sociologist, former C.I.A. case officer and scholar-in-residence with the New York Police Department. His new book, “Leaderless Jihad,” argues that the main threat no longer comes from the organization called Al Qaeda, but from the bottom up — from radicalized individuals and groups who meet and plot in their neighborhoods and on the Internet. In his camp, he said, are agents and analysts in highly classified positions at the Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation.

    If Dr. Hoffman gets inside organizations — focusing on command structures — Dr. Sageman gets inside heads, analyzing the terrorist mind-set. But this is more important than just a battle of ideas. It is the latest twist in the contest for influence and resources in Washington that has been a central feature of the struggle against terrorism since Sept. 11, 2001.

    Officials from the White House to the C.I.A. acknowledge the importance of the debate of the two men as the government assesses the nature of the threat. Looking forward, it is certain to be used to win bureaucratic turf wars over what programs will be emphasized in the next administration.

    If there is no looming main Qaeda threat — just “bunches of guys,” as Dr. Sageman calls them — then it would be easier for a new president to think he could save money or redirect efforts within the huge counterterrorism machine, which costs the United States billions of dollars and has created armies of independent security consultants and counterterrorism experts in the last seven years.

    Preventing attacks planned by small bands of zealots in the garages and basements just off Main Street or the alleys behind Islamic madrasas is more a job for the local police and the F.B.I., working with undercover informants and with authorities abroad. “If it’s a ‘leaderless jihad,’ then I can find something else to do because the threat is over,” said Peter Bergen, a senior fellow at the nonpartisan New America Foundation, who puts himself in Dr. Hoffman’s camp. “Leaderless things don’t produce big outcomes.”
    But it doesn't take very much to provide leadership, as Osama bin Laden demonstrated. A charismatic man, or small group of men, with some kind of funding can bring together a fair number of leaderless men seeking jihad and provide the direction required to create a 9/11, a 3/11, or a Bali. One of the major lessons of modern terrorism is that it can be surprisingly low tech and remain off the radar screens of local and national police. It's what you can do with a small cadre of committed people. Given the bureauocratic, officious nature of police and the inability of many analysts to find dots, let alone connect them, the complacency Mr. Bergen advocates seems fatally misplaced.
    On the other hand, if the main task can be seen as thwarting plots or smiting Al Qaeda’s leaders abroad, then attention and resources should continue to flow to the C.I.A., the State Department, the military and terror-financing sleuths.
    The NYT presents this as an 'either/or' scenario, when what is needed is, of course, both, but without the hidebound structures that spend more time in empire-building than they do in rooting out problems.
    “One way to enhance your budget is to frame it in terms of terrorism,” said Steven Simon, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “But the problem is that ‘Al Qaedatry’ is more art than science — and people project onto the subject a lot of their own preconceptions.”

    The divide over the nature of the threat turned nasty, even by the rough standards of academia, when Dr. Hoffman reviewed Dr. Sageman’s book this spring for Foreign Affairs in an essay, “The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism: Why Osama bin Laden Still Matters.” He accused Dr. Sageman of “a fundamental misreading of the Al Qaeda threat,” adding that his “historical ignorance is surpassed only by his cursory treatment of social-networking theory.”

    In the forthcoming issue of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Sageman returns fire, accusing Dr. Hoffman of “gross misrepresentation.” In an interview, Dr. Sageman said he was at a loss to explain his rival’s critique: “Maybe he’s mad that I’m the go-to guy now.”

    Some terrorism experts find the argument silly — and dangerous. “Sometimes it seems like this entire field is stepping into a boys-with-toys conversation,” said Karen J. Greenberg, executive director of New York University’s Center on Law and Security. “Here are two guys, both of them respected, saying that there is only one truth and only one occupant of the sandbox. That’s ridiculous. Both of them are valuable.”
    And both would spend more time at each other's throats than they would dealing with the major problem at hand.
    Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, a former director of central intelligence, sees merit in both sides, too; he said in Singapore last week that Al Qaeda is training European, and possibly American, recruits. But, he added, “You also have the development of violent, extremist networks.”

    One argument for playing down Al Qaeda’s importance — Dr. Sageman’s point — has been the public declarations of some prominent Sunni clerics who have criticized Al Qaeda for its indiscriminate killing of Muslim civilians.

    A leading Syrian-born militant theorist believed to be in American custody, known by the nom de guerre Abu Musab al-Suri, also has argued in favor of leaderless jihad. In his 1,600-page life work, he advises jihadists to create decentralized networks of individuals and local cells bound by belief, instead of hierarchical structures that could be targets of attack. He has referred to Mr. bin Laden as a “pharaoh.”

    Dr. Hoffman’s principal argument relies on the re-emergence of Al Qaeda, starting in 2005 and 2006, along the Afghan-Pakistan border. There is empirical evidence, he says, that from that base, Al Qaeda has been “again actively directing and initiating international terrorist operations on a grand scale.”
    The al-Qaeda model has been to find a faraway place that can be used for a base of operations, so that young men can be trained for terrorist or paramilitary operations. It's what Binny did in Afghanistan in the late 90s and what he was seeking to do in the Sudan and in Somalia before that. In turn that came from his experiences during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Binny wants a hierarchy with himself as director; that hierarchy needs a physical location. The other type of model, what al-Suri advocates, is a decentralized network that needs little if any physical plant. A look at al-Suri's life demonstrates why he favors this model; he's never had the opportunity to slip a leash and build a terrorist structure for himself.
    But it has been easy for intelligence agencies to get the analysis wrong when faced with piecemeal and contradictory evidence.

    One example is the 2004 train bombings in Madrid that killed 191 people. Declarations by several Spanish officials and experts of such a link were undermined by evidence that the group was self-motivated, self-trained and self-financed, and that the explosives were bought locally.

    Other examples are provided by the 2004 plot to attack the London area with fertilizer bombs, and the July 7, 2005, transit bombings in London. At first, both were thought to support the home-grown terrorist thesis: British citizens, most of Pakistani descent, had carried out attacks with homemade bombs. Only later did evidence surface that in both cases, at least some had trained in Pakistan at military camps suspected of links to Qaeda operatives.

    So a question remains: Was Mohammad Sidique Khan, one of the suicide bombers in the 2005 attacks, a local kid gone wrong, a full-fledged Qaeda operative, or both?

