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| Abu Musab | Abu Musab | Jundulalh | Afghanistan/South Asia | 20040714 | Link | ||||
| Abu Musab Abd al-Wadoud | Abu Musab Abd al-Wadoud | Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat | Africa: North | 20051108 | Link | ||||
| Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud | Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud | Salafist Group for Call and Combat | Africa: North | 20050704 | |||||
| Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud | Supreme Council of Global Jihad | Terror Networks | 20030813 | ||||||
| Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud | Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat | Africa North | 20060104 | Link | |||||
| Abu Musab Abdul Wadud | Abu Musab Abdul Wadud | Salafist Group for Call and Combat | Africa: North | 20050914 | Link | ||||
| Abu Musab Al Suri | Abu Musab Al Suri | al-Qaeda | Afghanistan-Pak-India | 20051107 | Link | ||||
| Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi | Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi | Jihad and Tawhid Brigades | Israel-Palestine-Jordan | 20060921 | Link | ||||
| Abu Musab al Zarqawi | Abu Musab al Zarqawi | al-Qaeda | Arabia | Jordanian | Deceased | 20060228 | Link | ||
| Abu Musab al-Iraqi | Abu Musab al-Iraqi | al-Qaeda in Iraq | Iraq | 20051017 | Link | ||||
| Abu Musab al-Iraqi | al-Qaeda | Africa: North | 20051116 | Link | |||||
| Abu Musab al-Saudi | Abu Musab al-Saudi | Supreme Council of Global Jihad | Terror Networks | 20030813 | |||||
| Abu Musab al-Seif | Abu Musab al-Seif | Chechnya | Africa North | 20051215 | Link | ||||
| Abu Musab al-Siri | Abu Musab al-Siri | al-Qaeda in Europe | Britain | 20050804 | |||||
| Abu Musab al-Suri | Abu Musab al-Suri | al-Qaeda | Terror Networks | 20040523 | Link | ||||
| Abu Musab al-Zarqawi | Abu-Musab al-Zarqawi | al-Qaeda in Iraq | Iraq-Jordan | At Large | 20050704 | ||||
| Abu Musab al-Zarqawi | Moroccan Combatant Islamic Group | Europe | Jordanian | Deceased | 20040516 | Link | |||
| Abu Musab Al Zarqawi | Tawhid and Jihad | Africa: North | 20050704 | ||||||
| Abu Musab al-Zarqawi | Tawhid wal Jihad | Africa North | Jordanian | Deceased | 20060428 | Link | |||
| Abu Musab al-Zarqawi | Tawhid and Jihad | Iraq | Jordanian | Deceased | 20060608 | Link | |||
| Abu Musab al-Zarqawi | al-Qaeda in Iraq | Iraq-Jordan | Jordanian | Deceased | 20050627 | ||||
| Abu Musab al-Zarqawi | Iraqi Insurgency | Iraq-Jordan | Jordanian | Deceased | 20040218 | ||||
| Abu Musab al-Zarqawi | Ansar al-Islam | Europe | Jordanian | Deceased | 20051118 | Link | |||
| Abu Musab al-Zarqawi | Jund al-Shams | Terror Networks | Jordanian | Deceased | 20040524 | Link | |||
| Abu Musab al-Zarqawi | Beyyiat el-Imam | Terror Networks | Jordanian | Deceased | 20040524 | Link | |||
| Abu Musab al-Zarqawi | Ansar Al-Islam | Iraq-Jordan | Jordanian | Deceased | 20040210 | ||||
| Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi | Al-Tawhid | Europe | 20030625 | ||||||
| Abu Musab Al Zarqawi | Al-Qaeda in Iraq | Africa: North | 20050805 | ||||||
| Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi | al-Qaeda in Iraq | Iraq | Jordanian | Deceased | Supremo | 20051022 | Link | ||
| Deader than a rock | |||||||||
| Fadel Nazzal Al Khalayleh | al-Qaeda in Iraq | Iraq-Jordan | 20040210 | ||||||
| Abu Musab Al Zarqawi | al-Qaeda | Arabia | 20050705 | ||||||
| Abu Musab al-Zarqawi | Tawhid and Jihad Movement | Iraq-Jordan | Jordanian | Deceased | 20040707 | Link | |||
| Abu Musab Al Zarqawi | Al Qaeda in Iraq | Iraq-Jordan | 20050714 | ||||||
| Abu Mussab al Zarqawi | al-Qaeda | Arabia | 20030207 | ||||||
| Abu Musab al-Zarqawi | al-Qaida in Iraq | Europe | Jordanian | Deceased | 20051028 | Link | |||
| Abu Musab al-Zarqawi | Al-Qaeda in Iraq | Iraq-Jordan | Jordanian | Deceased | 20050716 | ||||
| Abu Musab al- Zarqawi | al-Qaeda in Iraq | Iraq | 20051017 | Link | |||||
| Abu Musab Zarqawi | al-Tawhid | Axis of Evil | 20030930 | ||||||
| Abu Musab Zarqawi | al-Qaeda | Axis of Evil | 20021005 | ||||||
| Abu-Musab al-Zarqawi | al-Qaeda in Iraq | Iraq-Jordan | Jordanian | Deceased | 20050614 | ||||
| Abu Musab Zarqawi | Al Tawhid | Terror Networks | 20031208 | ||||||
| Abu Musab Zarqawi | Ansar al-Islam | Europe | 20040111 | ||||||
| Fadel Nazzal al-Khalayleh | al Qaeda | Middle East | Jordanian | At Large | Supremo | 20030204 | |||
| Real name of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi | |||||||||
| Abu Musab Al Zarqawi | al-Qaeda in Iraq | Iraq-Jordan | Deceased | 20050825 | |||||
| Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi | al-Tawhid | Middle East | 20050719 | ||||||
| Abu Musab al-Zarqawi | al-Qaeda | Iraq-Jordan | Jordanian | Deceased | Supremo | 20040210 | |||
| Looking very natural | |||||||||
| Abu Zarqawi | Ansar al-Islam | Iraq | 20040123 | ||||||
| Abu Musab al-Zarqawi | Qaida al-Jihad | Iraq | Jordanian | Deceased | 20051104 | Link | |||
| Abu Musab Al Zarqawi | Ansar al-Islam | Europe | 20040520 | Link | |||||
| Abu Mussab al Zarqawi | Ansar al-Islam | Axis of Evil | 20030123 | ||||||
| Abu Mussab Zarqawi | al-Qaeda in Iraq | Iraq-Jordan | 20050705 | ||||||
| Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi | al-Qaeda | Middle East | Jordanian | At Large | Big Shot | 20021215 | |||
| Ahmed Fadil al-Khalayila | al-Qaeda in Iraq | Iraq-Jordan | Jordanian | Deceased | 20050609 | Link | |||
| Doorknob dead | |||||||||
| Abu Musab al-Zarqawi | Bayat al-Imam | Central Asia | Jordanian | Deceased | 20040606 | Link | |||
| Abu Mussab Al-Zarqawi | al-Qaeda | Iraq-Jordan | Big Shot | 20050713 | |||||
| Abu Musab al-Zarqawi | Jund al-Sham | Syria-Lebanon-Iran | Jordanian | Deceased | 20050707 | ||||
| Abu Musab al-Zarqawi | Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan | Terror Networks | Jordanian | Deceased | 20040524 | Link | |||
| Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi | al-Qaeda | Arabia | 20040107 | ||||||
| Abu Musab al-Zarqawi | al-Qaeda in Europe | Europe | Jordanian | Deceased | 20051205 | Link | |||
| Abu Musab al-Zarqawi | al-Qaeda in Iraq | Europe | Jordanian | Deceased | 20050815 | ||||
| Abu Musab al-Zarqawi | al-Qaeda in Iraq | Iraq-Jordan | Jordanian | Deceased | 20050713 | ||||
| Abu Musab al-Zarqawi | al-Qaeda in Iraq | Iraq-Jordan | Jordanian | Deceased | 20050712 | ||||
| Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi | al Qaeda | Middle East | 20030204 | ||||||
| Abu Musab al-Zarqawi | al-Tawhid | Europe | Jordanian | Deceased | 20030704 | ||||
| Abu-Musab al-Zarqawi | al-Tawhid | Iraq-Jordan | 20031219 | ||||||
| Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi | Jund al-Shams | Middle East | 20030703 | ||||||
| Abu Musab al Zarqawi | al-Qaeda in Iraq | Iraq-Jordan | Jordanian | Deceased | Supremo | 20050907 | |||
| Deader than a rock. | |||||||||
| Abu Musab al-Zarqawi | al-Qaeda in Iraq | Iraq-Jordan | Jordanian | Deceased | Supremo | 20050623 | |||
| Deader than a rock. | |||||||||
| Abu Mussab al Zarqawi | al-Tawhid | Axis of Evil | 20030502 | ||||||
| Abu Musab al-Zarqawi | Omar Brigade | Iraq-Jordan | Jordanian | Deceased | 20050706 | ||||
| Abu Musab al-Zarqawi | Ansar al-Fath | Europe | Jordanian | Deceased | 20051011 | Link | |||
| Abu Mussab Zarqawi | al-Tawhid | Europe | 20030727 | ||||||
| Abu Musab al Zarqawi | Coalition for Militant Action in the Niger Delta | Africa: Subsaharan | 20051027 | Link | |||||
| Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi | Ansar Al-Islam | Europe | Jordanian | Supremo | 20050701 | ||||
| Abu Mussab al Zarqawi | al Qaeda | Middle East | 20030204 | ||||||
| Fadel Nazzal Al Khalayleh | Ansar Al-Islam | Iraq-Jordan | Jordanian | At Large | Big Shot | 20040210 | |||
| Real name of Zarqawi | |||||||||
| Abu Musab Zarqawi | al-Qaeda in Iraq | Syria-Lebanon-Iran | Jordanian | Deceased | Supremo | 20050613 | |||
| Abu Mussab al Zarqawi | Al Tawhid | Europe | 20030205 | ||||||
| Abu Musab al-Zarqawi | Omar Corps | Iraq-Jordan | Jordanian | Deceased | 20050708 | ||||
| Iraq | |
| Why Kata’ib Hezbollah backed away from confrontation over Jurf al-Sakhr | |
| 2026-11-21 | |
[Rudaw] After more than a decade of exercising near-exclusive control over Jurf al-Sakhr, Iran-aligned paramilitary group Kata’ib Hezbollah
In a statement on Thursday, Kata’ib Hezbollah Secretary-General Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi indicated that his group would seek to resolve its dispute with Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi through private channels, following days of escalating tensions and warnings that a government attempt to enter the area could trigger armed confrontation. "We affirm that the existing disagreements with the head of the authority will be addressed through private channels, denying our real enemies the opportunity to exploit them," Hamidawi said, without mentioning Zaidi by name. He also thanked Iraqi security forces and the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) for their positions during the confrontation, while instructing his fighters to resume their normal duties. The apparent de-escalation follows an agreement on Thursday under which Kata’ib Hezbollah fighters would move out of Jurf al-Sakhr, with a joint security force expected to deploy on Friday. However, some people cause happiness wherever they go; others whenever they go... the faction has not explicitly announced its withdrawal, and whether it will surrender effective control of the area remains uncertain. The confrontation represents more than a dispute over security arrangements in a town approximately 60 kilometers southwest of Baghdad. It is a test of whether Iraq's government can dismantle an entrenched armed faction's territorial and economic power without triggering conflict within the country's Shiite political establishment. Several developments suggest that Kata’ib Hezbollah is confronting a political and regional environment considerably less favorable than the one that allowed it to consolidate control after the Islamic State ...formerly ISIS or ISIL, depending on your preference. Before that they were al-Qaeda in Iraq, as shaped by Abu Musab Zarqawi. They're really very devout, committing every atrocity they can find in the Koran and inventing a few more. They fling Allaharound with every other sentence, but to hear western pols talk they're not reallyMoslems.... 's (ISIS) defeat in 2014. IRAN'S WEAKENED REGIONAL POSITION Perhaps the most significant change is the weakening of Iran, Kata’ib Hezbollah's principal foreign backer, following a series of military and geopolitical setbacks that have diminished Tehran's ability to protect its regional allies. The collapse of Bashir Pencilneckal-Assad Despoiler of Deraa... 