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Africa North
Mali: Tuareg commander Inkinane threatens the FAmas
2026-11-13


Translated Text:

Breaking/Mali: The fearsome Tuareg commander Inkinane threatens the FAmas: "We will meet again"

For the Azawad army forces, the strategic withdrawal from Kidal conceded in early October, which allowed the terrorist groups Africa Corps and FAmas to reestablish themselves in this historic Tuareg stronghold, is merely a countdown heralding dark days for the imperialist forces.

Just this Thursday, November 12, the famous FLA commander, Inkinane, threatens to the tune of British singer Vera Lynn's song: "We will meet again." A clear message that could feed the annals of the conflict in Azawad amid the current strategic repositioning of Azawad forces.
Related:
Tuareg 10/23/2026 'Gaddafi's Head.' Nomadic tribes are being poisoned with drugs 'from Germany.'
Tuareg 10/09/2026 Russian African Corps helped the Malian army retake the city of Kidal
Tuareg 10/08/2026 The general adjacency of the Kidal region to Algeria explains the Front's withdrawal from Kidal

Link


Africa North
'Gaddafi's Head.' Nomadic tribes are being poisoned with drugs 'from Germany.'
2026-10-23
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Leonid Tsukanov

[Regnum] A decade and a half has passed since the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi's regime in Libya with the aim of "setting the country on the path of reform."

However, the change of power did not bring stability. On the contrary, the state, once a thriving regional player, transformed into a battlefield for others and a site of covert operations. Drug traffickers, targeting the rich and ever-growing market, showed particular zeal.

In 2026, large shipments of synthetic drugs arriving from Europe were regularly surfacing in various parts of Libya. Moreover, according to the evidence available to investigators, most of the shipments were carried out by German dealers, or by those posing as them.

"TRUE GERMAN QUALITY"
The rise of the German drug trade is not a new phenomenon.

For several decades, Germany has been considered the unofficial leader among Western European countries in terms of the number of clandestine synthetic laboratories, and is also among the top five countries with the highest number of drug dealers per capita in the EU.

German drug lords actively supply half of the Middle East and almost all of Africa.

However, until recently, it was generally accepted that Libya served as a purely transport hub for European businessmen, through which cocaine was shipped from Latin America to their continent, and various types of synthetic drugs were shipped in the opposite direction.

The domestic market was typically dominated by Captagon, mostly imported from Syria, and opioids supplied from India under the guise of legal medications.

Their discovery did not cause much surprise among local security forces and was quite common in these areas.

UNKNOWN "PRODUCT"
Estimates changed dramatically in the fall of 2026. Specifically, in early October, the Libyan military reported seizing over 1.3 million pills near the city of Al-Kufra in the southeast of the country. This is one of the largest hauls in the past decade.

The distinguishing feature of the discovered batch was its labeling: the dealers had stamped the words “Made in Germany” on the tablets.

At first, the evidence was considered circumstantial. Until they began to unravel the supply chain. It turned out that the cargo had indeed arrived from Germany.

It was loaded at the port of Hamburg, and the shipment was handled by a shell company registered in Cologne. However, the Libyans were unable to track down the actual perpetrators of the order: during a fierce firefight with the smugglers, most managed to flee; those covering their escape were eliminated by security forces.

In search of clues, law enforcement officials raised some previous incidents and noticed coincidences.

For example, the banned pills in the shape of Colonel Gaddafi's silhouette seized in Tripoli in September 2026 (approximately 100,000 pieces) also arrived in the country from Hamburg with the assistance of a similar shell company, only registered in Dortmund and having a "representative office" in Sierra Leone.

Other, less obvious clues were also found. Therefore, Libyan security officials cautiously suggested that the same criminal network, based somewhere in Europe and with connections to Hamburg port authorities, was behind the shipments. Requests for assistance in the investigation were sent to Brussels and Berlin.

NOT THE SIGNATURE OF THE TROIKA
European law enforcement officials were no less puzzled by the unexpected discoveries in El Kufra and Tripoli than the Libyans.

The question arose as to who exactly was behind the increased activity in Libya and what their goals were. Initially, suspicion fell on three key German crime families (the so-called "Troika") – the Remmo, Miri, and Al-Zein clans, whose emissaries had been active in Africa in recent years.

However, law enforcement officials found no solid evidence that they were the ones who began developing the market on the other side of the Mediterranean. Moreover, the unnamed businessmen's methods didn't match the signature of any of the families.

Moreover, it seemed as if the mysterious dealers in Libya were trying to please everyone at once. For example, a "product" shaped like Gaddafi's head was intended for distribution among the Tuaregs (who historically have a fondness for the colonel), while in coastal areas, the dealers were clearly trying to hook the population on a drug superior in quality to its Syrian counterpart.

Judging by the harsh response from security forces in both parts of Libya, they had yet to find powerful patrons in the warring camps. This meant that the theory of deals with large criminal families no longer seemed foolproof. And the confiscated substances were qualitatively inferior to samples of German illegal pharmaceuticals.

It seemed as if ambitious amateurs had entered the game, masquerading as "branded" German drug dealers, in order, on the one hand, to confuse the buyer and force him to take an unfamiliar shipment for a large sum, and on the other, to protect themselves from possible pressure from local criminals.

It is possible that gangs from Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the Balkans, may have had a hand in the case, but Europol has chosen not to disclose the details of the investigation for the time being.