    “You can argue that if you subtract his travel to Pakistan, there’s no 7/7,” said Samuel J. Rascoff, an assistant professor of law at New York University and a former intelligence official with the New York City police. “You can also argue that if you subtract his radicalization in Northern England, there’s no 7/7.”

    Dr. Sageman’s critics argue that his more local focus plays to a weak point in gauging threats: People tend to feel the threat nearest to home is the most urgent. In April, for example, the Kansas City office of the F.B.I. met with state and local authorities from Kansas and Missouri to analyze “agroterrorism,” a big issue in America’s heartland. The discussion was about the possibility of terrorists causing an outbreak of diseases that could poison cattle or crops, crippling the economies of farm states.

    Terrorism-weary prosecuting judges and police investigators in Europe listen to the debate on the other side of the Atlantic and tend to find it empty. They say it is hard to know where radicalization starts — among groups of friends, in an imam’s sermon in Europe or at home on the Internet — and when operational training by Al Qaeda is a factor. They prefer a blended approach.

    France, Spain and Italy, for example, pour resources and manpower into investigations at home — from studying radicalization and wiretapping suspicious individuals to infiltrating mosques and community centers. These countries also track movements of suspicious individuals abroad and networks with both local and foreign connections. Terrorist-related cases fall under the authority of special investigative superjudges who have access to all classified intelligence, and can use much of the information in trials.

    The Europeans say that for them, the argument is not theoretical. Somewhere in Europe, just about every week, a terrorist plot is uncovered and arrests are made.
    We at the Burg sometimes forget that the Euro anti-terror organizations are very, very good at what they do, even if their courts and their politicans don't back them up.
    “The danger of this ‘either-or’ argument could lead us to the mistakes of the past,” said Baltasar Garzón, Spain’s leading antiterror investigatory magistrate. “In the ’90s, we saw atomized cells as everything, and then Al Qaeda came along. And now we look at Al Qaeda and say it’s no longer the threat. We’re making the same mistake again.”
    So for America, a suggested perscription is 1) vigorous prosecution of home-grown threats 2) continued surveillance at home without stomping on our civil liberties, as bureaucracies tend to do over time 3) cooperation with competent anti-terror units around the world 4) revising our national and international legal structures to be more effective against terrorism and, important, to prevent terrorists from using those legal structures against us 5) treating countries that harbor terrorists, or who can't police their own countries, as pariahs subject to removal (with or without UN blessing) and 6) treating regions of the world that lack sovereign governments as free-fire zones.
    Link


    India-Pakistan
    Unconfirmed: Dr. Amin al-Haq. head of Bin Laden's "Black Guard" Reported Captured
    2008-01-07
    Until it's confirmed we get the accordion lady.
    A senior al Qaeda commander has been reported to have been captured in the Pakistani city of Lahore, according to a Pakistani newspaper. Dr. Amin al Haq, the security coordinator of Osama bin Laden’s Black Guard, “was apprehended from Lahore couple of days back,” The Nation reported, citing “credible Afghan sources.” Al Haq is said to be “under interrogation” at an undisclosed location.

    The report of al Haq’s capture has not been confirmed, a senior intelligence official told The Long War Journal. US intelligence agencies are aware of the report.

    Al Haq has a long pedigree with both the Taliban and al Qaeda. He was born in Afghanistan's Nangarhar province, was educated as a physician, and practiced medicine in Pakistan. “He was associated with Hizb-e-Islami Afghanistan headed by late Maulvi Younas Khalis, which joined the Taliban Movement in 1996,” The Nation reported. He “was also part of the Afghan delegation flown to Sudan in 1996 to bring Osama bin Laden to Afghanistan.”

    On Dec. 19, 2000, al Haq was identified as a senior member of al Qaeda per United Nations resolution 1267. He accompanied Osama bin Laden during the 2001 battle at Tora Bora in Nangarhar province, and helped senior al Qaeda leaders escape the US and Afghan militia assault on the cave complex. During renewed fighting at Tora Bora in the summer of 2007, al Haq was reported to have been wounded and fled across the border into Pakistan's Kurram tribal agency.

    As security coordinator for the Black Guard, it is believed al Haq would be in close proximity to Osama bin Laden. US intelligence believes Osama bin Laden is hiding in Pakistan’s tribal agencies, a claim the Pakistani government has denied. Many of the senior al Qaeda leader captured in Pakistan since Sept. 11, including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abu Musab al Suri, have been detained in Pakistan’s major cities.
    The last I heard, which was awhile ago, Binny was holed up in Chitral. However, I also believe he travels with relative freedom throughout Pakistain and at any given time he's as likely to be in Lahore or Peshawar or Multan as he is to be in Chitral.
    Several senior al Qaeda leaders -- such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Saif al Adel, and Walid bin Attash -- rose through the ranks in al Qaeda by serving in the Black Guard. A Special Forces raid against the Black Guard camp in Danda Saidgai in North Waziristan, Pakistan in March 2006 resulted in the death of Imam Asad and several dozen members of the Black Guard. Asad was the camp commander, a senior Chechen al Qaeda commander, and associate of Shamil Basayev, the Chechen al Qaeda leader killed by Russian security forces in July 2006.
    Link


    Terror Networks
    How Qaeda Warned Its Operatives on Using Cell Phones
    2006-10-18
    When an aspiring Al Qaeda terrorist is buying a cell phone, it's best that he purchase the chip inside the device under a phony name or from a black market vendor that does not sell the accompanying documentation. If he has any reason to believe his phone has been tapped, he should sell it immediately to a stranger.

    This is the kind of advice contained in "Myth of Delusion," a 151-page manuscript making the rounds on password-protected jihadi Web sites. The book recently caught the attention of American intelligence analysts, who estimate that it was released sometime this summer.

    An English translation obtained by The New York Sun and whose authenticity was confirmed by a senior intelligence official gives an insight into what America's Islamist enemies believe they know about the CIA and the National Security Agency. It also underscores the paranoid mind at the heart of the international jihad movement, devoting paragraphs to how South Korean intelligence influences America's national security through a newspaper controlled by the Unification Church, the Washington Times.