's government in Syria in December 2024 deprived Iran ...a theocratic Shiite state divided among the Medes, the Persians, and the (Arab) Elamites. Formerly a fairly civilized nation ruled by a Shah, it became a victim of Islamic revolution in 1979. The nation is today noted for spontaneouslytaking over other countries' embassies, maintaining whorehouses run by clergymen, involvement in international drug trafficking, and financing sock puppet militiasto extend the regime's influence. The word Iranis a cognate form of Aryan.The abbreviation IRGCis the same idea as Stürmabteilung (or SA).The term Supreme Guideis a the modern version form of either Duceor Führeror maybe both. They hate of a crucial regional ally and disrupted the land corridor through which Tehran had supplied Leb ...The Lebs have the curious habit of periodically murdering their heads of state or prime ministers...'s Hezbollah. Israel's military campaign against Hezbollah further weakened an important component of Iran's regional network. The 12-day war with Israel in June 2025 inflicted further damage on Iran's military capabilities and leadership. The US-Israeli war launched on February 28 dealt another severe blow, killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ...the very aged actual dictator of Iran, successor to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini...> and senior military commanders while damaging critical Iranian military infrastructure. The consequences have become increasingly apparent in Lebanon. In September, Iran warned Washington against an Israeli operation targeting Hezbollah's fortified positions on the strategic Ali al-Taher ridge in southern Lebanon. Israel subsequently announced that it had destroyed Hezbollah's underground infrastructure there, illustrating the limits of Tehran's ability to deter military action against its allies. These developments do not mean Iran has lost its ability to influence Iraqi politics or support armed factions. However, some people cause happiness wherever they go; others whenever they go... they suggest that Tehran faces far greater constraints on its ability to intervene militarily on behalf of an ally confronting the Iraqi government. Iran's response to the Jurf al-Sakhr crisis appears to have been diplomatic rather than military. Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani met Zaidi on Monday, according to two senior Iraqi officials who spoke to Rudaw, attempting to persuade the premier to accept a negotiated settlement. Kata’ib Hezbollah subsequently confirmed that Hamidawi had met Qaani, Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Ameri, and PMF Chairman Falih al-Fayyadh, describing the discussions as positive. The mediation illustrates that Tehran retains considerable political leverage in Iraq, even as its capacity and willingness to protect allies through direct military intervention appear increasingly constrained. OIL SMUGGLING AND THE BATTLE FOR PUBLIC LEGITIMACY The second factor is the government's use of alleged corruption to challenge Kata’ib Hezbollah's control over Jurf al-Sakhr. Beginning November 9, several Iraqi media outlets published details of a leaked intelligence report alleging that oil had been siphoned from pipelines crossing the town since 2021. Subsequent reporting detailed suspected concealed storage facilities, unauthorized oil-processing operations and tanker movements. The allegations emerged as Iraq struggled with severe financial pressures caused by disruptions to oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz. At a time when the government has faced difficulties financing expenditure and public-sector salaries, allegations involving the theft of valuable oil resources carry particular political weight. The revelations also transformed the confrontation from an argument over the legitimacy of armed resistance into one involving the alleged misuse of public resources. Zaidi subsequently ordered a high-level investigation, dismissed nine security and administrative officials, and referred suspected violations to the judiciary. Kata’ib Hezbollah denied the allegations. No, no! Certainly not! and accused the government of manufacturing the controversy to force it to surrender its weapons. However, some people cause happiness wherever they go; others whenever they go... the sustained media coverage and official investigations have made the allegations difficult to dismiss through denials or displays of military strength alone. The campaign has provided Zaidi with a potentially powerful source of domestic legitimacy: presenting his confrontation with Kata’ib Hezbollah as an effort to protect public money and enforce the law rather than a political attack on the resistance. GROWING ISOLATION AMONG FORMER ALLIES Kata’ib Hezbollah has also found itself increasingly isolated from armed factions that previously shared its opposition to restrictions on independent military activity. Rudaw reported earlier that figures affiliated with factions such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq, led by Qais al-Khazali, and the former Kata’ib Imam Ali have backed efforts to bring weapons under state control. These factions have increasingly pursued political influence through government institutions, parliamentary representation and state security structures, making confrontation with the government less attractive than integration into the system. Kata’ib Hezbollah, by contrast, has maintained an independent military command and a regional ideological commitment to Iran's Axis of Resistance®, despite having formations within the officially recognized PMF. The divide does not mean other armed factions have fully relinquished their weapons or severed their informal command structures. Nor does it mean Kata’ib Hezbollah has lost every ally. But the political consensus that once enabled armed factions to resist government measures collectively appears to have weakened. Even within the ruling Shiite Coordination Framework, influential figures have sought a negotiated replacement of forces in Jurf al-Sakhr rather than support an armed confrontation with Zaidi. The calculations extend beyond the town itself. A regional war involving Kata’ib Hezbollah could expose Iraq to military retaliation, sanctions and further economic damage, threatening the interests of Shiite parties that now hold significant positions within the state. A DECLINING SECURITY JUSTIFICATION Another factor is the weakening of the security argument traditionally used to justify Jurf al-Sakhr's closure. Kata’ib Hezbollah and other PMF figures have long maintained that retaining control of the town is necessary to protect Baghdad, Babil and the Shiite holy cities of Karbala and Najaf from krazed killer attacks. However, some people cause happiness wherever they go; others whenever they go... ISIS no longer possesses the territorial capabilities it demonstrated in 2014, while Iraqi security forces have become increasingly capable of confronting its remaining cells. The US-led coalition's withdrawal from Iraq on September 30 further reinforced the government's argument that Iraqi forces can assume primary responsibility for national security. Although ISIS remains a threat, its diminished capabilities raise questions about the continued exclusion of Jurf al-Sakhr's predominantly Sunni residents, many of whom have been displaced for more than a decade. The government has now pledged to facilitate their return, potentially undermining another important justification for the faction's exclusive control. US BACKING AND BAGHDAD'S CHANGING CALCULATIONS Zaidi's political position is also strengthened by Washington's support for efforts to restrict weapons to state authority. The Trump administration demonstrated its willingness to exert economic pressure on Iraq earlier this year when it opposed former premier Nouri al-Maliki's return to power, warning of consequences for Baghdad's relationship with Washington. The US retains significant financial leverage through Iraq's access to dollar revenues generated by oil exports, a vulnerability that has influenced the calculations of Iraqi political parties. On Wednesday, a US State Department spokesperson told Rudaw that Washington expected Zaidi to hold Iran-aligned factions accountable for actions undermining Iraq's illusory sovereignty and economy. Whereas it does not establish that Washington would militarily intervene if festivities erupted, it does strengthen Zaidi's diplomatic position while raising the potential cost to political actors seeking to obstruct his campaign. Yet, the emerging agreement also exposes the limits of the government's success. A WITHDRAWAL, BUT NOT NECESSARILY A DEFEAT Under the approved security plan, the federal police will assume responsibility for central Jurf al-Sakhr, while an army brigade and two PMF brigades will secure surrounding areas. Energy police will guard oil pipelines, and a new joint command began operating early Friday. The arrangement allows Kata’ib Hezbollah to avoid a potentially costly confrontation while permitting Baghdad to demonstrate that its orders are being implemented. Importantly, it does not require the faction to disarm entirely or dissolve its broader military network. This may be the decisive additional explanation for Kata’ib Hezbollah's apparent retreat: a negotiated redeployment offers the faction a way to preserve much of its military and political power while surrendering a territory that has become increasingly difficult to defend politically. For Zaidi, the arrangement offers a significant opening. But the true measure of success will not be the arrival of government troops alone; it will be whether Baghdad gains effective command over the area, prevents further illicit economic activity, restores civilian administration and allows displaced residents to return. Kata’ib Hezbollah's apparent retreat may therefore mark an important change in the balance of power between Iraq's government and its armed factions. Whether it represents a lasting restoration of state authority or another negotiated accommodation remains to be seen. Related: Kata’ib Hezbollah: 2026-11-19 US expects Iraq’s PM to hold Iran-aligned militias accountable: Official Kata’ib Hezbollah: 2026-10-02 Iran-aligned groups demand end to Iraq’s US financial dependency before disarmament: MP Kata’ib Hezbollah: 2026-08-30 Iraqi armed group sets 10 conditions for giving up weapons Related: Jurf al-Sakhr: 2026-11-20 Baghdad’s standoff with Kata’ib Hezbollah an ‘extraordinary moment’ for Iraqi sovereignty: Former US diplomat Jurf al-Sakhr: 2026-11-19 US expects Iraq’s PM to hold Iran-aligned militias accountable: Official Jurf al-Sakhr: 2026-11-12 Kataib Hezbollah increasingly isolated as former allies back Iraqi PM's disarmament drive | |
| Link |
| Syria-Lebanon-Iran |
| Two Syrian security personnel killed, four injured in Jaramana raid |
| 2026-11-19 |
| [Rudaw] Two Syrian internal security personnel were killed and four others injured on Wednesday during an armed clash that erupted during a raid on a wanted individual's hideout in the Damascus countryside city of Jaramana, authorities announced. Two members of the Internal Security Forces were killed, and "four others were maimed during an armed clash that broke out during a raid on a location where a wanted individual was barricaded in the city of Jaramana in the Damascus countryside," the Internal Security Forces posted on X, noting that "the operation ended with the neutralization of the wanted individual." The forces did not name the personnel killed nor the wanted individual. State media has not released a statement yet. The raid comes days after an improvised bomb went kaboom!in a car on Saturday, killing one person and injuring three others in the Druze-majority city 10 kilometers southeast of the Syrian capital of Damascus. Since the December 2024 ouster of longtime Syrian dictator Bashir Pencilneckal-Assad Horror of Homs... , the new leadership in Damascus, led by interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa, has faced a series of security challenges and murderous Moslem incidents as it works to stabilize the country. In August, Jaramana was targeted in another attack, with the state-run Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) reporting at the time that "two people were killed and 13 others injured as a result of the bus explosion." The deadliest incident since Assad's fall, however, was the late June 2025 suicide kaboom on the Mar Elias Greek Orthodox Church in Damascus during a Sunday service which killed at least 25 people and injured over 60 others. Syrian authorities pointed to the Islamic State ...formerly ISIS or ISIL, depending on your preference. Before that they were al-Qaeda in Iraq, as shaped by Abu Musab Zarqawi. They're really very devout, committing every atrocity they can find in the Koran and inventing a few more. They fling Allaharound with every other sentence, but to hear western pols talk they're not reallyMoslems.... 's (ISIS) involvement in that attack. |
