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| Iraq | |
| Why Kata’ib Hezbollah backed away from confrontation over Jurf al-Sakhr | |
| 2026-11-21 | |
[Rudaw] After more than a decade of exercising near-exclusive control over Jurf al-Sakhr, Iran-aligned paramilitary group Kata’ib Hezbollah
In a statement on Thursday, Kata’ib Hezbollah Secretary-General Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi indicated that his group would seek to resolve its dispute with Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi through private channels, following days of escalating tensions and warnings that a government attempt to enter the area could trigger armed confrontation. "We affirm that the existing disagreements with the head of the authority will be addressed through private channels, denying our real enemies the opportunity to exploit them," Hamidawi said, without mentioning Zaidi by name. He also thanked Iraqi security forces and the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) for their positions during the confrontation, while instructing his fighters to resume their normal duties. The apparent de-escalation follows an agreement on Thursday under which Kata’ib Hezbollah fighters would move out of Jurf al-Sakhr, with a joint security force expected to deploy on Friday. However, some people cause happiness wherever they go; others whenever they go... the faction has not explicitly announced its withdrawal, and whether it will surrender effective control of the area remains uncertain. The confrontation represents more than a dispute over security arrangements in a town approximately 60 kilometers southwest of Baghdad. It is a test of whether Iraq's government can dismantle an entrenched armed faction's territorial and economic power without triggering conflict within the country's Shiite political establishment. Several developments suggest that Kata’ib Hezbollah is confronting a political and regional environment considerably less favorable than the one that allowed it to consolidate control after the Islamic State ...formerly ISIS or ISIL, depending on your preference. Before that they were al-Qaeda in Iraq, as shaped by Abu Musab Zarqawi. They're really very devout, committing every atrocity they can find in the Koran and inventing a few more. They fling Allaharound with every other sentence, but to hear western pols talk they're not reallyMoslems.... 's (ISIS) defeat in 2014. IRAN'S WEAKENED REGIONAL POSITION Perhaps the most significant change is the weakening of Iran, Kata’ib Hezbollah's principal foreign backer, following a series of military and geopolitical setbacks that have diminished Tehran's ability to protect its regional allies. The collapse of Bashir Pencilneckal-Assad Despoiler of Deraa... 's government in Syria in December 2024 deprived Iran ...a theocratic Shiite state divided among the Medes, the Persians, and the (Arab) Elamites. Formerly a fairly civilized nation ruled by a Shah, it became a victim of Islamic revolution in 1979. The nation is today noted for spontaneouslytaking over other countries' embassies, maintaining whorehouses run by clergymen, involvement in international drug trafficking, and financing sock puppet militiasto extend the regime's influence. The word Iranis a cognate form of Aryan.The abbreviation IRGCis the same idea as Stürmabteilung (or SA).The term Supreme Guideis a the modern version form of either Duceor Führeror maybe both. They hate of a crucial regional ally and disrupted the land corridor through which Tehran had supplied Leb ...The Lebs have the curious habit of periodically murdering their heads of state or prime ministers...'s Hezbollah. Israel's military campaign against Hezbollah further weakened an important component of Iran's regional network. The 12-day war with Israel in June 2025 inflicted further damage on Iran's military capabilities and leadership. The US-Israeli war launched on February 28 dealt another severe blow, killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ...the very aged actual dictator of Iran, successor to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini...> and senior military commanders while damaging critical Iranian military infrastructure. The consequences have become increasingly apparent in Lebanon. In September, Iran warned Washington against an Israeli operation targeting Hezbollah's fortified positions on the strategic Ali al-Taher ridge in southern Lebanon. Israel subsequently announced that it had destroyed Hezbollah's underground infrastructure there, illustrating the limits of Tehran's ability to deter military action against its allies. These developments do not mean Iran has lost its ability to influence Iraqi politics or support armed factions. However, some people cause happiness wherever they go; others whenever they go... they suggest that Tehran faces far greater constraints on its ability to intervene militarily on behalf of an ally confronting the Iraqi government. Iran's response to the Jurf al-Sakhr crisis appears to have been diplomatic rather than military. Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani met Zaidi on Monday, according to two senior Iraqi officials who spoke to Rudaw, attempting to persuade the premier to accept a negotiated settlement. Kata’ib Hezbollah subsequently confirmed that Hamidawi had met Qaani, Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Ameri, and PMF Chairman Falih al-Fayyadh, describing the discussions as positive. The mediation illustrates that Tehran retains considerable political leverage in Iraq, even as its capacity and willingness to protect allies through direct military intervention appear increasingly constrained. OIL SMUGGLING AND THE BATTLE FOR PUBLIC LEGITIMACY The second factor is the government's use of alleged corruption to challenge Kata’ib Hezbollah's control over Jurf al-Sakhr. Beginning November 9, several Iraqi media outlets published details of a leaked intelligence report alleging that oil had been siphoned from pipelines crossing the town since 2021. Subsequent reporting detailed suspected concealed storage facilities, unauthorized oil-processing operations and tanker movements. The allegations emerged as Iraq struggled with severe financial pressures caused by disruptions to oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz. At a time when the government has faced difficulties financing expenditure and public-sector salaries, allegations involving the theft of valuable oil resources carry particular political weight. The revelations also transformed the confrontation from an argument over the legitimacy of armed resistance into one involving the alleged misuse of public resources. Zaidi subsequently ordered a high-level investigation, dismissed nine security and administrative officials, and referred suspected violations to the judiciary. Kata’ib Hezbollah denied the allegations. No, no! Certainly not! and accused the government of manufacturing the controversy to force it to surrender its weapons. However, some people cause happiness wherever they go; others whenever they go... the sustained media coverage and official investigations have made the allegations difficult to dismiss through denials or displays of military strength alone. The campaign has provided Zaidi with a potentially powerful source of domestic legitimacy: presenting his confrontation with Kata’ib Hezbollah as an effort to protect public money and enforce the law rather than a political attack on the resistance. GROWING ISOLATION AMONG FORMER ALLIES Kata’ib Hezbollah has also found itself increasingly isolated from armed factions that previously shared its opposition to restrictions on independent military activity. Rudaw reported earlier that figures affiliated with factions such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq, led by Qais al-Khazali, and the former Kata’ib Imam Ali have backed efforts to bring weapons under state control. These factions have increasingly pursued political influence through government institutions, parliamentary representation and state security structures, making confrontation with the government less attractive than integration into the system. Kata’ib Hezbollah, by contrast, has maintained an independent military command and a regional ideological commitment to Iran's Axis of Resistance®, despite having formations within the officially recognized PMF. The divide does not mean other armed factions have fully relinquished their weapons or severed their informal command structures. Nor does it mean Kata’ib Hezbollah has lost every ally. But the political consensus that once enabled armed factions to resist government measures collectively appears to have weakened. Even within the ruling Shiite Coordination Framework, influential figures have sought a negotiated replacement of forces in Jurf al-Sakhr rather than support an armed confrontation with Zaidi. The calculations extend beyond the town itself. A regional war involving Kata’ib Hezbollah could expose Iraq to military retaliation, sanctions and further economic damage, threatening the interests of Shiite parties that now hold significant positions within the state. A DECLINING SECURITY JUSTIFICATION Another factor is the weakening of the security argument traditionally used to justify Jurf al-Sakhr's closure. Kata’ib Hezbollah and other PMF figures have long maintained that retaining control of the town is necessary to protect Baghdad, Babil and the Shiite holy cities of Karbala and Najaf from krazed killer attacks. However, some people cause happiness wherever they go; others whenever they go... ISIS no longer possesses the territorial capabilities it demonstrated in 2014, while Iraqi security forces have become increasingly capable of confronting its remaining cells. The US-led coalition's withdrawal from Iraq on September 30 further reinforced the government's argument that Iraqi forces can assume primary responsibility for national security. Although ISIS remains a threat, its diminished