    The author of the book is a little-known terrorist named Mohammed al-Hakaymah, a member of a violent group that recently splintered off from an Egyptian Islamist organization, Gama'a al-Islamiyya, when it signed a cease-fire agreement with Cairo. Mr. Hakaymah gained some notoriety on August 5, when Osama bin Laden's Egyptian-born deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, mentioned his name in an announcement that Al Qaeda was merging with the splinter group.

    An independent analyst affiliated with the Washington-based Jamestown Foundation, Chris Zambelis, said yesterday that the book is similar to a military manual published by a Syrian named Abu Musab al-Suri, which was based largely on open sources and information released by the Pentagon.

    "You see this kind of thing a lot. On the radical Islamic forums, you have people put up U.S.military manuals advising followers about American military tactics. In terms of an actual manual for intelligence, though, this is the most extensive and comprehensive I have seen," Mr. Zambelis said.

    Intelligence community analysts are aware of the book, but it is seen as more of a strategic document and contains no tactical threat information, a senior intelligence analyst who spoke to the Sun on condition of anonymity said.

    In the scope of its sources and its attempt to write a history of the CIA and other intelligence agencies, Mr. Hakaymah's book is different from other jihadist tracts on American intelligence. While he makes no mention of the December 2005 New YorkTimes article that first disclosed that the National Security Agency was tapping phone numbers found in cell phones captured from suspected Al Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan, he does devote a chapter to electronic surveillance.

    In it, Mr. Hakaymah writes that any electronic communication between operatives can be monitored using key words such as "Mullah Omar," the name of the Taliban leader, or even voice printing.

    Two pages are devoted to the Echelon surveillance system, which Britain and America developed in the 1990s. Mr. Hakaymah warns future terrorists not to repeat the mistake of the Kurdish terrorist leader Abdullah Öcalan, who was captured in Nairobi, Kenya, after making a cell phone call to northern Iraq.

    "The surveillance may be for a certain number or for detecting a certain voice fingerprint for a wanted person," Mr. Hakaymah writes. "When a person's number is detected, the recorded calls can be retrieved whether it was incoming or outgoing on that number."

    The book also gives a detailed description of how the CIA recruits spies, based on information widely available in fiction and nonfiction books about espionage. But in this section, the author conflates the training of spies and officers, writing that recruited spies are trained in the West Virginia CIA facility known as the Farm, when in fact only officers receive training there. Yesterday, the senior intelligence official summed up the book as "an assessment of American intelligence, a mixture of a couple of things. There is some element of training from things they gather from open sources. ... But this is also clearly propaganda."

    The propaganda element appears to be aimed at certain Islamists who have rejected Al Qaeda's view that America, or what the group's leaders call "the far enemy," is too powerful and too efficient to challenge.

    One of the purposes of the book is to show that America's intelligence agencies "make mistakes and are not infallible," a professor of strategic studies at Johns Hopkins University, Mary Habeck, said. The author is saying, "We don't have to fear them like we always fear them. That is why it is called the ‘Myth of Delusion.' One of bin Laden's purposes, he says, in authorizing 9/11 was to break the media blockade, to show the invincibility of the United States as a media myth," Ms. Habeck added.

    In his preface, Mr. Hakaymah writes that the book will "use the published reports, news, and research, which expose the extent of the failure of the American intelligence services inside and outside the United States."

    To that end, he speculates that a high-level spy may have tipped off Al Qaeda's September 11 hijackers or that elements of the American intelligence apparatus had prior knowledge of the plot. He writes that the November 2001 killing of a CIA officer, Michael Spann, in Afghanistan represented an enormous victory for Al Qaeda because the agency had to admit his death publicly.

    But the book also shows a paranoid and conspiratorial worldview that mimics many of the more radical critiques of American intelligence. The RAND Corporation, the Hoover Institute, the American Enterprise Institute, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies were founded, Mr. Hakaymah writes, by a cabal of "financial and industrial groups of Texas, including the giant weapons manufacturers together with the intelligence community headed by the CIA."

    Mr. Hakaymah also devotes several pages to the pending case against a former Pentagon analyst, Lawrence Franklin, who pleaded guilty last fall to mishandling classified documents but was initially reported in the press to be a spy for Israel.
    Link


    Terror Networks
    An Omission of Note
    2006-06-02
    by Dan Darling, from the Weekly Standard

    LAST WEEK the Washington Post featured a story on Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, the Spanish-Syrian al Qaeda strategist who wrote the 1,600 page Call for a Global Islamic Resistance. The Post story provided a revealing look at Nasar who, despite his capture, remains the leading ideological architect of al Qaeda's war against the United States. But the Post also missed a number of important points in Nasar's career.

    The Post describes Nasar as having been "born in Aleppo, Syria, in 1958 and studied engineering. In the early 1980s, he took part in a failed revolt by the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood against Syrian strongman Hafez al-Assad. According to his own written accounts, he fled the country after that, then trained in camps in Jordan and Egypt. Later, he said, he moved to Europe when it became clear that Assad was firmly entrenched in power."

    But according to Murad al-Shishani's profile of Nasar during this same period for the Jamestown Foundation:

    Nasar was initiated into al-Tali'a al-Muqatila (Fighting Vanguard), a Jihadist group linked to the Syrian Muslim Brothers, founded by the late Marwan Hadeed. Nasar received training from Egyptian and Iraqi officers and additional training in camps in Jordan and Baghdad during an era when Arab regimes were on a collision course with the Syrian Ba'athists. He was also a member of the higher military command of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement that was established in Baghdad after the Syrian Brothers fled from their country. According to unverified sources Sheikh Saeed Haowa was head of that military command.

    Following the events in Hama in 1982, when the Syrian army successfully suppressed the Muslim Brotherhood uprising, Nasar left the movement, after declaring his opposition to the Brotherhood's alliance with sectarian movements and the former Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He headed for Afghanistan where he met with Abdul-Kader Abdul-Aziz writer of the book entitled The Master of Preparations, which is regarded as a reference point for the jihadis, and also met with Sheikh Abdullah Azzam.

