Hello !
| Syria-Lebanon-Iran | |
| Saudi Suspect in 1996 Khobar Bombing Detained: Report | |
| 2015-08-27 | |
| [ALMANAR.LB] The alleged main suspect in the 1996 bombing of a housing complex in Saudi Arabia’s eastern city of Khobar has reportedly been arrested in Lebanon. Ahmad Ibrahim al-Mughassil, 48, was detained in the Lebanese capital city of Beirut and sent to Saudi Arabia for interrogation, the Saudi-owned Asharq al-Awsat daily reported on Wednesday, quoting unnamed Saudi officials. The report also said that Mughassil was captured based on information received by Saudi security forces. “The discovery of Mughassil and his arrest in Lebanon and his subsequent transfer to Saudi Arabia is a qualitative achievement, for the man had been in disguise in a way that made it hard to identify him,” the report added. Back in 2001, the Saudi man was indicted by a US court for the June 25, 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers residence at a US military base, which killed 19 US servicemen and injured approximately 500 people.
U.S. prosecutors have said that Mughassil drove the explosives-laden truck and parked it outside the military compound. The FBI has offered a reward of up to $5 million (4.4 million euros) for information leading directly to his apprehension or conviction. | |
| Link |
| Arabia |
| Shiite Saudi Clerics Warn against Anti-Govt. Violence |
| 2014-03-10 |
| [An Nahar] Shiite Saudi holy mans warned Sunday against taking up arms against the authorities in the Sunni-ruled kingdom, in the wake of sporadic violence that has rocked the country's Shiite-dominate east. Demonstrations in Eastern Province, where most of the kingdom's two million Shiites live, erupted simultaneously with a protest movement in neighboring Bahrain in 2011. They took a violent turn in 2012 and festivities between police and protesters have so far killed 24 people, including at least four coppers, according to activists. The 10 influential holy mans from Eastern Province said in the statement received by Agence La Belle France Presse that "using violence and arms against the state is rejected and condemned". They also warned Shiite Moslems in the kingdom from "being lured into violence and extremism... which complicates matters and serves enemies." The holy mans insisted that religion demands achieving "security and stability in the country" and that "political violence destroys the nation." Clerics who signed the statement included Hassan al-Saffar who is known for his role as mediator between Shiite protesters and authorities in the past. The statement follows several meetings between Khalid al-Safyan, governor of Qatif in Eastern Province, and a number of Shiite dignitaries to try and ease tensions that have been brewing in the oil-rich east, activists said. It also comes after Soddy Arabia ...a kingdom taking up the bulk of the Arabian peninsula. Its primary economic activity involves exporting oil and soaking Islamic rubes on the annual hajj pilgrimage. The country supports a large number of princes in whatcha might call princely splendor. When the oil runs out the rest of the world is going to kick sand in the Soddy national face... published Friday a list designating "terror" groups, including the little-known Saudi Hezbollah Shiite Death Eater group and the Shiite Houthi ...a Zaidi Shia insurgent group operating in Yemen. They have also been referred to as the Believing Youth. Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi is said to be the spiritual leader of the group and most of the military leaders are his relatives. The Yemeni government has accused the Houthis of having ties to the Iranian government, which wouldn't suprise most of us. The group has managed to gain control over all of Saada Governorate and parts of Amran, Al Jawf and Hajjah Governorates. Its slogan is "God is Great, Death to America", Death to Israel, a curse on the Jews" ... rebels in neighboring Yemen. In February unknown gunnies shot up a cop shoppe in the flashpoint village of Awamiya, in Qatif, wounding three coppers, a week after a firefight there killed two coppers and two wanted Shiite activists. |
| Link |
| Terror Networks |
| Eyes Wide Open |
| 2006-05-23 |
| AS THE IRAN DEBATE has progressed, a somewhat disturbing trend has emerged in which those who have previously warned of the dangers posed by Tehran have now sought to ignore or downplay these earlier statements. Perhaps this is because they are fearful of the prospect of a military confrontation with Iran and do not wish to be seen as supplying anything resembling a casus belli. This is essentially the reverse of what the Bush administration is accused of doing during the run-up to the war in Iraq, with information being presented selectively for the purpose of downplaying the Iranian. This seems unwise. An honest assessment of the Iranian threat is necessary, beginning with the Iranian regime's role in the events leading up to September 11. According to the text of the 9/11 Commission report: Khallad and other detainees have described the willingness of Iranian officials to facilitate the travel of al Qaeda members through Iran, on their way to and from Afghanistan . . . Such arrangements were particularly beneficial to Saudi members of al Qaeda. . . . In October 2000, a senior operative of