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Hilal Hussein al-Badrani Hilal Hussein al-Badrani Ansar al-Sunna Iraq-Jordan 20050627  

Iraq
Iraq’s top security official links Khor Mor attack to internal disputes
2026-11-12
For information.
[Rudaw] The head of Iraq’s National Security Service (INSS) stated on Wednesday that the recent strike on the Khor Mor gas field differs from previous attacks on the Kurdistan Region, suggesting the incident is linked to internal political disputes rather than regional conflict, based on confidential data.

"The day before yesterday is a completely different matter. Right now there is a crisis, as everyone knows—an internal crisis within the Kurdistan Region between the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)," Basim al-Badri told news hounds during a presser at Chatham House in London.

Badri's remarks follow a late Sunday strike that halted gas production at the Khor Mor field west of Sulaimani after an unknown projectile hit the facility’s warehouse and truck loading unit, which stores nearly 1,500 tons of cooking gas across 170 tankers.

A security source told Rudaw’s Peshawa Bakhtyar that the attack was launched from the disputed town of Tuz Khurmatu south of Kirkuk and had caused a "massive fire."

Badri dismissed media reports that drones were launched from Tuz Khurmatu, stating that officials must rely on verified intelligence rather than media accounts. He went on to suggest that "perhaps a Kurdish party carried out these attacks," or an external actor.

"The Iraqi government has indicators and data, especially regarding this latest attack. I personally possess information regarding the nature and type of the targeting, as well as the trajectory of the attack, but it is not appropriate for me to declare," Badri said.

United Arab Emirates-based operator Dana Gas, a key operator at the field, confirmed the blaze was extinguished without casualties, though production was suspended and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Electricity Ministry reported a 2,800-megawatt drop in power generation capacity.

Addressing the broader security landscape and previous strikes on the Kurdistan Region, Badri noted that Iraq faces evolving security challenges despite its prior counterterrorism operations against the Islamic State
...formerly ISIS or ISIL, depending on your preference. Before that they were al-Qaeda in Iraq, as shaped by Abu Musab Zarqawi. They're really very devout, committing every atrocity they can find in the Koran and inventing a few more. They fling Allah around with every other sentence, but to hear western pols talk they're not really Moslems....
(ISIS).

"Frankly, one of the most significant challenges facing us is these complex threats," Badri stated, noting that the "level of the threat has differed and changed. Now, the scale of the challenge and the threats are complex, involving drone attacks, the launching of long-range missiles, and cross-border attacks."

"Regarding Kurdistan, it received part of the repercussions of this regional war, and perhaps the presence of interests," he added.

The Kurdistan Region has been hit with more than 1,000 drones and missiles since the outbreak of a 42-day war launched by the United States and Israel against Iran
...a theocratic Shiite state divided among the Medes, the Persians, and the (Arab) Elamites. Formerly a fairly civilized nation ruled by a Shah, it became a victim of Islamic revolution in 1979. The nation is today noted for spontaneously taking over other countries' embassies, maintaining whorehouses run by clergymen, involvement in international drug trafficking, and financing sock puppet militias to extend the regime's influence. The word Iran is a cognate form of Aryan. The abbreviation IRGC is the same idea as Stürmabteilung (or SA). The term Supreme Guide is a the modern version form of either Duce or Führer or maybe both. They hate Jews Zionists Jews. Their economy is based on the production of oil and vitriol...
in late February.

Iran and its affiliated gangs in Iraq grabbed credit for the strikes, prompting Kurdish officials to request security guarantees from Baghdad.

Telegram channels affiliated with Iraqi pro-Iran gangs—which have previously been accused of striking Khor Mor—claimed Sunday's attack was carried out using a "suicide drone."

The strike ended a nearly four-month lull in attacks on the facility, which provides the majority of the Kurdistan Region's electricity and household cooking gas.

A KRG official told Rudaw in late July that the field had been hit 12 times, resulting in the deaths of three personnel, while Dana Gas only began gradually restoring production after August, following repeated precautionary suspensions during the regional conflict.
Link


Arabia
Tehran's 'Papa': Mysterious Iranian General Leads Houthis to Victory
2026-10-21
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Leonid Tsukanov

[Regnum] Against the backdrop of the Houthi (Ansar Allah) offensive against central government forces in Yemen, foreign sponsors of Rishad Mohammed al-Alimi's cabinet began racing to find someone to blame for the strategic failure. And they quickly found someone to blame.

The blame for the Houthis' "unprecedented successes" was placed on Abdolreza Shahlai, a general in Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and one of the most enigmatic and simultaneously recognizable Iranian security officials. However, the official identification of the "culprit" had little impact on the balance of power in Yemen or the course of the fighting.

20 YEARS OF WAR
Despite his aura of mystery, Abdolreza Shahlai was well known to Tehran's adversaries in the Middle East long before 2026. Over the past two decades, he operated under various operational aliases— Hajji Yasser, Haji Yousef, and Yousef Abu al-Karkh —overseeing the most flamboyant and complex foreign operations.

For example, in 2006–2007, he helped Iraqi Shiites create a flexible military structure from disparate militias, which subsequently dealt the Americans a number of painful blows, including during the clashes near Karbala in January 2007. Over time, these units grew into a fully-fledged military structure, known as the Popular Mobilization Forces (Hashd al-Shaabi), and became an important part of the Iraqi security forces. This forced the United States to consider the factor of Shiite resistance and influence in subsequent attempts to turn Iraq against Tehran.

Furthermore, according to the US Treasury Department, in 2011, Shahlai may have been involved in a plot to assassinate Saudi Ambassador to the US Adel al-Jubeir (who was then trying to persuade Washington to toughen its policy toward Tehran). According to US documents, his relative, Mansour Arbabsiar, was used to carry out the plan, attempting to recruit the perpetrators. Although the assassination plot ultimately failed, Saudi courtiers for a long time hesitated to weave intrigues even under the wing of the White House.

Over the course of a decade and a half, Shahlai made a dazzling career in the IRGC's special forces, eventually matching the legendary Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani, whose protégé he was. However, unlike his mentor, Shahlai preferred to always operate from the shadows. Therefore, after Soleimani's death in 2020, he declined to take over as head of the force, handing it over to another associate, General Ismail Qaani.

IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO FOLLOW THE TRAIL
However, Shahlai truly became famous among his enemies thanks to his oversight of Yemen's Houthi rebel movement. It was with his support that the movement learned to fight a numerically and technologically superior enemy, mastered advanced military technology, and developed the skills to conduct large-scale military operations. Shahlai's contribution to the movement's development is eloquently demonstrated by the nicknames he has been given in Yemen on both sides of the front—the Pope of the Houthis, Shaitan Saada, and Soleimani Sana'a.

It is not known for certain when exactly Shahlai began overseeing the activities of the Ansar Allah movement. The Israelis and Saudis insist that the Iranian general accompanied the Houthis almost from the very beginning, including allegedly recruiting the movement's key ideologist, Hussein al-Badr al-Houthi, while he was still a member of the Yemeni parliament (that is, between 1993 and 1997). However, this is likely an exaggeration.

Moreover, even the Americans, who have amassed the most detailed archive on their opponent, claim that until the first half of the 2010s, Shahlai's "area of ​​responsibility" included Iraq and part of Syria. It's far more likely that his shift to Yemen occurred closer to 2015, when Iranian authorities helped the Houthis stabilize their system of governance after successfully capturing the capital, Sana'a, and prepare the rebel forces for a protracted war with the pan-Arab coalition led by Saudi Arabia.

Subsequently, the Saudi crown repeatedly offered exorbitant rewards to local field commanders and defectors for any information leading to the capture or neutralization of the Houthi leader (according to some reports, the "rewards" reached $1.5 billion), but they were never able to track down Shahlai. American intelligence agencies, who attempted to assassinate the Houthi leader along with Soleimani in 2020, were also unsuccessful.

It got to the point where foreign intelligence agencies began arguing among themselves in their attempts to compile an accurate profile of Shakhlai—their intelligence didn't even match up when it came to identifying features, let alone potential routes and personal connections.

Soleimani's student remained elusive.

PRIMORSKY ONSLAUGHT
Shahlai, apparently, also had a hand in the events of the autumn of 2026, when the Houthis not only repelled the government forces' offensive (one of the largest in the history of the conflict), but were also able to seize vast territories in response, including the entire western coast of Yemen, and establish formal control over the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

Saudi and Yemeni officials, prudently preferring to speak anonymously, vie with each other to claim that the renowned general arrived in Sana'a at the height of the fighting, when the enemy's advanced units were already a decisive dash from the capital, and assumed overall command of the defense. Shahlai's military stratagem subsequently brought pro-Saudi forces in Yemen to the brink of losing their legitimacy, forcing Riyadh to plead with Ansar Allah and Tehran to open a negotiating window.