In any case, the change in the operational version didn't make things any easier for Europeans. Even if the synthetic drugs confiscated in Libya weren't produced in Germany but were imported there only for further transshipment, Hamburg still remained an exit point for traffickers, and the German shell companies a convenient cover.
Related:
Muammar Gaddafi 09/30/2026 Revolt in the 'smugglers' city': Europe faces problems due to Libyan strife
Muammar Gaddafi 09/11/2026 Major eastern Libya industrial project seen drawing $2.5 billion investment
Muammar Gaddafi 09/01/2026 Attempted coup d’état on August 29 in Niamey would have been carried out by young officers

Related:
Libya: 2026-10-15 Somalia Welcomes 162 Young Migrants Returned from Libya
Libya: 2026-10-08 Libya’s Benghazi Deports 100 Ethiopian Migrants
Libya: 2026-10-07 Kuwaiti jailed for life in UK over attempted attack at Israeli embassy in 2025
Related:
Captagon 10/21/2026 Iraq records 220 human trafficking cases in September
Captagon 10/16/2026 Iraq says it dismantled two human trafficking networks
Captagon 10/16/2026 Captagon pills seized by Syria’s Anti-Narcotics Administration

Link


Africa North
Russian African Corps helped the Malian army retake the city of Kidal
2026-10-09
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
[Regnum] Malian armed forces, with the support of Russian Afrika Korps units, have regained control of the northern city of Kidal, which had been under the control of armed groups since April. The Afrika Korps press service reported this on October 8.

The operation lasted from October 1 to 7. Malian and Russian troops, supported by the allied GATIA and MSA forces, traveled more than 450 km from the city of Gao, including through mined areas, and captured several settlements.

Air forces carried out strikes on militant positions and rear facilities. Specifically, 30 kilometers west of Kidal, a detachment preparing an ambush for an allied convoy was discovered and destroyed.

According to the Afrika Korps, the FLA
… from the French name for the group, Azawad Liberation Front (ALF) in English: the current iteration (since 2024) of the Islamist Tuareg liberation movement in northern Mali, which has been known to team up with JNIM, the Saharan branch of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Algeria, Mauritania, France, drone operators from the Ukrainian Main Directorate of Intelligence (HUR), and the Qatari royal family are said to be supporters…
and JNIM (the latter affiliated with al-Qaeda, a terrorist organization banned in Russia) suffered heavy losses and retreated. Malian and Russian units entered Kidal from several directions.

The Afrika Korps noted that the recapture of the city has not only military but also political significance, as Kidal is considered one of the symbols of Mali's statehood in the north of the country.

The military is currently completing the cleanup of the city, demining the area, and providing humanitarian aid to local residents.

In April, Afrika Korps units helped Malian authorities repel an attempted coup. Around 12,000 militants, trained with instructors from Europe and Ukraine, simultaneously attacked several cities across the country, including Kidal. Russian troops engaged the attackers and helped maintain control of the capital.
Related:
Russian Afrika Korps: 2026-09-02 'They put a harsh end to it.' The Russian African Corps dispersed a pro-Western rebellion in Niger
Russian Afrika Korps: 2026-04-29 Terrorist Attack in Mali: Afrika Korps Smashes Bandits of Four Colors
Russian Afrika Korps: 2026-02-07 Suspect in 2012 Benghazi attack arrested and brought to the US
Related:
Kidal: 2026-10-08 The general adjacency of the Kidal region to Algeria explains the Front's withdrawal from Kidal
Kidal: 2026-10-07 Good Morning
Kidal: 2026-10-07 Mali: FAMa, Africa Corps, GATIA, and MSA convoys spotted moving toward Kidal
Related:
FLA: 2026-10-08 The general adjacency of the Kidal region to Algeria explains the Front's withdrawal from Kidal
FLA: 2026-10-06 Mali: Airstrikes were reported in Tinzaouatène, near the border with Algeria
FLA: 2026-10-01 Hind Rajab Foundation files complaint in Vietnam against IDF reservist vacationer
Link


Africa North
The general adjacency of the Kidal region to Algeria explains the Front's withdrawal from Kidal
2026-10-08


Translated Text:

Military expert Ahmedou Mubarak Al-Iman 🇲🇷 in an interview with Sahara 24 channel:

The curse of geography with regard to the Azawad Liberation Front,
… ALF, in French FLA, the current iteration (since 2024) of the Islamist Tuareg liberation movement in northern Mali, which has been known to team up with JNIM, the Saharan branch of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Algeria, Mauritania, France, drone operators from the Ukrainian Main Directorate of Intelligence (HUR), and the Qatari royal family are said to be supporters…
and the general adjacency of the Kidal region to Algeria 🇩🇿, make it compelled to meet these pressures, which explains the Front's withdrawal from Kidal.

Historically, Morocco 🇲🇦 and Algeria 🇩🇿 handed over Azawadi rebel leaders to Mali in 1963.

The actual ruler of Mali 🇲🇱 today is Russia 🇷🇺, not Goïta or anyone else.

Mauritania 🇲🇷 stands neutral, as it is not involved with either Mali or the Azawad Liberation Front.