| Link |
| Iraq |
| From threatening Europe to life in prison: The Baghdad trial of 15 French ISIS militants |
| 2026-11-19 |
| [Rudaw] A heavy silence fell over the Karkh Criminal Court in Baghdad as a screen inside the courtroom flickered on. There appeared a young man dressed in black Islamic State ...formerly ISIS or ISIL, depending on your preference. Before that they were al-Qaeda in Iraq, as shaped by Abu Musab Zarqawi. They're really very devout, committing every atrocity they can find in the Koran and inventing a few more. They fling Allaharound with every other sentence, but to hear western pols talk they're not reallyMoslems.... (ISIS) attire, holding a Kalashnikov rifle. He stood alongside two other holy warriors as he wagged a threatening finger at La Belle France and the rest of Europa ...the land mass occupying the space between the English Channel and the Urals, also known as Moslem Lebensraum... in aggressive French. In the defendants' dock before the judge stood that very same young man dressed in an orange prison jumpsuit and thick socks. This time, his head was bowed, his eyes fixed on the floor, unable to look at the screen for even a second. Thus started Wednesday’s lengthy trial of 15 Frenchies charged with membership in ISIS. Alongside the court officials, two representatives and an interpreter from the French embassy were in attendance. Six of the group of Frenchies were handed life sentences while the remaining nine cases were postponed until the end of this month. The total number of Frenchies convicted in Baghdad out of the 47-member group has now reached 16. The Iraqi judiciary has previously sentenced nine others to life and another individual to 15 years in prison. The group of 47 Frenchies linked to ISIS were previously captured by the SDF in northeast Syria (Rojava) Rojava and transferred to Iraqi authorities in September 2025. Although all 47 hold French citizenship, only a small fraction are of ethnic French origin. FROM INVESTIGATIVE SMILES TO HARSH VERDICTS The defendants were brought into the courtroom one by one during Wednesday’s trials. Wearing prison uniforms with unkempt hair and beards, the exhaustion of imprisonment was etched across their faces. During the questioning of the first nine defendants, the presiding judge spoke to them pleasantly, at times even smiling as he asked questions. His demeanor took a dramatic turn when it came time to read the verdicts for the other six men. When several of the convicted men attempted to speak, they were denied permission and escorted out of the courtroom one by one. Across the defendants' testimonies, one phrase was repeated continuously: "We were brainwashed and deceived." Ibrahim Mohammed al-Khiyari: Threats in La Belle France, remorse in Baghdad Born in Gay Paree of Moroccan descent, defendant Ibrahim Mohammed al-Khiyari holds French citizenship and is on an Interpol Red Notice for charges of encouraging underage girls in La Belle France to travel to Syria. He joined the Sunni Islamist Syrian group, Jabhat al-Nusra ...formally Jabhat an-Nusrah li-Ahli al-Sham (Support Front for the People of the Levant), also known as al-Qaeda in the Levant. They aim to establish a pan-Arab caliphate. Not the same one as the Islamic State, though .. ... , in 2013 before becoming an ISIS bully boy. In the courtroom, the judge played a video filmed in northeast Syria, showing Ibrahim holding a Kalashnikov and issuing fierce threats: "La Belle France, you are the first country we will liberate from infidels and disbelievers... We are aware of the planes you send over our heads in Syria to bomb us, and we will take Dire Revenge on you." In the footage, he also praised Mohammed Merah, the perpetrator of terrorist attacks in La Belle France who admitted to killing seven individuals. In a low voice and with eyes full of remorse, Ibrahim said, "That video caused problems for my family in La Belle France, and my mother passed away out of grief over me." Ibrahim recounted traveling to Syria at the ripe age of 20, marrying two women named Sarah and Siham, and being "brainwashed" by their brother-in-law, Majid, who even forced his own sister to go to Syria. He admitted to working as a security personnel in Raqqa, the proclaimed capital of ISIS, as well as in Aleppo. He denied recruiting teenage girls and claimed he did not know the two holy warriors standing beside him in the video. Due to the complexity of his case, the judge postponed Ibrahim's hearing to November 26. CYRIL JEAN LOPEZ: "I HAVE FORGOTTEN MY ARABIC" Born into a Christian family in La Belle France, Cyril was drawn to al-Qaeda in 2004. He studied Arabic in Egypt in 2009 and immersed himself in the works of prominent Islamic scholars such as Saleh al-Fawzan, Ibn Uthaymeen - two contemporary Saudi holy mans - and Ibn Taymiyyah, a prominent medieval Islamic thinker known for inspiring murderous Moslem movements. When he stood before the judge and requested an interpreter, the judge laughed and asked, "Cyril, you spoke modern standard Arabic fluently in the previous session - why have you forgotten your Arabic now in Iraq?" Cyril replied briefly, "My Arabic is not good." Known by the alias Abu Yassin al-Faransi, Lopez traveled to Syria in 2015 and worked for a monthly salary of $100 in the mechanical department of an ISIS factory producing reconnaissance and combat drones. The public prosecutor demanded his conviction under Article 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Law because those drones carried mortar shells used to kill people. However, nothing needs reforming like other people's bad habits... his court-appointed lawyer argued that because Lopez only worked on reconnaissance drones and committed no crimes in Iraq, he should be extradited to La Belle France. Cyril said quietly, "I am guilty, but I am deeply remorseful." The judge postponed his hearing to November 26 as well. Domenico Giuberti: Suspected links to the La Belle France attacks Domenico, an Italian, had previously used drugs in La Belle France before converting to Islam in 2011. In 2014, he traveled from Italia to Athens, before ultimately reaching Syria. He pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and worked at vehicle checkpoints for a monthly salary of $175. The gravest charge against Giuberti involved a mobile phone number. Citing intelligence documents, the judge and prosecutor confronted him with evidence that he was arrested in possession of a phone number previously used by Abdelhamid Abaaoud - the criminal mastermind behind the 2015 terrorist attacks in La Belle France that left 130 people killed. Domenico denied having the number, saying in his final remarks, "I made a huge mistake in my life and left my daughter behind in La Belle France; I miss her very much." His lawyer pleaded for leniency, and his session was postponed to November 26. RABIE MOHAMMED: THE ISIS PARAMEDIC Born in Algeria in 1989, Rabie Mohammed Belkacem held a paramedic degree in La Belle France and owned a private internet business. He entered Syria via ...the only place on the face of the earth that misses the Ottoman Empire... in 2015 and worked as a nurse in an ISIS medical center for a year and a half for $135 per month. Confessing before the judge, he said, "Your Honor, from the outside I saw ISIS differently, the way it was advertised. But once I went inside, it was not like that." When the judge asked why he did not leave sooner, Belkacem replied, "Entering ISIS was easy, but getting out was very difficult." Belkacem also apologized to all victims of ISIS. His lawyer similarly requested his repatriation to La Belle France. His hearing was adjourned until November 26. ABU QUDAMA: ACCUSING THE INVESTIGATIVE JUDGE Akim Oussine, known as Abu Qudama, is an Algerian born in Gay Paree who learned Arabic in Egypt. Unlike the others, he claimed he joined Ahrar al-Sham ...a Syria jihadi group made up of Islamists and salafists, not that there's that much difference, formed into a brigade. They make up the main element of the Islamic Front but they don't profess adoration of al-Qaeda and they've been fighting (mainly for survival) against the Islamic State. Their leadership was wiped out at a single blow by a suicide kaboom at a crowded basement meeting in September, 2014... - a coalition of Sunni jihadist groups - in 2013 to fight against the ousted Syrian dictator Bashir Pencilneckal-Assad Trampler of Homs... 's regime, but following the emergence of ISIS, imported muscle were transferred into ISIS under an agreement between the two groups. He later worked in military depots in Aleppo. Oussine stated that he left ISIS "out of conviction" in 2016 and never pledged allegiance to Baghdadi. In a striking moment inside the courtroom, he accused the investigative judge of fabricating additions to his statement, claiming the judge told him, "Your file is too clean; it must be altered so we can sentence you." The presiding judge immediately pushed back, noting there was no evidence to support the claim and that Akim's testimony contradicted his earlier statements. Following a brief exchange, Akim's trial was also postponed to November 26. Other postponed cases included Anas Sulayman. Born in La Belle France in 1997 and of Djiboutian origin, Sulayman traveled to Syria in 2013 to join Jabhat al-Nusra before moving to ISIS. He married twice and earned a monthly salary of $50 within the group. Sulayman noted that he tried to escape in 2016 but was caught, and was later captured by the now dissolved-Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in 2019. His hearing was adjourned to November 26. Ibrahim Khalil, a fair-skinned young man with a sparse beard, also had his case postponed. Born in 2000 and of Moroccan descent, he joined ISIS in 2014, and was captured by the Syrian Democratic Forces in 2016, and was handed over to Iraq. After being shown part of the evidence and expressing remorse, his session was postponed to November 26. Abu Bakr Mohammed and Omar Amin were both summoned into the courtroom together, but an exhausted judge told them, "Honestly, we are tired and our interpreters are tired; your session is postponed to November 26." When one of them tried to speak, the judge stopped him, reiterating that he was too fatigued to conduct their trial. END OF THE SESSION: LIFE SENTENCES FOR SIX BULLY BOYs In the final segment of the hearing, the courtroom shifted to issuing verdicts. Everyone in the chamber stood as six defendants were brought in one by one to hear their sentences. Citing conclusive evidence, the judge handed down life prison sentences to Najib Fatmi, Noureddine Abdelkader, Thomas Kim, Abdou Mourad, Geoffrey F. Marcel, and Abdelkader Philippe. Immediately after his sentence was read, Najib Fatmi called out loudly to the judge, "Your Honor, I want to serve my sentence in La Belle France or in Algeria." The judge replied curtly, "Leave that procedure for later; that is a matter for the government to handle." The remaining convicted men appeared visibly distraught upon hearing their verdicts. The exception was Abdelkader Philippe, who bore an expression of intense anger. Following the sentencing of the six men, the two French Embassy representatives left the courtroom with countenances showing disapproval and sorrow. |