    This resentment towards the Iraqi regime, which Nasar believed had co-opted the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood for their own purposes and stymied their revolution, is reflected in Lessons Learned from the Armed Jihad Ordeal in Syria, in which Nasar discusses the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood's alliance with Saddam Hussein and warns prospective jihadis to ensure that their own organizations are self-sufficient. Al Qaeda seems to have taken Nasar's advice to heart concerning any dealings with Saddam Hussein, which the CIA assessed (according to p. 322 of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee report on pre-war Iraq intelligence):

    In contrast to the patron-client pattern between Iraq and its Palestinian surrogates, the relationship between Iraq and al-Qaida appears to more closely resemble that of two independent actors trying to exploit each other--their mutual suspicion suborned by al-Qaida's interest in Iraqi assistance, and Baghdad's interest in al-Qaida's anti-U.S. attacks . . .

    THIS DYNAMIC appears whenever al Qaeda involves itself with state actors; which may be a result of Nasar's influence. As Dr. Reuven Paz notes in his discussion of Nasar's 1,600 tract (Nasar is using the nom de guerre "Abu Musab al-Suri"):

    Al-Suri also surprises his readers by sending requests to North Korea and Iran to continue developing their nuclear projects. It is most unlikely for a Jihadi-Salafi scholar to hint at possible cooperation with countries like Shi'ite Iran or Stalinist North Korea, both of which are generally regarded as infidel regimes. However, Al-Suri seems to advise that Jihadi Sunni readers should cooperate with the devil to defeat the "bigger devil."

    . . . Al-Suri does not see much benefit from the guerrilla warfare waged against the U.S. by al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia. Hence, "the ultimate choice is the destruction of the United States by operations of strategic symmetry through weapons of mass destruction, namely nuclear, chemical, or biological means, if the mujahideen can achieve it with the help of those who possess them or through buying them." One other option, he says, is by "the production of basic nuclear bombs, known as "dirty bombs."

    There is some debate as to the nature of Nasar's views with regard to Shiites. Paz states elsewhere that Nasar "has no anti-Shia sentiments, and refrains, as much as known, from being involved in the Islamist insurgency in Iraq. His pragmatism might be connected also to his known Sufi family origins."

    But Lorenzo Vidino notes that:

    A further glance at [Nasar's] extremist ideology is provided by tapes of his sermons that were seized in the apartment of a member of an Algerian terrorist cell dismantled by Italian authorities in Naples in 2000. The tapes reveal [Nasar's] deep hatred for Shiites, whom he considers deviators from pure Islam . . . In fact, he points at the "negative influence" that Shiite groups have had on the Palestinian struggle, as some groups like Hamas have decided to work with Shiite groups like Hezbollah.

    This would seem odds with the Post's claim that one of the reasons Nasar left the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood was because its alliance with other sectarian movements.

    THE FACT THAT NASAR is the leading ideological architect of al Qaeda's strategy (combined with his endorsement of both the Iranian nuclear program and the use of the weapons of mass destruction) takes on an added emphasis when taken in conjunction with his apparent flight to Iran after the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan. A June 2005 story by NBC News quotes Spanish counterterrorism judge Baltasar Garzon as describing Nasar's role in a November 2002 meeting of the al Qaeda leadership to discuss how to operate in the post-9/11 environment:

    al-Qaida convened a strategic summit in northern Iran in November 2002. Without bin Laden present, but with many of the top leaders, the group's "shura," or consultative council, met secretly to decide how to operate within the new restraints and confinements.

    Leading the discussion was a Syrian, Mustafa Setmariam Nasar. He looked unlike most Arabs, being fair-skinned and red-haired, and carried a Spanish passport, having married a Spanish woman in 1987. Setmariam Nasar, derisively called a "pen jihadist" by some at the CIA but a "strategist" by Spanish counterterrorism officials, said it was time for al-Qaida to carry out the February 1998 fatwa bin Laden wrote and transmitted widely across the Arab and Muslim world.

    "He told the shura that al-Qaida could no longer exist as a hierarchy, an organization, but instead would have to become a network and move its operations out over the entire world," said Garzon, the prosecuting judge who investigated the role of Spanish citizens in Sept. 11 as well as the Madrid attacks. "He pointed to the Feb. 23, 1998, fatwa for inspiration."

    Whether or not the Iranian authorities were aware of this meeting is unknown, but an October 2003 Washington Post article cited a European intelligence official as saying that al Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri used his relationship with Ahmad Vahidi (the then-commander of the elite Iranian Qods Force unit) "to negotiate a safe harbor for some of al Qaeda's leaders who were trapped in the mountains of Tora Bora, Afghanistan, in 2001."

    It helps to know the back story when trying to understand the development of Mustafa Setmariam Nasar's views and how they influenced al Qaeda.

    Dan Darling is a counterterrorism consultant.
    Link


    Terror Networks
    Mastermind Revealed
    2006-05-23
    FROM hideouts in South Asia, the Spanish-Syrian al-Qaeda strategist published thousands of pages of internet tracts on how small teams of Islamic extremists could wage a decentralised global war against the US and its allies. With the Afghanistan base lost, he argued, radicals would need to work primarily on their own, though sometimes with guidance from roving operatives acting on behalf of the broader movement.

    Last October, Pakistani agents seized Mustafa Setmariam Nasar in a friend's house in the border city of Quetta and turned him over to US intelligence operatives, according to two Pakistani intelligence officials. With Spanish, British and Syrian interrogators lining up to question him, he is a prize catch: he is not a bombmaker or operational planner but one of al-Qaeda's prime theorists for the post-September 11, 2001 world.

    Counterterrorism officials and analysts see Nasar's theories in action in terrorist attacks in Casablanca in 2003, Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005. In each case, the perpetrators organised themselves into local, self-sustaining cells that acted on their own but also likely accepted guidance from visiting emissaries.

    Nasar's masterwork, a 1600-page volume titled The Call for a Global Islamic Resistance written under the pen name Abu Musab al-Suri, has been circulating on websites. Nasar, 47, outlines a strategy for a global conflict on as many fronts as possible and in the form of resistance by small cells or individuals, rather than traditional guerilla warfare.

    "The enemy is strong and powerful, we are weak and poor, the war duration is going to be long and the best way to fight it is in a revolutionary jihad way for the sake of Allah," he said in one paper.