Hezbollah visited Saudi Arabia to coordinate activities there. He also planned to assist individuals in Saudi Arabia in traveling to Iran during November. A top Hezbollah commander and Saudi Hezbollah contacts were involved. . . . In November, Ahmed al Ghamdi flew to Beirut, traveling--perhaps by coincidence--on the same flight as a senior Hezbollah operative. Also in November, Salem al Hazmi apparently flew from Saudi Arabia to Beirut. In mid-November, we believe, three of the future muscle hijackers, Wail al Shehri, Waleed al Shehri, and Ahmed al Nami . . . traveled in a group from Saudi Arabia to Beirut and then onward to Iran. An associate of a senior Hezbollah operative was on the same flight that took the future hijackers to Iran. Hezbollah officials in Beirut and Iran were expecting the arrival of a group during the same time period. The travel of this group was important enough to merit the attention of senior figures in Hezbollah. . . . In sum, there is strong evidence that Iran facilitated the transit of senior al Qaeda members into and out of Afghanistan before 9/11, and that some of these were future 9/11 hijackers. There is also circumstantial evidence that senior Hezbollah operatives were closely tracking the travel of some of these future muscle hijackers into Iran in November 2000. The Commission's final report noted that it had found "no evidence that Iran or Hezbollah was aware of the planning for what later became the 9/11 attack," but closed that section of the report by stating that, "We believe this topic requires further investigation by the U.S. government"--a position which was also taken by the Commission's co-chairs, Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton, in interviews following the publication of the final report. Kean said that "We know of a relationship [between Iran and al Qaeda]; how deep that relationship is . . . that's really going to require more research." Hamilton agreed, saying that the relationship "really does need more investigation." Unfortunately, with the exception of then-Interim CIA director John McLaughlin's repeated assertions that there was "no evidence that there is some sort of official connection between Iran and September 11," (a claim made nowhere in the Commission report) there appears to have been little progress made by the U.S. intelligence community in learning more about the information brought to light by the 9/11 Commission report. Indeed, to the extent that the 9/11 Commission's findings have been invoked, they have been done in order to "debunk" claims of ties between the former Iraqi regime and al Qaeda, rather than to illuminate ongoing ties between the terror network and Iran. The status of (or the willingness to conduct) the investigation into the information unearthed by the 9/11 Commission is extremely relevant to the current Iran debate. If Iran, or its Hezbollah proxies, are shown to have assisted the transit al Qaeda members whose numbers included the future 9/11 hijackers--under what appear to be extremely curious circumstances--shouldn't those facts be included in discussions over how to deal with Iran? The issue of al Qaeda ties to Iran are not simply a matter of historical interest. In March 2006, U.S. intelligence officials told the Los Angeles Times that they believed that "the Iranian regime is playing host to much of Al Qaeda's remaining brain trust and allowing the senior operatives freedom to communicate and help plan the terrorist network's operations." Another U.S. intelligence official was quoted in the same article as being far more skeptical, but noted that "the relationship between Tehran and Al Qaeda officials within Iran was largely unknown to U.S. and allied intelligence, especially since Ahmadinejad's election last summer." Whether the United States is planning to fight or talk with Iran, it might be a good idea to know more about the nature of that relationship. Dan Darling is a counterterrorism consultant. |
| Link |
| Syria-Lebanon-Iran |
| Terrorism is still Iran's most feared trump card |
| 2006-05-04 |
| A senior commander in the Iranian Revolutionary Guards warned this week that any strike against his country by the United States would be met with a severe missile attack against Israel. History suggests, however, that Tehran's most menacing threat is its vow to carry out retaliatory terrorist strikes against American interests around the world. In comments last week, Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said that Tehran would "give a double response to any strike." "The Americans should know that if they launch an assault against Islamic Iran, their interests in every possible part of the world will be harmed," said Khamenei, who has the last word on security and foreign policy issues in Iran. Indeed, the mullah regime does boast a record of international terrorist action spanning from Lebanon to Saudi Arabia to Europe to South America, and could reactivate its sprawling network of operatives in the event of American military strikes against its nuclear facilities. Iran has not been linked to major terrorist attacks in the past decade. But the regime's vow to strike back, combined with media reports of Iran's training of suicide bomber squads and renewed ties with senior terrorist operatives, has fueled concern that