capabilities raise questions about the continued exclusion of Jurf al-Sakhr's predominantly Sunni residents, many of whom have been displaced for more than a decade. The government has now pledged to facilitate their return, potentially undermining another important justification for the faction's exclusive control. US BACKING AND BAGHDAD'S CHANGING CALCULATIONS Zaidi's political position is also strengthened by Washington's support for efforts to restrict weapons to state authority. The Trump administration demonstrated its willingness to exert economic pressure on Iraq earlier this year when it opposed former premier Nouri al-Maliki's return to power, warning of consequences for Baghdad's relationship with Washington. The US retains significant financial leverage through Iraq's access to dollar revenues generated by oil exports, a vulnerability that has influenced the calculations of Iraqi political parties. On Wednesday, a US State Department spokesperson told Rudaw that Washington expected Zaidi to hold Iran-aligned factions accountable for actions undermining Iraq's illusory sovereignty and economy. Whereas it does not establish that Washington would militarily intervene if festivities erupted, it does strengthen Zaidi's diplomatic position while raising the potential cost to political actors seeking to obstruct his campaign. Yet, the emerging agreement also exposes the limits of the government's success. A WITHDRAWAL, BUT NOT NECESSARILY A DEFEAT Under the approved security plan, the federal police will assume responsibility for central Jurf al-Sakhr, while an army brigade and two PMF brigades will secure surrounding areas. Energy police will guard oil pipelines, and a new joint command began operating early Friday. The arrangement allows Kata’ib Hezbollah to avoid a potentially costly confrontation while permitting Baghdad to demonstrate that its orders are being implemented. Importantly, it does not require the faction to disarm entirely or dissolve its broader military network. This may be the decisive additional explanation for Kata’ib Hezbollah's apparent retreat: a negotiated redeployment offers the faction a way to preserve much of its military and political power while surrendering a territory that has become increasingly difficult to defend politically. For Zaidi, the arrangement offers a significant opening. But the true measure of success will not be the arrival of government troops alone; it will be whether Baghdad gains effective command over the area, prevents further illicit economic activity, restores civilian administration and allows displaced residents to return. Kata’ib Hezbollah's apparent retreat may therefore mark an important change in the balance of power between Iraq's government and its armed factions. Whether it represents a lasting restoration of state authority or another negotiated accommodation remains to be seen. Related: Kata’ib Hezbollah: 2026-11-19 US expects Iraq’s PM to hold Iran-aligned militias accountable: Official Kata’ib Hezbollah: 2026-10-02 Iran-aligned groups demand end to Iraq’s US financial dependency before disarmament: MP Kata’ib Hezbollah: 2026-08-30 Iraqi armed group sets 10 conditions for giving up weapons Related: Jurf al-Sakhr: 2026-11-20 Baghdad’s standoff with Kata’ib Hezbollah an ‘extraordinary moment’ for Iraqi sovereignty: Former US diplomat Jurf al-Sakhr: 2026-11-19 US expects Iraq’s PM to hold Iran-aligned militias accountable: Official Jurf al-Sakhr: 2026-11-12 Kataib Hezbollah increasingly isolated as former allies back Iraqi PM's disarmament drive | |
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| Iraq |
| Baghdad’s standoff with Kata’ib Hezbollah an ‘extraordinary moment’ for Iraqi sovereignty: Former US diplomat |
| 2026-11-20 |
[Rudaw] The Iraqi government’s standoff with the pro-Iran ...a theocratic Shiite state divided among the Medes, the Persians, and the (Arab) Elamites. Formerly a fairly civilized nation ruled by a Shah, it became a victim of Islamic revolution in 1979. The nation is today noted for spontaneouslytaking over other countries' embassies, maintaining whorehouses run by clergymen, involvement in international drug trafficking, and financing sock puppet militiasto extend the regime's influence. The word Iranis a cognate form of Aryan.The abbreviation IRGCis the same idea as Stürmabteilung (or SA).The term Supreme Guideis a the modern version form of either Duceor Führeror maybe both. They hate Kata’ib Hezbollah militia over control of Jurf al-Sakhr represents an "extraordinary moment" for Iraqi illusory sovereignty, a former senior US diplomat said on Thursday, praising Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi for taking a bold step toward curbing the influence of Iran-backed armed factions. Barbara Leaf, former US assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, gave "full credit" to Zaidi for taking a "really bold step" toward disarming Iran-backed factions. "This is a really important moment," she told Rudaw’s Nwenar Fatih. "To begin a new stage of recovering full illusory sovereignty." Leaf strongly criticized the activities of Iran-backed militias in Iraq, describing them as a major threat to the country’s stability and economy. "The lawlessness, the criminality, the corruption that these militias have engaged in for years is a kind of cancer on the Iraqi economy, and on Iraq in general terms," she said. Referring to the ongoing standoff in Jurf al-Sakhr, in Babil province, Leaf expressed outrage that Kata’ib Hezbollah had maintained control of the town for more than a decade, effectively turning it into a "no-go zone" for Iraqi security forces. "They keep weapons there that are probably more advanced than the Iraqi security forces themselves have, it’s outrageous." Leaf also refuted the pro-Iran militia groups’ previous attempts to label the US-led coalition in Iraq as a threat to Iraqi illusory sovereignty. "In all of those years since 2008, all of those [coalition] forces have all been there at the invitation of successive Iraqi governments, and under their close supervision as to their activities, we have always respected Iraqi illusory sovereignty." "It is these militias that have been a constant threat and challenge to Iraq's illusory sovereignty. This is a critical moment and ... just the beginning of a larger effort." Asked about the possibility of US intervention in the tension, Leaf further stated the importance of establishing Iraqi illusory sovereignty over the matter with armed factions backed by Tehran. "It is rather a question of Baghdad asserting Iraqi illusory sovereignty over every inch of the country, as it should." Kata’ib Hezbollah might be relocated to another Iraqi province: Security official [Rudaw] Iran-aligned Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) forces currently based in Babil province’s Jurf al-Sakhr subdistrict could be relocated to Anbar province, the head of the Iraqi Security Media Cell said on Thursday, as a week-long standoff between the group and Iraqi security forces risks a military confrontation. “These brigades are respected, have contributed greatly, and will be assigned duties in other areas,” Saad Maan told Rudaw’s Zana Kiyani in an interview. He mentioned the town of Qaim in Anbar province near the Syrian border as an option, while emphasizing that the relocation will be executed according to “operational needs and the assessment of the military leadership” in coordination with the state-funded Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Maan’s statement comes as Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi has deployed troops around Jurf al-Sakhr after reports of oil theft in the town - which is under KH’s de facto control after they expelled militants of the Islamic State (ISIS) following the capture of the district in 2014. Zaidi’s office announced earlier in the day that the federal police would establish a command center in Jurf al-Sakhr starting Friday at dawn. An Iraqi Army brigade, a federal police brigade, two brigades from the state-funded PMF, and a regiment from the energy police to “secure and protect the oil pipelines in the area” are expected to be stationed, the office’s statement read. Commenting on the subject, Maan said that “the order has been issued and there is no turning back; we hope no clashes occur in Jurf al-Sakhr." His statement coincided with Abu Taleb al-Saeedi, a senior KH commander, stating in a press conference on Thursday that “the departure of Kata’ib Hezbollah from this land will be on their bodies.” Furthermore, Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi, the group’s leader, in a statement late Thursday instructed his fighters to return to their normal without elaborating. “The future holds serious challenges, and confronting them will require men like you, possessing great patience, steadfastness and a strong sense of responsibility,” he said. However, Hamidawi did not explicitly address whether Kata'ib Hezbollah would relinquish control of Jurf al-Sakhr. But Maan was optimistic about a peaceful settlement of the issue. “It will be a smooth and easy process with cooperation between us and the brothers,” he noted. Full interview of Saad Maan with Rudaw can be read at the link. Related: Jurf al-Sakhr: 2026-11-12 Kataib Hezbollah increasingly isolated as former allies back Iraqi PM's disarmament drive Jurf al-Sakhr: 2026-08-13 Baghdad is moving to encircle the positions of factions run by the 'Revolutionary Guard' without clashes Jurf al-Sakhr: 2026-02-28 Iranian-backed militias in Iraq struck by missiles, possibly of Israeli origin - report |
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| Iraq |
| Kataib Hezbollah increasingly isolated as former allies back Iraqi PM's disarmament drive |
| 2026-11-12 |