Ukraine 🇺🇦, France 🇫🇷, NATO, and the West in general will not leave Algeria alone if it is proven that there is a Russian–Algerian–Malian alliance against the Azawad Liberation Front.
Related:
Azawad Liberation Front: 2026-08-23 FLA frees two Russians after more than two years in captivity
Azawad Liberation Front: 2026-08-18 Following the coordinated offensive in Mali and the capture of Kidal: Who is really calling the shots?
Azawad Liberation Front: 2026-08-01 Global Mercenary: The Geography and Methods of Kyiv's Proxy Terrorism
Related:
Kidal: 2026-10-07 Good Morning
Kidal: 2026-10-07 Mali: FAMa, Africa Corps, GATIA, and MSA convoys spotted moving toward Kidal
Kidal: 2026-10-06 Mali: Airstrikes were reported in Tinzaouatène, near the border with Algeria
Link


Africa North
Is JNIM in the Sahel breaking away from 'Al-Qaeda'?
2026-09-28
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Mina al-Lami

[BBC] Recent events in Mali, where JNIM, Al-Qaeda's branch in the Sahel, joined forces with a non-Islamist separatist group to launch a large-scale territorial offensive in April and again in July, have revived questions about its links with Al-Qaeda and the possibility that it is preparing the ground for a split, even if only a formal one.

JNIM has maintained its military momentum, most recently claiming responsibility for a major attack against a military base in central Mali on September 10, which reportedly killed more than 100 soldiers.

The group, whose full name is Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), officially remains an Al-Qaeda affiliate and one of its two most powerful, alongside Al-Shabab in Somalia. However, it no longer resembles Al-Qaeda, neither in appearance nor in its rhetoric, whether in terms of media strategy, branding, or messaging.

Although Al-Qaeda branches generally focus their attacks on their local or regional theaters of operation, JNIM's discourse has moved markedly away from the network's traditional global jihadist rhetoric.

In recent years, it has focused almost exclusively on the Sahel, largely avoided major Muslim causes – notably the Palestinian question, which is central to Al-Qaeda’s propaganda and stated objectives
Don’t be absurd, Ms al-Lami. The Palestinian question, as you put it for the BBC, is just something Al Qaeda pronouncements occasionally throw in at the end to puff up a list of grievances, not an actual concern. Had that part of the world actually mattered to them, they would have joined in the fun sometime in the last three years, or at least said something on the subject. But I don’t recall hearing anything from them…
– ceased issuing joint statements or participating in coordinated campaigns with other branches of Al-Qaeda, and adopted a more conciliatory tone towards some adversaries.

JNIM has also abandoned the distinctive Al-Qaeda branding that once featured prominently in its main propaganda videos.

On the ground, he allied himself with the nationalist Tuareg separatists and expressed his willingness to maintain "balanced" relations with "the Russian side," referring to the forces of Moscow's African Corps present in Mali.

These changes come amid a broader debate within jihadist circles about whether greater pragmatism offers a more viable path to political power, after international jihadist groups repeatedly failed to seize and hold territory, while the Taliban in Afghanistan and, more recently, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Syria, succeeded in taking control.

This analysis examines the indications that JNIM may be seeking to distance itself from al-Qaeda, either through a formal split or simply by further reducing its ties with this global network. Such a shift would not necessarily signify a complete break between the two groups, but could result from a mutual agreement and constitute a tactical maneuver aimed at improving JNIM's political prospects and allaying fears of an al-Qaeda takeover in Mali.

More at the link (in French)
Related:
JNIM: 2026-09-26 JNIM continues its rise in power on Malian soil with 3 new attacks
JNIM: 2026-09-24 Mali: A War Without End: Why Aren’t Military Strikes Succeeding in Stopping Attacks by Armed Groups?
JNIM: 2026-09-23 Mali: Armed Group Attacks in the Sahel, August, 2026
Link


Africa North
Algerian demarche: Middle East conflict spills into North Africa
2026-09-13
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Kirill Semenov

[Regnum] On September 10, Algeria officially announced the complete severing of diplomatic relations with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), ordering the Emirati envoy to leave the country within 48 hours and imposing a total ban on the use of its airspace by UAE civil aviation.

An official statement from the Republic's Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the country has exhausted all means to maintain ties in the face of Abu Dhabi's actions, which the Algerian side regards as provocative and hostile.

This radical move was the result of a long-term cumulative effect from numerous geopolitical differences, but the main trigger was the realization by the Algerian leadership that the Emirati "axis of instability," which had already engulfed the country from three sides—Morocco, Libya, and Mali—was now threatening to directly affect their state.

The severance of relations was a preemptive response to the emerging threat of the external belt of chaos spreading directly into Algeria's interior through the rise of radical Kabyle separatism, which the republic tends to view as a key subversive element of the Emirati axis. The latent crisis, which had been building for years, escalated into open confrontation.

Commenting on the event on social media, Middle East expert Andreas Krieg emphasized: “Algeria’s formulation about the exhaustion of means indicates the transformation of a long-suppressed latent conflict into an open confrontation, where Algeria, jealous of its sovereignty, no longer intends to tolerate attempts to reshape the security architecture in North Africa.”

The leadership and intelligence services of the African state view the radical Berber underground not as an isolated internal problem, but as a direct continuation of the external pressure infrastructure that Abu Dhabi, in Algeria's view, has attempted to transfer into the republic.

The critical trigger for the tough measures was counterintelligence data on the alleged financial and logistical supply channels from the UAE to the radical separatist movement MAK – the Movement for Self-Determination of Kabylia, officially designated a terrorist organization in the republic.

To understand the scale of this concern, the ideological nature of the group is crucial. Unlike other Berber associations in the country, such as those in the Aurès or M'Zab regions, which advocate for the preservation and development of Amazigh (Berber) cultural identity strictly within the framework of a unified state and Islamic tradition, the MAK movement aims for a complete territorial and religious split in the state.

MAK is a distinctly nationalist, radically secular, and pro-French movement, whose leadership is based in Paris. Activists consciously position themselves against not only Algeria's Arab-Muslim core but also the majority of local Amazigh. Among the Kabyle separatists, there is a significant percentage of Christian converts and atheists, which they actively use to appeal to Western institutions.

