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Syria-Lebanon-Iran
Gunmen attack police post as clashes intensify in southeast Iran
2026-10-13
[Rudaw] Heavy festivities erupted in southeast Iran
...a theocratic Shiite state divided among the Medes, the Persians, and the (Arab) Elamites. Formerly a fairly civilized nation ruled by a Shah, it became a victim of Islamic revolution in 1979. The nation is today noted for spontaneously taking over other countries' embassies, maintaining whorehouses run by clergymen, involvement in international drug trafficking, and financing sock puppet militias to extend the regime's influence. The word Iran is a cognate form of Aryan. The abbreviation IRGC is the same idea as Stürmabteilung (or SA). The term Supreme Guide is a the modern version form of either Duce or Führer or maybe both. They hate Jews Zionists Jews. Their economy is based on the production of oil and vitriol...
early Monday after button men attacked a cop shoppe in the restive Sistan and Baluchestan province, as weeks of escalating violence have prompted an IRGC-linked news agency to accuse Pakistain of failing to prevent cross-border krazed killer attacks.

"Armed men attacked the Mortan police post in the Parud district of Rask county. Local sources said heavy festivities broke out between the assailants and forces stationed at the post, with both sides exchanging fire," Haalvsh, a human rights
...which are usually entirely different from personal liberty...
organization monitoring developments in the Baloch region, reported.

There were no immediate reports of casualties from Monday’s attack, and no group had grabbed credit. State media did not report the attack.

The latest confrontation comes amid a wave of attacks against Iranian security forces in the southeastern province, which borders Pakistain and Afghanistan.

More than a dozen Iranian military and police personnel were killed or maimed in four attacks over a 24-hour period last week, according to Haalvsh.

The deteriorating security situation comes as Tehran faces mounting military and economic pressure from Washington, with renewed attacks on commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz raising fears of further escalation.

"At least 17 attacks against tankers in the Strait of Hormuz and surrounding waterways since Sept 28, and at least two confirmed hailing incidents all linked to Iran," Noam Raydan, a senior fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy which tracks attacks in the Strait of Hormuz, reported on Sunday.

US forces have also carried out repeated strikes against Iranian military installations, including targets in the southeastern coastal cities of Chabahar and Konarak in July, according to US Central Command.

Monday's attack followed the killing on Friday of Lieutenant Colonel Nosrat Eftekhari Poudineh, deputy for cultural and social affairs at the Sistan and Baluchestan provincial police command.

Eftekhari was killed when a roadside kaboom went kaboom! near a police vehicle travelling through the Cheshmeh Ziarat area outside Zahedan, the scenic provincial capital.

Her killing prompted condemnation from senior Iranian officials, including President Masoud Pezeshkian, who called on security forces to swiftly identify and punish those responsible.

On Sunday, Tasnim, a news agency linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), published an editorial accusing Pakistain of failing to take effective measures against gangs operating along the border.

"The main issue in assessing Pakistain’s performance is not the number of official meetings or joint statements, but the results of its security measures," the Tasnim news agency stated.

It questioned whether Islamabad had prevented krazed killer groups from using Pak territory to launch attacks against Iran and whether security cooperation had resulted in a lasting reduction in violence.

The agency argued that repeated promises and security agreements were insufficient without tangible results on the ground, including dismantling krazed killer networks, eliminating safe havens and disrupting logistical support.

Relations between Iran and Pakistain have long been strained by gangs operating along their roughly 900-kilometer border.

Tensions escalated dramatically in January 2024 when Iran launched missiles and drones into Pakistain on January 16, targeting what Tehran described as bases belonging to Jaish al-Adl, a Sunni Baloch krazed killer organization.

Pakistain retaliated on January 18, carrying out Arclight airstrike
...KABOOM!...
s against suspected Baloch separatist hideouts inside Iran. At least nine people were killed in the Pak strikes, according to the News Agency that Dare Not be Named.

Both countries subsequently moved to restore diplomatic relations and strengthen border security cooperation and even Pakistain have played as a main mediator in brokering talks between the US and Iran following the six week war which began on February 28.

The latest violence has also claimed the lives of senior IRGC and intelligence officials.

On September 23, Baloch bandidos turbans killed IRGC Brigadier General Hossein Zarifi, commander of the Shahid Sajjad Operational Base in Saravan, and Ahmad Herat
...a venerable old Persian-speaking city in western Afghanistan, populated mostly by Tadjiks, which is why it's not as blood-soaked as areas controlled by Pashtuns...
i Zera'ati, the base's intelligence chief, during heavy fighting in the area.

Responsibility for several recent attacks has been claimed by the People's Fighters Front, a coalition of Baloch armed and political groups formed on December 10, 2025, to coordinate their struggle against the Islamic Theocratic RepublicThe coalition brings together Jaish al-Adl, the PADA Baloch Movement, the Nasr Movement of Baluchestan, the Mohammad Rasulullah group and other Baloch fighters.

In its founding document, the coalition called for unity among opponents of Iran's holy manal establishment and outlined its opposition to the political system based on velayat-e faqih, or guardianship of the Islamic jurist.

"We all know that the despotic rule of the velayat-e faqih is a problem for all the people of Iran ... for this reason, all the people of Iran need unity of action against the despotic and anti-democratic structure of the velayat-e faqih in order to free themselves from it," the coalition declared in a statement.

Jaish al-Adl, the coalition's most prominent armed component, emerged around 2012 following the weakening of Jundullah, a Sunni Baloch krazed killer organization that had carried out deadly attacks against Iranian security forces and civilians since 2003.

Jundullah's leader, Abdulmalek Rigi, was captured by Iranian intelligence in February 2010 and executed four months later. Jaish al-Adl subsequently emerged as a successor organization, continuing armed operations in the predominantly Sunni Baloch areas of southeast Iran.

The United States designated Jundullah a foreign terrorist organization in 2010 and formally included Jaish al-Adl under the designation in 2019.

Iranian authorities regard Jaish al-Adl and the broader Baloch coalition as serious national security threats and have repeatedly accused Washington and Israel of supporting gangs seeking to destabilise the country.

In its Sunday's editorial, Tasnim described Jaish al-Adl, which it calls Jaish al-Zolm, or the Army of Injustice, as an illegitimate creation of the US and Israel. The article did not provide verifiable evidence of direct US or Israeli support for the group.

Sistan and Baluchestan is among Iran's poorest and most marginalized provinces, where longstanding grievances over economic deprivation, discrimination and the treatment of the predominantly Sunni Baloch population have fueled resentment towards Tehran.

The province was also the scene of one of the deadliest crackdowns during Iran's nationwide protests in 2022. On September 30 that year, Iranian security forces opened fire on protesters and worshippers in Zahedan in what became known as Bloody Friday. Amnesty International documented at least 66 people killed that day, with more deaths recorded in the aftermath.

