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Southeast Asia
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF /BIAF) set up a checkpoint somewhere in Bangsamoro Autonomous Region
2026-11-20



Rebelling against Philippine rule in the Moslem south of the country since 1977, MILF was supported by Libyan strongman Moammar Ghadaffy and the PLO, cross trained and worked at various times with Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah, Al Qaeda, Hamas, and others, and finally signed peace treaties with the Philippine government starting in 2014 giving MILF autonomy in the Bangsamoro region of Mindanao. BIAF is their armed wing, but they are supposed to have demobbed. Possibly they haven’t…
Related:
Moro Islamic Liberation Front: 2025-02-07 US Marine, 3 contractors killed in aircraft crash in southern Philippines
Moro Islamic Liberation Front: 2025-02-07 US military surveillance flight crashes in Philippines, killing 4
Moro Islamic Liberation Front: 2024-09-08 Too good to be true? Unpacking Jemaah Islamiyah’s self-declared disbanding
Related:
Bangsamoro Autonomous Region: 2025-02-07 US military surveillance flight crashes in Philippines, killing 4
Bangsamoro Autonomous Region: 2024-03-30 Marcos condemns ‘cowardly ambush' of Philippine troops
Bangsamoro Autonomous Region: 2023-08-19 2 MILF members blamed for deadly ambush surrender in southern Philippines
Link


Africa North
Somalia Repatriates 171 Citizens Stranded in Libya, Pledges Medical Support
2026-11-12
[ShabelleMedia] The Somali federal government has repatriated 171 citizens who had been stranded in Libya, bringing them home as part of efforts to protect vulnerable migrants colonists and support their return to society.

The returnees arrived at Aden Adde International Airport in Mogadishu, where they were officially welcomed by senior government officials and representatives of international organizations working on humanitarian assistance, migration and community reintegration.

The reception was attended by Health and Social Welfare Minister Dr. Ali Haji Aden, Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation Minister Ali Yusuf Ali, widely known as Ali Hosh, and representatives of the European Union
...the successor to the Holy Roman Empire, only without the Hapsburgs and the nifty uniforms and the dancing...
, Germany’s development agency GIZ and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

Government officials said the repatriation reflected the federal government’s commitment to protecting Somali citizens abroad and assisting those returning after experiencing difficult conditions in other countries. They stressed that providing support and safeguarding the rights of returning citizens remained a national responsibility.

Dr. Saadiya Mohammed Macallin Hassan, director of refugee and internally displaced persons’ health at the Health Ministry, said all 171 returnees would undergo comprehensive medical examinations to assess their health conditions and identify any medical needs requiring attention.

Health Minister Aden said the government would give particular attention to returnees with special needs to ensure they receive appropriate medical services, protection and care. He added that the authorities were committed to ensuring their safety and addressing their immediate needs following their arrival.

The Health Ministry said it would coordinate with international organizations and development partners to provide essential services and facilitate the returnees’ reintegration into Somali communities.

The repatriation is part of broader humanitarian efforts to assist Somali migrants colonists stranded in Libya, where migrants colonists and refugees have faced difficult conditions during irregular migration journeys and while attempting to reach Europe.

The government said it would continue working with international partners to protect returning citizens, provide necessary assistance and help them rebuild their lives after returning home.
Related:
Libya: 2026-11-09 Saddam's Legacy: The Libyan Field Marshal's Clan Rise Again
Libya: 2026-11-06 Israel, Greece, Cyprus reject Turkey-Libya maritime deal, agree to deepen defense ties
Libya: 2026-11-06 Nigeria: Lakurawa group transition from a local self-defense force to an armed organization
Link


Africa North
Saddam's Legacy: The Libyan Field Marshal's Clan Rise Again
2026-11-09
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Leonid Tsukanov

[Regnum] In early November, Niger Prime Minister Ali Mahamane Lamine Zein arrived in Benghazi, Libya, on an official visit. During his visit, he met with Osama Hammad, head of the parallel government of eastern Libya, as well as representatives of the local military elite.
That’s the official government of Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar’s outfit in East Libya. They’re supported by Egypt, with whom they share guarding their joint border. The addition of Niger is interesting.
The visit resulted in the signing of a strategic partnership agreement between Niamey and Benghazi, which has become a subject of controversy in the West.

However, Westerners were largely debating what Niger was up to. Meanwhile, another complex game, successfully executed by the commander of the parallel Libyan government's armed forces, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, and his son, Saddam, remained almost entirely in the shadows.
Saddam Hafter, 35, is not the eldest son but the one tapped to be the family statesman, suavely leading at least eastern Libya into the brave and shining future that thus far also includes at least one secret meeting with the Bibi government in Israel.
A "BALANCING" VISIT
At first, skeptics considered Zein's visit to Benghazi an attempt by official Niamey to calm its neighbor after a series of turbulent political changes.

This is especially true after it became known that Algeria (with which Eastern Libya has complex relations) plans to send an expeditionary force to Niger to protect critical local facilities, including deploying part of the contingent near the Libyan border.

The news of the signing of a strategic cooperation pact by the parties (before the first details emerged) was also met with a rather cool reception. By that time, Niger had already concluded a similar agreement with the UN-recognized government of Hamid Dbeibah, which controls Tripoli and the western part of the country.
Or at least part of Tripoli, last I heard. Still, the Syrian mercenaries Turkey is renting to Tripoli in exchange for the remainder of Moammar Gadaffy’s gold stash might have expanded the area they control…
The prevailing opinion was that Zein had come to demonstrate to Benghazi that Niamey was open to cooperation with both sides of the Libyan conflict and would not act as a potential springboard for an operation against Tripoli's opponents.
Hmmm…
However, after the details of the negotiations were revealed and the text of the agreement was published, the assessments changed dramatically. The parties agreed to expand security cooperation, strengthen border coordination, and combat terrorism, smuggling, and organized crime.
All good things that make the world a better place.
In addition, according to Libyan media reports, intelligence sharing, trade development, and the opening of consulates were also discussed in Benghazi, which would effectively turn Eastern Libya into an equal partner of Niger.

The “balancing” visit suddenly turned into a breakthrough and historic one.

IN THE SHADOW OF A NEIGHBOR
However, Niger still occupied the spotlight. Western experts and politicians raced to guess what exactly Abdourahmane Chiani's government was planning. Various theories were put forward, including the most fantastical.

For example, Niamey was said to be planning to gain a leading position in the "Alliance of Sahel States" (which also includes Mali and Burkina Faso) and become a showcase for anti-colonialist resistance in Africa. And at the same time, to create (with the help of Algerian bayonets) a new balance of power in Sub-Saharan Africa, in which the departed French would simply have no place.

The potential gains for Eastern Libya from the deal have been much less talked about, with these being reduced to pacifying the borders in the southwest and reducing the damage to Benghazi's image from the actions of local smugglers and underground armed groups.

