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Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia

'The Stalin Affair': How Borders Were Drawn Along Former Russian Outskirts

2025-05-14

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Daniil Pelymov

[REGNUM] One hundred years ago, on May 13, 1925, the III All-Union Congress of Soviets unanimously decided to include two new republics into the Soviet Union - the Uzbek SSR and the Turkmen SSR. But this was not an expansion of borders.

Later, in 1939-1940, the number of union republics and the size of two of them expanded along with the state's borders (the annexation of Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, the Baltics and Bessarabia). But that was still a long way off.

And in 1925, there was talk of “redevelopment with the transfer of walls” within the recently established USSR. The Soviet government, on the orders of the ruling All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), redrew the borders in the sands and oases of Turkestan.

This was done in fulfillment of Lenin’s principles of national policy, which were based on the right of nations to self-determination, including secession, as well as “indigenization,” that is, the implantation of the languages of the titular peoples, and the creation (sometimes from scratch) of national elites.

Those who, against the backdrop of the war with the Basmachi, drew the administrative borders of the Central Asian republics, of course, did not predict that 65 years later the country would disintegrate along these borders. That the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st century would be marked by new civil wars, uprisings (similar to the Andijan rebellion of 2005), the death and exodus of the “alien population” – the Russians.

And that “low-intensity conflicts” will regularly flare up on the borders of the former fraternal republics.

TO THE BORDERS OF THE 17TH CENTURY
At first glance, to understand the scale of national-territorial demarcation, it is enough to look at two maps of Soviet Central Asia.

Until 1925, the territory of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (as the abbreviation RSFSR was then deciphered) extended to the borders with Persia and Afghanistan. Within the RSFSR were the Kirghiz (Kazakh) ASSR with its center in Orenburg and the Turkestan ASSR with its center in Tashkent.

Two people's Soviet republics were included in the territory of the Russian Federation: the Khorezm People's Soviet Republic, created on the site of the Khiva Khanate occupied by the Bolsheviks, and the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic, organized, accordingly, on the territory of the former Bukhara Emirate.

After the territorial demarcation, Orenburg was "withdrawn" from the Kazakh ASSR, whose capital moved to the city of Perovsk (renamed then to Kzyl-Orda, or - translated from Kazakh - Krasnoarmeysk). To the south of the Kazakh Autonomous Republic, two autonomous regions were allocated - Karakalpak and Kara-Kyrgyz. For now, part of the RSFSR.

Eleven years later, in 1936, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan went from being autonomous regions to full-fledged union republics, and the Russian border acquired its current form, roughly corresponding to the borders of the Russian kingdom in the first half of the 17th century.

But in order to appreciate the significance of this shift in the administrative boundaries of the union republics, it is necessary to briefly recall how Russia moved to the southeast from the end of the 16th to the beginning of the 20th century.

SEMEY AND PETROPAVL
In the last year of Ivan the Terrible's life, in 1584, several hundred Don and Lower Volga Cossacks marched east and occupied the lands of the Nogai Khans along the Yaik River. The history of the Yaik Cossack Host began from that moment. After the suppression of the Pugachev rebellion in 1775, the Yaik Host was renamed the Ural Host, and the military capital, Yaitsky Gorodok, founded in the same 1584, was named Uralsk. This city, which retained its historical name, is the oldest in the European part of independent Kazakhstan.

During the reign of Alexei Mikhailovich, in 1640, the merchant Guriy Nazaryev built a fort at the mouth of the Yaik River into the Caspian Sea - the city of Guryev that arose here bore this name until 1991. Now it is the regional center of Atyrau.

Under Peter the Great, in 1718, a detachment of the voivode Vasily Cheredov built the Semipalatnaya fortress in the southern Siberian steppe near the Irtysh, around which the city of Semipalatinsk (now Semey in Kazakhstan) arose. In those same years, in the same place, in the Irtysh region, the Cossacks built the Koryakovsky outpost, where a village of the same name would later arise, which in the 19th century became a city named Pavlodar.

In 1720, by decree of Peter I, the "capital" of Rudny Altai, the fortress of Ust-Kamenogorsk, was founded to strengthen the borders of the Russian state and explore gold veins in the upper reaches of the Irtysh. It is still known as the city of Ust-Kamenogorsk (now the center of the East Kazakhstan region).

Simultaneously with the advancement of the Russian Tsardom, and then the Russian Empire, into the steppe, there was also a counter movement.

In 1731, the Chingizid Abulkhair, khan of the Younger Zhuz (a Kazakh tribal union that roamed from the Southern Urals to the Syr Darya), asked for Russian citizenship, counting on help in the fight against the Dzungar Khanate. Abulkhair and the heads of 27 clans swore allegiance to Empress Anna Ioannovna on the Koran.

But even after this, the southeastern steppes remained permeable to raids on the Russian frontier by slave traders from three Central Asian states, fragments of Tamerlane’s empire – from Bukhara, Khiva and the Kokand Khanate.

Under Elizabeth Petrovna and Catherine the Great, fortified lines were built to protect against the nomadic Dzungars and Kyrgyz-Kaisaks of the Middle Zhuz: the Tobolsk-Ishim and Irtysh lines, from Tomsk and Omsk through Ust-Kamenogorsk to Semipalatinsk. A logical continuation were the defensive lines in the steppes near Orenburg, founded in 1730.

Note that in the first half of the 18th century, with a difference of 12 years, the empire founded two outposts with the same name - Petropavlovsk: on Kamchatka and on the bank of the Irtysh tributary, the Ishim River. In modern Kazakhstani documentation, this city is called Petropavl.

At the beginning of the 19th century, on the frontier from the lower reaches of the Yaik-Ural to Altai, on the lands of the Orenburg and Siberian Cossack troops, there were 46 fortresses and 96 redoubts. But the logic of history prompted the empire to move further south.

OUTRUN THE LION
In the early 1820s, the Kokand Khan carried out a devastating raid on the Kazakh nomad camps. At the same time, the ruler of the Middle Zhuz, Vali Khan, transferred his subjects under the protection of Russia. According to the "Charter on the Siberian Kirghiz" developed under Alexander I, the Kazakhs were introduced to Russian-style governance and legal proceedings. A little later, in 1830, the Cossack outpost of Akmolinsk appeared on the Ishim River, which, after changing many names, became the capital of Kazakhstan - Astana.

In 1839–1840, Russia organized its first campaign against Khiva, the center of the slave trade in Central Asia. Vasily Perovsky’s expedition was unsuccessful, but it was only the beginning of counterattacks in response to the raids.

It was no longer just a matter of protecting villages, peasant settlers and "peaceful foreigners" who had sworn allegiance to Russia, but also of the great game that had begun between two empires, the Russian and the British. The Chinese Qing Empire also laid claim to Central Asia, but its forces were incomparable with the might of the "bear" and the "lion".

The empire was forced to move further, relying on new southern outposts such as Lepsinsk (founded in 1846), the Perovsk fort (Kzyl-Orda) built in 1853, the Vernoye fortification built a year later (also known as the Cossack village of Vernaya, the city of Verny), and, finally, the southern capital of Kazakhstan, Alma-Ata.

In 1865, General Mikhail Chernyaev took Tashkent by storm, which became the main stronghold in the region. Cossacks of the new Semirechye army (with its center in Verny) and settlers from Central Russia rushed here. Thus, in 1868, peasants from the Penza, Samara, Voronezh and Tambov provinces founded the settlement of Pishpek (now the capital of Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek) near the Verny tract. Only later did the Sarts join the Great Russians - sedentary Turks from Tashkent and the centers of the Fergana Valley: Namangan, Kokand and others.

The imperial government abolished the remainder of the Kokand Khanate in 1876. In response to a series of uprisings, troops under the command of the "white general", the future hero of the Russo-Turkish War Mikhail Skobelev, entered the Khan's headquarters. The Russians began to develop the former Kokand lands much earlier. So much so that already in 1869 Mikhail Saltykov-Shchedrin could satirically describe the " Tashkent gentlemen " - officials in the newly annexed territories.

"WHO BUILDS SCHOOLS, BUILDS THE FUTURE"
Events in the Khanate of Khiva and the Emirate of Bukhara developed somewhat differently. In 1866, in the battles of Irdjai and Chapan-Ata, the troops of Adjutant General Konstantin Kaufman routed the army of the Emir of Bukhara, Muzaffar. Two years later, Samarkand was captured. In all cases, Russian soldiers released slaves. In 1868, the Emir of Bukhara concluded an agreement with Russia: the ruler of the faithful retained the throne, but Russia received the right to station garrisons and determine foreign policy. The territories from the Pamirs to the middle reaches of the Amu Darya were no longer in danger of becoming another pearl of the British crown.

A similar fate awaited the Khiva Khanate. After a quick campaign in 1873, Kaufman signed a treaty with Khan Seid Muhammad Rahim II : Khiva freed the slaves and transferred most of its possessions to Russian Turkestan.

In the late 1870s and early 1880s, it was time to "pacify" the warlike Turkmens (some of whom were vassals of Khiva). The port of Krasnovodsk on the Caspian Sea, now called Turkmenbashi, was founded in 1869 by the expedition of General and scientist-geographer Nikolai Stoletov. And since the 1880s, the border village of Askhabad has turned into a fast-growing city, the center of the Trans-Caspian region.

At the same time, "soft power" was taking root in the vassal states. "Whoever builds schools in Bukhara, builds the future" - so said the participant of the Central Asian campaigns, artist Vasily Vereshchagin.

Always.

At the end of the 19th century, with the demarcation of the borders in the Pamirs, the "Great Game" in Central Asia seemed to be won by Russia. According to the 1897 census, of the 7 million 746 thousand inhabitants of Turkestan (present-day Central and Southern Kazakhstan and Central Asia), 770 thousand were Russian-speaking - Great Russians, Little Russians, Belarusians, Poles and Germans.

By 1913, the settlers were cultivating the fields of Semirechye and Fergana, working in the mines of Rudny Altai and in the oil fields of the Ural-Embinsky region, and working on the Trans-Caspian, Semirechye, and Altai railways (the last two lines would serve as the basis for the Soviet Turksib). One of the elements of Pyotr Stolypin's agrarian reform was the project to resettle 100,000 peasants from the central provinces to Turkestan.

ANOTHER "BALKANS"
As for the indigenous population, the situation was almost as confusing as the infamous ethnic patchwork in the Balkans.