The continued attacks, despite repeated security operations and the killing of several krazed killer commanders in recent years, highlight the persistent security challenges facing Tehran in the border region and the growing importance of cooperation with Pakistain to prevent further cross-border violence.
Related:
Sistan and Baluchestan province: 2026-10-09 Iranian police officer killed in attack on patrol in Sistan and Baluchestan
Sistan and Baluchestan province: 2026-09-26 Clashes continued in Saravan early Thursday as military drones fly over city
Sistan and Baluchestan province: 2026-09-19 Clashes erupt in southeastern Iran amid reports of casualties
Related:
Zahedan: 2026-10-09 Iranian police officer killed in attack on patrol in Sistan and Baluchestan
Zahedan: 2026-09-26 Clashes continued in Saravan early Thursday as military drones fly over city
Zahedan: 2026-09-19 Clashes erupt in southeastern Iran amid reports of casualties
Link


Syria-Lebanon-Iran
IRGC says two alleged US, ‘Zionist’ collaborators killed in southeast Iran
2026-09-06
[Rudaw] Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said on Saturday that its forces killed two members of a "terrorist cell" in the southeastern province of Sistan and Baluchestan who were allegedly planning attacks in coordination with the United States and Israel.

The IRGC Ground Forces’ Quds Headquarters said the group was identified through intelligence surveillance and targeted in a joint operation involving the provincial intelligence ministry, IRGC intelligence and police.

The cell had planned attacks on pre-selected targets in the province, the IRGC claimed, adding that the group was linked to the United States and Israel and intended to carry out the attacks alongside the ongoing US war against Iran. It provided no evidence to support the allegations.

Sistan and Baluchestan, which borders Pakistain and Afghanistan, is one of Iran’s poorest provinces and has long been a flashpoint for festivities between security forces and Baluchi gangs.

Several Baluchi groups operate in the region and have fought the IRGC and other Iranian security forces, saying they seek greater rights for the country’s marginalized Baluchi minority. Several of the groups formed a coalition in December known as the Popular Fighters Front to coordinate their activities against Tehran.

In a clash last week between members of Jaish al-Adl,
Jaish al-Adl ("Army of Justice” or “People’s Fighters’ Front” in Arabic, depending on the translator, sometimes transliterated as Jaysh al-Adl) appeared in 2012 as a successor to the Salafist Balochi independence group Jundullah (Soldiers of God), which operates on both sides of the Pak-Iranian border but was based in Pakistan. In December 2025, Jaysh al-Adl and other Baloch nationalist organizations announced merging into a single united organization, the People's Fighters Front.
a Baluchi krazed killer group that is part of the coalition, and the IRGC in Saravan, one member of the group was killed and six others were detained, according to an IRGC statement carried by the Tasnim news agency.

Baluchi krazed killer groups have grabbed credit for a series of attacks and liquidations targeting intelligence and police officials in recent months, prompting intensified operations by the IRGC and other security forces in the province.

Iranian authorities regularly accuse Baluchi and Kurdish opposition groups of receiving support from foreign powers, particularly the United States and Israel. The groups and their supporters have in turn accused Tehran of using such allegations to delegitimize demands for greater political and cultural rights.
Related:
Sistan and Baluchestan: 2026-09-02 US strikes IRGC targets after 'attempted attacks' in Strait of Hormuz: CENTCOM
Sistan and Baluchestan: 2026-08-26 Iran carries out flogging, sentences of two female Kurdish activists: Watchdog
Sistan and Baluchestan: 2026-08-23 Iran’s Baloch uprising: A rising lever or a strategic illusion?
Related:
Jaish al-Adl: 2026-08-23 Iran’s Baloch uprising: A rising lever or a strategic illusion?
Jaish al-Adl: 2026-08-22 49 terrorists killed in IBOs in KP, Balochistan: ISPR
Jaish al-Adl: 2026-08-12 Good Morning
Related:
Saravan: 2026-07-01 2 IRGC members shot dead at home in Iran, in what state media calls ‘terrorism’
Saravan: 2026-02-16 People's Resistance Front ambushed Iranian Forces' vehicle in the vicinity of Saravan, Sistan and Balochistan
Saravan: 2025-08-11 Balochi terrorists said to kill police officer in Iran’s southeast
Link


Syria-Lebanon-Iran
Iran’s Baloch uprising: A rising lever or a strategic illusion?
2026-08-23
[Jpost] The core issue therefore centers not on the raw strength of the Baloch movement alone but on whether it holds attributes that make it a strategic asset major powers can viably invest in.

Has the Baloch insurgency in Iran become a genuine pressure lever for Washington, now that its options with the Kurds have narrowed?

A rise in armed operations in southeastern Iran might suggest this outcome, yet this reading outpaces available facts: the Baloch lever remains far from serving as a viable replacement for the Kurdish alternative.

The worth of any armed movement rests not in attack volume but in the capacity to alter internal power dynamics, secure political legitimacy, and sustain external backing. The core issue therefore centers not on the raw strength of the Baloch movement alone but on whether it holds attributes that make it a strategic asset major powers can viably invest in.

On-the-ground records confirm that the Sistan and Baluchestan province has been Iran’s weakest territorial segment since its military annexation under Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1928.

Three to four million residents live there; Sunni Baloch make up roughly three-quarters of the population. Official figures rank this province as Iran’s poorest, with the lowest scores for development, education, and life expectancy nationwide.

Systemic marginalization carried steep political and security costs. The Baloch people account for no more than five percent of Iran’s population, yet their share of individuals executed in political and security cases in recent years far exceeds their demographic weight.

The events of the Bloody Friday massacre in Zahedan in September 2022, when dozens of protesters and worshippers died, deepened rifts between the state and large groups of local residents and turned the province into one of Iran’s most persistent, chronic unrest hubs.

Such environments naturally breed protest movements and armed factions. The emergence of insurgency does not set strategic worth, however. True value comes from an evolution into a political project that enforces new realities.

From the rise of the Sunni Jundallah
..."Soldiers of God," a name used by two multiple separate terror outfits, one active in Iran and the other in Pakistain. Both are Sunni organizations that target Shiites. The Pak version has close relations with al-Qaeda and the Pak Talibs and is probably a false nose and mustache for Lashkar-e-Jhangvi...
fighter group under leader Abdolmalek Rigi in Iran, through the Jaish al-Adl group’s activities, to the late 2025 unification of multiple factions under the People’s Fighters Front, the Baloch movement moved beyond scattered independent groups. It pursued a tighter unified political and military framework.

Most notably, this shift avoided open separatist rhetoric and instead framed goals as replacing the Velayat-e Faqih system (a political Shi’ite approach) alongside other Iranian societal groups. This nationalist stance gives the movement a wider margin for maneuvering than separatist messaging, which faces tougher acceptance domestically and internationally.