Be that as it may, there is no official confirmation of these rumors. Tehran doesn't overly emphasize its contribution to the rise of Ansar Allah, attributing the Houthis' strategic successes to their "fight for a just cause." However, Persian officials, smiling slyly at their counterparts, never miss an opportunity to taunt them.

This includes hinting that Shahlai is not a rare commodity, and that the IRGC still has plenty of generals capable of ruining the enemy's "great game" in the Middle East. Especially if it could harm Tehran's strategic interests or those of its close partners.

Link


India-Pakistan
Pakistan Border Post Targeted in Retaliatory Attack in Kandahar
2026-09-26
[KhaamaPress] Reports from Kandahar said a Pak border post in Spin Boldak district was destroyed in a retaliatory attack on Thursday, following Pakistain’s recent Arclight airstrike
...KABOOM!...
s in southern and eastern Afghanistan, as cross-border tensions between the two sides continued to escalate.

The Taliban
...the Pashtun equivalent of men...
’s 205 al-Badr Corps said it launched the attack after Pak forces allegedly shelled the Cargo area of Spin Boldak throughout Wednesday. Nazir Ahmad Shakib, spokesperson for the corps, said forces carried out a counterattack targeting a Pak military position near the border.

Shakib claimed the border post was completely destroyed and that Pak forces suffered "heavy casualties." The Taliban did not provide evidence to support the claim, and Pak authorities have not commented on the alleged attack or reported any casualties.

The claimed retaliation follows a series of Pak airstrikes carried out early Thursday in Kandahar, Khost and Paktia provinces. Taliban officials said four non-combatants were killed in those strikes and accused Pakistain of violating Afghanistan’s illusory sovereignty.

Pakistain has said the strikes targeted hideouts of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistain (TTP) and affiliated bully boy groups, as well as locations allegedly used to launch drones into Pakistain. Islamabad has repeatedly accused bandidos hard boyz operating from Afghanistan territory of carrying out attacks inside Pakistain, an allegation the Taliban administration denies.

The latest exchange comes just days after Pakistain also launched airstrikes in Kunar and Paktika
...which coincidentally borders North Wazoo and Kurram Agency...
provinces, where Taliban officials reported three people killed and four others injured. Pakistain has described its recent operations as part of efforts to counter cross-border bully boy threats.

Cross-border violence has intensified in recent months, with both sides exchanging accusations over bully boy activity, drone attacks and artillery fire along the Durand Line. Diplomatic relations between Islamabad and Kabul administration have deteriorated amid growing security concerns.

Regional observers warn that continued military exchanges risk further destabilizing the Afghanistan-Pakistain border, where festivities between security forces and gangs have become increasingly frequent since the Taliban returned to power in 2021.

Mujahid Accuses Pakistan of Destabilizing Region

[ToloNews] Zabihullah Mujahid, spokesperson for the Islamic Emirate, strongly criticized Pakistan’s current policies toward the world and neighboring countries during a speech at the Hamadia religious school in Aino Mina, Kandahar, accusing the country of destabilizing the region.

Mujahid said Pakistan is carrying out attacks on Afghanistan in an effort to withdraw from the “Mecca Joint Defense Agreement,” portray itself as being at war with Afghanistan, and divert public attention from its domestic problems.

Zabihullah Mujahid, spokesperson for the Islamic Emirate, said: “Pakistan recently signed the Mecca pact, and Saudi Arabia has also asked Pakistan to fulfill its commitments. Pakistan shamelessly attacked Afghanistan after claiming just a day earlier that Afghanistan had carried out drone attacks on Pakistan, while these claims are completely baseless. Through such attacks, Pakistan wants to extricate itself from the Mecca pact and portray itself to the world as being engaged in a war in Afghanistan.”

Mujahid stressed that the Islamic Emirate does not support opponents of any country and said an appropriate response would be given to attacks by Pakistani forces.

Mujahid added: “We do not support the opponents of any country. If we did, the situation would be different now. Pakistan’s claim that the TTP is present in Afghanistan was also proven baseless by its recent attacks, as those attacks targeted civilian facilities. But we will certainly respond.”

Meanwhile, religious scholars have criticized what they describe as the silence of Islamic countries, Pakistani religious scholars and the Pakistani people over Pakistan’s attacks on Afghan territory.

Sheikh Abdul Hadi Hammad, head of the Hamadia Islamic Foundation in Kandahar, said: “My complaint is with Pakistan’s religious scholars and people: why do they remain silent in the face of their oppressive system, which is attacking a defenseless country? We are also disappointed with Islamic countries for remaining silent over Pakistan’s attacks while quickly reacting to events in other parts of the world.”

Analysts, however, say Pakistan is attempting through its attacks on Afghanistan to conceal its domestic problems and failures before the international community.

Bilal Fatimi, a political analyst, said: “Through such actions, Pakistan wants to divert attention from its domestic failures and the commitments it has made to the international community.”

Sayed Haroon Hashemi, a political analyst, said: “Pakistan will become further isolated as a result of such actions, but attacks on Afghanistan will come at a heavy cost for Pakistan.”

In recent days, Pakistan has carried out attacks on several areas of Afghanistan, including Paktia, Khost and Kandahar, killing four civilians.

The Islamic Emirate has said it will respond to the attacks at an appropriate time.
Link


Iraq
Iraq picked an outsider to tame Its militias. He may end ip strengthening the system that created them
2026-06-27
[NationalContext] A sweeping reshuffle of Iraq’s security, financial and border institutions, paired with the slow and partial integration of the Shia armed factions, is rearranging the Coordination Framework’s order from within. The prime minister’s lack of a political base of his own may be precisely what makes it possible.

Ali al-Zaidi has spent his first weeks in office replacing the people who run Iraq’s security and financial institutions. The head of the National Security Service, Abdul Karim al-Basri, better known as Abu Ali al-Basri, was removed in favour of Basim al-Badri, with Zaidi overseeing the handover himself. The national security adviser, Qasim al-Araji, was replaced by Qasim al-Aboudi. Nizar Nasser, who previously ran Iraq’s anti-money-laundering office, took charge of the Central Bank and began work on 22 June, and Adel al-Yasiri replaced Haider Makiya at the National Investment Commission. Further changes have been reported at senior security and provincial posts. All of it has come without a complete government: parliament has confirmed only 14 of 23 ministers, and the two portfolios most central to any reckoning with the armed groups, Interior and Defence, are still unfilled.

The personnel changes sit alongside a broader push. The government issued five directives reorganising the border crossings, closing unofficial routes and widening the role of the intelligence services there, and the Border Crossings Authority rotated 1,905 of its officers and staff within 48 hours. Zaidi cancelled two large projects inherited from Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, a $764 million development at Baghdad airport and a railway scheme. His anti-corruption drive, run through a new Supreme Sovereign Council for Integrity that he chairs, has produced the most prominent arrests of his tenure, beginning with the deputy oil minister for refining affairs, Adnan al-Jumaili, in a case in which the judiciary says it has recovered more than $85 million, some of it cash buried underground. On the armed factions, Muqtada al-Sadr announced the separation of Saraya al-Salam from his movement, Asaib Ahl al-Haq followed with its own disengagement, and Kataib Imam Ali after it, each transferring personnel lists and weapons records to government committees. The two factions widely seen as closest to Iran, Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba, have refused, describing their weapons as non-negotiable, and the process has stalled at that point.

Around these moves sits a clear external pressure. Iraq was placed on the Financial Action Task Force grey list on 19 June. The US envoy Tom Barrack visited Baghdad and tied Washington’s disarmament demands to a large economic and investment package, and Zaidi is expected at the White House in mid-July. The changes touch money, intelligence, the borders and the senior security command at once and within weeks of one another, which is what marks them out from ordinary rotation.

More at the link
Related:
Ali al-Zaidi 06/20/2026 Iran’s Revolutionary Guard set up Iraqi cells to attack Gulf neighbors, sources say
Ali al-Zaidi 06/16/2026 Iraq exports 600k tons of oil via new Syrian corridor
Ali al-Zaidi 06/06/2026 Iraq’s Hardline Factions Refuse a Disarmament Others Have Accepted

Related:
Financial Action Task Force: 2026-02-01 Pakistan: Terrorist Outfits Utilize New Fundraising Methods
Financial Action Task Force: 2025-11-15 UNIFIL says parts of new Israeli border wall violate Lebanese sovereignty, IDF strikes Hezbollah weapons depot as Leb gov’t cuts off Hezbie moneychangers
Financial Action Task Force: 2025-04-05 Lebanon’s new central bank chief vows to combat terror financing
Link


Israel-Palestine-Jordan
Palestine Chronicle editor-in-chief admits cousin was top Hamas commander who carried out suicide attack
2026-05-24
[PostMillennial] The US-based nonprofit is facing a lawsuit filed by three former Israeli hostages who were kidnapped during the Oct 7 attack and rescued from the home of one of the outlet's journalists after months in captivity.