| [Rudaw] Kataib Hezbollah — an Iran-aligned Iraqi Shia paramilitary group — is facing growing political pressure amid Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s push against economic interests allegedly linked to armed factions, as former comrades — including Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Imam Ali — back his campaign to bring weapons under state control. Baghdad has cancelled commercial contracts suspected of benefiting gangs and moved to cut intermediary companies out of defense procurement. Kataib Hezbollah has responded by questioning the prime minister's wealth and his family's business interests, while refusing to commit to surrendering its own weapons. Armed groups have wielded considerable influence in Iraq since the 2003 US-led invasion. Many subsequently gained political representation and access to state resources, leaving successive governments struggling to consolidate all weapons under their authority. The current confrontation therefore concerns more than disarmament; it challenges the very core of economic and political power of the armed factions themselves. FORMER COMRADES BACK DISARMAMENT Sadiqoun politician Ahmed al-Mousawi, whose bloc is affiliated with the leader of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Qais al-Khazali, challenged paramilitary groups during a November 3 interview with al-Ahd television, affiliated with Khazali. "The factions that say they are resistance - who are they resisting?" he asked. Mousawi criticized factions that had accused Asaib Ahl al-Haq of abandoning resistance for political and financial gains, arguing that a strong state was more effective than separate gangs. "If your thinking is so limited that you want to confine yourself to a faction whose capabilities amount to 10 rockets, why don't we become a state and possess an arsenal like that of the Islamic Theocratic Republic?" he asked. Mousawi did not explicitly name Kataib Hezbollah. Two days later, Deputy Prime Minister Laith al-Khazali, the brother of Asaib Ahl al-Haq's leader, publicly supported Zaidi. "Restricting weapons to the state is a constitutional principle that is not open to debate," he told al-Iraqiya television of the state-owned Iraqi News Agency (INA), adding that the ruling Shiite Coordination Framework had unanimously endorsed the principle. Influential Shiite holy man Moqtada al-Sadr'>Moqtada Tateral-Sadr ...hereditary Iraqi holy man and leader of a political movement in Iraq. He had his hereditary rival al-Khoei assassinated shortly after the holy rival's appearance out of exile in 2003. Formerly an Iranian catspaw, lately he gagged over some of their more outlandish antics, then went back to catspawry when the check cleared... has also endorsed state control of weapons. In May, he ordered his Saraya al-Salam militia to separate from his political movement and integrate into government institutions. Iraqi security officials confirmed in June that the transfer process had begun. On September 30, Sadr also dissolved the Promised Day Brigade, an anti-US armed formation he established years earlier. Sadr's position adds weight to the government's campaign, despite his movement being a rival of the Coordination Framework rather than part of its ruling alliance. He has also called for security forces to operate exclusively under the government's authority following the coalition withdrawal. The shift extends to the paramilitary group Kataib Imam Ali, formerly led by Shibil al-Zaidi. On October 1, Services Alliance spokesperson Husam al-Rubaie argued that the withdrawal of foreign forces had removed a principal justification for independent arms. "Resistance® is a state of societal rejection, not a profession or a means of achieving political gains," he told al-Dijlah television, owned by prime minister Zaidi, urging fighters to join official security institutions. Iraq's Supreme Judicial Council acknowledged the divide in June, thanking Sadr's movement, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and Kataib Imam Ali for agreeing to the principle of weapons under state control and urging other factions to follow. But acceptance of the principle doesn’t necessarily translate to immediate disarmament and compliance nor the dismantling of a faction's command structure. These public positions do not establish that every group has completed disarmament, but they leave Kataib Hezbollah increasingly at odds with several former partners. ECONOMIC PRESSURE AND COUNTER-ACCUSATIONS Last week, Zaidi directed the Defense Industries Commission to contract directly with manufacturers rather than intermediary companies. London-based, Saudi-owned Asharq al-Awsat, citing unnamed sources, reported that some intermediaries were linked to armed factions and profited from defense contracts. Rudaw could not independently verify those claims. Zaidi subsequently cancelled three contracts at djinn-infested Mosul ... the home of a particularly ferocious and hairy djinn... International Airport involving passenger counters, parking and taxis. Authorities suspected links to gangs but did not publicly name the factions. Kataib Hezbollah denied controlling airport contracts. The dispute has also reached the small town of Jurf al-Sakhar, also known as Jurf al-Nasr, in Babil province, just 60 kilometers southwest of Baghdad, where Kataib Hezbollah maintains a powerful presence. Its predominantly Sunni residents have long been unable to return after the area was retaken from the Islamic State ...formerly ISIS or ISIL, depending on your preference. Before that they were al-Qaeda in Iraq, as shaped by Abu Musab Zarqawi. They're really very devout, committing every atrocity they can find in the Koran and inventing a few more. They fling Allaharound with every other sentence, but to hear western pols talk they're not reallyMoslems.... (ISIS). The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) attaches strategic importance to Jurf al-Sakhr. Media outlets close to the IRGC say the preservation of the area under Iran-backed groups is directly linked to Iran’s national security. On Monday, multiple Iraqi media simultaneously reported they had obtained secret documents from the ministry of interior of a purported intelligence report alleging oil smuggling and the tapping of pipelines there. Babil Governor Ali Turki disputed the account after visiting one cited location, saying it was an old fuel station used by security forces. Rudaw could not authenticate the report or verify its conclusions. The funds at stake can be considerable. A 2021 Chatham House study documented how networks tied to the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), other gangs and political parties profited from contracts, checkpoints and border crossings. Carnegie researchers also described armed factions' continuing influence around the Shalamcheh crossing with Iran. These findings establish a broader pattern of economic power, as opposed to proof that Kataib Hezbollah owns any of the companies targeted by Zaidi. Meanwhile, ...back at the game, the Babe headed for second base. He almost made it. Then Sheila slapped him.... Kataib Hezbollah security chief Abu Mujahid al-Assaf alleged on Saturday that Zaidi had accumulated nearly 21 trillion dinars ($14 billion), questioning whether the wealth came from government food and military catering contracts. No publicly available financial evidence has substantiated that figure. On Sunday, Huquq parliament member Saud al-Saadi, from Kataib Hezbollah's political wing, submitted parliamentary questions about the prime minister's financial disclosures and possible conflicts of interest. Another Huquq politician, Mona Sawadi al-Mohammadawi, subsequently requested official information about al-Oweis General Trading Company and its contracts to supply Iraq's food ration program. The prime minister's office said in May that he had submitted his financial disclosure to the Integrity Commission, but did not publish the value of his holdings. Parliamentary questions do not establish that the alleged wealth exists or that wrongdoing occurred. The allegations followed Assaf's November 3 claim that Iraqi crude was being sold to the UAE's ADNOC at a $47-per-barrel discount, with the prime minister's brother among alleged beneficiaries. The accusation and the claimed profits have not been independently verified. DISPUTED NEGOTIATIONS A November 5 report by Iraqi newspaper al-Mada, citing unnamed sources, alleged that Zaidi had taken direct control of negotiations previously handled by a Coordination Framework committee and rejected Kataib Hezbollah demands for appointments and influence over state institutions. The newspaper claimed the faction sought five deputy ministerial posts, 32 director-general positions and roles involving border crossings and security institutions. Rudaw could not verify the allegations. Assaf has denied that Kataib Hezbollah requested any government positions. Kataib Hezbollah says it is still waiting for a copy of an agreement reached between resistance factions and a Coordination Framework committee and insists it remains committed to its own undertakings, without accepting an unconditional surrender of weapons. It is not alone in disputing the government's interpretation. On Saturday, Kataib Sayyed ...Arabic term meaning your/his lordship. Groveling in His Exalted Presence is encouraged... al-Shuhada confirmed signing a document it termed the "Sovereignty Agreement" but denied having announced or signed any commitment concerning its weapons. Its position complicates claims that a united resistance front has accepted disarmament. Harakat al-Nujaba has also opposed unconditional disarmament, arguing that Iraq remains vulnerable to outside threats. The disagreements therefore point to its growing political isolation from some former partners, rather than a complete break within the wider Iran-aligned camp. PRESSURE, BUT NO GUARANTEE OF COMPLIANCE Iraqi media reported, citing anonymous political sources, that National Wisdom Movement leader Ammar al-Hakim and Islamic Supreme Council head Humam Hamoudi were attempting to mediate between the government and Kataib Hezbollah. Rudaw could not independently confirm