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Terror Networks
'Election Jihad' and the Brotherhood's ballot-box pivot
2026-11-09
By Imam Mohammad Tawhidi

[AlEtihad] Islamist networks aren't trying to storm American institutions. They're getting elected to them.

For twenty years, American counterterrorism thinking focused on the lone attacker and the foreign cell. That focus left a blind spot.

Critics now use the term "election jihad" for a slower strategy: building community power through mosques, charities and advocacy groups, then turning that power into votes, candidates and influence over local government. Its defining feature is that it is legal.
A variant on the soft jihad of the law
The Muslim Brotherhood presents itself as a religious and social movement. Its record says otherwise. The movement's most influential ideologue, Sayyid Qutb, wrote the texts that inspired generations of terrorists, including al-Qaeda and ISIS.

The Brotherhood's method has always been two-track: a respectable public face for governments and the media, and an ideology that justifies violence when it's useful.

Governments that know it best have acted. Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the UAE have all designated the Brotherhood a terrorist organisation.

In January 2026, Washington followed: the US designated the Egyptian and Jordanian branches of the Muslim Brotherhood as terrorist organisations and named the Lebanese chapter as a foreign terrorist organisation, a more severe classification. The Lebanese chapter's secretary general, Muhammad Fawzi Taqqosh, received an individual SDGT designation.

Treasury made the dual strategy explicit: chapters of the Muslim Brotherhood purport to be legitimate civic organisations while, behind the scenes, they explicitly and enthusiastically support terrorist groups like Hamas. Washington described these as the first actions of an ongoing, sustained effort, with more designations to come.

This is the key point for American elections. A movement that runs terrorist wings abroad and civic fronts at home isn't a normal participant in democracy. Its electoral activity is not separate from its violence. It is the other half of the same strategy.

In May 2025, a French government report found that while the Brotherhood has lost ground in most of the Muslim world, it is gaining strength in European democracies; especially at the local level.

It described the strategy as "entryism": placing members into institutions with the intent to slowly alter their direction. French officials called the result "municipal Islamism."

The conditions that made it possible in France exist in America too: dense immigrant neighbourhoods, low-turnout local elections, and a few organisations that claim to speak for an entire community.

More at the link
Related:
The soft jihad of the law 05/23/2025 French Report Warns Of Islamist / Muslim Brotherhood 'Entryism' As Risk To National Cohesion
The soft jihad of the law 09/06/2024 ‘Mohammed and Muhammed’: Analysis of Gang Rape Suspects’ Names in Germany Claims Majority more than 75% are Migrant-Heritage
The soft jihad of the law 08/27/2023 Top Dutch court confirms Gantz can’t be sued for civilian deaths in 2014 Gaza strike

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Arabia
Information on Yemeni militias
2026-10-22


Translated Text:

Information on Yemeni militias

The forces of the legitimate government in Yemen are a collection of militias and not an organized army as some may think.

These militias include the following:

1- The Homeland Shield Brigades
2- The Emergency Forces
3- The Giants Militias (Salafi Jihadist)
4- The Tawhid Brigade (Salafi)
5- The Islah Militias (Muslim Brotherhood)
6- Tariq Saleh's militias, the Republican Guard (Separatist)
7- The Southern Resistance Militias (Separatist), which branch out into the Shabwa Elite Forces and the Security Belt Forces of the Transitional Council

Their strength lies in the massive external support they receive from Gulf countries—media, financial, political, and military—along with international recognition.

Their weakness is that they are fragmented and fighting among themselves and internally, with vast ideological differences. Moreover, they do not manufacture their own weapons but receive them ready-made, making them weak in the field. They also lack military decision-making authority and freedom of movement, and as a result, they are placed in extremely naive positions where they become prey to the Sana'a forces.

The number of these forces is very large, reaching hundreds of thousands. Yet, they have been powerless for 12 years in the war against the Houthis, for reasons I've mentioned both in the past and recently, and there's no need to detail them now.

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Bangladesh
'No Future for Our Youth' Say Despairing Christians in Bangladesh After Deadly Unrest
2025-10-29
[PJMedia] The gang rape of a 12-year-old schoolgirl from the indigenous Marma community in Bangladesh's Khagrachhari town led to mass protests that began on the night of September 23. The unrest between indigenous tribes, Bengali Moslem settlers, and the military continued for days in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

According to reports from the region, the girl was raped while returning home from a private tutoring session. Her parents reportedly found her unconscious in a field that night. Police, with army assistance, arrested one suspect: Shayon Shil. But demonstrations continued as protesters demanded the arrest of two other suspects who are believed to have participated in the crime.

At least three people were reportedly rubbed out by Bangladeshi security forces during the protests and dozens were maimed. Protests led to the traffic being suspended on several roads and additional forces being deployed in Khagrachari. Additionally, the Bangladeshi army was also deployed in the region.

Protesters from the Marma and Mog communities said that the homes of people from indigenous communities of the region were burned.

According to the Christian Daily International, as ethnic unrest intensifies, Christian leaders say fear and uncertainty is spreading among the country’s religious minorities because they feel increasingly vulnerable amid the wider political instability that has led to a breakdown of trust in state protection.

According to a press statement issued by the Jumma Chhatra Janata (JCJ), an indigenous student organization, armed settlers and military forces attacked demonstrators in Guimara Upazila (a subdistrict), resulting in what the group described as the "Guimara massacre."

The statement identified three people killed in the violence whom the police later confirmed were Teiching Marma, 20, Aukhrau Marma, 22, and Athuipru Marma, 21.

The student organization also documented the destruction of several vehicles, houses, and shops which belong to indigenous residents. Local reports indicated that nearly 50 homes and 40 shops were torched during the unrest.

Nila Pada Chakma, coordinator of the Bangladesh Bible Society, told Christian Daily International that five Christians on their way to church were assaulted by the army. "They had to be hospitalized for their injuries," he said. "All Christians were released from the hospital and are back home."

Chakma noted that the attackers showed no regard for either religion or ethnicity. "Their targets were the indigenous people. It did not matter whether they were Buddhist, Hindu or Christian," he added. "Whose house was being burnt and who was being attacked did not matter to them."

The Christian Conference of Asia condemned the deadly festivities and urged the Bangladeshi government to guarantee the safety and protection of ethnic and religious minorities. The organization noted that homes, businesses, and places of worship which belonged to indigenous minority communities were targeted during the attacks.

Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) also issued a statement expressing strong outrage over the events in Khagrachhari, saying that vested interests had turned a peaceful protest seeking justice for the rape of a 12-year-old girl into widespread violence. The group questioned why the army-controlled administration has failed to prevent the unrest. TIB called for a comprehensive judicial investigation, the exemplary punishment of the perpetrators, and accountability for those who instigated the unrest.

The situation in the hill districts remains tense, with prohibitory orders still in effect and security forces maintaining heavy patrols across the region.

Meanwhile at the 60th session of the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva (held from September 8 to October 8), multiple speakers raised concerns over escalating attacks on ethnic and religious minorities in Bangladesh.

Suhas Chakma, director of the New Delhi—based Rights and Risks Analysis Group, told the Council that it was the Bangladesh Army that indiscriminately opened fire on those protesters demanding justice for the September 23 rape case, killing three indigenous people and injuring dozens more.

At the same session, rights advocates also cited broader data showing that Bangladesh witnessed 637 mob lynching deaths, the targeting of 878 journalists, 2,485 acts of violence against religious minorities, and criminal cases filed against more than 500,000 political opponents last year.

Charlotte Zehrer, a UN—EU Human Rights Officer with Global Human Rights Defense, reported more than 2,400 incidents of violence against minorities within the past year. She noted that indigenous peoples in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (along with Hindu and Christian communities across the country) have been among the primary targets.

On August 5, 2024, Bangladesh’s Prime Minister the loathesome Sheikh Hasina
...Bangla dynastic politician and now exiled former Prime Minister of Bangladesh. She was President of the Bangla Awami League since the Lower Paleolithic. She is the eldest of five children of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founding father of Bangla. Her party defeated the BNP-led Four-Party Alliance in the 2008 parliamentary elections. She once before held the office, from 1996 to 2001, when she was defeated in a landslide. She and the head of the BNP, Khaleda Zia showed such blind animosity toward each other that they are known as the Battling Begums. That is probably because Khaleda's late husband was the Pak tool who had Mujib assassinated...
fled the country following mass uprisings against her government. She held the post since 2009 and won the most recent parliamentary elections in January 2024. An interim government led by economist Muhammad Yunus now governs the country.

The protests and overthrow of PM Hasina are part of a longer-term trend in Bangladeshi politics which represents the weakening of the secular model that marked the nation's founding, as well as a resurgence in radical Islam and the persecution against minorities.

Though the July 2024 protests were largely started by student groups angry about job quota systems, the violence quickly spilled over and targeted religious minorities. Jamaat-e-Islami
...The Islamic Society, founded in 1941 in Lahore by Maulana Sayyid Abul Ala Maududi, aka The Great Apostosizer. The Jamaat opposed the independence of Bangladesh but has operated an independent branch there since 1975. It maintains close ties with international Mohammedan groups such as the Moslem Brotherhood. the Taliban, and al-Qaeda. The Jamaat's objectives are the establishment of a pure Islamic state, governed by Sharia law. It is distinguished by its xenophobia, and its opposition to Westernization, capitalism, socialism, secularism, and liberalist social mores...
, the country's main Islamist party, strongly supported the uprising. The terrorist organization al-Qaeda in the Indian Sub-continent (AQIS) described it as a "significant victory for Islamists and jihadists in the region." Homes were burned (including house churches), and some Christians were driven underground. Radical Islamic groups such as Hizbut Tahrir
...an al-Qaeda recruiting organization banned in most countries. It calls for the reestablishment of the Caliphate...
have since expanded their influence. They have used the chaos in the country to attack religious minority communities.