Under the rule of the rulers of Bukhara and Khiva and in Russian Turkestan lived the Turkic-speaking Uzbeks and "Kipchaks" (as the ruling class called themselves), Turkmens and Karakalpaks close to the Kazakhs. But in the same Bukhara and Samarkand lived many who spoke Persian and called themselves Tajiks. Often people who spoke different languages settled in different quarters of the same city. This was the case, for example, in the settlement of Dushanbe-Kurgan, the current capital of Tajikistan.

The ethnonyms were not established either - the Kazakh zhuzes were called Kyrgyz and Kyrgyz-Kaisaks for a long time, and the modern Kyrgyz ethnic group was called Kara-Kirghiz. It was quite complicated with the above-mentioned Sarts, who simply spoke "Turkic", but often had Persian roots.

And this ethnic diversity, after the upheavals of the civil war and the “march of Soviet power,” had to be territorially demarcated.

According to a number of authors, the civil strife in Central Asia lasted not from 1918 to 1922, but from 1916 (a series of uprisings of the local population against mobilization for rear work, the Russian administration and settlers) until the suppression of organized Basmachi by the end of the 1930s.

The history of the civil war in Turkestan requires a detailed description. Let us just note that, for example, the Fergana Peasant Army under the command of Konstantin Monstrov, a migrant from Syzran, managed to fight for both the Reds and Kolchak's forces. Both times against the Basmachi, who were slaughtering settlers.

And the former leader of the Young Turks, Enver Pasha, who had moved to Turkestan, first acted on the side of the Red Army as an emissary of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR to combat the Basmachi, and soon as a kurbashi (general) of the Basmachi with the blessing of the Emir of Bukhara. But in all cases, this nationalist pan-Turkist acted against the settlers. "Things are going the way I wanted... Many Russians were killed," Enver reported in 1921.

"THERE WAS A FIERCE STRUGGLE"
Despite all the confusion “on the ground,” the Soviet government steadfastly followed the general line formulated in Vladimir Lenin’s letter to the communists of Turkestan in November 1919: “Make every effort to prove… the sincerity of our desire to eradicate all traces of Great Russian imperialism.”

As in other outskirts of the former empire, the party in the 1920s relied on the nationally minded intelligentsia. In the case of Bukhara and Khiva, this was the left wing of the Jadids (“enlighteners,” nationalists, and Islamic modernists), who, in particular, proposed using the original Turkic ethnonym “Uzbek” instead of the word of unclear origin “Sart.”

In 1920, under the supervision of Mikhail Frunze and his troops, "revolutions" took place in the multi-ethnic Bukhara and Khiva. But the overthrow of the emir and khan and the creation of republics under flags with a crescent, star, sickle and hammer were only an interim solution. Then it was time for "national building".

As Vyacheslav Molotov recalled at the end of his life, the implementation of Lenin’s national policy in Central Asia was entirely the merit of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Joseph Stalin, as a great specialist in nationality affairs (and the People’s Commissar for the field in 1917–1923).

"The creation of the Central Asian republics and the border was entirely Stalin's work. There was a fierce struggle. The Kazakhs, for example, their top brass, fought for Tashkent, wanted it to be their capital... Stalin gathered them... looked at the borders and said: Tashkent to the Uzbeks, and Verny, Alma-Ata to the Kazakhs," Molotov said. An equally difficult task was how to divide the Khorezm oasis between the new national states, the Uzbek and Turkmen SSRs. Or how to divide the Fergana Valley between Uzbekistan and the Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Region, still part of the Russian Federal Republic.

However, as recent history has shown, the “filigree” of national borders with enclaves and semi-enclaves did not protect against ethnic cleansing (for example, the massacre in Osh, Kyrgyzstan, in 1990) or border conflicts in the 2020s.

The fact that the city of Skobelev (Fergana) should go to Uzbekistan, Krasnovodsk to Turkmenistan, and Przhevalsk (modern name Karakol) to Kyrgyzstan, did not raise any questions in 1925. It is also not surprising that, in fulfillment of the “desire to eradicate traces of Great Russian chauvinism,” the Kazakh ASSR with its capital in Orenburg included cities of the former Ural, Omsk and Semipalatinsk regions of the Russian Empire.

As is known, in the discussions of 1922 on the principles of creating the Soviet state, "People's Commissariat of Nationalities" Stalin defended the plan of autonomization. National formations were to become a garland of autonomies around the Russian SFSR without the right to secede.

But - again, as is well known - in Moscow in 1922, the Leninist approach of creating equal Soviet states (as the core of the communist " United States of the World ") with the right of each national republic to secession prevailed. Stalin accepted this principle and continued to adhere to it in the 1930s and 1940s, when creating new SSRs - Kazakh, Kirghiz, Tajik and others.

The Central Asian countries that emerged in 1991 within the administrative borders drawn in 1925 have emerged as national states with which modern Russia maintains friendly and, in some cases, allied relations. But for the fact that in the 1990s Russians and other “non-titular peoples” who had lived here for generations found themselves in the position of unwanted migrants, one cannot help but say “thank you” to the creators of Lenin’s national policy.

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Syria-Lebanon-Iran

'They Kill Everyone': How Central Asian Militants Carried Out Massacre in Syria

2025-03-12

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Sergey Adamov

[REGNUM] The past few days in Syria have seen an unprecedented surge in violence against local religious minorities: Alawite Muslims and Christians. Social media has been rocked by hundreds of videos in which militants proudly documented their crimes, including mass murders of unarmed people and public torture.

Throughout the conflict, Regnum correspondents were in contact with residents of the Syrian coast, thanks to which they were able to collect dozens of testimonies from civilians about crimes committed by militants.

Eyewitnesses note that militants of foreign origin, natives of Central Asia and the Caucasus, who are noticeably different from Arabs in appearance and stand out against their background, showed particular cruelty in reprisals against the civilian population.

A longstanding problem in the region.

A Red Crescent volunteer, who witnessed mass executions, spoke about the atrocities of foreigners. "The murders are happening for no reason, it is not the military or soldiers who are doing this. These are foreigners - Afghans, Uzbeks, Uighurs," said the author of the video, published on social networks.

Now the new Syrian authorities are arresting civilians for communicating with the media (primarily with the Russian media), so all reports from sources are published anonymously. However, oral testimonies can only serve as confirmation of the crimes in which natives of the Caucasus and Central Asia took part, who do not hide their goals: to create a monolithic society in Syria, united by a radical ideology, in order to carry this ideology further.

GUESTS FROM THE EAST
Militants of foreign origin first appeared in Syria during the first stage of the civil war in 2011–2012. The leadership of the Al-Qaeda* movement called on Central Asians to participate in military operations in the Middle East.

Terrorists from Uzbekistan (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, IMU), Tajikistan and the Caucasus (Anjad-Kavkaz*)

…or Ajnad al-Kavkaz, Chechen group that split off from Caucasus Emirate…

were able to penetrate through Turkey into the northern regions of Syria, where they came into direct contact with the local branch of Al-Qaeda*, the Jabhat al-Nusra* group (later Hayat Tahrir al-Sham*).

Later, militants from among ethnic Uyghurs, representatives of the so-called “East Turkestan Islamic Movement” (ETIM)*, appeared on the territory of Syria.

The formed "terrorist international" took part in battles against government troops and by 2015 was able to establish control over the province of Idlib. A number of groups received their "allotments", for example, the Uyghurs settled in the area of the city of Jisr al-Shughur, and the Caucasians - the outskirts of Idlib.

The region has become a “promised land” for terrorists from all over the world, who have found in Idlib a safe haven and a springboard for planning attacks around the world. In the fall of 2024, it was these formations, as the most motivated, that took part in the offensive on Aleppo, which ended with the fall of the city, and subsequently the collapse of the government of Bashar al-Assad.

IN A NEW ROLE
The "revolutionary" government of Syria has praised the role of foreign formations, granting all foreign fighters Syrian citizenship and effectively legalizing their status.

Now the former “exiles” have become full-fledged citizens, and, what’s more, 100% loyal to the new regime.

The exact number of foreign fighters is unknown. According to Tajik authorities in 2024, there were about 400 Tajik citizens in the Syrian province of Idlib. The total number of "insurgents" in the ranks of the new Syrian army, according to various estimates, ranges from 5,000 to 10,000 people.

Former mercenaries received high positions in the new government.

For example, a native of Tajikistan, Saifiddin Tadjiboev, who was wanted in his home country on charges of terrorism and mercenarism, was appointed commander of the operational headquarters in the new government’s Ministry of Defense.

ON THE EVE OF THE MASSACRE
Since the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad's government, members of ethnic and religious minorities in Syria have lived in constant fear.

The new authorities in Damascus have officially declared that they will not persecute representatives of any community. Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa (aka Mohammed Julani) has demonstratively met with heads of Christian churches, promising protection and patronage.

However, already in the first days of the "new Syria" a wave of attacks on churches and representatives of religious minorities swept across the country. Even then, militants of foreign origin distinguished themselves separately, simply ignoring Damascus' calls for religious tolerance and disarmament.

In the following months, it was these same formations that spread across the entire Syrian coast, viewing the region and its inhabitants as fair game.

After the first open clashes broke out, a total mobilization of radicals and their supporters, a kind of "activists", was declared in the neighboring provinces of Hama and Idlib, who were joined by local residents who wanted to rob their Alawite neighbors. However, the backbone of the "cleansing" forces was made up of armed foreigners.

Footage taken by a militant of Chechen origin, commenting on the events in Syria in Russian, is being published online. "There will be no mercy," the author of the videos says, showing footage of terrorist columns being transferred to Latakia. "We continue to clean up," reads the caption to the video of armored vehicles being deployed on the streets of coastal cities.

Over the following days, Regnum correspondents maintained round-the-clock contact with residents of the Syrian coast, receiving information about what was happening first-hand.

This is how residents of the city of Baniyas describe the first night of the pogroms: “Towards evening, the power went out in our neighborhood. Then groups of pogromists began to enter from different sides, they broke into cars, robbed stores, threw stones at windows. They were followed by armed people who went from house to house. They came to our neighbors’ house with a can of paint, they “marked” people, painted their faces black, insulted them, and then left threats and insults on the walls.”

Among the attackers, local residents particularly noted militants with a characteristic Turkic appearance, often not speaking Arabic. According to eyewitnesses, it was they who showed particular cruelty. An audio recording with instructions calling on local residents "loyal" to the government was distributed, calling on them not to go out into the streets. The voice on the recording says that "Uzbek and Chechen mujahideen" do not differentiate between Sunnis and Shiites and kill everyone.