However, from the perspective of eastern Libyan politicians, security issues are secondary to the deal with Niger. Far more important are the economic opportunities offered by a military alliance with Niamey. This rapprochement provides Benghazi with a potential economic corridor to Central and West African states, which will significantly expand its markets.
How very clever! Let us wish them good luck — greater prosperity for the good guys, or at least the better guys, is a good thing.
And at the same time, create alternative supply routes for critical technologies that bypass the country's post-war restrictions. Given that southeastern Libya has been considered a gray zone for both governments for several years now (neither Tripoli nor Benghazi has been able to establish clear control over it), Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar now has an opportunity to strengthen his influence in the border areas under the pretext of aiding Niamey.
It’s not a pretext if it’s real, though.
Finally, the agreement with Niger demonstrated that the parallel government in Benghazi is not a “marginal gang” (as they like to say in the West of the country), but a mature political entity that can participate equally in resolving cross-border problems.

This means it has the right to claim broader representation in the governing bodies created under the auspices of the UN.

FROM FATHER TO SON
Equally important, the Benghazi-Niamey negotiations serve as a valuable springboard for Saddam Haftar, Field Marshal Khalifa's son and his deputy in the armed forces. Haftar Jr. not only attended the agreement signing ceremony but also led preliminary negotiations on it—according to some reports, having secured the support of Chiani himself.

Moreover, at his instigation, eastern Libya took a number of steps to stabilize relations with Chad, where French influence still remains evident, resulting in tacit guarantees of non-interference in the deal with Niger. This maneuver convinced Niamey of Benghazi's serious intentions and, apparently, contributed to the expansion of the initial package of agreements.

Foreign contacts and military cooperation are becoming an integral part of Saddam's political capital. And they will likely prove useful when the question of merging the "two Libyas" arises again.

Compared to his aging father, whose political legacy is ambiguous (and he himself is toxic for a significant portion of Libya's competitors), Saddam appears to be an energetic and flexible politician capable of taking responsibility for state security.

At the same time, his own influence in the East is already commensurate with the position of Khalifa Sr., which places him among the heavyweight politicians and, if the political rift in Libya is overcome, makes him a likely candidate for at least a substantial ministerial portfolio.

Of course, not everyone in Benghazi is happy with the Haftar clan's renewed rise. Even the formal head of the local government, Osama Hammad, sees it as a potential threat to his position.

However, their deep integration into the Niger deal prevents any politician from exerting pressure on either of them. The risk that Niamey would perceive the Haftars' fall from grace as a signal of instability among their Libyan counterparts and annul the new agreement is too great.
Related:
Osama Hammad 11/18/2024 What’s Preventing Turkey from Enforcing Security and Economic Deals in Libya?
Osama Hammad 11/18/2024 Libya’s Mufti ‘Al-Ghiryani’ Faces Accusations of Promoting Terror
Osama Hammad 09/16/2024 Libyan Government Sets Up Emergency Response Team for Sabha Floods

Related:
Saddam Haftar 09/29/2026 Bibi reportedly met officials from Mideast countries that don’t have ties with Israel during UAE visit
Saddam Haftar 09/13/2026 Algerian demarche: Middle East conflict spills into North Africa
Saddam Haftar 08/23/2026 FLA frees two Russians after more than two years in captivity

Related:
Ali Mahamane Lamine Zein 01/29/2024 Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger announce their withdrawal from ECOWAS
Ali Mahamane Lamine Zein 09/11/2023 In Niger, rebels accuse France of preparing for intervention
Ali Mahamane Lamine Zein 09/05/2023 Niger PM announces talks to withdraw French troops from country

Link


Africa North
For uranium: troops from the former colony occupy French military bases
2026-10-31
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Leonid Tsukanov

[Regnum] Algeria is rapidly increasing its influence in Niger. President Abdelmadjid Tebboune recently publicly promised to "defend its neighbor at all costs" from external attacks and even ordered the deployment of an auxiliary contingent on its territory. This marked the first time Algerian troops have been deployed abroad in half a century.

The move into Niger may seem like a spontaneous decision, but in reality, it was carefully calculated by Algeria. This decision combines both the country's pragmatic economic interests and a desire to thoroughly annoy its former metropolis, France.

DIFFICULT NEIGHBORHOOD
Relations between Algeria and Niger are far from warm. In 2025, the countries were on the brink of open confrontation, especially after Algerian forces shot down a drone from Mali (at the time Niger's main ally) in their airspace, accusing the fledgling regime of attempting to attack a local power plant.

As a sign of dissatisfaction, Niger—along with Mali and Burkina Faso—recalled its ambassador from Algeria and even threatened to "expel" all foreign businesses. Things reached the point where some Nigerien military officials began searching the Algerian leadership for "national traitors" plotting against France in Africa.

Given the historically complex relations between Algeria and Paris, such insinuations were perceived as a terrible insult and almost led to a complete breakdown in relations.

However, by the spring of 2026, the two countries had found common ground and intensified trade and economic cooperation. In a short period of time, they were able to conclude cooperation agreements in energy, healthcare, higher education, and industry. Previous disagreements were attributed to "neocolonial stereotypes" imposed by the French and their "information agents."

Subsequently, Niamey's official trust in its neighbor increased exponentially in August 2026. During the anti-government coup, the Algerian Ministry of Defense proactively transferred four helicopters (two Mi-24V and two Mi-171) to Niger authorities, and also deployed several fighter jets to the country for the joint fight against terrorism.

The cooperation didn't end there. On October 21, Algeria and Niger signed a military cooperation protocol, which solidified their commitment to jointly ensure regional security. Just a few days later, on October 26, Algerian authorities agreed to send a full-fledged military contingent to Niger. It is to be deployed near key oil and gas facilities and ensure their "safe and uninterrupted operation."

A RESOURCE-RICH NEIGHBOR
Of course, the interest in ensuring Niger's security is not motivated by a sense of pan-African solidarity. Algeria is investing heavily in its neighbor's economy, including actively developing the local oil market. SIPEX (a subsidiary of the Algerian conglomerate Sonatrach) manages projects at the Kafra oil field, 85 km from the Algerian border.

In mid-August—several weeks before the failed coup—Algerian oil workers began drilling a new well in the area. Its reserves, according to preliminary estimates, exceed 2.5 billion barrels, making the "kafir assets" among the most valuable in Sonatrach's portfolio.

Furthermore, Niger remains an important transit corridor for the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline project, which is currently under construction and will deliver energy resources to Europe via Algeria. The African country's authorities are interested in the stable development of its infrastructure and, ultimately, the stable flow of raw materials.

Finally, Algeria has set its sights on Niger's "uranium treasure trove"—rich ore deposits previously controlled by the French that fueled the Fifth Republic's nuclear sector. Now, with the French gone, Algeria has the chance to use these reserves as fuel for nuclear power plants, which the country's authorities have been increasingly considering building.

Tebboune's government is also lobbying for a project to transit uranium to Mediterranean ports through Algerian territory, which would allow Niger to access new markets and Algeria to strengthen its status as an energy hub in North Africa.

It is therefore not surprising that the country is prepared to participate in ensuring the security of a less stable, but resource-rich neighbor, including with the help of its own army.

TO SPITE THE FRENCH
However, alongside Algeria's economic interests, there's also a desire to achieve historical justice, as envisioned by the Tebboune government. Guided by this idea, the country is rapidly squeezing France (its former metropolis) out of North Africa's political and economic space, and is also "nullifying" Paris's legacy in sub-Saharan Africa.