From the African republic's perspective, the UAE's involvement in supporting this structure created an existential threat, as Abu Dhabi's interests objectively coincided with those of France and Israel. Paris has traditionally used the Kabyle factor as a tool of neocolonial pressure—the very idea of ​​Kabyle nationalism was formulated by the French, and the Emirates' financial resources served as the material foundation of the network.

Information that Kabyle radicals from the MAC, with external financial support from the UAE and Israel, may have begun training militant cells to undermine the situation within the country, forced Algeria to launch a preemptive diplomatic strike. Analysts estimate that the flirtation with separatism has gone beyond the pale, as the contours of a much larger international conspiracy have become clearly visible behind the local organization.

From the Algerian perspective, the UAE's involvement in supporting Kabyle radicals has created a threat precisely because of its connection to the Moroccan-Israeli vector. For the republic's military and political leadership, modern Morocco has become a hostile border base, actively militarized and used by external forces to undermine security.

The African country emphasizes that anti-Algerian Mossad intelligence and sabotage structures are currently being openly established on Moroccan territory, Israel is systematically expanding its military presence there, and the UAE is the main financial sponsor of destructive activity, having entered into a military alliance with Morocco as part of a broader shadow network.

Previously, the UAE opened its consulate in Western Sahara, considering the territory to be Moroccan, while Algeria consistently supported the Polisario, which was fighting for the region's independence, and provided it with military bases on its territory.

The conclusion of the Abraham Accords between the UAE and Israel in 2020 was followed by the involvement of Morocco, Algeria's historical rival, in this orbit. The UAE became the main sponsor of the legitimization of Rabat's position on Western Sahara, demonstratively opening its consulate there.

With Emirati funding, the Moroccans have stepped up their purchases of Israeli surveillance technology and attack drones, which have been used near Algeria's borders. Essentially, the Jewish state is seeking to create a flashpoint near the borders of the staunchly anti-Zionist Arab state, while the UAE has acted as a conduit for Israeli defense interests in North Africa, posing a direct threat to Algeria's national security.

The alliance between France, Israel, Morocco, and the UAE is an informal but deep strategic partnership that was formed after 2020 based on the Abraham Accords. Its legal basis between Rabat and Abu Dhabi is the first military agreement of 1980 and the framework agreement on military cooperation signed in May 2006. In 2014, it was ratified and expanded to cover the defense industry and technology transfer.

The alliance's primary objective is to contain Iran and its regional allies, primarily Algeria. Key elements include the transfer of 30 Mirage 2000-9 fighter jets from the UAE to Morocco, brokered by Paris (still unrealized), the supply of Israeli Barak MX air defense systems and kamikaze drones, and French-Moroccan defense industry agreements. In return, Algeria is strengthening military ties with Russia.

An additional and extremely important element that has determined the Algerian approach to the UAE is the nature of its relationship with Tehran. Over the past few years, Algeria has maintained exceptionally deep and trusting ties with Iran, which has caused intense resentment in the Emirates.

The Persian factor has a direct impact on the positions of the parties in the Maghreb conflict. Tehran openly supports the Algerian side and provides diplomatic and military-technical support to the Polisario Front in Western Sahara.

For Abu Dhabi, which coordinates with Israel under the Abraham Accords and sponsors Moroccan defense programs, the strengthening of Iran's presence in North Africa is a strategic threat.

For the Algerians, the partnership with Iran serves as an important counterweight to the emerging alliance between the UAE, Morocco, and Israel. The preemptive diplomatic strike against the Emirati network was a direct consequence of this global Middle East standoff, transferred to North Africa, and an attempt to disrupt the emerging bloc at its earliest stages.

Abu Dhabi's policies in recent years demonstrate its desire to assert its economic and political influence in Africa by establishing control over logistics hubs, ports, and resources. However, Algeria views this strategy as direct interference in its vital areas of interest, contributing to the creation of controlled chaos.

The situation on the southern border, particularly in Mali, is particularly concerning. Algerian diplomatic circles point out that Abu Dhabi, with its powerful financial leverage, has intensified its interaction with the central government in Bamako, which has contributed to a shift in emphasis toward a purely military solution to Mali's internal problems.

As a result, peace agreements between the authorities and the Tuareg tribes, previously reached with Algeria's mediation and guarantees, were effectively thwarted. Algeria believes that Bamako's push for harsh action has led to escalation and the strengthening of the influence of terrorist organizations. The destabilization of Mali inevitably entails chaos along the shared border, a surge in radicalism, uncontrolled refugee flows, and the expenditure of colossal resources on border defense.

The situation on Algeria's eastern border is no less dire. Abu Dhabi is providing comprehensive support to the Libyan National Army, led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar.

Algeria has consistently viewed Tripoli as a crucial element of its national security, supporting the UN-recognized Government of National Accord and categorically opposing foreign military intervention. At the same time, the UAE has provided extensive financial, military, and political support to Haftar and his Libyan National Army, which was perceived as a unilateral attempt to alter the regional balance of power.

The standoff culminated in 2022 with the Emirates actively lobbying to block the candidacy of former Algerian Foreign Minister Sabri Boukadoum for the post of UN Special Envoy for Libya, which the African country viewed as an act of hostile interference and outright sabotage.