Ramzy Baroud, editor-in-chief of the US-based nonprofit The Paleostine Chronicle, openly admitted during a recent interview that his cousin was a senior Hamas
..a regional Iranian catspaw,...
commander who later carried out a suicide kaboom in Gazoo
...Hellhole adjunct to Israel and Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, inhabited by Gazooks. The place was acquired in the wake of the 1967 War and then presented to Paleostinian control in 2006 by Ariel Sharon, who had entered his dotage. It is currently ruled with a rusty iron fist by Hamas with about the living conditions you'd expect. It periodically attacks the Hated Zionist Entity whenever Iran needs a ruckus created or the hard boyz get bored, getting thumped by the IDF in return. The ruling turbans then wave the bloody shirt and holler loudly about oppression and disproportionate response...
, revelations that surfaced as his organization is facing a federal lawsuit accusing it of aiding a Hamas operative, who was one of its journalists, that was holding Israeli hostages captive in his family home after the October 7 attacks.

During the interview with journalist Chris Hedges, Baroud spoke candidly about his cousin, Ehab al-Badrasawi, whom he described as "the head of the northern command of Hamas’ Izz ad-Din al-Qassam military arm of Hamas." Baroud recounted learning of his cousin’s role during a 2012 trip to Gaza.

Baroud also described Ehab’s involvement in the battle for Gaza’s Shati refugee camp following the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war after October 7. According to Baroud, his cousin returned personally to the battlefield during intense fighting after younger Hamas fighters became fearful. "He needed to do something so extreme before he dies, that he would change the dynamics of the Shati battle," Baroud said. Hedges then summarized the incident by stating that Ehab walked into the open and fired on an Israeli tank, after which Baroud said his cousin "went kaboom!," followed later by his sons Abdulrahman al-Rahman and Muhammad.

Social media posts from both Baroud and his daughter, Zarefah Baroud, who serves as head of digital marketing for American Moslems for Paleostine, one of the main drivers behind anti-Israel protests on US college campuses, eulogized Ehab al-Badrasawi and his son Abdulrahman following their deaths in Gaza. Critics note that those tributes described them as victims of Israeli actions but did not reference their alleged roles within Hamas or Baroud’s later comments about suicide operations.

Photos circulating online reportedly show Ehab al-Badrasawi alongside Hamas co-founder Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi during earlier years. Other relatives mentioned in connection to Hamas include Naseer al-Badrasawi and Muhammad al-Badrasawi, whom social media posts referred to as "deaders." Zarefah Baroud also reportedly visited Gaza in 2022 and met with several family members later identified online as linked to Hamas.

The controversy surrounding Baroud and The Paleostine Chronicle comes amid an ongoing federal lawsuit in the United States. Earlier this year, a federal judge ruled that a lawsuit filed by three former Israeli hostages against the outlet may proceed to discovery and trial. The suit was brought by Almog Meir Jan, Shlomi Ziv, and Andrey Kozlov, who were kidnapped during the October 7 Hamas attack on the Nova Music Festival and later rescued by the Israel Defense Forces after months in captivity.

The lawsuit alleges that The Paleostine Chronicle, operated by the nonprofit People Media Project, knowingly employed Abdallah Aljamal, a Gaza-based writer and former Hamas front man accused of participating in the hostages’ captivity. According to the complaint, Aljamal continued contributing articles to the outlet while allegedly holding hostages in his family home.

US District Judge Tiffany Cartwright denied the outlet’s motion to dismiss the case, writing that the plaintiffs had presented enough evidence to support a "reasonable inference" that the organization may have known about Aljamal’s Hamas connections. "Plaintiffs allege that Defendants had actual knowledge that Aljamal was a Hamas operative in the months following the October 7 attacks," Cartwright wrote in the ruling.

The plaintiffs argue that by providing Aljamal with a platform and compensation, the nonprofit effectively provided material support to a US-designated terrorist organization. Attorneys representing the hostages also contend that the outlet’s tax-exempt 501(c)(3) status meant American taxpayers indirectly subsidized Hamas propaganda efforts.

The Paleostine Chronicle has denied wrongdoing and has argued it did not know Aljamal’s alleged role in the kidnappings. After Aljamal was killed during the Israeli rescue operation, the outlet initially referred to him as a "correspondent" before later describing him as a "freelance contributor" in memorial coverage.

The complaint further points to statements made by Baroud himself, including comments describing the October 7 attacks as "the birth of a miracle," as evidence of ideological alignment with Hamas narratives.
Link


Afghanistan
Afghanistan's defense forces continuing their retaliatory operations at a rapid pace, 32 Pak troops toes up
2026-03-02

Text:

🚨BREAKING - 2nd Update

Afghanistan's defense forces, continuing their retaliatory operations at a rapid pace, once again launched offensive laser-assisted attacks tonight against the humiliated enemy in Nangarhar, Paktia, and Khost provinces, under the 203 Mansoori Army Corps and 201 Khalid bin Walid Corps.

So far, four major outposts have been captured, and dozens of enemy soldiers have been k..illed or wounded. The retaliatory operation is still ongoing with intensity.
The Afghan army is defending within Afghanistan’s borders? That doesn’t sound good, but perhaps I misunderstand.
Tolo News adds:
The Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (MoD) has announced that 32 Pak military regime’s soldiers were killed as a result of last night’s retaliatory attacks by its forces.

According to the ministry, the attacks—carried out by the 203 Mansouri, 201 Silab, and 205 al-Badr Corps, also resulted in the wounding of 10 Pak soldiers and the destruction of four of their outposts.

The deputy spokesperson for the ministry added that two drones of Pakistain’s military regime were also shot down by the forces of the Islamic Emirate.

Sediqullah Nasrat, deputy spokesperson for the Ministry of Defense, said: "The country’s defense forces last night launched offensive operations using laser weapons and advanced equipment against the enemy in the provinces of Nangarhar
The unfortunate Afghan province located adjacent to Mohmand, Kurram, and Khyber Agencies. The capital is Jalalabad. The province was the fief of Younus Khalis after the Soviets departed and one of his sons is the current provincial Taliban commander. Nangarhar is Haqqani country..
, Paktia, Khost, and Kandahar, led by the 203 Mansouri, 201 Khalid bin Walid, and 205 al-Badr Corps."

Security sources also told TOLOnews that Islamic Emirate forces carried out Arclight airstrike
...KABOOM!...
s at around 11 a.m. (Afghanistan time) on an army corps in the city of Quetta. These attacks were conducted in response to last night’s bombardments by Pak forces.

According to these sources, the strikes were carried out in retaliation for the previous night’s bombardments by Pak forces.

Dawood Mirakai, a political analyst, said: "This war has been imposed on us; when war is imposed, we are compelled to act to defend our land, country, and national identity."

The Islamic Emirate further stated that Pakistain’s military regime carried out drone attacks last night on civilian homes in the Ghani Khail district of Nangarhar province. As a result of these attacks, four houses were destroyed, one woman was killed, and two others were maimed.

According to reports by the Islamic Emirate, attacks by Pakistain’s military regime from February 22 until the end of the current month in the provinces of Khost, Paktika
...which coincidentally borders North Wazoo and Kurram Agency...
, Nangarhar, Paktia, Kandahar, and Kunar have resulted in the deaths of 52 civilians and the injury of 66 others, including women and kiddies.
And one little fact from Khaama Press:
According to the ministry, 32 Pakistani soldiers were killed during the operation, reportedly through the use of landmines.
Link


Terror Networks
How Terror Leaders Use Their Jihadist Pseudonyms to Confuse Officials, Build Lore, and Stay Politically Viable
2025-11-30
[Breitbart] Terrorist leaders in the Middle East have a tradition of using an alias, pseudonym, or "nom de guerre," even when their true identities and given names are common knowledge.

This serves the symbolic purpose of demonstrating commitment to the cause, with the civilian man "reborn" into a second life as a murderous Moslem leader. It also confuses Western media and helps to preserve the political viability of bully boy leaders who adopt conventional political roles.