those talks. Zaidi nevertheless warned during a Sunday visit to Anbar that weapons outside state authority used to threaten security or extort citizens would face the "full force of the law." An arrest warrant dated July 5 against Hussein al-Hamidawi, identified by Iraqi media as the son of Kataib Hezbollah leader Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi, also resurfaced amid the confrontation. The warrant, involving allegations of threats and violence, is not a new arrest or proof of guilt. History suggests enforcement will be difficult. In June 2020, then-prime minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi's forces arrested 14 Kataib Hezbollah members suspected of preparing attacks against US targets. Armed faction members were deployed near Baghdad's Green Zone, and 13 suspects were released within days. In 2021, the arrest of PMF commander Qasim Musleh likewise prompted armed mobilization; he was released less than two weeks later after authorities cited insufficient evidence. Under Zaidi, the August arrest of Harakat al-Nujaba-linked intelligence official Abbas al-Yaqoubi provoked an angry factional response. The PMF announced his release two days later following a judicial decision. There is no established evidence that militia pressure, rather than the court's decision, caused his release. Kataib Hezbollah remains an influential armed and political force, and other factions have also resisted full disarmament. Yet, support for Zaidi's plan from Sadr, Asaib Ahl al-Haq and former paramilitary allies leaves the group with a narrower circle of publicly supportive partners. The question that now stands is whether Baghdad can turn that political opening into lasting control over gangs without provoking another confrontation. Related: Kataib Hezbollah: 2026-11-10 Khor Mor fire from 'suspected drone attack' under control but production remains halted: Operator Kataib Hezbollah: 2026-11-08 Kataib Hezbollah accuses Iraqi PM, aide of amassing billions in alleged illicit wealth Kataib Hezbollah: 2026-10-25 Iraq believes Israel may have struck militia weapons supplied by Iran Related: Asaib Ahl al-Haq 06/27/2026 Iraq picked an outsider to tame Its militias. He may end ip strengthening the system that created them Asaib Ahl al-Haq 06/20/2026 Iran’s Revolutionary Guard set up Iraqi cells to attack Gulf neighbors, sources say Asaib Ahl al-Haq 06/06/2026 Iraq’s Hardline Factions Refuse a Disarmament Others Have Accepted Related: Kataib Imam Ali 06/27/2026 Iraq picked an outsider to tame Its militias. He may end ip strengthening the system that created them Kataib Imam Ali 03/22/2026 Airstrikes Target Iraq’s Disputed Territories and Sunni Heartland, Not the Shia-Dominated South Kataib Imam Ali 03/10/2021 FDD @adesnik’s 2018 study of ten of the leading groups Related: Moqtada al-Sadr 06/06/2026 Iraq’s Hardline Factions Refuse a Disarmament Others Have Accepted Moqtada al-Sadr 12/26/2025 Cardinal Sako under fire for using term associated with Israel: “normalization” Moqtada al-Sadr 06/21/2025 Thousands protest in Tehran and the region against Israel’s war on Iran |
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| Iraq |
| Iraq’s militias are adjusting for a new era, not going away |
| 2026-10-17 |
| By Hamdi Malik [AtlanticCouncil] Iran-backed militias in Iraq are celebrating their “victory” over the United States following the completion of the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. They are adjusting their posture for a new era in Iraq, signaling restraint, and continuing to pursue the completion of their state capture project. This “restraint” is designed to facilitate deeper entrenchment by easing US pressure on Baghdad while preserving the militias’ military capabilities. ![]() A statement by Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi illustrates this posture. He ordered his fighters to halt “all military operations and mobile logistical activities,” but explicitly retained an exception for targeting hostile aircraft violating Iraqi airspace until government air defenses are fully established. The withdrawal of US forces leaves fewer targets inside Iraq, making the announced halt relatively low-cost. Washington has threatened to impose sanctions on Iraqi oil revenues unless Baghdad works to curb the influence of the militias, and announcing a halt gives the government an argument against taking forceful measures. The militias have little incentive to invite financial restrictions that would deepen Iraq’s already severe economic problems and damage their own sources of funding and patronage. Tehran shares this interest in protecting Iraq’s economic viability. Under mounting sanctions, Iran increasingly depends on Iraq as an outlet through which the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Quds Force and its proxies can access hard currency and evade sanctions, giving both the militias and their Iranian patrons a reason to support the tactical pause. A Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) bill provides a further incentive for this tactical restraint. On September 29, the cabinet approved and referred to parliament an eighteen-article organizational bill governing the PMF’s structure and leadership. Although the PMF already has legal recognition and state funding, the new measure would be dedicated legislation, strengthening its position as a separate military institution and increasing its claim on the national budget. For the militias within it, this could mean stronger legal protections, greater funding, and access to military infrastructure without effective state control. Halting attacks could help ease US scrutiny and the threat of sanctions, facilitating the PMF’s consolidation as a parallel army. Al-Hamidawi explicitly advocated for this arrangement in a recent statement, calling for the “resistance” to remain a military force alongside the government’s armed forces. He described this as “a virtue and a good thing” and argued that many countries have more than one army or military organization. Yet the militias within this parallel army show little sign of behaving as responsible, professional forces accountable to Baghdad. Instead, they increasingly act as proxies at the IRGC’s disposal. During the first months of the US–Israeli war against Iran, much of the PMF’s state-funded personnel, bases, and logistical infrastructure mobilized in support of Tehran’s war effort. Thirty-six PMF brigades—roughly half the force—were implicated in conducting attacks or providing material support to the groups carrying them out. PMF camps and ammunition depots supported the campaign against US troops in the region, while the Badr Organization, the largest militia within the PMF, used PMF trucking fleets to distribute Iranian weapons to attack units. PMF forces also deployed into Iran without Baghdad’s authorization, committing Iraqi military resources to a foreign war that the Iraqi state had not joined. A halt by the established militias may not mean an end to attacks from Iraq. Smaller units directed by the Quds Force could continue operating while the larger factions deny responsibility and claim to honor the pause. This draws on the “special groups” model— Iranian-trained, armed, and funded Shia militant networks that operated outside Iraqi state control in the 2000s. Following Qasem Soleimani’s killing in January 2020, the Quds Force renewed its reliance on small, tightly controlled groups drawn from established Iraqi militias, selecting trusted, ideologically loyal fighters for direct Iranian command. Alongside this operational restructuring, militia networks expanded their use of “claim-only brands”—names and Telegram channels used to claim attacks conducted by existing factions without necessarily representing separate military units. Calls for a renewed effort to reactivate this model are now explicit. On July 16, a group calling itself al-Akhyar min Ahl al-Iraq (“the Righteous Among the People of Iraq”) urged the reactivation of the “special groups” to complement the established resistance factions, calling on members to regroup without competing with those already operating. Other names identify these operational cells. Units associated with names such as Ashab al-Kahf (“Companions of the Cave”) remain embedded within established militia systems, drawing on their facilities, logistics, and protection. The Quds Force trains these cells in surveillance, drone operations, and rocket and missile attacks; provides weapons and funding for their personnel; and retains ultimate command and control while delegating some supervision to the host factions. Small, carefully selected units offer Tehran a relatively economical force that is easier to manage and less vulnerable to infiltration. For the established militias, the separation between the host organization, the operational cell, and the name claiming an attack provides a layer of plausible deniability. More at the link |
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| Iraq | |||
| Explosions occurred near the Al Rasheed Hotel in central Baghdad, US embassy urges Americans to leave Iraq | |||
| 2026-03-17 | |||
| Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited [Regnum] Several powerful explosions occurred near the Al Rasheed Hotel in Baghdad. Al Hadath TV reported this on March 16, citing a source in the Iraqi security forces. ![]() It is specified that several explosions occurred in the “green zone”, where government buildings are located, as well as the embassies of several foreign countries. It is noted that air raid sirens are sounding at the United States Embassy, which is also located in the "green zone." According to the source, the Al Rasheed Hotel was attacked by a drone; there were no casualties or injuries as a result of the explosion. Earlier, the American embassy in Baghdad, Iraq, was attacked on the morning of March 14. It is believed that the target was the air defense systems located on the embassy's premises in Baghdad.