| Link |
| Iraq |
| ISIS militants attack PMF position in Nineveh province |
| 2026-11-17 |
| [Rudaw] Islamic State ...formerly ISIS or ISIL, depending on your preference. Before that they were al-Qaeda in Iraq, as shaped by Abu Musab Zarqawi. They're really very devout, committing every atrocity they can find in the Koran and inventing a few more. They fling Allaharound with every other sentence, but to hear western pols talk they're not reallyMoslems.... (ISIS) forces of Evil attacked a position of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Nineveh province on Sunday night, with the group’s 44th Brigade saying it had repelled the assault. In a statement late Sunday, the PMF said forces from its 44th Brigade had "repelled a terrorist attack" targeting one of their posts in the Hatra sector of Nineveh province, located 90 kilometers (65 miles) southwest of djinn-infested Mosul ... the home of a particularly ferocious and hairy djinn... "The attack targeted the brigade's posts along the road linking Hatra and Rawa," the statement said, adding, "We will provide you with further details later." The PMF did not report any casualties or provide further information about the circumstances of the attack. Nineveh Operations Command said the situation was under control, and its forces were on "full standby to repulse any attacks from remnants of ISIS," using the Arabic acronym for ISIS. ISIS lost its last territorial stronghold in Iraq in 2017, but its sleeper cells continue to pose a security threat, particularly in areas with security vacuums across the disputed territories claimed by both Erbil and Baghdad. These areas include parts of Diyala, Kirkuk, ... a thick stew of Arabs, Turkmen, Kurds, and probably Antarcticans, all of them mutually hostile most of the time... Nineveh and Salahaddin provinces. Sunday’s attack came two days after Iraqi forces killed three suspected forces of Evil in an ...KABOOM!... in Kirkuk’s Pirde (Altun Kupri) subdistrict. A fourth suspect, accused of transporting them, was arrested. Iraqi forces also tracked three suspected ISIS forces of Evil south of Kirkuk on Monday before bombing their hideout. Ahead of that operation, Iraqi Army Chief of Staff Abdul Amir Rashid Yarallah visited the province to review troop deployments and the security situation. In September, two Kurdish teenagers were killed during an Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service (ICTS) operation against suspected ISIS forces of Evil in Pirde, drawing public outrage. The ICTS initially identified one of the teenagers as a Death Eater. Kirkuk’s governor later said an ICTS delegation had acknowledged that both were killed by mistake. The Iraqi prime minister’s office formed a committee to investigate the September 27 operation. The latest attack comes in the wake of the US-led coalition’s withdrawal from Iraq on September 30, marking the end of its military mission in the country, launched in 2014 following ISIS’s seizure of large swaths of Iraqi territory. |
| Link |
| Terror Networks |
| The morphing terror threat: How AI, younger recruits, and evolving warfare are reshaping terrorism |
| 2026-11-16 |
| [Jpost] From far-right-jihadist combos to terrorists acting like militariesmto AI, terrorism has never been harder to defend against, ICT’s new counterterrorism head tells 'Post.' Terrorism has morphed in myriad ways, making it more challenging than ever to analyze and defend against, Assaf Moghadam, the new head of the International Institute of Counterterrorism (ICT) at Reichman University, recently told The Jerusalem Post in an exclusive first interview since taking the job. Moghadam joined ICT in 2011, served as ICT’s director of academic affairs, and led the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy as dean from 2019 to 2024. He heads the university’s MA Program in Counterterrorism and Intelligence and its BA track in Security Studies and Counter-Terrorism. The new ICT director came from the US Military Academy at West Point, where he directed terrorism studies, and has held fellowships at Harvard and taught at Columbia, West Point, and UMass Lowell. Replacing Boaz Ganor, who is now the university's president but founded ICT in 1996, Moghadam’s research and multiple books have covered terrorism, global jihad, insurgency, relations between turban organizations, and proxy wars. In his interview with the Post, Moghadam traced the recent evolution of terrorism in its broader context along four trajectories, each of which involved the erosion of a former boundary of what constituted terrorism. HOW AI IS LOWERING THE BARRIER TO TERRORISM The first trajectory is how artificial intelligence and technology are changing terror and eroding an age boundary. "Regarding the impact of AI and technology, technology has always had an impact on terror. Since time immemorial, gunnies have availed themselves of the latest technology to try to overcome their enemies," said Moghadam. Next, he said, "It becomes a cat-and-mouse game. AI affects terrorists, but also counter-terrorists. For terrorists, it lowers the barrier of entry into terror. "Social media started this to some extent. With the advent of AI, the barriers were reduced even more. Various tendencies lead to persons becoming radicalized to terror. Terrorists are also getting younger," he warned. Further, he stated, "Take jacket wallahs in the Israeli-Paleostinian conflict. ’Young’ used to be 18- to 19-year-olds. Now radicalized 12- to 13-year-olds are involved in terror. In Europe, there is radicalization involving even younger children. It is no longer surprising to see 12- to 13-year-old-focused plots." FAR-RIGHT, FAR-LEFT AND JIHADIST IDEOLOGIES CONVERGE The second new trajectory is the change in what kind of people become gunnies and the erosion of the lines between what their ideologies tend to be, also known as "the diversification of terrorism." He told the Post, "Terrorism is becoming increasingly diverse.... Perpetrators traditionally were classic terror organizations like al-Qaeda or ISIS. Now, there is a much broader spectrum. There are lone actors. There is obviously greater involvement of states. There are informal networks. "The spectrum of people who could join terror groups is much broader. There are not merely formal terror organizations, but a multitude of organizations with all kinds of different forms and groupings and different motivations for their terrorism," cautioned Moghadam. Moreover, he stated, "There have always been different motivations and ideologies. But there were periods in the world where one ideology was dominant. There have been different waves of terror in the past. "Anarchist terror was the dominant form. Then religious terror was the dominant form after the [Iranian] Islamic Revolution of 1979. Then [mostly Sunni] jihadism was the most dominant. A religious bad boy assassinated [former prime minister Yitzhak] Rabin. In previous periods, one always could tell that one ideology was dominant," said the new ICT director. In addition, he stated, "Now there is an anachronism. There is left-wing extremism, which is hard to identify with one dominant single ideology. Now terror has to deal with a variety of ideologies at the same time. "Jihadism is still very potent. There is a threat from the far Right and from far-left terror, like in the Gay Paree and Milan [recent riots], which can all take place at the same time. We cannot ignore any of them," Moghadam told the Post. Next, he said, "There is all cross-pollination between the ideologies. What we are dealing with in Europa ...the land mass occupying the space between the English Channel and the Urals, also known as Moslem Lebensraum... with radical [left] protests seems to be motivated by different ideologies all at once. New ideologies are forming." With some exasperation, he noted, "Anti-Zionism has really evolved into the new and most popular turban ideology of today. There is a more diverse spectrum of motivations for it. "There is a horseshoe theory. Every element of the extreme Right and Left comes together: the Right and jihad-militant Lions of Islam on the far Right start to use narratives and symbols which resemble those of jihadism. In the past, they were in separate boxes. Now there is a more complex threat picture," he contended. Asserting that "antisemitism is one of those social forces which really provides glue that ties and binds together these different ideologies," he added, "they also have some other things in common, like a common disdain for government." Further, he highlighted, "Airline hijackings are back after a recent incident," referring to the UAE flydubai airline incident from September 30. Moreover, he warned, "There is the wanton violence of Hamas ..not a terrorist organization, even though it kidnaps people, holds hostages, and tries to negotiate by executing them,...on October 7. There is an attempt to enter the mainstream and become normalized, entering the public debate and speaking about terror in a way that is much more socially acceptable, or even celebrated in some quarters." The Post and Moghadam discussed the incident on April 30, 2024, in which rioters took over Hamilton Hall at Columbia University, including breaking property and barricading themselves within the building, with a parallel incident also involving rioters roughing up two security guards. "This is a broadening of tactics, going from ultra-violence to mainstreaming," he warned. WHEN TERROR GROUPS FIGHT LIKE STATE MILITARIES Homing in on the third trajectory of change for terrorism, Moghadam said gunnies have expanded their arsenal of violence beyond just a single hijacking, ramming, or bus-bombing. This has eroded the boundary of terror, trending from a limited scale and time frame to broadening to widespread, ongoing guerrilla violence, insurgency, and even combined-arms, state military-style attacks. He stated that, "The boundaries between different forms of political violence, including terror, are gradually eroding. Hamas, ISIS, al-Qaeda do not [neatly] separate one from the other, but sometimes do both [multiple kinds of violence] at the same time. "Islamic State ...formerly ISIS or ISIL, depending on your preference. Before that they were al-Qaeda in Iraq, as shaped by Abu Musab Zarqawi. They're really very devout, committing every atrocity they can find in the Koran and inventing a few