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| Terror Networks | |
| The historical evolution of the Islamic State’s anti‑China propaganda | |
| 2026-10-24 | |
by Lucas Webber, Riccardo Valle, Colin Clarke, Daniele Garofalo
This article traces how the Islamic State has come to view China over the years. Over the past decade, within the Islamic State’s broader propaganda and operations ecosystem, Beijing has evolved from a peripheral grievance into a routinized enemy, with serious implications. It argues that this evolution unfolded in four phases: early, episodic references to Uyghur suffering prior to 2014 and, after 2014 and the caliphate’s proclamation, a gradual consolidation under Islamic State central media, which embedded Xinjiang and “East Turkestan” into the group’s global narrative; a period of experimentation with Chinese‑language content and symbolic threats, including Mandarin-language nasheeds and Uyghur‑focused videos; the emergence of Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) as the movement’s anti‑China vanguard; and finally, normalization of China alongside the usual arch-enemies of jihadis—America, Russia, and local regimes—and expansion of the anti-China campaign to Africa. ![]() The article concludes that China’s ascent to great‑power status and deepening involvement in fragile Muslim‑majority regions will sustain, and likely increase, its prominence in Islamic State discourse, posing a persistent, if uneven, security challenge for Beijing and its partners. Over the past decade, the Islamic State has moved China from the periphery of its worldview to a routinized enemy whose interests are legitimate targets for both propaganda and attack.1 This shift has not been linear, and it cannot be understood simply as a reaction to Beijing’s repression of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang. Rather, it emerges from the interplay of three major developments: the evolution of Islamic State central media after the proclamation of the caliphate in 2014; experimentation with Chinese‑language and Uyghur‑focused content; and, more recently, the rise of Islamic State Khorasan Province as the movement’s anti‑China vanguard.2 This article traces that trajectory in four phases primarily through the lens of Islamic State propaganda content and output. It begins by briefly situating the Islamic State’s hostility toward China in pre‑2014 jihadi discourse, then shows how the group’s central media after 2014 converted sporadic grievances into a recurring campaign theme. It then examines the Islamic State’s experimentation with Chinese‑language material and symbolic threats during the mid‑2010s, before turning to ISKP’s post‑2019 efforts to weaponize China’s regional posture and Taliban-China relations.3 The final section argues that by the mid‑2020s, violence and propaganda against Chinese targets had become normalized components of the Islamic State repertoire, lowering the threshold for future attacks on Chinese interests. The aim of this article is to accurately describe how the Islamic State views China in its media releases, how the views expressed through media content have changed over time, and why this matters for the terrorist threat landscape facing China. This includes a look ahead to regions such as sub-Saharan Africa where Beijing is likely to face increased resistance and outright hostility toward its expanding presence. This more aggressive pushback against Chinese interests is reflected in the proliferation of Islamic State media accounts, both official and unofficial, placing Beijing in their collective crosshairs. Phase 1: From Early Uyghur Grievances to Caliphate Rhetoric (2009-2014) The Islamic State’s hostility toward China predates the formal caliphate but was initially episodic and derivative of broader jihadi concerns. In the late 2000s, when the Islamic State was still the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) and part of al‑Qa`ida’s transnational network, references to Uyghur suffering only appeared sporadically in its messaging. Shortly after the 2009 Urumqi riots and ensuing crackdown, ISI released a lengthy martyrdom video4 that advocated for the protection of the Uyghurs, threatened Beijing, and folded Xinjiang into a global narrative of Muslim oppression at the hands of “crusaders,” “Jews,” and local “apostates.” This material foreshadowed later themes but did not yet place China at the center of Islamic State strategy. Geopolitical developments have impacted this shift to a more China-focused Islamic State propaganda campaign, with operational implications expected to follow. More at the link Related: Islamic State Khorasan Province: 2026-10-18 The Rise of Besira: Islamic State Supporters in Search of a Digital 'Safe Space' Islamic State Khorasan Province: 2026-07-30 Turkish ISKP Regional Leader's Arrest Sets Back Operations, Raises Questions About Organizational Structure Islamic State Khorasan Province: 2026-07-04 The New Virtual Front: The Digital Evolution of Terrorist Recruitment in Pakistan Related: ISKP: 2026-10-18 The Rise of Besira: Islamic State Supporters in Search of a Digital 'Safe Space' ISKP: 2026-08-19 ISKP strongholds in Afghanistan: 25 Taliban affiliates reportedly killed as IS maintains training camps ISKP: 2026-07-30 Turkish ISKP Regional Leader's Arrest Sets Back Operations, Raises Questions About Organizational Structure | |
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| China-Japan-Koreas | |
| Al‑Iman Media Center: New Pro–Islamic State outlet takes aim at China | |
| 2026-06-07 | |
by Lucas Webber
This messaging reflects a broader shift in Islamic State propaganda. Since around 2021, the group and its affiliated media networks have increasingly focused on China, elevating the issue of Uyghur Muslims in their publications and rhetoric. References to “East Turkestan” and depictions of Chinese authorities as central enemy figures in a global struggle have become more frequent, alongside explicit threats and calls for retaliation. The Al‑Iman article fits squarely within this trajectory, amplifying established themes while intensifying their language. Related: Uyghur Muslim 10/23/2025 The new Manchurian candidates Uyghur Muslim 07/08/2025 Trump bets big on new tariff deals as deadline to price spike 'doomsday' approaches Uyghur Muslim 07/06/2025 China 'is preparing to launch industrial-scale forced organ harvesting', as Beijing reveals plans to triple number of transplant facilities in province home to Uyghur Muslims | |
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| Iraq | |
| Nationality breakdown suspected ISIS-linked foreign fighters in Iraq | |
| 2026-02-17 | |
Text: Nationality breakdown + respective counts of 5,704 suspected #ISIS-linked foreign fighters (and affiliates) transferred from #Syria to #Iraq. Official table issued by the Iraqi Correctional Service, specifically from the Karkh Central Prison section.
2. Jordan – 19 3. Spain – 1 4. Australia – 13 5. Afghanistan – 25 6. Albania – 8 7. Bosnia and Herzegovina – 23 8. Algeria – 25 9. Sweden – 5 10. Iraq – 460 11. Germany – 27 12. Morocco – 187 13. Yemen – 9 14. Indonesia – 46 15. Uzbekistan – 36 16. Ukraine – 13 17. Iran – 23 18. Swaziland – 1 19. Ireland – 1 20. South America (unspecified) – 7 21. Pakistan – 17 22. Bahrain – 6 23. United Kingdom – 10 24. Belgium – 8 25. Bangladesh – 3 26. Poland – 2 27. Turkestan (Northwestern China) – 165 28. Turkey – 181 29. Trinidad and Tobago – 5 30. Netherlands – 9 31. Tunisia – 234 32. Maldives – 1 33. South Africa – 1 34. New Zealand – 1 35. Georgia – 3 36. Dagestan – 3 37. Denmark – 2 38. Russia – 130 39. Saudi Arabia – 68 40. Sudan – 8 41. Syria – 3,544 42. Sweden – 3 43. Switzerland – 3 44. Seychelles – 1 45. Chechnya – 7 46. Serbia – 2 47. Somalia – 2 48. China – 5 49. Tajikistan – 63 50. France – 4 51. Palestine – 5 52. Kyrgyzstan – 42 53. Kazakhstan – 4 54. Canada – 5 55. Guantanamo (?) – 1 56. Kurdistan – 3 57. Kosovo – 3 58. Lebanon – 13 59. Libya – 24 60. Maldives – 2 61. Malaysia – 5 62. Egypt – 116 63. North Macedonia – 1 64. Austria – 2 65. India – 1 66. United States – 2 Total count: 5,704 | |
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| Syria-Lebanon-Iran |
| Syria vows to curb threats to China as Uyghur militancy lingers: Official |
| 2026-01-23 |
| [Rudaw] Syria has pledged not to allow any entity to use its territory for activities that threaten Chinese security and interests, a senior Chinese official told Rudaw on Thursday, as concerns persist over the presence of Uyghur jihadists in the country. Guo Jiakun, Spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, said that "Syria has pledged not to allow any entity to use its territory to engage in activities that harm China’s security, illusory sovereignty, or interests." In early December 2024, a coalition of opposition forces led by the now-dissolved Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, formerly al-Nusra, before that it was called something else ...al-Qaeda's Syrian affiliate, from which sprang the Islamic State...(HTS), then headed by Ahmed al-Sharaa, launched a swift offensive that ousted longtime dictator Bashir Pencilneckal-Assad Before going into the family business Pencilneck was an eye doctor. If he'd stuck with it he'd have had a good practice by now... . Sharaa was appointed Syria’s interim president in late January. Since Assad’s fall, one of the most pressing issues concerning the international community - including China - has been the presence of thousands of battle-hardened imported muscle in Syria. For Beijing, the primary concern is the Uyghur turbans, whose status has become a point of friction with Syria’s new leadership, particularly after reports that many were integrated into the country’s emerging military structure. Most of the fighters are affiliated with the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), which Beijing refers to as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and designates as a terrorist organization. For good reason — they’re vicious. TIP turbans played a key role in the anti-Assad campaign, operating mainly in Idlib province in northern Syria and maintaining close ties with HTS.So is HTS, as we’ve seen recently. Following the collapse of Assad’s regime, the Syrian branch of TIP - along with other former opposition factions - was dissolved, and its members were absorbed into the newly formed defense ministry.A 2025 report by the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) estimated that between 3,500 and 4,000 Uyghur fighters were integrated into the newly established 84th Division of the Syrian army, a unit composed largely of imported muscle. Other estimates place the total Uyghur population in Syria, including families, at up to 15,000. Jiakun reiterated to Rudaw on Thursday that "the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is a terrorist organization recognized by China and listed by the United Nations ...an idea whose time has gone... Security Council." Importantly, the Chinese official’s remarks come days after a senior Syrian foreign ministry official denied reports claiming that Beijing had requested the handover of some 4,000 Uyghur fighters in Syria. Qutaibi Idlbi, Director of American Affairs at the Syrian foreign ministry, told Rudaw, "So far, there has been no official contact from the Chinese government regarding this matter. When we receive an official request, we will have an official stance on it." Related: Uyghur 12/28/2025 The first year of the 'new Syria': diplomatic successes, terror and old problems Uyghur 10/25/2025 Syria's new authorities are trying to deal with foreign jihadists Uyghur 10/23/2025 The new Manchurian candidates Related: East Turkestan Islamic Movement: 2025-12-23 UN Says 2,000 ISIS-K Fighters Active in Afghanistan, Using Children for Suicide Training East Turkestan Islamic Movement: 2025-03-12 'They Kill Everyone': How Central Asian Militants Carried Out Massacre in Syria East Turkestan Islamic Movement: 2024-10-29 CHR - New Intel: Sources Report Terrorists in Afghanistan Taking A Page From October 7 Playbook |
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| Afghanistan | |
| UN Says 2,000 ISIS-K Fighters Active in Afghanistan, Using Children for Suicide Training | |
| 2025-12-23 | |
| [KhaamaPress] The United Nations ...where theory meets practice and practice loses... reports that ISIS-K maintains around 2,000 fighters in Afghanistan, indoctrinating children under 14 and threatening regional security with ongoing terrorist operations. The United Nations Security Council (UNCS) has estimated that ISIS-K, the Khorasan branch of the Islamic State ...formerly ISIS or ISIL, depending on your preference. Before that they were al-Qaeda in Iraq, as shaped by Abu Musab Zarqawi. They're really very devout, committing every atrocity they can find in the Koran and inventing a few more. They fling Allaharound with every other sentence, but to hear western pols talk they're not reallyMoslems.... , maintains roughly 2,000 fighters in Afghanistan, according to a recent report. Leadership is dominated by Afghan Pashtuns, while many fighters come from Central Asian countries. The report says ISIS-K’s primary objectives include executing large-scale attacks globally and demonstrating its capacity to recruit fighters and attract financial support. Analysts warn that the group’s reach poses a continued threat to both Afghanistan and the wider region. According to the UN, Afghanistan hosts more than 20 regional and international terrorist organizations, including ISIS-K, Tehrik-e-Taliban ...Arabic for students... Pakistain, Al Qaeda, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, Jamaat Ansarullah, and the United Mujahideen Front of Pakistain. These groups have been linked to attacks both inside Afghanistan and in neighboring countries. Taliban intelligence officials have repeatedly asserted that ISIS-K has no permanent bases inside Afghanistan, claiming that recent attacks are planned from outside the country. However, the way to a man's heart remains through his stomach... UN findings and international media reporting contradict this, indicating that bully boy networks remain active domestically. UN monitors described Taliban claims that no terrorist organizations operate within Afghanistan as "unsubstantiated."