BLOODY MARCH 8TH
By the morning of the second day of the conflict, the regime had managed to concentrate enough forces on the coast to conduct all-out raids. The Islamists were particularly brutal in the Alawite areas outside the Syrian coast, in the provinces of Hama and Homs.

Tellingly, foreign fighters did not hide their participation in the massacre. In the area of the city of Jabla, a group of Uzbek natives was “spotted”, broadcasting live from the scene and streaming in the Uzbek language. The fighters, belonging to the group “Tawhid wal Jihad”*, told their audience that they had come to Latakia “to punish the infidels” and shared their “political program”.

In particular, they propose that the new Syrian authorities "cleanse" the region and populate it with "faithful Muslims." Syrian Christians are offered either to convert to Islam or to pay "jizya" for life - a tax on non-Muslims in Koranic law.

How traditional.

In fact, we are talking about a doctrine of genocide, which provides for the extermination of the indigenous population, followed by its replacement by “faithful” ones.

Convert, pay jizya, or die. Sometimes only the third is on offer.

In order to more actively populate the coast with "faithful" militants from Central Asia took part in the massacre of Alawites in the village of al-Tuwaim in Hama province. In the "final" round, the radicals beat to death about 15 children aged between one and ten years. Some of the residents of Hama were able to hide in the mountains, but now these people are afraid to return to their homes.

"When we heard about the beginning of the conflict, my relatives were able to leave. There were old people left in the village who asked to leave them. We know that they have been killed now. Somewhere in the houses there are bodies that no one has removed because people are afraid to return for a long time. All the men were killed, some women have disappeared, and no one knows where they are," the source told IA Regnum.

DENOUEMENT
By the morning of March 9, the militants had reached the epicenter of the conflict, the city of Jabla, after which another wave of violence swept through the surrounding villages. In one of the videos made in the vicinity of Jabla, the militants filmed a residential building they had set on fire. "Look, the house of the Alawites is burning!" one of the authors of the video says.

Throughout the day, terrorist gangs continued to repeatedly "cleanse" populated areas, often shooting at everyone they encountered without distinction. At the same time, the heads of Syria's Christian churches issued a joint statement calling for an immediate end to the violence. The "world community" also joined the call, albeit belatedly.

Local residents report that a “clean-up” has begun in the cities of Baniyas, Tartus and Latakia: militants are removing corpses from city streets and even washing blood off the asphalt in preparation for the arrival of foreign journalists.

In a separate statement, Ahmed al-Sharaa said the government would set up a "commission" to investigate "incidents of violence" on the coast, but locals were under no illusions.

"We are still afraid to leave our homes now, no one can assess the damage done. Those who survived were left without all their property, others without their families. We will never forget these two terrible days. Now there is a "roll call" in the chats, we are looking for our own. But we know that there will be no justice for the criminals," the Syrians believe.

Events in Syria have vividly confirmed the worst fears about the prospects for a peaceful settlement in that country. But whatever their consequences, it is absolutely clear that terrorist groups operating in Syria pose a threat far beyond its borders, and that their militants may fall victim to far more than just Syrian ethno-confessional minorities.

People from post-Soviet countries who “distinguished themselves” by committing mass murders probably dream of returning to their native lands and repeating the same thing in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and, of course, in Russia.

Of course.

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China-Japan-Koreas

'The Failure of the Insignificant': How Lenin and the British Credited Japan with Victory in 1905

2025-03-11

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Stanislav Smirnov

[REGNUM] Exactly 120 years ago, on March 10, 1905, the largest battle of the Russo-Japanese War ended - the Battle of Mukden. It is generally accepted that the three-week heavy fighting ended with a victory for the Japanese, which provoked a crisis of autocracy, and ultimately its collapse. After all, Port Arthur fell shortly before Mukden, which means the fate of the campaign was predetermined. With a calm and thoughtful analysis, such a dogma turns out to be untenable, conditioned by political considerations.

In essence, this is the point of view of Russia's opponents, which found its most concentrated expression in the interpretations of Vladimir Lenin, and those in turn were declared by Soviet historiography to be the ultimate truth. If the facts contradicted them, so much the worse for the facts.

But before assessing the nature and significance of the key episode of the Russo-Japanese War, let us recall where and how the battle unfolded.

Arrangement of the "figures" and plans of the parties

The Battle of Mukden took place in a space divided by the South Manchurian Railway into two parts: the western plain and the eastern mountainous part. An additional external factor was the weather - in early March there was a severe frost in this part of Manchuria.

By that time, the three Russian armies had 330,000 combat personnel with 1,266 guns and 56 machine guns. Nicholas II entrusted the overall command to General Alexei Kuropatkin, commander-in-chief of "all land and sea forces operating against Japan." The military leader had previously proven himself in the conquest and development of Turkestan and was considered well acquainted with military operations in steppe and desert conditions - in addition to our campaigns in Central Asia, he had a French military expedition to the Sahara to his credit. In 1898-1904, he held the post of Minister of War.

Kuropatkin's troops stood on a front about 150 km long. On the right flank were the positions of the 2nd Army of General Alexei Kaulbars, consisting of the 1st Siberian and the 8th and 10th Army Corps. The left flank was occupied by the 1st Army of Nikolai Linevich - the 2nd, 3rd, 4th Siberian and 1st Army Corps. The defense of the center was entrusted to the 3rd Army of General Alexander Bilderling, made up of the 5th and 6th Siberian and 17th Army Corps. The flanks were covered by the cavalry of General Pavel Mishchenko and a detachment of Colonel Maslov.

The enemy forces numbered 270,000 men, 1,062 guns and 200 machine guns. Emperor Meiji entrusted the command to Marshal Prince Iwao Oyama, one of the creators of the modern Japanese army. Oyama advanced the troops, dividing them into three groups.

Opposing Kaulbars's positions were the 2nd Army of Hakushaku (Count) General Yasukata Oku and the 3rd Army of General Maresuki Nogi. Linevich's troops were also threatened by two large formations - the 1st Army of General Tamemotu Kuroki and the 5th Army of Kageki Kawamura. The center was occupied by the 4th Army of Marshal Michitsura Nozu.

Let us add that Marshal Oyama kept a reserve force in reserve - a division and three brigades with a total strength of 30 thousand bayonets with 170 guns.

Both sides planned to play "on the offensive".

Our command intended to strike a decisive blow at the Japanese left flank. The enemy also expected to strike at the flanks, mainly the right. In general, Oyama, who as a young officer in 1870 personally witnessed the total defeat of the French by the Prussians at the Battle of Sedan, wanted to repeat the same scheme: divide the troops into three parts and encircle the enemy.

But the battle made adjustments to the participants’ plans.

THE COURSE OF THE BATTLE
At first, the Russian command planned an offensive, but intelligence data on the redeployment of enemy forces forced them to change the plan and go on the defensive. The approaches to Mukden were well equipped in engineering terms and included four lines of fortifications - forts, redoubts, lunettes.

On February 6, the advance units of General Kawamura's 5th Japanese Army launched an offensive, attacking the positions of our 11th Infantry Division on the Tsinghechen Heights. Then Kuroki's 1st Army went on the offensive. The actions on our left flank against the troops of Linevich's 1st Army were more of a demonstration, while the main attack was carried out on the right, with the intention of making a deep envelopment and reaching the rear of the defenders of Mukden.

The maneuver was carried out by Nogi's 3rd Army, secretly concentrated on the Taizihe River line and beginning the operation on February 13. The Japanese offensive encountered staunch resistance from Russian troops. Nevertheless, on February 22, at the cost of enormous losses, the enemy managed to approach Mukden to within 12 km from the west with the intention of striking our communications and rear. The 5th Army continued its offensive from the southeast, which created the possibility of encircling the main forces of the Manchurian armies.

In view of this threat, Commander-in-Chief Kuropatkin gave the order to withdraw troops to Telin, where new fortifications were created.

Our Manchurian armies successfully emerged from the emerging "bag". Only the rearguards and supply trains covering the retreat were cut off, which led to the partial capture of personnel from a number of batteries and infantry regiments, in particular, the 55th Podolsk and 241st Orsk.

In the twenty-day Mukden battle, the Japanese command made a desperate and, as it turned out later, last attempt to utterly defeat the Russian army in order to end the war under the dictation of their conditions. However, this did not happen, the "Manchu Sedan" planned by Marshal Oyama failed.

THE AFTERMATH OF MUKDEN. WHO IS DEFEATED?
The enemy's partially successful envelopment of Russian positions had one undoubted consequence - another, albeit not perfectly executed, retreat of the Manchurian armies to previously prepared lines in the area of the city of Sipingai.

At Mukden, the Russian army lost about 90,000 killed and wounded, with another 30,000 missing or captured. The Japanese lost at least 70,000 men, with several hundred captured.

Assessing the outcome of the Battle of Mukden, the modern historian Konstantin Zalessky writes:

“In the Battle of Mukden, neither side achieved a decisive victory, but the Japanese losses were higher; at the same time, the withdrawal of Russian troops and the occupation of Mukden by the Japanese gave Tokyo the opportunity to declare its victory.”

The news of this imaginary victory was carried by the British agency Reuters (London formally occupied a neutral position in the Russo-Japanese War) across the globe and was picked up by numerous enemies of Russia, and then, with their light hand, it firmly entered school textbooks as a historical fact.

A THWARTED BLITZKRIEG OR “CRIMINAL NEGLECT”?
In reality, everything was the other way around.

The "draw" at Mukden was fatal for Japan, because after this battle Tokyo had no forces left to continue the war. Since February 1905, the Japanese army was unable to carry out a single major offensive operation.

At the same time, Russia easily closed the gap that had formed in the personnel of its armies and continued to systematically increase its combat power. It was this circumstance that put the Japanese leadership in front of the threat of an imminent, inevitable defeat and led to the activation of Japanese diplomacy and intelligence - in establishing contacts and making deals with the revolutionary underground with the aim of undermining the Russian rear.

The leader of the left-radical faction in the RSDLP, Vladimir Ulyanov (Lenin), “predicted” Russia’s defeat back in November 1904, when the war was just beginning. “ The government will inevitably become entangled in that shameful and criminal Manchurian adventure, which brings with it a political crisis both in the event of a decisive military defeat and in the event of a protracted war that is hopeless for Russia,” wrote the Bolshevik leader from the Geneva exile.