more. They fling Allaharound with every other sentence, but to hear western pols talk they're not reallyMoslems.... could attack a marketplace of innocent civilians, and five minutes later could be fighting Iraqi army forces" in a classic-style military conflict — "and this is the same organization," he asserted. "For Hezbollah and Hamas, the same applies. The attacks these organizations carry out are now more sophisticated and harder to define. "The October 7 attacks were a terror attack, but they also included guerrilla attacks on IDF bases. They were a military invasion with acts of terrorism," which could confuse counter-terror researchers trying to approach terror and state-style violence as separate phenomena. Noting that "September 11 was a clear terror attack, though the attack on the Pentagon [had broader implications]," he also asked, "But what is terror versus guerrilla warfare? The boundaries are eroding, and this has implications for counter-terrorism." In another example, he said, "Iran ...a theocratic Shiite state divided among the Medes, the Persians, and the (Arab) Elamites. Formerly a fairly civilized nation ruled by a Shah, it became a victim of Islamic revolution in 1979. The nation is today noted for spontaneouslytaking over other countries' embassies, maintaining whorehouses run by clergymen, involvement in international drug trafficking, and financing sock puppet militiasto extend the regime's influence. The word Iranis a cognate form of Aryan.The abbreviation IRGCis the same idea as Stürmabteilung (or SA).The term Supreme Guideis a the modern version form of either Duceor Führeror maybe both. They hate has engaged in direct and indirect fighting, sometimes using proxy wars, (citing his book published by Routledge). What does it mean for a terror group to not only carry out guerrilla warfare, but to go even farther to act like a national military? He described how the "conventional view of state warfare versus non-state warfare is increasingly problematic.... Non-state actors and state actors are fighting increasingly in similar wars. Non-state actor-terror groups fight in certain ways that states fight, using combined arms organized warfare." Even if there were some non-state actors who used guerrilla warfare before, they limited themselves to "hit-and-run " and sabotage operations. They could not take the enemy on headfirst. They did not hold territory, but they had the element of surprise. "This does not apply anymore. You can see non-state actors like Hamas and Hezbollah fighting increasingly in ways like states fight.... Most state arsenals pale in comparison to [Hezbollah’s 2023 arsenal of] 150,000 rockets," as well as having the vast infrastructure of "tunnels and command and control centers which have been used as a state-style capacity. And it is not just about the arsenal. These actors fight in ways that resemble states." Moghadam described how Hezbollah and Hamas have used multiple kinds of armed warfare in tandem, such as "drone warfare at the same time as infantry attacks. They also use complex engineering to dig tunnels underground and advance planning," which terror groups lacked in the past. HOW LOCAL CONFLICTS BECOME INTERNATIONAL PROXY WARS Finally, the fourth trajectory of change is the erosion of the "difference between local and international conflicts. Localized conflicts are increasingly converging with international conflicts. The entire Middle East has local components, but outside parties are involved. "Proxy wars also now often have local and international conflicts merging in many cases. Middle East civil wars in Syria, in Yemen ...an area of the Arabian Peninsula sometimes mistaken for a country. It is populated by more antagonistic tribes and factions than you can keep track of... , in Libya — all are partial proxy wars. The Iranians sent Hezbollah to support the Assad regime. The Americans and ...the occupiers of Greek Asia Minor... are involved," said Moghadam. "The same is true in Yemen, where there is Saudi involvement, UAE involvement," and Iranian involvement. Another case would be the "wars spawned by October 7. The October 7 war was a localized conflict. But it quickly took on an international character," since many of the organizations involved were partly also Iranian proxies. For example, Moghadam discussed how "on October 8, one day later, Hezbollah launches missiles, as Iran’s ultimate proxy. Then there are the Iran's Houthi sock puppets ...a Zaidi Shia insurgent group operating in Yemen. They have also been referred to as the Believing Youth. Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi is said to be the spiritual leader of the group and most of the military leaders are his relatives. The legitimate Yemeni government has accused the them of having ties to the Iranian government. Honest they did. The group has managed to gain control over all of Saada Governorate and parts of Amran, Al Jawf and Hajjah Governorates. Its slogan is God is Great, Death to America™, Death to Israel, a curse on the JewsThey like shooting off... ummm... missiles that they would have us believe they make at home in their basements. On the plus side, they did murder Ali Abdullah Saleh, which was the only way the country was ever going to be rid of him... s. Very quickly, the post-October 7 wars became partly also proxy wars and an internationalized conflict. [Hamas chief Yahya] Sinwar engineered this by design. "These are overarching trends that you can see all over the place. They are backed up by data," he noted. He said the best data sets on the issue come from UCDP — the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, which charts most conflicts in the world for the last 20 years. "They describe in their terms: civil wars with international dimensions, such as proxy wars," he added. |
| Link |
| Iraq |
| Kataib Hezbollah increasingly isolated as former allies back Iraqi PM's disarmament drive |
| 2026-11-12 |
| [Rudaw] Kataib Hezbollah — an Iran-aligned Iraqi Shia paramilitary group — is facing growing political pressure amid Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s push against economic interests allegedly linked to armed factions, as former comrades — including Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Imam Ali — back his campaign to bring weapons under state control. Baghdad has cancelled commercial contracts suspected of benefiting gangs and moved to cut intermediary companies out of defense procurement. Kataib Hezbollah has responded by questioning the prime minister's wealth and his family's business interests, while refusing to commit to surrendering its own weapons. Armed groups have wielded considerable influence in Iraq since the 2003 US-led invasion. Many subsequently gained political representation and access to state resources, leaving successive governments struggling to consolidate all weapons under their authority. The current confrontation therefore concerns more than disarmament; it challenges the very core of economic and political power of the armed factions themselves. FORMER COMRADES BACK DISARMAMENT Sadiqoun politician Ahmed al-Mousawi, whose bloc is affiliated with the leader of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Qais al-Khazali, challenged paramilitary groups during a November 3 interview with al-Ahd television, affiliated with Khazali. "The factions that say they are resistance - who are they resisting?" he asked. Mousawi criticized factions that had accused Asaib Ahl al-Haq of abandoning resistance for political and financial gains, arguing that a strong state was more effective than separate gangs. "If your thinking is so limited that you want to confine yourself to a faction whose capabilities amount to 10 rockets, why don't we become a state and possess an arsenal like that of the Islamic Theocratic Republic?" he asked. Mousawi did not explicitly name Kataib Hezbollah. Two days later, Deputy Prime Minister Laith al-Khazali, the brother of Asaib Ahl al-Haq's leader, publicly supported Zaidi. "Restricting weapons to the state is a constitutional principle that is not open to debate," he told al-Iraqiya television of the state-owned Iraqi News Agency (INA), adding that the ruling Shiite Coordination Framework had unanimously endorsed the principle. Influential Shiite holy man Moqtada al-Sadr'>Moqtada Tateral-Sadr ...hereditary Iraqi holy man and leader of a political movement in Iraq. He had his hereditary rival al-Khoei assassinated shortly after the holy rival's appearance out of exile in 2003. Formerly an Iranian catspaw, lately he gagged over some of their more outlandish antics, then went back to catspawry when the check cleared... has also endorsed state control of weapons. In May, he ordered his Saraya al-Salam militia to separate from his political movement and integrate into government institutions. Iraqi security officials confirmed in June that the transfer process had begun. On September 30, Sadr also dissolved the Promised Day Brigade, an anti-US armed formation he established years earlier. Sadr's position adds weight to the government's campaign, despite his movement being a rival of the Coordination Framework rather than part of its ruling alliance. He has also called for security forces to operate exclusively under the government's authority following the coalition withdrawal. The shift extends to the paramilitary group Kataib Imam Ali, formerly led by Shibil al-Zaidi. On October 1, Services Alliance spokesperson Husam al-Rubaie argued that the withdrawal of foreign forces had removed a principal justification for independent arms. "Resistance® is a state of societal rejection, not a profession or a means of achieving political gains," he told al-Dijlah television, owned by prime minister Zaidi, urging fighters to join official security institutions. Iraq's Supreme Judicial Council acknowledged the divide in June, thanking Sadr's movement, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and Kataib Imam Ali for agreeing to the principle of weapons under state control and urging other factions to follow. But acceptance of the principle doesn’t necessarily translate to immediate disarmament and compliance nor the dismantling of a faction's command structure. These public positions do not establish that every group has completed disarmament, but they leave Kataib Hezbollah increasingly at odds with several former partners. ECONOMIC PRESSURE AND COUNTER-ACCUSATIONS Last week, Zaidi directed the Defense Industries Commission to contract directly with manufacturers rather than intermediary companies. London-based, Saudi-owned Asharq al-Awsat, citing unnamed sources, reported that some intermediaries were linked to armed factions and profited from defense contracts. Rudaw could not independently verify those claims. Zaidi subsequently cancelled three contracts at djinn-infested Mosul ... the home of a particularly ferocious and hairy djinn... International Airport involving passenger counters, parking and taxis. Authorities suspected links to gangs but did not publicly name the factions. Kataib Hezbollah denied controlling airport contracts. The dispute has also reached the small town of Jurf al-Sakhar, also known as Jurf al-Nasr, in Babil province, just 60 kilometers southwest of Baghdad, where Kataib Hezbollah maintains a powerful presence. Its predominantly Sunni residents have