The paramount current example of this is Ahmed al-Sharaa, the interim president of Syria. Sharaa was known for many years by his alias "Abu Mohammad al-Jolani," under which name he became a high-ranking member of al-Qaeda and was tangentially involved in the creation of the Islamic State
...formerly ISIS or ISIL, depending on your preference. Before that they were al-Qaeda in Iraq, as shaped by Abu Musab Zarqawi. They're really very devout, committing every atrocity they can find in the Koran and inventing a few more. They fling Allah around with every other sentence, but to hear western pols talk they're not really Moslems....
Sharaa was born in 1982 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
...a kingdom taking up the bulk of the Arabian peninsula, largely made up of sand and oil rigs. Its primary economic activity involves exporting oil and soaking Islamic rubes on the annual haj pilgrimage. The country supports a large number of princes in whatcha might call princely splendor. Formerly dictatorial and steeped in Olde Tyme Religion, deferring to Salafist holy men on all issues, it has now done a 180 and is making a serious effort to modernize, so as not to be left in the sand by its Gulf Arab neighbors. The holy men have been shoved to the background and the nation is now still dictatorial but somewhat rational. That doesn't make them trustworthy, but it's a start...
, but his family comes from the Golan Heights in Syria — an origin alluded to in his choice of "al-Jolani" as an alias. His family was reportedly displaced from the Golan Heights by Israeli occupation after the Six-Day War in 1967 and his father went from owning an olive grove in rural Syria to working as an oil industry economist in Saudi Arabia.

The alias of "Abu Mohammad al-Jolani" helped Sharaa stress his familial ties to Syria and his connection to the Paleostinian cause when he traveled to Iraq after the 2003 U.S. invasion, joined al-Qaeda, and became the leader of a terrorist cell. He was captured by U.S. forces in 2005, and by his own account spent much of his captivity rededicating himself to overthrowing Syrian dictator Bashir Pencilneck al-Assad
One of the last of the old-fashioned hereditary iron-fisted fascist dictators...
This focus on Assad led Sharaa to grow more estranged from al-Qaeda’s agenda. He founded a branch of al-Qaeda called the Nusra Front in Syria, but later renamed it Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, formerly al-Nusra, before that it was called something else
...al-Qaeda's Syrian affiliate, from which sprang the Islamic State...
(HTS) and broke with his old terrorist masters.

When he finally achieved his goal of knocking Assad off his throne in December 2024, Sharaa dropped the Jolani alias for good, traded his combat fatigues for a three-piece suit, and reinvented himself as a statesman. The U.S. government sportingly decided to drop the $10 million bounty it had placed on the head of Abu Mohammad al-Jolani and embraced the interim president named Ahmed al-Sharaa.

The al-Qaeda official who dispatched Jolani/Sharaa to Syria to create the Nusra Front was named Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri, but he was better known by a pseudonym of his own: Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, a name hinting at his family’s history in Iraq. Under that name, he founded the Islamic State and became the most wanted man in the world.

Baghdadi was a fierce Islamist from an early age who later embraced the harsh fundamentalist doctrine of Salafism. Like Sharaa, he organized terrorist attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq and he became the spiritual leader of the cell he co-founded. He was captured in the hard-fought city of Falluja and incarcerated at Camp Bucca, the same prison that held Sharaa.

Baghdadi was a fairly cooperative model prisoner, which led U.S. intelligence to underestimate the threat he posed. His terrorist cell was folded into al-Qaeda’s organization into Iraq, known as AQI, and when AQI’s leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was liquidated by a U.S. Arclight airstrike
...KABOOM!...
in 2006, the first version of the Islamic State was born.

ISIS was originally led by a different Baghdadi but, after he was killed by a U.S. raid in 2010, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took over and transformed the group into the rapacious, savage, hyper-Islamic "caliphate" that conquered a hefty amount of territory in Iraq and Syria to build its "caliphate." One of the useful features of a nom de guerre is that it helps terrorist leaders to sculpt their biographies, playing up details such as Baghdadi’s alleged descent from Islam’s Prophet Mohammad — a necessary qualification to lead the Islamic "caliphate" he wanted to create.

Baghdadi became a reclusive, security-obsessed leader during the salad days of the Islamic State and, when he died an ignominious death at the hands of U.S. special forces operatives on the orders of President Donald Trump
...Never got invited to a P.Diddy party...
in 2019, his fading caliphate collapsed. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi brought a certain mystique to his leadership of the world’s worst terror state, but nobody remembers Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri.

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Baghdadi’s old boss from al-Qaeda in Iraq, used a pseudonym as well — his real name was Ahmad Fadil Nazal al-Khalayeh. He was born and raised in Jordan, racking up dozens of criminal charges for assault, robbery, and drug abuse while living the life of a petty thug. He reinvented himself as a jihadi in 1989, at a training camp in Afghanistan established by the late Osama bin Laden
...... who is now among the dear departed, though not among the dearest......
The name "Zarqawi" alludes to Zarqa, the impoverished mining town in Jordan where the future terrorist criminal mastermind grew up. More than most of his peers, he felt the need to create a new identity for himself and build a jihadist mythology, becoming an elusive figure of legend instead of a violent mostly peaceful punk from a ramshackle town.

Zarqawi initially tried to wage jihad against the government of his native Jordan, but that did not go terribly well, so he became a rootless fire-breathing ideologue and an early pioneer of using the Internet to spread his teachings. This put him on al-Qaeda’s leadership radar, although bin Laden supposedly found him boorish and unreliable.

After a few years of working with the Afghan Taliban
...Arabic for students...
against U.S. forces, and a somewhat awkward interlude where he unilaterally declared himself to be in charge of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Zarqawi finally received bin Laden’s seal of approval in 2004.

The actual man behind the myth always seemed to be unpopular with other al-Qaeda leaders, but Zarqawi’s preaching brought in recruits, his camps were very effective at training them, and he was an aggressive terror operative. He was killed in a U.S. airstrike in Iraq in June 2006, and by the time of his death, he had arguably become too extreme for al-Qaeda. His carefully constructed identity remains one of the great enigmas of Islamic terrorism — a legend filled with countless stories that no one can absolutely confirm or deny.

Al-Qaeda leaders usually employ pseudonyms, although there are prominent exceptions, like the group’s infamous founder Osama bin Laden. The current de facto leader of the organization is believed to be an Egyptian named Mohammed Salah al-Din al-Halim Zaidan, better known by his alias Saif al-Adel
...holed up in Iran from 2002 until 2010, when he made bail and moved back to the Pak-Afghan border...
, and possibly the last surviving al-Qaeda leader from the pre-9/11 era. He took over from Ayman al-Zawahiri
...Formerly second in command of al-Qaeda, now the head cheese, occasionally described as the real brains of the outfit. Formerly the Mister Big of Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Bumped off Abdullah Azzam with a car boom in the course of one of their little disputes. Is thought to have composed bin Laden's fatwa entitled World Islamic Front Against Jews and Crusaders. Currently residing in the North Wazoo area assuming he's not dead like Mullah Omar. He lost major face when he ordered the nascent Islamic State to cease and desist and merge with the orthodox al-Qaeda spring, al-Nusra...>
, an Egyptian doctor who used his real name and was killed by a U.S. dronezap in July 2022.

Terrorists like to use pseudonyms for one more, very simple reason: the Middle East is a confusing place, most of its countries are not noted for having well-organized high-tech bureaucracies, and using an invented name can be surprisingly effective at confusing law enforcement.

The background of Saif al-Adel is surprisingly murky, given that he rose to the rank of lieutenant colonel in the Egyptian special forces. Separating the true details of his biography from the stories told about him is challenging, and he has been shrewd about playing up that ambiguity. It is likely that the next generation of bully boyz will learn many techniques from their forerunners about creating artificial identities in the Information Age.
Related:
Nom de guerre 11/16/2025 A war between Israel and Turkey?
Nom de guerre 11/03/2025 How al-Qaida-linked jihadist group JNIM is bringing Mali to its knees
Nom de guerre 11/02/2025 Trump to host Sharaa in 1st-ever visit by a Syrian president to White House — officials

Link


Syria-Lebanon-Iran
Syria moves to reinstate defected officers, diplomats
2025-11-10
[Rudaw] Syria on Thursday announced it will begin reinstating thousands of volunteer officers who had defected during the era of longtime Syrian dictator Bashir Pencilneck al-Assad
Lord of the Baath...
, marking what officials say is a key step in rebuilding the country’s armed forces. The move comes only days after Damascus’s foreign ministry reinstated over 20 defected diplomats.

The state-run Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) quoted Brigadier General Badr al-Din Qassas, Director of Recruitment and Mobilization at the Ministry of Defense, as describing the decision to reinstate volunteer Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) "who defected from the army during the era of the former regime" as "a normal organizational procedure within the military institution, which began its reconstruction from scratch" following the fall of Assad.

Qassas explained that "immediately after the liberation, we began receiving defected officers and took the necessary steps to start the process of reintegrating volunteer NCOs who had previously defected back into the defense ministry."

He further estimated the defected NCOs at "over three thousand," while "more than two thousand defected officers have already been reinstated within the Syrian Arab Army formations."