THE BALOCH CARD: WISHFUL THINKING?
These advances do not erase structural constraints limiting the movement. Its workforce and military capabilities stay small relative to Kurdish groups. The desert theater sits distant from Iran’s key political and economic hubs, and leading associated armed factions retain terrorist designations from the US.

These factors make transition from indirect contacts to overt support a costly choice politically and legally and explain the absence of indicators pointing to a true partnership.

Limits inherent to the Baloch lever emerge clearly here — reliance on external actors ties to the nature and limits of achievable support.

Near-term external engagement will likely stay confined to unacknowledged intelligence and financial aid in addition to limited media and political backing.

Overt military support is low-probability and costly; major powers favor deniable assistance channels and avoid direct involvement with gangs tangled in complex legal and regional sensitivities.

Drawing parallels with Kurdish movements brings the core trade-offs into focus. The Kurdish track record bears out a basic rule: major powers select armed partners for their capacity to produce strategic gains at acceptable political and military cost, not for their operational intensity.

The Kurdish lever thus appeared more operationally useful to Washington during the 2026 conflict before colliding with Ottoman Turkish national priorities.

Ankara viewed empowerment of any armed Kurdish force near its borders as a direct threat to national security and applied political pressure that halted this path before realization.

The collapse of the Kurdish option proved a critical point: no lever inside Iran carries value solely through military force; regional allies must also stand ready to absorb its consequences.

Accordingly, the decision to dial back Kurdish support did not trigger an automatic realignment behind the Baloch movement.

Pakistain carries equal weight in this calculus. Islamabad combats domestic Baloch insurgency and recognizes that escalation on Iranian territory risks a rapid spillover across borders. Ergo, national interests drive containment rather than encouragement of unrest, even as Pak influence over Washington lags behind Ottoman Turkish clout.

Consequently, moreover, any external bet on the Baloch factor remains governed more by regional balances than by developments inside Iran. The success of any such project requires a regional consensus that appears absent for now.

In this light, the Baloch card seems closer to an instrument of attrition than to a regime-change project. Although it does force Tehran to spread security resources across an added front and raises control costs for peripheral regions, it lacks the capacity to threaten the state’s center or impose a new political equation.

Confusing security nuisance with strategic impact often leads to misleading assessments.

History records many armed factions drained state resources successfully yet failed to alter underlying power balances.

Therefore, to correctly judge this option, analysts must use measurable indicators instead of impressions. Key measures include moving from scattered raids to holding inland territories permanently, coordinated external backing that grows past limited talks to regular political, logistical, or financial support, and wider splits in Iranian state bodies that weaken the IRGC’s grip on remote provinces.

If these three factors all come together, claims of a true strategic change would hold up. Without them, talk of a strong Baloch card is little more than wishful thinking.

Link


India-Pakistan
Jaish al-Adl (People's Fighters Front) released a new video from Sistan & Balochistan, calling for jihad against Iran
2026-08-12


Jaish al-Adl ("Army of Justice" in Arabic, sometimes transliterated as Jaysh al-Adl) appeared in 2012 as a successor to the Salafist Balochi independence group Jundullah (Soldiers of God), which operates on both sides of the Pak-Iranian border but was based in Pakistan. In December 2025, Jaysh al-Adl and other Baloch nationalist organizations announced merging into a single united organization, the People's Fighters Front.
Related:
Jaish al-Adl: 2026-07-01 Iran: Militants affiliated with the “Ansar Al-Furqan” released a new video from Sistan and Balochistan
Jaish al-Adl: 2026-04-28 Iran on brink of ‘irreversible' damage to oil fields as storage runs out during blockade
Jaish al-Adl: 2026-04-26 Iran hangs man for role in protests, another member of MEK, claims both were working for Mossad; also Jaish al-Adl turban who ambushed army troops
Link


Israel-Palestine-Jordan
IDF says Hamas commander, 4 terrorists killed in Gaza when planning attacks on troops
2026-07-02
[IsraelTimes] As strikes continue to hit Gaza, technocrats say ‘highly productive’ meetings held on advancing plans for enclave’s future; Board of Peace: ‘UNRWA has no place in the new Gaza’

A Hamas
..a contraction of the Arabic words for "frothing at the mouth",...
commander who "posed a threat" to Israeli forces in the Gazoo
...Hellhole adjunct to Israel and Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, inhabited by Gazooks. The place was acquired in the wake of the 1967 War and then presented to Paleostinian control in 2006 by Ariel Sharon, who had entered his dotage. It is currently ruled with a rusty iron fist by Hamas with about the living conditions you'd expect. It periodically attacks the Hated Zionist Entity whenever Iran needs a ruckus created or the hard boyz get bored, getting thumped by the IDF in return. The ruling turbans then wave the bloody shirt and holler loudly about oppression and disproportionate response...
Strip was killed in a strike on Tuesday, the military announced, as it continued to launch attacks against targets it said were terror operatives endangering troops in the enclave.

The Tuesday strike in southern Gaza killed Adel Jihad Mohammad Asfour, a platoon commander in Hamas’s military wing, according to the IDF statement on Wednesday.

During the war, Asfour advanced sniper and bomb attacks against Israeli troops, the military said, adding that recently, alongside advancing "imminent" attacks, he also worked to rebuild Hamas’s capabilities.

"The terrorist posed a threat to IDF troops operating in the Gaza Strip and was eliminated in an aerial strike," the IDF said.

The military also identified on Wednesday four other Hamas operatives who they said were advancing attacks on troops and were killed in strikes in the Gaza Strip in the past week.

The military named the operatives as Wael Mahmoud Ali Labad and Muaz Mohammad Hassan Ahmad, both anti-tank operatives; Sameh Abu Kamil, a platoon commander; and Akram Ashraf Hamad Labad, a sniper operative.

Additionally, several rocket-launching tunnel shafts were destroyed in strikes on Monday, the IDF added.

The military published footage showing some of the strikes.

Hamas-affiliated Paleostinian media outlets in Gaza also reported on Wednesday that one person had been killed and four were maimed in a strike in the Sheikh Radwan neighborhood of Gaza City.

Earlier Wednesday, another man, identified as Mohammad Jundiya, was reportedly killed in a separate strike in Gaza.

Footage from his funeral shows gunnies firing into the air.

As of Wednesday evening, the IDF had not commented on either strike.

Alongside the strikes across Gaza, the IDF has slowly been pushing out the boundaries of the area inside the enclave still under its control, saying it now controls at least 60 percent of the Strip, rather than the roughly 53% following its pullback on the first day of the truce. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said last month he had ordered the military to retake additional territory, amounting to 70% of the enclave.