Iran might attempt to hurt more than American interests in the Gulf or in neighboring Iraq. "Iran is very capable of carrying out several deathly terrorist strikes," said Daniel Benjamin, a counterterrorism official at the National Security Council during the Clinton administration. Benjamin is now a senior fellow at Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies "If they are in a retaliatory mode, the constraint that they had in the [past] decade would not be there anymore." In addition to using Iranian government intelligence services and paramilitary forces like the Revolutionary Guards and the Bassijis, Tehran could preserve some deniability by acting through proxies, first and foremost Hezbollah in Lebanon. "Iran has multiple options for employing terrorism," said Paul R. Pillar, the recently retired top CIA official in charge of the Middle East. Pillar is now a visiting professor at Georgetown University. "Their own operatives, particularly in the Revolutionary Guard Corps, constitute one such option. Allies and surrogates would be another. Premier among those is Hezbollah, which retains its close alliance with Iran and probably would still retaliate on behalf of Tehran even though it is far more self-sufficient now than it was when Iran helped to organize it in the 1980s." In 1983 Hezbollah bombed the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, killing 241, and in 1996 Saudi Hezbollah, allegedly directed by Iran, bombed Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, killing 19 U.S. soldiers. The Clinton administration retaliated for the Khobar Towers bombing by exposing Iranian intelligence operatives around the world, prompting Tehran to stop targeting Americans, according to a 2004 report in USA Today recently confirmed in an article by former American antiterrorism officials Richard Clarke and Steven Simon. Germany accused Iran of fomenting an attack on Kurdish opponents in the early 1990s; Argentina accused the country of ordering the bombing of a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires in 1994. Argentinean investigators have long argued, and Israeli officials recently acknowledged, that the attack, which killed 85 people, was retaliation for an Israeli operation against Hezbollah in Lebanon. In recent years, several reports of Iranian casing of Jewish institutions have emerged in Britain and in Canada, and senior Israeli officials have raised concerns repeatedly that different terrorist groups were planning attacks against Jewish targets. No indication has emerged that Iran or Hezbollah was involved in strikes in recent years against Jewish sites in Tunisia, Turkey and Morocco, which were blamed on Al Qaeda and affiliated groups. In addition to its network of intelligence cadres posted at worldwide embassies, Iran has a footprint in the United States. In recent years, Iranian diplomats working for the United Nations mission in New York City have been expelled for allegedly casing the subway and other potential targets; Iranians have been deported on visa violations because of their ties to various Iranian security services. Moreover, several alleged Hezbollah operatives have been arrested, most prominently members of two smuggling rings in North Carolina and Michigan. This past March, nine men were arrested in the Detroit area for reportedly smuggling cigarettes, Viagra pills, toilet paper and baby formula. That same month, FBI director Robert Mueller told a Congressional panel that his agency busted a Hezbollah smuggling ring that had operatives cross the Mexican border to carry out possible terrorist attacks inside the United States. Terrorism experts estimate that Hezbollah raises $20 million to $30 million a year through criminal activities in America. Michael Rubin, an Iran expert at the conservative American Enterprise Institute who recently worked for the Pentagon, said that Hezbollah could easily use those networks to carry out terrorist attacks. Last week, the London-based Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper reported that eight fundamentalist Islamist groups had received large sums of money in the past month from Iran's intelligence services as part of a project to strike American military and economic installations across the Middle East, as well as the interests of British, Arab and Muslim allies. The paper, which is owned by Saudis, cited a senior source in the Iranian joint chief of staff as describing a series of visits by leaders of groups in Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon, as well as by the heads of Hezbollah cells in the Persian Gulf, Europe and North America. The article also described weapons shipments to Palestinian Islamic Jihad and to Hezbollah, and contended that about 80 operatives underwent training to carry out suicide operations from the air and undersea. According to the source, in case the American military attacks continue, more than 50 Shehab-3 missiles will be targeted against Israel. Revolutionary Guards would be given the go-ahead for more than to allow more than 50 terrorists cells in Canada, the United States and Europe to attack civil and industrial targets in those countries. A few weeks ago, London's Sunday Times reported that firebrand Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had held a January meeting in Damascus with the Lebanese commander of Hezbollah's overseas operations, Imad Mugniyah, the man generally assumed to coordinate the group's terrorist attacks. The topic was reportedly to discuss retaliation against Western targets in the event of any strike by the United States on Iran's nuclear facilities, the article stated, citing American and Israeli sources. The same paper had earlier reported that the Revolutionary Guards had trained 40,000 suicide bombers to strike in Britain and the United States if Iran's nuclear facilities were attacked, and also cited a Guard official as saying that 29 Western targets had been identified. |