    Intelligence officials said Nasar's doctrine has made waves in radical Islamic chat rooms and on websites about jihad. "He is probably the first to spell out a doctrine for a decentralised global jihad," said Brynjar Lia, a counterterrorism researcher at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, who is writing a book on Nasar. "In my humble opinion, he is the best theoretician among the jihadi ideologues and strategists out there. Nobody is as systematic and comprehensive in their analysis as he is. His brutal honesty and self-criticism is unique in jihadi circles."

    After the bombings in Madrid and London, investigators fingered Nasar as the possible organiser because he had lived in both cities. But so far, investigators have unearthed no hard evidence of his direct involvement in those attacks or any others.

    Nasar was born in Aleppo, Syria, in 1958 and studied engineering. In the early 1980s he took part in a failed revolt by the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood against the Syrian strongman, Hafez al-Assad. According to his written accounts, he fled the country after that, then trained in camps in Jordan and Egypt. He arrived in Spain in 1985, married a Spanish convert to Islam, and spent the next 16 years in Europe - where he set up al-Qaeda groups in Italy and France, and attracted the attention of the Spanish and British authorities - and Afghanistan where he forged close ties with the Taliban.

    In London, he did publicity work for al-Qaeda, helping to arrange interviews with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan for CNN and the BBC.
    Link


    Terror Networks
    Mustafa Setmariam Nasar's master plan for war against the West
    2006-05-23
    From secret hideouts in South Asia, the Spanish-Syrian al-Qaeda strategist published thousands of pages of Internet tracts on how small teams of Islamic extremists could wage a decentralized global war against the United States and its allies.

    With the Afghanistan base lost, he argued, radicals would need to shift their approach and work primarily on their own, though sometimes with guidance from roving operatives acting on behalf of the broader movement.

    Last October, the writing career of Mustafa Setmariam Nasar came to an abrupt end when Pakistani agents seized him in a friend's house in the border city of Quetta and turned him over to U.S. intelligence operatives, according to two senior Pakistani intelligence officials.

    With Spanish, British and Syrian interrogators lining up with requests to question him, he has turned out to be a prize catch, a man who is not a bombmaker or operational planner but one of the jihad movement's prime theorists for the post-Sept. 11, 2001, world.

    Counterterrorism officials and analysts see Nasar's theories in action in major terrorist attacks in Casablanca in 2003, Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005. In each case, the perpetrators organized themselves into local, self-sustaining cells that acted on their own but also likely accepted guidance from visiting emissaries of the global movement.

    Nasar's masterwork, a 1,600-page volume titled "The Call for a Global Islamic Resistance," has been circulating on Web sites for 18 months. The treatise, written under the pen name Abu Musab al-Suri, draws heavily on lessons from past conflicts.

    Nasar, 47, outlines a strategy for a truly global conflict on as many fronts as possible and in the form of resistance by small cells or individuals, rather than traditional guerrilla warfare. To avoid penetration and defeat by security services, he says, organizational links should be kept to an absolute minimum.

    "The enemy is strong and powerful, we are weak and poor, the war duration is going to be long and the best way to fight it is in a revolutionary jihad way for the sake of Allah," he said in one paper. "The preparations better be deliberate, comprehensive, and properly planned, taking into account past experiences and lessons."

    Intelligence officials said Nasar's doctrine has made waves in radical Islamic chat rooms and on Web sites about jihad — holy war or struggle — over the past two years. His capture, they added, has only added to his mystique.

    "He is probably the first to spell out a doctrine for a decentralized global jihad," said Brynjar Lia, a senior counterterrorism researcher at the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, who is writing a book on Nasar. "In my humble opinion, he is the best theoretician among the jihadi ideologues and strategists out there. Nobody is as systematic and comprehensive in their analysis as he is. His brutal honesty and self-criticism is unique in jihadi circles."

    After the bombings in Madrid and London, investigators fingered Nasar as the possible hands-on organizer of those attacks, because he had lived in both cities in the 1990s. But so far, investigators have unearthed no hard evidence of his direct involvement in those attacks or any others, although they suspect he established sleeper cells in Spain and other European countries.

    Nasar was born in Aleppo, Syria, in 1958 and studied engineering. In the early 1980s, he took part in a failed revolt by the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood against Syrian strongman Hafez al-Assad. According to his own written accounts, he fled the country after that, then trained in camps in Jordan and Egypt. Later, he said, he moved to Europe when it became clear that Assad was firmly entrenched in power.

    He arrived in Spain in 1985. He married a Spanish woman who had converted to Islam, and through that connection, he became a dual Spanish-Syrian citizen. He also made contacts with other Syrian emigres who belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood. His neighbor in a small town in the province of Granada was Tayssir Alouni, a journalist for the al-Jazeera satellite television network who would later interview Osama bin Laden. Another friend was Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas, who was convicted last fall on charges of running an al-Qaeda cell in Spain.

    In 1987, Nasar journeyed to Pakistan and Afghanistan to help Muslim fighters in their rebellion against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. He trained at camps, met bin Laden and joined the ruling council of al-Qaeda, according to a Spanish indictment filed against him.

    When he returned to Spain in 1992, he concentrated on building his own cell there and also traveled widely in Europe to set up other al-Qaeda groups in Italy and France, according to the Spanish.

    "He's pretty much designed the structure of the cells that have operated in Europe," said Rogelio Alonso, a terrorism expert and professor at King Juan Carlos University in Madrid. "He was the one with the prominent role as the individual who had the links with the higher echelons of al-Qaeda."

    Although Nasar attracted the notice of Spanish police, investigators did not classify him as a serious threat. According to Spanish court papers, detectives had Nasar under surveillance in 1995. But when he moved to London that year, they stopped paying attention.

    In London, Nasar led an above-ground life as a writer and voice of Islamic extremism. He did publicity work for al-Qaeda, helping to arrange interviews with bin Laden in Afghanistan for CNN and the BBC.

    He edited an Arabic-language newsletter called al-Ansar, which was devoted primarily to the cause of fundamentalists fighting a long and bloody civil war in Algeria. Even in London's sizable community of Arab exiles and radical Muslims, Nasar stood out for his strong views and unwillingness to compromise.

    In his newsletter, he defended the Armed Islamic Group, the Algerian rebel force known by its French acronym, GIA, for targeting Algerian civilians in a series of massacres that destroyed entire villages. When other Arab dissidents decried the tactics, Nasar turned on them as well, denouncing his critics in letters and in person.