In the areas not controlled by Israel, Hamas remains in place as the enclave’s de facto government, as power will only be handed over to a transitional authority once the terror group agrees to give up its weapons.

Although battered by war, the terror group is reported to be maintaining its control over the Strip by executing its opponents and those it views as posing a threat to its rule.

A report on Sunday said the IDF assessed that Hamas is producing hundreds of bombs and anti-tank missiles every month, recruiting new fighters and rebuilding underground infrastructure.

Over 1,000 Paleostinians have been killed since the start of the ceasefire in October 2025, according to the Hamas‑run health ministry in Gaza, which does not distinguish between combatants and civilians.

Five Israeli soldiers have been killed during the same period.

NCAG TOUTS ’HIGHLY PRODUCTIVE’ MEETINGS FOR GAZA PLANS
The National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) said on Wednesday its members held a series of "highly productive" meetings in Cyprus to prepare for the next phase of its efforts to alleviate the suffering of Paleostinians in Gaza.

Participating in those meetings were representatives from Nickolay Mladenov’s Office of the High Representative and former UK prime minister Tony Blair’s Institute for Global Change, NCAG said in a statement.

"We concentrated on what can be done immediately, including initiatives and projects to ease conditions on the ground. We reviewed plans for reconstruction, security and governance, and we finalized the institutional arrangements that will ensure the transparency and accountability required by international donors," the statement continued.

The NCAG statement reiterated the Paleostinian technocratic government’s commitment to US President Donald Trump
...The tack in the backside of the Democratic Party...
’s 20-point plan for Gaza and says it is "prepared to take all necessary steps — in coordination with the Board of Peace and the Office of the High Representative — in order to assume its responsibilities once the right conditions are met."

It didn’t specify what those conditions are, but the Board of Peace has conditioned NCAG’s entry into Gaza on Hamas agreeing to disarm, while the terror group argues that Israel must first cease violations of the ceasefire deal reached in October.

This week’s meetings in Cyprus built on a workshop that was held in Cairo last week and "are part of a broader process to ensure we have every tool necessary to serve the Paleostinian people of Gaza," NCAG said.

"Further steps will be set out and announced in due course," the statement added.

In recent months, the Board of Peace’s Gaza envoy, Nickolay Mladenov, has insisted that the main obstacle preventing the NCAG from entering Gaza is Hamas’s refusal to give up its weapons.

Diplomats from each of the Middle Eastern mediating countries — Egypt, Qatar
...an emirate on the east coast of the Arabian Peninsula. It sits on some really productive gas and oil deposits, which produces the highest per capita income in the world. They piss it all away on religion, financing the Moslem Brotherhood and several al-Qaeda affiliates. Home of nutbag holy manYusuf al-Qaradawi...
and The Sick Man of Europe Turkey
...the decaying remnant of the Ottoman Empire...
— told The Times of Israel that Hamas has sought to drag out negotiations on the issue. They also argued that Israel’s refusal to adhere to the terms of the first phase of the October 2025 Gaza ceasefire has posed a major obstacle as well.

NO ROLE FOR UNRWA IN ’THE NEW GAZA’
Additionally, on Wednesday, the US-led Board of Peace overseeing the postwar management of Gaza indicated that the UN agency for Paleostinian refugees will not be allowed to play a future role in Gaza.

"UNRWA has no place in the new Gaza. We are turning the page on the complex of perpetual aid dependency and conflict. The people of Gaza deserve better," the Board of Peace tweeted.

It appeared to be the first time that the Board of Peace has voiced its stance regarding UNRWA, which Israel and the US argue has become an irredeemable organization due to its ties to Hamas.

Israel has taken measures to limit UNRWA’s ability to operate in Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem, but its infrastructure continues to be used to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid in the Strip.

The statement from the Board of Peace sparked outcry from the Paleostinian Authority’s foreign ministry, which stressed the importance of UNRWA’s work in providing for Paleostinians.

The PA statement also "rejects all terminology aimed at fragmenting Paleostinian Territory, including the term ’New Gaza,’ which seeks to isolate the Gaza Strip from its natural surroundings, as well as the term ’the people of Gaza.'"

However,
if you can't be a good example, then you'll just have to be a horrible warning...
the PA statement was careful to reiterate Ramallah’s support for Trump’s 20-point plan as well as the establishment of the NCAG.

Meanwhile,
...back at the shootout, Butch shot Black Bart's other gun out of his other hand......
Israel has relocated its screening facility for Paleostinians returning to the Gaza Strip from Egypt to the Kerem Shalom Crossing, instead of a military post in Rafah.

BOARD OF PEACE PARTS WAYS WITH DERADICALIZATION DIRECTOR AFTER 3 MONTHS, OFFICIAL TELLS TOI
On Tuesday, a Board of Peace official told The The Times of Israel that the panel had parted ways with its director of deradicalization after roughly three months.

"Jason Olson’s recent detail in support of the Board of Peace mission has concluded. We thank him for his capacity-building contributions," the official said in a statement.

Olson joined the Board of Peace from the US Department of Defense, with the creation of the position offering a sign of the panel’s priorities as it works to rebuild Gaza.

Israeli officials have repeatedly insisted that true peace in Gaza requires the "deradicalization" of Gaza’s population following the Hamas-led October 7 onslaught.

Olson appeared at a conference in Jerusalem last week, during which he touted the importance of the US-Israel relationship and stressed the need for Hamas to disarm in order to make way for Gaza to be rebuilt.

No reason was given for Olson’s departure, and he did not respond to a request for comment.

COGAT launches pilot to relocate screening for returning Gazooks to Kerem Shalom Crossing

The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) announced on Wednesday that as part of the ceasefire agreement, "a pilot has been launched to relocate the Israeli security screening conducted for residents returning from Egypt to the Gaza Strip via the Rafah Crossing."

Previously, Paleostinians returning to Gaza from Egypt would be screened at the IDF’s "Regavim" checkpoint, located in Rafah.

The screening and identification procedures have now been relocated to Kerem Shalom, and they will be conducted by the Defense Ministry’s Land Crossings Authority, alongside other security bodies, according to COGAT.

"This is an operational adjustment intended to streamline the crossing process, enhance screening capabilities, and ensure the continued safe and efficient operation of the mechanism," COGAT said.