The human rights
When they're defined by the state or an NGO they don't mean much...
organization, Open Doors, reported that as part of the unrest during that period, there was an increase in the number of churches and other Christian institutions that were attacked, mainly by members of local Moslem communities. Reports came in from all over Bangladesh. For example, at least 12 ethnic Bawm Christians were killed in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

The 2025 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF)'s Bangladesh factsheet elaborates on the attacks against indigenous groups in Chittagong Hill Tracts:

Indigenous communities in the Chittagong Hill Tracts also continue to report attacks since the July 2024 uprising. In September and October 2024, for example, a spate of attacks between Buddhist-majority indigenous groups and Bengali Moslem settlers resulted in the targeting of religious sites and the killing of at least four people. Buddhist temples were reportedly vandalized and looted, with inaction from security forces. Subsequently, a Buddhist monastic association announced it would not hold an annual month-long religious festival at Buddhist temples, citing fears of insecurity.

Radical Islamic groups, specifically Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh
... The JMB is said to be the youth front of Al Mujahideen, the parent organization that began working toward establishing Bangladesh as an Islamic state in the mid 1990s, which remains obscure and probably defunct today. Other organizations, such as Jama'atul Jihad, JMB, Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB), Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), Hizbut Tawhid, Tawhidi Janata, Islami Jubo Shangha, Islami Shangha, Al Falah A'am Unnayan Shanstha and Shahadat-e al Hiqma are believed to be part of the Al Mujahideen network. The JMB at its peak was reported to contain at least 100,000 members, and an alleged 2,000-man suicide brigade, few of whom actually exploded. JMB allegedly received financial assistance from individual donors in Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Libya. Reports have claimed that funding of JMB by international NGOs like Kuwait based Society of the Revival of Islamic Heritage (RIHS) and Doulatul Kuwait, Saudi Arabia based Al Haramaine Islamic Institute and Rabita Al Alam Al Islami, Qatar Charitable Society and UAE-based Al Fuzaira and Khairul Ansar Al Khairia. The top leadership of JMB was captured in 2005 and hung in 2007, which pretty much shot their bolt.
(JMB), Jamaat-e-Islami, Hefajat-e-Islam, and Ahle Sunnat, are implicated in attacks against religious minorities. Their influence in national politics is growing, and the Jamaat-e-Islami party (previously banned under anti-terrorism laws during the August unrest) had its ban lifted by Yunus' caretaker government, allowing it to re-enter the political arena.

The ousting of Hasina’s government has ushered in a period of uncertainty in Bangladesh. Islamist groups have exploited the power vacuum, and concerns about governance and minority rights have deepened. The interim government led by Yunus has appointed Islamist lawyers linked to Jamaat to court positions. The government has also ordered the release of Jashimuddin Rahmani, who leads a terrorist group linked to al-Qaeda. What is evident is that the democratic norms are eroding in Bangladesh.

The country is currently going through a so-called "constitutional reform process."

According to the USCIRF:

The extent to which religious minority communities have been involved in the reform process remains unclear. Many religious minority communities have expressed that they have not been included or consulted in the reform process and that minority groups are underrepresented in politics and state agencies. For example, within the whole cabinet under the interim government, only one member is a Hindu and one is a member of the Buddhist community from the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Bangladesh’s indigenous community members, many of whom live in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, have called for constitutional recognition.

Meanwhile,
...back at the pie fight, Bella grabbed the cocoanut cream...
Islamist networks tied to global jihadist movements, including al-Qaeda, continue to inspire fear, particularly in rural areas, where Christian converts face severe restrictions. Meanwhile,
...back at the pie fight, Bella grabbed the cocoanut cream...
the rise of Rohingya murderous Moslem activity along the Myanmar border, including ARSA’s (the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army) involvement in violent mostly peaceful crimes, has exacerbated tensions.

Religious minorities, including Christians, Hindus, and Buddhists, remain vulnerable amid these dynamics. Reports of mob violence, forced conversions, and vandalism of places of worship are widespread, often fueled by radical Islamic propaganda.

The 2025 Annual Report of the USCIRF also pointed out to an "increase in attacks against Hindu communities and temples:

Religious freedom conditions in Bangladesh declined amid a series of attacks against religious minority communities," the report said.

In November, police charged a Hindu priest, Chinmoy Krishna Das, with sedition charges for denigrating Bangladesh’s flag while demonstrating for the protection of Hindus... The same month, an estimated 30,000 Hindus gathered demanding government protection from attacks and harassment.

Leaders of religious minority communities continue to say that the government frequently uses laws such as the Digital Security Act (DSA) to target members of religious minority groups, particularly Hindus, for "hurting the religious sentiments" of Moslem populations. In almost all cases, courts take harsher measures against members of religious minorities for posting allegedly derogatory content on Facebook than against the perpetrators of retaliatory violence.

Open Doors stresses that Islamic radical groups and their ideology are now growing in influence in Bangladesh and the army's anti-insurgency campaign in the Chittagong Hill Tracts area is a reminder that Christians are at risk from a variety of persecution, in which communal tensions, the government's "divide-and-rule" tactics and underlying contests for control of land all combine to make Christians vulnerable.

For many Christians in Bangladesh, the violence in Khagrachhari has thus reinforced a sense of fear and abandonment shared across the country’s minority communities. Church leaders say the attacks, coupled with years of unaddressed discrimination and political volatility, have deepened feelings of isolation and uncertainty about the future.

"We are very hopeless with the present situation of the country," Martha Das from the National Christian Fellowship of Bangladesh (NCFB) told Christian Daily International. "Our Christian youth are perplexed; there seems to be no future for them in this country. Everything is uncertain and we will have to wait and see what happens in the February 2026 elections."
Related:
Marma  10/30/2022 Untangling the Chittagong Hill Tracts
Marma  04/03/2018 Myanmar lures Bangladesh Buddhists to take over Rohingya land
Marma  03/31/2018 Panic in the hills with call to join Arakan Army

Related:
Chittagong Hill Tracts: 2024-07-19 Bangladesh protesters set state TV HQ ablaze as death toll mounts, internet cut
Chittagong Hill Tracts: 2024-05-31 FIA Cyber Crime Wing to probe Imran Khan's controversial X post
Chittagong Hill Tracts: 2024-01-07 Bangladesh’s one-sided election leaves some voters asking, ‘What’s the point?’
Related:
Khagrachhari: 2017-07-03 Army detains UPDF regional insurgency commander
Khagrachhari: 2015-08-17 300 BNP men join AL in Khagrachhari
Khagrachhari: 2015-08-16 Five killed in Rangamati 'gunfight'
Related:
Mog  04/04/2016 More on Dhore Drone-Zap
Mog  10/18/2013 Fears of clashes loom in Gedo region of Somalia
Mog  05/28/2013 Somalia FG accuses Kenyan troops of ‘misbehaving’

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Syria-Lebanon-Iran
Syria's new authorities are trying to deal with foreign jihadists
2025-10-25
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Leonid Tsukanov

[REGNUM] The new Syrian authorities have launched a military operation in Idlib province. Damascus' efforts are aimed against the growing Firqat al-Ghuraba group.

Although members of the ruling cabinet claim that the fighting is part of a campaign to combat organized crime, in reality it signals the beginning of a purge within the ranks of yesterday's armed opposition.
As we thought here also.
And, at the same time, attempts to prevent the emergence of a new opposition.

However, for now, Damascus is conducting the campaign extremely cautiously, with breaks for truces.

TOUCHSTONE
Although clashes between the new Syrian authorities and former allies in the armed opposition have been occurring almost since the first days of the "transitional cabinet" led by Ahmed al-Shara'a's establishment, the scale of hostilities has been minor until recently. The sides have limited themselves to brief firefights, mostly without casualties.

The situation changed dramatically in October 2025, when Syrian security forces launched a full-scale operation against the Firqat Al-Ghuraba group, based in the city of Harim (Idlib province), consisting of French-speaking militants and former members of ISIS and Al-Qaeda terrorist cells in Syria.

During the clashes, the Syrian army used heavy weapons and armored vehicles, and deployed a record number of fighters—according to various sources, between 300 and 800 people.

Low-intensity fighting continued for several days, but neither side could yet claim victory. Ultimately, on October 24, the opponents agreed to a temporary withdrawal of forces.

FORMER ALLIES
The official reason for the security forces' "visit" to Harim is an arrest warrant for several high-ranking members of the group on charges of corruption and sexual crimes. However, in reality, this is Damascus's attempt to restore order in the border provinces and crush the rebellion formed by former allies.

Following the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad's regime in December 2024, Firqat Al-Ghuraba forces were integrated into the Ministry of Defense's 82nd Infantry Division—but only on paper. In reality, the group systematically ignored Damascus's orders and conducted covert operations in the border regions to mobilize forces disillusioned with the transitional government's policies.

Moreover, the leader of Omar Omsen's group began rapidly gaining influence, becoming one of the most feared figures in Idlib and could well become the leader of a new armed opposition. Especially since his authority was recognized by many commanders from African and post-Soviet countries hostile to Damascus.

The Katiba Tawhid Wal-Jihad and Jaysh al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar groups, as well as the forces of the Turkestan Islamic Party, have expressed interest in a “tactical alliance” with Firqat Al-Ghuraba.

The opposition's position in Idlib is strengthened by growing rumors that the al-Sharaa government wants to extradite the most notorious underground figures, most of whom face imprisonment in their home countries, to foreign partners in exchange for strengthening international ties.

Omsen, on the contrary, promises his supporters protection from persecution and support in defending their interests.

TIMELY RECONCILIATION
Damascus had long noticed the growing influence of the Idlib opposition, but until recently they had hesitated to openly respond to the challenge. This was primarily due to a lack of confidence in their own strength. The new Syrian leader was hesitant to send units into battle whose loyalty he doubted.