    "In Algeria, he pushed people to violence," said one Arab exile living in Britain who tangled with Nasar in the mid-1990s. "He was not just an editor. He served as a strategist for those people and played a very bad role in what happened in Algeria," said the exile, who spoke on condition of anonymity, saying he feared harassment from al-Qaeda supporters.

    British intelligence officials also took note of Nasar's activities in their country and questioned him on at least two occasions, according to people who knew him. But he was never placed under formal investigation, they said.

    "He's very intelligent and powerful in making his arguments," said an Arab dissident who knew Nasar well and also spoke on condition of anonymity. "But he is also a very difficult man. His tough attitude created many, many enemies for him, even in jihadi circles."

    With his pale white skin and red hair, Nasar physically blended into British society more easily than many Islamic fundamentalists. But he sometimes struggled to reconcile his beliefs with his surroundings.

    For instance, friends said, he was well educated on the finer points of Western classical music and enjoyed talking at dinner parties about composers. But he refused to actually listen to the music, for religious reasons. And while he rejected the authority of secular institutions, he once filed a libel lawsuit in a British court against the Arabic-language newspaper al-Hayat.

    Unlike many of his acquaintances who favored arranged marriages, the unsmiling Nasar possessed a romantic streak and surprised friends by doting on his Spanish-born spouse. "I was in his house once and he was putting out all these romantic touches for his wife," said one of the Arab dissidents. "I asked him, 'Where did you learn how to do that?' He said, 'We Syrians, we know these things.'"

    Nasar departed London in 1998 to return to Afghanistan, according to intelligence sources. There, he forged close ties with the new Taliban government and swore an oath of allegiance to Mohammad Omar, the Taliban leader. He was given a position in the Taliban defense ministry.

    He also resumed his contacts with al-Qaeda, but frequently clashed with bin Laden, according to Arab dissidents and Nasar's own writings.

    In an e-mail to bin Laden in 1999, recovered from a computer hard drive in Kabul by the Wall Street Journal, Nasar complained that bin Laden was getting a big head from his frequent media appearances. "I think our brother has caught the disease of screens, flashes, fans, and applause," Nasar wrote.

    In public statements and in interviews with Arab media, Nasar said he was happy to work with al-Qaeda but emphasized that he was an independent operator. His theories of decentralization had already taken shape: It would be a mistake, he said, for the global movement to pin its hopes on a single group or set of leaders.

    "My guess is that he saw bin Laden as a narrow-minded thinker," said Jarret Brachman, research director for the Combating Terrorism Center at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. "He clearly says that al-Qaeda was an important step but it's not the end step and it's not sufficient."

    Nasar's theories of war also called for the most deadly weapons possible. In Afghanistan, he worked with al-Qaeda leaders to train fighters in the use of "poisons and chemicals" at two camps near Jalalabad and Kabul, according to the State Department. After the Sept. 11 hijackings, Nasar praised the attacks. But he said a better plan would have been to load the hijacked airplanes with weapons of mass destruction.

    "Let the American people — those who voted for killing, destruction, the looting of other nations' wealth, megalomania and the desire to control others — be contaminated with radiation," he wrote. "We apologize for the radioactive fallout," he declared sarcastically.

    After the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001, Nasar went into hiding, moving to Iran, northern Iraq and Pakistan, according to intelligence officials. In November 2004, the State Department posted a $5 million reward for his capture.

    Within a few weeks, Nasar responded by posting a lengthy statement on the Internet. He denied reports that he was involved in the Sept. 11 attacks or the Madrid bombings, but issued warnings of his own.

    "As a result of the U.S. government's declaration about me, the lies it contained and the new security requirements forced upon us, I have taken the decision to end my period of isolation," he wrote. "I will also resume my ideological, media-related and operational activities. I wish to God that America will regret bitterly that she provoked me and others to combat her with pen and sword."

    Around the same time, Nasar posted his 1,600-page book on the Internet. In it, he critiqued failed insurgencies in Syria, Egypt and Afghanistan and offered a new model aimed at drawing individuals and small groups into a global jihad.

    Reuven Paz, director of the Project for the Research of Islamist Movements, in Herzliya, Israel, called Nasar's book "brilliant — from their point of view." He said researchers fear that it is already serving as a how-to manual for uniting isolated groups of radical Muslims for a common cause.

    "We are witnessing a new generation of jihadists who were not trained in the camps in Afghanistan," Paz said. "Unfortunately, this book has operational sections that may be more appealing to this new generation."
    Link


    Terror Networks
    Al-Suri treatise on jihad in Central Asia
    2006-05-10
    “Muslims in Central Asia and the Future Battle of Islam,” a twenty-seven page white paper authored by Abu Musab al-Suri AKA Musatafa Setmarian Nasar in November 1999, advocates jihad in the states of East Turkistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, and the capture of resources. This document is circulated amongst other archived al-Suri materials, such as his 1,600 page book International Islamic Resistance Call , and an assortment of terrorist training lectures, currently placed on a hacked directory of the website, “Meat’s Joke of the Day,” www.mjotd.com . Abu Musab al-Suri writes historically of the Soviet invasion of Central Asia, the strategic importance of the area in terms of natural resources, industrial institutions, Islamic capitals, commercial market, and the “military vigor” of the Muslims in this region.

    As this document is written in 1999, al-Suri references the success of the Afghan jihad and the availability of the Taliban regime for providing assistance and experience to the mujahideen in Central Asia, spearheading a “rejoicing Islamic and Jihadi arousal”. The states of this region are purportedly subjected to a “vehement crusading invasion,” formerly occupied by the Russians, but now open to economic invasion by the West, including heavy financial investments. Al-Suri summarizes aggression against Muslims in addition to the aforementioned, highlighting “hostile policy” and armed clashes. He cites arrests and confrontations in Tajikstan and Uzbekistan to illustrate rancor by these governments towards the mujahideen and Muslims.