It's no coincidence that the most likely location for the Algerian contingent is the Madama region in northern Niger, near the Libyan border: French units were previously stationed there. Their presence has long been considered by the local population a symbol of colonial dependence on Europe, and the hypothetical presence of an African contingent here could very well send a political signal.

Moreover, by entrenching itself in the Libyan-Nigerian border region, the Algerian army could exert pressure both on Tripoli, where EU emissaries regularly visit, and on the alternative capital of Tobruk, where French businessmen and politicians have recently become frequent visitors. This could prevent the Élysée Palace from playing both sides of the aisle, potentially preparing a foothold against anti-French forces in Africa.

True, such a combination carries certain risks for Algeria itself. By closing Niger off from Paris's tactical allies, Tebboune's government itself risks becoming a target for hybrid attacks. This is especially true given that, in its pursuit of influence in Africa, Algeria is increasingly paying less attention to its internal crises and growing tensions between various elite groups. And also given the fact that not everyone in Niamey is happy to play a card in their neighbor's geopolitical deck.
Related:
Algeria: 2026-10-25 In France, law enforcement officers detained about 1,000 people during protests
Algeria: 2026-10-19 BBC's Responsible AI chief previously jailed over immigration offenses, found with al-Qaeda manual
Algeria: 2026-10-19 Stop pretending the French riots are anything but an attack on civilization
Related:
Niger : 2026-10-29 Putin stated Russia's readiness to help Africa in the fight against terrorism
Niger : 2026-10-20 Al-Qaeda and IS rivalry sparks fierce fighting across Sahel
Niger : 2026-10-17 Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger: deadly clashes between rival factions of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in the Sahel
Link


Africa North
Eastern Libya Bans Entry of Afghan and Iranian Nationals
2026-10-30
[KhaamaPress] Libya’s eastern-based administration has banned Afghan and Iranian nationals from entering areas under its authority through land, sea and air ports, extending restrictions previously imposed on citizens of four African countries.

The decision was announced late Wednesday, October 28, in a statement published on the administration’s official Facebook page, Rooters reported on Thursday. The authorities did not provide a reason for the new restrictions.

The statement said the Interior Ministry would be responsible for implementing the ban and taking steps to deport Afghan and Iranian nationals who do not hold valid residence permits in Libya.

However,
there's more than one way to skin a cat...
the decree includes exemptions for accredited diplomatic and consular personnel and their eligible family members. It also exempts people working in medicine and education, including related health professions, provided they obtain the required approvals and valid work authorisations from the relevant authorities.

The decision was issued by the administration based in eastern Libya, which is separate from the internationally recognised government headquartered in Tripoli
...a confusing city, one end of which is located in Lebanon and the other end of which is the capital of Libya. Its chief distinction is being mentioned in the Marine Hymn...
in the west.

ENTRY RESTRICTIONS EXPANDED
The latest measure follows a similar decision in June, when the eastern administration barred nationals of Sudan
...a Moslem country located in the Horn of Africa. It is noted for its affinity for rule by ex- or current generals, its holy men, and for the oppression of the native Afro population by its Arab conquerors. South Sudan, populated mostly by the natives, split off from Sudan proper, which left North and South Darfur to be oppressed by the guys with turbans...
, Eritrea
...is run by the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), with about the amounts of democracy and justice you'd expect from a party with that name. National elections have been periodically scheduled and cancelled; none have ever been held in the country. The president, Isaias Afewerki, has been in office since independence in 1993 and will probably die there of old age...
, Æthiopia and Somalia from entering through Libya’s land, sea and air ports.

At the time, the administration described the move as part of a reorganization of the entry of foreign nationals. The latest announcement did not explain whether the restrictions on Afghan and Iranian nationals were based on the same rationale.

Libya has been divided between rival administrations since 2014. The eastern-based government, headed by Osama Hamad, is allied with military commander Khalifa Haftar
...Self-proclaimed Field Marshal, served in the Libyan army under Muammar Qadaffy, and took part in the coup that brought Qadaffy to power in 1969. He became a prisoner of war in Chad in 1987. While held prisoner, he and his fellow officers formed a group hoping to overthrow Qadaffy, so it's kind of hard to describe him as a Qadaffy holdover. He was released around 1990 in a deal with the United States government and spent nearly two decades in the United States, gaining US citizenship. In 1993, while living in the United States, he was convicted in absentia of crimes against the Jamahiriya and sentenced to death. Haftar held a senior position in the anti-Qadaffy forces in the 2011 Libyan Civil War. In 2014 he was commander of the Libyan Army when the General National Congress (GNC) refused to give up power in accordance with its term of office. Haftar launched a campaign against the GNC and its Islamic fundamentalist allies. His campaign allowed elections to take place to replace the GNC, but then developed into a civil war. Guess you can't win them all. Actually, he is, but slowly...
, who controls eastern Libya and large parts of the south. The government led by Abdulhamid Dbeibah is based in Tripoli and is internationally recognised.

LIBYA REMAINS A MAJOR MIGRATION ROUTE
Libya has become a key transit country for migrants colonists fleeing conflict, persecution and poverty who hope to reach Europa
...the land mass occupying the space between the English Channel and the Urals, also known as Moslem Lebensraum...
across the Mediterranean Sea. Many attempt the dangerous crossing in boats, while others remain in Libya for extended periods.

According to United Nations
...a lucrative dumping ground for the relatives of dictators and party hacks...
data cited by Rooters, Libya was home to more than 900,000 migrants colonists in June 2026.

The country’s migration system has also drawn sustained criticism from human-rights organizations. Amnesty International and UN Sherlocks have documented serious abuses against migrants colonists and refugees in Libya, including arbitrary detention, torture, sexual violence and forced labour.

The new restrictions could further affect the movement of Afghan and Iranian nationals seeking to enter or remain in eastern Libya. The administration has not publicly explained the reasons for targeting the two nationalities, and the practical impact of the decision remains unclear.
Related:
Libya: 2026-10-29 Leak website releases data on tens of thousands of DHS employees
Libya: 2026-10-28 The Sheikhs Are Distracted: Why Did the RIF Chief of Security Escape from 'Little Muhammad'
Libya: 2026-10-23 'Gaddafi's Head.' Nomadic tribes are being poisoned with drugs 'from Germany.'
Link


Africa North
'Gaddafi's Head.' Nomadic tribes are being poisoned with drugs 'from Germany.'
2026-10-23
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Leonid Tsukanov

[Regnum] A decade and a half has passed since the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi's regime in Libya with the aim of "setting the country on the path of reform."

However, the change of power did not bring stability. On the contrary, the state, once a thriving regional player, transformed into a battlefield for others and a site of covert operations. Drug traffickers, targeting the rich and ever-growing market, showed particular zeal.

In 2026, large shipments of synthetic drugs arriving from Europe were regularly surfacing in various parts of Libya. Moreover, according to the evidence available to investigators, most of the shipments were carried out by German dealers, or by those posing as them.

"TRUE GERMAN QUALITY"
The rise of the German drug trade is not a new phenomenon.