An attempt to resolve the problem using the "Uyghur Guard" (the 84th Special Forces Division, approximately 3,500 men)—a unit under the direct command of the president—was fraught with the risk of exacerbating relations with China due to the public demonstration of the combat readiness of people from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

Moreover, there was a risk of undermining the combat capability of the only unit in the new Syrian army that was loyal, from al-Shara's point of view, giving the enemy a chance to counterattack.

This prompted the interim Syrian leader to reconsider some past decisions. Specifically, in late September 2025, al-Sharaa suddenly reconciled with Abu Ahmed Zakur, the co-founder and former chief financier of the Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) group.

In early 2024, Zakur fell into disgrace and, fearing for his life, fled to the West, where he launched a campaign against the future Syrian leader. For a long time, he was considered a “personal enemy” of al-Sharaa, even being included in the list of people for whose heads a substantial reward was promised.

However, by the fall of 2025, al-Sharaa pardoned his former ally: Zakur was appointed assistant to the president for tribal affairs and will be responsible for strengthening ties and supporting local clans. Although he, despite the pardon, prefers to remain in the United States for now, his subordinates (in particular, former HTS field commander Abu Abdo Taum ) have already begun work on the ground.

IDLIB THROW
However, Zakur's first task, including as an Idlib native, was in fact preparing a staging area for an operation against the rebels. And by all accounts, he accomplished this task well.

His agents managed to win over hesitant armed groups in Bittir, Haram, and Batt Mishla—all of these towns are located along Route 56 (Idlib's main thoroughfare)—and the militias were intended to slow the advance of government forces should a military operation begin. Similar efforts were carried out in other parts of the province.

As a result, by the start of the operation against Firqat Al-Ghurab, Syrian government forces had guarantees from local neutrals that they would not engage in combat and would not interfere with the arrests of jihadists.

Moreover, Zakur's return to power reassured many commanders who had joined the army from HTS and its allied groups and who feared reprisals from Damascus.

As a result, the invigorated loyalists, including Taum, became the core of the forces sent to Harim. They later served as the government's primary negotiators. Through Taum, the parties agreed to a ceasefire and the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

The case of Omsen and other high-ranking members of Firqat al-Ghurab, whom Syrian security forces previously attempted to arrest, will be heard in the Sharia court of Idlib, where the influence of al-Sharaa and his entourage is strong, but not absolute.

This somewhat calmed the new armed opposition, especially given that Damascus had vowed not to extradite foreign fighters to third countries, thus removing the main unifying factor within the new armed opposition.

Overall, the brief offensive in Idlib can be considered the first step by the Syrian transitional authorities toward consolidating their influence on the ground. However, a quick conclusion to the campaign is not to be expected: the defeat of the rebels will be gradual, with a steady consolidation of the captured positions.

The reason for this strange tactic is simple: Damascus is well aware of the specifics of the "Idlib rebellion" and will try to avoid the same mistakes as their predecessor. In particular, they will try to prevent the dissatisfied from consolidating around specific figures.
Related:
Katiba Tawhid Wal-Jihad: 2024-07-26 Al-Qaeda militant accidentally detained in Moscow
Katiba Tawhid Wal-Jihad: 2024-07-16 In Omsk, FSB officers detain migrants for collecting money for Islamists
Related:
Turkestan Islamic Party: 2024-02-27 FSB detains 49 militant accomplices who were sending money to Syria
Turkestan Islamic Party: 2023-09-10 Heaven of Foreign Militants: The Taliban Are Extensively Hosting Extremist Groups
Turkestan Islamic Party: 2023-08-27 HTS: Mutual shelling gov’t forces Fri night and Saturday kills 2 kids, HTS kabooms tunnel under gov’t military camp kill 11 soldiers and 2 turbans
Link


Home Front: Politix
Texas announces ban on Sharia Law after Muslim 'patrols' tried to ban alcohol and pork
2025-09-10
[Daily Mail, where America gets its news] Abbott said on Tuesday: 'I signed laws that BAN Sharia Law and Sharia Compounds in Texas. No business and no individual should fear fools like this.'

Texas governor Greg Abbott has announced a ban on Sharia Law in the state after an imam launched a campaign to pressure Muslim-owned stores to stop selling pork, alcohol and lottery tickets.

Imam F. Qasim ibn Ali Khan of Masjid At-Tawhid was seen in a viral video confronting a store employee and accusing the business of selling 'haram' products forbidden under Islamic law.

The governor also addressed the imam, saying: 'If this person, or ANYONE, attempts to impose Sharia compliance, report it to local law enforcement or the Texas Dept. of Public Safety.'

In a statement, Abbott's office added: 'In Texas, we believe in equal rights under the law for all men, women, & children. Any legal system that flouts human rights is BANNED in the state of Texas.'

Abbott did not specify which bill he was referencing, but he signed a bill in 2017 that prohibits judges from applying any foreign law, including Muslim law, in US courtrooms.

Imam Khan, who leads a Nation of Islam
…considered heretical by mainstream (Sunni and Shiite) Moslems, who also object to their race…
-affiliated mosque in the Houston area, warned Muslim business owners they would face boycotts and public protests if they refused to comply.

In the viral video that sparked widespread outrage, he said a nationwide protest movement was set to begin specifically targeting Muslim businesses that violate Islamic teachings.

'We're kicking off a national protest and demonstration campaign against all Muslim businesses that have haram in their stores,' Khan said in the video.

The Council on American-Islamic Relations slammed governor Abbott's move, calling it 'fearmongering' and saying Sharia means 'the way to water' and compared it to Halacha for Jewish people or Canon law for Catholics.

'When Texas Muslims pray to God five times a day, donate (to) charity, fast in Ramadan, or speak up against injustice, among many other practices, they are observing sharia,' CAIR said.

The group said it is false that Sharia is 'banned' in Texas.

In several videos posted to Khan's TikTok and his 17,000 followers, Khan was seen confronting an employee at a Muslim-owned store, warning the business was violating Islamic law by selling 'haram' goods - items forbidden in Islam.

'This is the beginning of the campaign. We're serving notice to America and the world that enough is enough,' Khan said.

'The people that call themselves Muslims should not be selling haram in their stores... Pork, alcohol, and gambling need to stop.'

Standing outside the storefront with printed protest signs, Khan accused Muslim merchants of betraying their faith for profit and threatened coordinated action if they don't comply.
Related:
Greg Abbott 08/13/2025 Texas Dems begin to crack, confirm return to state after fleeing to obstruct GOP redistricting: report
Greg Abbott 08/06/2025 Texas Republicans Issue Arrest Warrants for Democrats Who Fled State to Evade Redistricting Vote
Greg Abbott 08/05/2025 Here We Go: Texas Dems Run to Illinois to Deny a Quorum for Redistricting, and Now the Real Fun Begins — RedState


Related:
Nation of Islam 09/06/2025 Meet the radical DC activist mobilizing gang members, 'hardcore men' to target federal takeover: 'Real enemy'
Nation of Islam 08/22/2025 Federalist - Stop Tolerating The Toxic Ideas Of Black Radicals
Nation of Islam 08/03/2025 Homeland Insecurity: Unraveling DHS Funding of Terror-Linked and Extremist Groups

Related:
Council on American-Islamic Relations: 2025-09-01 Philadelphia schools partner with Muslim advocacy group for more 'inclusive' education
Council on American-Islamic Relations: 2025-08-17 ‘They’re in Wall Street, they’re in the White House’: Thousands protest Israel in NYC led by Mahmoud Khalil
Council on American-Islamic Relations: 2025-07-28 US killer of Palestinian-American boy in Oct. ’23 hate crime dies in prison aged 73
Link


Syria-Lebanon-Iran
'They Kill Everyone': How Central Asian Militants Carried Out Massacre in Syria
2025-03-12
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Sergey Adamov

[REGNUM] The past few days in Syria have seen an unprecedented surge in violence against local religious minorities: Alawite Muslims and Christians. Social media has been rocked by hundreds of videos in which militants proudly documented their crimes, including mass murders of unarmed people and public torture.

Throughout the conflict, Regnum correspondents were in contact with residents of the Syrian coast, thanks to which they were able to collect dozens of testimonies from civilians about crimes committed by militants.

Eyewitnesses note that militants of foreign origin, natives of Central Asia and the Caucasus, who are noticeably different from Arabs in appearance and stand out against their background, showed particular cruelty in reprisals against the civilian population.
A longstanding problem in the region.
A Red Crescent volunteer, who witnessed mass executions, spoke about the atrocities of foreigners. "The murders are happening for no reason, it is not the military or soldiers who are doing this. These are foreigners - Afghans, Uzbeks, Uighurs," said the author of the video, published on social networks.

Now the new Syrian authorities are arresting civilians for communicating with the media (primarily with the Russian media), so all reports from sources are published anonymously. However, oral testimonies can only serve as confirmation of the crimes in which natives of the Caucasus and Central Asia took part, who do not hide their goals: to create a monolithic society in Syria, united by a radical ideology, in order to carry this ideology further.

GUESTS FROM THE EAST
Militants of foreign origin first appeared in Syria during the first stage of the civil war in 2011–2012. The leadership of the Al-Qaeda* movement called on Central Asians to participate in military operations in the Middle East.

Terrorists from Uzbekistan (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, IMU), Tajikistan and the Caucasus (Anjad-Kavkaz*)
…or Ajnad al-Kavkaz, Chechen group that split off from Caucasus Emirate…
were able to penetrate through Turkey into the northern regions of Syria, where they came into direct contact with the local branch of Al-Qaeda*, the Jabhat al-Nusra* group (later Hayat Tahrir al-Sham*).

Later, militants from among ethnic Uyghurs, representatives of the so-called “East Turkestan Islamic Movement” (ETIM)*, appeared on the territory of Syria.

The formed "terrorist international" took part in battles against government troops and by 2015 was able to establish control over the province of Idlib. A number of groups received their "allotments", for example, the Uyghurs settled in the area of ​​the city of Jisr al-Shughur, and the Caucasians - the outskirts of Idlib.