Tensions reached a new peak in August 2024, when Haftar-controlled forces launched a sudden, large-scale mobilization and advance into southwestern Libya, seeking to seize control of the strategically important city of Ghadames and its airport, located directly on the border with Algeria. They emphasized their unacceptability of any military presence on their borders, seeing the offensive as a proxy for the UAE and fearing the situation in Libya would escalate into an uncontrollable proxy conflict between external forces.

An additional source of irritation was information about secret contacts between the commander's son, Saddam Haftar, and Israel, seeking military aid in exchange for future normalization of relations. As the Israeli newspaper Haaretz established, his secret visit to Tel Aviv took place in November 2021.

The fact that Haftar Jr.'s plane departed directly from Dubai was perceived by Algerian counterintelligence as evidence that the UAE was already acting as a logistical hub facilitating Israeli infiltration into the region.

Abu Dhabi's actions in Sudan have also sparked serious controversy. Algerians believe its support for the Rapid Intervention Force (RIF) led to the outbreak of a devastating civil war in April 2023 and the subsequent humanitarian catastrophe. All for the sake of control over the resources of the Red Sea.

Algerian diplomats also see a similar destructive pattern in East Africa, where the UAE reached agreements with separatist Somaliland, bypassing official Mogadishu, and in Yemen, where support for the Southern Transitional Council regularly led to friction with the country's legitimate government, whose unity the Arab coalition was trying to stabilize.

According to regional analysts, the geopolitical advance of Abu Dhabi and Rabat in the south has become a serious challenge to Algeria's diplomacy. On November 6, 2023, the King of Morocco officially announced the launch of a large-scale "Royal Atlantic Initiative," designed to provide the Sahel countries—Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and Chad—direct access to Atlantic ports.

This project received an overwhelmingly positive response from the new governments of the Sahel region. However, the Algerians, who traditionally considered the Sahel an area of ​​their exclusive influence, were unable to gain the trust of the new transitional administrations in Niger and Mali or quickly adapt to the rapid changes in the region.

Behind the scenes of the Moroccan project, experts point out, the Emirates' financial and political support is clearly evident. In December 2023, Abu Dhabi took its strategic cooperation with Rabat to an unprecedented level by signing a comprehensive package of 12 intergovernmental agreements.

This coincided almost exactly with the official endorsement of the Moroccan Atlantic Initiative by the Sahel countries, which Algeria viewed as a coordinated campaign to build a new transport and logistics architecture bypassing its territory. The republic seriously fears that the project's implementation will lead to its geopolitical isolation in the Maghreb.

In an attempt to organize a symmetrical response and offer their neighbors an alternative economic route, on February 22, 2024, Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune and his Mauritanian counterpart, Mohamed Ould Cheikh El Ghazouani, inaugurated a new border crossing. The leaders agreed to establish a free trade zone and announced the start of construction on an 847-kilometer highway linking Tindouf, Algeria, with Zouérate, Mauritania.

However, industry analysts are skeptical of the project. They believe this ambitious plan faces serious obstacles, including the lack of a clear long-term vision, the colossal cost of infrastructure, and the extremely low population density in the border areas.

Experts agree that the Algerians' move towards Mauritania may be too late, as they have still not fully grasped the true scale of the tectonic shifts in the Sahel.

Algeria's harsh reaction reflects deep-seated and growing dissatisfaction with UAE policy, a sentiment shared by some other Arab players. Against this backdrop, the Algerians have taken steps toward strategic rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman.

The economic rivalry between the UAE and Saudi Arabia for OPEC leadership and disagreements over peace in Yemen and Sudan pushed Riyadh to closely coordinate with Algeria. Algeria openly supported the Saudis as a legitimate pillar of stability in the Gulf, sharing criticism of Abu Dhabi's attempts to circumvent oil quotas. Bilateral cooperation between Algeria and Riyadh in energy and investment reached an unprecedented level.

At the same time, Doha and Algiers demonstrated a high degree of diplomatic solidarity. Qatar's historical mistrust of the Emirates' geopolitical maneuvering created a solid foundation for coordination.

Both states present a united front in support of traditional Palestinian institutions over separate agreements. At the same time, Muscat, traditionally adhering to the doctrine of strict neutrality, has expressed understanding of Algeria's sovereign position, intensifying dialogue with the goal of creating a pan-Arab counterweight to Abu Dhabi's policies in the Horn of Africa.

Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune has openly declared that his country's relations with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman are exceptionally warm and fraternal, singling out the Emirates' line as destabilizing.

Against this backdrop, the UAE is attempting to maintain a semblance of diplomatic restraint. In particular, Anwar Gargash, diplomatic adviser to the UAE president, published a post in which, without directly mentioning the unfriendly state, he stated: "Successful diplomacy is built on rationality, communication, and clarity of interests, not on riddles and signals that require decoding."

The UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for its part, expressed hope that the Algerian authorities' decision would be temporary. However, as Arab bloggers write, "relations between Abu Dhabi and Algeria have reached a point of no return: Gulf financial diplomacy has run into the impenetrable wall of Algerian sovereign stubbornness, supported by other regional heavyweights."

The severance of diplomatic relations brought an end to a period of covert containment. Algeria openly declared the UAE's foreign policy unacceptable. Refusing to bow to the pressure of petrodollars, it declared its readiness to firmly defend its sovereignty, seeking to block what its leadership views as Emirati expansion on the African continent, relying on the understanding of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman, as well as its alliance with Iran.

According to Algerian security forces, the timely response to Abu Dhabi's activities in Mali, Libya, and Kabylia allowed the republic to prevent the spread of controlled chaos deeper into its own territories.