COGAT said this change only relates to the Israeli screening process. The movement through the Rafah Crossing itself remains unchanged, including "coordination with Egypt and the World Health Organization (WHO), Israel’s prior security approval process, the supervision of the European Union
...the successor to the Holy Roman Empire, only without the Hapsburgs and the nifty uniforms and the dancing...
Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM), and the mechanism governing the departure of residents from the Gaza Strip to Egypt."
Link


Syria-Lebanon-Iran
Iran: Militants affiliated with the “Ansar Al-Furqan” released a new video from Sistan and Balochistan
2026-07-01


Ansar Al-Furqan is a Sunni Islamist militant organization active in the Sistan and Baluchestan insurgency, as well as Arab separatism in Khuzestan. The group was established in December 2013 by a merger of Harakat al-Ansar and Hizbul-Furqan. The organization is a designated terrorist organization by Iran, Pakistan and China. They hang out with Jaish al-Adl ("Army of Justice" in Arabic, sometimes transliterated as Jaysh al-Adl) appeared in 2012 as a successor to the Salafist Balochi independence group Jundullah (Soldiers of God), which operates on both sides of the Pak-Iranian border but was based in Pakistan.
Related:
Ansar Al-Furqan: 2026-04-01 Anti-Iranian group Jaysh al-Adl (People's Fighters Front) released a new video from Sistan & Balochistan
Ansar Al-Furqan: 2025-09-18 Jaish al-Adl killed a Commander of the IRGC-affiliated Basij militias in Iranshahr
Ansar Al-Furqan: 2025-09-16 Ansar Al-Furqan released videos of the militants who were recently killed by Iranian Forces in Sistan and Balochistan
Link


Syria-Lebanon-Iran
Anti-Iranian group Jaysh al-Adl (People's Fighters Front) released a new video from Sistan & Balochistan
2026-04-01


Jaish al-Adl ("Army of Justice" in Arabic, sometimes transliterated as Jaysh al-Adl) appeared in 2012 as a successor to the Salafist Balochi independence group Jundullah (Soldiers of God), which operates on both sides of the Pak-Iranian border but was based in Pakistan. The Pak branch has close relations with al-Qaeda and the Pak Talibs and is probably a false nose and mustache for Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, while the Iranian branch hangs out with Ansar Al-Furqan (Sistan-Balochistan) and Al Nusra (Syria), concentrates on attacking Iranian soldiers and police, and for some reason went after the Taliban in Afghanistan in early 2019.
Related:
Jaysh al-Adl: 2025-09-18 Jaish al-Adl killed a Commander of the IRGC-affiliated Basij militias in Iranshahr
Jaysh al-Adl: 2025-07-27 Five civilians, three gunmen Killed in 'terrorist' attack in Southeast Iran
Jaysh al-Adl: 2024-11-12 Five IRGC members killed in southeast Iran
Related:
Jaish al-Adl: 2026-01-12 Baloch armed group Mazaran-e-Gomnam Balochistan warns the Iranian regime it will attack if regime represses protests
Jaish al-Adl: 2025-09-23 Jaish al-Adl ambushed and killed three Iranian Police officers in Khash, Sistan and Balochistan.
Jaish al-Adl: 2025-09-18 Jaish al-Adl killed a Commander of the IRGC-affiliated Basij militias in Iranshahr
Link


Iraq
Airstrikes Target Iraq’s Disputed Territories and Sunni Heartland, Not the Shia-Dominated South
2026-03-22
[NationalContext] From Jurf al-Sakhar and Baghdad to al-Qaim, Mosul, Kirkuk, and Tuz Khurmatu, the strike campaign has widened sharply since late February. But even as it has expanded, it still concentrates on the militias’ forward military infrastructure in Iraq’s disputed north, western border belt, and Sunni heartland, while avoiding the deep southern Shia core where these factions retain their densest political and social base.

The expanding strike campaign against Iran-aligned militias in Iraq is not random. Even as the map has widened since late February, its geographic logic remains remarkably consistent. The attacks are still concentrated on militia deployments, headquarters, checkpoints, command nodes, and logistics infrastructure in Iraq’s northern, western, and disputed belts, while the deep Shia south remains outside the strike map.

By faction, Kataib Hezbollah and its linked structures appear to be the most heavily targeted militia family, especially through repeated strikes on its Brigade 45 network in Anbar, later hits on its linked Brigade 63 structures in Kirkuk and Salah al-Din, and additional Kataib Hezbollah-linked sites in Baghdad, Fallujah, Jurf al-Sakhar, and Tuz Khurmatu. It is followed by Hashd al-Shabak, or Quwat Sahl Nineveh, whose Brigade 30 positions across the Nineveh Plains came under repeated attack, and by Kataib Imam Ali, whose Brigade 40 was repeatedly struck across Kirkuk and Nineveh.

What the updated map shows is not a nationwide air war, but a calibrated one. The campaign has widened into Baghdad, Babil, and Wasit, and has touched a broader range of militias than in its first phase. But it still stops short of Basra, Maysan, Dhi Qar, Muthanna, Najaf, and Karbala. In other words, it is hitting the militias’ exposed operational arc, not their deepest political home ground.

THE GEOGRAPHY IS WIDENING, BUT NOT IN EVERY DIRECTION
The earlier phase of the campaign centered on places like Jurf al-Sakhar, Akashat, al-Qaim, Muqdadiya, Bartella, Qayyarah, Rashidiya, Dibis, and Baiji. The newer map adds repeated strikes in Baghdad, more sites in Salah al-Din and Kirkuk, and further pressure on the Mosul area, the Nineveh Plains, and the Syria-facing border zone in Anbar.

That expansion matters, but it has not erased the campaign’s underlying pattern. The militias being hit are still overwhelmingly deployed in mixed, militarized, or frontier spaces. That includes Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, Hashd al-Shabak, Kataib Imam Ali, Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, Ansar Allah al-Awfiya, Saraya al-Khorasani, Badr-linked formations, Turkmen PMF units, Kataib Jund al-Imam, Risaliyun, Fawj Amerli, Waad Allah, Kataib Babiliyoun, Haras Nainawa, Liwa Salah al-Din, and mixed PMF command structures.

Baghdad has now clearly entered the map. So have some central Iraqi belts. But widening is not the same as becoming nationwide. The strikes have edged into the capital and its approaches, but they still avoid the deep southern provinces where the militias’ political offices, patronage networks, leadership environments, and social base are strongest.

More at the link
Link


Syria-Lebanon-Iran
Baloch armed group Mazaran-e-Gomnam Balochistan warns the Iranian regime it will attack if regime represses protests
2026-01-12

Text:

TKD MONITORING:
The Iran-based Baloch armed group Mazaran-e-Gomnam Balochistan has issued a video message warning the Iranian regime that the group will start attacking Iranian security forces in Sistan-ve-Baluchestan, if the regime represses protests in the province.

The last attack claimed by the group occurred in October 2025 near Zahedan, setting fire to vehicles near water pipelines.