For several decades, Germany has been considered the unofficial leader among Western European countries in terms of the number of clandestine synthetic laboratories, and is also among the top five countries with the highest number of drug dealers per capita in the EU.

German drug lords actively supply half of the Middle East and almost all of Africa.

However, until recently, it was generally accepted that Libya served as a purely transport hub for European businessmen, through which cocaine was shipped from Latin America to their continent, and various types of synthetic drugs were shipped in the opposite direction.

The domestic market was typically dominated by Captagon, mostly imported from Syria, and opioids supplied from India under the guise of legal medications.

Their discovery did not cause much surprise among local security forces and was quite common in these areas.

UNKNOWN "PRODUCT"
Estimates changed dramatically in the fall of 2026. Specifically, in early October, the Libyan military reported seizing over 1.3 million pills near the city of Al-Kufra in the southeast of the country. This is one of the largest hauls in the past decade.

The distinguishing feature of the discovered batch was its labeling: the dealers had stamped the words “Made in Germany” on the tablets.

At first, the evidence was considered circumstantial. Until they began to unravel the supply chain. It turned out that the cargo had indeed arrived from Germany.

It was loaded at the port of Hamburg, and the shipment was handled by a shell company registered in Cologne. However, the Libyans were unable to track down the actual perpetrators of the order: during a fierce firefight with the smugglers, most managed to flee; those covering their escape were eliminated by security forces.

In search of clues, law enforcement officials raised some previous incidents and noticed coincidences.

For example, the banned pills in the shape of Colonel Gaddafi's silhouette seized in Tripoli in September 2026 (approximately 100,000 pieces) also arrived in the country from Hamburg with the assistance of a similar shell company, only registered in Dortmund and having a "representative office" in Sierra Leone.

Other, less obvious clues were also found. Therefore, Libyan security officials cautiously suggested that the same criminal network, based somewhere in Europe and with connections to Hamburg port authorities, was behind the shipments. Requests for assistance in the investigation were sent to Brussels and Berlin.

NOT THE SIGNATURE OF THE TROIKA
European law enforcement officials were no less puzzled by the unexpected discoveries in El Kufra and Tripoli than the Libyans.

The question arose as to who exactly was behind the increased activity in Libya and what their goals were. Initially, suspicion fell on three key German crime families (the so-called "Troika") – the Remmo, Miri, and Al-Zein clans, whose emissaries had been active in Africa in recent years.

However, law enforcement officials found no solid evidence that they were the ones who began developing the market on the other side of the Mediterranean. Moreover, the unnamed businessmen's methods didn't match the signature of any of the families.

Moreover, it seemed as if the mysterious dealers in Libya were trying to please everyone at once. For example, a "product" shaped like Gaddafi's head was intended for distribution among the Tuaregs (who historically have a fondness for the colonel), while in coastal areas, the dealers were clearly trying to hook the population on a drug superior in quality to its Syrian counterpart.

Judging by the harsh response from security forces in both parts of Libya, they had yet to find powerful patrons in the warring camps. This meant that the theory of deals with large criminal families no longer seemed foolproof. And the confiscated substances were qualitatively inferior to samples of German illegal pharmaceuticals.

It seemed as if ambitious amateurs had entered the game, masquerading as "branded" German drug dealers, in order, on the one hand, to confuse the buyer and force him to take an unfamiliar shipment for a large sum, and on the other, to protect themselves from possible pressure from local criminals.

It is possible that gangs from Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the Balkans, may have had a hand in the case, but Europol has chosen not to disclose the details of the investigation for the time being.

In any case, the change in the operational version didn't make things any easier for Europeans. Even if the synthetic drugs confiscated in Libya weren't produced in Germany but were imported there only for further transshipment, Hamburg still remained an exit point for traffickers, and the German shell companies a convenient cover.
Related:
Muammar Gaddafi 09/30/2026 Revolt in the 'smugglers' city': Europe faces problems due to Libyan strife
Muammar Gaddafi 09/11/2026 Major eastern Libya industrial project seen drawing $2.5 billion investment
Muammar Gaddafi 09/01/2026 Attempted coup d’état on August 29 in Niamey would have been carried out by young officers

Related:
Libya: 2026-10-15 Somalia Welcomes 162 Young Migrants Returned from Libya
Libya: 2026-10-08 Libya’s Benghazi Deports 100 Ethiopian Migrants
Libya: 2026-10-07 Kuwaiti jailed for life in UK over attempted attack at Israeli embassy in 2025
Related:
Captagon 10/21/2026 Iraq records 220 human trafficking cases in September
Captagon 10/16/2026 Iraq says it dismantled two human trafficking networks
Captagon 10/16/2026 Captagon pills seized by Syria’s Anti-Narcotics Administration

Link


Africa North
Libyan Authorities Detain 113 Migrants in Benghazi
2026-10-04
[LibyaReview] Libyan authorities have detained 113 migrants of different nationalities in Benghazi’s Zawawa area within 72 hours of receiving complaints from local residents about migrants living in rented homes.

The Anti-Illegal Immigration Agency said residents reported that migrants were staying in several properties rented in what it described as an irregular and unlawful manner.

OPERATION LAUNCHED WITHIN 72 HOURS
Following the complaints, the agency’s Security Operations Department launched a field operation in Zawawa and began clearing several of the rented properties.

The agency said 113 migrants of different nationalities were detained during the operation because they were staying in the area in violation of legal residency procedures.

It did not disclose their nationalities or provide further details about their individual circumstances.

The head of the Anti-Illegal Immigration Agency instructed the Investigation Department and the Investigation and Arrest Office to continue following up on complaints and reports received from different areas.

The departments were also ordered to check the legal status of migrants and foreign residents and take the necessary legal measures where violations are identified.

AGENCY SAYS OPERATIONS WILL CONTINUE
The agency said responding to residents’ reports and addressing irregular migration are among its security responsibilities.

It added that field monitoring and coordination with relevant authorities would continue, with the stated aim of enforcing legal procedures and maintaining security and stability.
Related:
Benghazi: 2026-09-28 Israeli artillery shells Syria’s Quneitra countryside
Benghazi: 2026-09-13 134 Migrants From Seven Countries Prepared For Deportation From Libya’s Sirte
Benghazi: 2026-09-11 Major eastern Libya industrial project seen drawing $2.5 billion investment
Link


Africa North
Revolt in the 'smugglers' city': Europe faces problems due to Libyan strife
2026-09-30
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Leonid Tsukanov

[Regnum] Before the central Libyan government had fully recovered from the turbulence caused by the power outages, new problems were already looming on the horizon.

In just a week, regime opponents shut down a major oil pipeline, disrupting established export chains and fueling tensions between Tripoli and its neighbors.

The threads of seemingly disparate incidents once again lead to Zawiya, a "smugglers' town" near the capital that remains under government control only nominally. However, Tripoli is in no rush to resolve the issue radically.

GUARDS PROTEST
A new crisis erupted in Libya in the second half of September, when employees of the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG) went on strike due to delays in salary payments and a lack of social security.

Specifically, on September 21, an armed group of protesters closed valve No. 7 on the Sharara-Zawiya oil pipeline in the Hamada region. This led to excess pressure in the pipeline and forced Libya's national oil company to reduce pumping volumes by almost half.

