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| Abdel Nasser Abu Shokeh | Abdel Nasser Abu Shokeh | Hamas | Israel-Palestine | Palestinian | 20040210 | ||||
| Abdel Nasser Assidi | Abdel Nasser Assidi | Hamas | Middle East | Palestinian | At Large | Cannon Fodder | 20020903 | ||
| insufficient evidence to confirm the complicity of Abdel Nasser Assidi in the attack by his brother, a member of Hamas wanted by Israeli security forces for a July 16 bus ambush near an illegal Jewish settlement in the West Bank. | |||||||||
| Africa North | ||
| Imported From Egypt: The extremist ideology that inspired Boko Haram | ||
| 2026-09-01 | ||
| by Aliyu Dahiru 31 Aug 2026 [HumAngleMedia] This is the story of how modern Islamist extremism emerged from the edge of an African prison and moved into Nigeria, escalating into an unending fire of insurgency. In August 2016, Mamman Nur, one of Boko Haram’s foremost commanders, dramatically sat before a camera on the shore of the Sambisa Forest, a vast terrorist hideout in North East Nigeria. He publicly accused the group’s supreme leader, Abubakar Shekau, of doctrinal deviance and transgressions. He said Abubakar had become power-drunk, killing his own commanders over minor disagreements and spilling the blood of fellow Muslims.
![]() He titled the recording Exposé, deliberately weaponising the same word Shekau had used to attack his critics. He also invoked the words of the former Islamic State spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, saying: “Whoever changes, we will also change him.” His message was not only a threat; it was also a campaign to depose Shekau as the leader of the terror group. Within months, Mamman’s faction formally broke away to become the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), as Shekau led the Jama’atu Ahlussunnah Lidda’awati wal Jihad (JAS). This movement had existed before Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. Behind the sudden division lay an unfolding theological debate within the global Salafi-jihadi movements for decades. It revolved around one question that has repeatedly divided jihadist organisations from the Middle East to the Lake Chad Basin: How far can the practice of takfir – declaring other Muslims as non-believers – go before this doctrine, which is meant to validate jihad, starts to undermine the very concept of jihad itself?
The story begins with Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian author and one of the foremost figures in modern Sunni Islamic revivalism. He’s the author of a popular Islamist book, Ma’alim fi al-Tariq, mostly known as Milestones, which he wrote while in prison under the Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, and published shortly before his execution in 1966. The book was said to have transformed a classical Islamic concept into a revolutionary political doctrine. The term “jahiliyya” literally referred to the pre-Islamic Arabian era before the Prophet Muhammad’s message, but Sayyid gave it a radically different meaning in his book. He argued that contemporary Muslim societies had fallen back into a new jahiliyya because they accepted political systems that placed human authority above divine law. More at the link Related: Mamman Nur 05/19/2026 The al-Minuki raid raises questions about Nigeria-US military ties Mamman Nur 05/16/2026 Top ISIS commander is killed by American forces as Trump says world's 'most active terrorist' has been 'eliminated' Mamman Nur 05/15/2024 Son Of ISWAP Founder, Mamman Albarnawy Surrenders To Nigerian Security Operatives In Borno State Related: Abubakar Shekau 08/17/2026 Inside ISWAP's Online Propaganda Machine: How Al-Buhaira outlet is waging a war of words across the Lake Chad basin Abubakar Shekau 08/14/2026 Inside ISWAP's Online Propaganda Machine: How Al-Buhaira Outlet is Waging a War of Words Across the Lake Chad Basin Abubakar Shekau 07/29/2026 Fragmented security allows terrorists’ cross-mobility across Lake Chad and Sahel Related: Takfir 08/30/2026 The Scholarly Rebuttal of Boko Haram’s Logic of Terror Takfir 06/19/2026 The War Over Who Is Muslim Takfir 01/20/2026 SDF urges Kurds worldwide to ‘join the resistance’ as clashes escalate in Rojava: HTS allies free thousands of ISIS prisoners, slit throats and take slaves like ISIS did Related: Sayyid Qutb 12/01/2025 The Muslim Brotherhood's Strategic Entryism into Western Society: A Systematic Analysis (Analytical Briefing) Sayyid Qutb 03/21/2024 IDF: 90 Hamas gunnies killed, over 300 nabbed in raid of Gaza’s Shifa Hospital Sayyid Qutb 06/10/2023 Resident of Kaspiysk sentenced for participation in 'At-Takfir Val-Hijra' | ||
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| Africa North |
| The Aswan Turn: How Moscow Won the Battle for Africa Against the US and Britain |
| 2026-07-20 |
| Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited by Kirill Semenov [REGNUM] On July 19, 1956, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles bluntly told the Egyptian ambassador in Washington: The United States was withdrawing its offer to loan Egypt a loan for the construction of the first phase of the Aswan Dam. The Americans had rescinded the agreement concluded just six months earlier. Britain followed suit. This triggered Egypt's "turn" toward Moscow and became one of the key episodes in the history of the West and the USSR's struggle for Africa. ![]() From 1914 to 1952, Great Britain was the ruler of Egypt. At the beginning of World War I, the British seized the Ottoman Empire's holdings on the Nile. Until 1922, the world's oldest country was officially a protectorate of the British Empire. Then, London declared its possession de jure "independence," but in essence, the Kingdom of Egypt remained a British colony. A British military contingent was stationed at the Suez Canal, which was jointly controlled by Great Britain and France. The first low-head dams on the Nile (including the 53-meter-high Aswan Dam) were built by the British in the early 20th century to boost Egyptian agriculture profits for London firms. By 1952, Alexander Gibb & Partners had developed a design for a new Aswan High Dam, several dozen meters higher. But in July of that same year, 1952, the Young Officers' Movement overthrew King Farouk. General Mohammed Naguib was considered the leader of the conspirators (he officially headed the new regime), but the driving force behind the coup was 34-year-old Lieutenant Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser. The monarchy was abolished, making Egypt the first internationally recognized republic in the Arab world and a model for young officers in neighboring countries. The republican regime "nullified" British control and initially pursued a multi-vector policy, building relationships with both Washington and Moscow. Part of US President Dwight Eisenhower's team believed that Egypt could be firmly anchored within the US sphere of influence, given that the first head of the Revolutionary Command Council, Naguib, had persecuted the local Communist Party. Neighboring Israel, which emerged in 1948 under the joint auspices of the USSR and the US, was more oriented toward the Americans in 1950. But in 1954, General Naguib was ousted from power by the less predictable Nasser. Secretary of State Dulles viewed him with suspicion, considering him a "reckless and dangerous nationalist." In reality, Nasser acted pragmatically. As declassified documents and memoirs, including the work of Nasser's advisor Mohammed Heikal, attest, Cairo sought American arms and economic aid. CAIRO MAKES A CHOICE But in February 1955, Britain, seeking to punish Egypt for its out-of-control behavior, canceled the arms contract. Just a month later, a Czechoslovak trade delegation arrived in Cairo. Czechoslovakia served as a hub for Soviet arms shipments to Third World countries. In September 1955, Egypt and Czechoslovakia signed a contract worth $400 million at the time ($5 billion today), under which the Arab Republic received 230 modernized T-34s, 200 BTR-152s, and 150 MiG-15s and MiG-17s. Under the same deal, Poland sold Egypt six submarines and two destroyers. The Warsaw Pact countries were clearly guided by Moscow. Two months after the "Czechoslovak deal," in December 1955, Dulles, on behalf of the White House, announced that the United States, together with Britain, would provide Egypt with nearly $70 million in aid (equivalent to $875 million in today's money) for the construction of the Aswan Dam. This was sealed with an agreement in February 1956. But in July, Washington abruptly backtracked. Dulles attributed the demarche to "difficulties in agreeing on financial details." In reality, it was an attempt to "bring Nasser to his senses," who by that time had recognized China and established diplomatic relations with Beijing. The plan, apparently, was for a new coup. But Nasser had already firmly established his grip on power. And then, in July 1956, he nationalized the Suez Canal—a blow to the interests of the British (and, by extension, the French), who still controlled this critically important artery. In the fall, Britain, France, and Israel, who had joined them, attacked Egypt. This was a rare instance in which the United States did not support its partners. The United States and the USSR essentially found themselves on the same side of the barricades with Cairo. Eisenhower was dissatisfied with the actions of British Prime Minister Anthony Eden and French Premier Guy Mollet, who carried out the military operation without consulting the White House, especially during the US election campaign. The White House also distanced itself from Israel, which at that time was not yet considered a strategic partner in the region by Washington. But Soviet political and military assistance at a critical moment proved a more profitable investment than