The Syrian conflict, which erupted in 2011, was marked by a significant wave of high-ranking defections that dealt successive political, military and symbolic blows to Assad’s rule.

One of the most prominent political defections occurred in early August 2012, when then-prime minister Riyad Hijab defected after just two months in office, declaring that he could no longer serve a regime he described as one of "killing and terror."

The diplomatic corps also saw substantial erosion during the summer of 2012, with several senior envoys abandoning their posts. Among them were Nawaf al-Fares, Syria’s ambassador to Iraq, and Khaled al-Ayoubi, the chargé d’affaires in London.

A series of military defections coincided, including that of Colonel Riad al-Asaad, who went on to help lead the The Sick Man of Europe Turkey
...the occupiers of Greek Asia Minor...
-backed Free Syrian Army
... the more palatable version of the Syrian insurgency, heavily influenced by the Moslem Brüderbund...
(FSA) in its fight against Assad’s forces.

A pivotal moment came in July 2012 with the defection of Brigadier General Manaf Tlass, a senior officer in the Elite Republican Guard and a childhood friend of Assad. Later that year, in December, Major General Abdulaziz al-Shalal, head of the Syrian Military Police, announced his defection, denouncing the army’s transformation "into gangs of killing and destruction."

The senior defense official affirmed that "all NCOs will return to service with the ranks they held at the time of their defection from the former regime, under clearly defined standards for promotion."

Qassas confirmed that the NCOs are a "fundamental element in developing the army, due to the cumulative experience they possess, which contributes to building a professional army capable of defending Syria and safeguarding its security."

For his part, Assem Ghalyoun, Director of Media and Communication at the defense ministry, announced that the ministry "will soon begin accepting applications for the reinstatement of volunteer NCOs who defected during the era of the former regime."

Importantly, the push to reinstate NOCs comes only days after Syria’s Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani on Monday officially reinstated 21 diplomats who had defected from the Assad regime, according to SANA.

Shaibani praised the returnees for their "efforts in exposing the crimes of the defunct regime," stressing that the state seeks to build a nation where all citizens feel "security and belonging."

Director of the Diplomatic Institute at the Syrian foreign ministry, Yasser al-Jundi, remarked Monday that "the returning diplomats possess vast experience" and that "the ministry will benefit from their accumulated expertise."
Link


Israel-Palestine-Jordan
Mossad said to have refused to carry out ground op to kill Hamas leaders in Qatar
2025-09-13
[IsraelTimes] Reports emerge of widespread dissent among top security leaders ahead of op, which WSJ says involved air-launched ballistic missiles fired at Doha from over the Red Sea

The Mossad spy agency refused to carry out a planned ground operation to kill Hamas’s leaders in Doha, fearing that the operation would doom hostage-ceasefire talks and damage the agency’s ties with Qatar, a key Mideast mediator, the Washington Post reported Friday.
So that may or may not be true, and either way, the leak may or may not be malicious at a number of points.
Instead, Israel was forced to carry out Arclight airstrike
...KABOOM!...
s, which Israel’s security establishment now increasingly believes failed to kill any of Hamas
..a regional Iranian catspaw,...
’s top brass who were gathered at the site of Tuesday’s strike in Doha.

That assessment was strengthened Friday, when Hamas announced that its Qatar
...an emirate on the east coast of the Arabian Peninsula. It sits on some really productive gas and oil deposits, which produces the highest per capita income in the world. They piss it all away on religion, financing the Moslem Brotherhood and several al-Qaeda affiliates. Home of nutbag holy manYusuf al-Qaradawi...
-based leader Khalil al-Hayya performed funeral rites for his "martyred" son Hammam, effectively negating initial rumors that the terror group’s chief was killed in the attack.

Amid the fallout from the apparent failed strike, reports began to emerge of significant opposition to the plan, both in the way it was carried out and the timing amid ongoing hostage talks.

A bigwig with knowledge of talks on the hostage release-ceasefire deal told Channel 12 that most of the defense establishment recommended that the attack be put off.

"The position was clear — there is a deal for the return of the hostages on the table, and the negotiations should be exhausted. Everyone understood the consequences for the hostages and that an operation like this at the current time could harm this possibility," the official said.

Channel 12 reported that the plan was opposed by IDF chief of staff Eyal Zamir, Mosssd
...sees all, knows all, gets 'em all in the end...
chief David Barnea and National Security Adviser Tzachi Hanegbi.

It said that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Defense Minister Israel Katz, acting Shin Bet chief known as "Mem," and Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer were in favor of the attack.

Nitzan Alon, who heads the hostage negotiations, was reportedly not invited to the discussion on the operation, with brass hats assuming he would object to any action that could endanger the hostages.

The Mossad spy agency even declined to carry out a ground operation it had itself drawn up in recent weeks to assassinate the Hamas leaders, forcing the adoption of an air strike, two Israelis familiar with the matter told The Washington Post on Friday.

Mossad chief Barnea opposed killing the leaders in Qatar due to the spy agency’s relationship with Doha as well as its role as a mediator in talks with Hamas, the sources said.

Israel’s announcement of the strike said it had been carried out by the Air Force, in conjunction with the Shin Bet security service. The operation was even monitored from a Shin Bet command center.

The Shin Bet is normally tasked with domestic security, while the Mossad handles operations abroad.

The Washington Post report noted that it was the Mossad that killed Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh
...became Prime Minister of Gaza after the legislative elections of 2006 which Hamas won. President Mahmoud Abbas dismissed Haniyeh from office on 14 June 2007 at the height of the Fatah-Hamas festivities, but Haniyeh did not acknowledge the decree and continued as the PM of Gazoo while Abbas maintained a separate PM in the West Bank. Zapped during the 2023-24 war, to eveyone's satisfaction...
in Tehran last year. The agency was also heavily involved in Israel’s surprise attack on Iran
...a theocratic Shiite state divided among the Medes, the Persians, and the (Arab) Elamites. Formerly a fairly civilized nation ruled by a Shah, it became a victim of Islamic revolution in 1979. The nation is today noted for spontaneously taking over other countries' embassies, maintaining whorehouses run by clergymen, involvement in international drug trafficking, and financing sock puppet militias to extend the regime's influence. The word Iran is a cognate form of Aryan. The abbreviation IRGC is the same idea as Stürmabteilung (or SA). The term Supreme Guide is a the modern version form of either Duce or Führer or maybe both. They hate Jews Zionists Jews. Their economy is based on the production of oil and vitriol...
earlier this year and famously spearheaded the exploding pager operation on thousands of Hezbollah operatives.

"This time, Mossad was unwilling to do it on the ground," the Washington Post quoted one of the Israelis as saying, adding that the agency viewed Qatar as an important intermediary in talks with Hamas.

Another Israeli familiar with the dissent from the Mossad questioned Netanyahu’s timing. "We can get them in one, two, or four years from now, and the Mossad knows how to do it," he said, referring to the possibility of covertly assassinating Hamas leaders anywhere in the world. "Why do it now?"
Because in a war timing matters. Later the war may already be lost, or the opportunity to do the thing. Even I know that.
The Post said that the Mossad did not respond to a request for comment. The prime minister’s office, which oversees the Mossad, did not respond to requests for comment.

A separate report Friday by the Wall Street Journal revealed new operational details about the strike, which relied on air-launched ballistic missiles fired from over the Red Sea.

The newspaper, which cited interviews with senior US officials briefed on the operation, said the strike was designed to avoid having Israeli fighter jets enter Saudi airspace and to be carried out swiftly so the Trump administration would have less time to object.
It also gives America more room to maneuver because they can honestly say to their other allies that they were not involved.
According to the report, eight F-15s and four F-35s took part in the operation, flying south from Israel over the Red Sea before launching ballistic missiles toward Qatar from the opposite side of the Arabian Peninsula.

Israel reportedly didn’t tip off the US until minutes before the strike was launched or give precise details on the target, which the US was able to determine was the Qatari capital using space-based sensors that detected the missiles’ heat signatures. By the time the US alerted Qatar, the missiles had struck 10 minutes earlier.

“Notice was given so close to actual launching of missiles that there was no way to reverse or halt the order,” a senior American defense official was quoted as saying, while describing the operation as “absolutely unimaginable.”
The IDF does the impossible? That’s Start-Up Nation stuff, from the country that beat five professional Arab armies with a homegrown paramilitary militia in 1948.
NONE OF THE TOP LEADERS KILLED
As the Israeli security establishment increasingly believes that none of Hamas’s leadership was killed in the strike, it has begun checking whether the terror group’s top brass was even in the building that was targeted, Channel 12 reported Friday evening.
Sure, but now they get to worry that they’ll be next, just like Hezbollah and Iran’s Mullahs, which tends to disturb the sleep. I can live with that for a bit.
The other possibility still being examined is that the Hamas leaders were in a different part of the building than the section that was hit directly, the report said.