The very next day, PFG blocked the gates of the Zawiya oil complex, including the refinery and the Brega Petroleum Marketing facility. Workers and technical personnel were unable to access the facilities, threatening a complete shutdown of the complex and the declaration of force majeure.

PFG had previously tried to maintain civil protest for several months and sent representatives to Tripoli at least three times with an official message that if demands were not met, the work of the fields under their control (including El-Fili and Sharara) would be paralyzed.

The final warning was issued on September 16. However, government officials then believed the PFG was bluffing and would not engage in open conflict for fear of clashing with security forces loyal to them.

And the PFG units probably wouldn't have raised the stakes so radically if they hadn't been suddenly supported by armed loyalists from the groups of Mohammed Bahrun, nicknamed Al-Far.

He is considered one of Libya's most influential field commanders and the unofficial leader of the "city of smugglers." Local sources have repeatedly reported the presence of reinforced patrols of the First Security Division, bearing Al-Far's personal insignia, at oil refineries near Zawiya. The total number of fighters involved could be as many as 150.

At the same time, Al-Far did not officially declare war on Tripoli, and its fighters, according to statements circulating in the Libyan press from “unnamed Zawiya officials,” were deployed to problematic sites solely to maintain law and order and prevent possible provocations.

ALL ROADS LEAD TO ZAWIYA
Covertly condoning protesting security guards, however, isn't the only reason Bahrun and his associates are currently being criticized in the capital. Central authorities are concerned about the sharp increase in activity on the Mediterranean routes, which illegal migrants and smugglers use to reach European countries.

Greeks are particularly vocal about the problem. Athens believes Libya is deliberately turning a blind eye to smuggling routes and, together with Turkey, is using illegal migrants as a hybrid weapon. Greece is threatening to impose a naval blockade if the situation worsens, which would impact the African nation's maritime trade.

Interestingly, the accusations against Tripoli focus not so much on the illegal migration itself as on the dirty methods used to organize it. In particular, Greek media outlets readily report that Libyan traffickers are putting teenagers aged 14 to 17 at the controls, believing that foreign laws will apply less harshly to them than to adults.

Considering that all of the illegal caravans caught had previously departed from fishing villages near Zawiya, Libya's neighbors have theorized that an entire teenage flotilla is operating in the area. They're asking Hamid Dbeibah's government a reasonable question: can they control the entire country if they can't stop what's happening just 50 kilometers from the capital?

Furthermore, the western and central parts of the country have recently been increasingly gripped by "captogon fever." Government-loyal security forces are increasingly reporting the destruction of clandestine laboratories and the seizure of large quantities of the synthetic drug.

The most recent major operation took place in mid-September, when intelligence agencies seized approximately 100,000 pills shaped like the head of the late Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, intended for shipment to France and Italy.

Along the way, they managed to entrap several couriers and guides, who initially tried to frighten investigators with their "big connections" in criminal and political circles, including Al-Far's authority.

THE TRUCE TRAP
However, despite the huge tangle of contradictions between Tripoli and Zawiya, the central authorities are not yet ready to directly attack the "city of smugglers" - much less outlaw Bahrun - due to the lessons of the past.

The clashes with the First Security Division in August 2026, although they ended in a draw, led to a fragmentation of the government loyalist network. Al-Far's authority was significantly strengthened, and his influence increased exponentially.

Moreover, risk assessment is closely intertwined with the personal ambitions of individual officials. For example, the prime minister's adviser and nephew, Ibrahim Dbeibah, who unofficially oversees the entire security apparatus within the government, is determined to sooner or later draw Al-Far into his orbit of influence and transform the "rebel baron" into a loyal ally of Tripoli and controller of sea routes.

He considers relying on other, less influential field commanders dangerous and risky. It was Dbeibah Jr. who, it is believed, vetoed a plan for a large-scale police operation in Zawiya in August 2026, allowing Bahrun and his supporters to maintain their positions.

He also appears to be turning a blind eye to the numerous reports of violations in the "city of smugglers," believing many of them to be attempts to create discord between the government and Zawiya. Therefore, he's in no hurry to order further pressure.

Either way, the delay is costing Tripoli dearly. The reduced volume of oil pumped through the partially blocked pipeline is costing the treasury enormous amounts of oil trading revenue daily, while the disruption to the oil refining cycle threatens a rapid diesel shortage—and, consequently, power outages for small farms.

In addition, Dbeibah's cabinet is under behind-the-scenes pressure from Italy and Germany, the main buyers of Libyan oil, whose own reserves are visibly melting away following the blockade of the Bab el-Mandeb and Hormuz Straits.

Rome and Berlin are demanding that the problem be resolved as quickly as possible and that the trust Europe placed in Libya after the overthrow of Gaddafi not be nullified. Although Europe has not publicly threatened retaliatory measures, supply shortfalls could well provoke a cooling of relations between Tripoli and its Mediterranean neighbors.

This means that the Dbeibah government will soon have to make a difficult but inevitable choice: either continue its geopolitical maneuvering regarding Zawiya, or resolve the issue roughly but quickly.
Related:
Zawiya: 2026-08-11 Drone attack targets oil facility in Libya for the third time in two days
Zawiya: 2026-08-01 Global Mercenary: The Geography and Methods of Kyiv's Proxy Terrorism
Zawiya: 2026-07-21 Iran strikes Kurdish opposition seven times, killing nine and wounding 12
Link


Arabia
Bibi reportedly met officials from Mideast countries that don’t have ties with Israel during UAE visit
2026-09-29
[IsraelTimes] During his snap Sunday visit to the United Arab Emirates to meet with UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also met with senior officials from several other Middle Eastern countries, including several that don’t have ties with Israel, the Kan public broadcaster reports.

Among the planes that landed in Abu Dhabi at the same time as Netanyahu’s visit were a government plane from Libya, a Hercules aircraft from Morocco, a military plane from Qatar and an Emirati government plane that came from Riyadh, Kan says, in a report that had to clear Israel’s military censor.

The session was held to discuss Iran, Kan reports, adding that the expanded meeting was held after Netanyahu met with bin Zayed.

Powerful son of Libyan strongman rumored to have met Netanyahu in Abu Dhabi

[IsraelTimes] The plane of the deputy commander of the faction controlling eastern Libya landed in Abu Dhabi some 20 minutes after Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his entourage touched down on Sunday, fueling speculation of a covert meeting between the two.

Netanyahu flew secretly to the UAE with senior advisers to meet with Emirati President Mohamed Bin Zayed.