The region has become a “promised land” for terrorists from all over the world, who have found in Idlib a safe haven and a springboard for planning attacks around the world. In the fall of 2024, it was these formations, as the most motivated, that took part in the offensive on Aleppo, which ended with the fall of the city, and subsequently the collapse of the government of Bashar al-Assad.

IN A NEW ROLE
The "revolutionary" government of Syria has praised the role of foreign formations, granting all foreign fighters Syrian citizenship and effectively legalizing their status.

Now the former “exiles” have become full-fledged citizens, and, what’s more, 100% loyal to the new regime.

The exact number of foreign fighters is unknown. According to Tajik authorities in 2024, there were about 400 Tajik citizens in the Syrian province of Idlib. The total number of "insurgents" in the ranks of the new Syrian army, according to various estimates, ranges from 5,000 to 10,000 people.

Former mercenaries received high positions in the new government.

For example, a native of Tajikistan, Saifiddin Tadjiboev, who was wanted in his home country on charges of terrorism and mercenarism, was appointed commander of the operational headquarters in the new government’s Ministry of Defense.

ON THE EVE OF THE MASSACRE
Since the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad's government, members of ethnic and religious minorities in Syria have lived in constant fear.

The new authorities in Damascus have officially declared that they will not persecute representatives of any community. Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa (aka Mohammed Julani) has demonstratively met with heads of Christian churches, promising protection and patronage.

However, already in the first days of the "new Syria" a wave of attacks on churches and representatives of religious minorities swept across the country. Even then, militants of foreign origin distinguished themselves separately, simply ignoring Damascus' calls for religious tolerance and disarmament.

In the following months, it was these same formations that spread across the entire Syrian coast, viewing the region and its inhabitants as fair game.

After the first open clashes broke out, a total mobilization of radicals and their supporters, a kind of "activists", was declared in the neighboring provinces of Hama and Idlib, who were joined by local residents who wanted to rob their Alawite neighbors. However, the backbone of the "cleansing" forces was made up of armed foreigners.

Footage taken by a militant of Chechen origin, commenting on the events in Syria in Russian, is being published online. "There will be no mercy," the author of the videos says, showing footage of terrorist columns being transferred to Latakia. "We continue to clean up," reads the caption to the video of armored vehicles being deployed on the streets of coastal cities.

Over the following days, Regnum correspondents maintained round-the-clock contact with residents of the Syrian coast, receiving information about what was happening first-hand.

This is how residents of the city of Baniyas describe the first night of the pogroms: “Towards evening, the power went out in our neighborhood. Then groups of pogromists began to enter from different sides, they broke into cars, robbed stores, threw stones at windows. They were followed by armed people who went from house to house. They came to our neighbors’ house with a can of paint, they “marked” people, painted their faces black, insulted them, and then left threats and insults on the walls.”

Among the attackers, local residents particularly noted militants with a characteristic Turkic appearance, often not speaking Arabic. According to eyewitnesses, it was they who showed particular cruelty. An audio recording with instructions calling on local residents "loyal" to the government was distributed, calling on them not to go out into the streets. The voice on the recording says that "Uzbek and Chechen mujahideen" do not differentiate between Sunnis and Shiites and kill everyone.

BLOODY MARCH 8TH
By the morning of the second day of the conflict, the regime had managed to concentrate enough forces on the coast to conduct all-out raids. The Islamists were particularly brutal in the Alawite areas outside the Syrian coast, in the provinces of Hama and Homs.

Tellingly, foreign fighters did not hide their participation in the massacre. In the area of ​​the city of Jabla, a group of Uzbek natives was “spotted”, broadcasting live from the scene and streaming in the Uzbek language. The fighters, belonging to the group “Tawhid wal Jihad”*, told their audience that they had come to Latakia “to punish the infidels” and shared their “political program”.

In particular, they propose that the new Syrian authorities "cleanse" the region and populate it with "faithful Muslims." Syrian Christians are offered either to convert to Islam or to pay "jizya" for life - a tax on non-Muslims in Koranic law.
How traditional.
In fact, we are talking about a doctrine of genocide, which provides for the extermination of the indigenous population, followed by its replacement by “faithful” ones.
Convert, pay jizya, or die. Sometimes only the third is on offer.
In order to more actively populate the coast with "faithful" militants from Central Asia took part in the massacre of Alawites in the village of al-Tuwaim in Hama province. In the "final" round, the radicals beat to death about 15 children aged between one and ten years. Some of the residents of Hama were able to hide in the mountains, but now these people are afraid to return to their homes.

"When we heard about the beginning of the conflict, my relatives were able to leave. There were old people left in the village who asked to leave them. We know that they have been killed now. Somewhere in the houses there are bodies that no one has removed because people are afraid to return for a long time. All the men were killed, some women have disappeared, and no one knows where they are," the source told IA Regnum.

DENOUEMENT
By the morning of March 9, the militants had reached the epicenter of the conflict, the city of Jabla, after which another wave of violence swept through the surrounding villages. In one of the videos made in the vicinity of Jabla, the militants filmed a residential building they had set on fire. "Look, the house of the Alawites is burning!" one of the authors of the video says.

Throughout the day, terrorist gangs continued to repeatedly "cleanse" populated areas, often shooting at everyone they encountered without distinction. At the same time, the heads of Syria's Christian churches issued a joint statement calling for an immediate end to the violence. The "world community" also joined the call, albeit belatedly.

Local residents report that a “clean-up” has begun in the cities of Baniyas, Tartus and Latakia: militants are removing corpses from city streets and even washing blood off the asphalt in preparation for the arrival of foreign journalists.

In a separate statement, Ahmed al-Sharaa said the government would set up a "commission" to investigate "incidents of violence" on the coast, but locals were under no illusions.

"We are still afraid to leave our homes now, no one can assess the damage done. Those who survived were left without all their property, others without their families. We will never forget these two terrible days. Now there is a "roll call" in the chats, we are looking for our own. But we know that there will be no justice for the criminals," the Syrians believe.

Events in Syria have vividly confirmed the worst fears about the prospects for a peaceful settlement in that country. But whatever their consequences, it is absolutely clear that terrorist groups operating in Syria pose a threat far beyond its borders, and that their militants may fall victim to far more than just Syrian ethno-confessional minorities.

People from post-Soviet countries who “distinguished themselves” by committing mass murders probably dream of returning to their native lands and repeating the same thing in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and, of course, in Russia.
Of course.
Related:
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan: 2024-06-19 Already this summer, IS will carry out a terrorist attack in Central Asia
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan: 2024-03-26 Between ISIS and Ukraine. What does the handwriting of the terrorist attack at Crocus say?
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan: 2024-02-27 FSB detains 49 militant accomplices who were sending money to Syria
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East Turkestan Islamic Movement: 2023-09-10 Heaven of Foreign Militants: The Taliban Are Extensively Hosting Extremist Groups
East Turkestan Islamic Movement: 2023-08-27 Resurgence and Realities: Afghanistan’s Shifting Terror Threats
Related:
Ajnad al-Kavkaz: 2024-12-29 Lessons of Syria: The Fall of Damascus as the Main Outcome of the Year in the Middle East
Ajnad al-Kavkaz: 2024-12-14 [RT] Blinded by propaganda: What's really happening in Syria while the new government talks peace? (DISTURBING VIDEOS)
Ajnad al-Kavkaz: 2024-03-20 Zelensky’s terrorist legions: what ISIS militants are doing in Ukraine
Related:
Tawhid wal Jihad: 2024-09-29 Philadelphia: More on the Teen Jihadi who Planned to Bomb Pride Parade
Tawhid wal Jihad: 2024-02-27 FSB detains 49 militant accomplices who were sending money to Syria
Tawhid wal Jihad: 2023-08-22 Far-Left Philly Lawyer Shocked to Discover His Son Is Accused Terrorist
Related:
Caucasus Emirate: 2024-12-12 War Without Victory Day: How Russia Almost Lost Chechnya
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Caucasus Emirate: 2024-09-07 2004: Novaya Gazeta Releases Details of Tank Shooting at School in Beslan
Link


Europe
Number of victims in Munich car crash into crowd rises to 36
2025-02-15
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
Follow up to this story from two days ago.
[Regnum] The number of people injured in the car crash into a crowd of protesters in Munich has risen to 36. This was announced by Deputy Chief of the Munich Police Department Christian Huber at a press conference.

“At present, we are talking about 36 victims about whom we have information,” he said.

He also specified that two people were seriously injured, and eight more were moderately injured. At the same time, according to Huber, the number of victims as a result of the incident may increase.

As reported by the Regnum news agency, on February 13, a Smart car drove into a crowd of people in the center of Munich. The incident occurred at about 10:00 (12:00 Moscow time) during street protests in the city. Some eyewitnesses said that the driver had run over the car intentionally. Police officers broke the car's window to detain the suspect.

The Bild newspaper, citing informed sources, reported that the driver of the car that rammed the crowd was an Afghan citizen. And according to the Spiegel newspaper, the 24-year-old suspect moved to Germany from Afghanistan in 2016, after which he regularly published posts with Islamist content.

Later, Bavarian Interior Minister Joachim Hermann also reported that the driver of the car that rammed the crowd had previously requested asylum in Germany and was denied. However, the Afghan citizen still had the opportunity to be in Germany. The head of the local department clarified that the suspect had not previously been associated with committing acts of violence, but had been involved in shoplifting and drug crimes.
Paraphrasing the machine translation: Nius.de has photos of Afghan bodybuilder Farhad N., 24, and his beloved Mini Cooper, reporting that he came to Germany from Italy at the end of 2016, requesting asylum, but his application was rejected in September 2017. Some time later he received a “tolerance”, preventing him from being deported, and eventually he found a job as a security guard for Ralph Lauren in Munich. He was also a competition bodybuilder, posting videos of his workouts accompanied by Moslem songs, and photos of his medals and himself with the “Tawhid finger” extended, also in designer clothing and expensive carsfor his 33,000 TikTok followers and 68,000 Instagram followers. His neighbours described him as a friendly and helpful young man who recently underwent “Blitzradikalisierung“, Sudden Jihad Syndrome. He followed and shared from at least two TikTok sites that carry Moslem religious content, and had recently described himself as Islamist on social media. He is also connected to false identity documents and drug offenses, but previous reports if shoplifting are incorrect.