American "carrot and stick." Nikita Khrushchev decided to finance and build the Aswan Dam—the project began in 1960 with the participation of Soviet loans, equipment, and specialists. Ultimately, this undermined the US position and rendered American blackmail untenable. As researcher Raymond Garthoff noted, Washington's abandonment of the project was a significant geopolitical miscalculation. The USSR, rushing into this breach, did not give the Americans a chance to win back on more favorable terms. Egypt found itself within the Soviet sphere of influence for the next 20 years. This success became the basis for expanding the Soviet presence in Africa. ALGERIA, GUINEA, AND EVERYWHERE ELSE Europeans built only the infrastructure that supported the export of raw materials from the colonies. Railways and highways ran exclusively from mines or plantations to ports, severing the internal connectivity of the territories. Energy production served only Western concessions. The West deliberately maintained backwardness, failing to develop processing industries or domestic infrastructure. The former metropolitan powers maintained this policy even after the colonies declared independence. Moscow offered another option: development assistance in exchange for loyalty (which also included the possibility of a military presence). The USSR played a significant role in Algeria, where the war for independence against France was raging. The National Liberation Front (FLN) initially focused on supporting Western leftist forces. However, in March 1956, the French Communist Party voted in parliament to grant "special powers" to Guy Mollet's government for action in Algeria. This move significantly limited the FLN's ability to gain support in Europe and opened the door to cooperation with Moscow. The Soviet Union deployed diplomatic and material support to the FLN. At the UN, Moscow blocked France's attempts to classify the Algerian conflict as an internal matter, seeking recognition of the Algerians' right to self-determination. The USSR became one of the first countries to de facto recognize the FLN and open an office in Moscow. Supplies of weapons and equipment went through Tunisia, Morocco and other countries, often with the assistance of other socialist states. After Algeria gained independence, Soviet involvement was not limited to political support. A gigantic steel mill was built in Annaba, with the direct participation of Soviet specialists. For Paris, this was the final blow to the colonial model. The former colony gained the opportunity to produce its own steel, breaking the long-standing monopoly of European industrial concerns. Guinea is another example. In 1958, in a referendum proposed by Charles de Gaulle, the country was the only one to vote against association with France and achieved immediate independence. Paris imposed a massive blockade: all equipment, down to telephone exchanges and light bulbs, was removed from the country, financial accounts were frozen, and technical assistance was cut off. The USSR promptly recognized Guinea and sent humanitarian aid, including grain. Soviet specialists participated in restoring communications, building roads, creating energy capacity, and exploring bauxite deposits. Unlike the French, who exported the raw material, the USSR helped Guinea establish a base for its primary processing. The airport in Guinea's capital, Conakry, has become an important hub capable of handling military transport aircraft. Since 1971, ships from the Baltic and Black Sea fleets have been stationed off the republic's coast—ostensibly to protect vessels from our fishing fleet. The Republic of Guinea became a rear base for leftist guerrillas from neighboring Portuguese Guinea (now Guinea-Bissau). Conakry served as a transit point for arms, ammunition, and food supplies for rebels in another Portuguese colony, Angola, for the Moscow-aligned MPLA movement. When the 1974 revolution in Portugal itself brought down the world's oldest colonial empire, Angola and Mozambique gained independence. In both countries, a proxy war unfolded between the Soviet and Western blocs: Moscow supported the leftist regimes of the MPLA and FRELIMO parties, while the United States and South Africa stood behind the rebel groups (UNITA in Angola, RENAMO in Mozambique). The USSR provided its allies not only with military protection, including the deployment of Cuban troops, but also with extensive civilian aid. Soviet specialists restored hospitals destroyed by the war, built schools, and assisted with agricultural mechanization and the integration of power grids. In Ethiopia at the same time, in the mid-1970s, the Egyptian scenario was reproduced. The country was one of the key American footholds in the region: the US supplied weapons, trained the officer corps, and conducted intelligence. In 1974, the Derg military regime came to power under Mengistu Haile Mariam, who himself had studied in the US and had ties to the Americans. The new government, by inertia, oriented itself toward Washington and attempted to retain military aid from there. But the Jimmy Carter administration began blackmailing the new leadership with unacceptable conditions. It was the same reflex Dulles had in 1956: refuse aid and wait for the new regime, out of desperation, to accept American demands. The culmination came with the Ogaden War of 1977–1978, when Somali leader Siad Barre, previously a Soviet ally, attacked Ethiopia, which was also increasingly turning toward the USSR and was potentially a more valuable military-strategic ally than Somalia. Moscow made a sharp turn: it severed relations with Mogadishu and launched a large-scale operation to rescue the regime in Addis Ababa. Thousands of Cuban troops, Soviet weapons, and military advisers were deployed to the country. Ethiopia retained its territorial integrity and became Moscow's main ally in East Africa for the next 15 years. Soviet engineers built dams (including Genale Dawa), roads, industrial plants, and agricultural facilities, integrating disparate regions into a unified economic space. In parallel with infrastructure projects, the USSR implemented a major program for training national elites—from engineering to political and military personnel. The events of 1956 became the "matrix" for Africa's further pivot toward the USSR. The former colonial powers were unwilling to offer the African Continent an attractive development model. The Americans were let down by their "Atlantic solidarity." An orientation toward Moscow proved more advantageous (indeed, mutually beneficial)—even if it meant swearing allegiance to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism. Modern Russia, in building ties with African countries, is building on the foundations laid during that period. Infrastructure, economic, and educational ties established between the 1950s and 1970s continue to influence the configuration of relations. The proven idea of a joint fight against neocolonialism is being complemented by a new concept of a multipolar world. The lesson of 1956 is that countries in the Global South respond to offers of infrastructure development, technological cooperation, and respect for their sovereignty, rather than to financial constraints and political ultimatums. Russia, returning to the African continent with new projects in nuclear energy, logistics, and security, is developing this area based on historical experience that has proven its effectiveness and relevance. |
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| Science & Technology | |
| Missiles of Africa: Why the continent's story doesn't fit the usual script | |
| 2026-02-14 | |
| [RT] How imported rockets, aborted national programs, and external control have shaped the continent’s arsenals Missile development in Africa has traditionally been driven by the necessity to procure missiles for military forces; the development of national missile programs has been of secondary importance for most African countries. Despite this, under various regimes, certain nations have considered developing their own missile capabilities and even creating a “wonder-weapon” that would allow them to assume a dominant role in the region. In addition to South Africa, countries including Egypt, Libya, and Algeria have harbored such ambitions at different times. When it comes to missile supplies, the Soviet Union played a significant role in the militarization of Africa. During the height of Africa’s national liberation movements – many of which were ideologically aligned with socialism – the USSR provided a wide range of weaponry, including missile systems. These became some of the most potent tools for the continent’s “new democracies.” After the fall of the Soviet Union, the resulting “missile vacuum” didn’t last long. Some African countries remained traditional partners of the Soviet military-industrial complex and shifted their focus to Russian military equipment, while others drastically changed suppliers. Today, China has emerged as a key player in the African military market; some countries have also turned to American missile technology. However, the US does not supply long-range missiles, creating space for another exporter that faces no restrictions: North Korea. EGYPT’S MISSILE PROGRAMS Egypt was one of the few African countries with an active national missile program. Following its defeat in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and the Suez Crisis of 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser sought to develop a domestic nuclear missile shield. Egypt’s primary goal was to develop military capabilities that would be independent from external influence and that would benefit the entire Arab East. Egypt initiated its missile program by inviting in German scientists with experience in developing V-2 rockets.