| Link |
| Syria-Lebanon-Iran |
| Al-Qaeda finds safe haven in Iran |
| 2005-06-24 |
| Somewhere north of Tehran, living perhaps in villas near the town of Chalous on the Caspian Sea coast, are between 20 and 25 of al-Qaida's former leaders, along with two of Osama bin Laden's sons. Men such as Saif al-Adel, the former military commander of al-Qaida, and Suleiman Abu Ghaith, the bespectacled bin Laden spokesman, are not in hiding but rather in the care or custody of Iran's Revolutionary Guard. "They are under virtual house arrest," not able to do much of anything, said one senior U.S. intelligence official, speaking on condition of anonymity. How they got there and what will happen to them is one of the more intriguing stories of the war on terror, one that is filled with secret movements, stolen communications and a failed attempt at a prisoner exchange involving Iranian dissidents. "We believe that they're holding members of al-Qaida's management council," Fran Townsend, President Bush's counterterrorism czar, said of Iran. In an interview with Tom Brokaw two weeks ago, she added: "And we have encouraged and suggested that they ought to try them, they ought to admit freely that they're there which they have not done that they're holding them. Or they ought to return them to their countries of origin, which they've also been unwilling to do." How'd they get there? NBC News has learned that in the chaotic last days before Kabul, Afghanistan, fell to U.S. troops in November 2001, bin Laden and his lieutenants made a strategic decision. Al-Qaida's then military commander, Mohammed Atef, has just been blown up in a U.S. air attack in the city, one in which a CIA Predator had pinpointed the very house he was staying in. It was time to move out. Al-Qaida's leadership had been divided into consultative and management councils, both of which reported to bin Laden. The consultative council, the "al shura," was viewed as the more critical to the terror network's continued operations. Its members, including bin Laden and his No. 2, Ayman al-Zawahiri, would flee east to cities in Pakistan. There, over the next few years, many key players would be picked up and bundled off to interrogation centers with great regularity. Abu Zubaydah, al-Qaida's recruitment and training leader known as the "dean of students" was arrested in Faisalabad. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, its operations commander, was grabbed in Rawalpindi; two of his deputies, Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Abu Faraj al Libbi, were taken in Karachi and Multan, and other lesser figures were regularly rousted by Pakistani forces. The management council went west, to northern Iran, where the United States had little sway and the Iranians had little interest in pushing for their arrests. The group included al-Adel and abu Ghaith; Shaik Said, al-Qaida's chief financial officer; Abu Hafs, al-Qaida's personnel director; the two top aides to Zawahiri; and a mysterious Yemeni, Abu Dahak, who served as al-Qaida's ambassador to the rebels in Chechnya. On a personal level, two of bin Laden's teenage sons, Saad and Hamza bin Laden, also were taken to Iran. That's not to say the Iranians, with their Shiite leadership, held any love for the Wahhabis and Salafists. Iranian intelligence had tried to kill Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban, at a palace built for him by bin Laden in Kandahar, Afghanistan. "They missed, but it wasn't for lack of trying," said a Pentagon counter terrorism official at the time of the 2000 attempt. "It was one big truck bomb. I know. I saw pictures of the crater." But Iran was either unable or uninterested in taking the al-Qaida members into custody. Al-Qaida operatives, it was soon determined, were in communications, both personally and electronically, with the management and consultative councils. Orders were being given, commands were being carried out. In April 2002, only five months after leaving Afghanistan, U.S. intelligence officials believed they saw a link between al-Qaida in Iran and the first post-9/11 terrorist attack ordered by bin Laden. A propane truck, used a truck bomb, breached the gates of one of Africa's oldest synagogues in Djerba, Tunisia, killing 14 tourists. Although the suicide bomber was Tunisian, Western intelligence believed that the attack has been organized by Saad bin Laden. There was also evidence that critical meetings regarding the future of al-Qaida were being held in the relative safety of Iran. But al-Qaida decided at a meeting in Iran in November 2002 that the pressure on it was so great that it could no longer exist as a hierarchy. Two top leaders