It should be noted that the group is not part of the newly established front Jabh-e Mobarezin-e Mardomi (JMM), which is led by Jaish al-Adl.
…successor since 2012 to the Salafist Baloch igroup Jundullah (Soldiers of God) .
Related:
Jaish al-Adl: 2025-09-23 Jaish al-Adl ambushed and killed three Iranian Police officers in Khash, Sistan and Balochistan.
Jaish al-Adl: 2025-09-18 Jaish al-Adl killed a Commander of the IRGC-affiliated Basij militias in Iranshahr
Jaish al-Adl: 2025-08-28 Iranian Police (FARAJA) raided Jaish al-Adl cells and killed Eight militants in the city of #Iranshahr (Sistan and Balochis
Link


Syria-Lebanon-Iran
Syria moves to reinstate defected officers, diplomats
2025-11-10
[Rudaw] Syria on Thursday announced it will begin reinstating thousands of volunteer officers who had defected during the era of longtime Syrian dictator Bashir Pencilneck al-Assad
Lord of the Baath...
, marking what officials say is a key step in rebuilding the country’s armed forces. The move comes only days after Damascus’s foreign ministry reinstated over 20 defected diplomats.

The state-run Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) quoted Brigadier General Badr al-Din Qassas, Director of Recruitment and Mobilization at the Ministry of Defense, as describing the decision to reinstate volunteer Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) "who defected from the army during the era of the former regime" as "a normal organizational procedure within the military institution, which began its reconstruction from scratch" following the fall of Assad.

Qassas explained that "immediately after the liberation, we began receiving defected officers and took the necessary steps to start the process of reintegrating volunteer NCOs who had previously defected back into the defense ministry."

He further estimated the defected NCOs at "over three thousand," while "more than two thousand defected officers have already been reinstated within the Syrian Arab Army formations."

The Syrian conflict, which erupted in 2011, was marked by a significant wave of high-ranking defections that dealt successive political, military and symbolic blows to Assad’s rule.

One of the most prominent political defections occurred in early August 2012, when then-prime minister Riyad Hijab defected after just two months in office, declaring that he could no longer serve a regime he described as one of "killing and terror."

The diplomatic corps also saw substantial erosion during the summer of 2012, with several senior envoys abandoning their posts. Among them were Nawaf al-Fares, Syria’s ambassador to Iraq, and Khaled al-Ayoubi, the chargé d’affaires in London.

A series of military defections coincided, including that of Colonel Riad al-Asaad, who went on to help lead the The Sick Man of Europe Turkey
...the occupiers of Greek Asia Minor...
-backed Free Syrian Army
... the more palatable version of the Syrian insurgency, heavily influenced by the Moslem Brüderbund...
(FSA) in its fight against Assad’s forces.

A pivotal moment came in July 2012 with the defection of Brigadier General Manaf Tlass, a senior officer in the Elite Republican Guard and a childhood friend of Assad. Later that year, in December, Major General Abdulaziz al-Shalal, head of the Syrian Military Police, announced his defection, denouncing the army’s transformation "into gangs of killing and destruction."

The senior defense official affirmed that "all NCOs will return to service with the ranks they held at the time of their defection from the former regime, under clearly defined standards for promotion."

Qassas confirmed that the NCOs are a "fundamental element in developing the army, due to the cumulative experience they possess, which contributes to building a professional army capable of defending Syria and safeguarding its security."

For his part, Assem Ghalyoun, Director of Media and Communication at the defense ministry, announced that the ministry "will soon begin accepting applications for the reinstatement of volunteer NCOs who defected during the era of the former regime."

Importantly, the push to reinstate NOCs comes only days after Syria’s Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani on Monday officially reinstated 21 diplomats who had defected from the Assad regime, according to SANA.

Shaibani praised the returnees for their "efforts in exposing the crimes of the defunct regime," stressing that the state seeks to build a nation where all citizens feel "security and belonging."

Director of the Diplomatic Institute at the Syrian foreign ministry, Yasser al-Jundi, remarked Monday that "the returning diplomats possess vast experience" and that "the ministry will benefit from their accumulated expertise."
Link


Israel-Palestine-Jordan
Multilayered War: Israel Bets on Gangs Terrorizing Gaza
2025-11-05
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Kirill Semenov

[REGNUM] At the beginning of November, the ceasefire in Gaza remains extremely fragile, and faith in its stability among the nearly two million residents of the besieged enclave continues to rapidly fade.

According to the Government Media Office in the Strip,
…ie. the Hamas office of propaganda…
as of November 2, the Israeli army committed 194 violations of the ceasefire agreement, which came into effect on October 10.
Goodness — who knew they could count that high?
These violations are systemic and multi-layered, including not only direct military operations that have led to massive civilian casualties, but also the deliberate blocking of humanitarian aid, which together create a real threat of a complete breakdown of the peace process and exacerbate the already catastrophic humanitarian situation in the enclave.
*shrug* The UN said they have three months’ supply on hand. Heaven only knows how much more is in Hamas’s overstuffed warehouses…
Despite the official declaration of a ceasefire, Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip continued, taking various forms, including direct attacks that claimed civilian lives.

On October 18,
…almost three weeks ago. What has that to do with today’s events?
an Israeli tank fired a shell at the Abu Shaaban family's car in the Zeitoun neighborhood. The direct hit killed 11 people, including women and children, who were simply checking on the condition of their abandoned homes, dreaming of a return to normal life.
Didn’t the IDF warn them not to return because it isn’t safe? Whose fault then is it, when they get caught in the crossfire?
The events of October 19 were particularly tragic and revealing, when Israeli aircraft launched a series of isolated, deadly strikes on various areas of the Gaza Strip, killing 45 people.
Those forty-five were Hamasniks and human shields, not proper civilians. But even proper civilians are not a protected category when they deliberately put themselves in a fire zone.
That same day, an attack on a group of civilians in the city of Zuwayda killed six people.

Almost simultaneously, a drone strike targeting a tent of displaced people north of Khan Younis killed a woman and two children who were seeking refuge from earlier fighting.
Again, human shields. Mr. Semenov doth protest much too much.
Two more people, including a journalist covering the aftermath of the conflict, were killed in the strike on western Zuwayda.

These tragic episodes were part of a bloody series of ceasefire violations that reached its horrific climax on October 28-29, when massive Israeli bombings killed around 100 people, turning hopes for peace into a new wave of mourning.
Hamas sent bodies that were not hostages. Israel took umbrage and hit Hamas targets.
Among the victims that night was Amin al-Zein, whose story particularly vividly exposed the brutality of what was happening. Just half an hour before his own death in a school strike
…all of the schools in Gaza, along with the mosques and hospitals, ae Hamas strongpoints, command and control spots, entries to the underground tunnel system, and/or weapons caches. In other words, legitimate targets…
in Beit Lahiya, he gave a heartfelt interview in which he earnestly urged people to return to their homes in northern Gaza, trusting in the safety and stability of the ceasefire.
Those who trust that Hamas will not again break the ceasefire and provoke an IDF military response are fools.
His fate became a bitter symbol of shattered hopes for thousands of Palestinians, who were once again deceived in their expectations of peace.