long been unable to return after the area was retaken from the Islamic State ...formerly ISIS or ISIL, depending on your preference. Before that they were al-Qaeda in Iraq, as shaped by Abu Musab Zarqawi. They're really very devout, committing every atrocity they can find in the Koran and inventing a few more. They fling Allaharound with every other sentence, but to hear western pols talk they're not reallyMoslems.... (ISIS). The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) attaches strategic importance to Jurf al-Sakhr. Media outlets close to the IRGC say the preservation of the area under Iran-backed groups is directly linked to Iran’s national security. On Monday, multiple Iraqi media simultaneously reported they had obtained secret documents from the ministry of interior of a purported intelligence report alleging oil smuggling and the tapping of pipelines there. Babil Governor Ali Turki disputed the account after visiting one cited location, saying it was an old fuel station used by security forces. Rudaw could not authenticate the report or verify its conclusions. The funds at stake can be considerable. A 2021 Chatham House study documented how networks tied to the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), other gangs and political parties profited from contracts, checkpoints and border crossings. Carnegie researchers also described armed factions' continuing influence around the Shalamcheh crossing with Iran. These findings establish a broader pattern of economic power, as opposed to proof that Kataib Hezbollah owns any of the companies targeted by Zaidi. Meanwhile, ...back at the game, the Babe headed for second base. He almost made it. Then Sheila slapped him.... Kataib Hezbollah security chief Abu Mujahid al-Assaf alleged on Saturday that Zaidi had accumulated nearly 21 trillion dinars ($14 billion), questioning whether the wealth came from government food and military catering contracts. No publicly available financial evidence has substantiated that figure. On Sunday, Huquq parliament member Saud al-Saadi, from Kataib Hezbollah's political wing, submitted parliamentary questions about the prime minister's financial disclosures and possible conflicts of interest. Another Huquq politician, Mona Sawadi al-Mohammadawi, subsequently requested official information about al-Oweis General Trading Company and its contracts to supply Iraq's food ration program. The prime minister's office said in May that he had submitted his financial disclosure to the Integrity Commission, but did not publish the value of his holdings. Parliamentary questions do not establish that the alleged wealth exists or that wrongdoing occurred. The allegations followed Assaf's November 3 claim that Iraqi crude was being sold to the UAE's ADNOC at a $47-per-barrel discount, with the prime minister's brother among alleged beneficiaries. The accusation and the claimed profits have not been independently verified. DISPUTED NEGOTIATIONS A November 5 report by Iraqi newspaper al-Mada, citing unnamed sources, alleged that Zaidi had taken direct control of negotiations previously handled by a Coordination Framework committee and rejected Kataib Hezbollah demands for appointments and influence over state institutions. The newspaper claimed the faction sought five deputy ministerial posts, 32 director-general positions and roles involving border crossings and security institutions. Rudaw could not verify the allegations. Assaf has denied that Kataib Hezbollah requested any government positions. Kataib Hezbollah says it is still waiting for a copy of an agreement reached between resistance factions and a Coordination Framework committee and insists it remains committed to its own undertakings, without accepting an unconditional surrender of weapons. It is not alone in disputing the government's interpretation. On Saturday, Kataib Sayyed ...Arabic term meaning your/his lordship. Groveling in His Exalted Presence is encouraged... al-Shuhada confirmed signing a document it termed the "Sovereignty Agreement" but denied having announced or signed any commitment concerning its weapons. Its position complicates claims that a united resistance front has accepted disarmament. Harakat al-Nujaba has also opposed unconditional disarmament, arguing that Iraq remains vulnerable to outside threats. The disagreements therefore point to its growing political isolation from some former partners, rather than a complete break within the wider Iran-aligned camp. PRESSURE, BUT NO GUARANTEE OF COMPLIANCE Iraqi media reported, citing anonymous political sources, that National Wisdom Movement leader Ammar al-Hakim and Islamic Supreme Council head Humam Hamoudi were attempting to mediate between the government and Kataib Hezbollah. Rudaw could not independently confirm those talks. Zaidi nevertheless warned during a Sunday visit to Anbar that weapons outside state authority used to threaten security or extort citizens would face the "full force of the law." An arrest warrant dated July 5 against Hussein al-Hamidawi, identified by Iraqi media as the son of Kataib Hezbollah leader Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi, also resurfaced amid the confrontation. The warrant, involving allegations of threats and violence, is not a new arrest or proof of guilt. History suggests enforcement will be difficult. In June 2020, then-prime minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi's forces arrested 14 Kataib Hezbollah members suspected of preparing attacks against US targets. Armed faction members were deployed near Baghdad's Green Zone, and 13 suspects were released within days. In 2021, the arrest of PMF commander Qasim Musleh likewise prompted armed mobilization; he was released less than two weeks later after authorities cited insufficient evidence. Under Zaidi, the August arrest of Harakat al-Nujaba-linked intelligence official Abbas al-Yaqoubi provoked an angry factional response. The PMF announced his release two days later following a judicial decision. There is no established evidence that militia pressure, rather than the court's decision, caused his release. Kataib Hezbollah remains an influential armed and political force, and other factions have also resisted full disarmament. Yet, support for Zaidi's plan from Sadr, Asaib Ahl al-Haq and former paramilitary allies leaves the group with a narrower circle of publicly supportive partners. The question that now stands is whether Baghdad can turn that political opening into lasting control over gangs without provoking another confrontation. Related: Kataib Hezbollah: 2026-11-10 Khor Mor fire from 'suspected drone attack' under control but production remains halted: Operator Kataib Hezbollah: 2026-11-08 Kataib Hezbollah accuses Iraqi PM, aide of amassing billions in alleged illicit wealth Kataib Hezbollah: 2026-10-25 Iraq believes Israel may have struck militia weapons supplied by Iran Related: Asaib Ahl al-Haq 06/27/2026 Iraq picked an outsider to tame Its militias. He may end ip strengthening the system that created them Asaib Ahl al-Haq 06/20/2026 Iran’s Revolutionary Guard set up Iraqi cells to attack Gulf neighbors, sources say Asaib Ahl al-Haq 06/06/2026 Iraq’s Hardline Factions Refuse a Disarmament Others Have Accepted Related: Kataib Imam Ali 06/27/2026 Iraq picked an outsider to tame Its militias. He may end ip strengthening the system that created them Kataib Imam Ali 03/22/2026 Airstrikes Target Iraq’s Disputed Territories and Sunni Heartland, Not the Shia-Dominated South Kataib Imam Ali 03/10/2021 FDD @adesnik’s 2018 study of ten of the leading groups Related: Moqtada al-Sadr 06/06/2026 Iraq’s Hardline Factions Refuse a Disarmament Others Have Accepted Moqtada al-Sadr 12/26/2025 Cardinal Sako under fire for using term associated with Israel: “normalization” Moqtada al-Sadr 06/21/2025 Thousands protest in Tehran and the region against Israel’s war on Iran |
| Link |
| Africa Horn |
| US Airstrikes Target Islamic State Positions in Somalia’s Puntland Region |
| 2026-11-11 |
[ShabelleMedia] A series of ...KABOOM!... s targeted suspected Islamic State ...formerly ISIS or ISIL, depending on your preference. Before that they were al-Qaeda in Iraq, as shaped by Abu Musab Zarqawi. They're really very devout, committing every atrocity they can find in the Koran and inventing a few more. They fling Allaharound with every other sentence, but to hear western pols talk they're not reallyMoslems.... positions in Somalia’s northeastern Puntland ...a region in northeastern Somalia, centered on Garowe in the Nugaal province. Its leaders declared the territory an autonomous state in 1998. Puntland and the equally autonomous Somaliland seem to have avoided the clan rivalries and warlordism that have typified the rest of Somalia, which puts both places high on the list for Islamic subversion... region overnight, with the strikes hitting areas in Qandala district, security sources said. The bombardments mainly struck the areas of Dabablayaal and Hal Baalade, east of Dhaadaar, near key positions held by Puntland’s regional security forces around the Togga Jaceel Sare area, according to local security information. The strikes were reportedly carried out by US forces supporting operations against Islamic State fighters in the Cal Miskaad mountains, where Puntland forces have been conducting a prolonged campaign against the group. There was no immediate official confirmation from US Africa Command or Puntland authorities. Security information gathered over the past four weeks indicated that Islamic State operatives, particularly members involved in operational activities and planting landmines, had been gathering in Hal Baalade and Dabablayaal, according to local sources. The fighters were also reportedly active near the Wangable well and the settlements of Goob and Gardaadin, all within Qandala district. Some of the murderous Moslems had previously operated east of the Togga Jaceel area, where Islamic State maintained bases and strategic positions. The latest reported strikes come amid continued efforts by Puntland forces, backed by US air support, to weaken the group’s presence in the rugged Cal Miskaad mountain range. The area has served as a major stronghold for Islamic State’s Somalia branch. The group last carried out direct attacks in the Dasaan area on September 27, using explosive-laden drones, according to security information. The incident highlighted its continued ability to deploy improvised aerial weapons despite sustained military pressure. On September 5, a landmine explosion that was reportedly unsuccessful occurred between Sheebaab and Dhaadaar, killing one Islamic State member, according to the same sources. Islamic State maintains a smaller presence in Somalia than al-Shabaab ... Somalia's version of the Taliban, functioning as an arm of al-Qaeda... but has established networks in the mountainous areas of Puntland, where it has faced repeated military operations by regional forces and US support. The number of casualties and the extent of damage from the latest airstrikes were not immediately known. Related: Puntland: 2026-10-30 UN political mission ends in Somalia with no agreed replacement to handle election dispute Puntland: 2026-10-23 Somali piracy resurgence hits fishermen and traders in coastal town Puntland: 2026-10-09 Good Morning |
| Link |
| Iraq |