The report noted that Israel, fearing an even greater backlash from Qatar if there had been significant local casualties, had likely used very precise munitions that targeted specific rooms in the building and not ones with larger warheads that could have ensured the destruction of all in the building, as Israel had deployed in Gaza and Lebanon.

The security establishment believes that one or two Hamas leaders may have been injured — potentially al-Hayya among them. This could explain Hamas’s decision not to release a photo of him in its statement announcing that he is still alive.
Pray for sepsis, as Dr, Steve used to say.
Another scenario being checked is whether the Hamas leaders managed to get a heads-up at the last minute, which enabled them to escape ahead of time, though that would mean that top officials like Hayya didn’t alert his slain son.
Something for the beloved sons to ponder, too.
A Hamas source told the Al Araby TV network on Friday that the terror group did not receive any prior warning from an external source over the attack, and that the survival of the Hamas leadership was the result of security arrangements by the terror group and Qatar.

A defense source cited by Channel 12 tried to paint a more positive picture, charging that the strike “did its job” even though it apparently failed to kill any of the intended targets.

“Inside Hamas, voices are being heard that Israel is an unexpected enemy, and this scares them. When they see what happened in Qatar, they fear what may happen in Gaza,” the source said.

Hammam and the other acknowledged victims were buried Thursday.

Hamas said al-Hayya was able to hold a ceremony for his son thanks to “special security arrangements” in Qatar. It was not immediately clear if al-Hayya took part in the main ceremony or a separate private one.

Hamas did not publish a corroborating photo of al-Hayya’s presence and none of the top leaders believed to have been present at the site of the attack have been spotted publicly since the strike, as Hamas and Qatar have tried to maintain an information vacuum since.

Al-Hayya has been heading Hamas’s hostage negotiating team.

The strike on Qatari soil sparked a fierce diplomatic backlash against Israel, with even US President Donald Trump said upset with Netanyahu.
But President Trump has already gleefully mislead for effect, so that also may or may not be true. His security team might also be looking to see where malicious leaks are coming from, which should disturb sleep in certain domestic quarters as well…
Politico reported Thursday that Trump’s administration is growing frustrated with the prime minister, after Israel attempted to eliminate Hamas leaders in Qatar while they were said to be gathered to discuss the US-proposed framework for a hostage release deal earlier in the week.
Does Politico know, or are they making stuff up again — or again being told made-up stuff? They do have a history…
Trump himself said Tuesday that he was “very unhappy about every aspect [of the strike]. We’ve got to get the hostages back, but I’m very unhappy about the way that went down.”
An interesting statement. What, exactly, is he unhappy about?
Hamas identified the dead as Jihad Labad, head of the office of top Hamas official Khalil al-Hayya; al-Hayya’s son; and three others described as “associates” — either advisers or bodyguards: Abdallah Abd al-Wahid, Muamen Hassouna and Ahmad Abd al-Malek. In addition, a Qatari security officer, Lance Corporal Badr Saad Mohammed al-Humaidi al-Dosari, was killed.

Doha will host an emergency Arab-Islamic summit next Sunday and Monday to discuss the Israeli attack, Qatar’s state news agency reported earlier on Thursday.
Link


Arabia
Hamas says Israeli strike on Doha was ‘assassination of the entire negotiation process’
2025-09-12
[IsraelTimes] Funeral for six killed in airstrike held in Qatar, with a number of Hamas officials spotted alongside Qatari emir, while others conspicuously absent from proceedings

Hamas
..not a terrorist organization, even though it kidnaps people, holds hostages, and tries to negotiate by executing them,...
vowed Thursday that the Israeli attack targeting its leaders in Doha will not alter the Paleostinian group’s terms on ending the war in Gazoo, as those killed in the Arclight airstrike
...KABOOM!...
were buried with senior Qatar
...an emirate on the east coast of the Arabian Peninsula. It sits on some really productive gas and oil deposits, which produces the highest per capita income in the world. They piss it all away on religion, financing the Moslem Brotherhood and several al-Qaeda affiliates. Home of nutbag holy manYusuf al-Qaradawi...
i and Hamas officials in attendance.

Hamas official Fawzi Barhoum, in a televised speech, said that the attack targeted its negotiation delegation while it was discussing US President Trump’s latest ceasefire proposal.

"This crime was... an liquidation of the entire negotiation process," Barhoum said. "We affirm that the US administration is a full accomplice in this crime."

In an English-language statement issued immediately after the strike, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu averred that it was "a wholly independent Israeli operation. Israel initiated it, Israel conducted it, and Israel takes full responsibility." Trump himself has been publicly critical of the strike.

No senior Hamas members have been confirmed killed in the attack.

Hamas identified the dead as Jihad Labad, head of the office of top Hamas official Khalil al-Hayya; Himam al-Hayya, Khalil al-Hayya’s son; and three others described as "associates" — either advisers or bodyguards: Abdallah Abd al-Wahid, Muamen Hassouna and Ahmad Abd al-Malek. In addition, a Qatari security officer, Lance Corporal Badr Saad Mohammed al-Humaidi al-Dosari, was killed.

One coffin bearing a Qatari flag and five others bearing Paleostinian flags were brought into the mosque, live footage from Qatar television showed.

While Hamas has asserted that Khalil al-Hayya and its other leaders were not killed in the strike, he and other brass hats in the terror group were not spotted at the Doha funeral, despite his son being among those killed. Israel is said to be pessimistic about the results of the strike.

Barhoum said Thursday in the pre-recorded speech that Israel struck the home of Khalil al-Hayya. His wife, as well as the wife of his son Himam al-Hayya — who was killed — were maimed in the strike. Other family members were also maimed, Barhoum said.

The Hamas official said that the failed attempt
...Curses! Foiled again!...
to assassinate Hamas’s leadership would not change the movement’s positions in the ceasefire negotiations: ending the aggression, a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, a "genuine" prisoner and hostage exchange and Gaza’s reconstruction.

Barhoum added that the strike was an attempt by Israel to create a false image of victory, after it failed to achieve gains during 23 months of war.

Qatar’s emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, attended the funeral on Thursday in Doha.

The funeral was for all six people killed in the strike, but the emir was seen comforting the family of the Qatari security officer killed, with a diplomatic source indicating that the Qatari victim was the primary reason for Tamim’s presence.

The interior ministry said the dead would be buried in the Mesaimeer Cemetery after the funeral at Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdul Wahhab Mosque. Authorities beefed up security, with checkpoints on access roads to the mosque.

Hamas official Osama Hamdan, who is usually based in Leb
...Formerly inhabited by hardy Phoenecian traders, its official language is now Arabic, with the usual unpleasant side effects....
, and another senior member of the terror group, Izzat al-Rishq, who has been residing in Qatar in recent years, were also spotted at the funeral. The two appeared in photos published by Hamas.

Other big shots — including top official Khaled Mashaal and Hamas West Bank leader Zaher Jabarin — were not seen in footage shared from the funeral.

Meanwhile,
...back at the pond, Gloria again dodged the questing tip of the giant frog's tongue and ran for her life...
the United Arab Emirates on Thursday condemned Netanyahu’s "hostile remarks" against Qatar, adding that any attack on a Gulf state is an attack on the Gulf’s "joined security system," UAE official Afra Al Hameli said.

On Wednesday, Netanyahu warned Qatar to either expel Hamas officials or "bring them to justice, because if you don’t, we will."

A diplomatic adviser to UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan said that his tour of Gulf countries is aimed at coordinating positions after the Israeli strike.

"The President’s Gulf tour reflects a deep conviction in strengthening coordination and cooperation, and in reinforcing the concept of a common destiny," Anwar Gargash wrote in a post on X.

Doha will host an emergency Arab-Islamic summit next Sunday and Monday to discuss the Israeli attack, Qatar’s state news agency reported earlier on Thursday.
Link


Iraq
Dust storm hospitalizes over 3,700 in Iraq
2025-04-16
An annual problem.
[Rudaw] Over 3,700 people were admitted to hospitals across Iraq due to breathing difficulties caused by dust storms, the health ministry said on Tuesday, after a severe dust storm engulfed the country’s center and south.

"The number of suffocation cases recorded due to the dust storm yesterday and to date has reached 3,747 admissions to emergency rooms in Baghdad and the provinces," ministry spokesperson Said al-Badr told state media.

The southern oil-rich province of Basra topped the chart of hospitalizations with over 1,000, followed by Muthanna and Maysan respectively, according to Badr.

“Most of the cases have fully recovered and left after receiving the necessary treatment,” and ministry officials “have not recorded any deaths, and there are no cases admitted to intensive care or elsewhere,” he added.