Of particular concern, ISIS-K has reportedly established schools in parts of northern Afghanistan and areas near the Pakistain border, where children under 14 are indoctrinated and trained for suicide missions. The UN described this use of minors as deeply alarming. Pakistain media reported that the country’s Inter-Services Intelligence ...the Pak military intelligenceagency that controls the military -- heads of ISI typically get promoted into the Chief of Army Staff position. It serves as a general command center for favored turban groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad, tries to influence the politix of neighboring countries, and carries out a (usually) low-level war against India in Kashmir... (ISI) recently arrested Sultan Aziz Azzam, a key ISIS-K spokesperson, near the Afghanistan-Pakistain border, highlighting regional counterterrorism efforts. Analysts note this demonstrates Islamabad’s ongoing focus on preventing cross-border attacks. The report also details that ISIS-K and allied groups, including Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistain, have carried out attacks against Pakistain from Afghanistan territory, intensifying tensions between Kabul and Islamabad. Experts say the UN report underscores Afghanistan’s continuing role as a safe haven for multiple murderous Moslem groups. Regional and international authorities are increasingly concerned that without concerted counterterrorism measures, these organizations could expand their influence and carry out further attacks across the region. | |
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| Caribbean-Latin America |
| An Inconvenient Bessarabian: The Ukrainian Trace in the Death of Mikhail Frunze |
| 2025-11-01 |
| Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. by Igor Ivanenko [REGNUM] On October 31, 1925, after undergoing surgery for a stomach ulcer—from "general blood poisoning," as the official conclusion stated— Mikhail Frunze, People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs of the USSR and member of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee, died. And for a hundred years now, theories have circulated that this Civil War hero and powerful player in the Bolshevik "game of thrones" did not die due to medical error. ![]() Many believe this was a carefully planned political assassination. If this conspiracy theory is true, it requires answering a question that has been around since ancient Rome: "Who benefits?" Nine months before his sudden death in the Kremlin hospital, Frunze occupied two key posts from which, during a political battle, the founder of the Red Army, Leon Trotsky, was ousted —the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs and Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council. This was a strong move by those “friends against” Lev Davidovich – the triumvirate consisting of Joseph Stalin, Grigory Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev. After the death of Frunze, who was considered an enemy of Trotsky, but a strong politician, the post of People's Commissar of War and head of the Revolutionary Military Council passed to Kliment Voroshilov, a man from Stalin's inner circle, his protégé since the defense of Tsaritsyn. "THE OPERATION WAS POINTLESS" Less than a year later, the May issue of Novy Mir published " The Tale of the Unquenched Moon," written in just a few months by renowned writer Boris Pilnyak. In the story, the main character, Army Commander Gavrilov, lets slip in a conversation with a friend that he used to suffer from a stomach ulcer, but is no longer bothered by it. The conversation reaches an influential "unhunched man," who insists (or rather, orders) that the military commander undergo a complex and potentially fatal operation. But after opening the patient's abdomen, the surgeons discovered: "On the shiny flesh of the stomach, in the place where the ulcer should have been… there was a scar—indicating that the ulcer had already healed—indicating that the operation had been pointless." But Army Commander Gavrilov dies. In the very first sentence of the work, Pilnyak states: " The plot of this story suggests that the death of M.V. Frunze served as the impetus and material for its writing." The writer then tries to persuade readers not to look for "authentic facts and living people" in the work, but the first sentence proved more important. From that moment on, the interpretation of "The Tale of the Unquenched Moon" became established: the stocky, fair-haired Gavrilov is Frunze (there's even a portrait resemblance!), the all-powerful "unhunched man" is Stalin, and the surgical operation was an assassination. A clear allusion to the triumvirate of Stalin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev was also seen. In one scene, two men " from that 'troika' that decided..." enter the office of the "unhunched man," who decides matters of life and death. However, immediately after the death of the commander and politician, another rumor circulated in Moscow: Trotsky’s people, or even Lev Davidovich himself, were behind Frunze’s death, thus dealing with a successful opponent. The official version remains natural death. But if one sets out to determine "who benefited," one key episode in Frunze's biography may lead to certain conclusions. DANGEROUS BOSS Mikhail Vasilyevich's service to the Soviet government was immense. Considered were his experience as an Old Bolshevik (with combat experience dating back to 1905) and, most importantly, his contribution to the Red Army's victory in the Civil War, during which he commanded the Eastern, Turkestan, and Southern Fronts. After the evacuation of Wrangel's army from Crimea, Frunze became commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as well as a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine and deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR. This “red general,” who considered himself a Bessarabian by origin, contributed greatly to overcoming “independent” sentiments in Ukraine and its integration with Soviet Russia. Moreover, we are talking not only about the liquidation of the “ataman regime” and repelling the Petliurite invasion in 1921, but also about the fight against the “confederalism” of a number of Ukrainian leaders, who were preventing the creation of the USSR as a federal state. Frunze's immediate superior was one of these "confederalists" - the head of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR, Christian Rakovsky, an extremely curious figure. Unlike the "militant" and later Red officer Frunze, he was a professional politician with access to the highest echelons of the international social democratic and communist movements. Rakovsky was a delegate to the Second International, one of the founders of the Third International (the Comintern), and "made revolution" in the Balkans (where he crossed paths with the infamous Alexander Parvus ), Western Europe, and later Russia, including its southern regions. At the height of the Civil War, in 1918–19, he served as one of the leaders of the Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government of Ukraine. By the mid-1920s, Rakovsky had long been firmly established as Trotsky’s man. He was also one of the main opponents of Joseph Stalin's "autonomization plan," according to which Ukraine, Belarus, and Transcaucasia were to become autonomous regions within the RSFSR without the right to secede. The head of the Ukrainian government advocated maximum independence for the Soviet republics and the concentration of minimal powers in Moscow. This position enjoyed support among nationalist-minded Ukrainian elites. At the 11th Congress of the RCP(b) in the spring of 1922, a speech by Mykola Skrypnik, a member of the Ukrainian delegation, caused a great stir. Skrypnyk, who in 1918 had himself served as the head of Soviet Ukraine (as head of the People's Secretariat of the Ukrainian People's Republic of Soviets), was now outraged by the "formal-bureaucratic approach" to resolving issues of national-state building in the Soviet state "in the spirit of the slogan of a united and indivisible Russia." The "conductor of Ukrainization" Skrypnik found a situational ally in Rakovsky, and therefore in Trotsky. OPERATION CONFEDERATION Stalin believed that the sovereignty of the outskirts “turns the so-called unified federal national economy into a fiction.” "The young generation of communists on the outskirts refuse to understand the game of independence as a game, stubbornly accepting words about independence at face value," Stalin wrote to Vladimir Lenin in September 1922. The position of the future "father of nations" aligned with the aspirations of the RSFSR's economic departments for the "economic unification" of the country. "National unification is essentially economically irrational," said Ivan Alexandrov, the developer of the GOELRO plan and the architect of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station, referring to the division of the country along ethnic lines. But, as is well known, Stalin’s “autonomization plan,” which envisaged the entry of Ukraine, Belarus, and the Transcaucasian republics into the RSFSR as subjects, did not work out. Thanks to Lenin's intervention, the Treaty on the Formation of the USSR was adopted at the First All-Union Congress of Soviets on December 30, 1922, which contained a number of features of a confederative structure. But the final departure of the first leader of Soviet Russia in the spring of 1923 gave a chance to centralize the emerging state. It was then that work on the draft Constitution of the USSR began. The structure of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR—the supreme governing body between Congresses of Soviets—was of paramount importance for the balance of powers between the Union center and the Soviet republics. Stalin insisted that the new body should represent not just the four republics that founded the Union, but also smaller national-state entities. This ran counter to the aspirations of the Confederalists, who sought to gain a blocking majority when considering bills. Moreover, they saw the Council of Nationalities as an independent center of power, with a separately functioning presidium, and therefore, an apparatus. Granting autonomous republics and regions separate representation in the Council of Nationalities was contrary to the interests of the “confederalists.” After all, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the Soviet Union, there were more than two dozen national autonomies in the RSFSR. The autonomies created within the union republics were objectively interested in weakening the national-republican centers and strengthening the all-union center. One of these autonomies was the Moldavian Republic, the creation of which, with the participation of Frunze, was planned in 1923 on the territory of the Odessa and Baltic districts of Ukraine. THE WEIGHTY WORD OF THE "RED GENERAL" Frunze became one of the instigators of the discussion about the Council of Nationalities. On February 24, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) decided to submit Stalin's proposals to the upcoming 12th Party Congress, and on March 8, Frunze's article entitled "The Soviet System and the Bicameral Central Executive Committee" was published in the newspaper Kommunist. On the pages of the printed organ of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine, he justified the bicameral structure of the representative body and said that the Council of Nationalities should reflect the interests of all nations and peoples of the USSR. That is, the "vice-premier" of the Ukrainian government, in essence, expressed solidarity with Stalin's approach to the formation of a union "parliament." The administrative and political weight of this official, however, is difficult to overestimate. After all, Frunze oversaw the restoration of railways, the printing industry, the elimination of the fuel crisis, the organization of salt supplies, and even the resumption of agricultural work and cargo transportation after the Civil War. And all because these tasks were assigned to military units under Frunze's command. This is not to mention the "Red General's" enormous prestige as a hero of the Civil War. Nevertheless, at the 7th Conference of the Communist Party of Ukraine, which concluded on April 10, the prevailing opinion was that only the “separate” republics, that is, the four founders of the USSR, needed equal representation in the Council of Nationalities. True, this wording was not reflected in the resolution “On Union Construction,” which was held a day later in Kharkov at a session of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee. Frunze then proposed postponing consideration of the constitutional amendments for a month and a half. The resolution was formulated, as they say, “from the voice” of the speaker himself. That is, most likely, the Central Executive Committee of the Ukrainian SSR intended to support the republican party organization, but the impromptu action of the “Bessarabian” thwarted this plan. "THE WRONG PATH TO THE CREATION OF THE USSR" The pause in constitutional battles that occurred in Kharkov had a serious result, since after a few weeks the pressure of the “confederalists” in the leadership of the Ukrainian SSR noticeably diminished. After all, at first Rakovsky’s position “on the erroneous path” of creating the USSR did not receive support at the 12th Congress of the RCP(b), and the option of forming a second chamber of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR proposed by the conference of the CP(b)U was rejected. Then, at a meeting of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) with responsible officials of the national republics (June 1923), the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Dmitry Manuilsky, announced serious disagreements in the republic regarding the nature of the union state. "Some comrades hold the view that the union that is now being organized… should be a confederation of states," he said, clearly alluding to Rakovsky and Skripnik. The latter were forced to justify themselves and deny their sympathies for "confederalism." As a result, the June meeting supported the inclusion of representatives of all national republics and regions in the Council of Nationalities, the establishment of equal rights for both chambers of the Central Executive Committee, and the existence of a single legislative presidium of the Central Executive Committee. These provisions were subsequently embodied in the first Constitution of the USSR. Its adoption and entry into force took place on July 6, 1923, with a unanimous vote of members of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. Rakovsky, who had previously expressed a dissenting opinion on several articles of the fundamental law, did not oppose it this time. Perhaps in large part because he did not feel he had unified support within the republic. HE WROTE MURDER In Ukraine, a republic crucial to the emerging Union, Frunze, in an ideological clash with Trotsky's man, Rakovsky, proved himself a conduit for Stalin's ideas and plans. The military leader and politician played the same role when he succeeded Trotsky as head of the Revolutionary Military Council and People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs. In 1925, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was not yet powerful enough to trade the useful Mikhail Frunze for the ultra-loyal Klim Voroshilov. It was difficult to consider the military leader who had gone through the Civil War healthy. The ulcer was a reality, and in the summer of 1925, Mikhail Vasilyevich's health deteriorated noticeably. Frunze himself wrote to his wife (who was then vacationing in Yalta) that he feared the planned operation would be canceled. However, rumors of Stalin's guilt, allegedly having ordered the "slaughter" of the legendary commander, played into the hands of Trotsky, the leader of the "Left Opposition." In the clash of the mid-1920s, Lev Davidovich by no means surrendered all his positions. This is where Boris Pilnyak's story "The Tale of the Unquenched Moon" came in handy. The talented writer was a close friend of the old Bolshevik and literary functionary Alexei Voronsky, who in turn was in Trotsky's inner circle. It is significant that when Frunze was buried near the Kremlin wall, Stalin was present at the farewell and gave a speech, but Trotsky did not honor the event with his attention. There is evidence that Frunze's widow, Sofya Alekseyevna (who died in October 1926, according to one version, by suicide), was convinced that her husband had been "slaughtered by doctors." But she did not blame Stalin. Perhaps the tragic outcome of the operation in the Kremlin hospital was not orchestrated by Trotsky or his entourage, but the death of the “inconvenient Bessarabian” at that moment played into their hands. |
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| Syria-Lebanon-Iran | |
| Syria's new authorities are trying to deal with foreign jihadists | |
| 2025-10-25 | |
| Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. by Leonid Tsukanov [REGNUM] The new Syrian authorities have launched a military operation in Idlib province. Damascus' efforts are aimed against the growing Firqat al-Ghuraba group. ![]() Although members of the ruling cabinet claim that the fighting is part of a campaign to combat organized crime, in reality it signals the beginning of a purge within the ranks of yesterday's armed opposition.
However, for now, Damascus is conducting the campaign extremely cautiously, with breaks for truces. TOUCHSTONE Although clashes between the new Syrian authorities and former allies in the armed opposition have been occurring almost since the first days of the "transitional cabinet" led by Ahmed al-Shara'a's establishment, the scale of hostilities has been minor until recently. The sides have limited themselves to brief firefights, mostly without casualties. The situation changed dramatically in October 2025, when Syrian security forces launched a full-scale operation against the Firqat Al-Ghuraba group, based in the city of Harim (Idlib province), consisting of French-speaking militants and former members of ISIS and Al-Qaeda terrorist cells in Syria. During the clashes, the Syrian army used heavy weapons and armored vehicles, and deployed a record number of fighters—according to various sources, between 300 and 800 people. Low-intensity fighting continued for several days, but neither side could yet claim victory. Ultimately, on October 24, the opponents agreed to a temporary withdrawal of forces. FORMER ALLIES The official reason for the security forces' "visit" to Harim is an arrest warrant for several high-ranking members of the group on charges of corruption and sexual crimes. However, in reality, this is Damascus's attempt to restore order in the border provinces and crush the rebellion formed by former allies. Following the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad's regime in December 2024, Firqat Al-Ghuraba forces were integrated into the Ministry of Defense's 82nd Infantry Division—but only on paper. In reality, the group systematically ignored Damascus's orders and conducted covert operations in the border regions to mobilize forces disillusioned with the transitional government's policies. Moreover, the leader of Omar Omsen's group began rapidly gaining influence, becoming one of the most feared figures in Idlib and could well become the leader of a new armed opposition. Especially since his authority was recognized by many commanders from African and post-Soviet countries hostile to Damascus. The Katiba Tawhid Wal-Jihad and Jaysh al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar groups, as well as the forces of the Turkestan Islamic Party, have expressed interest in a “tactical alliance” with Firqat Al-Ghuraba. The opposition's position in Idlib is strengthened by growing rumors that the al-Sharaa government wants to extradite the most notorious underground figures, most of whom face imprisonment in their home countries, to foreign partners in exchange for strengthening international ties. Omsen, on the contrary, promises his supporters protection from persecution and support in defending their interests. TIMELY RECONCILIATION Damascus had long noticed the growing influence of the Idlib opposition, but until recently they had hesitated to openly respond to the challenge. This was primarily due to a lack of confidence in their own strength. The new Syrian leader was hesitant to send units into battle whose loyalty he doubted. An attempt to resolve the problem using the "Uyghur Guard" (the 84th Special Forces Division, approximately 3,500 men)—a unit under the direct command of the president—was fraught with the risk of exacerbating relations with China due to the public demonstration of the combat readiness of people from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Moreover, there was a risk of undermining the combat capability of the only unit in the new Syrian army that was loyal, from al-Shara's point of view, giving the enemy a chance to counterattack. This prompted the interim Syrian leader to reconsider some past decisions. Specifically, in late September 2025, al-Sharaa suddenly reconciled with Abu Ahmed Zakur, the co-founder and former chief financier of the Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) group. In early 2024, Zakur fell into disgrace and, fearing for his life, fled to the West, where he launched a campaign against the future Syrian leader. For a long time, he was considered a “personal enemy” of al-Sharaa, even being included in the list of people for whose heads a substantial reward was promised. However, by the fall of 2025, al-Sharaa pardoned his former ally: Zakur was appointed assistant to the president for tribal affairs and will be responsible for strengthening ties and supporting local clans. Although he, despite the pardon, prefers to remain in the United States for now, his subordinates (in particular, former HTS field commander Abu Abdo Taum ) have already begun work on the ground. IDLIB THROW However, Zakur's first task, including as an Idlib native, was in fact preparing a staging area for an operation against the rebels. And by all accounts, he accomplished this task well. His agents managed to win over hesitant armed groups in Bittir, Haram, and Batt Mishla—all of these towns are located along Route 56 (Idlib's main thoroughfare)—and the militias were intended to slow the advance of government forces should a military operation begin. Similar efforts were carried out in other parts of the province. As a result, by the start of the operation against Firqat Al-Ghurab, Syrian government forces had guarantees from local neutrals that they would not engage in combat and would not interfere with the arrests of jihadists. Moreover, Zakur's return to power reassured many commanders who had joined the army from HTS and its allied groups and who feared reprisals from Damascus. As a result, the invigorated loyalists, including Taum, became the core of the forces sent to Harim. They later served as the government's primary negotiators. Through Taum, the parties agreed to a ceasefire and the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The case of Omsen and other high-ranking members of Firqat al-Ghurab, whom Syrian security forces previously attempted to arrest, will be heard in the Sharia court of Idlib, where the influence of al-Sharaa and his entourage is strong, but not absolute. This somewhat calmed the new armed opposition, especially given that Damascus had vowed not to extradite foreign fighters to third countries, thus removing the main unifying factor within the new armed opposition. Overall, the brief offensive in Idlib can be considered the first step by the Syrian transitional authorities toward consolidating their influence on the ground. However, a quick conclusion to the campaign is not to be expected: the defeat of the rebels will be gradual, with a steady consolidation of the captured positions. The reason for this strange tactic is simple: Damascus is well aware of the specifics of the "Idlib rebellion" and will try to avoid the same mistakes as their predecessor. In particular, they will try to prevent the dissatisfied from consolidating around specific figures. Related: Katiba Tawhid Wal-Jihad: 2024-07-26 Al-Qaeda militant accidentally detained in Moscow Katiba Tawhid Wal-Jihad: 2024-07-16 In Omsk, FSB officers detain migrants for collecting money for Islamists Related: Turkestan Islamic Party: 2024-02-27 FSB detains 49 militant accomplices who were sending money to Syria Turkestan Islamic Party: 2023-09-10 Heaven of Foreign Militants: The Taliban Are Extensively Hosting Extremist Groups Turkestan Islamic Party: 2023-08-27 HTS: Mutual shelling gov’t forces Fri night and Saturday kills 2 kids, HTS kabooms tunnel under gov’t military camp kill 11 soldiers and 2 turbans | |