Eugyppius describes him as 26 year-old asylum seeker in Germany named Farhad Noori, adding:
This was the second automobile attack on innocent bystanders in public since Magdgeburg in December, when the Saudi migrant Taleb al-Abdulmohsen drove a rented BMW into a Christmas market crowd, killing 6 and injuring 299. To this terrible tally comes the knife attacks in Mannheim, Solingen and Aschaffenburg. This singular and exceedingly rare category of crime — which has become a symbol for the decay in domestic security associated with mass migration — presently claims a nine-month toll in Germany of 12 dead and 343 maimed. The latest attack is additionally poignant, because it follows the Green and Social Democrat blockade of a bill to restrict migration in the Bundestag on 31 January. Among other things, the left parties withheld their votes because Alternative fur Deutschland supported the legislation.

Noori fits what is by now a well-established pattern: He is a native Afghan who came to Germany in 2016 with the rest of the Merkel wave; he was known to the police for theft and drug offences; after the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees rejected his asylum application, he received a visa of tolerated stay anyway.

Like al-Abdulmohsen, the Christmas market attacker, Noori also had a large social media presence, with 68,000 followers on Instagram and another 33,000 on TikTok. On Instagram one finds pictures he posted last year of himself standing next to the Mini Cooper used in today’s attack:

Noori was primarily a competitive bodybuilder, but he was also a pious Moslem; Der Spiegel notes that some of his final social media posts contain "Islamist content," which seems to be a reference to TikTok posts like this one. In apparent video of his arrest this morning, Noori can be heard shouting "God is great" over and over:

What will happen now is the very same thing that happened after all of these other attacks. Politicians will tell us that these events are unacceptable and that Germany must enact grave changes to prevent them in future. Then there will be renewed marches to celebrate diversity and oppose "the right," because the most important victims of migrants colonists attackers are of course all the peaceful Moslems they did not attack. Around this time we will be warned against over-generalising and overreacting, and then the story will slip from the headlines until the next time.

UPDATE: Some additional details have come to light. Noori’s asylum application was rejected in 2017, a year after his arrival. He became an illegal resident in 2020, but received his visa of toleration sometime thereafter. Some of his (now-deleted) Instagram posts show that he worked as store security for Ralph Lauren in Munich. He was known to the authorities for document forgery, among other crimes.

Link


Syria-Lebanon-Iran
Disintegration or Integration: How Syria's New Authorities Are Trying to Save the Country
2025-01-11
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Kirill Semenov

[REGNUM] Just over a month ago, on December 8, 2024, the Assad family's 54-year rule in Syria suddenly ended. After a rapid 11-day military campaign, the armed opposition led by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Ahmed al-Sharaa ( Abu Muhammad al-Jolani ) came to power. From that moment on, the very future of Syria as a state was called into question.

Over the past month, Syria's new transitional government has made some efforts to reassure the public by emphasizing its commitment to preserving state institutions and avoiding the chaos that was seen during the transitions in Iraq and Libya. And it must be acknowledged that it has succeeded to some extent, although the time that has passed since it took power is still very short: it is too early to make more optimistic forecasts for the future.

Perhaps the main success of the new government is its international recognition.

Despite the presence of both HTS and al-Sharaa himself on terrorist lists, most leading world and regional capitals have rushed to establish ties with him. For example, many countries whose official representatives al-Jolani has already met have not considered it necessary to normalize relations with Taliban Afghanistan, although more than three years have passed since the Taliban came to power.

It is clear that international contacts were facilitated by HTS's refusal to necessarily proceed with the assertion of the primacy of Sharia, as well as the new authorities' declared readiness to maintain the existing secular system of government throughout the transition period. Within the country, major roads were opened, many previous restrictions were lifted, and basic public services were restored to return to normal life.

However, the main problem facing the current Syrian government is ensuring the security and unity of the country. And here there are many cracks that threaten to become splits in the future. Although the government is making efforts to prevent negative scenarios.

Unlike the situation in Afghanistan in 2021, when the Taliban came to power and faced a significant surge in ISIS terrorist activity, the new Syrian government was able to prevent terrorists from emerging from the desert to carry out attacks in Syrian cities. Therefore, New Year's celebrations throughout Syria and Christmas in Christian areas took place without casualties. Although it is Christians and representatives of non-Sunni Islamic faiths who are the first to fall victim to ISIS terrorist attacks.

The fact that large-scale public celebrations are held on these non-Islamic holidays also shows that the authorities in Damascus, despite the continuing concerns of Syrian religious minorities, have not introduced Sharia law in the country and banned holidays and events that are not related to Islam. Even alcohol continues to be freely available. The same applies to the dress code: women can still go around without covering their heads.

By the way, representatives of the fair sex have taken several positions in the leadership of the new Syria. In particular, Meysa Sabreen became the chairperson of the Central Bank of the country and the first woman in this position in the history of Syria, and Mohsen al-Maytawi was appointed governor of Suwayda province, also becoming the first woman in such a position.

CHRISTIANS: BETWEEN HOPE AND FEAR
Syrian Christians, despite many pessimistic expectations, were reportedly able to celebrate Christmas without hindrance. But it was not without incident.

In the run-up to the holiday, several individuals affiliated with HTS burned a Christmas tree in the city of Suqaylabiya in Hama province. This led to mass demonstrations by Christians on Christmas Eve (which is celebrated in Syria according to the Gregorian calendar). However, according to the new Syrian government's security service, the perpetrators were detained and given disciplinary punishment.

To reassure Syrian Christians, Ahmad al-Sharaa met with representatives of all Christian denominations in Syria on December 31. A ban was also imposed on sectarian slogans, including those directed against Syrian Christians.

However, the fear for their future among Christians in Syria has not disappeared. The situation is aggravated by conflicts between individual representatives of Christians and Muslims, which lead to an increase in interreligious tension. And, according to Christians, the new authorities are trying to side with the Muslims when resolving them.

This happened in the city of Maaloula, where a conflict between local Christians and Muslims occurred. Then one of the local Sunnis, accused of attempting to rob a Christian home, was killed. Armed Muslim militias from the surrounding villages began to converge on the city. This led to the flight of a number of Christian families, who began to accuse the new Syrian authorities of supporting local Muslims and doing nothing.

Nevertheless, many Christian communities in Syria, despite their fears and mistrust of the new authorities, are actively involved in building the new country. And the Antiochian Patriarchate has welcomed the return to the country of leading Syrian Ash'ari Muslim theologians, such as Sheikh Osama al-Rifai, a world-renowned Islamic scholar who can counter sectarian manifestations among Muslims.

The Patriarchate also organized a political conference to encourage Antiochian Christians to actively participate in the political life of Syria. “We see this as a significant development after many years of passivity in politics, which has negatively affected the Christian community in Syria. We also call on the government and people of Greece to support and assist such initiatives,” the statement said.

DRUZE AND KURDS: CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM
The appointment of Druze activist Mohsen al-Maitawi as governor of Suwayda province, populated by members of this religious minority, was able to open up opportunities for more productive cooperation with the new authorities in Damascus. Thus, the largest armed Druze groups, People of Dignity and Liwa al-Jabal, announced on January 6 their readiness to integrate into the new Syrian army.

This was the result of meetings between political, religious and public figures from Suwayda and officials from the transitional government, which agreed that all key positions for ensuring security in the region would be given to Druze.

A process of negotiations has also begun between the predominantly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the new Syrian authorities.

An SDF delegation met with Ahmed al-Sharaa in Damascus on December 30. The parties discussed the future of northern Syria, security cooperation between the SDF and the transitional government, and the fate of Kurdish-controlled areas of Aleppo.

Media outlets affiliated with the SDF called the meeting positive, noting that such discussions are expected to intensify in the coming weeks. SDF chief Mazloum Abdi noted that during the talks, the parties agreed on the need to preserve a united Syria. Therefore, it can be said that the SDF has already made certain concessions, abandoning the federalization of the country.

The transitional government hopes to peacefully integrate the Syrian Democratic Forces into the structures of the Ministry of Defense and does not intend to start an armed conflict for now. This, however, may be met with opposition from Turkey and the Syrian National Army (SNA) formations associated with it, which hope to solve the "problem" of the Syrian Kurds by force and are already preparing a new military operation.

PRO-TURKISH FORCES: INTEGRATION PROBLEMS
The SNA and Turkey have their own priorities, which do not fully correspond to the plans of the new authorities in Damascus. At the same time, the integration of the SNA into the new Syrian army has not yet begun, despite statements by its factions about self-dissolution and entry into new structures.

Moreover, the future of the so-called interim government in Gaziantep, Turkey, under whose auspices the SNA operates, is also unclear: it has not yet been dissolved either.

Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that the SNA, with the support of Turkey, will begin its own military campaign against the SDF, which could disrupt Damascus’ plans for the peaceful integration of Kurdish formations.

For now, Damascus and HTS have only received the opportunity to take control of border crossings that were previously controlled by the SNA.

The issue of including the "Southern Operational Headquarters" in the new army is no less complicated. It was the forces of this command that were the first to enter Damascus on December 8.

Armed groups in southern Syria have declared their refusal to disband themselves in accordance with the wishes of the new administration leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa. This will complicate his task of establishing Damascus' authority throughout Syria and could lead to serious consequences and even a clash between the parties.

A spokesman for the Southern Operations Command, which currently controls Daraa province, Colonel Nassim Abu Arra, told Al-Akhbar that the southern factions do not agree with the "idea of ​​dissolving the factions."