Officials have urged residents to take precautions to avoid complications from dust inhalation.

Hospitals across the country are also equipped with an ample supply of oxygen and medical supplies, Badr assured.

Dust storms are common in Iraq but have become more frequent and intense due to prolonged drought, desertification, and rising temperatures. According to Iraq’s environment ministry, the country has been experiencing 272 dust days per year over the past two decades. That number is projected to reach 300 by 2050.

Iraq is among the nations most vulnerable to climate change. Poor water management and dam construction in upstream countries have drastically reduced the flow of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. The United Nations has called for urgent measures to address environmental degradation and mitigate the worsening climate crisis in Iraq.
Related:
Dust storm 03/31/2025 'Alarming' report on impact of marijuana in Oklahoma
Dust storm 03/17/2025 35 dead from monster storm system charging across US spawning violent tornadoes, dust storm, blizzard
Dust storm 07/30/2024 A detailed analysis of what happened July 22-27 in Mali

Link


India-Pakistan
The rise of Hafiz Naeem ur Rehman within JI ranks
2024-04-05
[GEO.TV] Jamaat-e-Islami
...The Islamic Society, founded in 1941 in Lahore by Maulana Sayyid Abul Ala Maududi, aka The Great Apostosizer. The Jamaat opposed the independence of Bangladesh but has operated an independent branch there since 1975. It maintains close ties with international Mohammedan groups such as the Moslem Brotherhood. the Taliban, and al-Qaeda. The Jamaat's objectives are the establishment of a pure Islamic state, governed by Sharia law. It is distinguished by its xenophobia, and its opposition to Westernization, capitalism, socialism, secularism, and liberalist social mores...
(JI), the oldest religio-political party in Pakistain, is set to elect its new emir (leader) in early April for the next five years. Among the three names suggested by the party’s shura (decision-making executive council), Hafiz Naeem ur Rehman, the current emir of the JI Bloody Karachi
...formerly the capital of Pakistain, now merely its most important port and financial center. It is among the largest cities in the world, with a population of 18 million, most of whom hate each other and many of whom are armed and dangerous...
chapter, holds prominence for a couple of reasons — he has rejuvenated the party in the country’s commercial hub and provided it with a "liberal, progressive and secular Islamic" outlook.

Unlike most Pak political parties, in which the top slots are reserved for the party founder or their family members and relatives, JI has a worker to leadership ladder in place. Hafiz is a beneficiary of the same system and is among the few top politicians who come from a middle-class background.

Big Picture explores his journey from being a student activist muppet to his current position of power, analysing the impact he has had on the party.

ROAD TO PARTY LEADERSHIP
Hafiz's political career began at 16 when he joined the Islami Jamaat-e-Talaba
...The Islamic Students' Organization: the student wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami, where young Moslems are trained into the arts of street fighting...
(IJT), the student wing of JI, in 1988. Already drawn to the religious political ideology espoused by JI founder Syed Abul Ala Maududi, he quickly rose through the ranks. This was the time when ethnic violence and fascism
...a political system developed in Italy, symbolized by the Roman fasces -- thin reeds, each flimsy in itself but unbreakable when bound into a bundle. Its distinguishing philosophical feature is the Corporate State, which is the alliance of big business and labor with the government in service to the all-powerful State. The word is nowadays thrown around by all sorts of oddballs who have no idea what they're talking about...
were escalating in the port city and other urban centres of Sindh.

By the age of 20, he had been beaten up, arrested, and booked in numerous cases. His leadership qualities, honed through festivities with rival student groups, propelled him to become the "nazim
...small time big shot, the chief elected official of a local government in Pakistan, such as a district, tehsil, union council, or village council...
" (president) of his college and later, the head of IJT Karachi and Sindh. By 1998, he had reached the national level, becoming the Nazim-e-Ala of IJT Pakistain.

Hafiz's rise as IJT chief coincided with a crucial period for JI. The Afghan jihad against the Soviets — initially supported by Pakistain and the US — was winding down, and the "mujahideen" were being reframed as "terrorists." Yet, his speech at the organization’s 1998 annual convention in Islamabad continued to glorify the Afghan jihad and endorse the controversial al-Badr militia in Bangladesh, among other crucial matters.

From his perspective, the following two major things occurred in Pakistain when he was the IJT nazim-e-ala: Pakistain became a nuclear power, and General Pervez Perv Musharraf
...former dictator of Pakistain, who was less dictatorial and corrupt than any Pak civilian government to date. They'll hang him if they can catch him...
toppled Nawaz Sharif
...served two three non-consecutive terms as prime minister, heads the Pakistain Moslem League (Nawaz). Noted for his spectacular corruption, the 1998 Pak nuclear test, border war with India, and for being tossed by General Musharraf, then by the courts...
’s government. According to him the IJT had initiated an 11-point education campaign for a unanimous curriculum, language of instruction, and against fee hikes among other issues, inviting other student groups to join forces with them, but Musharraf’s emergency destroyed the momentum.

After completing his tenure as IJT chief in 2000, Hafiz meticulously climbed the JI hierarchy, starting from the grassroots level again. His dedication earned him the position of JI Karachi's deputy general secretary in 2005. He contested his first election in 2001 and won the seat of "naib nazim" in a Nazimabad union council. In the 2002 general election, he lost a provincial assembly seat to the Muttahida Qaumi Movement
...English: United National Movement, generally known as MQM, is the 3rd largest political party and the largest secular political party in Pakistain with particular strength in Sindh. From 1992 to 1999, the MQM was the target of the Pak Army's Operation Cleanup leaving thousands of urdu speaking civilians dead...
(MQM) — a dominant party in Karachi at that time.

ALTAF'S FALL, HAFIZ'S RISE
Hafiz's leadership since 2013 as JI Karachi's emir has been marked by a distinct strategy. Although he had been vocal on the issues of the city since assuming the charge, he arguably gained the pace later after the fall of MQM supremo the increasingly Sydney Greenstreet-ish Altaf Hussain

... The head of MQM in Pakistain, who has lived in safety and comfort in London and hasn't laid eyes on his purported homeland since about the time Caesar made corporal. Judging from the size of him, he may be a Hutt...
He struck when MQM's grip on the city's politics was loosening due to the disintegration of the party into many factions and seized the opportunity smartly.

Devoid of any central figure and direction following Altaf’s explosive August 2016 speech, Muttahida failed to keep its supporters and workers within its ranks, allowing rivals to fill the political vacuum.

Tapping the potential, JI started forcefully highlighting the issues faced by Karahciites on a day-to-day basis and raised its voice for their redressal, which helped it create space for itself in the port city.

In 2020, the city chapter of the party launched a robust campaign, the "Huqooq-e-Karachi Tehrik" (Rights of Karachi Movement), highlighting the metropolis’ grievances — water shortages, power outages, and economic disparity. Hafiz, with his carefully crafted persona and social media savvy team, emerged as the face of this campaign.

According to Hafiz, Karachi is in a mess. "Decades of neglect by the Pakistain Peoples Party (PPP) and MQM have left the city in ruins. We, at JI, saw this vacuum and spoke out. We raised our voices on issues like K-Electric, Nadra, indigenous land encroachment by a powerful real estate tycoon, and corruption, unlike the silent others — exposing their incompetence," he told Geo.tv.

"They've been playing politics as usual, while JI filled the gap. We focused on public concerns, especially youth and women, and strengthened communication with our audiences. This strategy paid off. Our vote bank has steadily grown.

According to political analyst and academic Dr Tauseef Ahmed Khan, Hafiz brought changes to the JI’s old doctrine.

"He, along with other JI leaders, initiated a campaign for national identity cards for citizens irrespective of their religion, sect, or ethnicity. He raised his voice over the power tariff hike, and campaigned over water theft and dilapidated road infrastructure in the city," Dr Khan mentioned.

"He gave a secular perspective to JI by going to churches and mandirs during the Covid-19 pandemic to supervise disinfectant spraying campaigns. Hafiz petitioned in the courts against the delay in local bodies election and sought amendments in the local government governance system."

Dr Khan added that for the first time in the history of JI, women with uncovered faces also campaigned for the party, and not just them but also actresses, and the party used music significantly.

CASHING IN ON SOCIAL MEDIA
JI Karachi — unlike other chapters of the party — has been very innovative in its use of media as compared to others and is considered by many as effective as that of PTI.

In the previous local bodies polls, they coined creative election slogans such as the famous ’Hal Sirf Jamaat-e-Islami’, developed reels from Bollywood songs, and appeared on popular YouTube channels to connect with younger voters.

Journalist and researcher Zia ur Rehman has credited the party’s media strategy for Hafiz’s rise.