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| Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia |
| 'An Example for the Peoples of the East': How 'Russian Occupation' Created Azerbaijan |
| 2025-09-01 |
| Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. by Mark Leshkevich [REGNUM] The interview of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev with the Saudi Arabian TV channel Al Arabiya (which the republic’s state news agency carefully translated into Russian ) became a clear indicator of both Baku’s current policy and how they see their history and the origins of statehood. The Azerbaijani president called the Russian special operation in Ukraine an “invasion” and assured that from the first days of the SVO “we (that is, the Azerbaijani state) supported the territorial integrity of Ukraine and continue to support it.” According to Aliyev’s logic, Russia “invaded” not only Ukraine, but allegedly committed aggression against Azerbaijan as well: “In April 1920, the Russian army invaded Azerbaijan and occupied it.” By the same logic, Azerbaijan was an occupied territory from May 1920, when the Azerbaijan SSR was proclaimed, until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. The “Russian occupation” is mentioned, for example, in the 8th grade history textbook (including in Russian). But it is rather strange to hear such a statement from Ilham Heydarovich Aliyev, who graduated from MGIMO in 1982 and then received a PhD in history there in 1985. "It's one thing for the son of the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan to study in Baku, and another thing in Moscow, in a completely different environment, and at such a young age. But I didn't let my father down, I studied well at the institute, and then in graduate school," Aliyev recalled in an interview with journalist Mikhail Gusman. Indeed, the father and immediate predecessor of the current president, Heydar Aliyevich Aliyev, was not only the third head of the Azerbaijan Republic. Before that (in 1969–1982), he worked as the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Azerbaijan SSR. Aliyev Sr. was also a candidate member (1976–82) and a member (1982–87) of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, the party that ruled the “occupier country.” At the same time as being a member of the Politburo, Comrade Aliyev held the post of First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, that is, the executive branch of the “occupier country.” No less interesting is the first permanent place of work of the future head of independent Azerbaijan. HOW COMRADE ALIYEV FOUGHT ANTI-SOVIETS Since 1941, Heydar Aliyev was accepted to serve in the NKVD department in his small homeland, the Nakhichevan ASSR. After a break to work in the local Council of People's Commissars in 1943-44, Heydar Alievich again entered the service of the security agencies. In 1948, he headed the 5th department of the USSR MGB Directorate for Azerbaijan. The 5th department was responsible for the fight against ideological enemies, that is, according to Aliyev’s current logic, against ideological supporters of the restoration of an independent Azerbaijan. After studying at the Leningrad school for retraining MGB operational staff, Comrade Aliyev Sr. was promoted. In June 1967, the Moscow leadership appointed him Chairman of the KGB of the Azerbaijan SSR. In the same year, KGB Major General Aliyev published an article in the all-Union departmental collection, “More actively suppress the machinations of enemy intelligence services in border areas.” Internal collection of the KGB of the USSR No. 4 (36) for 1967, in which an article by Heydar Aliyev was published He spoke about the work of his senior colleagues (NKVD of the 1930s and 1940s) and gave examples from the times when he himself worked in the NKVD-MGB-KGB. How the security officers caught not only agents of the US, Turkish and Shah's Iran special services, but also deserters from the Red Army recruited by the Turks. That is, those who - according to the current ideology of Aliyev's Azerbaijan - fought the "occupiers" with the support of friends from Ankara. The president and father of the president, who now rests in the Alley of Honor in Baku, concluded his article in the KGB collection with a promise to “honorably fulfill the tasks set before the Chekists by the party and government.” For his faithful service both in the security agencies and along the party-Soviet line, Heydar Aliyev received from the “occupiers”: five Orders of Lenin, two Hero of Socialist Labor stars, the Order of the October Revolution and the Order of the Red Star and – despite not having been at the front – the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st degree. It is hard to believe that Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev disrespects his father so much. It is even harder to believe that Heydar Aliyev, while working in the Soviet secret services and the highest echelons of the Baku and Moscow nomenklatura, was a deeply secret supporter of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic – which, allegedly, was “destroyed by Russia” in 1920. WHO WOULD ALIYEV BE WITHOUT THE “RUSSIAN OCCUPIERS”? In the article, Aliyev Sr. repeatedly mentions the agents of the Musavatists, members of the Muslim Democratic Party "Musavat" (translated from Arabic as "Equality"), who were destroyed in the 1930s. This liberal-nationalist and pan-Turkist party, in fact, created the ADR. And ruled in this short-lived republic from May 1918 to April 1920. More precisely, the Musavatists only pretended to govern. After all, in those years it was difficult to talk about any borders or statehood. Transcaucasia was engulfed in the chaos of the all-Russian civil war. To understand whether “in April 1920 the Russian army invaded Azerbaijan and occupied it”, we need to briefly recall what happened in Transcaucasia after the February Revolution of 1917. WHY AZERBAIJAN WAS ESTABLISHED IN TBILISI Until 1918, separatism was not even considered in Transcaucasia. The Muslim Turkic-Tatar national movement (the ethnonym "Azerbaijanis" was not in use at the time, the people were more often called Transcaucasian Tatars or Turks) advocated not even for a republic, but for national autonomy within the framework of a federal Russia. The same was said by the Georgian Social Democrats and the Armenian analogue of the Socialist Revolutionaries - the Revolutionary Federation "Dashnaktsutyun". After October 1917 and the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly in Tiflis, the Transcaucasian Commissariat (an organ created under Kerensky ) convened its own "Constituent Assembly" - with Georgian Mensheviks, Armenian Dashnaks and Transcaucasian Tatar Musavatists. In the parliament, which was called the Sejm in the Polish manner, there was also no talk of separation from Russia. Everything changed, firstly, with the collapse of the Caucasian Front in the winter of 1917–18 (not without the influence of Bolshevik agitators), and secondly, with the signing of peace by Soviet Russia in Brest-Litovsk. Having violated the armistice concluded in December 1917, the Ottoman Empire troops, with the support of their German allies, began to fill the military-political vacuum. Erzurum and other cities occupied by our army during the First World War were lost. In April, the Ottomans entered the Russian city of Batum. The Bolshevik Military Revolutionary Committee of the Caucasian Front fled from Tiflis to another multi-ethnic city, the Muslim-Armenian-Russian-Georgian Baku. That was when the history of the "Baku commissars" began - the local Council of People's Commissars (aka the Baku Commune) headed by Stepan Shaumyan, Nariman Narimanov and Ivan Fioletov. The Commune began forming the Red Guard. The "Tatar" national-liberal pan-Turkists from the "Musavat" party sat far from Baku, in Tbilisi and in Yelisavetpol - today's Ganja. But the Commune could not be called a full-fledged authority. Thus, it was unable to stop the Armenian-Muslim massacre in Baku in March 1918. On the one hand, Armenian soldiers who had left the front and Dashnak units (who were “taking revenge” on local Turks for the Ottoman genocide of 1915) took part in the mutual ethnic cleansing, and on the other, “Caucasian-Tatar” fighters of the Wild Division. As a result, the Musavatists lost all influence in Baku. The Commune conditionally strengthened its power, but was forced to reckon with the hostile Dashnaks. Meanwhile, the Ottomans took the Russian cities of Kars, Ardahan, Artvin and moved on to Erivan (Yerevan) and Tiflis. There was no one to defend Tbilisi’s “moderate democracy” in the form of the Sejm and the Commissariat. The democrats asked for peace. The Turks issued an ultimatum, one of the points of which was to de jure separate all of Transcaucasia from Russia. Therefore, in April 1918, the ZDFR - Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic - was proclaimed in Tbilisi, headed by the Georgian Menshevik Akaki Chkhenkeli. His cabinet included five representatives from the "Muslims" (the word "Azerbaijanis" was again not used), the main one of whom was the non-partisan Khan Fatali Iskander-ogly Khoysky. The Transcaucasian Democratic Federation collapsed after a month and a week, due to the same external reasons for which this pseudo-state appeared. On May 15, 1918, the Turks occupied Alexandropol (later called Leninakan, now Gyumri). Hundreds of thousands of Armenian refugees rushed to Tiflis. The Terek-Dagestan government of the Caucasus highlanders "closed the border" - the Armenians there were threatened with the same massacre. Under these conditions, the Georgians in the ZDFR government decided to consider themselves a National Council and turned to the allies of the same Turks, the Germans, for help from the Turks. The German Empire issued an ultimatum: Georgia proclaims itself an independent republic under the protectorate of Kaiser Wilhelm. Which was done. Left without “his” state of the ZDFR, Fatali Khan gathered a Muslim faction in Tiflis, which on May 28, 1918, made the following decision: “Since the Federal Transcaucasian Republic was fragmented by the separation of Georgia from it, the National Azerbaijan Council declared… the independence of Azerbaijan.” The Musavatists, who set the tone in the government of this involuntarily independent and essentially virtual state, outlined the borders of the ADR in an extremely arbitrary manner - "the territory consists of Eastern and Southern Transcaucasia". The proclaimed Azerbaijan Democratic Republic did not control anything in essence, but quickly found itself under control. HOW THE TURKS TOOK BAKU FROM THE BRITISH In June 1918, the Ottoman Empire and the ADR signed a “friendship treaty,” under which the new state formally acquired its own armed forces—the Caucasian Islamic Army. This unit of approximately 18,000 bayonets was part of the Turkish Eastern Army Group. The commander of the troops of the democratic republic was the Turk Nuri Pasha, half-brother of Enver Pasha, the Sultan's Minister of War and one of the organizers of the Armenian genocide. The biography of the brothers requires separate stories. Let us just mention that Enver will manage to be an emissary, and then an enemy of the Bolsheviks in Central Asia and will die in a skirmish between the Red Army and the Basmachi. Nuri will turn out to be one of the organizers of the Turkestan Legion of the SS, but will not be punished and will die after the Second World War in his native Turkey. And in the summer of 1918, Turkish "proxies" from the Caucasian Islamic