The US diplomatic mission in Iraq on Monday reiterated its urgent call on American citizens to "leave Iraq now" and avoid heading to the US embassy in Baghdad or the consulate in Erbil, citing an escalation in attacks by Iran-aligned gangs and warning that US nationals face a "risk of kidnapping." The warning came shortly after a top commander of a powerful Iran-backed Iraqi gang, Kata’ib Hezbollah, was confirmed dead, reportedly killed in a US strike in Baghdad late last week. In a statement on X, the US embassy in Baghdad said that "Iran-aligned terrorist militias have incited and carried out attacks against U.S. citizens and U.S.-linked targets throughout Iraq, including the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR)." "U.S. citizens must leave Iraq immediately," it added, urging Americans not to attempt travel to the US Embassy in Baghdad or the Consulate in Erbil due to ongoing security risks. The warning comes amid "repeated attacks" in the heavily fortified Green Zone, where the American embassy is located, as well as incidents targeting Erbil International Airport and the US Consulate General in the Kurdish capital. The embassy further advised that US citizens should leave Iraq now and avoid traveling to the country, warning they "face the risk of kidnapping" and noting that "U.S. individuals have been specifically targeted." It also cautioned that "Iran-aligned militias may hinder the ability of Iraqi authorities to respond effectively during emergencies." Notably, shortly after the warning, video footage reportedly showing the embassy’s C-RAM defenses intercepting what is believed to be an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) surfaced online.
The American diplomatic mission’s warning - the second of its kind within 48 hours - notably came against the backdrop of Iraq’s pro-Iran ...a theocratic Shiite state divided among the Medes, the Persians, and the (Arab) Elamites. Formerly a fairly civilized nation ruled by a Shah, it became a victim of Islamic revolution in 1979. The nation is today noted for spontaneouslytaking over other countries' embassies, maintaining whorehouses run by clergymen, involvement in international drug trafficking, and financing sock puppet militiasto extend the regime's influence. The word Iranis a cognate form of Aryan.The abbreviation IRGCis the same idea as Stürmabteilung (or SA).The term Supreme Guideis a the modern version form of either Duceor Führeror maybe both. They hate Kata’ib Hezbollah announcing on Monday that its spokesperson and security bigshot, Abu Ali al-Askari, was killed. "We announce to you the martyrdom of Hajj Abu Ali al-Askari," Kata’ib Hezbollah said in a statement by leader Ahmad al-Hamidawi, known as Abu Hussein, published by Sabreen News, a channel affiliated with Iranian-backed factions of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).
Kataeb Hezbollah referred to Askari as the group’s security chief. He was also the spokesperson in charge of issuing all key statements in the group’s name. The last was released on March 7, following the killing of Iran’s supreme leader. According to the group’s statement, Askari will be replaced by Abou Moujahed al-Assaf as the new security chief.
Reacting to the news on Monday, Tsurkov wrote on X that Askari “was personally involved in keeping me captive and spreading hilarious lies about me, even after my release.” She said he was “killed by the United States for [Kataeb Hezbollah]’s targeting of US interests in Iraq & neighboring countries. KH also killed hundreds of American servicemen. But most of the blood this man had on his hands was that of Arabs: Iraqis and Syrians.”
Related: Green zone: 2026-01-29 Scientists warn of magnetic storms due to solar wind Green zone: 2025-10-26 US president warns Hamas to return hostages’ bodies within 48 hours, Hamas pledges to expand search Green zone: 2025-10-05 A week-long magnetic storm has ended on Earth Related: Elizabeth Tsurkov 02/28/2026 Iranian-backed militias in Iraq struck by missiles, possibly of Israeli origin - report Elizabeth Tsurkov 12/22/2025 Iraq’s top judge says pro-Iran militias will coordinate with state on gun control Elizabeth Tsurkov 12/11/2025 South Darfur: Drone Strike Kills 250+ in Kutila Locality Related: Kata’ib Hezbollah: 2025-09-01 Iraq's Popular Mobilization Forces Face Withdrawals Kata’ib Hezbollah: 2024-09-17 Iran Moving Hamas, Houthis into Iraq as Biden Admin Watches Kata’ib Hezbollah: 2024-01-31 Terrorist Group Responsible for Killing American Soldiers 'Suspends' Operations Against the US Related: Abu Ali al-Askari 11/12/2025 Elizabeth Tsurkov recovering from captivity and torture at hands of Iraqi terrorists Abu Ali al-Askari 04/05/2024 Iran is approaching the 'red line' when it is ready to strike Israel Abu Ali al-Askari 12/10/2023 Militia vows to continue attacks until all US troops leave Iraq | |||
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| Syria-Lebanon-Iran |
| IDF eliminates Hezbollah regional commander |
| 2026-03-12 |
Text: 🚨 IDF ELIMINATES HEZBOLLAH REGIONAL COMMANDER The IDF confirms it eliminated Hassan Salameh, also known as Abu Hussein Ra’ab, in an airstrike in Jouaiyya, southern Lebanon on Sunday night. Salameh commanded Hezbollah’s Nasr Unit, responsible for the area between Mount Dov and Bint Jbeil. He assumed the role after his predecessor Taleb Abdullah was killed in June 2024. The IDF has released footage of the strike. |
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| Syria-Lebanon-Iran |
| IDF says it eliminated Hezbollah commander Hassan Salameh, 3 unnamed in South Leb |
| 2026-03-11 |
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| Arabia | ||
| Houthi military mobilizations across multiple fronts. | ||
| 2026-02-22 | ||
Text: Yemeni journalist Fares AL hemyari reports unprecedented Houthi military mobilizations across multiple fronts. According to his security sources, a Houthi military force moved from the city of Amran under the command of Abu Ali Mohammed Zaid Yahya Al Makhdhi, heading toward the border areas with Saudi Arabia as part of a broader mobilization effort to various front lines.