JUSTIFICATION TACTICS
These attacks were accompanied by a deliberate suspension of humanitarian aid deliveries, further exacerbating the suffering of the civilian population.

The violence takes many forms, with Israeli strikes regularly targeting critical civilian infrastructure and drones carrying out targeted killings, as happened on October 30, when a Palestinian was killed near a vegetable market in Shuja'iya.

The Israeli army justifies these operations by citing the need to protect its troops from threats, particularly those emanating from the so-called "Yellow Line"—a virtual boundary dividing the territory. However, in practice, their actions result in the deaths of civilians.
So Mr, Semenov demands that the Israelis bare their throats to the Hamas sword? Fuck that shit.
The current tactical situation has apparently given Israel the opportunity to more accurately identify and specifically target Hamas commanders, who have become less cautious under the ceasefire.
Precisely.
Every strike is justified—either by pretexts or military rationales.

According to an Israeli army statement, several battalion commanders of Hamas's military wing, the Al-Qassam Brigades, were killed in a series of operations, including strikes in late October. Among them were Abdullah al-Lidawi, commander of the Western Battalion in the Northern Gaza Brigade, and commander Hatim al-Qudra.

The Israeli command claimed that among the dead were three battalion commanders, two deputy battalion commanders and sixteen company commanders, indicating the scale and systematic nature of the operations carried out after the armistice.

Israel was able to achieve successes it had not enjoyed during the period of intense fighting by taking advantage of the fact that Hamas commanders had come out of hiding.

HUMANITARIAN BLOCKADE
The humanitarian consequences of Israel's violations are also multifaceted. Gaza authorities state that from October 10 to 31, 3,203 trucks were allowed into the Strip, representing only 24% of the 13,200 allowed under the deal.
And Hamas raided something like 80% of them, the UN admitted afterward, so who is at fault?
The Rafah crossing on the border with Egypt remains closed. This is blocking the evacuation of the wounded and further restricting the flow of aid.
Complain to Egypt. They refuse to take those people back, except the ones who can afford their very high fees.
Israel is also blocking the entry of heavy equipment needed to clear the rubble, which is estimated to contain some 9,500 bodies of Palestinians who have not yet been counted among the 68,500 dead in Gaza.
No. They ar blocking the Turks, who brought ghr heavy equipment, because Turkey has proved itself an enemy of Israel and an overt supporter of Hamas.
At the same time, equipment was allowed through to search for the remains of Israeli hostages, which demonstrates a selective approach to fulfilling humanitarian obligations.
Bith Israel and Hamas know where most of the hostqge bodies are, and that no heqvy equipment is needed to to obtain them. So why should Israel allow in tools intended for rebuilding Hamas’s war tunnel system?
The agreement protocol also called for the deployment of more than 300,000 tents and mobile homes for displaced families, but this never happened, leaving hundreds of thousands of people homeless and facing further suffering.

NETANYAHU'S THREATS
The political context only exacerbates the situation. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has made no secret of his skepticism about the ceasefire, has publicly stated that Hamas "pockets" still exist in areas controlled by the Israeli army in Rafah and Khan Yunis, and that they will be eliminated.

Although, with American mediation, an agreement was reached on the unimpeded withdrawal of these Hamas units from behind the “yellow line”.

Netanyahu insists that the destruction of Hamas is a key principle, and Israel will not deviate from it. This creates a constant threat of a resumption of full-scale hostilities.
Hamas is required first to turn over all hostages, whether living or dead, and second to lay down all their weapons and leave Gaza. Hamas refuses to accomplish either.
As a result, the ceasefire, which was supposed to be a bridge to peace,
…Hamas insists it can omly be a ceasefire of nore more than 3-5 years duration, so the bridge is already collapsed…
is turning into an instrument for maintaining permanent tension, where every violation leaves the Palestinians alone with a deepening humanitarian catastrophe, claiming more and more lives.
Hamas’s choice. Just like the PLO, they never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.
WAR WITHOUT FRONTS
It seems that the war in Gaza has not stopped, but has only changed, taking on more insidious and sophisticated forms.
You noticed that, too? How very clever.
The period of nominal truce has turned into a sluggish, but no less deadly, phase of the conflict, where death can await Palestinians at any moment and in the most unexpected place.

Danger has lost its clear frontal contours and has become completely unpredictable: it can come from the sky in the form of a sudden drone strike, seemingly aimed at one person but killing an entire family in the neighboring house; it can lurk around a bend in the road in the form of a shell fired at a car filled with civilians; it can fall on a tent in a refugee camp or on a bread line.
The Damoclean sword of violence is familiar to Israelis for the past generation, courtesy of the Palestinians. Why should they feel sorry for you?
This has created a state of permanent fear and psychological tension, in which people live in anticipation of an attack, with no safe zones or guarantees of tomorrow.

The armistice, which deprived the war of clear boundaries, made it in some ways even more inhuman, turning it into a routine of horror, where ordinary activities – a trip home, a walk through the market, children playing – became mortally risky.

This state of total unpredictability and permanent fear, in which death can overtake a person at any moment, is not just a side effect of war, but part of a calculated strategy.

While paralyzing society from within, Israel isn't limiting itself to mere periodic strikes and openly undermining the ceasefire. A parallel, equally calculated campaign is being waged, aimed at sowing social divisions in Gaza.

Its essence is to methodically erode Hamas's domestic support and pit Palestinians against each other. Various tactics are used to achieve this, including targeted funding and support for armed groups opposed to Hamas, to which Israel provides resources and carte blanche for destabilizing activities.

These groups, taking advantage of the security vacuum and general state of impunity, unleash localized wars for influence, plunder humanitarian aid, attempt to control it by turning it into an instrument of blackmail, and intimidate the population.

The ultimate goal of this multi-layered war is not just military victory, but the total disorganization of Palestinian society.

Israel appears to be seeking to create a persistent security and governance vacuum in Gaza, a chaotic situation in which any attempt to establish viable Palestinian institutions will be doomed to failure and the territory will remain fragmented and incapable of consolidation, depriving the Palestinian people not only of a present but also of a political future.

CLANS AND EXTREMISTS
In Gaza's complex pattern of armed fragmentation, where Palestinian militias and clan networks challenge Hamas's monopoly on power, groups directly supported by Israel play a particularly prominent role.

The most prominent figure among them is Yasser Abu Shabab, the leader of the so-called "Popular Forces." His group is implicated in the looting of humanitarian aid. Furthermore, among his associates are individuals whose ties to international terrorism have been reliably established.