Commenting on the capture of Port Arthur by the Japanese in January 1905, Lenin wrote in an article that became a textbook example in Soviet times:

"The generals and commanders turned out to be incompetents and nonentities. The entire history of the 1904 campaign was, according to the authoritative testimony of one English military observer (in the Times), "a criminal disregard for the elementary principles of naval and land strategy." References to British experts were intended to confirm the general conclusion: defeat in war creates favorable ground for public indignation, and therefore revolution.

But let us ask ourselves: how did things really stand and, in particular, was the military art of the Japanese really so great?

PLAYING WITH NUMBERS
As the Soviet military historian Alexander Sorokin noted in his fundamental 1956 work on the Russo-Japanese War: "The Japanese generals were no higher in military terms than the Russians. This was confirmed at Mukden. Even in a favorable situation, with the passivity of the Russian command, the Japanese generals were unable to accomplish the task set - to encircle and destroy the Russian troops."

Of great importance for the analysis and evaluation of the results of battles and the war as a whole are data on the balance of power between the opposing sides and the extent of their losses.

Most works on the history of the Russo-Japanese War, domestic and foreign, usually cite the same figures. They migrate from one book to another, without being questioned or critically analyzed.

However, there are grounds for such doubts, if only because the data used by the authors on the number of troops and the size of the losses of the Japanese army are based primarily on the data of its own command. As the researchers note, the Japanese military initially sought to hide information on the number of their armed forces and losses, while at the same time publicizing deliberately distorted statistics that were advantageous to them.

Such data were published or transferred to the allies in a confidential manner and immediately became public knowledge, being carried around the world by wire agencies and influential British media such as the London Times or the Reuters agency. They were also disseminated by the Russian press.

In reality, the picture was quite different, as indicated by the fact that official Japanese figures often look contradictory and unconvincing. This circumstance was noted by members of the military-historical commission of the Russian General Staff, the authors of a nine-volume work on the history of the war, published in 1910.

They used Japanese data on numbers and losses (for lack of other data), but with serious reservations and often refutations.

Thus, analyzing the official data of the enemy on the number of killed and wounded in the Battle of Mukden (41 thousand people), the commission came to the conclusion that they were underestimated by more than half, while the real amount of bloody losses of the Japanese army at Mukden was no less than 67,500 people.

The table provides data on losses in the main battles of the Russo-Japanese War, taken from the publication of the military-historical commission of the Russian General Staff, supplemented by figures from the Great Russian Encyclopedia (Liaoyang, Port Arthur, “for the entire war”).

Let us emphasize that the figure for the loss of our armies at Mukden (89,423 people) includes 29,330 people taken prisoner, while the bloody losses in this battle were, as stated above, less than the Japanese: 60,093 people against more than 70,000, and it is significant that the Japanese command reported losses of only 41,000 people.

It should also be noted that, while the total losses of both sides were equal throughout the war (270,000 people), as reported by the Great Russian Encyclopedia, the number of those killed in the Japanese army was significantly greater than in the Russian: 86 thousand people versus 50 thousand.

Soviet historian and professor at the General Staff Academy Nikolai Levitsky provided more detailed figures for total losses. According to his data, the total number of Japanese army officers killed and hospitalized wounded and sick amounted to 689,000 people, while "Russia's total losses in people for the combat front, including those killed, wounded, missing, and evacuated due to illness," did not exceed 400,000 people.

If we add to the above that during the war the population of Japan and Russia was 45 million and 140 million people, respectively, then it becomes clear why already in the spring of 1905 the Land of the Rising Sun persistently asked for peace.

In light of all this, both the Japanese victory in the war and our supposedly “crushing” and “shameful” defeat are nothing more than political speculation, a malicious myth.

NOT AN INCH OF LAND, NOT A RUBLE OF REPARATIONS
The Battle of Mukden and the naval battle in the Tsushima Strait are entrenched in the public consciousness as the main events of the "lost" war with Japan. However, Mukden was not a rout, and Tsushima did not play a major role, since the fate of the campaign was decided on land.

All the retreats of the Russian army have a simple explanation: the numerical superiority of the Japanese, not only in the initial phase of the war, when their army had a huge strategic advantage and a threefold superiority in forces, but also in the subsequent period (Liaoyang, Mukden), when this superiority was maintained despite the arrival of reinforcements from the European part of Russia throughout 1904.

The very fact that offensive operations require a significant superiority in forces (and all the Japanese battles were offensive in nature) proves that they had such an advantage up until Mukden. Under these conditions, the strategy of retreating and avoiding a decisive battle until the Russian forces had gained an undoubted advantage was completely justified.

The build-up of these forces proceeded at a rapid pace from the beginning of 1905.

Our combat power grew rapidly, while Japan's steadily declined. Our defeats were conditional, if not imaginary: the Russian Manchurian armies were never surrounded and destroyed. While "losing" individual battles, Russia won the war as a whole.

This explains why Tokyo eventually asked for peace, and its Western patrons (England, the USA) did everything to ensure that peace was achieved as quickly as possible. In Portsmouth, Russia essentially spoke to its enemy from a position of strength. Nicholas II's concessions were minimal: not an inch of Russian land (except for half of the already lost Sakhalin), not a ruble of reparations.

It is not without reason that in Japan the results of the war were perceived as a defeat. It would have been even more crushing (in view of the changed balance of forces) if internal and external enemies had not managed to ignite revolutionary unrest in the rear of warring Russia. But this is a separate topic.

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Syria-Lebanon-Iran

SDF claims foreign nationals among Manbij attackers

2025-01-03

[Rudaw] The Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on Thursday claimed to have repelled several attacks near Manbij and Tishreen Dam by Syrian National Army (SNA) turbans, alleging the presence of Chechen, Turkestani, and Uzbek nationals among the attackers.

"With the participation of hundreds of mercenaries, including members of the so-called ’Guardians of Religion organization’ from Uzbek, Turkestani, and Chechen nationalities, the Ottoman Turkish occupation and its mercenaries launched ~~violent~~ mostly peaceful attacks" read a statement from the SDF.

The al-Qaeda-aligned Hurras al-Din (Guardians of Religion) group broke away from Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, formerly al-Nusra, before that it was called something else

Tahrir al-Sham, formerly al-Nusra, before that it was called something else

...al-Qaeda's Syrian affiliate, from which sprang the Islamic State...
(HTS) in 2018. Since then, the two groups have competed for influence and territory, with HTS periodically arresting Hurras al-Din members, particularly in 2020, and engaging in conflicts with the group. There have been attempts to reconcile their differences.

The US Central Command (CENTCOM), which oversees American troops in the Middle East, has repeatedly reported conducting strikes against Hurras al-Din members and leaders, viewing the group as a threat to its allies and American presence in the region.

In 2023, the US designated Sami Mahmud Mohammed al Uraydi, a leader of the Hurras al-Din, as "a Specially Designated Global Terrorist," offering a reward of up to five million dollars for information on his identification or location.

The SDF has been the main ally of the US-led global coalition against ISIS on the ground.

The SDF statement added that they countered the attacks, destroying six armored vehicles as well as killing and wounding "dozens of mercenaries."

Last month, the United States brokered a ceasefire between the SDF and ~~The Sick Man of Europe~~ Turkey
...a NATO
...the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A collection of multinational and multilingual and multicultural armed forces, all of differing capabilities, working toward a common goal by pulling in different directions...
member, but not the most reliable...
, though Ankara denied having agreed to the arrangement.

However,
some men learn by reading. A few learn by observation. The rest have to pee on the electric fence for themselves...
there have been reports of continued festivities between the SDF and the SNA which has recently launched expanded attacks on the SDF, particularly near the strategic Tishreen Dam on the Euphrates River.

The Pentagon emphasized on Monday that the ceasefire is "still holding."

Link

Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia

Why Rostov is Great. How the 'wrong' Tolstoy wrote ancient Russian history

2025-01-02

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Mikhail Moshkin

[REGNUM] On December 28, Vladimir Putin signed the previously approved parliamentary renaming of the city of Rostov in the Yaroslavl region to Rostov the Great. The initiative to change the name of the oldest city of the Golden Ring was introduced to the State Duma by Yaroslavl regional deputies back in October, and the bill was approved by the State Duma on November 17.

Adding the epithet "Great" to the official name of the city will not only consolidate the historically established name, but will also correspond to the cultural and historical status - such arguments were given by the government in its response. And, we will add, now there will be fewer reasons to confuse the two Rostovs - the ancient capital city on Lake Nero and the "new building" from the time of Empress Elizabeth Petrovna on the Don.

With similar goals in mind, Novgorod was made Great again in 1999. It had been called that way before, unofficially, to clarify that it was not Nizhny that was meant. And now the titles of the Novgorod Republic times have been officially restored. With the expression "Lord (or Gospodar) Veliky Novgorod" known from the epics, everything is clear - it has been recorded since the 14th century, since the fourth century after the city's foundation. But with Rostov the Great, everything, as they say, is not so clear.

This story, like the onions for which the Yaroslavl region is famous, has several layers.

The first, superficial layer: the expression “Rostov the Great” is almost colloquial, and it appeared in order not to confuse the tourist town on the Golden Ring with Rostov-papa.

The second layer is a little deeper. The name "Rostov the Great" appeared many centuries before the fortress of St. Demetrius of Rostov was built on the Don in 1761. Rostov was called Great if not in the legendary eras before the Varangians were called to Russia (in the "Tale of Bygone Years" it is written that Rurik " began to distribute cities to his men: Polotsk to this one, Rostov to this one", which means that a city with this name already existed), then under the first known prince of Rostov and the greatest of the Kiev princes, Yaroslav the Wise. In any case, since time immemorial.

This version is popular, sounds quite plausible, and respects the city, first mentioned in 862, perhaps later than Kiev or Veliky Novgorod, but almost three centuries earlier than Moscow. After all, in Soviet dictionaries and encyclopedias, for example, in the Encyclopedic Dictionary of 1955 or in the Soviet Historical Encyclopedia, they wrote directly: "Known in Ancient Rus under the name Rostov the Great" or "Rostov Yaroslavsky, in the 12th-17th centuries Rostov the Great."

Rostov the Great has long been called so and rightfully so. At least, this is what the “second layer” version says, briefly formulated in a recent TASS report : “Rostov the Great, founded in 862 by Rurik, is the oldest of the cities of the Golden Ring. ”

But the third level is where the revelations begin. If you go to the website of the Rostov Kremlin State Museum-Reserve, you can find an article published in 1999 by its research fellow, historian Sergei Sazonov. The scientist refutes the established version, but no refutations of Sazonov's version have appeared since then. Moreover, the Rostov historian did not "rip off the covers," but reminded us of a half-forgotten fact.