had just been arrested in Pakistan and in the pre-Iraq war environment, Western governments were putting up a united front. Instead, following the advice of a key Iran-based al-Qaida strategist, Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, the terror network decided to move its operatives out into the wider world, to the rest of the Middle East, Europe and North America. As time wore on, the al-Qaida operatives became bolder. In May 2003, operatives in Saudi Arabia carried out the first attack in Riyadh, targeting Westerners' compounds. Thirty-five people, including eight Americans, were killed. But then things changed. As a former senior U.S. counterterrorism official told NBC News: "The U.S. government believed that the Saudis made a deal with the Iranians in 1996 after the Khobar Towers bombing. The deal was structured this way: The Saudis would not cooperate with the U.S. on the investigation, knowing that if they did cooperate, the U.S. would have the justification for bombing Iran." In return, said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, the Iranians agreed not to support any terrorist attacks in the kingdom. (Ultimately, the United States charged Saudi Hezbollah members with the Khobar Towers attack and named as unindicted co-conspirators two officers of Iran's Ministry of Intelligence.) "Then, in 2003, we are told, the Saudis with U.S. and British help discovered that al-Qaida's management council in Iran was communicating with the al-Qaida cell in Saudi that had carried out the attacks on Western compounds in Riyadh," the official said. "The Saudis let the Iranians know and, citing the earlier agreement, demanded that the Iranians put a halt to the operations of the management council, leading to the Iranians putting the 20 to 25 al-Qaida officials in Iran under virtual house arrest," the official said. And that's just what happened, say current U.S. officials. According to reports in the Arab media, they were rounded up and taken to two locations guarded by Iran's Revolutionary Guards: one in villas in the Namak Abrud region, near the town of Chalous on the Caspian coast, 60 miles north of Tehran, and the other in Lavizan, a region northwest of the capital that also houses a large military complex. Publicly, all CIA Director Porter Goss will say is that Iran has "detained" al-Qaida elements. "I don't have all of the information I would like to have," he told Tom Brokaw. "But I think your understanding is that there is a group of leadership of al-Qaida under some type of detention I don't know exactly what type, necessarily in Iran is probably accurate. But I don't think I want to go too far into that if you don't mind." Whether it was a quid pro quo with the Saudis is uncertain to this day, say U.S. officials, but it's better that they are under some sort of control and not operating freely. The Iranians admit privately they have the al-Qaida officials and say they are "investigating" their activities. That does not impress Townsend. "But the Iranians are not telling us who they have," she said. "They may be telling you and there may be things in their newspapers, but they're not telling us, and they were not talking about what, if anything, what progress, if any, has been made in terms of their investigation." Does the White House counterterrorism czar think there will be a trial of the al-Qaida officials anytime soon? "No. I do not," she said. And does the United States have any kind of communication with Iran about the situation? "I would refer you to the State Department," Townsend said. Isn't that a matter that might go outside of channels? "It could," she said. In fact, says one former senior U.S. intelligence official, back-channel discussions have been a lot more concrete. "The Iranians will not give you specific names, or at least they would never give us specific names. They would always duck the question," said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity. In fact, he said, Iran first proposed the exchange of al-Qaida operatives for leaders of the group Mujahedeen e Khalk who are under U.S. control in Iraq. The MEK has been on the State Department's list of terrorist organizations since 1998, when the Clinton administration was trying to open up lines of communications with Iran. The State Department blames the group for the killings of five Americans in the run-up to the Iranian revolution in 1979 and various murders and attacks on Iranian diplomats and civilians both inside and outside Iran. In addition, Saddam Hussein had financed, trained and armed the MEK, even building the group a 5,000-man training facility in Fallujah (now being used by the U.S. Marines) and used them in the Iran-Iraq War and in cross-border attacks after the war. "The exchange was never formally proposed, but several general offers were made through third parties, not all of them diplomatic," said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity. "One reason nothing came of it was because we knew that there were parts of the U.S. government who didn't want to give them the MEK because they had other plans for them -- like overthrowing the Iranian government." Even if there is no movement in U.S.