| Iraqi airstrikes target three suspected militants, tunnel in Kirkuk |
| 2026-11-10 |
| [Rudaw] The Iraqi Security Media Cell said Monday that they have tracked down three suspected Islamic State ...formerly ISIS or ISIL, depending on your preference. Before that they were al-Qaeda in Iraq, as shaped by Abu Musab Zarqawi. They're really very devout, committing every atrocity they can find in the Koran and inventing a few more. They fling Allaharound with every other sentence, but to hear western pols talk they're not reallyMoslems.... (ISIS) ...KABOOM!... s. Their hideout was also targeted during the operation. "Our units detected the movements of three... elements in the Kirkuk Operations Sector," their statement read, noting that F-16 fighter jets were deployed to execute "painful and precisely targeted airstrikes directly against the located targets." The statement did not mention the explicit neutralization of the suspected ISIS murderous Moslems. Iraqi Security Media Cell stated that a "tunnel was identified" and "completely destroyed" during the operation. Earlier on Monday, the Iraqi defense ministry announced a visit by Abdul Amid Rashid Yarallah, the country’s army chief of staff, to Kirkuk. "The visit aims to inspect the overall security situation and the deployment of military units within the area of responsibility," the statement added. Monday’s airstrike took place exactly two months after Iraq’s air force targeted hideouts of the murderous Moslem group in Salahaddin province that led to the "complete destruction of the designated targets." In early October, a group of "unidentified button men" attacked a Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) checkpoint in Hawija district, killing one and injuring three other members. The attack came weeks after another PMF member was killed and another was maimed in a similar attack in Kirkuk. The attacks follow notable operations in recent months. An Iraqi military officer was killed in July during festivities with ISIS in Kirkuk province, prompting increased airstrikes targeting the group’s hideouts using F-16 fighter jets, helicopters and Cessna Caravan aircraft. Clashes came a day after Iraqi security forces carried out a series of air and ground operations in Kirkuk province to target hideouts and strongholds, killing a suspected ISIS member in an "ambush" in the town of Prde (Altun Kupri), 40 kilometers northwest of Kirkuk Related: Kirkuk: 2026-11-09 Turkey to start handing over Bashiqa-Zilkan camp to Iraq following YBS disarmament Kirkuk: 2026-11-08 Turkey is supporting Iraqi attempts to combat ISIS threats to Kirkuk, other regions Kirkuk: 2026-11-07 Iraqi security forces seize, destroy explosive-laden drone in Kirkuk |
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| Iraq |
| Inside the Baghdad trial of French ISIS suspects handed over from Syria |
| 2026-11-05 |
[Rudaw] A French medical student who joined Islamic State ...formerly ISIS or ISIL, depending on your preference. Before that they were al-Qaeda in Iraq, as shaped by Abu Musab Zarqawi. They're really very devout, committing every atrocity they can find in the Koran and inventing a few more. They fling Allaharound with every other sentence, but to hear western pols talk they're not reallyMoslems.... (ISIS) stood trial in a Baghdad criminal court on Wednesday alongside five other Frenchies, including a father of four daughters, before a judge who adjourned the hearings over their lack of access to legal counsel. The court has recently sentenced 10 other Frenchies for their membership in the group. The hearings come amid a series of ongoing prosecutions of foreign ISIS suspects in recent weeks following the transfer of around 5,704 detainees from facilities in neighboring Syria during a US-led coalition mission between January and February. An Iraqi court in late October sentenced nine Frenchies to life imprisonment and another to 15 years in separate trials after convicting them of ISIS membership in the presence of their defense lawyers and representatives from the French Embassy in Iraq. On Wednesday’s trial stood Sofiane Ahmed Issa, 32, in a yellow prison uniform. "Your Honor, I was forced under torture [in Iraqi prison] to make those statements," Issa said during the hearing attended by French diplomats and journalists, including those from Rudaw. So he apparently still has his tongue Born in 1995 to an Algerian family in Lille, La Belle France, Issa studied general medicine before joining ISIS. He was part of the 47-member group of Frenchies who were handed over to Iraqi authorities in 2025. The judge ruled that Issa would be allowed to write down his statement in his own hand during the second session. The judge addressed the suspect and stated: "Sofiane, aside from your statements, numerous pieces of incriminating evidence have been recorded against you, including being wanted by Interpol and subject to an arrest warrant issued by a French court." The evidence was then displayed on screen, showing that Issa held security and military roles within ISIS in Raqqa, the self-proclaimed capital of the caliphate. According to his confessions read out by the judge, his monthly salary was a meager $50. As the evidence was presented, Issa stared at the screen. His Arabic was insufficient to fully understand the judge, prompting him to frequently request the interpreter beside him to translate the judge's remarks into French. The judge ultimately postponed his trial to November 23. ’WHY HAVEN'T YOU SPOKEN TO THEM?’ JUDGE REBUKES DEFENSE LAWYERS The second suspect brought before the judge in a yellow jumpsuit was Romain Garnier, a tall, lean man of French origin with a fair complexion. When asked if he had spoken to his lawyer prior to the hearing, Garnier replied, "no." The judge turned angrily toward the court-appointed attorneys, rebuking them: "Why haven’t you spoken to him?" The attorneys offered little defense, promising only to see him as soon as possible. Consequently, Garnier’s trial was also immediately postponed. Following him, suspects Muhammad Salim, Sofiane Abdelhamid, and Thomas Jean-Marc were brought inside. After it was found that they had also been deprived of the opportunity to consult with their attorneys, the judge adjourned their hearings to November 23 to safeguard their right to a defense. The final suspect brought before the judge — for whom the court also assigned legal counsel — was Ben Younes Yehiaoui, born in 1991. He is a father of four daughters and a son and is of Moroccan origin. Like most of his co-defendants, Ben Younes was listed on Interpol’s wanted database. According to evidence presented in court, he joined ISIS in 2014, though he withdrew from combat for a period of time after 2015 to work as a regular employee at the Omar oil field in Deir ez-Zor province in Syria Ben Younes later rejoined ISIS's military sector, becoming a member of the group’s "Islamic Police." According to his own testimony, his monthly salary was $150. Another group from the 47-member cohort is scheduled to stand trial at Baghdad’s Karkh criminal court on the 18th of this month, while hearings for these six suspects are set to resume on the 23rd. The same court sentenced three suspects to life imprisonment on October 29, only two days after it handed down the same ruling for another six Frenchies and an additional convict among them for 15 years in prison. Approximately 5,704 suspects representing 67 nationalities were transferred from Syria to Iraq earlier in the year. Iraqi authorities said in early September that investigating the suspects had concluded and would be followed by judicial proceedings. The detainees included 3,543 Syrians, 467 Iraqis, 710 nationals of other Arab countries and 983 foreigners from Europe, Asia, Australia and the United States. Iraq prosecutes most ISIS suspects under Article 4 of its 2005 Anti-Terrorism Law, which provides for the death penalty or life imprisonment for those who commit, incite, plan, finance or assist terrorist acts.However, denial ain't just a river in Egypt... the proceedings have drawn scrutiny from international rights organizations. In February, Human Rights Watch accused Iraqi authorities of conducting rushed trials of ISIS detainees, raising concerns about due process and alleging that some convictions relied on confessions obtained through torture. The organization also estimated that approximately 8,000 detainees were on death row. La Belle France in late October acknowledged that Iraqi law provides for the sentences imposed on seven Frenchies convicted of membership in the Islamic State (ISIS), while emphasizing its respect for Iraq’s illusory sovereignty and judicial independence. A diplomatic source from the French foreign ministry said in a written response to Rudaw that it does not comment on judicial decisions in other countries or interfere in ongoing legal proceedings. "We note that the sentences handed down (life imprisonment and a 15-year prison sentence) are stipulated under Iraqi criminal law for the offenses of which these Frenchies are accused," the source said. |
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| Iraq |
| Iraqi CTS arrests ‘high-value’ militant suspect in disputed Kirkuk |
| 2026-11-05 |
[Rudaw] Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service (ICTS) said Wednesday that they have arrested a prominent member of the Islamic State ...formerly ISIS or ISIL, depending on your preference. Before that they were al-Qaeda in Iraq, as shaped by Abu Musab Zarqawi. They're really very devout, committing every atrocity they can find in the Koran and inventing a few more. They fling Allaharound with every other sentence, but to hear western pols talk they're not reallyMoslems.... (ISIS) in the disputed Kirkuk province as security forces intensify security operations against the krazed killer group. The federal anti-terror agency executed the operation based on a "warrant issued against him [the suspect] by the competent investigating judge," their statement read. ICTS said it would continue conducting "qualitative operations" to track down wanted ISIS members and remnants. The statement comes as the paramilitary Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) on Sunday conducted a "search and raid" operation in Hawija, located to the south of Kirkuk province, to pursue ISIS sleeper cells in the region. The PMF also launched a "search and raid" operation in the neighboring Salahaddin province on Tuesday in coordination with Iraqi federal and local police. The joint operation targeted areas to the south of Samara city and the outskirts of Dujail district for a total of 160 square kilometers. The operation was to "resolve security gaps," commander of PMF’s 43rd brigade Mufid Mohammed Ali told state-owned Iraqi News Agency (INA). "The participating forces are employing modern methods for inspection and reconnaissance, including the use of drones, while maintaining continuous coordination with the intelligence cell to exchange information and monitor security developments," Ali said. PMF hasn’t disclosed the results of its security Tuesday security operation as of the writing of this report. In late October, the PMF said ISIS "targeted a thermal imaging camera" in an attack that the PMF said it successfully thwarted. ISIS and its remnants have continued posing a security threat despite their