Army of Nuri Pasha launched an offensive on Baku. Although the main striking force was still Turkish troops. They were opposed by a very strange coalition of the Red Army of the Baku Commune, Dashnaks - refugees from Western Armenia, White Cossacks under the command of the general of the Russian Imperial Army, the Ossetian Lazar Bicherakhov and soldiers of the British Expeditionary Force. The appearance of the latter was logical. In London they did not want the Baku oil fields to go to the Turks (and in fact to their senior allies, the Germans). The Turkish group with the "ADR army" attached to it acted more successfully than the Red-White-Dashnak opponents. In the battles near Geokchai and Shemakha, the Baku coalition lost to Nuri Pasha, after which the history of the Commune ended. In August, the Council of People's Commissars resigned, and the Central Committee of the Caspian Flotilla took power (Dictatorship of the Central Caspian). In Soviet history, the Socialist Revolutionary-Menshevik "dictators" figured as the murderers of the 26 Baku commissars. In fact, they were the ones who wanted to bring the British to Baku: at the last stage, the city was defended from the Turks by the expeditionary corps of Leonel Dunsterville and the Indian riflemen of Sir William Montgomery Thompson. In September 1918, the British were forced to surrender Baku to Nuri Pasha, who made the city the capital of Azerbaijan. The capture of Baku was accompanied by mass murders. Unlike the events of March of the same year, the main victims of this massacre were Armenians - according to Armenian historians, from 10,000 to 30,000 people died. This happened just a month before the Ottoman Empire's armistice with Britain and other Entente countries - the de facto capitulation of the Sultan. But the ADR, which was essentially a colony of the Ottoman Empire, did not collapse and existed for another year and a half. It was again a matter of external circumstances. HOW SIR WILLIAM SAVED DEMOCRACY AND DIDN'T PREVENT A MASSACRE On November 16, 1918, the last soldiers of the Ottoman regular army left the city, and on November 17, William Thompson's Anglo-Indian troops entered Baku. After several incidents, Sir William and the Musavatists came to an agreement: the Caucasian Islamic Army and the Turkish troops that had joined it retreated to the interior. The ADR War Ministry settled in Ganja, and the British allowed the ADR government to sit in Baku. The subsequent history of the republic essentially boiled down to a war with the Dashnak Republic of Armenia with the help of a traditional ally. The defeated Ottomans were replaced by a national movement led by Mustafa Kemal Pasha (the future Ataturk). The Kemalists, who were building a national state, did not de jure lay claim to Transcaucasia, but were ready to help another Turkic state in the war with the Armenians, especially one with floating borders. The epicenter of the war was the territories of Karabakh, Zangezur and Nakhichevan. The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict of 1919-20 created the matrix of post-Soviet wars and “settlements”. In terms of the level of violence in the capture of cities and villages, it could be compared to the Karabakh war of the first half of the 1990s. Thus, already at the end of the war, in March 1920, the Musavatists drove the Armenian troops out of Karabakh Shusha with a mixed Armenian-Azerbaijani population. This was accompanied not only by a massacre (according to the Armenian side - 20 thousand dead, the Azerbaijani side says 500 dead), but also by the deportation of Armenians. Describing the Dashnak raid on the "Turkic" town of Boyuk Vedi in the Ararat Valley, British observers noted "the inherent inability of both sides to settle any problem except by murder or massacre." HOW THE US FIRST WANTED TO TAKE ZANGEZUR The first (or “zero”) Armenian-Azerbaijani war became part of the scenario that is beginning to be realized in the Transcaucasus when the restraining force – Russia – leaves. When the fighting in Karabakh was going on, Menshevik Georgia was fighting the South Ossetians and Abkhazians, laying claim to Sochi and waging a border conflict with Armenia. From the west, from Turkey, the Kemalist army was advancing, which by December 1920 had put the very existence of the Armenian state and people into question. In the southeast, in the Lenkoran district, the local people, the Talysh, proclaimed a Soviet republic and fought with Azerbaijan until the summer of 1919. To the north of the Caucasus Range, from Circassia to Dagestan, there was a war between the Reds, White Cossacks, “Red-Greens” and Islamic mountain militias. Another parallel - now with the latest events. In the summer of 1919, the United States attempted to mediate between Armenia and Azerbaijan and at the same time take control of the zone between the two states. The Woodrow Wilson administration, through the Entente High Commissioner in Armenia, proposed the idea of creating a neutral zone under U.S. control in the Nakhichevan region. But the project failed: Azerbaijan and Georgia accused the Americans of playing along with the Armenians. Baku set a condition - a neutral zone only on the condition of the withdrawal of Armenian troops from the Zangezur corridor (with the entry of Azerbaijanis there). The negotiations reached a dead end, and the war resumed. External circumstances once again played a role in stopping this bloody chaos. HOW ILYICH IMPLEMENTED THE DECOLONIZATION AGENDA When Ilham Aliyev says that "the Russian army invaded Azerbaijan and occupied it", he is being disingenuous. Several armies operated in the territory of the disintegrated Russian Empire. And if the Armed Forces of the South of Russia (AFSR) of General Denikin, who fought for a great, united and indivisible Russia, had entered Transcaucasia, then the Democratic Republic of the Baku and Elisavetpol provinces would have had to be forgotten. The Transcaucasian democracies were by no means allies or reliable rear of the Whites. But in reality, by the end of 1919, the Armed Forces of South Russia on the Don and in the Ciscaucasia were defeated, the Menshevik Georgian Democratic Republic interned the retreating Denikinites. And in the spring of 1920, it was not the Russian, but the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army that entered from the eastern Caucasus and the Caspian. From a military point of view, it neutralized the non-Bolshevik forces on the outskirts of the former empire. The political tasks were not at all about occupation and inclusion in the “united and indivisible.” The talk was about the re-creation of the Transcaucasian republics – only now not “SR-Menshevik,” but “correct” ones: Soviet and socialist. Arrival of the armored train of the XI Red Army in Baku on April 28, 1920 Back in 1918, Vladimir Lenin told the Azerbaijani communist Dadash Buniyatzade (later head of the Council of People's Commissars of the Azerbaijan SSR): “We must once again gather our forces and re-educate the workers and peasants of Azerbaijan who were deceived by the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries and liberate them.” At that time, even some of the Azerbaijani Bolsheviks believed that the Baku and Ganja provinces should become part of the RSFSR. Georgian communists were also skeptical about the “reset” of Azerbaijan. However, Lenin said directly: the opinion about creating an independent republic is correct, and joining by provinces is colonialism and even stupidity. It is curious that one of the decisive arguments in favor of this thesis was presented to Lenin by the Armenian Anastas Mikoyan, one of the active figures of the Baku Commune and a future political long-liver. In a letter to Lenin in May 1919, Mikoyan insisted: the Bolsheviks, as internationalists, must support the idea of an independent Soviet Azerbaijan in order to win the trust of the Muslim working masses. As a result, at the insistence of Ilyich, on July 19, 1919, at a joint meeting of the Politburo and the Organizational Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(b), a decision was made to make Azerbaijan Soviet, but sovereign. According to the testimony of Sergei Kirov and another surviving Baku commissar, Nariman Narimanov, Lenin emphasized that the new Azerbaijan Republic should become an example for the peoples of the East. The plan was implemented after Denikin's defeat - and very quickly: on April 27, 1920, the Azerbaijani communists rebelled, on the night of the 28th a group of armored trains moved out from Petrovsk (today's Makhachkala) and in the morning almost without fighting reached Baku. Then, on April 28, the Azerbaijani Revolutionary Committee proclaimed a Soviet republic and turned to Moscow with a request for support. At that time, the ADR army was absorbed by a more important matter - the war with Dashnak Armenia. Therefore, the Sovietization of Azerbaijan took no more than two weeks and did not encounter any particular obstacles. Next came the turn of Armenia, which became a Soviet republic in November-December of the same 1920. As a result, the short-lived Musavat republic with its conditional and disputed borders was replaced by a Soviet socialist state that lasted much longer – 71 years. And it is precisely this that the Republic of Azerbaijan inherits, including because in territorial disputes with Armenia, Baku appeals to the Soviet administrative borders. Ilham Aliyev claims that by establishing these borders, the "occupiers" acted in favor of Armenia. But in reality, everything happened "exactly the opposite." |
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| Syria-Lebanon-Iran |
| St. Elijah Church Massacre: Who is Behind the Attack on Christians in Damascus |
| 2025-06-24 |
| Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. by Leonid Tsukanov [REGNUM] On June 22, a terrorist attack occurred in the Church of St. Elijah in the suburbs of Damascus. As a result of the attack, representatives of the Christian denomination, including several foreigners, were killed. The attack on the Greek Orthodox diocese was far from the first terrorist attack on religious sites in Syria, but it was the first major attack on Christians since the change of power in Damascus. And how the Syrian government responds to this challenge will largely determine its future relations with local minorities. ATTACK ON THE CHURCH According to information from Syrian security forces, a lone radical belonging to ISIS* attacked parishioners during a Sunday service, opening fire on them with small arms. Some time later, when the scene of the terrorist attack was cordoned off by police, he entered into a shootout with them and then blew himself up. According to various sources, between 30 and 100 people died in the attack. Of these, at least a dozen died on the spot. Another ten died on the way to hospitals and on operating tables. At the same time, the attacker, as noted, did not take hostages and did not make any demands on the security forces, which allows the attack to be characterized as an act of intimidation without a clear political subtext. DELAYED REACTION Although the Syrian government almost immediately blamed ISIS* for the attacks, the group only claimed responsibility for the attack 10 hours later, calling it a "contribution to the defeat of the apostates." According to terrorist media resources, the attack highlighted Damascus's inability to protect its citizens even near the capital, let alone the outskirts, where ISIS* activity is many times higher. However, radical propagandists described the terrorist attack in extremely general terms, without naming the attacker or his motives. This is noticeably different from their usual tactics, when a broad ideological basis is provided for the actions of the adherents of the "caliphate" in Syria, and the "semantic roots" of the attack are linked to the plots of Islamic history. Here, the information was presented in the most routine manner and tied exclusively to the events of the present day. Such uncharacteristic stinginess in details allows us to assume that the radical who attacked the church was a lone wolf and acted without instructions “from above,” although he could