-Iranian discussions, there have been indications over the past year of discussions between Arab states and Iran about the disposition of al-Qaida members in Iran. There was a particularly intense and public flurry last summer, according to Sharq al-Awsat, the London-based Arab newspaper, which also reported that the total number of al-Qaida operatives in Iran was 348 and leaders 18. In June, Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi said his country had in the past given Saudi Arabia some useful information concerning members of bin Laden's network that it was detaining. He did not elaborate. Sharq al Awsat also reported that Tehran handed over wanted Saudi militant Khaled bin Odeh bin Mohammed al-Harbi to Saudi authorities. Riyadh believed the disabled militant, suspected of being an al-Qaida figure close to bin Laden, surrendered in mid-July under an amnesty after contacting the Saudi Embassy in Iran. That reportedly followed a meeting at which Syrian President Bashar al-Assad convinced Tehran during a visit early this month of the "seriousness" of using al-Qaida elements in Iran as a card in its policy with the United States. Most recently, there are reports in Iranian newspapers of the investigation proceeding and a comment by Saif a-Adel, the former military commander, in al-Quds, a radical London-based newspaper. Accompanying an article in which he praises Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaida in Iraq, was a note saying that al-Adel had "a lot of free time" to write. That, say U.S. officials, is a good thing. What officials? If al-Adel is free to write and use the Internet, then he can issue orders and other strategy documents, like the one that gave the 3/11 guys the order to hit Spain. If he can issue orders, then he can still order attacks. How in God's name is that a good thing? |
| Link |
| Syria-Lebanon-Iran |
| New links between Iran, al-Qaeda cited |
| 2004-07-22 |
| Of course, it's a Pincus story so you have to get half-way through the page to figure out what these links are ... On Iran, by contrast, the report concludes that al Qaeda's relationship with Tehran and its client, the Hezbollah militant group, was long-standing and included cooperation on operations, the officials said. It also details previously unknown links between the two, including the revelation that as many as 10 of the Sept. 11 hijackers may have passed through Iran in late 2000 and early 2001 because Iranian border guards were instructed to let al Qaeda associates travel freely, sources familiar with the report have said. Commission and government officials emphasize that they have found no indication that Tehran knowingly helped in the plot. But the commission report will cite evidence that Iran allowed al Qaeda members into the country even after the attacks. The Sept. 11 panel has also raised the possibility that al Qaeda may have had a "yet unproven" role in the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, which killed 19 U.S. servicemen and has been blamed on a Saudi Hezbollah group. Iran is a primary sponsor of Hezbollah, or Party of God, which the United States considers a terrorist group. Many of the commission's findings about Iran were discovered only in recent weeks from, among other sources, electronic intercepts and interrogations of al Qaeda suspects in U.S. custody, sources familiar with the commission's findings said. Even before then, Chairman Thomas H. Kean (R), a former New Jersey governor, said, "There were a lot more active contacts, frankly, with Iran and with Pakistan than there were with Iraq." |
| Link |
| Syria-Lebanon-Iran | |||||||||
| US outed Iranian spies in retaliation for Khobar Towers | |||||||||
| 2004-03-30 | |||||||||
After a bombing killed 19 U.S. airmen at a barracks in Saudi Arabia in 1996, the Clinton administration struck back by unmasking Iranian intelligence officers around the world, significantly disrupting Iranian-backed terrorism, according to a high-level U.S. official and a former top official who was serving at the time of the operation. Undisclosed until now, Operation Sapphire took place in 1997. Though the bombers who struck the Khobar Towers barracks were mostly Saudis, U.S. investigators quickly determined that Iranian intelligence officials had trained and organized the plotters.
| |||||||||
| Link |
| Iran | ||
| Ex-spy links Iran to al Qaeda pre 9/11, court told | ||
| 2004-01-23 | ||
| EFL Iranâs secret service had contacts with Osama bin Ladenâs al Qaeda network ahead of the September 11 attacks on the United States, a German court heard on Thursday. Two members of Germanyâs Federal Criminal Police told a court in Hamburg a former Iranian spy had informed them of the contacts and had also said he tried to warn Washington about the attacks in mid-2001, but that the CIA had not believed him. The police officers were speaking at the trial of a Moroccan accused of aiding the September 11 attacks... The Iranian said he had been in a department of the Iranian intelligence service that was "responsible for carrying out terrorist attacks globally," one of the officers said. "In 2001, a delegation with Osama bin Ladenâs son was in Iran," the officer said, quoting the witness. The police officers told the court the witness had implicated Mzoudi and had said the Iranian secret service had worked with al Qaeda in 1996 in an attack in Saudi Arabia that killed several U.S. citizens.