Related:
Algeria: 2026-09-10 Greta Has a New Cause
Algeria: 2026-09-08 Libya linked to reported drone attack on Russian ship in Mediterranean
Algeria: 2026-09-02 'They put a harsh end to it.' The Russian African Corps dispersed a pro-Western rebellion in Niger
Related:
UAE: 2026-09-10 The Houthis have stepped up their attacks, sparking renewed civil war in Yemen
UAE: 2026-09-10 Haaretz: Netanyahu's office was warned in advance of a Hamas attack in 2023
UAE: 2026-09-09 Riyadh condemns renewed Houthi attacks that injured '73 civilians'
Link


Africa North
FLA frees two Russians after more than two years in captivity
2026-08-23

Translated Text;

#AZAWAD | The FLA Frees Two Russians After More Than Two Years in Captivity

The Azawad Liberation Front (FLA)
…Tuareg group in northern Mali that regularly joins or is joined by the Al Qaeda-linked JNIM in their fight against Malian government forces and the Russian Wagner Group/Africa Corps…
freed two Russian nationals on August 20, 2026, who had been captured during the fighting in Tinzaouaten in July 2024. According to a statement from the Africa Corps, their release was made possible after lengthy negotiations involving the Russian side, the Africa Corps, and Saddam Haftar, vice-commander of the Libyan National Army.
…and son of Khalifa Haftar, commander of the Libyan National Army and the eastern part of Libya. Saddam is thought to be intended to be his father’s heir…
The transfer of the two Russians to Libya, rather than their direct handover to Malian or Russian forces present in Mali, highlights the growing role of external actors in the Sahel in prisoner and hostage cases. Mali gives money to the Russians to be saved, and the Russians give money to the FLA to be saved. A formula that sums up the paradox of this situation.

These releases also raise a major question about the sovereignty claimed by Bamako: several prisoners and hostages captured in the Sahelian space are freed through foreign mediations, without direct intervention from Malian authorities. The FLA, for its part, continues to favor silence and let the facts speak for themselves.

Mali pays Wagner to fight the FLA. Russia pays the FLA to save Wagner. In short, Mali indirectly funds the FLA through Russia.

Beyond the rhetoric on sovereignty and the Alliance of Sahel States, this affair above all shows that the real negotiations around prisoners and hostages.

Russians and Americans. In Mali, Haftar frees everyone (with money from the Emirates)
Translated from the Italian and paywalled, but these few words tell us all we need.
[IlFoglio] First the missionary kidnapped in Niger, Kevin Rideout, now two mercenaries from the Africa Corps. Saddam’s strange mediation with the Tuaregs and terrorists, sponsored by Dubai, to become the hero of Trump and Putin
Related:
Azawad Liberation Front: 2026-08-18 Following the coordinated offensive in Mali and the capture of Kidal: Who is really calling the shots?
Azawad Liberation Front: 2026-08-01 Global Mercenary: The Geography and Methods of Kyiv's Proxy Terrorism
Azawad Liberation Front: 2026-07-26 Negotiations are the junta's last card to prevent the fall of Bamako; and the FLA refuses any agreement with the putschists
Related:
Tinzaouaten: 2026-08-21 Mali: FAMa and the Africa Corps in Tombonkouri (Bandiagara) committed 'horrific violations'
Tinzaouaten: 2026-05-23 Anti-Russian protests continue to surface in Mali amid Russian-linked forces operating alongside the Malian army
Tinzaouaten: 2026-02-20 FAMa, Russian mercenaries attacked by the FLA (Azawad Liberation Front) and JNIM near Aguelhok (Kidal)

Related:
Saddam Haftar 05/13/2026 'Unification of Dynasties': Why Erdogan and Trump Need a United Libya
Saddam Haftar 02/26/2026 Senior officer assassinated in South Libya
Saddam Haftar 02/23/2026 'Good Uncle.' Trump's Relative Turns Libya into a Family Business

Related:
Kevin Rideout 08/20/2026 How Stable is Mali’s Junta?
Kevin Rideout 08/15/2026 Trump confirms release of US missionary kidnapped in Niger

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Africa North
Azawad-Mali – Central Sahel: Arguments and counterarguments
2026-08-20

Translated Text:

Azawad-Mali – Central Sahel: Arguments and Counterarguments

These questions and arguments are invitations to think rigorously and honestly about a reality that state propaganda, media simplifications, and ideological posturing have long distorted.

To those who reduce the Azawad question to an exclusively Tuareg claim: have they even consulted the founding texts and public declarations of the FLA and the movements that preceded it? None defines itself as an ethnically Tuareg organization. The Azawad is claimed as a plural political space, bringing together Tuaregs, Arabs, Peuls, and Songhai who share a common destiny.

To those who assert that the Azawad has never existed historically: do they know that the borders of present-day African states were drawn between 1885 and 1960 by foreign colonial administrations, which fragmented or merged preexisting political entities according to their own interests alone? The Azawad, by contrast, corresponds to a coherent geographic, cultural, and economic space, shaped by centuries of human presence, caravan routes, and autonomous social organizations, long predating colonization.

To those who question the etymology of the word "Azawad": do they ask the same about the origins of the names "Mali," "Niger," or "Burkina Faso"? All these names have a history—some borrowed from rivers, others from bygone empires or local languages. The Azawad derives its name from an ancient geographic and pastoral reality: it designates a clay depression zone favorable to grazing, known and named as such by its inhabitants for generations.