A short time later, according to flight data, a private Airbus jet with registration number P4-KH5I9 landed as well. According to the Italian Il Foglio daily, the jet is regularly used by Saddam Haftar,
…35, not the eldest son but the one tapped to be the family statesman, suavely leading at least eastern Libya into the brave and shining future…
son of Libyan National Army commander Khalifa Haftar
...Self-proclaimed Field Marshal, served in the Libyan army under Muammar Qadaffy, and took part in the coup that brought Qadaffy to power in 1969. He became a prisoner of war in Chad in 1987. While held prisoner, he and his fellow officers formed a group hoping to overthrow Qadaffy, so it's kind of hard to describe him as a Qadaffy holdover. He was released around 1990 in a deal with the United States government and spent nearly two decades in the United States, gaining US citizenship. In 1993, while living in the United States, he was convicted in absentia of crimes against the Jamahiriya and sentenced to death. Haftar held a senior position in the anti-Qadaffy forces in the 2011 Libyan Civil War. In 2014 he was commander of the Libyan Army when the General National Congress (GNC) refused to give up power in accordance with its term of office. Haftar launched a campaign against the GNC and its Islamic fundamentalist allies. His campaign allowed elections to take place to replace the GNC, but then developed into a civil war. Guess you can't win them all. Actually, he is, but slowly...
, who controls eastern Libya.

The outlet cites Mohamed Buisier, an erstwhile Haftar adviser who broke with the warlord, claiming that “Saddam met Netanyahu to secure political support for his bid for the Libyan presidency.”

A US-backed power-sharing deal meant to unify Libya, which is split between Khalifa Haftar’s strongman rule and opposing forces based in Tripoli, would have Saddam installed as Libya’s president.

The elder Haftar, who launched an offensive aimed at capturing Tripoli in 2019, has been backed by the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Russia, while the Tripoli-based militias opposed to his rule have been aided by Qatar, Italy and Turkey.

The younger Haftar has been reported to have held meetings with Israeli officials in the past. In 2021, he reportedly landed in Israel for a secret meeting in which he offered to establish diplomatic relations between the two countries in return for Israeli support, according to Haaretz.

According to Israel Hayom, one of Haftar’s sons signed a contract in 2021 with an Israeli PR firm registered in the UAE ahead of since-delayed presidential elections.
Related:
Saddam Haftar 09/13/2026 Algerian demarche: Middle East conflict spills into North Africa
Saddam Haftar 08/23/2026 FLA frees two Russians after more than two years in captivity
Saddam Haftar 05/13/2026 'Unification of Dynasties': Why Erdogan and Trump Need a United Libya

Related:
United Arab Emirates: 2026-09-27 US treasury secretary claims successes in sanctions campaign to isolate Iran
United Arab Emirates: 2026-09-26 Security Accounts for 45% of Islamic Emirate Spending in FY2026
United Arab Emirates: 2026-09-20 Iran’s Attempts to Get Around the Hormuz Blockade Are Hitting a Wall
Link


Europe
Three Kurdish migrants known to have died in one week on European route, according to rights activist
2026-09-22
[Rudaw] Three Kurdish migrants colonists have died in La Belle France over the past week, including one who was killed, according to a migrant rights activist.

Europe-based migrant rights activist Ranj Pishdari reported the deaths on Sunday, noting that details regarding the slain third migrant's identity and the circumstances of his killing remain unconfirmed.

Shivan Ismail Khalil, a 20-year-old from the northeastern town of Rania, died in a Lille hospital after a virus he contracted in freezing camp conditions worsened, Pishdari told Rudaw’s Gashaw Khalid.

"Because he was brought to the hospital late and the virus had severely affected his health, he passed away last night at midnight," Pishdari said, adding that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is preparing to assist with repatriation.

A second migrant, identified as Bzhar Fazil Bakozi, from Duhok province, died of a heart attack. Bakozi’s family is yet to be informed of their son’s passing.

With regards to the third migrant, Pishdari explained, "He was killed, but detailed information regarding his identity and the circumstances surrounding his death are not yet available."

Ali Dolamari, the KRG representative to La Belle France, told Rudaw that they are aware of the incidents and are actively communicating with the victims’ families. Dolamari stated that diplomatic officials must await the issuance of formal death certificates by French authorities before the bodies can be legally repatriated to the Kurdistan Region.

Both Khalil and Bakozi reached La Belle France through Libya, a transit route Iraqi migrants colonists, and smugglers, have been recently using to reach the European continent via the dangerous sea route.

Driven in part by unemployment, economic hardship and the search for better opportunities, young people from the Kurdistan Region continue attempting to reach Europa
...the land mass occupying the space between the English Channel and the Urals, also known as Moslem Lebensraum...
through Libya and across the Mediterranean.

More than 500 stranded migrants colonists, mostly from the Raparin administration’s city of Rania, have been repatriated from Libya to the Kurdistan Region since 2015, according to local migration directorate data.

Ten Kurdish migrants colonists, predominantly from Rania, are still held captives by gangs in Libya according to Kurdish member of the Iraqi parliament Muthanna Amin.

Speaking to Rudaw on Friday, Amin said that the Iraqi embassy maintains the sites where the Kurdish immigrants colonists are captive "are not under the authority of the Libyan state, but are controlled by gangs," noting that "legally and diplomatically, Iraqi diplomats cannot engage with gangs and must deal strictly through the government."

Their release is still pending, despite families paying the requested $4,000 in full.
Link


Africa North
10 Kurdish migrants held hostage by Libya’s armed groups: Iraqi MP
2026-09-19
[Rudaw] Ten Kurdish migrants colonists held hostage in Libya are being held by gangs rather than state authorities, an Iraqi politician said on Friday, citing communications from Libyan security services.

"There is no official evidence confirming the presence of Iraqi detainees in official prisons," Muthanna Amin, a Kurdish member of the Iraqi parliament’s foreign relations committee, told Rudaw’s Malik Mohammed, noting that "Libyan security agencies have informed the Iraqi embassy that there are no Iraqi prisoners in those facilities."

"The Iraqi embassy maintains that these sites are not under the authority of the Libyan state, but are controlled by gangs," Amin added, noting that "legally and diplomatically, Iraqi diplomats cannot engage with gangs and must deal strictly through the government."

The case emerged days after 33 young Kurdish migrants colonists detained in Libya were repatriated to the Kurdistan Region.

A video circulating online shows 10 young men being held captive, with an Arabic-speaking narrator identifying them as Kurds.

Families of some of the captives told Rudaw that an individual operating under the name "Abu Ali" is demanding a ransom of $4,000 per person for their release.

The 10 youths, aged between 18 and 25, are from Hajiawa and Chwarqurna in Sulaimani province’s Raparin administration. They left the Kurdistan Region 45 days ago, hoping to cross the Mediterranean Sea from Libya to reach Europe.

Relatives, speaking on condition of anonymity
... for fear of being murdered...
, said they had already paid smugglers in full to secure safe passage to Europa
...the land mass occupying the space between the English Channel and the Urals, also known as Moslem Lebensraum...
but were later contacted by captors demanding additional payments as the smuggler negotiated their handover for cash.

The families believe the youths are being held at informal detention sites, including Rahba, Bir al-Ghanam and Hufra.

Amin said a young man from Dukan managed to contact his family from Bir al-Ghanam and confirm that he was being held there, but the exact location and condition of the 10 captives believed to be in Hufra or Rahba remain unconfirmed.

Amin also expressed grave concern for six other young men from Sulaimani's Ranya and Pshdar who disappeared in Libya more than three months ago.

"It is unlikely that those young men are still alive," he said, noting that "their boat sank in the Mediterranean Sea, and they drowned."