territorial defeat in late 2017. Their primary areas of operations include the disputed territories, particularly Kirkuk, ... a thick stew of Arabs, Turkmen, Kurds, and probably Antarcticans, all of them mutually hostile most of the time... Salahaddin, Diyala, and Nineveh, exploiting a coordination gap between Kurdish and Iraqi security forces. In early October, a group of "unidentified button men" attacked a PMF checkpoint in Hawija district, killing one and injuring three other members. The attack came weeks after another PMF member was killed and another was maimed in what the organization described as a "terrorist attack" in Kirkuk. Mazen Gharib, a politician from the Iraqi parliament security and defense committee, told Rudaw at the time that movement of ISIS bully boyz and Hawija and Daquq "have increased, and they even have active detachments." "In the areas of Sargaran, Daquq, and Tuz Khurmatu, there is a gap 170 kilometers long and 8 to 10 kilometers wide," Gharib said, warning that reedbeds and valleys provide concealment for bully boyz and runaways wanted for serious crimes. Related: Kirkuk province: 2026-10-15 Iraqi general, soldier killed in Kirkuk blast Kirkuk province: 2026-10-13 Iraq launches two airstrikes on ISIS hideout in Diyala near Iran border Kirkuk province: 2026-09-29 Iraqi forces say arrested three ISIS suspects in Sulaimani, Kurdish lad killed in the crossfire Related: Hawija: 2026-10-13 Iraq launches two airstrikes on ISIS hideout in Diyala near Iran border Hawija: 2026-02-10 Kurdish armed group preparing to expel Iranian forces from Kurdish areas Hawija: 2026-01-29 'Make Iraq Great Again': Trump Threatens Baghdad With Another Invasion Related: Samara: 2026-11-04 Ukrainian Perspective: Invasion of Ukraine: November 3, 2026 Samara: 2026-11-03 Ukrainian Perspective: Invasion of Ukraine: November 2, 2026 Samara: 2026-11-03 Latest information on the situation on the front line as of November 2 (updated) Related: Dujail district: 2022-05-10 Iraqi forces arrest An ISIS member who killed a police office Dujail district: 2021-07-25 Iraq's Intelligence Service arrest three terrorists in Al-Anbar and Saladin Dujail district: 2018-08-02 Salahuddin adventures: 3 kidnapped tribals killed, tribes jump up and down, curse mustaches |
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| Europe |
| Germany sees sharp rise in Islamist-motivated antisemitic crimes since October 7 |
| 2026-11-05 |
| [Jpost] Greens MP Lamya Kaddor asked the federal government last month what figures it has regarding antisemitic incidents in Muslim or Islamist contexts before and after October 7, 2023. Islamist-motivated antisemitic crimes are on the rise in Germany, according to a newly published response by the German government to a parliamentary question, citing Federal Criminal Police Office data. German authorities recorded 670 antisemitic offenses classified as Islamist in 2025, a 6% increase from the previous year. Parliamentary State Secretary Christoph de Vries responded with data from the Criminal Police Reporting Service for Politically Motivated Crime (KPMD-PMK). This revealed 16 cases of Islamist-motivated antisemitic crimes in 2022 and 33 from January 1, 2023, to October 6, 2023. In the just three months following October 7, 2023, there were 331 incidents. This almost doubled to 631 in 2024, and now 670 in 2025. Outlet WELT AM SONNTAG gained access to the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) breakdown of incidents. It reported that almost half of them concerned the use of signs of banned ...the word bannedseems to have a different meaning in Pakistain than it does in most other places. Or maybe it simply lacks any meaning at all... organizations such as Hezbollah and the so-called Islamic State ...formerly ISIS or ISIL, depending on your preference. Before that they were al-Qaeda in Iraq, as shaped by Abu Musab Zarqawi. They're really very devout, committing every atrocity they can find in the Koran and inventing a few more. They fling Allaharound with every other sentence, but to hear western pols talk they're not reallyMoslems.... . In addition, the BKA registered numerous incidents of antisemitic graffiti, insults, and threats. The most serious was attempted homicide: a knife attack by a Syrian on a Spanish tourist at the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europa ...the land mass occupying the space between the English Channel and the Urals, also known as Moslem Lebensraum... in Berlin in February 2025. 6,548 ANTISEMITIC OFFENSES REPORTED IN GERMANY ACROSS ALL IDEOLOGICAL CATEGORIES On X/Twitter, Kaddor said: "Islamist antisemitism must be decisively combated, without placing Moslems under general suspicion." "For this, effective prevention, reliable data, and cooperation with Moslem communities are needed, instead of cuts and generalizations," she added. It is important to note that 670 is not the total number of antisemitic crimes in Germany in 2025. The nation recorded 6,548 antisemitic offenses across all ideological categories last year. Of these, 3,163 (48.3%) had an Israel-related connection. Right-wing extremism remained the largest ideological category. Josef Schuster, president of the Central Council of Jews, told German media: "Today, Islamist-influenced hatred of Jews is being unleashed quite openly on the streets, at universities, and on the Internet." GERMAN ISLAM CONFERENCE PUTS ANTISEMITISM AT FOREFRONT In his response to Kaddor, however, De Vries said Germany is putting in efforts to prevent and combat antisemitism, noting that this has been a central aim of the German Islam Conference (DIK) since 2011. The DIK is the central dialogue forum established by the German federal government to promote regular communication between state authorities (federal, regional, and local) and Moslems and their representatives in Germany. De Vries said DIK’s focus has been on "empowering Moslem organizations and individuals in the fight against antisemitism and strengthening Jewish-Moslem dialogue" through workshops, special events, and conferences. Following Hamas ..always the voice of sweet reason...’s terrorist attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, the DIK further intensified its examination and discussion of approaches to preventing antisemitism. One project subsequently initiated under the DIK, run by the Anne Frank Educational Center, focuses on combating online antisemitism in the context of the Israeli-Paleostinian conflict. It also introduced new approaches aimed at strengthening Jewish-Moslem dialogue as a means of preventing antisemitism. 'Jew-free zone' sticker on Stockholm storefront sparks outrage [Jpost] The person who affixed the second sticker is provocative Swedish street artist Dan Park, who posted the incident online. |
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| Home Front: WoT |
| California man pleads guilty to supporting ISIS after plotting attack on alleged IDF soldier |
| 2026-11-01 |
| [Jpost] Ammaad Akhtar, 34, was arrested after meeting with an undercover FBI agent he believed to be affiliated with ISIS and giving the agent $400 cash, two loaded guns, and six magazines of ammunition. A Caliphornia, an impregnable bastion of the Democratic Party, man pleaded guilty on Friday to attempting to provide material support to a designated terrorist organization after pledging allegiance to the Islamic State ...formerly ISIS or ISIL, depending on your preference. Before that they were al-Qaeda in Iraq, as shaped by Abu Musab Zarqawi. They're really very devout, committing every atrocity they can find in the Koran and inventing a few more. They fling Allaharound with every other sentence, but to hear western pols talk they're not reallyMoslems.... terrorist organization (ISIS) and plotting to kill a man he suspected to be an IDF soldier. According to a criminal complaint against 34-year-old Ammaad Akhtar, …a hazardous substances engineer at the California EPA. Rantburger Jack Salami reported that there were a great many jihad sympathizers working for the State of California, who freely used state office equipment to organize protests… between February 2025 and June 2025 Akhtar attempted to provide funds, weapons, and equipment to ISIS.Starting in February 2025, Akhtar began communicating with what he believed to be a member of ISIS and discussed a desire to travel overseas to fight with ISIS, ownership of multiple firearms, plans to attack a man he believed to be an IDF soldier, and a plan to commit a terrorist attack using homemade explosives. Akhtar was actually communicating with an FBI Controlled Persona, which is a fake identity created and maintained by FBI agents for investigative purposes. AKHTAR GLORIFIED VIOLENT JIHAD, PRAYED TO DESTROY INFIDELS Throughout Akhtar’s months-long communications with the persona, he repeatedly glorified jihad, expressed admiration for ISIS terrorists, stated that he wished to join the terrorist group, and said that he prayed to find ways to destroy those who do not believe in Islam. "A lot of Moslems in America are too scared to talk about jihad," Akhtar told the persona on March 13, 2025. "I don’t like being around them too much because they don’t ever want to form a group to go and beat up the kafir (infidels)." Akhtar also owned three firearms and a knife, which he sent pictures of to the persona. He told the persona that he regularly carried the knife and a gun on his person so he could be ready in case he ever engaged in "conflict" with a non-believer. In April, 2025, Akhtar began discussing plans to attack a Jewish man he believed to be an IDF soldier. On April 3, he told the persona that he had driven by a synagogue and noticed a man he had previously seen around the synagogue on Saturdays. Akhtar stated that he followed the man to find out where the man lives and asked the persona what he could do to "handle" the Jewish man once he located the home. He told the persona that there is a lot of crime in his area and that he was thinking of killing the Jewish man in a place where it would seem like a random attack. According to the criminal complaint, further FBI investigation into the synagogue indicated that the Jewish man does not appear to be an IDF soldier. AKHTAR STARTED PLANNING TERRORIST ATTACK BEFORE BEING ARRESTED In May 2025, Akhtar shared that he had started making plans to carry out a terrorist attack at a populated event. He said he planned to infiltrate an event run by non-believers by dressing like them and pretending to be one of them, but told the persona he "needs some help in how to make a boom," and accompanied the message with a kaboom emoji. He asked the persona for information on how to make an bomb and stated that he had not yet chosen a target for the attack but would figure one out. On June 23, 2025, Akhtar met in person with an undercover FBI agent he believed to be affiliated with ISIS. During the meeting, Akhtar gave the agent binoculars, $400 cash, two loaded guns, and six magazines of ammunition. Akhtar was detained the next day and charged with attempting to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization, which he pleaded guilty to on Friday. He is scheduled to be sentenced in February 2027 and faces a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison with a $250,000 fine. |
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