well have shared the ideas of ISIS* or its allied groups. However, the ambiguities did not prevent the radicals from ultimately taking credit for the attack and presenting it as one of the signs of their own growing power in the fight against the new Syrian authorities. COUNTER-ACCUSATIONS The attack on the Christian minority has once again stirred up discussions about the ability of the new authorities to fulfill their promises and “return Syria to peaceful life”; to protect the “suffering” national and religious minorities. Some Syrian leaders, out of old habit, tried to convert tensions into political points and blame the tensions on the “surviving supporters of the old regime.” For example, the country's Minister of Culture, Mohammed Yassin Saleh, stated that the destabilization of minorities is beneficial to "those parties that suffered the most from the fall." Thus hinting at the participation in the attack of representatives of the defeated republic, of whom there are still many in both the security and civilian agencies. The placement of former associates of ousted President Bashar al-Assad on the same level as radicals suggests that the search for compromise between yesterday's opponents is still complicated, and not all of the new Syrian elite agree to peacefully coexist with the vanquished. However, opponents of the current Syrian authorities also did not remain in debt and recalled Damascus' controversial management decisions. Among them, for example, the integration of Uyghur militants from the "Islamic Party of Turkestan"* (IPT*) into the ranks of the army and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Considering that many IPT* leaders still have close ties with terrorist cells, their inclusion in government structures significantly simplifies the radicals' planning and execution of operations. The version that was spread on emigrant resources (especially on the X network) was that the person who attacked the church had previously served in the ranks of the “Security Service” of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham* group, from whose leadership part of the current Syrian cabinet “grew” – including the country’s interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa. Thus, the opposition placed responsibility for the terrorist attack directly on the country's leadership. However, this version was not confirmed. KEEPING BALANCE However, even taking into account the sharp rhetoric, neither side of the conflict is interested in elevating the voiced accusations to absolutes. Excessive pressure on Damascus could provoke the authorities to expand repressive measures against the internal opposition. In this case, the al-Sharaa government risks repeating the same scenario as earlier with the Druze and Alawites. Damascus does not want to create another hotbed of tension in the country, and therefore quickly shifted the emphasis in its accusations from the “Assad camp” to the terrorist underground. Former supporters of the republic also agreed to “shift the blame” to ISIS*, due to the fact that the camp of supporters of ex-President Assad is still segmented. Most of its leaders are either in exile or do not have sufficient authority to challenge Damascus and “take” minorities under their protection. One way or another, today's Damascus will have to seriously reconsider the model for preventing terrorist attacks, especially since the strategy for fighting ISIS, with an emphasis on destroying cells in border areas, has weakened attention to the capital region. The radicals have not failed to take advantage of this. |
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| Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia | |
| The enemy did not win, Russia did not lose. Why do we need the myth of the 'Tsushima disgrace' (1904-‘05) | |
| 2025-06-04 | |
| Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. by Stanislav Smirnov [REGNUM] The publication of two articles for the 120th anniversary of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 — materials dedicated to the Battle of Mukden and the Battle of Tsushima — has provoked an active reaction on social networks. The author drew attention to some of the responses — in the Telegram channels “ Military Scientific Archive ” and “ Turkestan General Staff Officer ”. In the end, the objections fit into the historical narrative that emerged after 1917 about Japan’s military superiority over the backward Russian army. ![]() But critics ignore the facts and figures cited in the published articles. In particular, the approximate equality of Russian and Japanese losses in all major battles in the theater of military operations in Manchuria (battles at sea are a separate topic, and we covered it in detail in the article dedicated to Tsushima) - an equality that became fatal for the enemy. The reasons for the allegedly "incompetent" command of Alexei Kuropatkin were left unattended, and in particular one of the most important reasons - the threefold superiority in forces of the enemy in the first period of the war. Likewise, it was overlooked that when this balance of forces changed, the Japanese immediately asked for peace and eventually abandoned most of their initial demands. The author does not claim that Russia won the Russo-Japanese War. But following a number of other researchers, including those with high academic degrees, and following the commander-in-chief of the Russo-Japanese War, Nicholas II, he states that there was neither a winner nor a loser in the battle. This is despite the fact that, being armed to the teeth by England, France and Germany, having a multiple advantage in manpower, artillery, and navy, Japan - as it seemed to itself and its Western patrons - was simply doomed to a crushing victory in the blitzkrieg. But victory did not happen, Russia held out. And, having gathered its strength, having completed the Trans-Siberian Railway, having increased its group to 1 million bayonets and sabres, it was able to defeat Japan, squeezing it out of China. But such a development of events was prevented by domestic political circumstances - turmoil, which was used by the fifth column with money from American bankers and Japanese intelligence. Here the author relies on the work of historian Sergei Petrov and Doctor of Historical Sciences, leading research fellow of the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences Dmitry Pavlov " Japanese Money and the Russian Revolution ". One more remark. Describing the supposedly catastrophic defeats of the Russian army in Manchuria, opponents draw parallels with the "Great Retreat" in 1915. Objectively, both in 1904-1905 and in 1915, our troops retreated. But how and with what consequences? As follows from the 9-volume Military Historical Commission of the General Staff (St. Petersburg, 1910), which collected about 40 thousand documents of the Manchurian armies, the entire series of retreats for the whole of 1904 and the beginning of 1905 - from the Kwantung (Liaodong) Peninsula to Sipingai - did not exceed 200 miles. It is difficult to compare this with the consequences of the difficult retreats for our army in 1915 and especially 1941. Further, the author will allow himself to make several general comments. Centuries and eras follow each other, but human nature and the essence of international relations remain unchanged. Today, the world is as complex and full of contradictions as it was in the times of Ivan the Terrible or Nicholas II. The latter's father, Emperor Alexander III, liked to repeat that Russia has only two allies - its army and navy. This is obviously how things stand now. At the same time, the army is strong not only because of its strong discipline and advanced technology. Above all, its strength lies in its fortitude of spirit, and that, in turn, is achieved by learning from the examples of the past. If a warrior carries in his memory and heart the knowledge of the exploits of distant ancestors and a reverent attitude towards them, he is spiritually ready to repeat heroic deeds in new conditions.
From the first days of that war, Russia's ill-wishers spread myths about the "catastrophic" and "shameful" defeats of the Russian troops. Such exaggerations served purely political purposes - to demoralize society and the government and to break through to power. Later, the myth about the supposedly crushing defeat of Russia in the war with Japan, implanted by historians and publicists of the Soviet school, solved the problem of "post factum justification" of the revolutions of 1905 and 1917. The Russo-Japanese War ended for Russia with certain concessions and losses, but by no means with a crushing defeat, as biased publicists and historians tried and are trying to present. One can argue about the correctness of the strategy chosen by the Commander-in-Chief of the Manchurian armies, General Kuropatkin, but - let us emphasize - given the enormous advantages of Japan, which had been purposefully preparing for war for almost a whole decade, such a strategy seems justified. The enemy never managed to utterly defeat our armies. There were no fatal encirclements or catastrophic "cauldrons" in this war. There were organized retreats and losses commensurate with the enemy's losses. The latter circumstance concealed Japan's final defeat, since it was many times inferior to Russia in human and material resources. The defeat at Tsushima, declared by its opponents as proof of “Russia’s military collapse,” had a resounding political and psychological effect, but little strategic consequence, since the fate of the war was ultimately decided not at sea, but on land. As already noted, the Japanese blitzkrieg failed because the enemy did not achieve the goals it set: to capture not only Korea and Manchuria, but also Primorye and the Amur region, to weaken the Pacific Fleet, and to compensate the aggressor for all of its expenses for the war. The negotiations in Portsmouth were conducted on the basis of the fact that "Japan did not win - Russia did not lose". Nicholas II resolutely demanded from the Russian delegation: not an inch of Russian land, not a kopeck of contributions, otherwise - continuation of the war until complete victory. Let us repeat: by the summer of 1905, Russia had a large advantage in military force, the morale of the Manchurian armies was high; the capacity of the completed Trans-Siberian Railway increased from 3 to 14 pairs of trains per day in 1904, which ensured the rapid delivery of reinforcements. But — let us emphasize once again — the deterioration of the domestic political situation forced the Tsar to agree to peace talks and certain concessions. It is characteristic that the treaty signed in Portsmouth, USA, with the mediation of US President Theodore Roosevelt was regarded in the world as a success of Russian diplomacy. Roosevelt himself noted that the Russian delegation headed by Count Sergei Witte achieved not just a mutually acceptable result, but a result that was disadvantageous for the seemingly victorious Japan: "I think that the Japanese have given up more than was necessary." Even London, where they were openly rooting for their Far Eastern partners, was forced to admit this. As The Standard noted, “Russia had won one of its greatest diplomatic victories, fully in line with Witte’s statement: ‘Not a single kopeck in return.’” In fact, initially the Mikado's representatives demanded that the entire Sakhalin Island they had captured be handed over to Japan, that all Japanese ships interned by Russia be returned, that Russian naval forces in the Far East be limited, and that a contribution be paid. But the only thing they managed to achieve was the transfer of part of Sakhalin south of the 50th parallel, given that Russia and Japan mutually agreed “not to build any fortifications in their possessions on Sakhalin Island and the islands adjacent to it.” Although the domestic press nicknamed Witte “ Count Half-Sakhalin,” it was difficult to deny that Russia returned the northern part of the island without any contributions. At the same time, Japan was openly dissatisfied with the outcome of the war. The world press wrote about the riots that broke out in Tokyo (at least 30,000 angry subjects of the Mikado demonstrated in Hibiya Park) and about the subsequent organizational conclusions from the Emperor: for the failure in Portsmouth, the Prime Minister Prince Katsura Taro resigned, and, most importantly, the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Marquis Kamura Jutaro, the creator of the Anglo-Japanese diplomatic alliance, who was responsible for the political preparation of the Russo-Japanese War, and in Portsmouth headed the Japanese delegation. This hardly resembled the outcome of the “ total defeat of the weak tsarist army and backward Russia,” but rather a halt to the war and a military draw in the battle that was played out in August–September 1945. The assessment that Vladimir Lenin gave in an article on the occasion of the capture of Port Arthur by the Japanese: “Progressive, advanced Asia dealt an irreparable blow to backward and reactionary Europe… with Russia at the head… The Russian Pacific fleet, which was initially no less, if not more, powerful than the Japanese, was finally destroyed,” turned out to be premature. The Pacific Fleet had been restored by 1914 (based on the Siberian Military Flotilla), and the blow, judging by the results in Portsmouth, was far from irreparable. So the courage and fortitude of Russian soldiers on the fields of Manchuria and in the defense of Port Arthur, inscribed in history in golden letters, were not in vain. | |