He noted that they have weapons, heavy equipment and full gear, and they should become part of the Ministry of Defense forces as a single military body.

However, the real leader of the southern Syrian forces, who prefers to remain in the shadows and refuses to take up positions in the new government, is Ahmad al-Awda, the former commander of the 8th Brigade of the 5th Corps, formed by the Russian military from among the reconciled rebels. He apparently also intends to play his own game, relying on the support of the UAE and Jordan, which are very wary of al-Sharaa.

The latter also has many problems with more radical groups such as Ansar al-Tawhid. Since HTS took control of Hama province on December 5, 2024, several extrajudicial executions, destruction of houses, attacks on public and private property have been recorded there. They were carried out by representatives of this group from among foreign citizens, primarily ethnic Uzbeks and people from the Russian Caucasus.

It is known that al-Sharaa met with representatives of this group in Damascus, but the results of the meeting and whether it will be liquidated are unknown. However, the number of sectarian crimes in the Hama region has decreased. Also, representatives of this radical group were unable to prevent the celebration of Christmas in the province.

ALAWITES: THREAT OF REPRISALS
Security issues in Alawite-populated areas remain the most difficult. The delicate balance between restoring order and protecting individual rights is highlighted by sporadic reports of people being detained for minor violations. There are also crackdowns on alleged accomplices to Bashar al-Assad 's regime crimes. However, the criteria for "involvement" are not clearly defined. Therefore, any Alawite who served in the security forces could be at risk.

And while there are not many serious abuses in other parts of the country, in regions where Alawites live, the number of violent acts increases sharply.

There are two factors at play here.

Firstly, the hostility of Assad's opponents towards the Alawites as the regime's mainstay that developed during the civil war. And, secondly, the persistence of cells of armed supporters of Assad in Alawite areas who carry out attacks on representatives of the new Syrian authorities.

On December 28, the transitional government's security forces launched a large-scale operation to clear northwestern Syria, the purpose of which was to find "war criminals" from among the employees of the former Syrian structures. However, independent observers noted that peaceful Alawites who were not members of the armed formations of the former government also became victims of such operations. Some of them were subjected to violence, beatings and arrests simply because they belonged to the Alawite religious community.

There have been cases of Alawites being killed by radical jihadists who serve the current transitional government. These killings have usually been presented as “eliminations” of criminals in hiding. The situation is aggravated by the presence of a large number of provocateurs and openly criminal elements in the region.

However, despite the existing cases of violence against members of minorities, there are no mass killings, much less genocide, of Alawites, contrary to the statements of a number of information resources associated with the previous regime, as well as some Kurdish and Alawite organizations.

Numerous journalists and representatives of human rights organizations work openly in the country, recording almost all cases of violence, and any acts of mass reprisals would have become known immediately. Just as the names and places of detention of all those arrested after the establishment of the new government became known.

But this does not change the existing problems that Alawite sheikhs pointed out at a meeting with representatives of the transitional government in Tartus in early January.

Ahmad al-Sharaa, through his envoys, tried to reassure the Alawites, stressing that HTS and the transitional government were seeking to protect minorities. In response, the sheikhs declared their support for the transitional phase and their desire to build a just state. They noted that the Assad regime did not represent any sect or faith, and the Alawites should not be held accountable for its crimes: it was a repressive system from which everyone suffered.

The Alawites also demanded that criminals from all sides, not just former supporters of the regime, be held accountable fairly and without discrimination. Incidentally, this demand is absolutely fair.

Of course, everyone is familiar with the mass killings of civilians by Assad's supporters from the so-called shabiha. For example, one can recall the massacre in Houla in May 2012, where more than 100 bodies of civilians were found, including 32 children under 10 years old. The UN Security Council blamed the Syrian government for these events in a corresponding resolution, which was then supported by Russia.

However, the opposition also committed mass killings of civilians, including women and children, during the conflict, and most often the victims were Alawites. Examples include the bloody events in the cities of Arima (Latakia) in August 2013 and Al-Zara (Homs) in May 2016. In both cases, the terrorist group Jabhat al-Nusra, the predecessor of HTS, was involved in the mass killings of Alawite civilians.

Therefore, if we are talking about searching for people who committed particularly serious crimes during the civil war, then this should not concern only the accomplices of the regime; all those responsible should be held accountable.

The Alawites also insist on the eradication of all abuses and violations that occur locally in relation to representatives of individual faiths. They supported the confiscation of weapons from all those who are not in the service of the state, but again drew attention to the fact that the confiscation operations should concern not only representatives of individual sects and faiths (primarily the Alawites), but also all other citizens of Syria, including former members of opposition groups.

Alawite leaders also called on the authorities to prevent decisions that harm social equality, such as arbitrary dismissals or delays in salaries for members of certain faiths.

Thus, over the past month, Syria has not descended into bloody chaos, but the threat of disintegration, followed by a new round of civil war, remains on the agenda. And in this matter, much depends not only on the ability of the various factions of Syrian society to negotiate and the ability of the authorities to keep the radicals in check, but also on the position of international players.

Link


Syria-Lebanon-Iran
8 Foreign Nationals have been arrested by Security Forces in the Northwestern Syrian City of Hama, for lighting a Christmas Tree in the City on Fire
2024-12-24
[PUBLISH.TWITTER]

Hundreds protest in Syrian capital after Christmas tree burned

[IsraelTimes] Hundreds of demonstrators have taken to the streets in Christian areas of Damascus to protest the burning of a Christmas tree near Hama in central Syria.

“We demand the rights of Christians,” protesters chant as they march through the Syrian capital toward the headquarters of the Orthodox Patriarchate in the Bab Sharqi neighborhood.

The protests come a little more than two weeks after an armed coalition led by Islamists toppled the government of Bashar al-Assad, who had cast himself as a protector of minorities in the Sunni-majority country.

A demonstrator who gives his name as Georges tells AFP he was protesting “injustice against Christians.”

“If we’re not allowed to live our Christian faith in our country, as we used to, then we don’t belong here anymore,” he says.

The protests erupted after a video spread on social media showing hooded fighters setting fire to a Christmas tree in the Christian-majority town of Suqaylabiyah, near Hama.

According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, the fighters were foreigners from the Islamist group Ansar al-Tawhid.

In another video posted to social media, a religious leader from Syria’s victorious Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) addresses residents, claiming those who torched the tree were “not Syrian” and promising they would be punished.

“The tree will be restored and lit up by tomorrow morning,” he says.

The Islamist HTS movement, rooted in Al-Qaeda and supported by Turkey, has promised to protect minorities since its lightning offensive toppled Assad this month following years of stalemate.
Related:
Ansar al-Tawhid: 2024-12-12 Syria after the collapse. What next?
Ansar al-Tawhid: 2023-10-05 Dozens of terrorists killed in Syrian offensive in Idlib province
Ansar al-Tawhid: 2023-08-30 Military escalation causes casualties in NW Syria
Link


Syria-Lebanon-Iran
Lebanese Druze politician says country should ‘permanently abandon’ war on Israel
2024-12-17
[IsraelTimes] Hezbollah ally Wiam Wahhab, who heads the minor Arab Unification Party, says ‘the nation does not want war’ and the only victor in the region is Netanyahu

Wiam Wahhab, a Druze Lebanese politician and former minister, said in an interview on Sunday that Leb
...The Lebs maintain a precarious sectarian balance among Shiites, Sunnis, and about a dozen flavors of Christians, plus Armenians, Georgians, and who knows what else?...
should end its long-running fight against the State of Israel and pursue normalization.

Wahhab, the founder and head of the minor Tawhid Party, or Arab Unification Party, is considered an ally of the Hezbollah terrorist group, which holds considerable power in Lebanon, and of ousted Syrian president Bashir Pencilneck al-Assad
The Scourge of Hama...
In an interview with the local al-Jadeed TV station, Wahhab said, "We must permanently abandon this mentality of war with Israel," according to translation from the L’Orient Today Lebanese news outlet.

Wahhab, who served as environment minister in Lebanon from 2004 to 2005, said he would be willing to strike a "deal with the devil," meaning Israel, in order to ensure the safety of his Druze community. The Druze population in Lebanon is thought to make up about three percent of the population. Wahhab’s party does not currently hold any seats in parliament.

"The Lebanese have sacrificed more than 75 years of their lives for the Paleostinian cause. This must come to an end," he said during the interview, adding that "the nation does not want war and no longer wishes to fight the Israeli state."

After decades of constant fighting against Israel, Lebanon "must stop following pipe dreams... the nation does not want to fight," said Wahhab. "We want to live comfortably," he added, suggesting that "the only victor in the region is Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who continues to reshape the Middle East."

"The Lebanon front has paid a heavy price since Hezbollah opened a support front for Gazoo
...Hellhole adjunct to Israel and Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, inhabited by Gazooks. The place was acquired in the wake of the 1967 War and then presented to Paleostinian control in 2006 by Ariel Sharon, who had entered his dotage. It is currently ruled with a rusty iron fist by Hamas with about the living conditions you'd expect. It periodically attacks the Hated Zionist Entity whenever Iran needs a ruckus created or the hard boyz get bored, getting thumped by the IDF in return. The ruling turbans then wave the bloody shirt and holler loudly about oppression and disproportionate response...
," said Wahhab, referring to the more than year of attacks by the terror group on northern Israel, starting right after the Hamas
..a contraction of the Arabic words for "frothing at the mouth",...
onslaught on the south on October 7, 2023.

Israel believes that around 3,500 Hezbollah operatives have been killed throughout the conflict. A tentative ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah entered into effect last month, though each side has accused the other of violating the terms of the deal.

Wahhab suggested that the Iranian Axis of Resistance® "ended after the deaths of [Iranian general] Qassem Soleimani
[in 2020] and [Hezbollah leader] His Eminence Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah
...The late, lamented satrap of the Medes and the Persians in Leb...>
" in an Israeli Arclight airstrike
...KABOOM!...
earlier this year. The only path forward, he said, is normalization with the State of Israel.