Simultaneously, efforts to develop nuclear weapons were underway. Likely due to the influence of the Soviet Union and other external factors, these programs were curtailed after Nasser’s death. The USSR then offered its 9К72 SCUD missile systems to Egypt. In 1971, in order to equip two missile brigades, the Soviet Union began supplying 9K72E missile systems mounted on MAZ-543 self-propelled launchers to Egypt. By the time of the next Arab-Israeli conflict in 1973, Egypt had already acquired nine launchers and 18 missiles. During the hostilities in October 1973, the first three launches were executed against targets on the Sinai Peninsula, marking the first combat use of the SCUD missile system. In 1979, several SCUD missiles were transferred to North Korea, and there were likely discussions about jointly improving these weapons. This collaboration resulted in the Condor missile program, initiated in the late 1980s. Its goal was to enhance the range of SCUD-type missiles beyond 500 km. The program involved North Korea, Iraq, and Argentina, but by 1993, Argentina and presumably Egypt withdrew from the initiative. Nevertheless, Iraq’s partnership with North Korea continued until the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Today, the Egyptian armed forces still operate 9K72E missile systems equipped with SCUD missiles. While some of them may be original Soviet-produced missiles, most are likely upgraded North Korean versions delivered in the early 2000s. They have a range of up to 300 km and compared to modern missiles, take a long time to prepare for launch. However, they remain a formidable sight during military parades! LIBYA’S MISSILE AMBITIONS During the 1970s, Libya embarked on a path toward socialism under the leadership of Muammar Gaddafi, who established the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. By 1977, the country had received several brigades of 9K72E missile systems, boasting 72 launchers and about 200-300 missiles – quite a formidable arsenal for that era. Gaddafi likely harbored ambitions for expansion to the south, yet the extensive deployment of this missile stockpile never came to fruition. Nevertheless, during confrontations with the United States, Libya launched missile strikes against an American base on the island of Lampedusa in Italy. On April 14, 1986, the missiles missed their target and fell into the sea. Concurrently, Libya initiated modernization programs in collaboration with North Korea and Iran. As demand grew, Gaddafi reportedly requested new missile systems from the USSR, specifically solid-fueled Temp-S systems with a range of up to 900 km. However, times changed; the USSR began cutting back on missile production, and the US and its allies became increasingly concerned about the proliferation of missile technology. Consequently, Libya’s missile program was dismantled in the 1990s and early 2000s in exchange for an easing of economic sanctions. ALGERIA Algeria also eventually broke free from colonial rule and began its journey towards independence. However, apparently Algeria didn’t openly embrace a socialist agenda during this transition. Soviet missiles were not supplied to the country, but other Soviet military equipment found its way into Algeria, including submarines, aircraft, and various weapon systems. In the ‘00s, Algeria became increasingly interested in acquiring modern missile systems and purchased the Russian 9K720E Iskander-E missile system (the “E” stands for the export variant of the missile). Between 2014 and 2018, Algeria received 12 of these systems; each system included a self-propelled launcher, a transport-loader vehicle, and a command vehicle for mission preparation (one per battery). Each launcher comes with four missiles, not counting the reserves that may be stored in warehouses. 9M723 ballistic missiles used with the system have a range of 280 km. The system can also deploy cruise missiles, such as 9M728E missiles with a range of up to 300 km. While these missiles could potentially have a greater range, the 300 km limit aligns with international non-proliferation regulations. Today, Algeria stands out as the only country in Africa and the Arab East equipped with the advanced Iskander missile system. This capability significantly alters the balance of power in North Africa. In addition to Russian systems, Algeria has also acquired Chinese multi-role DF-12A systems which can launch both short-range ballistic missiles like the SY-400 and anti-ship missiles such as the YJ-12B for coastal defense. Overall, this modern missile infrastructure effectively secures the nation’s coastal waters. SOUTH AFRICA In the 1980s, South Africa was arguably the most technologically advanced nation in the southern part of the continent. The country developed its own aircraft, armored vehicles, nuclear weapons, and missiles. South Africa’s missile program gained traction in collaboration with Israel in the 1970s-1980s. Since the mid-1960s, South Africa had been actively working on developing an atomic bomb, making it a valuable partner for Israel, which was willing to share missile technology in return. Two research reactors, SAFARI-1 (1965) and SAFARI-2 (1967), were constructed to work with plutonium and uranium. In 1979, the so-called Vela Incident occurred – which was likely an explosion of a nuclear weapon developed by South Africa. By the 1980s, South Africa had tested its first ballistic missiles – the RSA-3 – which featured a range of up to 1,000 km. The missiles incorporated Israeli technology from the Shavit and Jericho missile programs. However, by the early 1990s, following a change in government and the end of apartheid, South Africa officially dismantled its missile program and adopted non-nuclear status, relinquishing its nuclear arsenal. OTHER COUNTRIES IN AFRICA When it comes to other countries on the African continent, their missile capabilities are largely limited to multiple launch rocket systems and ground-based or air-launched missiles. Aerial drones are increasingly gaining traction even in developed nations, which see them as an alternative to precision-guided missile technology. Drones offer greater versatility and are generally more affordable. As a result, it seems that today only a few wealthy nations can afford traditional long-range missile systems. | |
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| Israel-Palestine-Jordan | |
| Death toll rises to 67 in Gaza Strip since dawn | |
| 2025-09-07 | |
| [GEO.TV] At least 67 people have been killed by Israel since early this morning, Al Jazeera reported, citing sources at local hospitals tell our team on the ground. The majority of these people, 45, were killed in Gaza City as the Israeli army continues its campaign to seize the city and displace all its residents south. Four Palestinians killed in Israeli strikes in Khan Younis [NEWARAB] Four Palestinians were killed after Israeli airstrikes targeted Khan Younis, Wafa reports. Three Palestinians were killed after a drone targeted a group of civilians on Jamal Abdel Nasser Street in central Khan Younis, while another was killed after a vehicle was targeted in the al-Mawasi area.