    Concerning the importance of jihad in Central Asia and reasons for its priority, Abu Musab al-Suri explains that in the new global order, this region is the “weakest spot of the enemy,” and may be a prudent epicenter for operations. He notes the natural geography of the countries, and the “the military inheritance, including equipment, structures and ammunition of the [former] Soviet Union that has accumulated in this region is a military resource and an inheritance that the people of Islam cannot even dream of finding elsewhere”. Importantly, al-Suri advocates the possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in the hands of Central Asian Muslims because they will not be able to wage a successful “classical war” against the West. The weapons are to be used for threatening and casting fear amongst the enemy. Further, the document reads: “The developed state of the industries and the existence of raw materials for these weapons make Central Asia a base, as well as the subject of the Muslims’ hope, for possessing these weapons”.

    Media reports indicate that a suspect believed to be Abu Musab al-Suri was captured in Quetta, Pakistan during the beginning of November 2005. Abu Musab al-Suri, AKA Mustafa Setmarian Nassar, or Umar Abd al-Hakim, is an al-Qaeda operative who ran terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and instructs in poison and chemical warfare. On November 18, 2004, the U.S. State Department offered a $5 million for information leading to his arrest. Al-Suri, meaning “The Syrian,” was indicted in Spain in 2003 for allegedly training al-Qaeda sleeper cells for deployment in Spain, Italy, and France and is believed to have masterminded the Madrid train bombings in March 2004.
    Link


    India-Pakistan
    Nasar turned over to US officials
    2006-05-02
    A top al-Qaida leader whose links stretch from Afghan terror training camps to extremist networks operating throughout Europe has been detained in neighboring Pakistan and possibly handed over to American authorities, according to a U.S. law enforcement official.

    Mustafa Setmarian Nasar, a Syrian who also holds Spanish citizenship, was captured during a November 2005 sting in the southwestern Pakistani city of Quetta in which a gunfight broke out and a person was killed, said the American official, who declined to be identified further because of the sensitivity of the issue.

    The official, who spoke to The Associated Press late last week, said Nasar, who is also known as Abu Musab al-Suri, may now be in U.S. custody but did not specify where. He declined to comment further.

    U.S. military officials aware of the detention of terror suspects at American prison facilities in Bagram, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, had no immediate information Tuesday on whether Nasar had been incarcerated at either jail.

    A senior Pakistani intelligence official told The AP from the capital, Islamabad, that Nasar had been flown out of Pakistan to an undisclosed destination "some time ago."

    "I only know that he is not here. But, I do know that Syrian authorities had also requested to get him back," said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of sensitive nature of his work.

    Pakistani and American officials have long been tightlipped on the status of Nasar, who has had a $5 million U.S. bounty on his head and has been described by the American Justice Department as a former trainer at Osama bin Laden's camps in Afghanistan who helped teach extremists to use poisons and chemicals.
    Link