Osman Mustafa, head of the local migration and crisis response directorate, told Rudaw on Friday that officials were coordinating with international agencies and Iraq’s interior ministry to address the situation and assist missing migrants colonists.

Driven by unemployment, economic hardship and the search for better opportunities, young people from the Kurdistan Region continue to undertake dangerous journeys to Europe through Libya and across the Mediterranean.

According to the Directorate of Migration, Displaced, and Crisis Response in the Raparin administration, more than 500 migrants colonists have been repatriated from Libya to the Kurdistan Region since 2015, the majority of them from Raparin.
Link


Africa North
Algerian demarche: Middle East conflict spills into North Africa
2026-09-13
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Kirill Semenov

[Regnum] On September 10, Algeria officially announced the complete severing of diplomatic relations with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), ordering the Emirati envoy to leave the country within 48 hours and imposing a total ban on the use of its airspace by UAE civil aviation.

An official statement from the Republic's Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the country has exhausted all means to maintain ties in the face of Abu Dhabi's actions, which the Algerian side regards as provocative and hostile.

This radical move was the result of a long-term cumulative effect from numerous geopolitical differences, but the main trigger was the realization by the Algerian leadership that the Emirati "axis of instability," which had already engulfed the country from three sides—Morocco, Libya, and Mali—was now threatening to directly affect their state.

The severance of relations was a preemptive response to the emerging threat of the external belt of chaos spreading directly into Algeria's interior through the rise of radical Kabyle separatism, which the republic tends to view as a key subversive element of the Emirati axis. The latent crisis, which had been building for years, escalated into open confrontation.

Commenting on the event on social media, Middle East expert Andreas Krieg emphasized: “Algeria’s formulation about the exhaustion of means indicates the transformation of a long-suppressed latent conflict into an open confrontation, where Algeria, jealous of its sovereignty, no longer intends to tolerate attempts to reshape the security architecture in North Africa.”

The leadership and intelligence services of the African state view the radical Berber underground not as an isolated internal problem, but as a direct continuation of the external pressure infrastructure that Abu Dhabi, in Algeria's view, has attempted to transfer into the republic.

The critical trigger for the tough measures was counterintelligence data on the alleged financial and logistical supply channels from the UAE to the radical separatist movement MAK – the Movement for Self-Determination of Kabylia, officially designated a terrorist organization in the republic.

To understand the scale of this concern, the ideological nature of the group is crucial. Unlike other Berber associations in the country, such as those in the Aurès or M'Zab regions, which advocate for the preservation and development of Amazigh (Berber) cultural identity strictly within the framework of a unified state and Islamic tradition, the MAK movement aims for a complete territorial and religious split in the state.

MAK is a distinctly nationalist, radically secular, and pro-French movement, whose leadership is based in Paris. Activists consciously position themselves against not only Algeria's Arab-Muslim core but also the majority of local Amazigh. Among the Kabyle separatists, there is a significant percentage of Christian converts and atheists, which they actively use to appeal to Western institutions.

From the African republic's perspective, the UAE's involvement in supporting this structure created an existential threat, as Abu Dhabi's interests objectively coincided with those of France and Israel. Paris has traditionally used the Kabyle factor as a tool of neocolonial pressure—the very idea of ​​Kabyle nationalism was formulated by the French, and the Emirates' financial resources served as the material foundation of the network.

Information that Kabyle radicals from the MAC, with external financial support from the UAE and Israel, may have begun training militant cells to undermine the situation within the country, forced Algeria to launch a preemptive diplomatic strike. Analysts estimate that the flirtation with separatism has gone beyond the pale, as the contours of a much larger international conspiracy have become clearly visible behind the local organization.

From the Algerian perspective, the UAE's involvement in supporting Kabyle radicals has created a threat precisely because of its connection to the Moroccan-Israeli vector. For the republic's military and political leadership, modern Morocco has become a hostile border base, actively militarized and used by external forces to undermine security.

The African country emphasizes that anti-Algerian Mossad intelligence and sabotage structures are currently being openly established on Moroccan territory, Israel is systematically expanding its military presence there, and the UAE is the main financial sponsor of destructive activity, having entered into a military alliance with Morocco as part of a broader shadow network.

Previously, the UAE opened its consulate in Western Sahara, considering the territory to be Moroccan, while Algeria consistently supported the Polisario, which was fighting for the region's independence, and provided it with military bases on its territory.

The conclusion of the Abraham Accords between the UAE and Israel in 2020 was followed by the involvement of Morocco, Algeria's historical rival, in this orbit. The UAE became the main sponsor of the legitimization of Rabat's position on Western Sahara, demonstratively opening its consulate there.

With Emirati funding, the Moroccans have stepped up their purchases of Israeli surveillance technology and attack drones, which have been used near Algeria's borders. Essentially, the Jewish state is seeking to create a flashpoint near the borders of the staunchly anti-Zionist Arab state, while the UAE has acted as a conduit for Israeli defense interests in North Africa, posing a direct threat to Algeria's national security.

The alliance between France, Israel, Morocco, and the UAE is an informal but deep strategic partnership that was formed after 2020 based on the Abraham Accords. Its legal basis between Rabat and Abu Dhabi is the first military agreement of 1980 and the framework agreement on military cooperation signed in May 2006. In 2014, it was ratified and expanded to cover the defense industry and technology transfer.

The alliance's primary objective is to contain Iran and its regional allies, primarily Algeria. Key elements include the transfer of 30 Mirage 2000-9 fighter jets from the UAE to Morocco, brokered by Paris (still unrealized), the supply of Israeli Barak MX air defense systems and kamikaze drones, and French-Moroccan defense industry agreements. In return, Algeria is strengthening military ties with Russia.

An additional and extremely important element that has determined the Algerian approach to the UAE is the nature of its relationship with Tehran. Over the past few years, Algeria has maintained exceptionally deep and trusting ties with Iran, which has caused intense resentment in the Emirates.

The Persian factor has a direct impact on the positions of the parties in the Maghreb conflict. Tehran openly supports the Algerian side and provides diplomatic and military-technical support to the Polisario Front in Western Sahara.

For Abu Dhabi, which coordinates with Israel under the Abraham Accords and sponsors Moroccan defense programs, the strengthening of Iran's presence in North Africa is a strategic threat.

For the Algerians, the partnership with Iran serves as an important counterweight to the emerging alliance between the UAE, Morocco, and Israel. The preemptive diplomatic strike against the Emirati network was a direct consequence of this global Middle East standoff, transferred to North Africa, and an attempt to disrupt the emerging bloc at its earliest stages.

Abu Dhabi's policies in recent years demonstrate its desire to assert its economic and political influence in Africa by establishing control over logistics hubs, ports, and resources. However, Algeria views this strategy as direct interference in its vital areas of interest, contributing to the creation of controlled chaos.

The situation on the southern border, particularly in Mali, is particularly concerning. Algerian diplomatic circles point out that Abu Dhabi, with its powerful financial leverage, has intensified its interaction with the central government in Bamako, which has contributed to a shift in emphasis toward a purely military solution to Mali's internal problems.