"He has gotten significant media coverage, even more than JI emir Siraj ul Haq, because Karachi is the media hub in the country. Hafiz’s politics has revolved around local issues which affect every individual. This is how his personality evolved," Rehman mentioned.

Not only this, taking a leaf out of PTI’s playbook, they have several unofficial social media pages — like Karachi Stories — which are actively engaged in promoting Hafiz.

In an interview during a morning show, Hafiz said, "Our strength lies in in-house expertise. We conduct public opinion polls (both general and qualitative) to guide our strategies. Social media campaigns are crafted entirely by our team. We have a dedicated team of volunteers, some paid, but most driven by ideology. This translates to increased productivity."

An analysis of the party's social media handles shows that its Karachi chapter has established its supremacy having 77,000 followers on X account — the highest number of followers compared to other regions. Not only this, other divisions of the party, like JI Punjab, where the party is headquartered, have only 32,300 followers. Similarly, JI KP has 13,100 followers while JI Women has 44,600 followers.

However,
ars longa, vita brevis...
the party's main X handle (@JIPOfficial) has 280,600 followers.

Moreover, Hafiz's personal X account (@NaeemRehmanEngr) is among the top five most followed leaders of JI with 201,900 followers.

JI chief Sirajul Haq
...current head of the Pak Jamaat-e-Islami. Siraj was born in 1962 and entered politics shortly after that...
is on top with 1.3 million followers while Mushtaq Ahmed Khan has 207,500 followers, Liaqat Baloch 156,200, Dr Samia Raheel Qazi 115,500, Shamsuddin Amjad 75,100, Inayatullah Khan 62,400, Dr Meraj Siddiqui 43,200, Qaisar Sharif 37,300, Dr Farid Ahmed Piracha 25,200 and Mrs Aliya Mansoor 21,200 followers.

CONTRADICTIONS AND PRAGMATISM
However,
ars longa, vita brevis...
Hafiz's pronouncements on certain issues raise eyebrows. While vehemently criticising MQM for playing the "Muhajir card," a form of ethnic politics, he — during the Grand Democratic Alliance's protest sit-in against the February 8 election rigging at Jamoshoro interchange — praised Ayaz Latif Palijo, leader of the Sindhi nationalist party, Qaumi Awami Tehrik (QAT), as the "Baghawat ka Shair (lion of the rebellion)".

This inconsistency exposes a pragmatic side to Hafiz's politics — perhaps cooperation trumps ideology when faced with a common political opponent. However,
ars longa, vita brevis...
Hafiz reacted to this by saying that he could have said it "in Josh-e-Khitabat" (in the heat of rhetoric), but referred to the same speech in which he said that Sindhis and Muhajirs would no longer be pitted against each other.

Sharing a similar incident from the past, Dr Khan mentioned that in the 70s when PPP and the National Awami Party (NAP) started taking industries into government hold, the JI opposed the move terming it un-Islamic.

He added, however, when in the 90s the same industries were being privatised courtesy of the free-market capitalism and neoliberalism policies, the JI opposed it, causing a shift in their strategy.

He noted that Hafiz had campaigned vehemently to shape public opinion against K-Electric for failing to provide adequate power supply to Karachi residents.

He said there was another change in the strategy as well. The party would celebrate Youm-e-Hijab each year on Women’s Day, but this time they celebrated Women’s Day instead.

Similarly, Hafiz's stance on the establishment role is intriguing. He advocates for a delicate balance between the public and the military, urging the military to stay within its constitutional boundaries. Yet, his criticism is far less pronounced compared to his fiery
...a single two-syllable word carrying connotations of both incoherence and viciousness. A fiery delivery implies an audience of rubes and yokels, preferably forming up into a mob...
attacks on other political parties.

This cautious approach suggests an awareness of the power dynamics in Pakistain's political landscape.

INTERNAL PARTY DYNAMICS
Hafiz's leadership style has impacted JI Karachi's internal structure. He has built a strong team around him, comprising researchers, social media specialists, lawyers, and volunteers, in contrast to the more hierarchical structure often associated with Islamist parties.

His emphasis on data-driven decision-making, further sets him apart from some traditional politicians.

According to him, "We conducted an extensive exercise analysing public demographics and socio-economic classes, revealing that despite our efforts, we struggle to effectively communicate our work. This perception persists from several years ago. Our movement is grounded in scientific principles, drawing insights from both quantitative and qualitative research."

However,
ars longa, vita brevis...
questions remain about the extent of ideological consensus within JI Karachi. Hafiz's focus on local issues and social welfare programmes may appeal to a broader segment of the population, but it could also alienate more hardline elements within the party. The long-term impact of Hafiz's leadership on JI's national ideology remains to be seen.

ASTUTE POLITICIAN?
When Hafiz relinquished his Sindh Assembly seat that he won in the 2024 election, some people called him an astute politician as with two seats, the party could not make a big difference in the provincial legislature and wanted to remain focused on the city council, where they enjoy a considerable mandate.

To this Hafiz said, "This isn't about where the Karachi case could be taken. It's a matter of principle and conscience. If I had won the seat, there might be a case to be made that I relinquished it to keep the local body seat. However,
ars longa, vita brevis...
the reality is that I lost by a few thousand votes. Their goal was to silence us on the seats we actually won. It was a political bribe, a lollipop offered by those who wanted to weaken JI's influence or hold it hostage."

Hafiz was not only widely covered by international media when he gave up the seat last month, he was also praised by political analysts for the move.

According to Dr Khan, this was a "positive" and "democratic" act.

Journalist Rehman notes that Hafiz announced the move after a thorough probe into the matter.

THE NATIONAL STAGE AND THE FUTURE OF JI
Hafiz's success in Karachi has inevitably fuelled speculation about his potential for the national leadership of JI. His charisma, communication skills, and ability to connect with younger demographics make him a potentially attractive candidate.

Rehman said Hafiz has the ability to engage with the audience as he is eloquent and assertive. He added that Naeem had contested the recent local bodies and the general election on his picture. Naeem’s campaign posters can be seen behind rickshaws, on street polls, and in other locations, which appear strategic from the marketing point of view to attract significant eyeballs.

"The Pak nation is religious, however, they don’t vote for religious political parties in the election because they prefer someone who speaks about solving their everyday problems. And understanding this issue Hafiz put his focus on local issues, while putting the religious issues behind."

POTENTIAL LEADERSHIP CHALLENGES
According to Rehman, although Hafiz would be a popular figure within and outside the party, he would face significant challenges in his ascent to the position of power. Not only would he need to improvise the JI national-level political strategy, which would get him some opposition within the party, but he would also need to come up with issues that resonate with the general public and not just Karachi.

He said JI may need an aggressive person like Hafiz to raise the issues assertively.

"There is an anomaly to this thesis that the public doesn’t vote on the basis of religious issues and that is Tehrik-e-Labbaik Pakistain (TLP), which capitalised on the blasphemy
...the act of insulting or showing contempt or lack of reverence to a deity, or sacred objects, or toward something considered sacred or inviolable. Some religions consider it to be a crime. In Pakistain you can commit blasphemy by looking cross-eyed at a Koran...
issues and garnered votes more than what the JI and Jamaat Ulema-e-Islam
...a Pak religious party. It is usually part of the govt, never part of the solution...
(Fazl) obtained from all over the country," Rehman said.

"PTI has dented the JI vote bank by getting the anti-MQM votes from Karachi and in comparison to PTI, JI has not resonated with the young voters much. This could be the personality issue. Most people, especially the youngsters, like Imran Khan
...aka The Great Khan, who is the lightweight's lightweight...
because of his personality. On the other hand, JI discourages personality politics, yet, it is needed in the country’s political landscape."

Dr Khan is also of the same opinion, and he referred to his article ’Jamaat-e-Islami Karachi Ka New Edition’ published in the Express News on 18 January 2023, as saying, "Although Naeem has provided traction to JI in Karachi, it is yet to be seen whether the party adopts a similar strategy on the national level".

JI Karachi has provided a liberal, progressive, and secular outlook to the Islamic party, which is different from the past, according to Dr Khan.

In conclusion, Hafiz Naeem ur Rehman is a complex and intriguing figure. He has revitalised JI Karachi and presented a more nuanced image of the party. His focus on local issues, innovative communication strategies, and emphasis on social welfare programmes have resonated with Karachi's electorate.

However,
ars longa, vita brevis...
questions about the depth of his ideological shift and his ability to translate his success to the national stage remain.

Overall, Hafiz's leadership represents a potential turning point for JI. Whether he can navigate the treacherous waters of Pak politics and steer JI towards a more moderate and inclusive future remains to be seen. His success, or failure, will be a significant indicator of the evolving political landscape in Pakistain.
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