...back at the dirigible, Jack stuck the cigar in his mouth, stepped onto the gantry, and asked Got a light, Mac? Von Schtinken stopped short, lowering the dagger and trying to control his features. If you light that thing, Herr Armschtröng,he pointed out, his voice tense, we all die!... medical sources in the Hamas-run Gaza Strip reported at least 21 people killed in Israeli strikes across the Strip, including 13 people in Gaza City, since dawn on Saturday. Another six people, including a child, died as a result of malnutrition over the past 24 hours, according to the Hamas health ministry. The tolls, reported before the strike on the al-Susi building, could not be independently verified. The IDF did not immediately comment on the reported strikes. | |
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| Iraq |
| The 12-day war and silent transformations of western Asia, Part I: Iraq and Turkey |
| 2025-07-05 |
The view from Kurdistan, at length. Part II: PKK and Iran will be published tomorrow. [Rudaw] The 12-day Israel—Iran ...a theocratic Shiite state divided among the Medes, the Persians, and the (Arab) Elamites. Formerly a fairly civilized nation ruled by a Shah, it became a victim of Islamic revolution in 1979. The nation is today noted for spontaneouslytaking over other countries' embassies, maintaining whorehouses run by clergymen, involvement in international drug trafficking, and financing sock puppet militiasto extend the regime's influence. The word Iranis a cognate form of Aryan.The abbreviation IRGCis the same idea as Stürmabteilung (or SA).The term Supreme Guideis a the modern version form of either Duceor Führeror maybe both. They hate war stands as one of the most consequential events of the first quarter of the 21st century, with the potential to reshape both the economic landscape and the political-security dynamics of western Asia. Much like the Six-Day Arab—Israeli War of 1967, which extended beyond mere territorial occupation, the 12-day conflict between Iran and Israel was not solely about missile exchanges and nuclear ambitions. Beyond the overt military dimensions, the war was also aimed at strategically distancing Tehran from its deepening ties with China and Russia, while simultaneously curbing the expansion of the pan-Shia movement led by Iran. In this sense, the conflict served a role analogous to that of the 1967 war, which effectively halted the rise of the pan-Arab movement spearheaded by Gamal Abdel Nasser and supported by Moscow. Regardless of whether it is referred to as Operation Rising Lion, True Promise, or Midnight Hammer, it is evident that this war is quietly transforming the regional landscape. Syria appears to be entering a new phase aimed at establishing the foundations of governance, while the regional influence of both ...the only place on the face of the earth that misses the Ottoman Empire... and the Gulf states is expanding. In parallel, the issue of Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) disarmament has progressed into a new stage, influenced by the broader consequences of the conflict. The war has turned Iraq and the Kurdistan Region into arenas for two major regional rivalries. On one front, these areas have become a battleground for military competition between Iran and Israel, a dynamic that has pushed Iraq’s internal situation to the edge of crisis where unknown drones have emerged as key players in shaping the security environment. On another front, Iraq is increasingly becoming a site of strategic contention between Ottoman Turkish and Iranian interests. Additionally, the war - and even the anticipation of it - has compelled Turkey to quietly engage in a discourse aimed at redefining its nation-state identity, particularly through the rhetoric of Ottoman Turkish—Kurdish brotherhood. Simultaneously, within Iran, a growing debate between the ultra-conservative faction and other elements of the political elite reflects yet another dimension of the war’s subtle but enduring influence - an influence that appears likely to persist. IRAQ BETWEEN THE HAMMER OF WAR AND THE ANVIL OF RIVALRY Iraq’s current situation appears increasingly precarious as the country approaches elections under the shadow of both ongoing regional conflict and intensifying geopolitical rivalry - developments that may, as in previous instances, prove decisive for its future. In relation to the recent war, Iraq has formally protested the violation of its airspace illusory sovereignty. However, a clean conscience makes a soft pillow... this issue is only one dimension of a broader and more complex set of challenges. On the day the conflict ended, two of Iraq’s radar systems were destroyed, and in the days that followed, unidentified drones have emerged as a growing security concern, appearing in areas ranging from Kirkuk to Sulaimani and Duhok. The Iraqi government is currently conducting investigations to determine the origins of these incursions. While some have speculated that the Islamic State ...formerly ISIS or ISIL, depending on your preference. Before that they were al-Qaeda in Iraq, as shaped by Abu Musab Zarqawi. They're really very devout, committing every atrocity they can find in the Koran and inventing a few more. They fling Allaharound with every other sentence, but to hear western pols talk they're not reallyMoslems.... (ISIS) may be responsible, this theory does not align with the group’s current limited military and organizational capabilities. In reality, only three regional actors possess the capacity to conduct such drone operations across the Kurdistan Region and Kirkuk: Turkey, Iran and its affiliated "resistance" groups, and Israel. At a time when the world is closely monitoring PKK disarmament negotiations, it is unlikely that Turkey would risk undermining the process, especially since the nature and targets of the drone activity do not suggest Ottoman Turkish involvement. Both Iran and Israel remain highly sensitive to the strategic positioning of the Kurdistan Region and Iraq more broadly. Contrary to prevailing assumptions, the Kurdistan Region adopted a stance of silent neutrality during the recent conflict. However, a clean conscience makes a soft pillow... this neutrality has failed to satisfy either Iran or Israel, each of which interprets the Region’s posture through its own security and strategic lens. Whether war resumes or not, the Kurdistan Region’s geographic and strategic location renders it critically important to the offensive and defensive calculations of both parties. At this stage, the identity of the actors behind the drone incidents remains unknown. Nonetheless, the prevailing interpretation is that these incidents constitute strategic signaling - intended more as a message than as direct acts of aggression or destruction. The ambiguity surrounding these developments underscores the fragile and volatile security environment in which Iraq now finds itself - caught between the hammer of regional warfare and the anvil of great-power rivalry. Another point is that the possibility of Iraq being caught up in war due to the balance of power in the region is always open, because Iraq is important to Iran to protect its last regional bastion, but it’s also important to Israel to keep a gateway to reach Iran open and prevent a problem from forming through Iraq. It seems that in the future, beyond security and military matters, Iraq will increasingly become a field of economic competition and influence between Turkey and Iran, and this will translate into political tension. Iran has increasingly focused on developing its economic relations with Iraq and the Kurdistan Region. In 2020, Iran’s trade volume with Iraq did not reach $6 billion, while Turkey positioned itself at around $17 billion. Since then, it has continuously tried to turn toward the Iraqi market, and in 2024 it reduced its gap with Turkey. Iran’s economic losses after the fall of Bashir Pencilneckal-Assad Oppressor of the Syrians and the Lebs... are estimated at around $30-50 billion. It is estimated that the 12-day war also cost it between $24 and 35 billion. If international sanctions are to return by October 18, then it must grip the Iraqi market with teeth and claws, as it seems like the last resort for its economy. Mohsen Rezaee, former commander of the Revolutionary Guards, once said that we cannot fight wars for countries while their benefits go to other countries. A DOUBLE-SIX FOR TURKEY AND THE GULF, AND AN OPPORTUNITY FOR SYRIA The recent conflict has elevated the regional prominence of both Turkey and the Gulf states. For these actors, the simultaneous weakening of Iran and Israel constitutes a strategic gain - akin to a "double six" in backgammon - provided that the hostilities remain confined within the borders of the two principal belligerents. At the same time, both Turkey and the Gulf countries are vying with Oman for the opportunity to host prospective negotiations between Iran and the United States, if such talks prove feasible. From Turkey’s perspective, the Iran—Israel war represents the weakening of two of its major regional competitors. However, a clean conscience makes a soft pillow... had the conflict intensified or triggered sudden political upheaval in Iran, it could have posed a direct threat to Ottoman Turkish security. Despite this risk, the war appears to have drawn Turkey and the United States into closer alignment. The US ambassador in Ankara has publicly stated that Turkey might be readmitted into the F-35 fighter jet program. Additionally, Turkey was reportedly one of the few countries briefed by the United States shortly before Israel launched its attack. It appears that Turkey has played - and possibly continues to play - a role in the diplomatic efforts to end the conflict. This includes mediating between Iran and the United States, as well as between Hamas ..a regional Iranian catspaw,...and the US. In the event that an agreement is reached between Syria’s Ahmed al-Sharaa faction and Israel, it would signify a potential normalization of relations between Turkey and Israel. Such a reconciliation would not only alleviate long-standing political and security concerns, but also facilitate more stable and reliable access to the Syrian market - particularly significant given the recent partial lifting of US sanctions on Syria under the Trump administration. The aftermath of the war has also encouraged Sharaa to move closer to Israel, thereby strengthening his position and increasing his chances of consolidating political authority in Syria. This shift could signal broader transformations in the geopolitical dynamics of the region. |