To those who argue that the Tuaregs are a minority in certain Azawad areas: the right to self-determination and sovereignty over a territory is not proportional to population numbers. Indigenous peoples and communities historically established in a space have rights that mere demographic criteria cannot erase—a principle recognized by international law, particularly the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

To those who conflate the Azawad's claims with jihadist terrorism: let them cite a single terrorist act—suicide bombing, massacre of sedentary civilians, ideologically motivated hostage-taking—claimed by the Azawad Movements. The confusion deliberately maintained between secular nationalist movements and jihadist groups is a calculated political manipulation. By contrast, the abuses by the Malian army and its auxiliary militias against Azawad civilian populations are documented by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the MINUSMA.
Related:
Azawad 08/19/2026 Mali: FAMa strikes hit several positions of the JNIM/FLA coalition in Sikasso and Ménaka
Azawad 08/18/2026 Following the coordinated offensive in Mali and the capture of Kidal: Who is really calling the shots?
Azawad 08/01/2026 Global Mercenary: The Geography and Methods of Kyiv's Proxy Terrorism

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Africa North
How Stable is Mali’s Junta?
2026-08-20
(Frente de Liberación de Azawad vía AP)
[SoufanCenter] BOTTOM LINE UP FRONT
Recent successes in hostage diplomacy in the Sahel, such as the release of Kevin Rideout, stand in stark contrast to the grim reality of Mali’s current security landscape.

Mali’s junta is deeply embattled, even as gold exports and Russian mercenaries continue to prop it up.

JNIM has established itself as one of Africa’s most successful insurgencies, raking in significant revenue streams, maintaining and governing territory, and launching terrorist attacks with impunity.

ISSP continues to expand its operational footprint and launch attacks at both security forces and civilian targets.

Last week, the Tuareg-led rebel group Front de libération de l’Azawad (FLA) released 82 Malian Armed Forces soldiers whom it had held captive. Many of the soldiers had been taken on April 25, 2026, when the group and its ally Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), al-Qaeda’s affiliate in the Sahel, launched their spectacular joint offensive across Mali, leading to the recapture of the city of Kidal and further ratcheting up the pressure on Bamako. An additional 60 civilians taken hostage by JNIM were also liberated in Mali last week, an apparent sign of goodwill towards the villages from which they were taken. That same day, the Malian junta, following mediation efforts by Morocco, released the French intelligence agent it had held since August 2025. Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), which has been at war with JNIM since 2019 and is nestled in the tri-border area and the eastern Ménaka and Gao regions of Mali, released a U.S. citizen, Kevin Rideout, one of a handful of Western hostages it was holding.

Analysts have emphasized that these outcomes stem from distinct negotiation paths with different parties involved, including Libyan strongman Khalifa Haftar, who reportedly played a central role behind the scenes, allegedly paying $12 million in ransom. These recent instances of successful hostage diplomacy in the Sahel stand in stark contrast to the grim reality of Mali’s current security landscape, which remains marked by major upheaval and violence.

The fuel blockade, launched in September 2025 by JNIM, is approaching its one-year anniversary. JNIM continues to demonstrate its strength by capturing and holding territory, while launching new attacks targeting the regime. Human rights abuses by all parties, including Mali’s junta and Russia’s Africa Corps, show the devastating extent of the civilian toll. And ISSP profits from diminished state capacity, counting roughly 2,000 fighters and growing operational capabilities.

Economically, Mali’s junta remains heavily reliant on gold, the country’s main export, which is primarily sourced from the South and West, where Africa’s third-largest gold deposit is located. But even this important, lucrative economic pillar is increasingly destabilized by JNIM, which also relies on extortion around the gold industry as an economic motor.

Rather than directly controlling gold mines, the group uses the routes gold takes to extort and tax, earning illicit proceeds from nearly every stage of the value chain. JNIM also engages in economic warfare and, during the April offensive, regained control over Intahaka, with the largest artisanal gold mine in northern Mali. While the junta remains in control of the industrial mines and continues to collect revenue from them, it must also pay major expenses to survive, including costly blockade workarounds such as army-escorted supply convoys and heavy monthly bills for the dubious help of Russian mercenaries. JNIM also benefits from ransom paid for hostages. Most notably, the UAE paid the group $50 million for the release of its citizens in 2025, which significantly helped fund its offensive.

More at the link
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Africa North
Russian ship defies sanctions to send military vehicles to Mali
2026-08-03
[BBC] Russian and Malian troops fighting against a rebel offensive in northern Mali have been resupplied with a vast number of military vehicles that appear to have been delivered by a sanctioned cargo ship, BBC Verify has found.

A large column of armoured vehicles were seen arriving in the capital Bamako in verified footage broadcast by Malian state TV on 25 July. Reporters said the convoy had travelled from Lomé port in Togo.

A sanctioned Russian cargo ship, Mikhail Britnev, docked in Lomé on 9 July, according to ship tracking data reviewed by BBC Verify. Satellite images appear to show that the ship was carrying the kind of trucks, armoured personnel carriers and light infantry vehicles seen in Bamako, according to experts.

Ship tracking data shows that the Mikhail Britnev left Russia's Baltiysk port on 18 June and moved through the North Sea before entering the English Channel.

BBC Verify understands that the vessel was escorted through the Channel by a Russian Ropucha-class warship. The UK's Ministry of Defence declined to comment.