In addition to Abu Shabab's criminal past, a former drug lord convicted of drug trafficking, his circle includes prominent supporters of the terrorist Islamic State*. Abu Shabab himself was only able to escape from prison due to Israeli strikes in late 2023.

One of the Popular Forces' commanders is 33-year-old Issam Nabahin, who previously fought for ISIS* in Sinai. He was reportedly sentenced to death for his crimes in 2023 but managed to escape from prison before his execution. Another prominent member of the group, Ghassan al-Daini, pledged allegiance to ISIS* in 2015 and was previously involved in the kidnapping of BBC News journalist Alan Johnston in 2007.

Despite this, Israel provides Abu Shabaab with comprehensive support. Its militants operate from a fortified base in the Israeli army-controlled area of ​​Rafah, from where they freely trespass and rob humanitarian convoys entering through the Kerem Shalom crossing.

This "activity" was officially documented by the UN. According to a UN memorandum, Abu Shabaab was identified as "the main influential figure behind the widespread and organized looting" of humanitarian aid.

The memo also concludes that criminal groups "may benefit from passive, if not active, favor or protection from the Israeli military," which is a direct accusation against Israel for supporting groups engaged in robbery.

Israel, in turn, continues to accuse Hamas of stealing humanitarian aid.

Another key Israeli "partner" in Gaza is the powerful Dogmush clan, whose feud with Hamas has lasted since the 1980s. This clan has a long history of involvement with jihadist groups.

Its historical leader, Mumtaz Doghmush, founder of the Army of Islam, publicly pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (ISIS)* in 2015.

Despite documented ties to one of the most radical groups in the world, Israel directly approached the clan with a proposal for cooperation. As the current head of the clan, Nizar Dogmush, confirmed, Israeli officials offered to take control of the humanitarian zone in Gaza City in exchange for logistical support, including arms and food supplies.

"The Israelis wanted us to take charge of the humanitarian zone in Gaza City, so that we could recruit as many of our family members as possible, and they would provide logistical support - weapons, food and housing," he said.

Alongside the Popular Forces and the Dogmush clan, a number of other armed groups operate in Gaza, creating a complex web of opposing forces. In the northern part of the Strip, the Popular Army's Northern Forces, led by Ashraf al-Mansi, operate. Like Abu Shabab's forces, they claim to be anti-Hamas and, according to sources, employ a similar model of interaction with the Israeli army.

Hussam al-Astal's "Counter-Terrorism Strike Force" has gained a foothold in the Khan Yunis area, openly declaring cooperation with Israel and Western countries, confirming that his fighters receive logistical assistance, water, and electricity from the Israeli army.

Furthermore, traditional clans—the Hellis, Hanidaq, Jundiya, and Abu Werda—are also playing a role in this confrontation. Some of their members have formed joint militias, such as the Shuja'iya Popular Defense Forces, which, according to Israeli media, receive logistical support and salaries from Israel through the Palestinian Authority. However, the leaders of these clans often distance themselves from the armed factions, describing them as "out of control."

Hamas, for its part, conducts large-scale military operations against gangs and identifies individuals collaborating with Israel. The movement's effectiveness becomes especially evident in situations where Israeli cover is weakened.

Figures like Yasser Abu Shabab can only operate under the direct protection of the Israeli army at their bases. Hamas staged several assassination attempts against him, and Abu Shabab was saved only by direct military intervention by the Israeli military.

Following violent clashes in the Sabra area, where Hamas deployed hundreds of fighters in the stronghold of the Dogmush clan, the movement demonstrated its ability to carry out targeted and powerful military actions and retake control of territory.

When Israeli troops retreated from certain areas, supporters of pro-Israeli clans were immediately deprived of cover, found themselves under threat of extermination, and were forced to seek reconciliation with Hamas, which quickly reasserted its control over these territories.

QUESTIONABLE STRENGTH
Thus, Israel's support for figures like Yasser Abu Shabab and clans like the Dogmush, with their historical ties to ISIS*, is a modern incarnation of the old colonial strategy of divide and rule.

The goal is to sow chaos and division among the Palestinians, making the restoration of unified governance in Gaza impossible. Prime Minister Netanyahu has publicly acknowledged this policy, claiming that the "activation" of Palestinian clans "saves the lives of IDF soldiers."

However, as experience shows, Hamas retains sufficient control, resources, and resolve to suppress the activities of collaborators. For now, these groups exist only thanks to direct military cover from Israel, and their real ability to challenge Hamas in the long term remains questionable.

Link


Syria-Lebanon-Iran
Jaish al-Adl killed a Commander of the IRGC-affiliated Basij militias in Iranshahr
2025-09-18
[X]

Jaish al-Adl ("Army of Justice" in Arabic, sometimes transliterated as Jaysh al-Adl) appeared in 2012 as a successor to the Salafist Balochi independence group Jundullah (Soldiers of God), which operates on both sides of the Pak-Iranian border but was based in Pakistan. The Pak branch has close relations with al-Qaeda and the Pak Talibs and is probably a false nose and mustache for Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, while the Iranian branch hangs out with Ansar Al-Furqan (Sistan-Balochistan) and Al Nusra (Syria), concentrates on attacking Iranian soldiers and police, and for some reason went after the Taliban in Afghanistan in early 2019.
Related:
Jaish al-Adl: 2025-08-28 Iranian Police (FARAJA) raided Jaish al-Adl cells and killed Eight militants in the city of #Iranshahr (Sistan and Balochis
Jaish al-Adl: 2025-08-26 'Jaish al-Adl' carried out several ambushes against Iranian Police officers in Iranshahr (Sistan and Balochistan).
Jaish al-Adl: 2025-08-25 'Jaish al-Adl' militants ambushed and killed Iranian Police officers in Iranshahr (Sistan and Balochistan).
Related:
Jundallah: 2024-05-31 'The people who control the country.' How Afghanistan has changed under the Taliban
Jundallah: 2024-01-19 Iran and Pakistan exchanged missile strikes. What to expect next
Jundallah: 2024-01-17 Iran strikes Pakistan killing two children
Related:
Ansar Al-Furqan: 2025-09-16 Ansar Al-Furqan released videos of the militants who were recently killed by Iranian Forces in Sistan and Balochistan
Ansar Al-Furqan: 2023-04-21 IRGC says it thwarted ''Army of Justice'' Plot, seized weapon cache
Ansar Al-Furqan: 2022-12-18 Trouble in Iran: An interview with Jaish al-ʿAdl of Baluchestân
Related:
Jaysh al-Adl: 2025-07-27 Five civilians, three gunmen Killed in 'terrorist' attack in Southeast Iran
Jaysh al-Adl: 2024-11-12 Five IRGC members killed in southeast Iran
Jaysh al-Adl: 2024-09-14 Three killed in Baluchi militants attack in southwest Iran
Link


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