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| Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia | |
| 'The Stalin Affair': How Borders Were Drawn Along Former Russian Outskirts | |
| 2025-05-14 | |
| Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. by Daniil Pelymov [REGNUM] One hundred years ago, on May 13, 1925, the III All-Union Congress of Soviets unanimously decided to include two new republics into the Soviet Union - the Uzbek SSR and the Turkmen SSR. But this was not an expansion of borders. ![]() Later, in 1939-1940, the number of union republics and the size of two of them expanded along with the state's borders (the annexation of Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, the Baltics and Bessarabia). But that was still a long way off. And in 1925, there was talk of “redevelopment with the transfer of walls” within the recently established USSR. The Soviet government, on the orders of the ruling All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), redrew the borders in the sands and oases of Turkestan. This was done in fulfillment of Lenin’s principles of national policy, which were based on the right of nations to self-determination, including secession, as well as “indigenization,” that is, the implantation of the languages of the titular peoples, and the creation (sometimes from scratch) of national elites. Those who, against the backdrop of the war with the Basmachi, drew the administrative borders of the Central Asian republics, of course, did not predict that 65 years later the country would disintegrate along these borders. That the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st century would be marked by new civil wars, uprisings (similar to the Andijan rebellion of 2005), the death and exodus of the “alien population” – the Russians. And that “low-intensity conflicts” will regularly flare up on the borders of the former fraternal republics. TO THE BORDERS OF THE 17TH CENTURY At first glance, to understand the scale of national-territorial demarcation, it is enough to look at two maps of Soviet Central Asia. Until 1925, the territory of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (as the abbreviation RSFSR was then deciphered) extended to the borders with Persia and Afghanistan. Within the RSFSR were the Kirghiz (Kazakh) ASSR with its center in Orenburg and the Turkestan ASSR with its center in Tashkent. Two people's Soviet republics were included in the territory of the Russian Federation: the Khorezm People's Soviet Republic, created on the site of the Khiva Khanate occupied by the Bolsheviks, and the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic, organized, accordingly, on the territory of the former Bukhara Emirate. After the territorial demarcation, Orenburg was "withdrawn" from the Kazakh ASSR, whose capital moved to the city of Perovsk (renamed then to Kzyl-Orda, or - translated from Kazakh - Krasnoarmeysk). To the south of the Kazakh Autonomous Republic, two autonomous regions were allocated - Karakalpak and Kara-Kyrgyz. For now, part of the RSFSR. Eleven years later, in 1936, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan went from being autonomous regions to full-fledged union republics, and the Russian border acquired its current form, roughly corresponding to the borders of the Russian kingdom in the first half of the 17th century. But in order to appreciate the significance of this shift in the administrative boundaries of the union republics, it is necessary to briefly recall how Russia moved to the southeast from the end of the 16th to the beginning of the 20th century. SEMEY AND PETROPAVL In the last year of Ivan the Terrible's life, in 1584, several hundred Don and Lower Volga Cossacks marched east and occupied the lands of the Nogai Khans along the Yaik River. The history of the Yaik Cossack Host began from that moment. After the suppression of the Pugachev rebellion in 1775, the Yaik Host was renamed the Ural Host, and the military capital, Yaitsky Gorodok, founded in the same 1584, was named Uralsk. This city, which retained its historical name, is the oldest in the European part of independent Kazakhstan. During the reign of Alexei Mikhailovich, in 1640, the merchant Guriy Nazaryev built a fort at the mouth of the Yaik River into the Caspian Sea - the city of Guryev that arose here bore this name until 1991. Now it is the regional center of Atyrau. Under Peter the Great, in 1718, a detachment of the voivode Vasily Cheredov built the Semipalatnaya fortress in the southern Siberian steppe near the Irtysh, around which the city of Semipalatinsk (now Semey in Kazakhstan) arose. In those same years, in the same place, in the Irtysh region, the Cossacks built the Koryakovsky outpost, where a village of the same name would later arise, which in the 19th century became a city named Pavlodar. In 1720, by decree of Peter I, the "capital" of Rudny Altai, the fortress of Ust-Kamenogorsk, was founded to strengthen the borders of the Russian state and explore gold veins in the upper reaches of the Irtysh. It is still known as the city of Ust-Kamenogorsk (now the center of the East Kazakhstan region). Simultaneously with the advancement of the Russian Tsardom, and then the Russian Empire, into the steppe, there was also a counter movement. In 1731, the Chingizid Abulkhair, khan of the Younger Zhuz (a Kazakh tribal union that roamed from the Southern Urals to the Syr Darya), asked for Russian citizenship, counting on help in the fight against the Dzungar Khanate. Abulkhair and the heads of 27 clans swore allegiance to Empress Anna Ioannovna on the Koran. But even after this, the southeastern steppes remained permeable to raids on the Russian frontier by slave traders from three Central Asian states, fragments of Tamerlane’s empire – from Bukhara, Khiva and the Kokand Khanate. Under Elizabeth Petrovna and Catherine the Great, fortified lines were built to protect against the nomadic Dzungars and Kyrgyz-Kaisaks of the Middle Zhuz: the Tobolsk-Ishim and Irtysh lines, from Tomsk and Omsk through Ust-Kamenogorsk to Semipalatinsk. A logical continuation were the defensive lines in the steppes near Orenburg, founded in 1730. Note that in the first half of the 18th century, with a difference of 12 years, the empire founded two outposts with the same name - Petropavlovsk: on Kamchatka and on the bank of the Irtysh tributary, the Ishim River. In modern Kazakhstani documentation, this city is called Petropavl. At the beginning of the 19th century, on the frontier from the lower reaches of the Yaik-Ural to Altai, on the lands of the Orenburg and Siberian Cossack troops, there were 46 fortresses and 96 redoubts. But the logic of history prompted the empire to move further south. OUTRUN THE LION In the early 1820s, the Kokand Khan carried out a devastating raid on the Kazakh nomad camps. At the same time, the ruler of the Middle Zhuz, Vali Khan, transferred his subjects under the protection of Russia. According to the "Charter on the Siberian Kirghiz" developed under Alexander I, the Kazakhs were introduced to Russian-style governance and legal proceedings. A little later, in 1830, the Cossack outpost of Akmolinsk appeared on the Ishim River, which, after changing many names, became the capital of Kazakhstan - Astana. In 1839–1840, Russia organized its first campaign against Khiva, the center of the slave trade in Central Asia. Vasily Perovsky’s expedition was unsuccessful, but it was only the beginning of counterattacks in response to the raids. It was no longer just a matter of protecting villages, peasant settlers and "peaceful foreigners" who had sworn allegiance to Russia, but also of the great game that had begun between two empires, the Russian and the British. The Chinese Qing Empire also laid claim to Central Asia, but its forces were incomparable with the might of the "bear" and the "lion". The empire was forced to move further, relying on new southern outposts such as Lepsinsk (founded in 1846), the Perovsk fort (Kzyl-Orda) built in 1853, the Vernoye fortification built a year later (also known as the Cossack village of Vernaya, the city of Verny), and, finally, the southern capital of Kazakhstan, Alma-Ata. In 1865, General Mikhail Chernyaev took Tashkent by storm, which became the main stronghold in the region. Cossacks of the new Semirechye army (with its center in Verny) and settlers from Central Russia rushed here. Thus, in 1868, peasants from the Penza, Samara, Voronezh and Tambov provinces founded the settlement of Pishpek (now the capital of Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek) near the Verny tract. Only later did the Sarts join the Great Russians - sedentary Turks from Tashkent and the centers of the Fergana Valley: Namangan, Kokand and others. The imperial government abolished the remainder of the Kokand Khanate in 1876. In response to a series of uprisings, troops under the command of the "white general", the future hero of the Russo-Turkish War Mikhail Skobelev, entered the Khan's headquarters. The Russians began to develop the former Kokand lands much earlier. So much so that already in 1869 Mikhail Saltykov-Shchedrin could satirically describe the " Tashkent gentlemen " - officials in the newly annexed territories. "WHO BUILDS SCHOOLS, BUILDS THE FUTURE" Events in the Khanate of Khiva and the Emirate of Bukhara developed somewhat differently. In 1866, in the battles of Irdjai and Chapan-Ata, the troops of Adjutant General Konstantin Kaufman routed the army of the Emir of Bukhara, Muzaffar. Two years later, Samarkand was captured. In all cases, Russian soldiers released slaves. In 1868, the Emir of Bukhara concluded an agreement with Russia: the ruler of the faithful retained the throne, but Russia received the right to station garrisons and determine foreign policy. The territories from the Pamirs to the middle reaches of the Amu Darya were no longer in danger of becoming another pearl of the British crown. A similar fate awaited the Khiva Khanate. After a quick campaign in 1873, Kaufman signed a treaty with Khan Seid Muhammad Rahim II : Khiva freed the slaves and transferred most of its possessions to Russian Turkestan. In the late 1870s and early 1880s, it was time to "pacify" the warlike Turkmens (some of whom were vassals of Khiva). The port of Krasnovodsk on the Caspian Sea, now called Turkmenbashi, was founded in 1869 by the expedition of General and scientist-geographer Nikolai Stoletov. And since the 1880s, the border village of Askhabad has turned into a fast-growing city, the center of the Trans-Caspian region. At the same time, "soft power" was taking root in the vassal states. "Whoever builds schools in Bukhara, builds the future" - so said the participant of the Central Asian campaigns, artist Vasily Vereshchagin.