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| Africa North |
| In 1970, Egypt’s leader Nasser said he had ‘no interest’ in Palestinian cause, wouldn’t fight Israel — newly aired audio |
| 2025-04-29 |
| [IsraelTimes] A 1970 recording of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser indicating a lack of interest in the Paleostinian cause is causing a stir in Egypt, Haaretz reports. "We have no interest in the Paleostinian issue. We will only talk about Sinai. When [the Israelis] leave Sinai, there will be an agreement," he says to Libyan dictator Muammar Qadaffy ...a proud Arab institution for 42 years, now among the dear departed, though not the dearest...>in the audio clip. Nasser threatened to destroy Israel in his speeches, created the Paleostine Liberation Organization, led the Arab side in the 1967 Six Day War against Israel, and imprisoned hundreds of Jews after Israel’s victory. But in the 1970 recording — aired on Abdel Nasser’s son’s YouTube channel — he showed no interest in fighting Israel: "If someone wants to struggle — let them struggle, and if someone wants to fight — let them fight. But today the Iraqis are telling us — all of Paleostine from the river to the sea, or nothing." He seemed to think that defeating Israel in battle was a pipe dream. "If we want to achieve our goals, we must be realistic," he said to Qadaffy. "You are welcome to mobilize the forces, go to Baghdad and try to fight against Israel. We will stay away from this operation, leave us alone — we will choose a non-
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| Link |
| Syria-Lebanon-Iran |
| What Syria is made of. How a bomb planted by the French exploded 80 years later |
| 2024-12-11 |
| Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. by Artemy Sharapov [REGNUM] The flags flying over the Syrian embassies in Istanbul, Stockholm, Yerevan, and Moscow are being changed — a visible symbol of the fact that “power has changed.” The flag of the armed opposition that took control of the country was already the state flag — until 1958. ![]() In a sense, time has turned back in Syria to the times before the rise to power of the secular Arab socialists, from whose ranks emerged the Assad “dynasty” that ruled the country from 1970 to 2024. In order to understand the rapidly unfolding events now (after all, after 13 long years of civil war, the situation has changed dramatically in just 12 days), it is necessary to at least briefly glance at the recent history of Syria. FOUR IN ONE The word "Syria" ("Suriyya" in Arabic) is ancient, but the state with this name is only 78 years old. Until the end of World War I, this part of the Levant, that is, the Eastern Mediterranean, belonged to the Ottoman Empire. The Turks drew the borders of the provinces (vilayets) based on the convenience of governance, without regard for the diversity of ethnic groups and religions. Present-day Syria, Lebanon and the southern part of Turkey proper were divided between the vilayets of Damascus, Aleppo, Beirut and Deir ez-Zor. When the Entente defeated Germany and its allies (including the Ottoman Empire) in 1918, the victorious powers divided up the Turkish Sultan's possessions. France — formally, under a League of Nations mandate — got the territories of modern Syria, Lebanon, and the Turkish province of Hatay. All of this was called Greater Syria. Syrian centenarians – there are almost a quarter of a million of them in the country – can remember the times when the French assembled the country and drew its borders as they saw fit. Initially, the Mandatory authorities divided their possessions into six “states” along ethnic lines. Thus, in the north, the state of Aleppo was allocated to the Kurds, Sunni Arabs, Turks and their relatives, the Turkomans. On the Mediterranean coast (in the present-day province of Latakia, where the Russian Khmeimim base and the Tartus base are now located) there was the Alawite state. It was intended for the compactly living Alawite religious community, whose religion is so different from orthodox Islam that many Sunnis and Shiites do not consider them to be true believers, as well as for Shiites and Christians. Another unorthodox community, the Druze, living in southern Syria, was given the state of Jabal Druze. The Sunnis and Shiites of the southwest were given the state of Damascus. Finally, Greater Syria included what is now Lebanon. But in 1926, the French separated Lebanon (which was distinguished by its high ethno-religious diversity, even by Middle Eastern standards) into a separate mandated territory. The Hatay region, after long interethnic clashes and complaints to the League of Nations, was given to the Turks (Syria, however, did not recognize Turkey's sovereignty over this territory until 2005). And from the remaining lands, the French authorities, for the sake of convenience of governance, cobbled together a country that had never existed before. In one territory there were Sunni Arabs, Shiite Arabs, Alawites, Ismailis, Christian Arabs, Armenians, Druze, Kurds, Turkomans and Assyrians. There is nothing special about this, however: the British authorities created the never-existent state of Iraq on the same principle. When leaving, the Europeans sought to ensure that their former colonies would always have ethnic and confessional tensions that would periodically “explode” into wars. And, it must be admitted, they succeeded. ONE COUNTRY, TWO STARS, MANY REVOLUTIONS Since gaining independence in 1947, Syria (like Iraq) has experienced a series of military coups, uprisings and has intervened in several wars with Israel. The optimal way to keep ethnic groups, confessions, clans and influence groups in line (and to keep the interests of these warring groups in balance) was an army dictatorship. However, this type of government was traditionally unstable for the Middle East. Between 1946 and 1956, the country saw 20 governments and 4 constitutions. In 1958–1961, the country lost its independence, becoming part of the United Arab Republic (UAR) for a time, the brainchild of the ambitious Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser. At that time, instead of the previous green-white-black flag, Syria adopted the black-white-red pan-Arab flag of the UAR with two green stars (the two stars originally symbolized the two "union republics", Egypt and Syria). In 1961, another coup took place in Syria, this time against Nasser. The country left the UAR, but the flag remained. In 1963, the military changed power again. Now the country is "ruled" by the regional branch of the Baath Party - the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party (in the same year, Baath comes to power in Iraq). The word "Arab" was added to the name "Syrian Republic", which is unlikely to be to the taste of non-Arab ethnic groups, primarily the Kurds inhabiting the northeast of the country. Three years later, in 1970, another coup takes place, this time within the Baathist leadership, and the leader of the country is the former commander of the Air Force, a native of the influential Alawite clan, Hafez al-Assad. LIONS ON THE THRONE The father and grandfather of the presidents of Syria, Ali Suleiman, the leader of a mountain clan in Latakia, changed his former nickname al-Wahsh (the savage) to a more harmonious one and one corresponding to his social status back in the 1920s: al-Assad (the lion). Hafez al-Assad, who held the presidency from 1971 until his death in 2000, was called "the Sacred One" ("al-Muqaddas") and "the Immortal Leader." His son and successor, Bashar al-Assad, was titled a little more modestly upon ascending to the "throne" - "the Hope of the People." It is hardly possible to reproach the Assads for a cult of personality: this was typical of Middle Eastern secular regimes - Baathist Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Egypt from Nasser to Hosni Mubarak, the Libyan Jamahiriya of Muammar Gaddafi, etc. There is an opinion that the years of the Assad family in power were a dictatorship of the Alawite religious community, to which Hafez and his son Bashar belonged. According to a slightly more complex version, the Assads relied on a coalition of ethno-religious minorities: Alawites, Shiites, Druze, Christians, etc. In fact, a regime