In a separate development, the Houthis staged what has been described as one of their longest military marches under the slogan “Do not weaken in pursuing the enemy.” The march involved symbolic units from the second batch of special forces moving from Al Bayda governorate toward Ma’rib governorate, two key front lines with the internationally recognized government of Yemen. | ||
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| Iraq |
| Iraq arrests senior ISIS figure, dismantles cell in Anbar |
| 2026-02-15 |
[Rudaw] Iraq’s National Security Service (INSS) said on Tuesday it had dismantled a key Islamic State ...formerly ISIS or ISIL, depending on your preference. Before that they were al-Qaeda in Iraq, as shaped by Abu Musab Zarqawi. They're really very devout, committing every atrocity they can find in the Koran and inventing a few more. They fling Allaharound with every other sentence, but to hear western pols talk they're not reallyMoslems.... (ISIS) cell in Anbar province, arresting senior figures and seizing weapons and explosives amid renewed concerns over turban activity in western Iraq. "The National Security Service waged a precise intelligence battle to track a complex terrorist cell in Anbar province that sought to reorganize its ranks and plan the execution of terrorist operations," INSS spokesperson Arshad al-Hakim said in a video message published on INSS’ Facebook page. Hakim said an INSS counterterrorism cell and tactical regiment carried out a "qualitative operation" across a five-kilometer area, resulting in the arrest of a senior ISIS member nicknamed Abu Ayman al-Rawi, who held the position of the group’s so-called "Wali of Anbar." The suspect was apprehended "while wearing a suicide belt just before executing his criminal plans," he said. Hakim added that the operation continued with efforts to dismantle the broader network, leading to the arrest of five additional "terrorists." Those detained included Abu al-Jais, Ghayib Awwad—responsible for transportation and logistical support—and Qusay Shaalan, who was tasked with preparing and manufacturing booby-trapped drones and managing what Hakim described as the group’s chemical file. The spokesperson said the INSS also conducted "an extensive combing operation" in the Rutba desert that lasted several days, resulting in the seizure of weapons and ammunition caches, bombs, suicide belts, and military and logistical equipment prepared for imminent attacks. During the operation, security forces discovered "a terrorist hideout containing the so-called ’Anbar Security Official’ nicknamed Abu Hussein al-Fahdawi and two of his The arrests come amid growing concern among Iraqi officials in Anbar and Nineveh provinces over renewed ISIS activity. Authorities have warned that the group is attempting to exploit security gaps in neighboring Syria following festivities in January between Damascus-affiliated gangs and Kurdish-led forces, during which ISIS detainees beat feet from several detention facilities. Iraq has transferred 4,583 tossed in the clink Drop the rod and step away witcher hands up! ISIS turbans into the country by air and land as part of an ongoing operation coordinated with the US-led international coalition, Iraqi Security Media Cell spokesperson Saad Maan told AFP on Tuesday. |
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| Iraq |
| 'Make Iraq Great Again': Trump Threatens Baghdad With Another Invasion |
| 2026-01-29 |
| Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited by Kirill Semenov [REGNUM] Another military crisis involving the United States is brewing in Iraq after the Iraqi Coordination Council, a coalition of Shiite parties, nominated Nouri al-Maliki for the post of prime minister. ![]() "I'm hearing that the great country of Iraq may be making a very bad choice by returning Nouri al-Maliki to the post of Prime Minister. The last time Maliki was in power, the country was plunged into poverty and utter chaos... Because of his insane policies... the United States of America will no longer aid Iraq." This statement by Donald Trump on January 27, 2026, at first glance, seems to express concern for the fate of the Middle Eastern country. Of course, there are some things one cannot disagree with Trump on. The return of al-Maliki, a figure whose rule (2006–2014) became synonymous with sectarian politics and institutional collapse, indeed carries great risks for the future of Iraq, and perhaps the region. His current fanatical rhetoric contrasting "the army of Imam Hussein and the army of Yazid" demonstrates the persistence of his confrontational approach towards Iraq's Sunni community. However, Trump’s hypocritical “concern” for the future of Iraq is only a pretext for a new escalation, the target of which is the Islamic Republic of Iran. His harsh criticism fails to take into account the United States' own past mistakes, such as the country's collapse in 2003. This statement is a tactical move within a larger strategy to counter Iran. Its goal is to exploit Iraq's internal weaknesses and problems and deal a decisive blow to Tehran's regional influence. Trump's advisers are likely now suggesting this scenario as preferable to direct strikes against the Islamic Republic, or perhaps even in addition to limited strikes. THE DESTRUCTION OF SAHWA OPENED THE DOOR FOR ISIS But Trump is right that al-Maliki's rule wasn't just unsuccessful—it systematically destroyed the remaining fragile foundations of Iraqi statehood and sectarian balance. His policies transformed de-Baathification (the elimination of the Baath Party's influence) from an instrument of national reconciliation into a weapon of collective punishment for the Sunni population. State institutions were de facto replaced by a shadowy system of loyalty, where Shiite militias and proxies of the radical Shiite Islamist party Dawa had priority over professional cadres. An army riven by corruption (the "ghost soldiers" that cost millions of dollars) proved incapable of confronting the ISIS* terrorists who emerged from the desert in 2014, having been driven there by the Sunni militias of the Sahwa (Awakening) movement. They had previously single-handedly cleared the provinces of al-Qaeda* from Anbar, Salah ad-Din, and Diyala. Around 100,000 Sahwa fighters became human shields protecting their communities and a key factor in reducing violence. Their success was so significant that the word "sahawat" became firmly established in jihadist jargon as a symbol of shameful defeat. For al-Maliki, however, the autonomy and influence of Sunni fighters became a direct threat to his model of Shiite dominance. Therefore, after 2008, his government took a series of steps that led to the movement's dismantling. In particular, funding was completely cut off. Payments to fighters promised by the US and Baghdad were delayed or stopped, depriving thousands of families of their livelihoods, and many Sahwa commanders were arrested on trumped-up charges of terrorism and Baathism. Plans to integrate Sahwa fighters into the army and police were blocked. Persecution and arbitrary arrests of Sunnis became the norm, leading to mass killings, such as the 2013 al-Hawijah massacre, in which 42 Sunnis were killed while peacefully protesting. The destruction of the Sahwa was one of al-Maliki's most destructive and cynical decisions of that period. The consequences were catastrophic. Thousands of dispossessed, embittered, and experienced fighters and their supporters joined the ranks of the nascent ISIS*, which replaced al-Qaeda* in Iraq, bringing with them tactical knowledge, connections, and weapons. But more importantly, the Sunni population, betrayed by the state and subjected to repression by the Shiite government and pro-government forces, no longer saw Baghdad as a protector. The state was perceived as an occupying force, and the terrorists skillfully positioned themselves as "avengers" and "defenders." It was precisely this deep chasm between the government and Sunnis that allowed ISIS* to seize vast territories and the country's second-largest city, Mosul, virtually without a fight in June 2014. Therefore, al-Maliki's return today is not simply a change of power; it is the legitimization of a policy that already led to the country's collapse. FORMAL BRIGADES AND THE REAL IRANIAN NETWORK But for Trump, al-Maliki's return is a pretext to crack down on pro-Iranian forces in Iraq and drive them out of the "Axis of Resistance." Today, the key player in Iraq and the main irritant to the United States are the Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilization Forces, PMF). Created in 2014 in response to the ISIS offensive as a collection of various Shiite militias, they are now formally integrated into the Iraqi security forces as "brigades" within the Internal Security Forces. Their total strength is estimated at approximately 150,000–200,000 fighters. Behind the neutral brigade numbers are well-known, ideologically motivated pro-Iranian groups. Their funding, armament, and ideological training are closely linked to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The most well-known component of the NMI is the Hezbollah Brigades (Kata'ib Hezbollah), a direct analogue of the Lebanese Hezbollah, created with the active participation of the IRGC. It is included on the US list of terrorist organizations and has been repeatedly accused of launching rocket attacks on US bases in Iraq. Other major groups include Asaib Ahl al-Haq, a splinter group from Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army, and the Badr Organization, one of the oldest pro-Iranian structures, formed in the 1980s from Iraqi prisoners of war and refugees to fight alongside Iran against Saddam Hussein. It also has close ties to the Iranian leadership. Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, another direct offshoot of the Iranian IRGC, has actively participated in the fighting in Syria on the side of Bashar al-Assad's government. There are others. Following al-Maliki's return, these very groups may be presented by the Trump administration as a sign that they have passed the "point of no return," after which Washington will need "urgent intervention." This perception of its urgency is also fueled by statements from leaders of Iraqi groups. In particular, the leader of the Iraqi group Kataib Hezbollah, Abu Hussein al-Hamidavi, said in a statement released on Sunday that the "enemies" of the Islamic Republic will face "the most terrible deaths." "You will taste all forms of mortal suffering, nothing will remain of you in our region, and we will sow terror in your hearts," the statement said. This in turn gives the American carrier force in the Arabian Sea a pretext to bomb the NMS instead of Iran. US AND ISRAELI STRIKE AGAINST THE "AXIS OF RESISTANCE" In the context of a likely scenario being developed in the White House, which presupposes not a direct military confrontation with Iran, but its strategic weakening through the defeat of its allies in the “Axis of Resistance,” the political crisis surrounding al-Maliki creates an ideal pretext for the United States to intervene in Iraq. Under the slogan of “defending Iraq’s sovereignty from pro-Iranian militias” or “preventing a new dictatorship,” Washington could sanction targeted strikes or a full-scale operation against the Hashd al-Shaabi Brigades. In parallel, as part of a coordinated strategy, Israel could launch a new large-scale operation against Hezbollah in Lebanon, creating a second front. The IDF's active strikes against targets in Lebanon in January 2026, including the assassination of an Al-Manar satellite channel anchor, indicate a readiness for a serious escalation. Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem has already stated that the group will not stand aside in the event of an attack on Iran. However, it is unclear whether Iran will become involved in this conflict unless it itself is directly attacked. It is highly likely that Tehran will refrain from overt military intervention amid the complex domestic political situation. Thus, Iraq and Lebanon risk becoming new battlefields of the "Washington-Tel Aviv Axis" and the "Axis of Resistance". Nevertheless, the risk of direct military aggression against Iran remains. Perhaps, following limited attacks on the Islamic Republic, which would provoke some members of the "Axis of Resistance" to support Tehran militarily, all forces will be thrown against them. REPEATING MISTAKES UNDER THE GUISE OF CORRECTING THEM The historical irony and tragedy of the situation is that the United States itself created Nouri al-Maliki as a political project. After the 2003 invasion, the American administration actively promoted it, seeing radical Shiite politics as a guarantee of stability and loyalty in opposition to Sunni radicals. Throughout his sectarian rule (2006–2014), Washington gave him full political and military support, turning a blind eye to all negative trends, the collapse of the army and the repression of Sunnis, since he formally complied with the US status of forces agreement. For years, American advisers and diplomats ignored warnings about Sunni radicalization, seeing Maliki as an ally in the "war on terror." Furthermore, Washington was once again forced to come to his aid, sending troops and air power when ISIS* emerged from the desert and captured Mosul, threatening to overrun Baghdad. Therefore, Trump's harsh rhetoric today is not remorse, but a cynical rewriting of history. The US is condemning the very politician it nurtured and whose actions it encouraged. Threats to “cut off aid” are not a concern for the Iraqis, but a tool of blackmail, designed either to install a more convenient figure in power in Baghdad or to create legal and informational cover for direct military intervention. Al-Maliki's return is truly a bad choice for Iraq. But an even worse choice is believing that the external forces whose past experiments led the country to its current state are now acting in its interests. Trump's criticism is a call for a new intervention, this time under the pretext of correcting the mistakes that the US itself committed. Iraq once again finds itself hostage to a great game, where its sovereignty and stability are bargaining chips in the strategy to contain Iran. Related: Iraq: 2026-01-28 Turkey plans buffer zone inside Iran if regime falls – report Iraq: 2026-01-27 Current ground coordination of anti-ICE activities appears to include leadership within Minneapolis PD, and two more analyses of connections and funding Iraq: 2026-01-26 Smashed by ISIS, a 2,700-year-old carving may have been the earliest-known depiction of Jerusalem Related: Nouri al-Maliki 11/13/2025 PM Sudani emerges as top winner of Iraq’s legislative elections Nouri al-Maliki 11/09/2025 Black Iraqis running for parliament hope to end discrimination Nouri al-Maliki 07/24/2025 'Dawn of the Tribes': 50,000 Armed Men Could Reshape Syria Related: Sahwa 07/24/2025 'Dawn of the Tribes': 50,000 Armed Men Could Reshape Syria Sahwa 06/28/2023 One killed, three injured in clashes in eastern Daraa Sahwa 09/02/2022 Sunken village rises from the deep: Roman settlement flooded to create reservoir is visible in its entirety after drought caused water levels to drop in Spain |
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| Iraq |
| Iraq's Popular Mobilization Forces Face Withdrawals |
| 2025-09-01 |
| [ALESTIKLAL] Amid mounting pressure from Washington on Baghdad to disband the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), several figures and factions have announced their withdrawal from the predominantly Shiite militia for various reasons, raising questions over whether this marks the beginning of the group’s unraveling. The PMF was formed in 2014 in response to the territorial advances of the Islamic State ...formerly ISIS or ISIL, depending on your preference. Before that they were al-Qaeda in Iraq, as shaped by Abu Musab Zarqawi. They're really very devout, committing every atrocity they can find in the Koran and inventing a few more. They fling Allaharound with every other sentence, but to hear western pols talk they're not reallyMoslems.... , which at the time controlled roughly a third of Iraq. Its creation followed a "defensive jihad" fatwa issued by Iraq’s highest Shiite holy man, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, in Najaf. Some 70 mainly Iran-aligned Shiite militias were integrated into the PMF, which Western governments often accuse of serving as Tehran’s proxy in Iraq. With its mission ostensibly completed following the defeat of the Islamic State, calls for its dissolution have resurfaced. REPEATED WITHDRAWALS In the wake of what it described as a "fissure," the Kata’ib Hezbollah militia announced on August 4, 2025 that it was withdrawing from the areas encircling Baghdad and handing over all its equipment and positions to the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), noting that the move was intended to pre-empt attempts at smear campaigns and reputational attacks. The announcement followed armed festivities on July 27, 2025 between security forces and members of the PMF’s 45th and 46th brigades, both affiliated with Kata’ib Hezbollah. The festivities were triggered by the replacement of the director-general of a department in Baghdad’s Ministry of Agriculture, previously aligned with Kata’ib Hezbollah under the leadership of Abu Hussein (Mohsen Mohamdawi), with a figure linked to the militia Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, headed by Qais al-Khazali. Iraq’s Security Media Cell issued a statement announcing that security forces had arrested 14 suspects. Upon verifying their identities, authorities confirmed that the detainees belonged to the two brigades of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) previously mentioned, and they were referred to the judiciary for legal proceedings. For the first time, the government explicitly named Kata’ib Hezbollah. In a statement released on August 10, 2025, it said, "The armed elements responsible for this breach belong to the Iraqi Hezbollah formation and are affiliated with the 45th and 46th brigades of the Popular Mobilization Forces." The office of Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani announced the dismissal of the commanders of the two brigades over their involvement in the attack on the Ministry of Agriculture site in Baghdad, which included the use of weapons against security personnel and resulted in fatalities and injuries, some of them civilians. In a further development, senior Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) figure Shaker Mahmoud al-Tamimi, known as "Abu Turab," announced his permanent withdrawal from the group, vowing never to return. He cited his intention to run in the parliamentary elections scheduled for November 11, 2025 as the reason for his departure. In an early August television interview, al-Tamimi stated that he had left the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) permanently and "will never return." He warned that certain actors were exploiting the name of the group, "which has been harmed from both inside and outside," while promising to reveal all relevant facts in the coming days. Al-Tamimi, known as "Abu Turab" and affiliated with the Badr militia led by Hadi al-Amiri, confirmed that al-Amiri would be their candidate for prime minister in the post-election period. He also indicated that he would not hesitate to seek a ministerial position in the next Iraqi government. Al-Tamimi’s withdrawal from the military formation to contest elections marks an unprecedented move. Until now, the head of the PMF, Faleh al-Fayyad, has remained in office despite leading the political movement Ata’a, participating in every election since 2014, and maintaining parliamentary representation. ROLE EXCHANGE On the motivations behind the recent withdrawals and their possible link to U.S. pressure, Iraqi affairs researcher Hamid al-Obaidi suggested that "even if Kata’ib Hezbollah announces its withdrawal, there is nothing to prove it, because the Popular Mobilization Forces are entirely under their control. The chief of staff, Abd al-Aziz Malluh Mirjirash al-Muhammadawi (Abu Fadak), is one of their most prominent