Big news? | ||
| Link |
| Iran |
| Freeh Links Iran To Khobar Bombing |
| 2003-12-19 |
| Former FBI director Louis Freeh testified yesterday that he believed there was "overwhelming evidence" that senior Iranian government officials financed and directed the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia. Gee, Iran again. Go figure. Freeh testified as a key witness on behalf of the families of 12 Americans killed in the bombing, who are suing the government of Iran. The former director took particular interest in the investigation into the bombing, traveling to Saudi Arabia soon after the June 25, 1996, explosion. The bombing ripped a dormitory in half and killed 19 Air Force servicemen and servicewomen. Freehâs testimony came at a fragile stage in the civil trial, which is in its third week and had been set to end today. U.S. Magistrate Judge Deborah A. Robinson said last week she might dismiss the suit if the plaintiffs could not produce Freeh and his former FBI counterterrorism chief, Dale Watson, the other critical witness in the case. Neither man got clearance from the Justice Department to testify until late last Friday night. Funny, I havenât seen any coverage of this trial. Youâd think that the press would be all over it, saying Bush failed to protect our troops in 1996 and failed to investigate......Oh, right, wrong president. Freeh told Robinson he was "heavily involved" in the Khobar investigation, and had traveled to the bomb site hours after the explosion. He said he spent nearly two years trying to persuade Saudi diplomats to let FBI agents interview six Saudi citizens whom the Saudi government considered the bombingâs perpetrators, and he ultimately succeeded. They did talk to them? When did this happen? "They admitted they were members of Saudi Hezbollah," Freeh said. "They admitted complicity in the act. And they implicated senior Iranian officials in the funding and planning of the attack." Robinson repeatedly questioned what led Freeh to his conclusion that Iran was responsible, other than the confessions of six Saudis. Freeh responded that other witnesses and evidence corroborated their stories. He said they also named leaders in the Iranian military and information agency who helped select the target site and pay for the groupâs training and explosives. Hummm, now who do you suppose gave clearance for Freeh to release this information? Outside the courtroom, Freeh said in a brief interview that he rejects recent theories that al Qaeda may have had a role in the Khobar Towers attack. Interesting, is somebody winding up another clock? |
| Link |
| Arabia |
| Remember Khobar Towers |
| 2003-05-20 |
| Louis Freeh has an interesting article in today's Opinion Journal on the Saudi Hezbollah, its backing by the IRGC, and the Khobar Towers bombing. |
| Link |
| Terror Networks |
| Saudi terror links |
| 2003-05-06 |
| Source is WorldnetDaily â not the most reliable source, but not bad... Saudi Arabia's continuing links to Islamic terrorism around the world, coupled with the imminent pullout of U.S. troops, could jeopardize the very existence of the kingdom in the future, according to a report in the latest issue of Joseph Farah's G2 Bulletin. The online intelligence newsletter published a list of terrorist organizations funded by Saudi Arabia provided by a Jordanian security official. They include:
internal opposition from radical Muslim groups is growing within Saudi Arabia;Saudi support of terror groups is not only provided for cultural and religious reasons, says the G2 Bulletin report. It is also motivated by a desire of the kingdom to avoid insurgencies from within. "Middle East scholars have been trying to link this subtle blackmail system to the Muslim charity religious law of 'Zakat,'" says the report. "Zakat is the law by which a certain percentage of one's wealth or income should go to charity." An Egyptian official discussing the Egyptian-based Islamic Jihad said: "If the Jihadis would have to rely solely on local donations they would be out of business in no time." "As long as the U.S. could expect the Saudis to support American interests, criticism (from Washington) was minimized," says the report. "This policy continued even after Sept. 11, when, among others, the wife of the Saudi ambassador to the U.S. was found to be involved in Zakat donations that found their way into terrorist bank accounts. Now that the U.S. is on the brink of fully evacuating forces from Saudi Arabia, more information becomes available. Criticism of Saudi Arabia is bound to become more vocal, and more and more evidence of Saudi involvement in financing terror will rise to the surface and be exposed." The report concludes: "That U.S. troops are leaving will provide only brief absolution for the kingdom and its sin of cooperating with infidels. In reality, the kingdom's life expectancy is going to drop sharply without the presence of U.S. troops." |
| Link |