was created in the country that was in many ways similar to Saddam's government: a group of authoritative military men in power, united by common interests with a division of spheres of influence. ON THE BRINK OF SPRING And it was this system that largely allowed the Syrian government to successfully repel the first onslaught of Islamists – the Muslim Brotherhood* uprising of 1976–1982. The storming of the city of Hama, which was commanded by the president’s younger brother Rifaat al-Assad, was considered a model for restoring order (it was this battle that pacified the radical jihadists for a long time). Syria's loss of the Yom Kippur War with Israel did not shake the regime's position. Especially since the Assads waged a successful proxy war with the same Israel in Lebanon. Compared to Saddam Hussein’s regime, which essentially fell victim to its own foreign policy adventures, the Assad “dynasty” demonstrated stability. But Soviet specialists who worked in the country in the 1970s and 1980s recalled that the situation was consistently unsettled. Explosions and shootouts “somewhere on the outskirts” were commonplace, and even family members of civilian specialists were trained in case of a terrorist attack. The stability gained at such a high price allowed the country's economy to develop until the crisis caused by the US invasion of neighboring Iraq in 2001 erupted. The constant influx of refugees and the growth of radical sentiments in the region could not help but affect Syria. At the same time, discontent grew among a part of Syrian society and the army, who had been removed from key positions. The political opposition demanded democratic reforms (essentially, a redistribution of power and property), while the Islamists demanded the introduction of Sharia law. Therefore, the wave of unrest throughout the Arab world (the so-called Arab Spring) and the fall of governments in Yemen, Egypt and Tunisia in 2011–2012 and the outbreak of war in Libya could not but lead to similar events in Syria. BEGINNING OF HALF-LIFE In 2011, protests began across the country, quickly escalating into fighting. Some of the armed forces broke away from government control, forming the Free Syrian Army (FSA). They were joined by local Islamist militias known as the Islamic Front and a number of other groups. The country, first assembled by the French and then by the Damascus military regimes, began to fall apart at the seams. A number of regions in the north, near the border with Turkey (where the Turkmen tribes live), and in the south, in the regions adjacent to Jordan and Israel, where the Druze live, have left the government's control. At the same time, in the northwest, in areas of ethnic Kurdish residence, a local administration and armed structures were created that were equally hostile to the government in Damascus and the opposition. By the beginning of 2012, the revolution and “democratization” were forgotten – a full-scale civil war broke out in the country. WAR OF THE ENCLAVES Unlike traditional wars, where the sides are divided by a front line and strive to break through it, the map of the war in Syria quickly took shape into a bizarre mosaic of several colors. After the authorities managed to suppress the opposition and Islamists in most major cities, they were pushed out to the outskirts, where they strengthened their positions. For example, in Aleppo, the armed opposition retained part of the central districts of the city and the northwestern outskirts, in Homs – the northern districts of the city and the suburb of al-Rastan, in the vicinity of Damascus – entire oases of dozens of settlements, closely adjacent to the city quarters. In one of these enclaves – Eastern Ghouta, there were up to ten thousand armed people. On the other hand, the successful opposition offensive led to the capture of large territories in the provinces of Raqqa, Idlib and Hama. But even here there remained enclaves that remained loyal to the government. First of all, areas inhabited by religious minorities. For example, the cities of Fua and Kafariya in Idlib province; Nubl and Zahraa in Aleppo province have been fighting in complete encirclement for several years. The reason is simple: Shiites live here, “heretics” from the point of view of the militants who consider themselves devout Sunnis. The history of the city of Deir ez-Zor stands apart, its garrison, together with local militia units, was able to withstand several years of siege and wait for help to arrive. Several airbases also remained completely surrounded, the garrison of which did not surrender and continued to resist. The Tabqa, Abu Duhur and Menang airfields were eventually taken by storm, and their garrison was killed. However, the garrison of the Kweires air base, consisting mainly of cadet pilots, was able to repel attacks for several years and eventually received outside help. Such tenacity and sometimes, without exaggeration, heroism seem even more incredible against the backdrop of the events of 2024, when the army simply refused to participate in military operations. In other words, military operations were conducted on dozens of fronts at once, and the decisive role was often played not by regular armed formations, but by local forces. DIVERSITY VS. GENOCIDE The semi-collapse of the Syrian state after 2011 went hand in hand with the internationalization of the conflict. Since 2013, Al-Qaeda* and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant* (ISIS, later the Islamic State*) have been actively involved in the war. The Wahhabi IS*, which by definition does not recognize existing state borders, included part of the territory of Syria with the cities of Idlib and Raqqa into its “caliphate,” which continued further to the east, capturing part of Iraq. It is noteworthy that even in a state of simultaneous war on ten fronts throughout the country, the Damascus government of Bashar al-Assad has not lost control of the situation. Over the course of several years of military action, the troops managed to fully or partially hold all major settlements. This was partly possible due to the actions of the armed opposition itself, in whose leadership former politicians and military personnel were often replaced by radicals. Those groups that swore allegiance to the terrorist international directly stated that they were bringing death to representatives of other religious communities: Christians, Shiite Muslims, Alawites and Ismailis. For example, in March 2014, Islamist units stormed the Armenian city of Kessab, carrying out ethnic cleansing in it. And in this case, the thesis about the “coalition of minorities” opposing the Islamists and situationally supporting Bashar al-Assad is correct. Thus, a pro-government Druze militia was formed in the province of Suwayda, a Christian militia in the city of Maharda in the province of Hama (later one of the most combat-ready formations of the government forces), and an Ismaili militia from Salamiyah and Masyaf. These formations were created primarily for the survival of their communities. They waged war on the side of the Assad government as long as they considered this government capable of protecting the interests of communities and ethnic groups. Also on the government's side were representatives of local businesses and/or criminals, who simply did not want to give up their positions to new people and created militia units with their own money. The most famous example of such formations is the "Desert Falcons", financed by the Jaber clan from the Latakia province. One should also not forget about the loyalty of some army commanders who refused to go over to the opposition for one reason or another. Among them are the commander of the defense of the encircled Deir ez-Zor, General Issam Zahreddine, and the hero of the defense of Aleppo, Suheil Hassan. Therefore, Bashar al-Assad managed to avoid the fate of Gaddafi and retain power, albeit having lost control over part of the country's territories. But this could not go on forever. START FROM SCRATCH With access to almost inexhaustible human, financial and military resources from abroad, the Islamists have organized a series of successful military operations. Government forces, on the contrary, began to gradually “run out of steam” and give up their positions by the mid-2010s. In the circumstances, the Syrian government turned to foreign military assistance. Russia's involvement in ending the Syrian conflict since 2015, including support for the government army and other anti-ISIS forces "on the ground" and in the air, has radically changed the course of the long-standing war. Russia's peacekeeping efforts require a separate description. For now, several important points should be noted The Russian leadership has always supported the Assad government in its fight against terrorism, while emphasizing that intra-Syrian reconciliation, the restoration of the balance of interests of the various communities, faiths and ethnic groups living here is the business of the Syrian people themselves. As President Vladimir Putin noted back in 2015, “we are not going to be more Syrian than the Syrians themselves.” Moscow has always advocated for the normalization of dialogue between Syria’s political and religious forces and organizations, speaking about the need to conduct the most fruitful negotiations under the auspices of the UN. Now that the government has collapsed, the danger of the conflict becoming "Somalizatsi" is growing, with a complete collapse of statehood and intercommunal wars. Therefore, now more than ever, dialogue is needed between the constituent parts of Syria, from the Kurds to the Druze and from the Alawites to the Sunnis. |