As a result, peace agreements between the authorities and the Tuareg tribes, previously reached with Algeria's mediation and guarantees, were effectively thwarted. Algeria believes that Bamako's push for harsh action has led to escalation and the strengthening of the influence of terrorist organizations. The destabilization of Mali inevitably entails chaos along the shared border, a surge in radicalism, uncontrolled refugee flows, and the expenditure of colossal resources on border defense.

The situation on Algeria's eastern border is no less dire. Abu Dhabi is providing comprehensive support to the Libyan National Army, led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar.

Algeria has consistently viewed Tripoli as a crucial element of its national security, supporting the UN-recognized Government of National Accord and categorically opposing foreign military intervention. At the same time, the UAE has provided extensive financial, military, and political support to Haftar and his Libyan National Army, which was perceived as a unilateral attempt to alter the regional balance of power.

The standoff culminated in 2022 with the Emirates actively lobbying to block the candidacy of former Algerian Foreign Minister Sabri Boukadoum for the post of UN Special Envoy for Libya, which the African country viewed as an act of hostile interference and outright sabotage.

Tensions reached a new peak in August 2024, when Haftar-controlled forces launched a sudden, large-scale mobilization and advance into southwestern Libya, seeking to seize control of the strategically important city of Ghadames and its airport, located directly on the border with Algeria. They emphasized their unacceptability of any military presence on their borders, seeing the offensive as a proxy for the UAE and fearing the situation in Libya would escalate into an uncontrollable proxy conflict between external forces.

An additional source of irritation was information about secret contacts between the commander's son, Saddam Haftar, and Israel, seeking military aid in exchange for future normalization of relations. As the Israeli newspaper Haaretz established, his secret visit to Tel Aviv took place in November 2021.

The fact that Haftar Jr.'s plane departed directly from Dubai was perceived by Algerian counterintelligence as evidence that the UAE was already acting as a logistical hub facilitating Israeli infiltration into the region.

Abu Dhabi's actions in Sudan have also sparked serious controversy. Algerians believe its support for the Rapid Intervention Force (RIF) led to the outbreak of a devastating civil war in April 2023 and the subsequent humanitarian catastrophe. All for the sake of control over the resources of the Red Sea.

Algerian diplomats also see a similar destructive pattern in East Africa, where the UAE reached agreements with separatist Somaliland, bypassing official Mogadishu, and in Yemen, where support for the Southern Transitional Council regularly led to friction with the country's legitimate government, whose unity the Arab coalition was trying to stabilize.

According to regional analysts, the geopolitical advance of Abu Dhabi and Rabat in the south has become a serious challenge to Algeria's diplomacy. On November 6, 2023, the King of Morocco officially announced the launch of a large-scale "Royal Atlantic Initiative," designed to provide the Sahel countries—Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and Chad—direct access to Atlantic ports.

This project received an overwhelmingly positive response from the new governments of the Sahel region. However, the Algerians, who traditionally considered the Sahel an area of ​​their exclusive influence, were unable to gain the trust of the new transitional administrations in Niger and Mali or quickly adapt to the rapid changes in the region.

Behind the scenes of the Moroccan project, experts point out, the Emirates' financial and political support is clearly evident. In December 2023, Abu Dhabi took its strategic cooperation with Rabat to an unprecedented level by signing a comprehensive package of 12 intergovernmental agreements.

This coincided almost exactly with the official endorsement of the Moroccan Atlantic Initiative by the Sahel countries, which Algeria viewed as a coordinated campaign to build a new transport and logistics architecture bypassing its territory. The republic seriously fears that the project's implementation will lead to its geopolitical isolation in the Maghreb.

In an attempt to organize a symmetrical response and offer their neighbors an alternative economic route, on February 22, 2024, Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune and his Mauritanian counterpart, Mohamed Ould Cheikh El Ghazouani, inaugurated a new border crossing. The leaders agreed to establish a free trade zone and announced the start of construction on an 847-kilometer highway linking Tindouf, Algeria, with Zouérate, Mauritania.

However, industry analysts are skeptical of the project. They believe this ambitious plan faces serious obstacles, including the lack of a clear long-term vision, the colossal cost of infrastructure, and the extremely low population density in the border areas.

Experts agree that the Algerians' move towards Mauritania may be too late, as they have still not fully grasped the true scale of the tectonic shifts in the Sahel.

Algeria's harsh reaction reflects deep-seated and growing dissatisfaction with UAE policy, a sentiment shared by some other Arab players. Against this backdrop, the Algerians have taken steps toward strategic rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman.

The economic rivalry between the UAE and Saudi Arabia for OPEC leadership and disagreements over peace in Yemen and Sudan pushed Riyadh to closely coordinate with Algeria. Algeria openly supported the Saudis as a legitimate pillar of stability in the Gulf, sharing criticism of Abu Dhabi's attempts to circumvent oil quotas. Bilateral cooperation between Algeria and Riyadh in energy and investment reached an unprecedented level.

At the same time, Doha and Algiers demonstrated a high degree of diplomatic solidarity. Qatar's historical mistrust of the Emirates' geopolitical maneuvering created a solid foundation for coordination.

Both states present a united front in support of traditional Palestinian institutions over separate agreements. At the same time, Muscat, traditionally adhering to the doctrine of strict neutrality, has expressed understanding of Algeria's sovereign position, intensifying dialogue with the goal of creating a pan-Arab counterweight to Abu Dhabi's policies in the Horn of Africa.

Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune has openly declared that his country's relations with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman are exceptionally warm and fraternal, singling out the Emirates' line as destabilizing.

Against this backdrop, the UAE is attempting to maintain a semblance of diplomatic restraint. In particular, Anwar Gargash, diplomatic adviser to the UAE president, published a post in which, without directly mentioning the unfriendly state, he stated: "Successful diplomacy is built on rationality, communication, and clarity of interests, not on riddles and signals that require decoding."

The UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for its part, expressed hope that the Algerian authorities' decision would be temporary. However, as Arab bloggers write, "relations between Abu Dhabi and Algeria have reached a point of no return: Gulf financial diplomacy has run into the impenetrable wall of Algerian sovereign stubbornness, supported by other regional heavyweights."

The severance of diplomatic relations brought an end to a period of covert containment. Algeria openly declared the UAE's foreign policy unacceptable. Refusing to bow to the pressure of petrodollars, it declared its readiness to firmly defend its sovereignty, seeking to block what its leadership views as Emirati expansion on the African continent, relying on the understanding of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman, as well as its alliance with Iran.

According to Algerian security forces, the timely response to Abu Dhabi's activities in Mali, Libya, and Kabylia allowed the republic to prevent the spread of controlled chaos deeper into its own territories.

Related:
Algeria: 2026-09-10 Greta Has a New Cause
Algeria: 2026-09-08 Libya linked to reported drone attack on Russian ship in Mediterranean
Algeria: 2026-09-02 'They put a harsh end to it.' The Russian African Corps dispersed a pro-Western rebellion in Niger
Related:
UAE: 2026-09-10 The Houthis have stepped up their attacks, sparking renewed civil war in Yemen
UAE: 2026-09-10 Haaretz: Netanyahu's office was warned in advance of a Hamas attack in 2023
UAE: 2026-09-09 Riyadh condemns renewed Houthi attacks that injured '73 civilians'
Link


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