leaders." Al-Obaidi added to al-Estiklal that "the individuals arrested by the government and said to belong to Kata’ib Hezbollah within the PMF were not shown clearly; their faces were blurred." This, he argued, "raises serious doubts that they could be released at any moment, since such discretion is not applied to everyone detained on security or terrorism-related cases." Iraqi political analyst Wael Hazem argued that "the U.S. has essentially bargained with the Shiite Coordination Framework: either hand over weapons and disband the militias, or risk losing power. Any rational actor within the framework will weigh retaining political influence against giving up arms." Hazem told local al-Fallujah television that "in the coming days, we are likely to hear that many factions will announce withdrawals from the Popular Mobilization Forces, citing disagreements with the prime minister, and claiming loyalty to the state while surrendering their weapons to it." "Other armed factions have quietly withdrawn without making announcements and are moving to participate in the political process through the upcoming parliamentary elections," Hazem added. From a broader perspective, former MP and Iraqi politician Mithal al-Alusi argued that claims of a split within the ruling Shiite Coordination Framework over disarmament are inaccurate. He stressed that the position remains unified due to "shared leadership, loyalty, and subordination," as well as an internal "distribution of roles." Local news agency Shafaq News quoted al-Alusi on August 10, 2025, saying, "The Iraqi government, under al-Sudani, is trying to convince the U.S. administration that it is serious about controlling uncontrolled weapons and dismantling illegal militias, but Washington still considers these arms as Iranian and executing terrorist missions." "The Coordination Framework and al-Sudani are attempting to present themselves as a reliable political ally to the United States in Iraq," noting that "the U.S. position, supported by the UK, does not tolerate any direct or indirect Iranian influence within the country." "Washington regards the presence of uncontrolled weapons as a means for Iran ...a theocratic Shiite state divided among the Medes, the Persians, and the (Arab) Elamites. Formerly a fairly civilized nation ruled by a Shah, it became a victim of Islamic revolution in 1979. The nation is today noted for spontaneouslytaking over other countries' embassies, maintaining whorehouses run by clergymen, involvement in international drug trafficking, and financing sock puppet militiasto extend the regime's influence. The word Iranis a cognate form of Aryan.The abbreviation IRGCis the same idea as Stürmabteilung (or SA).The term Supreme Guideis a the modern version form of either Duceor Führeror maybe both. They hate to impose its will on Iraq’s political process. It believes that successive prime ministers were selected with Iranian consent, but that era is over. The next phase must see the formation of a government with a parliamentary majority, free from foreign interference," al-Alusi added. Related: Qais al-Khazali 08/07/2025 Lawmakers reject US intervention in PMF bill Qais al-Khazali 08/16/2023 Sadiqoun bloc condemns alleged entry of 2,500 US Soldiers into Iraq, citing sovereignty violation Qais al-Khazali 06/23/2023 Political Frictions Surface Among Shiite Armed Factions Ahead of Iraq's Provincial Council Elections Related: Kata’ib Hezbollah: 2024-09-17 Iran Moving Hamas, Houthis into Iraq as Biden Admin Watches Kata’ib Hezbollah: 2024-01-31 Terrorist Group Responsible for Killing American Soldiers 'Suspends' Operations Against the US Kata’ib Hezbollah: 2024-01-23 US Treasury sanctions Iraqi airline, militia leaders for assisting IRGC; Fly Baghdad rejects accusation Related: Popular Mobilization Forces: 2025-08-30 US troops to begin withdrawing from Baghdad Saturday: Sources Popular Mobilization Forces: 2025-08-30 Will Iraq's Shiite Bloc Bow to Washington and Scrap the PMF Law? Popular Mobilization Forces: 2025-08-27 US-led coalition forces to withdraw from Iraq, relocate to Erbil: Source Related: Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani 08/07/2025 Lawmakers reject US intervention in PMF bill Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani 04/21/2024 Sudani, American weapons manufacturer discuss rebuilding Iraq's military capabilities Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani 04/08/2024 Iraq begins testing repaired Kirkuk-Turkey pipeline Related: Ali al-Sistani 08/21/2025 Iran-backed Iraqi armed group claims Israeli attack on its forces imminent Ali al-Sistani 12/18/2024 Pope Francis says survived two assassination attempts during 2021 Iraq trip Ali al-Sistani 08/13/2024 Al-Sistani calls for resignation of officials who are negligent in combating drugs and to work on purging the security services of corrupt people |
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| Terror Networks |
| Thousands protest in Tehran and the region against Israel’s war on Iran |
| 2025-06-21 |
Merely thousands? Historically they got tens or hundreds of thousands — huge crowds competing to see who could shout their devotion to their overlords and hatred of Israel and America the loudest. [IsraelTimesDemonstrators chant ‘Death to America’ and ‘Death to Israel,’ burn the two nations’ flags, as Iran proxies and other Shiite Muslims rally after noon prayers in Lebanon, Iraq, YemenThousands of people rallied in Tehran, Baghdad and Beirut on Friday after weekly prayers to protest Israel’s strikes on Iran, chanting slogans against Israel and its main backer, the United States. Images on Iran’s state television showed protesters in Tehran holding up pictures of commanders killed since the start of the war last week. Other protesters waved the flags of Iran and its Lebanese proxy Hezbollah. Protesters could be heard chanting “Death to America” and “Death to Israel” in footage from the protests. “This is the Friday of the Iranian nation’s solidarity and resistance across the country,” the news anchor said. “I will sacrifice my life for my leader,” read a protester’s banner, referring to Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. According to state television, protests took place in other cities around the country, including in Tabriz in northwestern Iran and Shiraz in the south. Last Friday, the IDF launched a sweeping assault on Iran’s top military leaders, nuclear scientists, uranium enrichment sites, and ballistic missile program. Israel says the operation is necessary to prevent the Islamic Republic from realizing its avowed plan to destroy the Jewish state. Mohammad Javad Haj Ali Akbari, the Imam leading Tehran’s prayers, told worshippers that Israel had attacked Iran out of “despair,” the official IRNA news agency reported. He accused Israel of launching a “psychological war” to “pit the people of the country against the government.” Israel launched a real war, buddy. The psychology follows instead of replacing it. “Their plans were precise, but their calculations were laughable,” the imam said.Iran has retaliated to the IDF strikes by launching over 470 ballistic missiles and around 1,000 drones at Israel. So far, Iran’s missile attacks have killed 24 people and wounded thousands in Israel, according to health officials and hospitals. Some of the missiles have hit apartment buildings, causing heavy damage. With warnings of all-out regional war intensifying, fears are growing over an intervention by Iran-backed Iraqi factions, who have threatened Washington’s interests in the region if it were to join Israel in its war against Iran. ‘NO RIGHT’ In Iraq, thousands of supporters of powerful cleric Moqtada al-Sadr rallied after Friday prayers in Baghdad and other cities, AFP correspondents said. Again, only thousands? Sadr, who has previously criticized Tehran-backed Iraqi armed factions, retains a devoted following of millions among Iraq’s majority community of Shiite Muslims.“No to Israel! No to America!” chanted demonstrators gathered in the Sadr City district of Baghdad, the cleric’s stronghold in the capital. “It is an unjust war… Israel has no right” to hit Iran, said protester Abu Hussein. “Israel is not in it for the [Iranian] nuclear [program]. What Israel and the Americans want is to dominate the Middle East,” added the 54-year-old taxi driver. In the city of Kufa, protesters set fire to Israeli and American flags. Iraq is both a significant ally of Iran and a strategic partner of the United States. In Lebanon, hundreds of Hezbollah supporters took to the streets in the group’s stronghold in Beirut’s southern suburbs. To be fair, most of Hezbollah is dead, which interferes with marching and screaming. Men, women, and children waved the flags of Iran, Hezbollah, and Lebanon, with some holding pictures of Khamenei.“It is my duty to stand with [Iran] against the Zionist Israeli enemy,” said Adnan Zaytoun, 60. To supporters like Zaytoun, “if anyone attacks us, we will defend ourselves, but we do not support war.” Hezbollah has not expressed any intention to intervene militarily on Iran’s side against Israel. They are fanatics, not stupid… The terror group emerged severely weakened from a nearly 15-month war it launched against Israel on October 8, 2023, a day after fellow Iran-backed group Hamas invaded Israel and sparked the war in Gaza.“We are here to show the American and Israeli enemies that we are resilient and will not be defeated… even if they destroy our homes over our heads,” said Fadel Saad, an 18-year-old student. In Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, and other areas, tens of thousands of people gathered for protests organized by the Houthi authorities, according to their official media outlets. They haven’t anything better to do in Yemen except protest and chew khat. The Iran-backed rebels — whose banner includes the words “death to America, death to Israel, a curse on the Jews” — have launched ballistic missiles and drone attacks on Israel, and attacked Red Sea shipping, since November 2023, a month after the Hamas onslaught. |
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