"During the 19th and 20th centuries, the name of the city of Rostov with the definition "Great" became widespread in literature. An earlier use of this definition is found in 1847 in the work of M. Tolstoy " Ancient Shrines of Rostov the Great ". Judging by the fact that the author considered it necessary to explain to the reader the reasons that allowed him to include the definition "Great" in the name of the city, he had no predecessors," wrote Sazonov.

That is, it turns out that not under Rurik, not under Yaroslav the Wise, and not in the 12th century, but in 1847 the name came from the pen of an almost contemporary author. Then, at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, the name “Rostov the Great” gets into the Brockhaus and Efron Encyclopedia, and from there into popular and even respectable pre-revolutionary and Soviet publications.

The author of the article about the "ancient shrines of Rostov", from which the name "Rostov the Great" went viral, is Mikhail Vladimirovich Tolstoy, a representative of the count's family, as ramified as the Rurikovich family. A contemporary of the famous distant relatives Lev Nikolaevich and Alexei Konstantinovich, a cousin of Dmitry Andreevich Tolstoy, the chief prosecutor of the Synod and the president of the Academy of Sciences.

Count Mikhail Tolstoy himself, now completely forgotten, was known as a historian, albeit with a narrow specialization - as a church historian. More precisely, a church historian. His most famous work is "The Life and Miracles of St. Nicholas the Wonderworker." The Count also wrote "Lives of the Saints of God Who Lived within the Borders of the Current Yaroslavl Diocese," a description of the holy places of Pskov and Rostov the Great. But strictly speaking, Mikhail Tolstoy was not a medievalist, that is, a specialist in the Middle Ages.

Rostov the Great appeared from the pen of Count Tolstoy and subsequent authors in an atmosphere of a kind of “historical romanticism” of the times of Nicholas I and Alexander II, notes historian Sazonov.

A modern specialist writes: “The fact that this innovation turned out to be so tenacious… indicates the presence of some rational basis in it, satisfying the real need for a more precise identification of the city.” That is, the need not to confuse Rostov in the Yaroslavl province (and then region) with Rostov-on-Don.

So, we are back to the beginning, to the first, most "vulgar" version of the origin of the name? And the antiquity of the name "Rostov the Great" is a fake, like the "Veles Book", "Great Tartary" or "Slavic Vedas"? Not quite so, or even not at all so.

But to understand it you will have to get down to the fourth level.

Mikhail Tolstoy may have been a romantic conservative with a penchant for fantasy, but he was not a falsifier. And in his conclusions, the Count relied on one specific fact. Specifically, on the Ipatiev Chronicle, or more precisely on the entry in it from the summer of 6659 from the creation of the world (1159 AD).

It tells of one of the episodes of the then "game of thrones" - the war for the Kiev "table", which the Rostov-Suzdal prince Yuri Dolgoruky waged with his nephews Izyaslav and Rostislav Mstislavich. At a certain point, the nephews were supported by Yuri Dolgoruky's elder brother, Prince Vyacheslav Vladimirovich.

Prince Yuri Dolgoruky at the city walls. Miniature from the chronicles
And so, in the midst of civil strife, Vyacheslav writes to his brother Yuri, persuading him: abandon your claims to the Kiev throne and go home - "to your Pereyaslavl and to Kuresk (that is, to Kursk)... and there you have Rostov the Great." That is, " and there you have Rostov the Great."

On this basis, Mikhail Vladimirovich Tolstoy in his article of 1847 made Rostov Great again. He does, however, state there that "Rostov is called Great in many places in the chronicles." But this, as modern historians believe, is already the count's fantasy.

After this paragraph of the Ipatiev Chronicle, the combination "Rostov the Great" does not appear in any chronicle or source of all subsequent centuries. Historian Sergei Sazonov, citing the chronicle, believes that "Rostov the Great" is simply "Rostov the Great, rich, populous." But this, we note, is also just a version.

And most importantly, the debates about the antiquity of the name do not cancel out the real historical greatness of this city, whose inhabitants were baptized a little later than in Kiev, and became the conductors of the Orthodox faith and culture throughout the north-east of Europe. From the time of the baptizer of Rus' Vladimir the Saint until the Mongol invasion, Rostov was the main center of the north-eastern possessions of the large (though not very friendly) Rurikovich family.

The Rostov-Suzdal prince was the founder of Moscow, Yuri Dolgoruky, and only under his son Andrei Bogolyubsky did the primacy among cities pass from Suzdal and Rostov to Vladimir. But even later the city remained a stronghold of Russian Orthodoxy, especially from the end of the 17th century, when under Metropolitan Jonah a grandiose bishop's residence was founded, now known as the Rostov Kremlin.

Even after the provincial reform of Catherine II, when the city became a district town, Rostov did not become a backwater - only the Nizhny Novgorod Fair could compete with the Rostov Fair, which arose at the end of the 18th century, and local merchants traded in St. Petersburg, Moscow, the Volga region and even Turkestan. At the same time, one of the main local crafts with an "ancient" flair arose - Rostov enamel, painting on enamel, which became one of Russia's export brands, in demand from Greek monasteries to Parisian exhibitions.

And the fact that it was Rostov that “played the role” of medieval Moscow in Leonid Gaidai’s “non-science fiction, not entirely realistic and not strictly historical film” “Ivan Vasilyevich Changes Profession” is in itself a contribution to Russian culture, now of modern times.

One can agree with senator from the Yaroslavl region Natalia Kosikhina, when in August she called the renaming of Rostov an important step towards a “new prosperous future” for the city itself and its residents – there will be more opportunities for the development of ancient crafts and new start-ups, tourism and more.

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Syria-Lebanon-Iran

Syria after Assad: what will happen to Christians, Russian military bases and US interests

2024-12-10

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Kirill Semenov

[REGNUM] Now former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad resigned on Sunday, December 8, ordered a peaceful transfer of power and left Syria. The TASS news agency later reported that he and his family had arrived in Moscow, where they had been offered asylum.

Earlier, armed opposition forces, continuing their victorious march that began just over 10 days ago, occupied Homs in the north and Daraa to the south of Damascus and advanced unhindered toward the Syrian capital, taking it under full control on the same day that marked the fall of the Assad dynasty, which had ruled Syria for more than 50 years.

Meanwhile, in Damascus, which had fallen into the hands of the armed Syrian opposition, its leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani delivered a speech on Syrian state television that ended with the words “the future is ours,” then visited the Umayyad Mosque. In a show of his efforts to ensure an orderly transition, Jolani said that Syrian state institutions would remain under the supervision of Assad’s appointed prime minister until the full transfer of power.

In turn, when the rebels entered the government palace, its chairman Mohammad Ghazi al-Jalali said he was ready to work with any leadership and called for unity.

"We are ready to cooperate, and all the property of the people and the institutions of the Syrian state must be preserved," he said, adding that " they belong to all Syrians."

Jolani also banned entry into government offices and ministries so that they could continue to operate until a new transitional government was established.

THE FATE OF RUSSIAN BASES
In Russia the flags of the old regime were quietly removed from Syrian diplomatic institutions, which indicates a peaceful transition of power and that there will be no “government in exile,” and that dialogue will be conducted with those who currently rule the country from Damascus.

The issue that is most pressing for Russia now is the fate of two Russian military bases in Syria – the Khmeimim air force base and the Tartus naval base. Will the new Syrian authorities in Damascus implement the agreements to transfer these facilities for use by Russia?

There is a lot of speculation and unverified information on this matter, especially in Western and Middle Eastern media, which claim that Russian military personnel are returning to their homeland en masse.

In particular, information has emerged that Russia has allegedly requested support from Turkey in withdrawing personnel from Russian military bases from Syria.

As Regnum News Agency managed to find out from Turkish sources, such requests could indeed have taken place, although their existence is not directly confirmed. At the same time, it is noted that this concerns Russian military facilities scattered throughout Syria, which, among other things, were used to organize joint Russian-Turkish patrols in the northeast. The situation does not affect the main bases in Khmeimim and Tartus.

Thus, both main Russian bases in Syria continue to function for now.

In fact, as a source in the Kremlin told TASS, the leaders of the armed opposition guaranteed their safety. Therefore, the Russian military can take its time and give the negotiators a chance to resolve the issue of the future of these military facilities with the new authorities.

It is obvious that it is very important for Russia to maintain a military presence in Syria, as Russian military facilities are the main logistical hub for supporting operations in Africa and projecting power in the Mediterranean.

A sticky point, that.

So far, there has been no serious deterioration in the situation in the provinces of Latakia and Tartus, where they are stationed.

KURDS AND PRO-TURKISH GROUPS
In Damascus, rebels immediately began trying to maintain order and imposed a curfew. Additional forces were mobilized to prevent looting.

The Syrian opposition is thus trying to prevent a power vacuum and is taking steps to curb unrest and anarchy. However, it now faces the difficult task of bridging divisions in a country devastated by war and still divided between various armed groups.

Turkish-backed opposition fighters from the Syrian National Army (SNA) are battling the US-allied Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the north of the country. The SNA captured the city of Manbij on December 8, while the ISIS* terrorist group is still active in some remote areas of the Syrian desert.

It is not yet clear whether the pro-Turkish SNA groups operating in the north of the country will be able to find a common language with the armed opposition that has captured Damascus, or whether the country will face a new stage of escalation. The same applies to the further confrontation between the SNA and the SDF.

Interestingly, the Kurdish factions associated with the US consider the armed opposition led by al-Jolani to be the most capable with which to begin negotiations on coexistence within the framework of a “new Syria,” in contrast to the pro-Turkish SNA.

Public messages from Syrian Kurdish officials are that Jolani and his men are more independent from Ankara and far less anti-Kurdish than many SNA factions.

Well sure. Hayat Tahrir al Sham only objects to your godless Communism and your independence, not your ethnicity. So all you need do to be golden is accept their form of Islam and swear submission, whereas the SNA’s lord and master in Ankara demands that you all die and disappear from history.

Clearly, the new transitional government, centered in Damascus, will need to address key issues such as access to energy resources, water supplies, and agricultural areas. Many of these resources are controlled by the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces in the east of the country, which has already become a significant factor in undermining Assad's rule.

Therefore, as Khaled Hoja, former president of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, notes, Jolani needs to negotiate with the SDF for access to resources such as fuel from oil fields near Deir ez-Zor.