By 1913, the settlers were cultivating the fields of Semirechye and Fergana, working in the mines of Rudny Altai and in the oil fields of the Ural-Embinsky region, and working on the Trans-Caspian, Semirechye, and Altai railways (the last two lines would serve as the basis for the Soviet Turksib). One of the elements of Pyotr Stolypin's agrarian reform was the project to resettle 100,000 peasants from the central provinces to Turkestan. ANOTHER "BALKANS" As for the indigenous population, the situation was almost as confusing as the infamous ethnic patchwork in the Balkans. Under the rule of the rulers of Bukhara and Khiva and in Russian Turkestan lived the Turkic-speaking Uzbeks and "Kipchaks" (as the ruling class called themselves), Turkmens and Karakalpaks close to the Kazakhs. But in the same Bukhara and Samarkand lived many who spoke Persian and called themselves Tajiks. Often people who spoke different languages settled in different quarters of the same city. This was the case, for example, in the settlement of Dushanbe-Kurgan, the current capital of Tajikistan. The ethnonyms were not established either - the Kazakh zhuzes were called Kyrgyz and Kyrgyz-Kaisaks for a long time, and the modern Kyrgyz ethnic group was called Kara-Kirghiz. It was quite complicated with the above-mentioned Sarts, who simply spoke "Turkic", but often had Persian roots. And this ethnic diversity, after the upheavals of the civil war and the “march of Soviet power,” had to be territorially demarcated. According to a number of authors, the civil strife in Central Asia lasted not from 1918 to 1922, but from 1916 (a series of uprisings of the local population against mobilization for rear work, the Russian administration and settlers) until the suppression of organized Basmachi by the end of the 1930s. The history of the civil war in Turkestan requires a detailed description. Let us just note that, for example, the Fergana Peasant Army under the command of Konstantin Monstrov, a migrant from Syzran, managed to fight for both the Reds and Kolchak's forces. Both times against the Basmachi, who were slaughtering settlers. And the former leader of the Young Turks, Enver Pasha, who had moved to Turkestan, first acted on the side of the Red Army as an emissary of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR to combat the Basmachi, and soon as a kurbashi (general) of the Basmachi with the blessing of the Emir of Bukhara. But in all cases, this nationalist pan-Turkist acted against the settlers. "Things are going the way I wanted... Many Russians were killed," Enver reported in 1921. "THERE WAS A FIERCE STRUGGLE" Despite all the confusion “on the ground,” the Soviet government steadfastly followed the general line formulated in Vladimir Lenin’s letter to the communists of Turkestan in November 1919: “Make every effort to prove… the sincerity of our desire to eradicate all traces of Great Russian imperialism.” As in other outskirts of the former empire, the party in the 1920s relied on the nationally minded intelligentsia. In the case of Bukhara and Khiva, this was the left wing of the Jadids (“enlighteners,” nationalists, and Islamic modernists), who, in particular, proposed using the original Turkic ethnonym “Uzbek” instead of the word of unclear origin “Sart.” In 1920, under the supervision of Mikhail Frunze and his troops, "revolutions" took place in the multi-ethnic Bukhara and Khiva. But the overthrow of the emir and khan and the creation of republics under flags with a crescent, star, sickle and hammer were only an interim solution. Then it was time for "national building". As Vyacheslav Molotov recalled at the end of his life, the implementation of Lenin’s national policy in Central Asia was entirely the merit of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Joseph Stalin, as a great specialist in nationality affairs (and the People’s Commissar for the field in 1917–1923). "The creation of the Central Asian republics and the border was entirely Stalin's work. There was a fierce struggle. The Kazakhs, for example, their top brass, fought for Tashkent, wanted it to be their capital... Stalin gathered them... looked at the borders and said: Tashkent to the Uzbeks, and Verny, Alma-Ata to the Kazakhs," Molotov said. An equally difficult task was how to divide the Khorezm oasis between the new national states, the Uzbek and Turkmen SSRs. Or how to divide the Fergana Valley between Uzbekistan and the Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Region, still part of the Russian Federal Republic. However, as recent history has shown, the “filigree” of national borders with enclaves and semi-enclaves did not protect against ethnic cleansing (for example, the massacre in Osh, Kyrgyzstan, in 1990) or border conflicts in the 2020s. The fact that the city of Skobelev (Fergana) should go to Uzbekistan, Krasnovodsk to Turkmenistan, and Przhevalsk (modern name Karakol) to Kyrgyzstan, did not raise any questions in 1925. It is also not surprising that, in fulfillment of the “desire to eradicate traces of Great Russian chauvinism,” the Kazakh ASSR with its capital in Orenburg included cities of the former Ural, Omsk and Semipalatinsk regions of the Russian Empire. As is known, in the discussions of 1922 on the principles of creating the Soviet state, "People's Commissariat of Nationalities" Stalin defended the plan of autonomization. National formations were to become a garland of autonomies around the Russian SFSR without the right to secede. But - again, as is well known - in Moscow in 1922, the Leninist approach of creating equal Soviet states (as the core of the communist " United States of the World ") with the right of each national republic to secession prevailed. Stalin accepted this principle and continued to adhere to it in the 1930s and 1940s, when creating new SSRs - Kazakh, Kirghiz, Tajik and others. The Central Asian countries that emerged in 1991 within the administrative borders drawn in 1925 have emerged as national states with which modern Russia maintains friendly and, in some cases, allied relations. But for the fact that in the 1990s Russians and other “non-titular peoples” who had lived here for generations found themselves in the position of unwanted migrants, one cannot help but say “thank you” to the creators of Lenin’s national policy. | |
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| Syria-Lebanon-Iran | |||||
| 'They Kill Everyone': How Central Asian Militants Carried Out Massacre in Syria | |||||
| 2025-03-12 | |||||
| Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. by Sergey Adamov [REGNUM] The past few days in Syria have seen an unprecedented surge in violence against local religious minorities: Alawite Muslims and Christians. Social media has been rocked by hundreds of videos in which militants proudly documented their crimes, including mass murders of unarmed people and public torture. Throughout the conflict, Regnum correspondents were in contact with residents of the Syrian coast, thanks to which they were able to collect dozens of testimonies from civilians about crimes committed by militants. Eyewitnesses note that militants of foreign origin, natives of Central Asia and the Caucasus, who are noticeably different from Arabs in appearance and stand out against their background, showed particular cruelty in reprisals against the civilian population.
Now the new Syrian authorities are arresting civilians for communicating with the media (primarily with the Russian media), so all reports from sources are published anonymously. However, oral testimonies can only serve as confirmation of the crimes in which natives of the Caucasus and Central Asia took part, who do not hide their goals: to create a monolithic society in Syria, united by a radical ideology, in order to carry this ideology further. GUESTS FROM THE EAST Militants of foreign origin first appeared in Syria during the first stage of the civil war in 2011–2012. The leadership of the Al-Qaeda* movement called on Central Asians to participate in military operations in the Middle East. Terrorists from Uzbekistan (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, IMU), Tajikistan and the Caucasus (Anjad-Kavkaz*)
Later, militants from among ethnic Uyghurs, representatives of the so-called “East Turkestan Islamic Movement” (ETIM)*, appeared on the territory of Syria. The formed "terrorist international" took part in battles against government troops and by 2015 was able to establish control over the province of Idlib. A number of groups received their "allotments", for example, the Uyghurs settled in the area of the city of Jisr al-Shughur, and the Caucasians - the outskirts of Idlib. The region has become a “promised land” for terrorists from all over the world, who have found in Idlib a safe haven and a springboard for planning attacks around the world. In the fall of 2024, it was these formations, as the most motivated, that took part in the offensive on Aleppo, which ended with the fall of the city, and subsequently the collapse of the government of Bashar al-Assad. IN A NEW ROLE The "revolutionary" government of Syria has praised the role of foreign formations, granting all foreign fighters Syrian citizenship and effectively legalizing their status. Now the former “exiles” have become full-fledged citizens, and, what’s more, 100% loyal to the new regime. The exact number of foreign fighters is unknown. According to Tajik authorities in 2024, there were about 400 Tajik citizens in the Syrian province of Idlib. The total number of "insurgents" in the ranks of the new Syrian army, according to various estimates, ranges from 5,000 to 10,000 people. Former mercenaries received high positions in the new government. For example, a native of Tajikistan, Saifiddin Tadjiboev, who was wanted in his home country on charges of terrorism and mercenarism, was appointed commander of the operational headquarters in the new government’s Ministry of Defense. ON THE EVE OF THE MASSACRE Since the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad's government, members of ethnic and religious minorities in Syria have lived in constant fear. The new authorities in Damascus have officially declared that they will not persecute representatives of any community. Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa (aka Mohammed Julani) has demonstratively met with heads of Christian churches, promising protection and patronage. However, already in the first days of the "new Syria" a wave of attacks on churches and representatives of religious minorities swept across the country. Even then, militants of foreign origin distinguished themselves separately, simply ignoring Damascus' calls for religious tolerance and disarmament. In the following months, it was these same formations that spread across the entire Syrian coast, viewing the region and its inhabitants as fair game. After the first open clashes broke out, a total mobilization of radicals and their supporters, a kind of "activists", was declared in the neighboring provinces of Hama and Idlib, who were joined by local residents who wanted to rob their Alawite neighbors. However, the backbone of the "cleansing" forces was made up of armed foreigners. Footage taken by a militant of Chechen origin, commenting on the events in Syria in Russian, is being published online. "There will be no mercy," the author of the videos says, showing footage of terrorist columns being transferred to Latakia. "We continue to clean up," reads the caption to the video of armored vehicles being deployed on the streets of coastal cities. Over the following days, Regnum correspondents maintained round-the-clock contact with residents of the Syrian coast, receiving information about what was happening first-hand. This is how residents of the city of Baniyas describe the first night of the pogroms: “Towards evening, the power went out in our neighborhood. Then groups of pogromists began to enter from different sides, they broke into cars, robbed stores, threw stones at windows. They were followed by armed people who went from house to house. They came to our neighbors’ house with a can of paint, they “marked” people, painted their faces black, insulted them, and then left threats and insults on the walls.” Among the attackers, local residents particularly noted militants with a characteristic Turkic appearance, often not speaking Arabic. According to eyewitnesses, it was they who showed particular cruelty. An audio recording with instructions calling on local residents "loyal" to the government was distributed, calling on them not to go out into the streets. The voice on the recording says that "Uzbek and Chechen mujahideen" do not differentiate between Sunnis and Shiites and kill everyone. BLOODY MARCH 8TH By the morning of the second day of the conflict, the regime had managed to concentrate enough forces on the coast to conduct all-out raids. The Islamists were particularly brutal in the Alawite areas outside the Syrian coast, in the provinces of Hama and Homs. Tellingly, foreign fighters did not hide their participation in the massacre. In the area of the city of Jabla, a group of Uzbek natives was “spotted”, broadcasting live from the scene and streaming in the Uzbek language. The fighters, belonging to the group “Tawhid wal Jihad”*, told their audience that they had come to Latakia “to punish the infidels” and shared their “political program”. In particular, they propose that the new Syrian authorities "cleanse" the region and populate it with "faithful Muslims." Syrian Christians are offered either to convert to Islam or to pay "jizya" for life - a tax on non-Muslims in Koranic law.
"When we heard about the beginning of the conflict, my relatives were able to leave. There were old people left in the village who asked to leave them. We know that they have been killed now. Somewhere in the houses there are bodies that no one has removed because people are afraid to return for a long time. All the men were killed, some women have disappeared, and no one knows where they are," the source told IA Regnum. DENOUEMENT By the morning of March 9, the militants had reached the epicenter of the conflict, the city of Jabla, after which another wave of violence swept through the surrounding villages. In one of the videos made in the vicinity of Jabla, the militants filmed a residential building they had set on fire. "Look, the house of the Alawites is burning!" one of the authors of the video says. Throughout the day, terrorist gangs continued to repeatedly "cleanse" populated areas, often shooting at everyone they encountered without distinction. At the same time, the heads of Syria's Christian churches issued a joint statement calling for an immediate end to the violence. The "world community" also joined the call, albeit belatedly. Local residents report that a “clean-up” has begun in the cities of Baniyas, Tartus and Latakia: militants are removing corpses from city streets and even washing blood off the asphalt in preparation for the arrival of foreign journalists. In a separate statement, Ahmed al-Sharaa said the government would set up a "commission" to investigate "incidents of violence" on the coast, but locals were under no illusions. "We are still afraid to leave our homes now, no one can assess the damage done. Those who survived were left without all their property, others without their families. We will never forget these two terrible days. Now there is a "roll call" in the chats, we are looking for our own. But we know that there will be no justice for the criminals," the Syrians believe. Events in Syria have vividly confirmed the worst fears about the prospects for a peaceful settlement in that country. But whatever their consequences, it is absolutely clear that terrorist groups operating in Syria pose a threat far beyond its borders, and that their militants may fall victim to far more than just Syrian ethno-confessional minorities. People from post-Soviet countries who “distinguished themselves” by committing mass murders probably dream of returning to their native lands and repeating the same thing in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and, of course, in Russia.
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