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| Israel-Palestine-Jordan |
| The Leftist History Behind The Creation of Arab ‘Palestinians' |
| 2024-10-02 |
| [AmericanThinker] The United Nations Organization opened its doors in 1945, and by 1989, the Security Council and General Assembly together voted on 870 resolutions dealing with the "Arab-Israeli" conflict—as it was commonly known in those decades. When I worked on a research project commissioned by the Office of the late Prime Minister of Israel, Yitzhak Shamir, I read and tabulated every one of them. In this period, the Security Council "condemned" Israel," its highest rebuke, 49 times. Sometimes Israel was "vigorously condemned," "deplored," or "strongly deplored." No Arab state was ever so chastised. In the same period, the General Assembly "condemned," "deplored," or otherwise castigated Israel 321 times. Again, no Arab state was ever so judged. The aggregate number of individual state votes against Israel in the UN’s first 44 years came to 55,642 votes. For the UN’s first quarter-century, it did not issue a single resolution referencing "Palestinians." In those UN decades, there were no "Palestinian" on anyone’s lips. The "Palestinians" made their UN debut three years after the Six-Day War of 1967. Post-war, the five months of heated debate in both chambers climaxed on November 22 with UN Security Council Resolution 242, which would shape the conflict for decades to come. And this text, too, said nothing about any "Palestinians." The germ of this notional nation originally came from the Chairman of the Arab League of States, Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt. In a 1959 meeting, he raised the idea of rebranding the mixed bag of migrant workers called "the Arab refugees"—as they had been called for ten years —into "Palestinian refugees," even though there was nothing Palestinian about them. (No, it was not the KGB that created the "Palestinian" identity). His model was the then-ongoing, five-year bloody terror rebellion in Algeria against the French (1954-62), which he supported. There, the Muslims had the brains to abandon their religious jihadi vocabulary, which would not win them support in France, and, instead, adopted the identity of patriotic, anti-imperialist freedom fighters. After WWII, there were scores of such colonial uprisings. After that, it took another decade for the lie of "Palestinians" to gestate. Golda Meir was their inadvertent midwife. Two years after Israel’s miraculous victory, on June 17, 1969, during an interview with the London Sunday Times, Israel’s new Prime Minister went to war against the growing fashion of speaking of Israel’s enemies not as "the Arabs" but as "the Palestinians." Golda said, "There never was such a nation," causing the Jew-haters to exclaim, "How dare she deny the existence of the Palestinians!" And the rest is history. ...The "Palestinian" national identity is a verbal hologram; that is, something that looks like it is there, but really is not. The enemy is Islam. The "Palestinian" identity is as empty as the Palestinian National Museum was on the day it opened in Bir Zeit in 2016. After the ribbon-cutting ceremony, guests were ushered into the brand-new, $25 million building whose every corridor, wall, and gallery was empty of any objets d’art produced by "Palestinian" artists and artisans in the "Palestinian" style. And when journalists asked the curator, "Where are the exhibits?" He said they were being made abroad, and there was a delay in delivery. |
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| Israel-Palestine-Jordan |
| When the world presses for a Mideast ceasefire, it means Israel Is crushing evil |
| 2024-10-02 |
And their beautiful thing is that most of them don’t even have to come to Jerusalem to lay wreaths and shed tears for dead Jews because they already have murdered so many Jews themselves, for centuries, that they can save the airfare and lay wreaths and shed tears at one or another Jewish cemetery or Holocaust museum in their own backyards or along the Rhine or Seine. The world has less patience for live Jews. They mask their words, and most Jews are too oblivious to realize that many of their "friends" actually despise them. So many Jews buy the baloney. In a world of diplomacy, sensible people simply do not say "I hate you people and want you all dead." They are more elegant and speak in subtleties that only skilled and trained interpreters and translators can help other Jews better understand. When a British person wants to say "car trunk," he says "boot." When he wants to say "elevator," he says "lift." When he wants to say "truck," he says "lorry." See? It’s that way. When a New Yorker says "Your mother," he is meaning "I respectfully disagree with you." A Texan says it differently:"That dog won’t hunt." When an Israeli says "Al lo davar" (eh, it’s nothing, really!), he is saying "One day, you will make it up to me." And when a non-Jew wants to see Jews dead, or — at best — does not care one way or another, he says: "It’s time for Israel to enter into a CEASEFIRE." Read old newspapers. View old videos. In all of recorded history, no non-Jew ever asked Jews or their antagonists to enter into a ceasefire when Jews were losing. Never happened. Not during the Holocaust. Not during any of Israel’s wars. Not when Jewish kids get pummeled and abused at American colleges. When Jews are losing, everyone turns the other way. Many are happy and want the Jews dead. Many others — not just a few, but many others, good people — feel bad for the Jews, pray to their gods for the Jews, and even teach their kids that it is wrong to beat up and murder Jews because Jews are kind-of similar to everyone else. But when Jews are winning, as when Israel’s Irgun, Lechi, and Haganah — ultimately the Palmach and Tzahal (IDF) — emerged capable of kicking out the British and then defeating the seven invading Arab armies, it was then that the United Nations sent Count Folke Bernadotte to bring about a CEASEFIRE. He came with a beautiful plan: the Arabs would get almost everything except for two Jews’ backyards, a patio, and some sand. Haifa port would be internationalized. Also Lod airport. Also Jerusalem — all of it. After a brief interregnum, it would be a matter of international oversight as to whether any more Jews even could enter the country any more. In other words, Jerusalem, Haifa port, and the international airport at Lod would end up under Arab sovereignty, with a ban on future Jewish immigration even into the truncated Jewish section. All he wanted was a CEASEFIRE. The Lechi did not agree. So they did not cease firing — and, G-d bless the late Prime Minister Yitzchak Shamir and his men — on him. That problem solved. By 1967, it was war again. Early word was that Gamal Abdel Nasser and his Egyptian air force were destroying Israel from one side while Syria was massacring Jews from the north. The news of the slaughter was so enticing that King Hussein of Jordan came in for the ride. In New York, the United Nations knew only what the Arabs were proclaiming to the media. Only Chaim Herzog, then Israel’s U.N. ambassador, knew the Arab governments all were lying, as they always do. (Remember the denials recently, assertions that Mohammed Deif had not been eliminated? And that Haniyah had not been in the house? Or that Nasrallah survived? They always lie until they can’t hide it anymore.) So Ambassador (later President) Herzog kept the actual truth of Israel’s stunning successes on the ground a secret at the U.N., a task particularly easy to perform. Why? Because Israel knew the U.N. would not call for a ceasefire as long as they believed the Arabs were driving the Jews into the Sea. And Israel wanted extra time to keep winning, to keep driving the Arabs back, and to emerge (despite the perpetually politically cowardly Dayan) with all of Jerusalem and Judea and Samaria and the Golan and the Sinai and Gaza. Indeed, the moment "the cat was let out of the bag," and the world realized that Israel was winning and had reached Har HaBayit (the Temple Mount), the Security Council raced to demand a... CEASEFIRE. The same in 1973. Remember? It seemed Sadat had taken Israel by surprise on Yom Kippur and was marching on Jerusalem, while Syria was racing to Jerusalem from the north, and brave Dayan was experiencing a nervous breakdown and Golda Meir was pocketing her cyanide tablets. Remember? No one called for a ceasefire then. But, then, Ariel Sharon — when he was a national military hero, before he became a corrupted politician — built that pontoon bridgehead across the Suez, and started threatening to march toward Cairo, and Israel suddenly had Egypt’s Third Army totally surrounded for slaughter. Remember? Suddenly, Kissinger — the Bernie Sanders of his day, other side of the political aisle but same kind of Jew, brother of another mother — was there demanding a CEASEFIRE. Rescue the Egyptian Third Army to kill the Jews another day and lay the groundwork for giving Sadat (i) the Etzion air base, (ii) the Alma oil fields, (iii) the Abu Rudeis oil fields, and all the rest of Sinai. And so it is, and so it was, and so it will be. Half a century later, Yair Lapid, a talk show host without a high school degree, was giving precious Israeli gas resources and territory to the, uh, late Hassan Nasrallah. (Assistedy by Naftali Bennett.) When Macron or England’s Keir Starmer or David Cameron or America’s Joe Biden or Kamala Harris or Rashida Tlaib calls for a CEASEFIRE, they are not jockeying for a Nobel Peace Prize. Rather, they are sounding the clarion call, the shofar sound to the world: "The Jews are winning! We have to stop them! CEASEFIRE!" |