Oh good — I was afraid the Kurds had nothing to bargain with for their continued existence.

TURKEY'S CONCERNS
The possibility of new alliances in Syria that do not correspond to Turkish interests is the biggest concern in Ankara, so any understanding between groups that Turkey considers terrorist will be a headache for it. And such a scenario cannot be ruled out.

The poor darlings.

It is obvious that the further the armed opposition moved away from Idlib towards Damascus, the less leverage Turkey had in the form of cutting off electricity, the Internet, and aid for refugees in Idlib.

Some American experts also pointed out the emergence of problems between Turkey and Jolani. In particular, the director of the Turkish program at the Middle East Institute in the United States, Gonul Tol, noted that Turkey may not be able to control the forces that captured Damascus, since they are unpredictable and pursuing their own interests. “Does Turkey really want a jihadist organization to rule a neighboring country?” she said.

Sure they do. They just want it to be their captive jihadi org, a Muslim Brotherhood type without ideas above their station.

At the same time, it should be kept in mind that for now, it is the Turkish military who are the people who can freely drive their armored vehicles from Idlib to Damascus. Therefore, at the moment, it is Turkey that remains the most influential player in Syria.

THE US DILEMMA
The United States also maintains a military presence in Syria, in the northeast and at At-Tanf in the southeast. As Assad's army collapses, American-controlled rebel groups in the southeast have been able to establish control over vast areas of the Syrian desert, with the support of the US military.

In addition, the US has long had channels of communication with al-Jolani, who was their "secret partner" in the fight against ISIS*.

Really?

On the other hand, American and British political strategists have done much to change his image in the direction of "moderation." The same Kurds make curtseys to him, clearly not without American prompting.

And here the main question arises: will the connection with the US of the forces that have taken control of Damascus lead to a conflict of interests between the US and Turkey for influence over Jolani?

At the same time, it is far from clear in Washington whether Jolani’s claims about future democratic reforms in Syria are genuine. It is one of the unknowns in the swirl of uncertainties in the crisis, which is changing so quickly that Western intelligence analysts themselves admit they are having a hard time keeping up.

Therefore, the US, like Turkey, also believes that the armed opposition may be uncontrollable, and they do not trust it completely. However, it is obvious that the US has an effective lever of pressure on it - sanctions. Promises to lift them can make Jolani more accommodating and bring significant investments to the country.

For Arab states, and especially the Gulf Arab monarchies, which welcomed the relatively peaceful transition of power in Damascus, a US decision to lift restrictions on Syria is needed in order to begin investing there.

But here, among other things, the ability of the new Syrian authorities to prevent a new wave of chaos in the country, which would negate investment prospects, will also play a role.

Both the US and Syria's Arab partners therefore face a dilemma.

On the one hand, they would like to eliminate the figure of Jolani from the game as a person who left ISIS* and was in Al-Qaeda*, who in many ways discredits the image of the new Syrian government. But on the other hand, if he is eliminated, there may not be another figure in the country who would keep the situation under control: fight ISIS*, suppress the internal opposition, but in such a way as not to raise many questions, and force all other factions in the country to recognize the authority of Damascus.

And for now it seems that there is no alternative to Jolani. And so it turns out that one "tyrannical regime" that could not fulfill its functions was replaced by another, more "fresh".

OPPORTUNIST OR JIHADIST?
Of course, there are many indications that the leader of the armed opposition is an opportunist who has changed many masks, and it is difficult to say which one is real. But it is also obvious that he leaves loopholes to return to his radical views if he thinks that this will be in demand again.

Therefore, Jolani appears before different audiences in different images. Radicals are still his loyal "electorate", and it is worth noting that he explains his current steps to them as temporary political expediency, and justifies each decision with a Sharia prescription.

That’s what I would believe, but I’m just a little Midwestern suburban housewife, so what do I know?

Thus, the seemingly significant concessions to Christians, Alawites, Druze and other religious minorities in Syria are so far only temporary.

To do this, Jolani found a Sharia loophole to, on the one hand, show his “goodwill” to the Alawites, Christians, Druze and Ismailis, but, when necessary, get rid of them.

Thus, the radicals recognized the status of all these communities as musta'min, "non-Muslims" who came from the "lands of the infidels" to conduct business or trade in Muslim territory for a long time.

On the one hand, this gives them the opportunity to "throw dust in their eyes" and even demonstrate their privileged status. They say that they are exempt from many taxes and are "under protection."

But the problem is that this is a temporary status, and at any moment the radicals can demand that the musta'min leave their territory, or convert to Islam, since formally they are considered “guests” and not the indigenous population.

This also creates problems with the right of these communities to own and use their religious sites. They are prohibited from many transactions involving the purchase, sale or ownership of real estate and agricultural land, as they cannot be their owners, but only tenants, etc.

In this regard, despite the change in form, there are doubts about the change in the content of the core of the armed opposition. It may make concessions to local Christians and Alawites for a time, but then abandon them. It is enough to observe the rhetoric of foreign jihadists operating in Syria, including those from the Russian Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as from China, who, despite the voiced "moderate" programs of their leadership, promise that Syria will only be a springboard for the transfer of "jihad" in their understanding to the Caucasus, Central Asia and East Turkestan.

It’ll be interesting to see if HTS rejoins the Al Qaeda borg once they don’t need to appease anyone anymore, or if they’re going to be an independent caliphate now that they conquered the place.

Link

The Grand Turk

'The march continues.' Erdogan chose the perfect moment to strike Syria

2024-12-07

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Leonid Savin

[REGNUM] Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has broken the curtain of silence and finally spoken out about the sharp escalation of the situation in Syria. And his words can be considered sensational without exaggeration.

"Idlib, Hama, Homs and the goal, of course, is Damascus. The opposition march in Syria continues. We hope that it will be without upheavals and disasters," the Turkish leader essentially revealed the militants' plans to seize the Syrian capital. Erdogan then complained that attempts to reach an agreement "in a good way" were fruitless: "We appealed to Assad with a call to jointly determine the future of Syria. Unfortunately, this call was not answered positively."

Not just a tin ear, but a lead one.

With such statements, Erdogan is essentially turning the chessboard of the Syrian conflict upside down and is rushing to consolidate the successes that the militants have achieved on the ground in the political plane. However, for those who professionally follow the situation in the region, such a development of events was not too stunning.

He thought the Kurds annoying. The Syrians are an entirely different kettle of piranhas — back when the Ottoman empire was a thing and not just a Playboy centerfold, the sultan’s army had to regularly decimate their Arab population just to keep their troublesomeness down to a dull roar. Hama Rules, if your men have the will.

Literally on the eve of the events in northern Syria, where Turkish-backed Islamist militants launched a fairly effective offensive and captured Aleppo, Hama and a number of other cities, meetings were held in Ankara with representatives of various think tanks and the academic community dealing with foreign policy issues.

In open and behind-the-scenes conversations, it was felt that some events were coming, in particular, the idea was expressed that the “Astana process” for the Syrian settlement had been exhausted and Russia should understand Turkey’s interests in determining the type of political unity in Syria. However, the matter does not end with the relations between Russia, Syria and Turkey.

In Turkey, current political processes are viewed through the prism of interconnected events not only in Syria, but also in Libya, Ukraine, and Nagorno-Karabakh, which came under the control of Azerbaijan. The Islamist militants have also been seen wearing symbols of “Eastern Turkestan” and “Grey Wolves,” which indicates at least the nominal presence of supporters of the pan-Turkic project in their ranks.

That’s what Turkey is paying them for. Statistically at least a few should believe in it.

If previously there was a clear belief that the United States is the leading external force in the Middle East, now in Ankara they are talking about a political vacuum that has formed that needs to be filled.

It will be on January 20th, my dears. But y’all carry on roistering about the landscape while still you can.

Without claiming to be a great power, Turkey, observing what is happening and other countries in the Middle East and Central Asia, has come to the conclusion that middle powers can also benefit greatly from the current geopolitical turbulence associated with conflicts and competition among great powers.

It is likely that the current round of escalation represents such a rationalization (from the Turkish point of view) due to the status quo in the Turkey-Iraq-Syria triangle. But if Ankara has managed to achieve some progress with the Iraqi leadership (despite the occupation of part of Northern Iraq by Turkish troops and regular bombing of Kurdish settlements),

…(a pungent point)…

then the situation with Syria is more complicated.

The Syrian issue is now taking on existential features for Ankara. This is due, firstly, to the large number of Syrian refugees in Turkey, who, given the current inflation, are becoming a kind of scapegoat. It is easiest to declare them the cause of internal problems, of which Ankara has many. Secondly, the Kurdish paramilitary formations are a real pain in the neck for the Turks. Thirdly, due to previously established contacts with the Syrian opposition, Turkey is counting on a political agreement, but there is still no such agreement.

At the same time, Turkey understands that the accumulating issues are creating contradictions within the country, and their resolution requires the active participation of Syria, Iran, Russia, and the United States.

With Donald Trump elected as the new US president, Ankara will have to balance hard, as it is not yet clear what strategy Washington will choose.

I feel seen, as the kids say nowadays.

It is possible that US troops will be withdrawn from both Syria and Iraq. For Ankara, an increase in the Russian military contingent would be preferable, as Russia does not put pressure on Turkey. On the other hand, it also sought to push Bashar al-Assad to a more compromising position, as Recep Tayyip Erdogan wants.

Turkey would probably be willing to leave Syria if there were no threats coming from there. But as long as there are militant Kurdish groups there, there is no such certainty. The Kurds, for their part, are not ready to disarm, especially given their experience of confronting ISIS* in the past.

The Kurdish YPG forces are active in Syria, and like the Kurdistan Workers' Party, Turkey considers them a terrorist organization. But while the US used to openly support and arm the YPG, this is no longer the case. Moreover, the Kurdish enclaves in northern Syria are now effectively surrounded by the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham* group.

From this we can conclude that Turkey has reached some kind of agreement with the US on non-interference in the conflict.

Not the U.S. — if such a decision was made it could be no more than the current ad hoc cabal in Washington making decisions on various issues as various subgroups turn their attention this way and that… for the next few weeks. None of their decisions can be binding, as they have no legal authority to decide for the nation.

Or the Turkish special services, understanding the specifics of the transition period in the White House and the absence of any forceful decisions, gave the go-ahead to the militants to conduct the current offensive operation. It is worth immediately making a reservation that the militants from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham* would hardly have escalated on their own.

I seem to recall that HTS has talked about having rehearsed for a yeqr for this…

However, the scale of the escalation seems to have exceeded all expectations.