The Lebanese politician is known for his outspoken statements, and has made comments suggesting Lebanon abandon its fight against Israel in the past.

In October 2022, after Israel and Lebanon reached an agreement over their maritime border, Wahhab said in an interview with al-Jadeed that, "in my opinion [by signing the deal], we went for sustainable peace. Let’s not kid around."
Related:
Wiam Wahhab 10/31/2022 Lebanese politician close to Hezbollah: ‘We went for sustainable peace’ with Israel
Wiam Wahhab 05/17/2022 Sunday's vote early results: LF, independents make significant gains
Wiam Wahhab 11/28/2018 Roads Blocked in Protest at Wahhab's Anti-Hariri Remarks

Link


Syria-Lebanon-Iran
Syria after the collapse. What next?
2024-12-12
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.

Text taken from the website of Elijah J. Magnier. The rest of the text is in Russian and behind a paywall.

[ColonelCassad] Rapid military developments in Syria, without resistance from the Syrian army, led to the fall of President Bashar al-Assad and his unopposed departure from Damascus. This transition was the result of high-level negotiations between key players, including Turkey, Russia and Iran. However, the surprises in the Middle East are far from over; they are only just beginning with this transition of power and the attempt to create a new state with very different standards.

One of the key reasons for the rapid fall of the Assad regime was the strategy employed by the advancing forces in the towns and villages they captured, especially in the countryside of Idlib, Aleppo and its surroundings (apart from isolated extremist actions), but also in Hama, Homs, Damascus and southern Syria.

The attackers deliberately distanced themselves from the brutal tactics that had united the world against the forces fighting the Syrian army since 2011.

This shift in approach allowed the regime to collapse like a snowball rolling down a mountain, with minimal resistance as one city after another surrendered. The orderly surrender occurred without significant bloodshed after protracted negotiations led by the main mediators: Turkey, Iran, and Russia.

Russia and Iran lost a staunch ally and a strong base in the Middle East, leaving Turkey as the dominant power. Istanbul provided military support to the advancing forces, coordinated their operations, and carefully directed their actions through a joint operations room. Under Turkish leadership, these forces achieved all of their objectives in areas previously controlled by the Syrian army. However, they did not extend their success to areas controlled by U.S.-backed Kurdish forces in the northeast, where power extended to Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa.

Syria remains deeply divided, with the northeast under Kurdish control, Israel expanding its occupation of new Syrian territory in the south, and no unified factions that could form a cohesive ruling authority. Instead, Prime Minister Mohammed Ghazi al-Jallali has been appointed to lead an interim administration running the country. What events have brought Syria to this point, and what does the future hold?

As head of the interim administration, Prime Minister al-Jallali will likely be responsible for the day-to-day functions of the state while preparing it for a longer-term transition. This includes maintaining basic governance, preventing a complete collapse of institutions, and overseeing negotiations to achieve a more permanent political settlement. Al-Jallali will have to navigate deep divisions as he works with opposition groups, external actors, and the remnants of the Assad-era bureaucracy. His ability to manage these relationships will determine whether Syria can move toward stability. His appointment signals to the international community that Syria is attempting to rebuild itself within a framework that combines continuity and change. However, it also raises questions about whether genuine reform is possible with a figure associated with the previous regime. Al-Jallali’s leadership during the transition will set the tone for Syria’s transition. Whether he can maintain stability and steer the country toward a new political structure will depend on his ability to build consensus among internal and external actors.

His tenure will likely determine whether Syria moves toward unity or remains divided and uncertain.

Many factions in Syria have united under the leadership of the Repel Aggression Coalition, forming a single alliance that includes groups such as Jaysh al-Izza, Jaysh al-Ahrar, Faylaq al-Sham, Al-Quwat al-Mushtaraka, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zinki, the Sultan Murad Brigade, Ansar al-Tawhid, Suqour al-Sham, Ahrar al-Sham, the Sulayman Shah Brigade, the Al-Hamza Division, and the Turkistan Islamic Party Brigades. Among them, Ahrar al-Sham and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham stand out as the largest and most influential.

A call has been announced for a “National Transitional Council” (NTC) to unite all elements of the revolution. This comes after Abu Muhammad al-Julani said that existing institutions would remain under the current prime minister in order to maintain stability following the unexpectedly rapid collapse of the Syrian government’s control over major cities.

However, the path forward remains uncertain. It is not yet clear how the state will be governed in the coming weeks or who will lead the effort to draft a new constitution and prepare for parliamentary elections. The main challenge will be creating a coherent governance structure and reconciling the diverse and often conflicting ideologies of the combined factions.

As these factions, with their different backgrounds and agendas, try to forge a unified vision for Syria’s future, questions remain about who will wield ultimate authority and how they will navigate the complexities of building a functioning state.

The success of this fragile alliance will likely determine whether Syria can move toward stability or remain divided and uncertain.

The creation of the National Transitional Council highlights the enormous challenges of uniting disparate factions into a coherent governing structure. While the Repel Aggression coalition suggests a temporary convergence of interests, the long-term sustainability of such an alliance remains questionable.

Factions within the NTC span a wide range of ideologies. Groups such as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Ansar al-Tawhid advocate sharia-based governance of Syria. Their extremist vision risks alienating moderate factions and potential international supporters. Large groups such as HTS and Ahrar al-Sham may claim disproportionate influence, risking the marginalization of smaller factions and internal disunity. At the same time, Ahrar al-Sham and Faylaq al-Sham combine Islamic principles with nationalist aspirations, seeking a pluralistic model of governance that includes diverse Syrian groups.

On the other hand, factions such as the Sultan Murad Brigade and the Turkistan Islamic Party Brigades include foreign fighters and minorities, and they pursue unique goals, complicating the prospect of national unity. Smaller factions often support democratic or technocratic governance, which can conflict with the dominant Islamist forces in the coalition. These differences highlight the difficulty of creating a common vision of governance and policy.

Israel has formally abandoned the 1974 disengagement agreement with Syria, declaring its intention to renegotiate the dynamics on the border. In a bold move, Israel captured Mount Hermon and several villages in Quneitra, declaring Syria an open battlefield and signaling its intention to advance further into Syrian territory with blatant disregard for international norms. The Israeli Air Force conducted a sustained campaign, systematically attacking and destroying more than 100 strategic targets, including Syrian air defense systems, ammunition depots in Damascus, and key installations at several airports across the country, further weakening Syria’s already depleted defenses.

On the other hand, Russian forces, deployed on the Syrian-Israeli border primarily for stabilization following the Syrian civil war, acted as a buffer between Israeli and Syrian forces, preventing escalation. They were stationed primarily in the Quneitra and Golan Heights areas and served as intermediaries, restraining both sides from aggressive actions that could lead to a wider conflict. However, their presence was also a symbol of Russia’s influence in the region and its role as a security guarantor for the Assad regime.

Recent events have forced Moscow to abandon these positions due to the security risks to its soldiers, creating a vacuum that has allowed Israel to expand its operations and consolidate its control in southern Syria.

No international power has stepped up to defend Syrian sovereignty or oppose Israel’s annexation of additional Syrian territory. For Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the occupation of parts of Syria represents a major achievement in Israel’s strategic ambitions. Not only does the move strengthen his political position at home, it also reinforces Israel’s territorial and military dominance at a key moment in the evolution of the Middle East’s geopolitical situation.

Moscow, which has provided refuge to Bashar al-Assad and his family, has announced that it remains in touch with all parties involved in Syria, maintaining a pragmatic approach toward the new authorities. However, uncertainty hangs over Russia’s strategic presence in the region. The possible loss of the Khmeimim and Tartus military bases would be a significant loss, as these facilities provide the only access to the warm waters of the Mediterranean, a critical geopolitical asset for projecting influence in the region.

Since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2012, Turkey under Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has taken a firm stance against President Bashar al-Assad. Erdogan has repeatedly stated that his goal is to visit Damascus and pray at the Umayyad Mosque. Today, with the fall of Assad, this goal seems achievable, cementing Turkey’s status as the “godfather” of the new Syrian leadership.

Turkey has long-term goals in Syria: securing its borders, countering Kurdish autonomy, and strengthening its influence in northern Syria. To this end, Ankara has used military action, economic integration, and support for opposition groups and jihadists. However, achieving these goals depends on Turkey’s ability to balance domestic political objectives, regional rivalries, and international interests.

Turkey has established zones of influence in regions such as Afrin, Jarablus, and al-Bab, where it exerts significant administrative, economic, and military influence. Turkish currency and goods dominate local markets, and the establishment of schools and cultural institutions has helped spread the Turkish language and culture.

These actions also help Turkey address its domestic challenges. It hosts more than 3.5 million Syrian refugees, and anti-refugee sentiment has become a significant political issue. By creating “safe zones” in northern Syria, Ankara aims to repatriate significant numbers of refugees, reducing domestic tensions and demonstrating its role as a stabilizing force in the region. However, such ambitions have drawn opposition from Russia and Iran, especially in light of Turkey’s resettlement of opposition-supporting Syrians in areas cleared of Kurdish forces. This process of demographic engineering is aimed at weakening Kurdish influence and strengthening Turkey’s position.

Turkey’s military campaigns and support for offensive forces are also aimed at undermining U.S.-backed Kurdish militias in northeastern Syria. Although the United States relies on Kurdish militias such as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to fight ISIS, Ankara views the alliance as a threat to its security. Turkey’s operations demonstrate to Washington that it will not tolerate a prolonged Kurdish presence on its borders, even if it means disrupting American plans to stabilize the region.

Despite the fall of the Assad regime, the fighting in Syria is far from over. Fighting continues in northeastern Aleppo between Turkish-backed forces and U.S.-backed Kurdish militias. Turkey views these Kurdish forces not as Syrian militias but as affiliates of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is designated a terrorist organization in Turkey and internationally. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan recently underscored this position, saying that these forces are “foreign fighters who have gathered in Syria and they must all be eliminated.” The Kurdish forces remain determined to defend their autonomy and continue to receive U.S. support, creating a protracted conflict that limits Ankara’s ability to achieve its goals.