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| Africa North |
| Meeting Blinken, Sissi claims Jews never persecuted in Egypt; slams Israeli collective punishment |
| 2023-10-16 |
[IsraelTimes] Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi uses his meeting with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken ...71st United States secretary of state and a leading light of the corrupt and inept Biden administration. He previously served as deputy national security advisor from 2013 to 2015 and deputy secretary of state from 2015 to 2017 under the corrupt and inept Obama administration. He advocated for the 2003 invasion of Iraq while serving as the Democratic staff director of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 2002 to 2008. He was a foreign policy advisor for the Biden 2008 presidential campaign. During his tenure in the Obama administration, Blinken helped craft B.O.'s policy on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the nuclear program of Iran. We all saw how well each of those worked. After leaving government service, Blinken moved into the private sector, co-founding WestExec Advisors, a lobbying firm...to falsely claim that Egypt never persecuted its now no longer existent Jewish minority. "You said that you are a Jewish person," Sissi says to Blinken in remarks in front of news hounds. Jewish, or of Jewish descent? UPDATE: Wikipedia says he grew up Jewish, back when Democrats were Zionists, so now we know. "I am an Egyptian person who grew up next to Jews in Egypt. They have never been subjected to any form of oppression or targeting and it has never happened in our region that Jews were targeted."Egypt’s Jewish community, which dates back millennia, numbered around 80,000 in the 1940s, but today stands at fewer than 20 people. That’s because a law was passed making it illegal for male Jews over the age of seventeen to be in the country. Shockingly, most left instead of staying and converting, having heard from Maimonides and others who escaped from Spain at the end of the Reconquista. The departure of Egypt’s Jews was fueled by rising nationalist sentiment after Israel’s founding in 1948 and during the Arab-Israeli wars, harassment, and some direct expulsions by then-Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser.Sissi, whose country shares a narrow border with the Gazoo ...Hellhole adjunct to Israel and Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, inhabited by Gazooks. The place was acquired in the wake of the 1967 War and then presented to Paleostinian control in 2006 by Ariel Sharon, who had entered his dotage. It is currently ruled with an iron fist by Hamas with about the living conditions you'd expect. It periodically attacks the Hated Zionist Entity whenever Iran needs a ruckus created or the hard boyz get bored, getting thumped by the IDF in return. The ruling turbans then wave the bloody shirt and holler loudly about oppressionand disproportionate response... Strip that has remained largely blocked over the past week, also said during the meeting that Israel’s "reaction went beyond the right to self-defense, turning into collective punishment for 2.3 million people in Gaza," according to Egypt’s state-run media. The US State Department issues a readout on the Blinken-Sissi meeting, which says the two "agreed on the importance of addressing the humanitarian situation in Gaza to ensure assistance can reach people who need it and help keep civilians out of harm’s way. Blinken also stressed the US focus on preventing the conflict from spreading and facilitating the safe passage of American citizens and their family members from Gaza. |
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| Olde Tyme Religion |
| Egypt: Jewish New Year celebrated at Heliopolis synagogue for first time in 70 years, while in Tehran services are televised by the gov’t |
| 2023-09-17 |
| [AlAhram] The Egyptian Jewish community celebrated on Friday the New Year (Rosh Hashanah) at the Vitali Madjar Synagogue in Heliopolis on Friday for the first time in 70 years. The celebration, organized by the Drop of Milk Egypt NGO, was attended by members of the small Jewish community in Cairo as well as foreign diplomats and Egyptians of other faiths. Since its inauguration in 1928, the synagogue has been renovated several times, including most recently in 2017. Recently, the Vitali Madjar synagogue hosted a number of events including Hanukkah in December 2022. The Jewish New Year service was led by Magda Haron, head of the Jewish community in Cairo The year 5784 in the Jewish calendar began at sunset on 15 September. Worshipers pack Tehran synagogue for Selichot service ahead of Rosh Hashanah [IsraelTimes] Some two hundred worshipers attended a Selichot service this this week in the Iranian capital Iran, according to footage broadcast by the Kan public broadcaster on Friday. The nightly Selichot prayers — a litany of penitential and supplicant prayers — are held in the run-up to Rosh Hashanah, the Jewish New Year, which began on Friday night. The service was led by Iran’s Chief Rabbi Yehuda Gerami. Prior to the Islamic Revolution in 1979, there were some 100,000 Jews in Iran; by 2016, according to an Iranian census, that number had fallen to below 10,000. This year, Rosh Hashanah coincides with the first anniversary of the death of Mahsa Amini in the custody of Iranian police, which sparked weeks of widespread protests. Security forces were deployed across Iran ...a theocratic Shiite state divided among the Medes, the Persians, and the (Arab) Elamites. Formerly a fairly civilized nation ruled by a Shah, it became a victim of Islamic revolution in 1979. The nation is today noted for spontaneouslytaking over other countries' embassies, maintaining whorehouses run by clergymen, involvement in international drug trafficking, and financing sock puppet militiasto extend the regime's influence. The word Iranis a cognate form of Aryan.The abbreviation IRGCis the same idea as Stürmabteilung (or SA).The term Supreme Guideis a the modern version form of either Duceor Führeror maybe both. They hate on Saturday, amid regime fears of renewed unrest. A number of members of the Tehran Jewish community were detained amid the protests last year. At the time, the Tehran Central Jewish Committee issued a letter, in which it said it was standing by the Iranian regime amid its deadly crackdown on protesters. The Jewish community in Iran has previously taken other precautionary measures to protect members, with Gerami saying in 2021 that he condemned the US killing of top Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Gen. Qassem Soleimani in 2020, amid fears Jews could be physically attacked by some Moslem neighbors.Prominent figures in the Jewish community of Iran intermittently issue anti-Israel statements that match the regime’s agenda. Meanwhile in Egypt, prayers were held at a Cairo synagogue on Friday night for the first time in 70 years, Kan reported. A number of members of Cairo’s small remaining Jewish community attended the service at the 100-year-old Vitali Madjar Synagogue, alongside foreign diplomats. Egypt’s Jewish community, which dates back millennia, numbered around 80,000 in the 1940s, but today is thought to stand at fewer than 20 people. The departure of Egypt’s Jews was fueled by rising nationalist sentiment during the Arab-Israeli wars, harassment, and some direct expulsions by then-Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser. ...also a law which made it illegal for any Jewish male to be in the country after his eighteenth birthday. Some stayed, of course, but most left. Their sisters followed, because without the young men, who were they to marry? Bat Ye’or, who wrote about Eurabia and the idea of dhimmitude, was one of the latter. |
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| Arabia |
| Southern Yemeni separatist tighten military control over Aden |
| 2023-03-04 |
[HODHODYEMENNEWS.NET] Armed elements affiliated with the so-called "Southern Resistance®" have tightened their control militarily over the port of Aden, which is under the control of the Saudi-led coalition, in southern Yemen...an area of the Arabian Peninsula sometimes mistaken for a country. It is populated by more antagonistic tribes and factions than you can keep track of... According to media sources, button men following the leader of the Southern Resistance®, Abdel Nasser al-Bawah, "Abu Hammam al-Yafe’i," tightened their control over the vicinity of the port of Aden amid accusations by the pro-coalition government of looting the port’s revenues without paying the salaries of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) recruits. The sources added that the "resistance" hard boyz aboard military vehicles carried out a pre-emptive operation to tighten their control over the port before the deployment of the Saudi-backed forces, "Dera al-Watan" in the port. |
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