And if initially the talk was about pushing Syria, as well as Russia and Iran, to a speedy resolution of the political crisis, including defining the political role of the opposition and the return of several million refugees, which was planned to be agreed upon at the next round of meetings in the “Astana format” in Qatar, then the sudden success of the militants forced Erdogan to come out of the shadows.

The timing is ideal, given Russia's involvement in the SVO in Ukraine, as well as a certain pause in Iran's activity in the region, caused by both the death of an IRGC representative in Syria and the Hezbollah leadership in Lebanon.

Given how unfavorable the situation is for the Syrian government, even if the YPG Kurds decide to support it in repelling the militants' advance, more decisive action by Turkey could follow. Seeing the Kurds' weakness, Ankara could decide to finish them off once and for all, first in Rojava (in northern Syria), and then moving on to methodically destroying other structures in Iraq and Turkey itself.

The Kurdish issue is indeed extremely important for the current Turkish leadership. It is no coincidence that Erdogan's ally and leader of the Turkish Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) Devlet Bahceli in October called on the founder of the Kurdistan Workers' Party, Abdullah Ocalan, who has been sentenced to life imprisonment, to address parliament and announce the dissolution of the PKK. Given that parliament is a particularly sacred place for Turks, the proposal to allow a person convicted of terrorism to sit there clearly demonstrates concern about a possible Kurdish mobilization in the future. In addition, the demographic situation should be taken into account, since the Kurds have many more children than the Turks.

Which is why President Erdogan has been busily arranging as many Kurdish deaths as possible, both in Turkey and in the Kurdish territories immediately beyond Turkey’s borders.

Therefore, there are several elements in the equation - behind the interests of the Islamists trying to overthrow the government of Bashar al-Assad is Turkey with its interests in destroying the military-political structures of the Kurds. And in a broader context, we are talking about following the strategy of neo-Ottomanism and pan-Turkism.

What’s to be said? The man has dreams.

The US has so far distanced itself from active participation in resolving the Syrian problems, probably fearing to get bogged down in another conflict in the Middle East, as happened earlier in Iraq and Afghanistan.

And now Russian forces are bugging out for the same reason.

Link

Syria-Lebanon-Iran

Syrian Air Force and Russian Aerospace Forces Destroy Hayat Tahrir al-Sham Headquarters in Idlib

2024-12-03

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
[Regnum] The Syrian Air Force, with the support of the Russian Aerospace Forces, destroyed one of the headquarters of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham group (a terrorist organization banned in the Russian Federation) in Idlib. This was reported on December 2 by the Sham FM radio station.

According to the radio station, dozens of militants were killed and wounded as a result of the strike, including one of the leaders of the terrorist group of Arab origin.

Very good.

As reported by the Regnum news agency, on November 27, militant groups in Syria launched an offensive against government army positions in the Aleppo region. The terrorists were able to capture 13 settlements.

On November 29, it became known that Syrian soldiers launched a counteroffensive against Hayat Tahrir al-Sham militants in Aleppo and Idlib. The government army also managed to liberate the city of Al-Bakoum.

On December 2, the command of the Syrian government army announced that the country's troops and the Russian Aerospace Forces had destroyed more than 400 militants in the Aleppo and Idlib provinces in a few hours.

More from regnum.ru
Terrorists seized Aleppo with the help of US technology and support from Ukraine
Terrorists from the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham group (a terrorist organization banned in Russia) captured the city of Aleppo thanks to Ukrainian advisers and advanced American technology. This was reported by RIA Novosti, citing a source close to the Syrian special services.

According to the source, the militants of the group have no experience in using high technology, but they managed to master it with the support of advisers from Ukraine, from the Islamic Party of Turkestan

…the Uighur contingent of Al Qaeda it started as an Islamist independence movement in China, joined Al Qaeda on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, and sent a contingent to Syria to join Al Nusra/Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. They are known in Syria for being particularly nasty in a milieu that encourages nastiness…

(a terrorist organization banned in Russia) and Syrian officers who went over to the terrorists' side.

“The assault groups and drones were equipped with encrypted GPS devices and extensive use of artificial intelligence, so that the use and navigation of attack UAVs and kamikaze drones could be carried out from a long distance,” the unnamed source added.

He also noted that the Syrian army encountered powerful electronic warfare systems during the militants' offensive for the first time since 2011. As reported by Regnum News Agency, on November 27, militant units in Syria launched an offensive against government army positions in the Aleppo region. The terrorists were able to capture 13 settlements.

On November 29, it became known that Syrian soldiers launched a counteroffensive against Hayat Tahrir al-Sham militants in Aleppo and Idlib. The government army also managed to liberate the city of Al-Bakum. On December 2, the command of the Syrian government army stated that Syrian troops and the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) had destroyed more than 400 militants in the Aleppo and Idlib provinces in a few hours.

Courtesy of Lord Garth:

Iran sends aid to Syria, maybe including troops
[IsraelTimes] As Iran sends forces to Syria, IDF warns it not to smuggle arms to Hezbollah

Speaking to Sky News Arabia, Israel Defense Forces spokesman Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari said the military is closely following the events in Syria and has observed Tehran sending forces to bolster Assad’s regime.

-------------
article contained image of Bashir Assad in his palace, per the image it was on 1 December 24.

Good to know.

More from the Times of Israel

Hundreds of Iran-backed Iraqi fighters crossed into Syria on Monday to help the government fight rebels who seized Aleppo last week, while Lebanon’s Hezbollah has no plans for now to join them, according to sources.

Iraqi and Syrian sources confirmed the deployment of more Iran-backed Iraqi fighters to Syria. Iran’s foreign minister said Tehran “will provide any support needed” and that “resistance groups” would come to Assad’s aid.

At least 300 fighters, primarily from Iraq’s Badr and Nujabaa groups, crossed late on Sunday using a dirt road to avoid the official border crossing, two Iraqi security sources said, adding that they were there to defend a Shi’ite shrine.

A senior Syrian military source said the fighters had crossed in small groups to avoid airstrikes. “These are fresh reinforcements being sent to aid our comrades on the front lines in the north,” the source said.

The head of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, which includes the major Shi’ite militia groups aligned with Iran, said no group under its umbrella had entered Syria, and that it does not operate outside Iraq.

But Lebanon’s Hezbollah terror group, which is the most capable Iran-backed force in Assad’s military alliance in Syria, has not yet been asked to intervene and was not ready to send forces after the 14-month-long war it initiated with Israel, said three sources familiar with the group’s thinking.

In recent months, Hezbollah withdrew its operatives from Syria, including the north, to focus on battling Israel in southern Lebanon, after the IDF launched its ground operation in late September after a year of near-daily Hezbollah attacks displaced some 60,000 residents of northern Israel.

The rebels who swept this week into Aleppo pointed to Hezbollah’s withdrawal as one of the reasons they faced little resistance from government forces.

Hezbollah bases and weapons shipments through Syria have been repeatedly hit by Israel, which has sought to weaken Iran across the region.

Arab countries and Washington have seen the weakening of Hezbollah as a potential opportunity to peel Assad away from his alliance with Iran.

Sources have told Reuters that the United Arab Emirates and United States had been discussing the possibility of lifting sanctions against Assad if he reduces his reliance on Tehran. The rebel advance could complicate this if it pushes Assad to depend more on Iranian support.

Fog of war?

Pro-Iranian militias enter Syria from Iraq to aid beleaguered Syrian army
[IsraelTimes] Iranian-backed militias entered Syria overnight from Iraq and were heading to northern Syria to beef up beleaguered Syrian army forces battling insurgents, according to two Syrian army sources.

Dozens of Iran-aligned Iraqi Hashd al Shaabi fighters from Iraq also crossed into Syria through a military route near Al Bukamal crossing, a senior Syrian army source tells Reuters.

“These are fresh reinforcements being sent to aid our comrades on the front lines in the north,” the officer says, adding that the militias included Iraq’s Kataib Hezbollah and Fatemiyoun groups.

“It’s time to earn those paychecks, boys!”

Iran sent thousands of Shiite fighters to Syria during the Syrian war and, alongside Russia with its air power, enabled Syrian President Bashar Assad to crush the insurgency and regain most of his territory.

A lack of that manpower to help thwart the rebel onslaught in recent days contributed to the speedy retreat of Syrian army forces and withdrawal from Aleppo city, according to two other army sources. Militias allied to Iran, led by the Hezbollah terror group, have a strong presence in the Aleppo area.

Hezbollah has been seriously weakened in its war with Israel over the past year.

Link

Afghanistan

CHR - New Intel: Sources Report Terrorists in Afghanistan Taking A Page From October 7 Playbook

2024-10-29

[CatherineHerridgeReports] "The system is blinking red," a former special operator said. "No one wants to be in the room when the Afghanistan grenade goes off."

The new reporting underscores concern that terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda, are strengthening their foothold in Afghanistan.

DEEP DIVE
Vice President and now Presidential candidate Kamala Harris once boasted that when President Biden made the final call to pull US troops from Afghanistan she was the last person in the room.

Three years later, a recent UN report left no doubt Al Qaeda is building out its infrastructure in Afghanistan.

The UN monitoring team found, "Al-Qaida cells are operating in multiple Afghan provinces, mainly in the south-east of the country." And "While the Taliban have done much to constrain the activities of Al-Qaida and their affiliates...its reorganization and training activities, as well as new travel into Afghanistan, indicate that the group still uses Afghanistan as a permissive haven under the Taliban, raising questions about Al-Qaida’s intent."

Credible sources now describe footage that suggests small terrorist cells, primarily Al Qaeda, training with ultralights and paragliders in Afghanistan. The sources describe the terrorists as "taking a page from the October 7 playbook" by mirroring the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) of the 2023 Hamas attack which killed more than 1200 people in Israel.

The raw intelligence and reports also describe operatives trained to build light aircraft and drones from "off the shelf" materials available in large home improvement stores. As described, the idea is not to export equipment from Afghanistan, but to build it once an operative is inserted near the target. These small cells apparently have cooperation from the Taliban who, in some cases, monitor training sessions.

The reporting comes through credible sources and I draw no conclusions about potential contact between al Qaeda and Hamas. As described, the most innocuous analysis is the footage was designed to boost morale among fighters and for fundraising.

Another intelligence stream details that in recent months an Al Qaeda operative traveled from Afghanistan to Saudi Arabia for financing, tasked with developing a weaponized drone capability for use against the US or its interests overseas.