The United States, however, takes a different stance. While Washington also considers Ahmed al-Shaar (Abu Muhammad al-Julani), the leader of the task force, a terrorist, it continues to support Kurdish groups, including militias linked to the PKK, which it also officially recognizes as terrorist organizations. Yet these same Kurdish forces play a key role in protecting the American presence in Syria. U.S. forces also provide them with air cover and prevent attacks on them, creating a paradoxical dynamic. The U.S. will only recognize new leaders in Syria if there is a smooth transition.

In recent days, Kurdish forces have advanced and taken control of Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa, adding these territories to the already-held regions of Hasakah and Qamishli, which are critical to Syria’s economy and resources. The new Syrian leadership is unlikely to accept this development, as it exacerbates tensions in the northeastern region, which contains the country’s grain basket as well as oil and gas resources. This Kurdish control presents an ongoing dilemma and raises the question of federalization, especially given the different identities of the Kurds, Alawites, and Druze in Syria.

However, Turkey’s staunch opposition to Kurdish autonomy will make the creation of a Kurdish state similar to Iraqi Kurdistan much more difficult. Ankara is unlikely to tolerate even the hint of a Kurdish enclave in northeastern Syria, ensuring that the issue remains a contentious and unresolved point in the country’s fragmented landscape.

Read the rest at the link

Syria. The last 75 years
Text taken from the Telegram channel of alter_vij

Commentary by Russian military journalist is in italics.

[ColonelCassad] In Syria over the past 75 years, not counting external wars:

1949 – three military coups, the supreme power changes as many as three times in one year

1951 – military coup

1954 – general rebellion and coup

1961 – military coup

1962 – as many as two military coups in one year

1963 – military coup, the Baath Party comes to power (one of the leaders is Assad Sr.)

1966 – military coup, where Assad Sr. is one of the main participants

1968-69 – riots in the main cities of the country, suppressed by the army

1970 – military coup, Assad Sr. comes to power

1976-82 – civil war between the Assad government and the Islamists. Mass killings in Aleppo. The city of Hama, mentioned more than once in December 2024, was completely destroyed during the fighting in 1982...

1984 - President Assad's younger brother unsuccessfully tries to overthrow his brother and seize power.

Since 1985, 20 years of relative stability begin under the harsh dictatorship of the Assad clan

2000 - Assad Sr. dies, power passes to his son

2005 - Vice President Khaddam, a close associate of his late father, unsuccessfully attempts to overthrow Assad Jr.

Since 2011 - as we all know, an ongoing war.

So 2024 and even 2025 will not be the last years of the eternal Syrian turmoil...

P.S. And what beauty was happening there throughout the 19th century! Emperor Nicholas I first thought about introducing Russian troops into Syria in 1840, when the "Egyptians" and "Turks" were once again fighting for Damascus and Aleppo during the civil strife within the Ottoman Empire.

Russian military intelligence began systematic work on the lands of modern Syria while Pushkin was still alive...

For five years, from 1834 to 1839, Russian officers worked continuously in Palestine and Syria. The first to survey the region for the possibility of military operations was Colonel of the General Staff Alexander Duhamel, who was listed as consul in Egypt. Then Lieutenant Colonel Pyotr Lvov worked in Syria. This native of the Tver province, a veteran of wars with the Turks and Polish rebels, compiled the first military map and topographic description of Syria in the style: "... here a road cut into the rock winds, and Beilan in a military sense would deserve special note."

Beilan is now the Turkish Belan in Hatay, where there are still more Arabs than Turks, and the line of the Syrian-Turkish border was recognized by Damascus only in 2011 and almost immediately "unrecognized" after Erdogan supported the internal Syrian rebellion.

But let's go back to the 19th century.

Emperor Nicholas I personally familiarized himself with the map of Syria and other documents of Lieutenant Colonel Lvov, leaving his own notes on them. As a result of this acquaintance, the lieutenant colonel became a colonel and received a lifelong pension of 2,000 rubles per year.

Following Pyotr Lvov in Syria and Palestine in 1838-39, Captain of the Life Guards Pavlovsky Regiment Joseph Dainese, assistant to the quartermaster general of the Active Army, worked. This Italian, who transferred to Russian service, compiled a "military survey map" and a detailed "Memoire sur la Syrie en 1838" (written in French, "Report on Syria in 1838").

Based on the work of Duhamel, Lvov and Dainese in St. Petersburg, the Department of the General Staff of the Ministry of War compiled the following summary in 1840: "The conquest of Syria, given the disposition of the inhabitants to the advancing army, is possible by acting from Anatolia during one 7- or 8-month campaign, but given the hostility of the steppe and mountain tribes, offensive actions, even from Anatolia, will be extremely difficult, will require a strong army and can be successful only with the slowest course of the war, special caution and inevitable sacrifices."

https://t.me/alter_vij/3365 - zinc

PS. Find Bashar al-Assad in the picture, who has recently become a Muscovite. Perhaps he will vote for Sobyanin in the elections.
The Sobyanin reference refers to Sergey Sobyanin, current mayor of Moskva who is apparently running for reelection.
Link


Home Front: WoT
Philadelphia: More on the Teen Jihadi who Planned to Bomb Pride Parade
2024-09-29
More on this story from August. Robert Spencer gets us a name and background.
[PJMedia] Muhyyee-Ud-din Abdul-Rahman is eighteen years old, and like many young men his age, he had big dreams. Abdul-Rahman wanted to become a bombmaker for jihad groups, and he researched the Philadelphia Pride parade and the Army-Navy game as potential targets. His father, a prominent far-left lawyer, had no comment, but one has to wonder: did this young man learn at home that this kind of behavior was acceptable?

The News Agency that Dare Not be Named reported that Abdul-Rahman was nothing if not enterprising: he "conducted at least 12 tests on homemade bombs near his family’s home before he was arrested and was close to being able to detonate devices with a blast radius of several hundred yards."

Robert Listenbee, Philadelphia’s First Assistant District Attorney, adds that the would-be jihadi "had a scholarship to attend college as a wrestler and decided he wanted to become a bomb maker. He wanted to leave America and go to Syria to join a terrorist group. He developed bombs in his home and tested those bombs 12 to 20 times in his backyard and in the woods nearby. Some of the bomb-making parts were found in his trash before he was arrested."

As Abdul-Rahman was doing all this, it is extremely unlikely that his parents didn’t notice: "detectives found Abdul-Rahman was collecting materials to make explosives at his parents’ [home]."

Abdul-Rahman wanted make bombs for two jihad terror groups: Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad (KTJ),
…made up of Turkic types: Uzbeks/Tajiks/Uighurs and based in Syria’s Idlib province — nothing at all to do with the spoilt kid of a Moslem African-American politician….
which is an al-Qaeda affiliate, and Hay’at Tahrir al Sham (HTS). He did not, however, intend to use his bomb-making skills only in Syria. CBS News notes that he was "was searching online for potential targets in the Philadelphia area, specifically the Philly Pride March and the Army-Navy game. He allegedly was also looking into targeting local power plants and domestic military bases."

How far has the apple fallen from the tree? Muhyyee-Ud-din Abdul-Rahman is the son of Qawi Abdul-Rahman, a prominent Philadelphia criminal defense attorney who ran in May 2023 for a seat as a Philadelphia Common Pleas Court judge. In a "vote for ten" election, Abdul-Rahman finished fourteenth, with 3.88% of the vote.
According to the Rantburg archives, Pops is a lawyer, wannabe judge so he could put his thumb on the scales for his people, father of three teenagers, loudly proud to be a child of the US Air Force and the Philadelphia projects — but he lives in the intersection of activist Islam and Black Lives Matter...
In a campaign video, Abdul-Rahman wears a djellaba, a flowing robe that is common in North Africa but usually worn in America only by Moslems who are extremely devout. His forehead also sports a superbly prominent zebiba, a dark mark caused by performing the repeated prostrations that are called for in Islamic prayer, and that is generally understood to be a sign of extraordinary piety.

Journalist Victor Fiorillo of Philly Mag reported back in Aug. 2023 that he contacted Qawi Abdul-Rahman to ask him about his son, and found the renowned attorney extremely bellicose: "You wanna find out what I’m really about?" Qawi Abdul-Rahman asked Fiorillo. "Text or call me one more time, and you’ll find out what I’m really about."

Qawi Abdul-Rahman has insisted, however, that he had little or no knowledge of what his son had been up to. He said he was "shocked and devastated" by his son’s arrest, adding, "I didn’t see it coming at all. At all. I go to court because I want people to know that Moslems are out here doing things in the community, for the community. I’m an American like everyone else."

Of course. Qawi Abdul-Rahman’s judge campaign page features another video that proclaims that "Black Judges Matter." In that video, he complains of judges who don’t give him and his clients the same attention and care they give to his "white counterparts." He complained about judges and court staff "looking at us as if we don’t belong."

Philadelphia officials are insisting that their young terror suspect was "radicalized on the Internet" and that his plans had nothing to do with Islam, but is anyone there looking into the possibility that his determination to strike against America arose from sources closer to home?



Related:
Philadelphia: 2024-09-26 My Trip to America
Philadelphia: 2024-09-15 Government Report Calls for All Airports Closed to Comply with ‘Net Zero'
Philadelphia: 2024-09-15 VP Kamala Harris' first solo interview proves candidate is 'unprepared for office,' say online critics
Related:
Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad: 2024-02-27 FSB detains 49 militant accomplices who were sending money to Syria
Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad: 2023-08-22 Far-Left Philly Lawyer Shocked to Discover His Son Is Accused Terrorist
Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad: 2023-08-15 Philadelphia teen charged with plotting potentially 'catastrophic terrorist attack'
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