    Israel-Palestine-Jordan
    War against Israel cannot be separated from Global Jihad any more
    2006-04-28
    From Jewish World Review
    By Caroline B. Glick
    The nature of the war being waged against Israel changed, perhaps irreversibly this week. Processes that have been developing for more than four years came together this week and brought us to a very different military-political reality than that which we have known until now.
    The face of the enemy has changed. If in the past it was possible to say that the war being waged against Israel was unique and distinct from the global jihad, after the events of the past week, it is no longer possible to credibly make such a claim. Four events that occurred this week — the attacks in the Sinai; the release of Osama bin Laden's audiotape; the release of Abu Musab Zarqawi's videotape; and the arrest of Hamas terrorists by Jordan — all proved clearly that today it is impossible to separate the wars. The new situation has critical consequences for the character of the campaign that the IDF must fight to defend Israel and for the nature of the policies that the incoming government of Israel must adopt and advance.
    The two attacks in the Sinai were noteworthy for several reasons. First, they were very different from one another. The first, which targeted tourists in Dahab, was the familiar attack against a soft target that we have become used to seeing in the Sinai over the past year and a half. The attack against the Multinational Force Observers was more unique since it only has one past precedent.
    In an article published last October in the journal MERIA, Reuven Paz explained that al Qaida strategist Abu Musab al Suri supported the first type of attack. His follower, Abu Muhammed Hilali wrote last September that in waging the jihad against the Egyptian regime there is no point in attacking foreign forces or Egyptian forces because such attacks will lead nowhere. He encouraged terrorists to attack soft targets like tourists and foreign non-governmental organizations on the one hand, and strategic targets like the Egyptian gas pipeline to Israel on the other. In both cases, such attacks would achieve political objectives. Opposing Hilali's view is Zarqawi's strategy. As one would expect from Al Qaida's commander in Iraq, Zaeqawi upholds attacks on foreign forces.
    The foregoing analysis is not proof that two separate branches of al Qaida conducted the attacks. But the combination of approaches this week does lend credence to the assessment that al Qaida is now paying a great deal of attention to Israel's neighborhood. And this is a highly significant development.
    Until recently, Israel, like Jordan and Egypt, did not particularly interest al Qaida. When bin Laden's deputy Ayman al Zawahiri and his military commander Saif al-Adel merged their terror organization, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, to al Qaida, they adopted bin Laden's approach which dictated suspending their previous war to overthrow the Egyptian regime and concentrating on attacking America and its allies. In the same manner, when the Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab Zarqawi joined al Qaida, he was compelled to put his wish to overthrow the Hashemite regime to the side. Israel was not on the agenda.
    But today everything has changed. Israel, like Egypt and Jordan, is under the gun. Bin Laden himself made this clear in his tape this week. By placing Hamas under his protection, bin Laden made three moves at once. First, he announced that the Palestinians are no longer independent actors. Second, he defined the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority as a part of the liberated Islamic lands where al Qaida can feel at home. Third, he hitched a ride on the Palestinian issue which is more popular in the Islamic world than the Iraq war, where al Qaida is apparently on the road to defeat. For his part, Zarqawi already announced his plan to go back to his old war and work to topple the Hashemites (and destroy Israel) last November, after he commanded the Amman hotel suicide bombings. Back then Zarqawi announced that Jordan was but a stop on the road to the conquest of Jerusalem.
    In his video this week, Zarqawi emphasized that the destruction of Israel through the conquest of Jerusalem is one of his major goals. Both he and bin Laden made clear that from their perspectives, the war against the US and the war against Israel are the same war.
    It always has been. Israel is everything that the Islamists are not. Israel, sitting out in the middle of a bunch of hostile arabs sticks out like a sore thumb, in their eyes.
    On the level of strategic theory, bin Laden and Zarqawi both expressed al Qaida's long-term strategy that Zawahiri laid out last year to the Jordanian journalist Fuad Hussein. Zawahiri explained then that there are seven stages to the jihad before the establishment of the global caliphate. According to Zawahiri, the global jihad began in 2000 and will end in 2020. Today we are in the third stage which includes the toppling of the regimes in Jordan, Syria and Egypt and the targeting of Israel for destruction.
    Looking for another Black September, are ye?
    While al Qaida today is setting its sights on Israel and its neighbors, the arrests of Hamas terrorists this week in Jordan shows that for their part, the Palestinians are working to advance the global jihad. The Hamas attempt to carry out attacks in Jordan points to a change in Hamas's self-perception. They have gone from being local terrorists to being members of the Islamist axis, which is led by Iran and includes Syria, al Qaida and Hizbullah.
    The Paleos have just painted world-class bull's eyes on themselves.
    A week after Zarqawi carried out the attacks in Amman last November, Iranian Foreign Minister Manochehr Mottaki met with the heads of Hizbullah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, PFLP, DFLP and DFLP-GC in Beirut. At the end of the summit, Ahmed Jibril declared, "We all confirmed that what is going on in occupied Palestine is organically connected to what is going on in Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Lebanon."
    Boy, talk about a target-rich environment! I would imagine that there were some frustrated IDF folks.
    A week later, Hizbullah launched its largest Katyusha rocket attack on northern Israel since the IDF withdrew from south Lebanon in May 2000. Two weeks later, Islamic Jihad carried out the suicide bombing outside the shopping mall in Netanya. Shortly thereafter, Zarqawi's al Qaida operatives launched another barrage of Katyushas on northern Israel from Lebanon.
    I do not see why Israel showed so much restraint.
    Similarly, on January 19, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad hosted a terror summit in Damascus attended by the same cast of characters. The same day, Islamic Jihad carried out a suicide bombing by the old bus station in Tel Aviv. And on April 18, the day before last week's suicide bombing by the old bus station in Tel Aviv, Ahmadinejad carried out yet another terror summit in Tehran with the same participants. And, again, shortly after the summit, al Qaida struck in the Sinai.
    Another target-rich summit opportunity missed.
    Zawahiri's seven stages of jihad go hand in hand with a 60 page text written by Saif al Adel sometime after the US invasion of Iraq. Adel deposited his manuscript with the same Jordanian journalist. Adel, who has been operating from Iran since the battle of Tora Bora in November 2001, is reportedly Zarqawi's commander in Iraq and al Qaida's senior liaison with the Iranian regime.
    In his manuscript, Adel laid out al Qaida's intentions for the third stage of the jihad. He explained that the organization needed new bases and was looking for a failed state or states to settle in. Darfour, Somalia, Lebanon and Gaza were all identified as possible options.
    As the American author and al Qaida investigator Richard Miniter puts it, "US forces together with the Kenyans and the Ethiopians have pretty much prevented al Qaida from basing in Somalia or Darfour. That left only Lebanon with all its problems with its various political factions, overlords and the UN. But then suddenly, like manna from Heaven, Israel simply gave them the greatest gift al Qaida ever received when Ariel Sharon decided to give them Gaza."
    Israel, he explains, provided al Qaida with the best base it has ever had. Not only is Gaza located in a strategically vital area — between the sea, Egypt and Israel. It is also fairly immune from attack since the Kadima government will be unwilling to reconquer the area.
    Moreover, as was the case with Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Gamaa Islamiyya terrorists who merged with al Qaida in the 1990s, the Palestinians today constitute an ideal population for al Qaida. They already support jihad. They have vast experience in fighting. And if it only took Hamas two weeks in office to get all the other terror groups — from Fatah to the Popular Resistance Committees to the Popular Front — to pledge allegiance to it last week, Hamas's cooptation by al Qaida shouldn't be very difficult.
    Al Qaida today is building its presence in Gaza, Judea and Samaria gradually. It drafts Palestinian terrorists to its ranks and provides them with ideological indoctrination and military training. In November, for instance, a terror recruiter in Jordan who had drafted two terrorists from the Nablus area to al Qaida's ranks and instructed them to recruit others, informed them that he intended to send a military trainer from Gaza to train them. The two, who were arrested in December, had planned to carry out a double suicide bombing in Jerusalem.
    Last May, the first terror cell in Gaza announced its association with al Qaida. When Raanan Gissin, then prime minister Ariel Sharon's spokesman was asked to comment on the development by a foreign reporter, he presented the government's position on the issue as follows: "There is some evidence of links between militants in Gaza and al-Qaida… but for us, local terrorist groups are just as dangerous."
    On the face of it, Gissin's arrogance seems appropriate. After all, what do we care who sends the bombers into our cafes and buses? But things don't work that way.
    As the attacks in Egypt, the arrests in Jordan and the bin Laden and Zarqawi messages this week all indicated, we find ourselves today in a world war. The Palestinians are no longer the ones waging the war against us. The Islamist axis now wages the war against us through the Palestinians. The center of gravity, like the campaign rationale of the enemy, has moved away. Today, the decision-makers who determine the character and timing of the terror offensives are not sitting in Gaza and or Judea and Samaria. They are sitting in Tehran, Waziristan, Damascus, Beirut, Amman and Falujah. The considerations that guide those that order the trigger pulled are not local considerations, but regional considerations at best and considerations wholly cut off from local events at worst.
    This new state of affairs demands a change in the way all of Israel's security arms understand and fight this war. The entire process of intelligence gathering for the purpose of uncovering and preventing planned terror attacks needs to be reconsidered.
    A reconfiguration of political and diplomatic strategies is also required. Talk of a separation barrier and final borders, not to mention the abandonment of Judea and Samaria to Hamas sounds hallucinatory when standing against us are Zarqawi who specializes in chemical and biological warfare; bin Laden who specializes in blowing up airplanes; and Iran that threatens a nuclear Holocaust.
    Who can cause Ehud Olmert, Amir Peretz, Tzipi Livni and Yuli Tamir to take the steps required to protect Israel from the reality exposed by the events of this past week?
    Link



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