That said, I understand the reporting has been shared at senior levels of the Defense Department, Homeland Security and likely CIA. They have the ability to investigate, to assess the credibility of the reports, and most importantly, they have a duty to warn.

My contacts say there is a sense of urgency among field agents and officers who are aware of the raw intelligence, but there is a "head in the sand" attitude at more senior levels. Multiple sources explained, "No one wants to turn over the Afghanistan rock."

The presence of these camps, and the threats they pose are amplified by the American military hardware that the Biden administration abandoned in Afghanistan. In 2021, reporters were told and the public was reassured that the equipment would fall into disrepair.

This has proven false. Images shared with our team from multiple sectors in Afghanistan suggest every level of the armed forces from police to military are leveraging our ballistic helmets, gloves, boots, optics, body armor and weapons.

By summer, as I pulled the threads on the Afghanistan story, the warnings became more alarming. NGOs and other groups who work with the US-based Afghan community voiced some of the deepest concerns. They were, understandably, reluctant to go on the record, fearing retaliation from the administration.

Intelligence is like a mosaic. Slowly the pieces fall into place. It is a partial picture at best, but it suggests a landscape that is beginning to mirror pre-9/11 Afghanistan. Twenty-three years ago, the safe haven in Afghanistan afforded al Qaeda the freedom to train, to recruit and to raise money for the 2001 terrorist attacks that killed nearly 3,000 Americans.

On Saturday, seeking comment, our team emailed the media contact for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which has oversight for the US intelligence community. When there was no response, and with the Sunday afternoon deadline approaching, we re-upped our questions adding the Defense Department, Homeland Security and CIA.

The DoD duty officer and a CIA spokesperson responded. Both said they could look into our query Monday. Our questions focus on intelligence community efforts to determine credibility of the intel, risk to national security and briefings to congressional committees with oversight, including armed services and intelligence.

One of the most famous chapters in the 9/11 Commission Report is called, "The System was Blinking Red." It contains the painful chronology and missed opportunities to disrupt the 9/11 hijackers in the summer of 2001.

"As (CIA Director) Tenet told us, ’The system was blinking red in the Summer of 2001.’ Officials were alerted across the world. Many were doing everything they possibly could to respond to the threats. Yet no one working on these late leads in the Summer of 2001 connected the case in his or her in-box to the threat reports agitating senior officials and being briefed to the President.."

Twenty-three years later, the warnings are there. Political sensitivities should not hinder efforts to acknowledge and disrupt emerging threats in Afghanistan.

The article below, published in 8am (Hasht-e Subh Daily), has been sitting, half-edited, for a while because I’ve been too busy with life to finish the job — and at roughly 3000 words it was easy to push off to later. But it relates to Joe of the Jungle’s submission so it’s time to share under his headline, even without doing all the work I intended. The acquisition was triggered by a Media Line piece linked by Grom the Reflective in September in comments:

Hamza bin Laden’s return: Al-Qaida’s revival in Afghanistan sparks global terror fears: Terror group leader's survival and resurgence could signify al-Qaida’s most significant revival since the Iraq War, leading to worry across the world.

Herewith the opening of the piece — the rest can be read at the link.

The Taliban Host Terrorist Groups: Four New Settlements Built for Al-Qaeda and TTP
30.June 2024
The Hasht-e Subh Daily has obtained information indicating that the Taliban are constructing a well-equipped base with residential houses for the al-Qaeda network in the Malekuddin area of Nawa district, Ghazni province. Additionally, they are building three settlements for the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in the Dasht-e Bagh-e Attar area of Qarabagh district, Dasht-e Kabuli area of Waghaz district, and Kotal-e Rouza on the outskirts of Ghazni city. These settlements, in addition to residential houses, also include large religious schools and equipped dormitories, with some nearing completion.

Simultaneously, TTP members have chosen specific areas in Ghazni for relocating their families, with plans to move there soon. One of the TTP factions relocating to Ghazni is led by Hafiz Gul Bahadur, a TTP commander who has carried out extensive attacks against the Pakistani military. Furthermore, the findings of this report indicate that Haji Furqan (Uighur), a commander of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and a senior member of al-Qaeda, is residing in a guesthouse of Sirajuddin Haqqani in the Sherpur area of Kabul.

The findings from the Hasht-e Subh Daily in Ghazni province show that the Taliban are engaged in constructing four residential settlements with large religious schools and other security measures for the relocation of al-Qaeda and TTP members. According to the report, the construction of some of these settlements and religious schools in Ghazni is nearing completion. Information suggests that a settlement with a Madrasa in the Nawa district of Ghazni is being built for al-Qaeda, while the other three settlements are exclusively for TTP members and will soon be operational. The report also indicates that alongside the residential settlements, the Taliban have constructed large religious school buildings with all amenities, funded by the Haqqani network.

Link

Syria-Lebanon-Iran

Russian Aerospace Forces Hit Militant Training Camp in Syria

2024-07-12

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
[Regnum] The Russian Aerospace Forces carried out high-precision strikes on targets of illegal armed groups in the Syrian province of Idlib. This was reported on July 11 by Oleg Ignasyuk, deputy head of the Center for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in Syria.

“In order to prevent ongoing violations of the ceasefire regime, the Russian Aerospace Forces carried out high-precision strikes on targets of illegal armed formations on July 10,” he said during a briefing.

Ignasyuk specified that the Russian military destroyed a militant training camp near the settlement of Ashkhani-Takhtani, a workshop for the production of unmanned aerial vehicles and two drone warehouses. As a result of the strikes by the Russian Aerospace Forces, 15 militants were eliminated, and another 20 were wounded.

According to him, over the past 24 hours, six attacks on positions of Syrian government troops by militants have been recorded in the Idlib de-escalation zone. As a result of the dropping of an improvised explosive device from a UAV in the Urum al-Sughra area, two servicemen were injured.

As reported by the Regnum news agency, on July 30, the deputy head of the Center for the Prevention of Cruelty to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Yuri Popov reported that in Syria, two Syrian servicemen were wounded in shelling by the terrorist groups Jabhat al-Nusra (a terrorist organization banned in the Russian Federation) and the Islamic Party of Turkestan (a terrorist organization banned in the Russian Federation). He emphasized that control over compliance with the ceasefire regime continues in Syria. Russian military police units conducted patrols in the provinces of Aleppo, Raqqa, and Hasakah.

On July 3, a dangerous approach of an An-30 of the Russian Aerospace Forces with a Typhoon fighter of the so-called international coalition led by the United States occurred over the Syrian province of Homs. The incident occurred over the Et-Tanf region between 09:44 and 09:51 local time (coincides with Moscow time), a collision was avoided thanks to the professionalism of the Russian pilot, who took the necessary measures in a timely manner, Popov emphasized.

Link

Syria-Lebanon-Iran

Two Syrian Arab Army soldiers injured in terrorist attacks

2024-07-01

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
[Regnum] Two Syrian government servicemen were wounded as a result of two attacks by terrorist groups. This was reported on June 30 by Yuri Popov, deputy head of the Center for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides (CROS) in Syria.

Over the past 24 hours, the Center for Military Security in the Idlib de-escalation zone recorded two cases of firing by militants of the terrorist groups Jabhat Al-Nusra (a terrorist organization whose activities are prohibited in the Russian Federation) and the Islamic Party of Turkestan (a terrorist organization whose activities are prohibited in the Russian Federation).

“As a result of shelling by terrorists at government troop positions in the areas of the settlement of Kafer Nebel in Idlib province and the settlement of Basratun in Aleppo province, two Syrian servicemen were wounded,” Popov said during a briefing.

He added that control over compliance with the ceasefire regime continues in Syria. Russian military police units conducted patrols in the provinces of Aleppo, Raqqa and Hasakah.

As reported by IA Regnum, on June 1, the Russian Aerospace Forces in Syria launched strikes at two concentrations of militants who had left the al-Tanf zone. The terrorists' bases were located in remote areas of the Al-Amur mountain range in the province of Homs and Al-Bishri in the province of Deir Ez-Zor.

On June 8, the Ministry of Defense reported that the Russian Armed Forces, together with the Syrian military, conducted exercises to protect the Tartus base. As part of the exercises, the crews of the Pantsir-S air defense missile system, together with the crews of the Black Sea Fleet's anti-sabotage boat Kadet and small missile boats of the Syrian Navy, destroyed the naval drones of a mock enemy that were trying to break through to the inner roadstead of the port. The actions of the military were coordinated by the command of the Russian Armed Forces and the leadership of the Syrian Arab Army at joint command posts in Syria.

Link

Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia

FSB detains 49 militant accomplices who were sending money to Syria

2024-02-27

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
[Regnum] Almost 50 accomplices of Islamists who transferred money to militants in Syria were detained in 22 regions of Russia. The Center for Public Relations of the FSB of the Russian Federation reported this on February 26.

The FSB, in cooperation with Rosfinmonitoring and the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, eliminated the international channel of resource support for militants from “Katiba Tawhid wal-Jihad”

Also spelt Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad. The Syrian branch of this Al Qaeda franchise is the Uzbeks/Tajiks/Uighurs section allied to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS, formerly al-Nusra Front) in Idlib Province, having pulled together fighters from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Katibat Imam al Bukhari, and Turkestan Islamic Party. It was listed a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) in March, 2022. Back home they mostly cause trouble in post-Soviet Central Asia, Russia and Xinjiang of the Uygur Autonomous Region of China.

(a terrorist organization whose activities are prohibited in the Russian Federation), which was coordinated by emissaries located in Syria.

“As a result of the activities carried out on the territory of 22 Russian regions, 49 members of an accomplice terrorist network involved in the collection and transfer of funds for the needs of militants operating in Syria were detained,” the report says.

It is noted that some of them spread radical Islamic ideology in the Muslim Ummah of the Russian Federation via the Internet and justified terrorism.

The department noted that criminal cases have been initiated, operational search activities and investigative actions are ongoing.

As Regnum reported, a student was taken into custody in the Altai Territory for trying to send a parcel of medicines abroad to the militants of the Islamic State (IS, a terrorist organization whose activities are prohibited in the Russian Federation). He established contact with terrorists, and during the conversation expressed a desire to go to Syria and join the ranks of a terrorist organization.

In addition, at the end of 2023, the student purchased a batch of medical supplies needed in real combat conditions. Next, he sent the parcel abroad to the address specified by the “curators” in the interests of a terrorist organization. The mail was promptly seized by FSB operatives. A criminal case has been initiated on this fact.

Link

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