Experts say the deliveries signify that the Kremlin is doubling down on its support for Mali's ruling junta, which has been rocked by the success of a rebel offensive led by the Jihadist group Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Tuareg separatists. The advance has seized large swathes of territory in the north.
In other words, this is an ego thing because the Wagner Group is not the mighty deus ex machina as promised, showing up the incompetent French. How embarrassing for Russia.
The Kremlin has backed the Mali military government since French forces withdrew from the country in 2022, receiving cash payments and preferential access to mines and gold deposits in return. At first the Russian mercenary group Wagner was deployed, but its operations have since been taken over by Africa Corps, which falls under Russia's defence ministry.
Come now — we all know that the Africa Corps is just the Wagner Group in spiffy Russian uniforms.
Related:
Northern Mali: 2026-07-25 From Hombori to Gao, the Russian mercenaries' convoy remains in the crosshairs of JNIM
Northern Mali: 2026-07-25 Mali: Wagner's Secret Prisons
Northern Mali: 2026-07-23 Media reports indicate US plans to launch a military campaign in Mali
Related:
Bamako: 2026-07-26 Negotiations are the junta's last card to prevent the fall of Bamako; and the FLA refuses any agreement with the putschists
Bamako: 2026-07-26 Mali and Algeria continue to reactivate their relations
Bamako: 2026-07-25 From Hombori to Gao, the Russian mercenaries' convoy remains in the crosshairs of JNIM
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Africa North
Why Gaddafi's Mercenaries Failed - The Untold Story of Libya's Fall
2026-08-01
[YouTube] Libya's civil war unleashed chaos as Gaddafi's mercenaries found themselves stranded and hunted after his fall. Discover the dark fate of hired guns in the Arab Spring.

What drives men to fight for a dictator - and what happens when their employer is gone? This gripping documentary follows reporter Justin Hall on the ground in Libya, unraveling why Muammar Gaddafi relied so heavily on foreign mercenaries during the 2011 uprising. You'll learn how the infamous "Yellow Hats," mostly black African and Eastern European soldiers-for-hire, became targets of suspicion and violence as the regime crumbled. The video reveals Gaddafi's decades-long tactics: buying loyalty from Tuareg tribes, hiring skilled Eastern Bloc pilots, and using oil wealth to arm his forces - all to maintain his iron grip on Libya.

The story doesn't end with Gaddafi's death. As rebels swept through Tripoli and beyond, mercenaries were abandoned, forced to flee, blend in, or face brutal retribution. Innocent migrant workers became collateral damage in a wave of racism and paranoia. With powerful eyewitness accounts and on-the-ground interviews, this video explores the legacy of mercenaries in the Libyan conflict, the blurred lines between soldier and scapegoat, and the ongoing repercussions for North Africa. If you're interested in the Arab Spring, African geopolitics, or the hidden costs of dictatorship, this is essential viewing.



Related:
Gaddafi 06/21/2026 51 migrants reported dead or missing after boat sinks off Libya’s coast
Gaddafi 05/31/2026 The jewel of Paris: Champs-Elysee area trashed by gleeful migrant gangs, more than 416 arrested in post-championship celebration
Gaddafi 05/13/2026 'Unification of Dynasties': Why Erdogan and Trump Need a United Libya

Link


Africa North
Second Anniversary of the Battle of Tinzaouatène (July 2024)
2026-07-24

Translated Text:

Second Anniversary of the Battle of Tinzaouatène (July 2024)
➡️ PART 1: Looking Back on the Carnage That Shook Northern Mali 🇲🇱

Exactly two years ago, the FAMa, backed by Wagner mercenaries, pushed into the northern part of the country, hell-bent on retaking the last pockets held by the Tuareg rebels of the CSP-DPA and their JNIM allies. This short but bloody clash, which unfolded from July 22 to 27, 2024, around Tinzaouatène, left behind more than a hundred dead among the FAMa / Africa Corps, several dozen wounded, and numerous prisoners.

🟠Recap of the July 2024 Clash:

⚔️ July 22 – The FAMa, bolstered by 🇷🇺 mercenaries, launch a "stabilization operation" aimed at recapturing the last border villages controlled by the CSP-DPA rebels. The column of armored vehicles sets out from Tessalit, swiftly takes Inafaraq, and presses on toward Boughessa.

⚔️ July 25 – In the heart of the Tinzaouatène plain, the 🇲🇱🇷🇺 column is ambushed by CSP-DPA Tuareg fighters equipped with IEDs. The lead armored vehicle is destroyed, the advance grinds to a halt, and the Wagner forces find themselves without air support due to a fierce sandstorm.

⚔️ July 26 – The encirclement drags on; a 🇲🇱 MI-24 helicopter tries to intervene but crashes near Kidal. The surviving fighters face a second ambush from JNIM, which carries out multiple executions and hostage-takings.

⚔️ July 30, 2024 – Confronted with this dire situation, Mali calls in 🇹🇷 Turkish aid. An Akinci drone takes off from the Saponé base and bombs Tinzaouatène, mainly hitting a refugee camp and a gold mining site. The strikes cause heavy civilian casualties, mostly Nigerien 🇳🇪 and Chadian 🇹🇩.

⚠️ Social media floods the web with videos and photos showing the fighters' corpses, mass graves, and scenes of brutality. CSP-DPA channels release images of their fighters waving the independence flag, while Wagner accounts spread hate messages about the Tuaregs.

🔷 This marks the deadliest attack on the Wagner Group outside the Ukrainian theater since the 2018 Battle of Khosham during the Syrian civil war
Related:
CSP-DPA: 2024-10-15 New US strategy in Africa: why Ukraine's GUR is training terrorists
CSP-DPA: 2024-08-18 New footage of the Azawad special military operation against Wagner forces in Mali from July
CSP-DPA: 2024-08-12 Afrique Media: Ukrainian special forces used drones in battles against Malian army
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